AUGMENTED INTELLIGENCE TRAUMAS
https://library.oapen.org/.../978-3-95796-066-5-Alleys_of_Your_Mind.pdf · PDF fileAlleys of Your Mind: Augmented Intelligence and Its Traumas. ... Augmented Intelligence and Its Traumas
It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Thursday, August 05, 2021
PROJECT CYBERSYN
Tuesday, June 01, 2021
by Vilius Petkauskas
29 May 2021
in Editorial

Data processing workers with a Bulgarian ISOT EC 1035 in 1981.
First in space, Venus and Mars, the USSR did not lack engineering prowess. Why then, a revolution in personal computing happened westward of the Iron Curtain? Ideology played a role, of course, but computers were also just not cool enough.
Long before computers became phones, cameras, or TVs, their primary purpose was war. The power to calculate missile trajectories, nuclear impacts, and resource distribution within hours instead of months was, and still is, a crucial advantage over an enemy.
People in charge of the USSR were fully aware that the British and the Americans employed artificial machines to do their math for them. The official line on cybernetics was hostile, and computer science was denounced as ‘dehumanizing capitalism.’ Secretly, however, catching up was in full swing.

In 1962, President Kennedy’s top aid warned that if the Soviets manage to turn things around, ‘by 1970, the USSR may have a radically new production technology’ with self-teaching computers and concluded that without a change in pace on the American side ‘we are finished.’
As we now know very well, that did not materialize. So much so that there’s hardly anyone able to name at least a single Soviet computer brand. Understanding the benefits computing provides, it seems exceptionally odd.
According to Slava Gerovitch, science historian and director of the Program for Research In Mathematics, Engineering, and Science (PRIMES) at MIT, the history of computing in the USSR happened in waves. Computers were frowned upon, loved, and distrusted in 40 years.
“Many people in the Soviet Union were suspicious of the government. So, when cybernetics became popular and was approved officially, people started to think that maybe there’s something wrong with it,” Gerovitch told CyberNews.
I sat down with Gerovitch to discuss how ideology might have affected the cyber race, how different Soviet computing was, and why the said socialist revolutionaries did not champion the digital revolution that benefited the West so much.
Many people in the Soviet Union were suspicious of the government. So, when cybernetics became popular and was approved officially, people started to think that maybe there’s something wrong with it,Slava Gerovitch.
Looking back at the early days of the Cold War, the Soviet Union seemingly had technical capabilities to be on par with the United States. I’m talking about the rapid development of the atomic bomb, advanced aviation, and space capabilities. Would it be unreasonable to assume that the Soviets were not far behind the US, at least early on in terms of computing?
The first electronic digital computers were built in the US for the atomic bomb calculations in the mid-forties. The Soviets learned about them and started constructing their own. So, there was a definitive lag from the start.
With rocket development, the Soviets learned a lot from German scientists, so there was some technology transfer. There was a lot of ingenuity on the Soviet side, of course, but the Russians appropriated new technology, developed it, and improved it.
Also, the process of launching new technological initiatives was very different from the US. In the States, the military would present a problem and open funding for qualified academics to submit proposals to solve the problem using that funding. In the Soviet case, it was a top-down decision to assign someone to work on an issue.
So, there was little competition. Later on, as competition emerged when they had established institutions, there was competition among institutions, even in the Soviet system. But in the 1940s, like the work of Sergey Lebedev in Kyiv on the first Soviet electronic digital computer, the MESM machine, was initially his own initiative.

Essentially, using the resources he had personally under his control as director of the Institute of Electric Technology in Kyiv. It took a while before the proponents of electronic digital computers won the argument with the proponents of an analog computer in the Soviet Union and could get resources to launch a massive project of building a large electronic digital computer.
So even though the Soviets had had an Institute established for the development of large computers in 1948, initially, the champions of analog computer computers controlled the institute.
For two years, that Institute had had lots of resources. Still, they pulled all those resources into analog computing, and only in 1950, the proponents of electronic digital computing won that argument.
What you said paints a picture that there was a path dependency that started from the initial lag. Is it correct to assume this? Meaning the Soviets were always catching up instead of leading the race in computing?
In one sense, yes. The Soviets already knew that the Americans and the British had working machines, whereas they were trying to build the machines. But they did not know many details about the Western machines. So, they had a fair amount of room for their own invention rather than just coping Western machines. There was some room for interesting, genuine developments.
Cybernetics became a victim of the entire ideological campaign by Soviet journalists, ideologues, and people who are not in any way connected with actual computer development,Slava Gerovitch.
In your book From Newspeak to Cyber-speak, you talk about the Soviet refusal to accept cybernetics. You discuss how the computer in the Soviet Union was taken as a ‘giant calculator’ while the Americans saw it as a ‘giant brain.’ How did that ideological strain limit Soviet advances in computing, if they did at all?
There were two parallel developments. On one side, electronics engineers were working on new calculating machines for the military. This was a respectable activity, with a high priority for the defense industry, meaning the military provided necessary resources.
A parallel development, totally independent of this, was an ideological campaign in the Soviet media against all sorts of ideological targets in the West associated with American imperialism. That included academic theories developed in the West, including cybernetics.
Cybernetics became a victim of the ideological campaign by Soviet journalists, ideologues, and people who were not in any way connected with actual computer developments.
It became clear to the Soviet engineers who were working on computers that they should not in any way associate their work on computers with ‘tainted’ cybernetics. That led to engineers talking about their work as purely technical. Computers were essentially large calculators rather than machines capable of performing a thinking function. That would have put them in danger of being linked with ideologically tainted cybernetics.
While this helped them avoid ideological attacks, it limited their vision for applications of computers. They preferred not to seek contact with scientists working in various fields who might’ve used those computers for running computer simulations to advance other scientific disciplines. The need to avoid ideological complications led to the limited area of applications of computers in this initial period in the early 1950s.

Another factor, maybe even more important, was that computers were available only in defense institutions. So, scientists who could have used computers for simulations either didn’t know about those computers or didn’t have access to them. In essence, engineers were not interested in attracting users from the academy.
That ideological lag ties into the fact that by the late ’70s, the Americans witnessed a revolution in personal computing, while the Soviets could not meet the same speed of change. The Americans had Commodore, TRS, Apple, and all other sorts of machines. There wasn’t anything of that sort in the USSR up until 1983. Does it mean that ideology hindered the spread of computers in the Soviet Union?
The ideological complications with cybernetics and the applications of computers beyond pure calculation ended in the mid-50s when cybernetics was rehabilitated. Instead, it was pictured as a communist science. At that time, it became ideologically very beneficial to be associated with cybernetics.
Cybernetics was mentioned in the 1961 program of the Communist Party. It became ideologically acceptable to use computers for symbol processing and computer simulations. Naturally, scientists were very interested in using computers. And it was a very popular field from the mid-50s to the early-70s.
So, the cybernetics campaign of the ’50s did not have a long-term negative effect. There were other factors at play. By the early to mid-70s, the popularity of cybernetics began to look overreaching, claims started to seem too general, there were too many promises with little to show for it.
Skepticism began to creep in among serious scientists about those early claims of the usefulness of computers. There also was skepticism because cybernetics became ideologically correct. Many people in the Soviet Union were suspicious of the government. So, when cybernetics became popular and was approved officially, people started to think that maybe there’s something wrong with it.
That way cybernetics became a term associated with government-imposed efficiency-oriented control and not with novelty and reform in the sciences. That was particularly evident in economics, where people saw computers being used at various factories to control information and monitor people’s performance more effectively.
\\By the early to mid-70s, the popularity of cybernetics began to look overreaching, claims started to seem too general, there were too many promises with little to show,Slava Gerovitch.
Focusing on personal computing, other factors were at play. Computers are communication devices. You can easily store, transfer, copy, print, and distribute information. That means a computer is a tool for autonomous communication, not controlled by the suspicious government. Therefore, the Soviet government was not terribly keen for personal computers to get into many people’s hands.
Another thing was that PC manufacturing requires a consumer-focused industry which was not a priority for the Soviet Union. So, the quality of parts and components that were produced was not high. Take the Soviet automobile: when you bought one, the first thing you did was starting to fix it.
It was the same with computers. You had to be an engineer to use it. The very concept of personal computing in the West was that it was for general consumers, not necessarily computer scientists or engineers. There were very different environments in which PCs were introduced and to very different audiences.
However, something did change during the mid-80s. With Perestroika, there was an explosion of Soviet-made PCs. Some models were even meant for export. Can the change be linked only to policy changes, or have the Soviet Union increased its technological capabilities?
With Perestroika, the government controls on small economic activity became looser. People could import computers from the West, and suddenly people were allowed to resell computers from the Western countries. They could also buy spare parts in the West, assemble their computers, or assemble their own devices out of Soviet-made parts.
There was room for less controlled economic activity that somewhat met the popular demand for PCs. With less control over communications, people started exchanging emails with the outside world. The need for communication devices and information processing devices rose, and it was met by import and local manufacturing.

But with the general decline of the Soviet industry and the early post-Soviet period, when the government stopped subsidizing prices, the production collapsed very quickly. From then on, Russia essentially relied on foreign-produced personal computers.
Earlier, you’ve mentioned the divergence in technology development and the notion of cybernetics developing independently from Western ideas. Are there any Soviet contributions to computing that still are noticeable today? For people born after the Soviet Union collapsed, it’s very easy to think that no innovation came from the USSR.
There were some interesting innovations by Soviet computer engineers and software developers. Some of them were the results of necessity and scarcity of parts when the Soviets had to solve complex problems with minimal technological resources. So, they tried to invent new computer architectures that might be more efficient than traditional ones.
For example, our usual computers have zeros and ones, two states for each cell in computer memory. But in the fifties, the Soviets developed three-value machines. This required a different type of programming, a different kind of software. It was a much more efficient use of computer resources.
Also, the Soviets had a tradition of very efficient programming in low-level computer languages, which required many mathematical skills in designing efficient algorithms. Working with low-level computer languages, essentially machine codes, assembler codes, allowed programmers to use computer resources very efficiently. However, it was a very challenging mathematical and logical task to write those programs, debug them, and so forth. It requires a lot of expertise from programmers.
The Soviet programmers are also well-known since, in those early years, they were able to pack compelling and efficient programs into computers that had very little memory. Due to efficient programming, the Soviets were able to solve the problems they needed.
Saturday, October 25, 2025
October 24, 2025
By Dr. Azly Rahman
Introduction: The Cybernating Nation in a Globalized World
In the contemporary landscape of globalization and post-industrialism, the concept of a “cybernating nation” emerges as a critical lens for understanding how developing societies integrate advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs), particularly the Internet and telematics, into their socio-political and economic fabrics. Cybernation refers not merely to technological adoption but to a profound cybernetic reconfiguration of societal structures, where feedback loops between human agency, institutional power, and digital networks redefine national trajectories.
This essay expands upon a series of interconnected theses to explore the multifaceted implications of cybernation. Drawing from center-periphery dynamics, complexity theory, structuralism, and resistance paradigms, it argues that cybernation accelerates both integration into global systems and internal contestations of power, ultimately eroding traditional notions of sovereignty while fostering new forms of enculturalized discourse. These transformations, best illuminated through postmodern lenses, reveal the tensions between hegemony and subaltern agency in an increasingly wired world.
“The Enduring Grip of Center-Periphery Dynamics in Cybernation”
At the heart of cybernation lies the persistent center-periphery pattern of development, a framework originating from dependency theory that posits global economic and cultural flows as radiating from core (developed) nations to peripheral (developing) ones. In a globalized post-industrialist world, the development of a cybernating nation will continue to follow, to a degree or another, this center-periphery pattern.
Peripheral nations, eager to harness ICTs for economic leapfrogging, often replicate the infrastructural and ideological blueprints of the center—adopting Western-modeled digital platforms, data protocols, and innovation hubs—while reaping asymmetric benefits. For instance, investments in fiber-optic networks or the 5G rollout in nations like India or Kenya mirror Silicon Valley’s ecosystems but serve primarily to funnel data and labor to global corporations, perpetuating unequal exchange.
This pattern extends to the macro-level contestations of power, where hegemony between cybernating and fully cybernated nations defines global hierarchies. Fully cybernated centers, such as the United States or China, exert a gravitational pull through proprietary algorithms and standards, compelling peripherals to align or risk obsolescence. At the micro-level, however, power fractures along domestic lines, with contending political parties or groups vying for control over cybernetic resources—be it spectrum allocation or digital surveillance tools. Thus, cybernation does not dismantle center-periphery asymmetries but amplifies them, channeling peripheral creativity toward emulative models of success.
Complementing this, globalization theory underscores how creative consciousness in cybernating nations becomes centralized in business and the arts, patterned after triumphant global corporations. Entrepreneurial ecosystems in peripheral hubs, from Bangalore’s tech parks to Nairobi’s Silicon Savannah, cultivate a cosmopolitan ethos that prizes innovation and branding, often at the expense of indigenous epistemologies. This centralization fosters a hybrid cultural economy where local artisans collaborate with multinational firms, yet the fruits of such creativity—intellectual property and market access—flow disproportionately outward, reinforcing peripheral dependence.
“Complexity, Nationalism, and the Semantic Reconfiguration of Cybernetics”
Traditional historical materialism, with its linear dialectics of class struggle and productive forces, falters in explicating cybernation’s nonlinear trajectories. A purely historical materialist conception of change cannot fully explain why nations cybernate; the more a nation gets “wired,” the more complex the interplay between nationalism and internationalism becomes. Cybernation introduces emergent properties—unpredictable feedback loops where digital connectivity amplifies both centrifugal (globalizing) and centripetal (nationalist) forces. In complex systems, small inputs, such as viral social media campaigns, can cascade into regime-shifting upheavals, as seen in the Arab Spring, where Twitter’s algorithms intertwined local grievances with transnational solidarity.
This complexity manifests semantically and structurally, where the enculturalization of “cybernetics” itself becomes a battleground. The more a nation transforms itself cybernetically, the more extensive the enculturalization and transformation of the term “cybernetics” will be. Borrowed from Norbert Wiener’s foundational work on control and communication, “cybernetics” evolves from a technical term into a culturally laden signifier—recast in peripheral contexts as “digital sovereignty” in Russia or “jugaad tech” in India, blending foreign precision with local improvisation.
Structuralist semiotics reveals how these shifts in signifiers alter signified realities, embedding cybernetic logic into everyday discourses of governance, education, and identity. The political economy of this linguistic transformation is pivotal: the extent of the enculturalization of the concept of “cybernetics” will determine the speed at which a nation will be fully integrated into the global production-house of the telematics industry. Nations that swiftly domesticate cybernetic jargon—through policy glossaries, educational curricula, or media narratives—accelerate value-chain insertion, attracting foreign direct investment in data centers and AI hubs. Conversely, linguistic resistance, such as vernacular tech lexicons in non-English-dominant peripherals, can delay integration, preserving pockets of autonomous innovation but risking isolation from global standards.
Cybernation intersects with authoritarianism in profound ways, where regime strength dictates the scope and velocity of digital transformation. The stronger the authority of the regime, the greater the control and magnitude of the cybernating process. In a cybernating nation, authority can reside in the political will of a single individual or in a strong political entity, consequently producing the author’s “regime of truth,” to borrow Foucault’s phrase. Charismatic leaders in nations like Turkey under ErdoÄŸan or the Philippines under Duterte have weaponized cybernetic tools—state-controlled firewalls and algorithmic propaganda—to consolidate power, crafting digital panopticons that monitor and mold public consent. This “regime of truth” naturalizes cybernation as an extension of sovereign will, masking its extractive undercurrents.
Yet, this centralization begets resistance, particularly as the Internet undermines state monopolies on narrative production. The advent of the Internet in a developing nation signifies the genesis of the erosion of the power of government-controlled print media. Universal access to the Internet will determine the total erosion of government-produced print media.
Subaltern voices will replace Grand Narratives. In cybernating peripherals, where state broadcasters once disseminated monolithic ideologies, platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram democratize discourse, amplifying marginalized groups—from indigenous activists in Bolivia to urban youth in Nigeria. This withering of the nation-state’s communicative hegemony fosters polyphonic publics, where Grand Narratives of progress yield to fragmented, user-generated counter-stories.
Resistance centralizes critical consciousness in arenas of political mobilization and personal expression, modeled after successful Internet-based groups. Emulating tactics from global movements like #MeToo or Black Lives Matter, cybernating citizens repurpose social media for hashtag activism, doxxing corrupt officials, or coordinating flash protests. The more the government suppresses voices of political dissent, the more the Internet is used to affect political transformations. Suppression—via shutdowns or troll farms—paradoxically catalyzes circumvention, with VPNs and dark web forums becoming tools of subversion, turning digital repression into a feedback loop of escalating defiance.
“Imperialism, Deep-Structuring, and the Threat to Sovereignty”
Modern imperialism permeates cybernation, where external ideologies steer internal mutations. The fundamental character of a nation will be significantly altered with the institutionalization of the Internet as a tool of cybernating change. The source of change will, however, be ideologically governed by external influences, which will ultimately threaten the sovereignty of the nation-state. Platforms engineered in the Global North—Google, Meta, Tencent—impose neoliberal logics of surveillance capitalism, reshaping peripheral subjectivities from communal to consumerist. This neo-colonialism manifests in data sovereignty disputes, where peripheral governments enact laws like India’s Data Protection Bill, only to negotiate concessions with imperial tech giants.
At deeper levels, discourse embeds these shifts in language, eroding indigenous cores. The discourse of change, as evident in the phenomena of cybernation, is embedded in language. The more a foreign concept is introduced, adopted, assimilated, and enculturalized, the more the nation will lose its indigenous character built via schooling and other means of citizenship enculturalization processes. School curricula infused with STEM jargon supplant traditional cosmologies, while algorithmic biases in education apps perpetuate Anglocentric worldviews. This deep-structuring—akin to Gramscian hegemony—subtly supplants national mythologies with globalized cybernetic myths, hollowing out cultural sovereignty.
Conclusion: “Embracing Postmodern Paradigms for Cybernetic Inquiry”
Ultimately, comprehending cybernation demands paradigms attuned to flux and multiplicity. Postmodernist perspectives of social change—discourse theory, semiotics, and chaos/complexity theory—rather than those of structural-functionalists, Marxists, or neo-Marxists, can best explain the structure and consequences of cybernetic changes. Where structural-functionalism views society as equilibrated systems and Marxism as deterministic base-superstructure dialectics, postmodernism captures the rhizomatic, non-linear sprawl of cybernetic networks: discourses that fractalize power, signs that mutate meanings, and chaotic attractors that birth emergent resistances. In cybernating nations, these lenses reveal not inevitable decline but creative potentials—hybrids of center and periphery, authority and dissent—that could redefine global orders. As peripherals wire deeper into the digital mesh, the challenge lies in harnessing cybernation for endogenous futures, lest it consummate the very imperialisms it ostensibly disrupts.
Dr. Azly Rahman grew up in Johor Bahru, Malaysia and holds a Columbia University (New York City) doctorate in International Education Development and Masters degrees in six fields of study: Education, International Affairs, Peace Studies, Communication, Creative Non-Fiction, and Fiction Writing. He has written 10 books and more than 500 analyses/essays on Malaysia. His 35 years of teaching experience in Malaysia and the United States spans over a wide range of subjects, from elementary to graduate education. He is a frequent contributor to scholarly online forums in Malaysia, the USA, Greece, and Montenegro. He also writes in Across Genres: https://azlyrahman.substack.com/about
Wednesday, September 04, 2024
How zebrafish map their environment
Spatial orientation mechanisms surprisingly similar to our own
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
image:
A tracking microscop follows the zebrafish during their natural behaviour.
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Credit: Jean-Claude Winkler/MPI for Biological Cybernetics
Researchers are turning to zebrafish to unlock the secrets of place cells, which play a crucial role in forming mental maps of space, social networks, and abstract relationships. Until now, place cells have only been found in mammals and birds, leaving the question of how other species internally represent the external world largely unanswered. A team of researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics has now found the first compelling evidence for place cells in the brain of the tiny larval zebrafish.
When we explore an unfamiliar city, we use various cues – landmarks, a sense of how far we have walked in one direction, perhaps a river we cannot cross – to create an internal map of our environment. Deep in the brain, in a structure called the hippocampus, a set of place cells play a key role in building our internal maps of the external world. These place cells fire when we are at specific locations in space and can self-organize into an array of different mental maps.
That much is known for mammals, including humans, and even for birds. However, the existence of place cells in other species is controversial. A group of researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics in Tübingen (Germany), led by Jennifer Li and Drew Robson, has now found the first conclusive evidence for place cells in zebrafish.
Recording the entire brain during natural behaviour
The researchers recorded the brain activity of young zebrafish as they explored their environment. These fish are completely transparent when they are only a few days old, making it possible to look into their tiny brains, which contain only 100,000 cells. One can even make individual active neurons light up using fluorescent calcium indicators, since all neuronal activity is associated with fluctuations in calcium ion concentrations. An earlier key invention of Li and Robson was essential for observing brain activity during navigation: tracking microscopes that move with the freely swimming fish.
Using this experimental design, the team analysed what spatial information is encoded in each neuron in the fish's brain. They identified a population of about 1000 place cells in each fish, most of which only fire when the animal is in a specific location, while a few respond to more than one area. “Collectively, the place cell population encodes spatial information,” explains Jennifer Li. “From the firing patterns of the place cells, we were able to decode the location of each fish over time – with an error of just a few millimetres.”
Strikingly, most of the place cells were located in the telencephalon, an area of the zebrafish’s forebrain, whose precise function has been a source of debate for several decades. “The high concentration of place cells in the telencephalon potentially confirms the longstanding conjecture that this brain region is a functional analogue of the mammalian hippocampus, in miniature,” comments Drew Robson.
A flexible mechanism that integrates different inputs
However, Li and Robson needed additional evidence to conclude that the cells they had identified were indeed an analogue to mammalian place cells. The first feature to be tested was whether place cells use self-motion or external cues. In terms of human experience, a cue such as "I’ve been walking straight ahead at a brisk pace for about a minute" relies on self-motion, whereas "I can see the Eiffel Tower" is an external cue. In a series of experiments, the researchers manipulated both sources of information – taking the fish out of their environment and placing them back, removing landmarks, or rotating the behavioural chamber. They found that the fish integrate both external and self-motion cues to create their internal maps – just like we do.
Not only do the fish appear to refine their spatial representation map as they become more familiar with an unfamiliar environment, but they can also adapt to change: they use the same neuronal circuits to remember a second environment. When returned to their initial surroundings, they do not have to map it from scratch, but can partially recover the representation map they created previously. Thus, the place cell population exhibits a flexible memory system, a further hallmark of mammalian place cells.
An emerging model organism for a complex neuronal network
The authors of the study plan to use zebrafish as a new model organism to unravel the mysteries of place cells. In addition to their role in creating mental maps of space, these cells are also crucial for forming maps of social networks and abstract relationships, as well as for memory and planning. While mammalian place cells have been intensively investigated since their Nobel Prize-winning discovery more than 50 years ago, scientists still do not fully understand the neural networks that generate place cells or how they support such a wide range of mental functions.
The primary challenge has been the sheer complexity and size of mammalian place cell networks, which make it extremely difficult to study the entire network simultaneously. In contrast, the larval zebrafish brain is one of the smallest biological systems capable of generating place cells. Robson concludes: “Using this new minimal model, future studies can potentially trace all of the inputs to each place cell and create detailed models for how place cells acquire all their unique properties.”
A behavioral chamber under the tracking microscope
Credit
Jean-Claude Winkler/MPI for Biological Cybernetics
Journal
Nature
Article Title
A population code for spatial representation in the zebrafish telencephalon.
Article Publication Date
28-Aug-2024






