By Eanna Mackey
September 17, 2024
September 17, 2024
CEPA
Thirty years after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains deeply divided. It hopes to join the EU, but how will rising ethnic tensions and the risk of conflict affect the process?
Thirty years after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains deeply divided. It hopes to join the EU, but how will rising ethnic tensions and the risk of conflict affect the process?
Across the ancient city of Sarajevo, building facades stand as silent monuments to the relentless siege that once gripped the Bosnian capital, their surfaces still etched with the marks of bullets and shrapnel, like the scars of wounds that won’t heal.
Scattered along the cobbled streets lie the “Sarajevo Roses” — crimson-stained craters that show where mortar shells once fell, leaving behind splashes of red resin-like bloodstains frozen in time.
They are just two of the city’s perpetual reminders of the war that shook the Western Balkans and Europe to its core from 1992-95. While life has moved on, these daily prompts act as reminders that the possibility of destruction and death still linger.
The war ended after 100,000 deaths and some of the worst violence seen in Europe since World War II. In its place came a fragile peace, leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina divided not only by its ethnic split between Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats but also politically and functionally.
Today it is two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shared between Bosniaks and Croats, and Republika Srpska, a predominantly Serb autonomous republic. An EU-led peacekeeping force, EUFOR, continues to help.
The complex governance structure, installed by Dayton and designed to prevent further conflict, has been fertile ground for ethnic divisions to fester, bringing back memories of the build-up to war. At the same time, political stagnation and corruption have become endemic.
“Tensions today are as bad as they were when we were entering the 90s, the politically driven narratives, the hatred, the distrust amongst people is back because the rhetoric of some politicians is very aggressive,” said Leila Bičakčić, a Sarajevo-based investigative journalist who co-founded the Center for Investigative Reporting, an independent news source set up to counter disinformation. She has also worked for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE.)
These tensions have repeatedly been inflamed by Milorad Dodik, the ultra-nationalist leader of Republika Srpska. An ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, to whom he once awarded a state medal for “patriotic care and love,” Dodik has served in various political roles since the end of the war. He openly discusses the possibility of Republika Srpska seceding from the federation to re-join a greater Serbia, collapsing Dayton and potentially reigniting the war.
Dodik’s links with Russia have exacerbated existing tensions considerably, especially since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The Bosnian-Serb leader openly endorsed Putin’s position and refused to join Western sanctions against Moscow. In response, Russia has provided Dodik with vast financial support, while also training and heavily arming the Republika Srpska police forces.
More worrying is that Russian mercenaries now train Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, with experts saying that Moscow is attempting to leverage instability in the Balkans to maintain its influence while weakening NATO and the EU.
Dodik’s inflammatory rhetoric and persistent threats to break away have led to numerous US sanctions. He has publicly denied the Srebrenica genocide, in which more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were murdered by Serb forces. He has regularly sought to undermine state institutions, and recently decided to celebrate the highly controversial and outlawed Serb National Day.
In late August, Dodik publicly stated near Banja Luka that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not represent the identity of the people of Republika Srpska. He then went on to say that any threats made regarding the property or rights of the Serb Republic would be met immediately with a decision for independence.
Amidst these mounting tensions, enhanced EUFOR military training drills throughout September have been seen as a show of strength by the EU and the West in their efforts to ensure peace in the region.
The rising tide of separatism and nationalism in Republika Srpska is not happening in isolation. It enjoys strong support from Belgrade and Moscow with growing influence from China as they seek to expand their influence over the Western Balkans. The international community has condemned Dodik’s actions, but decisive action to counter him and his rhetoric has not yet been taken.
Amid this ongoing instability, the prospect of EU membership is seen as a way to move beyond the ethnic divisions. However, Bosnia’s accession relies on its ability to enact widespread reforms in governance, law, and state institutions, and the country’s fragmented political landscape, exacerbated by Dodik’s actions, is making this difficult, if not impossible.
In late 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted candidate status for EU membership. But the EU’s reluctance to impose stronger sanctions on Republika Srpska, or to exert more pressure on Dodik, has led to claims that the bloc is not fully committed to Bosnia’s integration.
“The EU is trying to act as if none of these issues are their concern,” said Bičakčić. “They need to change their approach and send a very clear message because the Western Balkans is a massive security risk for Europe and it needs to be handled very carefully.”
As Bosnia and Herzegovina approaches 30 years of peace, it again finds itself at a critical juncture. The path towards EU integration offers hope, but is littered with challenges. The choices made in the coming years will determine whether or not it can finally overcome the ethnic divisions that have long plagued it.
If not, the same forces of hatred and division that fueled one of Europe’s darkest chapters may rule again.
Eanna Mackey is a reporter based in Ireland with a background in geopolitics and economics. He has worked as a freelance on post-conflict stories in both Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he was an ICFJ Investigative Fellow in 2024.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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