Iran's technical collaboration with IAEA targets to resolve issues - Iranian FM

Nuclear Program Materials

 8 May 2024
Elnur Baghishov

BAKU, Azerbaijan, May 8. Iran is trying to solve problems with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) not by political pressure but via technical cooperation, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian told reporters, Trend reports.

According to him, there are important issues for cooperation between Iran and the IAEA. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi raised these issues during his visit to Tehran.

Amirabdollahian noted that there is progress between Iran and the agency if the IAEA director general takes steps within the law. However, in cases of external pressure, misunderstandings arise.

Meanwhile, the 3-day 1st International Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology (international conference on nuclear science and technology) kicked off in Isfahan, Iran, on May 6. Senior Iranian officials attended the conference. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossin also traveled to Iran to attend the conference.

Additionally, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement in March of last year (2023) and released a statement about it. According to the agreement, Iran's cooperation with the IAEA is within the framework of the Convention on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and safeguards, and the parties are to cooperate on allegations of the existence of enriched uranium substances in connection with Iran's nuclear program.

In January 2016, Iran and the P5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) implemented the Comprehensive Plan of Joint Action on Iran's nuclear program. The US announced in May 2018 that it was withdrawing from the plan and imposed sanctions on Iran in November of the same year. Iran has announced that there will be no restrictions on the Iran nuclear deal in 2020.

In late 2020, the Iranian parliament adopted a strategic plan to counter the sanctions, citing the non-fulfillment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between Iran and six countries, as well as the imposition of sanctions on Iran.

According to the Iranian parliament's decision, as of February 23, Iran had stopped the implementation of additional measures and an additional protocol included in the nuclear deal. Consequently, the IAEA reduced its monitoring mechanism by 20–30 percent.

Iran maintains its presence in JCPOA, showcasing goodwill - chairman of Atomic Energy Organization

Nuclear Program Materials

 7 May 2024
Elnur Baghishov

BAKU, Azerbaijan, May 7. As a sign of goodwill, Iran has remained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran's nuclear program, Iran's Vice President and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Eslami said during the joint press conference with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi, Trend reports.

“Iran has not withdrawn from the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan; the side that withdrew from this agreement is the US, and it has not fulfilled its obligations and has not allowed others to fulfill their obligations, and the three European countries (UK, France, and Germany) have also taken steps in this direction,” he said.

According to him, Iran has unilaterally fulfilled its obligations under the JCPOA and reduced its commitments under Article 26 of the agreement.

Eslami stated that the Iranian parliament has approved a strategic action plan to lift sanctions against Iran. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran is taking steps within the framework of the plan.

To note, the Comprehensive Plan of Joint Action on Iran's nuclear program was implemented between Iran and the P5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) in January 2016. The US announced in May 2018 that it was withdrawing from the plan and imposed sanctions on Iran in November of the same year. Iran has announced that there will be no restrictions on the Iran nuclear deal in 2020.

In late 2020, the Iranian parliament adopted a strategic plan to counter the sanctions, citing the non-fulfillment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between Iran and six countries and the imposition of sanctions on Iran.

According to the decision of the Iranian parliament, as of February 23, Iran had stopped the implementation of additional measures and an additional protocol included in the nuclear deal. As a consequence, the monitoring mechanism of the IAEA was reduced by 20–30 percent.

Under Article 26 of the nuclear deal, if one party fails to comply with its obligations, the other party may suspend all or part of its obligations.

The 3-day 1st International Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology in Isfahan, Iran, kicked off on May 6. Iran's top officials attended the conference. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossini also visited Iran to attend the conference.

Iran-IAEA cooperation not subject to US influence - Iranian FM

7 May 2024 13:34 

Elnur Baghishov

Read more

BAKU, Azerbaijan, May 7. The United States should not influence cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said, Trend reports.

He made the statement during a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi on May 6 in Tehran.

Amir-Abdollahian believes that Iran-IAEA cooperation is progressing positively and will continue to grow. He added that the impartial and professional stance of the IAEA director general will play an effective role in the cooperation between Iran and the agency, helping the region return to sustainable security and stability.

During the meeting, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi also stated that Iran's position is important for strengthening Iran's cooperation with the agency and restoring regional stability and security.

“Strengthening the cooperation process between Iran and the IAEA will lead to the failure of the parties who follow tensions and conflicts in the region under any pretext,” he said.

To note, on May 6, the three-day 1st International Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology began in Isfahan, Iran. Senior Iranian officials attended the conference. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi also visited Iran to participate in the conference.

Briefing: Addressing State Atrocities Against Protesters in Iran

Recommendations for the U.S. Government and the International Community

View a PDF version of this briefing here.

View this briefing’s press release here.

LONG READ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the September 16, 2022, killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini by Iran’s police for “improper” hijab, Islamic Republic security forces have killed more than 200 individuals—including at least 23 children—and violently arrested thousands of peaceful protesters.[1] Influential members of civil society, who were not participating in the protests, have been rounded up and detained “preventatively.”[2] Lawyers peacefully protesting these arrests have been teargassed and arrested.[3] Dozens of school children participating in peaceful protests have been rounded up and sent to “psychological centers.”[4]

This briefing by the Center for Human Rights in Iran argues that these actions have risen to the level of crimes against humanity by the Islamic Republic and must be urgently addressed by the international community. Condemnations by individual governments and U.N. officials have had no impact and the authorities in Iran have demonstrated both a deepening pattern of lethal suppression of peaceful protest and a complete unwillingness to institute any means of internal accountability.[5] The actions detailed in this briefing, aimed at signaling a significantly strengthened and coordinated international commitment to impose meaningful costs on the Islamic Republic for its continuing abuses, include the following key recommendations:

• The nuclear deal with Iran cannot be isolated from these events and must be put on hold. A significant release of funds for the Islamic Republic will flow from this deal, which will increase the repressive capacity of the state.

• EU and European countries and other governments around the world that have diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic must forge a forceful, coordinated diplomatic response to the state’s atrocities in Iran, including jointly recalling their ambassadors for consultations and summoning Iran’s ambassadors for censure.
• The U.S. and its partners should pursue the establishment of an urgent special session at the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) so that governments can collectively address the violence against protesters, and at this session the council should establish an independent mechanism with investigative, reporting, and accountability functions to address the Islamic Republic’s most serious crimes.

• U.N. member states should take action immediately to remove the Islamic Republic of Iran from its current membership in the Commission on the Status of Women, given the Islamic Republic’s ongoing atrocities against women and girls.

• The U.S government and its allies should vigorously pursue an urgent resolution at the U.N. General Assembly condemning in the strongest terms the atrocities committed by the authorities in Iran against peaceful protesters.

• The U.S. and other countries, especially those bordering Iran that are likely to receive Iranian refugees, should provide assistance to Iranians fleeing the Islamic Republic’s persecution, including expediting asylum cases and providing protection for those seeking asylum.
• In light of the continued state-imposed internet shutdowns in Iran aimed at blocking news of the state’s atrocities, the U.S. should provide urgent funding to ensure that companies offer, free of charge, the tools and services Iranians need to communicate with one another and the world.

The Center for Human Rights in Iran has developed these recommendations in close consultation with civil society inside Iran. The Center is in daily touch with protesters, lawyers, activists, labor leaders, journalists, teachers, students, workers, intellectuals and many others across civil society in Iran.

THE ISSUE

Escalating protests throughout Iran are being violently suppressed by the authorities.[6] Hundreds of protesters have been killed by state security forces (including many young women and children), thousands have been violently arrested, and scores of school children participating in protests have been abducted and placed in “psychological centers.”[7] These actions by the Islamic Republic have risen to the level of crimes against humanity. The potential for mass atrocities will increase as the authorities seek to reassert control.

THE CONTEXT

Protests broke out across Iran after the death in state custody of Mahsa Amini on September 16, 2022, three days after her arrest by the Islamic Republic’s morality police for wearing an alleged improper hijab.[8] Initially led by young women rejecting the state policy of forced hijab, the protests have grown to include men and women across socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds voicing broad rejection of the Islamic Republic’s political order.

Credible evidence has shown Iranian security forces repeatedly, deliberately and indiscriminately firing live ammunition and metal pellets, including birdshot, at protesters, including children, resulting in the known deaths of more than 200 protesters and bystanders, including at least 23 children.[9] Actual numbers are likely to be far higher. Violent arrests and abusive detainment conditions are causing untold numbers of serious injuries.

This is now the second time in recent years that the authorities in Iran have responded to nationwide protests with lethal violence on a mass scale. Several hundred —some credible estimates say over a thousand—civilians and bystanders were killed by state security forces during the November 2019 protests.[10] No state official was ever held accountable for any of those deaths. The current violence against protesters indicates a grave escalation of this pattern of swift, indiscriminate and lethal state violence to crush peaceful protest in Iran.

WHY IT MATTERS

As the authorities in Iran move to squash the protests, the fundamental rights of Iran’s citizenry are being violated and international law is being challenged. Defending the Iranian people and their rights is central not only to American principles but also to U.S. strategic interests that rest on the perpetuation of this rules-based order. Anything less than meaningful and coordinated international opprobrium at this juncture signals that the world is preoccupied with other matters and the authorities in Iran can commit their crimes at will and with impunity. This will encourage further state atrocities inside Iran, and increases the potential for similarly reckless behavior in the Islamic Republic’s external relations.[11] It will encourage tyrants everywhere.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

Coordinated action by the international community that imposes meaningful costs on the Islamic Republic for its crimes and rights violations is imperative; it will signal to the authorities that they will be increasingly penalized and isolated for their continued atrocities. The Islamic Republic has demonstrated resistance to pressure, but it is not impervious. As the Iranian government provides no avenues of accountability for abuses committed by its forces and ignores international condemnations, the world community must act together to impose significantly strengthened diplomatic costs and further isolation in an effort to stem the carnage underway in Iran.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

I. Suspend nuclear negotiations with Iran

• The nuclear deal with Iran cannot be isolated from the ongoing atrocities being committed by the Iranian authorities, which include the mass killings of peaceful protesters, including women and children. While efforts at nuclear nonproliferation are important, what will flow from this deal is a significant release of funds, in the form of both unfrozen assets and increased oil revenues, which will increase the repressive capacity of the state. Bolstering the capacity of the Islamic Republic at a time when it is trying to crush peaceful public protest with lethal state violence actively assists the government and directly impacts the country’s domestic affairs. As such, the nuclear negotiations should be suspended.

 

II. Advance an urgent session at the U.N. Human Rights Council

• The U.S. and its partners should establish an urgent special session at the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) so that governments can address in a coordinated manner and with a collective voice the extreme state violence and crimes against protesters underway in Iran at present. This session should also address Iran’s ongoing human rights crisis, which includes an entrenched pattern of lethal suppression of peaceful protest since November 2019 for which there has been no accountability, and the systemic impunity of state agents who commit numerous and grave human rights violations in the Islamic Republic. In that session, it is imperative that the council establish an independent mechanism with investigative, reporting, and accountability functions to address the most serious crimes under international law and other gross human rights violations committed in Iran, in a manner that meets general standards of admissibility in criminal proceedings, and assist in the investigation and prosecution of those suspected of criminal responsibility.

 

III. Advance a resolution at the U.N. General Assembly

• The U.S government and its allies and partners around the world, including in Europe, Canada, Japan, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and others, must lead and vigorously pursue a resolution at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) condemning the atrocities committed by the authorities in Iran against peaceful protesters, which have now risen to the level of crimes against humanity. Country-level condemnation has had no impact, and there exists no means for accountability inside Iran. Coordinated, forceful international opprobrium is imperative.

 

IV. Assist those fleeing Islamic Republic persecution

• The U.S. government should provide direct, expedited assistance for those Iranians who are fleeing persecution by the Islamic Republic, including expediting asylum cases and providing effective protection for those seeking asylum.
• The administration should also actively encourage other governments to provide similar assistance regarding assisting refugees, expediting asylum cases and providing protections, especially in countries bordering Iran that are more likely to receive Iranian refugees.

 

V. Support Iranian civil society

• Build on the U.S. Treasury’s new D2 General License (which exempts an expanded range of online communication tools and services from sanctions) by urging private companies to make these products accessible to Iranians. Without U.S. government encouragement and explicit assurances of permissibility (e.g. public statements, private meetings, letters of comfort, etc.) such sales will not proceed any better than they did under D1.
• Address the difficulties Iranians have in accessing international financial channels to pay for such products by persuading private technology companies to provide these products and services cost-free to the Iranian people, and provide full and expedited U.S. funding for companies that are willing to develop free tools and services for the people of Iran.[12]
• Expand U.S. government funding for Farsi-language news and informational broadcasts.

 

VI. Public condemnation and sanctions

• Continue to forcefully and publicly condemn, at the highest levels —which would include statements by U.S. President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan—the Iranian government’s violence against the protesters, the use of “preventative” arrests, which have been used to round up and intimidate key civil society actors, the abduction and detainment of school children in “psychological centers,” and the state-imposed disruptions to internet access inside Iran, which are designed to prevent communication amongst protesters and block news of state atrocities from reaching the world, and call for the immediate release of all those detained for participating in the protests.
• Encourage other governments, including not only U.S. allies and partners but also other countries, especially those in the Global South, to not only publicly condemn the Iranian authorities’ crimes, but also to take tangible actions in protest such as recalling their ambassadors from the Islamic Republic and summoning Iran’s ambassadors to issue condemnations and warnings of further isolation if the violence against protesters continues.
• Maintain all individual and institutional human rights sanctions and encourage other governments to impose meaningful human rights sanctions. The administration should also work to further identify and sanction individuals, companies and parastatal organizations associated with rights violations. This includes scrutiny of elite figures in the intelligence and security forces, police, judiciary, prisons, detention centers, and the inner circle of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as the companies they control, the placement of their funds, the individuals they use as asset-owning proxies, and financial holdings they have outside Iran.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO U.N. MEMBER STATES

• • EU and European countries that have diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic must forge a coordinated, forceful diplomatic response to the state’s atrocities in Iran. European countries should jointly recall their ambassadors for consultations, and they should summon Iranian ambassadors to communicate directly their condemnation of the crackdown and a warning that further international isolation will ensue unless the state violence ceases.
  • All member states should call for a U.N.-led investigative, reporting, and accountability mechanism on the Islamic Republic’s most serious crimes and human rights violations, including the current crackdown, as well as an urgent special session at the UNHRC to address the Iranian government’s ongoing lethal violence against protesters.
  • U.N. member states should take action immediately to remove the Islamic Republic of Iran from its current membership in the Commission on the Status of Women. In light of the Islamic Republic’s ongoing atrocities, especially against women and girls, it has no place in the principal global intergovernmental body dedicated to promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment.
  • Governments around the world should at a minimum communicate directly to Iranian ambassadors and other counterparts their unequivocal condemnation of the unlawful violence being used against women and other protesters in Iran, issue forceful public statements (both unilaterally and in joint statements with other governments) condemning the Iranian government’s violent suppression of peaceful protest, and consider recalling their ambassadors from the Islamic Republic and summoning Iran’s ambassadors to issue condemnations and warnings of further isolation if the violence against protesters continues.
  • Member states should assist the cases of individuals fleeing the Islamic Republic due to political persecution by the Iranian authorities and provide protection for those seeking asylum.
  • Governments around the world should impose and enforce meaningful human rights sanctions against any and all Iranian officials responsible for violence and unlawful activities against protesters and freeze the assets of regime officials who are human rights violators.

 

CONCLUSION

Without U.S. prioritization of the human rights crisis in Iran, and a significantly strengthened and coordinated international response that imposes meaningful costs on the Iranian authorities for their crimes and abuses, the government of Iran will receive a clear message: global attention is focused elsewhere and the authorities can violate the rights of citizens—and international law—at will and with impunity. The grave violations underway in Iran, which have become increasingly flagrant and reckless, will continue and likely worsen, with all the concomitant risks; a state that kills and abducts children for participating in peaceful protests is one that no longer has any check on its actions, legal, moral or otherwise.

The international community has failed to take meaningful action to address the Islamic Republic’s repeated violence against peaceful protesters and the Iranian authorities have repeatedly ignored the calls of the U.N. secretary general, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, the U.N. special rapporteurs, the U.N. General Assembly, and multiple governments around the world to cease the unlawful use of excessive and lethal force against protesters and to investigate and prosecute those responsible for unlawful killings and other abuses.[13]

The Islamic Republic has consistently demonstrated it has no intention of instituting any means of accountability for crimes committed by state officials. It is imperative that the U.S. and the international community move beyond isolated statements of condemnation and communicate to the Islamic Republic that its international isolation and pariah status will only increase if the state violence and denial of the Iranian citizenry’s most fundamental rights continues.

The U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, Javaid Rehman, put it succinctly, when he noted the “lack of any progress or political will to conduct investigations, let alone ensure accountability” in the Islamic Republic. He stressed that it was “imperative that the international community uses other existing channels… to seek accountability…. [and that] without the involvement of the international community, such grave violations will continue.”[14]

ENDNOTES 

[1] “Iran Protests: Death Toll Rises to at Least 201/Children Victims of the Crackdown,” Iran Human Rights, October 12, 2022 https://iranhr.net/en/articles/5517/

[2] “Iran Protests: Scores of Civil Society Members Detained ‘Preventatively’,” Center for Human Rights in Iran, October 6, 2022 https://iranhumanrights.org/2022/10/iran-protests-scores-of-civil-society-members-detained-preventatively/

[3] “Iran Protests: Human Rights Layers Arrested, Teargassed,” Center for Human Rights in Iran, October 12, 2022 https://iranhumanrights.org/2022/10/iran-protests-human-rights-lawyers-arrested-teargassed/

[4] “Iran Protests: Arrests of School Children Prompt Grave Fears of More Child killings,” Center for Human Rights in Iran, October 13, 2022 https://iranhumanrights.org/2022/10/iran-protests-arrests-of-school-children-prompt-grave-fears-of-more-child-killings/

[5] “Iran: Fundamental Legal and Institutional Reform Needed to Curb Impunity, Says UN Expert,” Press release from the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 17, 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/03/iran-fundamental-legal-and-institutional-reforms-needed-curb-impunity-says

[6] “Students Violently Attacked, Arrested by Security Forces,” Center for Human Rights in Iran October 3, 2022 https://iranhumanrights.org/2022/10/sharif-students-violently-attacked-arrested-by-security-forces-as-protests-in-iran-spread/

[7] “Iran Protests: Sanandaj Becomes Latest Killing Zone Amid Worsening State Violence,” Center for Human Rights in Iran, October 10, 2022 https://iranhumanrights.org/2022/10/iran-protests-sanandaj-becomes-latest-killing-zone-amid-worsening-state-violence/

[8] “Mahsa Amini is Another Victim of the Islamic Republic’s War on Women,” Center for Human Rights in Iran, September 16, 2022 https://iranhumanrights.org/2022/09/mahsa-amini-is-another-victim-of-islamic-republics-war-on-women/

[9] See this video of security forces shooting at a protester from close range in Tehran’s Sa’adat Abad neighborhood, October 8, 2022 (Source: Bazaar Civil Protest channel) https://t.me/Eterazebazar/96757; this video of security forces shooting at protesters in Lahijan, northern Iran, October 12, 2022 (Source: Bazaar Civil Protest channel) https://t.me/Eterazebazar/96757; this video of security forces shooting directly at protesters near Tehran’s Sharif University, October 10, 2022 (Source: Bazaar Civil Protest channel) https://t.me/Eterazebazar/97105; this video of security forces shooting at protesters when someone shouts: “They killed him!” in Divandareh, western Iran, October 4, 2022 (Source: Bazaar Civil Protest channel) https://t.me/Eterazebazar/96396; this video of security forces shooting at protesters in Dehgolan, Kurdistan province, October 1, 2022 (Source: Free Workers Union of Iran) https://t.me/ettehad/105927; and this video of security forces shooting at protesters in Isfahan, central Iran, October 1, 2022 (Source: Free Workers Union of Iran) https://t.me/ettehad/105926

[10] See “They Aimed at My Son’s Head: Report Reveals Carnage in Crushed Iran Protests,” Center for Human Rights in Iran, May 2020 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/05/they-aimed-at-my-sons-head-report-reveals-carnage-in-crushed-iran-protests/ and “Iran: Details of 321 Deaths in Crackdown on  November 2019 Protests,” Amnesty International, updated July 2022 https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/MDE1323082020ENGLISH.pdf and “Special Report: Iran’s leader ordered crackdown on unrest – ‘Do whatever it takes to end it’,” Reuters, December 23, 2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR

[11] See “Human Rights in Iran and U.S. National Security Interests: A Path Forward for U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Islamic Republic,” Center for Human Rights in Iran, June 13, 2022 https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Human-Rights-in-Iran-and-U.S.-Security-Center-for-Human-Rights-in-Iran.pdf and “Prioritizing Human Rights in Iran: A New U.S. Foreign Policy Approach,” Center for Human Rights in Iran https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/US-Iran-Human-Rights-Foreign-Policy-QA-for-Policy-Briefing.pdf and Burke-White, William W., “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation” (2004). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 960. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/960

[12] Joseph Menn and Yasmeen Abutaleb, “With U.S. Nudges, Google and Others Aim to Help Iranian Protesters,” The Washington Post, October 13, 2022 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/10/13/iran-protests-google-jigsaw-vpn/

[13] See “Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report of the Secretary-General, Report to the Seventy-sixth session of the UN General Assembly,” August 4, 2021 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/216/25/PDF/N2121625.pdf?OpenElement; and “Mahsa Amini: Acting UN human rights chief urges impartial probe into death in Iran,” Press release from the U.N. office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, September 20, 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/mahsa-amini-acting-un-human-rights-chief-urges-impartial-probe-death-iran; and “Iran: UN condemns violent crackdown against hijab protests,” UN News, September 27, 2022 https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1128111; and “UN experts strongly condemn death of Mahsa Amini, ‘victim of Iran’s sustained repression’,” UN News, September 22, 2022 https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1127471; and “Seventy-sixth session Agenda item 74 (c) Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2021 [on the report of the Third Committee (A/76/462/Add.3, para. 34)] 76/178, Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran” https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/403/86/PDF/N2140386.pdf?OpenElement

[14] A/HRC/49/75: Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, Published January 13, 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4975-situation-human-rights-islamic-republic-iran-report-special

MAKING SENSE OF THE PAK-IRAN STAND-OFF

Why, when its list of allies is already so thin, did Iran choose to venture down this seemingly ill-conceived path?

Ejaz Haider 

Published January 28, 2024


In what was widely described as a surprise attack, Iran fired missiles at a compound in Sabz-Koh, a hamlet about 45 kilometres from the Pakistan-Iran border, on the night of January 16. After the declared attack, Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, stated that Iran had targeted, “The so-called Jaish al-Adl group, which is an Iranian terrorist group.”

He further added while at the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, “On Pakistan, none of the nationals of the friendly and brotherly country of Pakistan were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones.”

Just hours before the attack, Amir-Abdollahian had had a bilateral meeting with Pakistan’s caretaker prime minister, Anwaarul Haq Kakar. Earlier, on January 16, Pakistan Navy had held a joint day-long exercise with Iran’s navy, which a Tehran Times report described as “demonstrating their commitment to enhancing cooperation and strengthening relations.”

Amir-Abdollahian also made it clear that the attack on “Pakistan’s soil” was in response to the Jaish al-Adl group’s recent attack on the Iranian city of Rask, in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan, stating, “The group has taken shelter in some parts of Pakistan’s Balochistan province. We’ve talked with Pakistani officials several times on this matter.”

Iran’s post-attack position was that, while it respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan, it would not “allow [Iran’s] national security to be compromised or played with.”


As Pakistan and Iran attempt to patch up their relationship in the aftermath of Iran’s unprovoked missile attack on Pakistani soil on January 16, one question remains unanswered: why, when its list of allies is already so thin, did Iran choose to venture down this seemingly ill-conceived path?

The logic did not wash with Pakistan. Pakistan downgraded its diplomatic relations with Iran, summoned Iran’s chargé d’affaires (since Iran’s ambassador was in Iran), issued a démarche and told the Pakistani ambassador to Iran, who was in Islamabad on official business, to not return to his post.


After this non-kinetic escalatory response, however, Pakistan decided to respond with a measured kinetic action, the reasons for which we shall discuss later. On January 18, Pakistan used drones and stand-off munitions to strike a compound in the village of Haq Abad in Saravan district in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province.

Underlying factors in Balochistan on Pakistan’s side and Sistan-Baluchestan on Iran’s side will continue to sour relations unless the two sides cooperate | AFP


Pakistan’s official statement said that the action was carried out on credible intelligence of an impending terrorist attack inside Pakistan by Baloch saramchar [fighters]. Iran also conceded that the 10 people killed in the three strikes were foreign nationals. To give Iran an off-ramp, Pakistan did not target any Iranian military facilities or missile launch sites.

While the international media made big of the exchange, since Iran had also struck targets in Syria and Iraq, the phone call between the two countries’ foreign ministers helped defuse tensions and the situation was de-escalated (more on that in a subsequent section).

Does this mean all is now well? Yes and no. ‘Yes’ because the signal to Iran is clear: if Pakistan’s territorial integrity is compromised, Islamabad will respond. Any escalation will then be the adversary’s option, who must understand the dynamics of escalation dominance.

‘No’ because the underlying factors in Balochistan on Pakistan’s side and Sistan-Baluchestan on Iran’s side would continue to sour relations unless the two sides cooperate and address them seriously. For that, one has to understand the ecosystem.

THE ECOSYSTEM OVERVIEW — IRAN’S CONCERNS

On December 15 last year, Jaish al-Adl (JaA), a reincarnation of the banned militant group Jundallah, in an early morning raid at a police station in Rask, killed 12 Iranian policemen and wounded eight.

Later the same day, Nasser Kanaani, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, “strongly condemned the crime by separatist terrorists and mercenaries of foreign adversaries of Iran.” Kanaani also promised that “the Foreign Ministry and other relevant bodies in Iran will act in concert to go after the murderous terrorists and bring them to justice.”

While JaA has been attacking Iran’s security forces on and off since 2013, when it reassembled in its present incarnation from Jundallah, the Rask attack was far more intense than anything in the previous years. The other three intense attacks were in 2013 (14 Iranian soldiers killed in an ambush) and April 26, 2017, when 10 Iranian border guards were killed in the town of Mirjaveh. The worst attack came in February 2019, when a suicide bomber killed 27 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) personnel.

At the time of the 2017 attack, the Iranian state media quoted police officials as saying that “the Pakistani government bears the ultimate responsibility of [sic] the attack.”

Two weeks after the attack, Maj Gen Mohammad Bagheri, an IRGC commander who serves as Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, threatened to strike inside Pakistan: “We expect Pakistani officials to control the borders, arrest the terrorists and shut down their bases… If the terrorist attacks continue, we will hit their safe havens and cells, wherever they are.”

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) summoned the Iranian ambassador over Bagheri’s ultimatum and noted that his comments went “against the spirit of brotherly relations.” Efforts were made at the diplomatic and military levels to defuse the tension and work out mechanisms for cooperation. When on October 16, 2018, JaA abducted 12 Iranian security personnel, including IRGC intelligence officers, Pakistan helped Iran to secure the release of at least five of them.

After the 2019 attack, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohammad Ali Jafari had issued Pakistan an ultimatum: “If Pakistan fails to punish them in the near future, Iran will do so based on international law and will retaliate against the terrorists.”

In the same statement, as reported by Al Jazeera, Jafari said Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are “conspiring” with the United States and the “Zionist regime” to foment attacks. “The patience that we have practised in the past towards Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who commit these actions, will change,” Jafari stated. Interestingly, Jafari’s comments came as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman landed in Pakistan on February 17 on a two-day official visit.

People gather near rubble in the aftermath of Pakistan’s strike on militant hideouts in an Iranian village near Saravan in Sistan-Baluchestan: Pakistan’s response was measured and targeted insurgents and not the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps launch pads | Reuters

REWINDING TO THE NOUGHTIES

Iran’s troubles in Sistan-Baluchestan are not new. The Sunni minority makes up about 10 percent of Iran’s population. While the majority of the Sunnis live in the Kurdish north, the Sunnis of Sistan-Baluchestan have traditionally faced persecution.

The area is underdeveloped and poor and religious freedom is restricted. For instance, while Christians and Zoroastrians have official prayer places in Tehran, the Sunni minority (about one million residents of Tehran) does not have a single official mosque in the city. Although they have several prayer places in the city, none is recognised as a mosque.

Tensions have always simmered in Sistan-Baluchestan, but the situation took a different turn in 2003 with the appearance on the scene of Jundallah, the precursor of JaA. Jundollah mounted a number of hit-and-run attacks on Iran’s security forces in the southeast, including in Zahedan.

The group’s young leader, Abdolmalek Rigi, became known as an elusive daredevil. As Alex Vatanka notes in his Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence, Jundallah adopted radical Sunni slogans as part of its resistance to Shia Iran. Rigi himself had studied at a seminary and later at the Binori Town Mosque in Karachi. The noughties, with Al Qaeda, its various franchises across the Muslim world and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borderlands, provided the radical Sunni habitat for Jundallah’s fight.

With Jundallah’s violent actions — resistance and Sunni radicalism — began the trouble between Pakistan and Iran. After the initial attacks, the IRGC decided to adopt a soft, two-pronged approach: reaching out to Sunni tribal elders and managing the border jointly with Pakistan. The first was also aimed at development initiatives. The second proved tougher, given clan linkages on both sides of the border and due to the activities of smugglers and other crime syndicates.

Vatanka notes that, while Iranian officials had begun to point fingers at Pakistan, “No one in Tehran could pinpoint the exact identity of the Pakistani backers of Jundallah, and Tehran never put forward concrete evidence to corroborate the charges levelled against Islamabad.”

Then came the assassination of Nur-Ali Shushtari, the deputy commander of the ground forces of IRGC. Shushtari had been given the task of dealing with Jundallah. On the morning of October 18, 2009, as he sat in a tent in Pishin, a town close to the border, meeting with local tribal leaders, a suicide bomber blew himself up, killing Shushtari, along with four other IRGC senior officers. The total toll was 41 dead.

As Vatanka narrates, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Jafari “issued a blanket indictment against the United States, Israel and Britain as the culprits.” He also said that, “Rigi took his orders not only from Pakistan but from [the] intelligence services of Britain and the US.” Later, Iran also threw Saudi Arabia and the UAE into the mix. Pakistan’s response was that it would help Iran in unearthing the people responsible.

After this attack, Iran “ratcheted up the pressure on Pakistan.” Iranian media also reported that Iran had shared evidence with Pakistan of the “links between Pakistani intelligence services and Jundallah.”

Pakistan refuted these allegations. It had its own concerns with Iran.

ECOSYSTEM — PAKISTAN’S CONCERNS

For all the outward rhetoric about brotherly relations, Pakistan has had many concerns with Iran since the revolution. Three stand out.

As part of ‘exporting the revolution’ with its Shia theocratic overtones, Iran has been reaching out overtly and covertly to Shia populations in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the greater Middle East. This, along with the rise of Sunni radicalism because of the Afghan wars, has introduced violent sectarianism in Pakistan. While Iran’s support for radical Shia groups goes back to the early ’80s, the IRGC and its Quds Force have added another element to it since the civil war in Syria: recruitment of Shia fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The rivalry in Afghanistan is another sore point, with Iran supporting the erstwhile Northern Alliance in that country. It is instructive that, after the American invasion of Afghanistan which ousted the Taliban, Pakistan was kept out of the Bonn process, while Iran was an essential part of the process, its delegates led by former foreign minister Kamal Kharazi.

James Dobbins, a former American ambassador and assistant secretary of state, notes, “In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, bilateral US-Iranian contacts produced the most significant cooperation since the 1979 revolution, as Iranian officials helped the US form a new Afghan government.”

Iran, Russia and India were the main backers of the Northern Alliance and Iran was in an excellent position to help with the Bonn Process and the formation of the new Afghan government. Later, as Dobbins states, Iran even offered to train the Afghan security forces. Tehran also tried to engage the US in stabilising Iraq, but the Bush administration spurned Tehran.

Iran’s close ties with India are another Pakistani concern. These ties have both broader implications for Pakistan-Iran relations and are also Balochistan-specific. Pakistan has repeatedly engaged Iran on the issue of Tehran’s support for Baloch sub-nationalism and about giving space to Indian intelligence agencies on its soil (especially through its consulate in Zahedan) to fund Baloch militant groups.

However, with the exception of one instance, unlike official Iranian statements, Pakistan has mostly discussed these issues with their Iranian counterparts behind closed doors. That one instance was in March 2016, during a visit to Pakistan by Iran President Hassan Rouhani.

Rouhani met the Pakistani leadership and also the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen Raheel Sharif. After he left for the airport to board the flight back to Tehran, former Lt Gen Asim Bajwa, who was then Director-General Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), tweeted that, during the meeting, Gen Sharif had told President Rouhani: “There is one concern that RAW [Indian external intelligence agency] is involved in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, and sometimes it also uses the soil of our brother country Iran.”

This was an egregious miscalculation. As the late Sartaj Aziz, then adviser to the prime minister on foreign affairs, told me in a private meeting, the tweet took the civilian government by surprise. Aziz said, “We had to try and defuse the situation.” Rouhani, for his part, “rejected the claim that the issue of the Indian spy agency’s involvement in Pakistan was discussed during his meeting with the country’s leadership.”

The fact is that Pakistan had discussed the activities of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). That was inevitable. Earlier, on March 3, a Pakistani counter-intelligence team had apprehended Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian naval officer, from Mashkel in Pakistani Balochistan. Jadhav had a passport that identified him as Hussain Mubarek Patel. He confessed to running agents in Balochistan and planning and handling subversive activities.

Pakistan has given dossiers to Iran, including one that was handed over by Shah Mehmood Qureshi in his last official appointment as foreign minister. India’s activities in assassinating people on foreign soil are no more a secret, after two cases in Canada and the US. Last year in October, a court in Qatar sentenced eight former Indian naval officers to death, on charges of spying for Israel. After much hectic diplomatic activity between Qatar and India, these sentences have been reduced, but India has refused to divulge any further details.

Pakistan, on its part, has handed over two dossiers to Western capitals and the United Nations on India’s state-sponsored terrorism inside Pakistan. There have also been increasing numbers of assassinations of Kashmiris on Pakistan’s soil. The essential point about referencing India is to establish that Pakistan’s concern over India-Iran relations in the context of Balochistan and Afghanistan is fact-based and not a case of paranoia.

It is important at this point to note that January 16 was not the first time Iran attacked a target inside Pakistan. Iran has done that before too, firing mortars and mounting shallow raids. But this was the first time that it used missiles and, more importantly, declared the attack.

Iran argues that the missile attack was in response to Jaish al-Adl’s recent attack on the Iranian city of Rask in Sistan-Baluchestan | Jaish al-Adl

WHY THE LATEST DECLARATORY ATTACK

One question that continues to bother Pakistan is about Iran’s calculus in conducting the January 16 attack. As noted above, Iran has previously fired mortars in Pakistani territory and occasionally mounted shallow raids inside Pakistani territory. But this was the first time that it used short-range missiles and also the first time it chose to go on record about having done so, invoking its sovereign right to defend itself.

Nor does Iran’s logic become any less opaque going by Tehran’s statements. It claimed that it struck terrorist cells of JaA, which it says has havens in Pakistani Balochistan. Iran also mentioned, as has been its motif, that JaA is linked with Zionists, even though it is a US-designated terrorist organisation.

It later said that the strike was made preemptively. That doesn’t square with the statement about the attack in Rask, which happened last year. That JaA enjoys sanctuaries in Pakistan, with alleged help from state actors hostile to Iran, has also been, as noted, a motif with Iran.

So, what changed?

One can only speculate. One possibility is that the operation was undertaken by some elements within the IRGC, without necessarily running it up the food chain. The IRGC is a parallel force and is responsible for recruiting and managing Iranian proxies in West Asia and the Mena (Middle East and North Africa) region. The nature of its work means giving its commanders carte blanche.

Iran had earlier struck targets in Syria and Iraq, justifying the strikes as a national security imperative. In combination with the factors mentioned above, someone decided to throw Pakistan into the mix. There’s also the possibility, in tandem with these factors, that Iran decided to put Pakistan on notice regarding its alignment with the US — especially with developments in the Middle East.

Be that as it may, it is still difficult to rationalise Iran’s action. One thing, though, is clear: in lumping Pakistan with Syria and Iraq, Iran miscalculated in a big way. As I wrote elsewhere, “Did Iran convince itself that Pakistan would not respond? If so, then Tehran obviously thought that its strategic objectives were holier than Pakistan’s. That’s magic, not policy.”

COULD PAKISTAN HAVE DONE WITHOUT A KINETIC RESPONSE?

The short answer is no. Here’s the long answer.

Over the past three to four years, relations between Pakistan and Iran have improved. Generally speaking, the two sides have had functional ties, neither always cold nor very warm. On the plus side, Iran and Pakistan began on the right foot with Iran recognising Pakistan immediately after the latter’s formation. This was vastly different from Afghanistan’s inimical behaviour.

Again, unlike Afghanistan’s continued irredentism regarding the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Iran and Pakistan managed, rather amicably, to delineate their border after two years of negotiations. The two sides signed the agreement on February 6, 1958. Before that, leaving aside some hilarious ups and downs, the two sides signed a Treaty of Friendship in May 1950.

The situation took an undesirable turn after the 1979 revolution, as indicated above. But despite running issues on both sides, much good work has been done since 2020. Pakistan did not object to Iran building a wall on the border in early 2007. Pakistan has also begun to build a wall on its side. There are easement gates on both sides for the locals to pass through.

Taftan used to be the only crossing point between Pakistan and Iran. Two other crossing points have been added at Gabd (between Gwadar and Chahbahar) and Mand (between Gabd in the south and Taftan in the north). These points are official crossings with immigration facilities.

Six border sustenance marketplaces have been agreed upon, one of which is already functional. In May 2023, former Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi jointly inaugurated the Mand-Pishin Border Sustenance Marketplace and the 220 kV Polan-Gabd Electricity Transmission Line project.

Cooperation has increased across the entire spectrum of bilateral relations, including the political, economic, energy and cultural domains. As Pakistan’s MoFA notes, “Both countries are committed to increas[ing] economic cooperation…by leveraging existing institutional mechanisms, such as [the] Joint Economic Commission (JEC), Joint-Border Trade Committee (JBTC), Joint Trade Committee (JTC) and Joint Border Commission (JBC).”

To circumvent sanctions against Iran, the Quetta and Zahedan Chambers of Commerce have been declared the clearing agents for barter trade. The statutory regulatory orders (SRO) and the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the decision have been established and the cabinet has approved them.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan has backed Iran at the UN rights bodies and whenever it gets into hot waters, which is generally frequently. On the security side, mechanisms (hotline etc) have been established for cooperation across a wide spectrum, including counter-terrorism.

This is not an exhaustive list of measures at multiple levels — from mid-ranking officials in the field to the highest levels of civilian and military leadership. Pakistan’s response, therefore, has to be seen in a context.

Put yourself in the position of the policymakers. Do you face a dilemma? The attack risks setting a dangerous precedent by violating Pakistan’s sovereignty, through Iran’s action on the ground, its public declaration of the attack and its iteration that it reserves the right to safeguard its security (in other words, a repeat). Two, India in the east is already publicly wedded to a muscular policy towards Pakistan and, in 2016 and 2019, has aggressed against Pakistan.

On the other hand, the borders with India and Afghanistan are already unstable and hostile. Do you want to add to that the Pakistan-Iran border too? Wouldn’t it complicate relations with all the neighbours, except China in the north? If you escalate against Iran, wouldn’t it get Pakistan into a three-front problem and bring Iran closer to India (India’s official statement supported the Iranian strike)?

Policymaking isn’t easy, after all! But in taking any course of action, it is important to understand that no policy is without a cost. What’s important is to balance the pluses with the minuses. For instance, it was important to show resolve, not just to signal to Iran but also to India, while giving the former the choice to escalate or quit.

For its part, Pakistan’s response was measured and targeted Pakistani Baloch insurgents and not the IRGC launch pads. That was both to manage escalatory pressure and give Iran an off-ramp. Iran understood the signal. Most probably also because, higher up the food chain, there was a better understanding of what was/is at stake. Does Iran want to go for escalation while Mena is already loaded against it? Clearly not.

As things stand, the ambassadors will be back at their stations by January 26 and, at the invitation of Pakistan’s caretaker foreign minister Jalil Abbas Jilani, the Iranian foreign minister will be visiting Pakistan on January 29.

Improved relations between Iran and Pakistan are an imperative for both sides. Given the situation in the Mena region, it’s time to close ranks. Equally, both sides need to sit down in earnest to address each other’s complaints on the thorny issues. That is the only way forward.

The writer is a journalist interested in security and
foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider

Header image: Iranian clergymen watch a missile being fired by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps: January 16 was the first time that Iran fired short-range missiles on Pakistani territory and also the first time it chose to go on record about having done so| AFP

Published in Dawn, EOS, January 28th, 2024