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Tuesday, January 20, 2026

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Sunday, December 01, 2024

The Fascist Counter-revolution



Karl Korsch
 1940

First Published: in Living Marxism, Volume 5, Number 2, Fall 1940, pp. 29-37
Source: Class Against Class;
Transcribed: by Zdravko Saveski, for marxists.org 2009;

What hope have we revolutionary Marxists, remnants of a past epoch, inheritors of its most advanced theories, illusions, ideologies-what hope have we left for a revolutionary turn of the sweeping counterrevolutionary movement of victorious fascism? The fate of France has finally proved that the old Marxist slogan of "world revolution" has in our epoch assumed a new meaning. We find ourselves today in the midst not of a socialist and proletarian but of an ultra-imperialistic and fascist world revolution. Just as in the preceding epoch every major defeat-the defeat of France in 1871, that of Russia, Germany, Hungary in 1905, 1917, 1918-resulted in a genuine revolution, so in our time each defeated country resorts to a fascist counterrevolution. Moreover, present-day war itself has become a revolutionary process, a civil war with an unmistakably predominant counterrevolutionary tendency. Just as in a horse race we do not know which horse will win but we do know that it will be a horse, so in the present war the victory of either party will result in a further gigantic step toward the fascization of Europe, if not of the whole European, American, Asiatic world of tomorrow.


I

There seem to be two easy ways for the "orthodox" Marxist of today to handle this difficult problem. Well-trained in Hegelian philosophical thought, he might say that all that is, is reasonable, and that, by one of those dialectical shifts in which history rejoices, socialism has been fulfilled by the social revolution implied in the victory of fascism. Thus Hegel himself at first followed the rising star of the French Revolution, later embraced the cause of Napoleon, and ended by acclaiming the Prussian state that emerged from the anti-Napoleonic wars of 1812-1815 as the fulfilment of the philosophical "idea" and as the "state of reason" corresponding to the given stage of its historical development.

Or, for that matter, our orthodox Marxist might not be willing, for the present, to go so far as to acknowledge the fascist allies of Stalin as the genuine promoters of socialism in our time. He would then content himself with feeling that the victory of fascism, planned economy, state capitalism, and the weeding out of all ideas and institutions of traditional "bourgeois democracy" will bring us to the very threshold of the genuine social revolution and proletarian dictatorship - just as, according to the teachings of the early church, the ultimate coming of Christ will be immediately preceded by the coming of the Anti-Christ who will be so much like Christ in his appearance and in his actions that the faithful will have considerable difficulty in seeing the difference.

In so reasoning, our orthodox Marxist would not only conform with the church but would also keep well in line with the precedents set by the earlier socialists and "revolutionary" Marxists themselves. It was not only the moderately progressive bourgeois ex-minister Guizot who was deceived by the revolutionary trimmings of Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat of 1851 and, when he heard the news burst out into the alarmed cry, "This is the complete and final triumph of socialism." Even the leading representative of French socialism, P. J. Proudhon, was taken in by the violently anti-bourgeois attitude displayed by the revolutionary imperialist, and he devoted a famous pamphlet to the thesis that the coup d'etat of the Second of December did in fact "demonstrate the social revolution."[1]

Indeed, in many ways that counterrevolutionary aftermath of 1848 is comparable to the infinitely more serious and more extended counterrevolutionary movement through which European society is passing today after the experience of the Russian, the German, and the other European revolutions which followed in the wake of the First World War. Every party and every political tendency had to go through a certain period of bewilderment until it had adapted itself to a totally changed situation. Marx himself, although he utterly despised the imperialist adventurer because of his personal inadequacy, was inclined to believe in the revolutionary significance of the counterrevolutionary coup. He described the historical outcome of the two years of revolutionary defeat from 1848 to 1849 by the paradoxical statement that "this time the advance of the revolutionary movement did not effect itself through its immediate tragicomic achievements but, the other way round, through the creation of a united and powerful counterrevolution, through the creation of an antagonist by opposing whom the party of revolt will reach its real revolutionary maturity." And even after the fateful event he most emphatically restated his conviction that "the destruction of the parliamentary republic contains the germs of the triumph of the proletarian revolution." This is exactly what the German Communists and their Russian masters said 80 years later when they welcomed the advent of Nazism in Germany as a "victory of revolutionary communism."

This ambiguous attitude of Proudhon and Marx toward counterrevolution was repeated ten years later by Ferdinand Lassalle, a close theoretical disciple of Marx and at that time the foremost leader of the growing socialist movement in Germany. He was prepared to cooperate with Bismarck at the time when that unscrupulous statesman was toying with the idea of bribing the workers into acceptance of his imperialistic plans by an apparent adoption of the universal franchise and some other ideas borrowed from the 1848 revolution and the Second Empire. Lasalle did not live to see Bismarck at the end of the 70's, when he had subdued the liberals and the ultra-montane Catholic party, revert to his old dream of enforcing a kind of "tory-socialism" based on a ruthless persecution and suppression of all genuine socialist workers' movements.

There is no need to discuss the wholesale conversion of internationalists into nationalists and proletarian Social Democrats into bourgeois democratic parliamentarians during and after the First World War. Even such former Marxists as Paul Lensch accepted the war of the Kaiser as a realistic fulfilment of the dreams of a socialist revolution, and the about-face of the socialists they themselves glorified as a "revolutionization of the revolutionaries." There was a "national-bolshevist" fraction of the German Communist party long before there was a Hitlerian National Socialist Party. Nor does the military alliance that was concluded "seriously and for a long time" between Stalin and Hitler in August 1939, contain any novelty for those who have followed the historical development of the relations between Soviet Russia and imperial, republican, and Hitlerian Germany throughout the last twenty years. The Moscow treaty of 1939 had been preceded by the treaties of Rapallo in 1920 and of Berlin in 1926. Mussolini had already for several years openly proclaimed his new fascist credo when Lenin was scolding the Italian Communists for their failure to enlist that invaluable dynamic personality in the service of their revolutionary cause. As early as 1917, during the peace negotiations in Brest Litovsk, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht had been aware of the dreadful danger that was threatening the proletarian revolution from that side. They had said in so many words that "Russian socialism based on reactionary Prussian bayonets would be the worst that still could happen to the revolutionary workers' movement."

It appears from this historical record that there is indeed something basically wrong with the traditional Marxian theory of the social revolution and with its practical application. There is no doubt, today less than at any former time in history, that the Marxian analysis of the working of the capitalist mode of production and of its historical development is fundamentally correct. Yet it seems that the Marxian theory in its hitherto accepted form is unable to deal with the new problems that arise in the course of a not merely occasional and temporary but deep-rooted, comprehensive, and enduring counterrevolutionary development.


II

The main deficiency of the Marxian concept of the counterrevolution is that Marx did not, and from the viewpoint of his historical experience could not, conceive of the counterrevolution as a normal phase of social development. Like the bourgeois liberals he thought of the counterrevolution as an "abnormal" temporary disturbance of a normally progressive development. (In the same manner, pacifists to the present day think of war as an abnormal interruption of the normal state of peace, and physicians and psychiatrists until recently thought of disease and more especially the diseases of the mind as an abnormal state of the organism.) There is, however, between the Marxian approach and that of the typical bourgeois liberal this important difference: they start from a totally different idea about just what is a normal condition. The bourgeois liberal regards existing conditions or at least their basic features as the normal state of things, and any radical change as its abnormal interruption. It does not matter to him whether that disturbance of existing normal conditions results from a genuinely progressive movement or from a reactionary attempt to borrow revolution's thunder for the purpose of a counterrevolutionary aggression. He is afraid of the counterrevolution just as much as of the revolution and just because of its resemblance to a genuine revolution. That is why Guizot called the coup d'etat "the complete and final triumph of the socialist revolution" and why, for that matter, Hermann Rauschning today describes the advent of Hitlerism as a "revolt of nihilism."

As against the bourgeois concept, the Marxian theory has a distinct superiority. It understands revolution as a completely normal process. Some of the best Marxists, including Marx himself and Lenin, even said on occasion that revolution is the only normal state of society. So it is, indeed, under those objective historical conditions which are soberly stated by Marx in his preface to the "Critique of Political Economy."

Marx did not, however, apply the same objective and historical principle to the process of counterrevolution, which was known to him only in an undeveloped form. Thus, he did not see, and most people do not see today, that such important counterrevolutionary developments as those of present-day fascism and nazism have, in spite of their violent revolutionary methods, much more in common with evolution than they have with a genuine revolutionary process. It is true that in their talk and propaganda both Hitler and Mussolini have directed their attack mostly against revolutionary Marxism and communism. It is also true that before and after their seizure of state power they made a most violent attempt to weed out every Marxist and Communist tendency in the working classes. Yet this was not the main content of the fascist counterrevolution. In its actual results the fascist attempt to renovate and transform the traditional state of society does not offer an alternative to the radical solution aimed at by the revolutionary Communists. The fascist counterrevolution rather tried to replace the reformist socialist parties and trade unions, and in this it succeeded to a great extent.

The underlying historical law, the law of the fully developed fascist counterrevolution of our time, can be formulated in the following manner: After the complete exhaustion and defeat of the revolutionary forces, the fascist counterrevolution attempts to fulfil, by new revolutionary methods and in widely different form, those social and political tasks which the so-called reformistic parties and trade unions had promised to achieve but in which they could no longer succeed under the given historical conditions.

A revolution does not occur at some arbitrary point of social development but only at a definite stage. "At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing production-relations (or property-relations) within which they hitherto moved. From being forms of development, those relations turn into fetters upon the forces of production. Then a period of social revolution sets in." And again Marx emphasized, and even to a certain extent exaggerated, the objectivistic principle of his materialist theory of revolution according to which "a formation of society never perishes until all the forces of production for which it is wide enough have been developed." All this is true enough as far as it goes. We have all seen how evolutionary socialism reached the end of its rope. We have seen how the old capitalistic system based on free competition and the whole of its vast political and ideological superstructure was faced by chronic depression and decay. There seemed no way open except a wholesale transition to another, more highly developed form of society, to be effected by the social revolution of the proletarian class.

The new historical development during the last twenty years showed, however, that there was yet another course open. The transition to a new type of capitalistic society, that could no longer be achieved by the democratic and peaceful means of traditional socialism and trade unionism, was performed by a counterrevolutionary and anti-proletarian yet objectively progressive and ideologically anti-capitalistic and plebeian movement that had learned to apply to its restricted evolutionary aims the unrestricted methods developed during the preceding revolution. (More particularly, both Hitler and Mussolini had learned much in the school of Russian Bolshevism.) Thus, it appeared that the evolution of capitalistic society had not reached its utter historical limit when the ruling classes and the reformistic socialists-those self-appointed "doctors at the sickbed of capitalism" -reached the limits of their evolutionary possibilities. The phase of peaceful democratic reforms was followed by another evolutionary phase of development-that of the fascist transformation, revolutionary in its political form but evolutionary in its objective social contents.

The decisive reason that the capitalistic formation of society did not perish after the collapse of the First World War is that the workers did not make their revolution. "Fascism," said its closest enemy, "is a counterrevolution against a revolution that never took place." Capitalistic society did not perish, but instead entered a new revolutionary phase under the counterrevolutionary regime of fascism, because it was not destroyed by a successful workers' revolution, and because it had not, in fact, developed all the forces of production. The objective and the subjective premises are equally important for the counterrevolutionary conclusion.

From this viewpoint all those comfortable illusions about a hidden revolutionary significance in the temporary victory of the counterrevolution, in which the earlier Marxists so frequently indulged, must be entirely abandoned. If counterrevolution is only extremely and superficially connected with a social revolution by its procedures, but in its actual content is much more closely related to the further evolution of a given social system, and is in fact a particular historical phase of that social evolution, then it can no longer be regarded as a revolution in disguise. There is no reason to hail it either as an immediate prelude to the genuine revolution, or as an intrinsic phase of the revolutionary process itself. It appears as a particular phase of the whole developmental process, not inevitable like revolution yet becoming an inevitable step within the development of a given society under certain historical conditions. It has reached its up-to-now most comprehensive and important form in the present day fascist renovation and transformation of Europe, which in its basic economic aspect appears as a transition from the private and anarchic form of competitive capitalism to a system of planned and organized monopoly capitalism or state capitalism.


III

It would be the greatest folly and, for people even slightly imbued with the great discoveries of Marx in the field of the social sciences, a total relapse into a pre-materialist and pre-scientific manner of thought if one were to expect that the historical progress from competitive capitalism to planned economy and state capitalism could be repealed by any power in the world. Least of all can fascism be defeated by those people who, after a hundred years of shameless acquiescence in the total abandonment of their original ideals, now hasten to conjure up the infancy of the capitalist age with its belief in liberty, equity, fraternity, and free trade, while at the same time they surreptitiously and inefficiently try to imitate as far as possible fascism's abolition of the last remnants of those early capitalist ideas. They feel a sudden and unexpected urge to celebrate the French Revolution's fourteenth of July and at the same time dream of destroying fascism by adopting fascist methods.

In opposition to the artisan and petty-bourgeois spirit of early utopian socialism, the first word of scientific and proletarian socialism stated that big industry and the machine age had come to stay, that modern industrial workers had to find a cure for the evils of the industrial age on the basis of a further development of the new industrial forces themselves. In the same manner the scientific and proletarian socialists of our time must try to find remedies for the wrongs of monopoly capitalism and fascist dictatorship on the basis of monopoly and state capitalism itself. Neither free trade (that was not so free for the workers after all) nor the other aspects of traditional bourgeois democracy - free discussion and free press and free radio - will ever be restored. They have never existed for the suppressed and exploited class. As far as the workers are concerned, they have only exchanged one form of serfdom for another.

There is no essential difference between the way the New York Times and the Nazi press publish daily "all the news that's fit to print"-under existing conditions of privilege and coercion and hypocrisy. There is no difference in principle between the eighty-odd voices of capitalist mammoth corporations-which, over the American radio, recommend to legions of silent listeners the use of Ex-Lax, Camels, and neighbourhood groceries, along with music, war, baseball and domestic news, and dramatic sketches-and one suave voice of Mr. Goebbels who recommends armaments, race-purity, and worship of the Fuehrer. He too is quite willing to let them have music along with it-plenty of music, sporting news, and all the unpolitical stuff they can take.

This criticism of the inept and sentimental methods of present-day anti-fascism does not imply by any means that the workers should do openly what the bourgeoisie does under the disguise of a so-called antifascist fight: acquiesce in the victory of fascism. The point is to fight fascism not by fascist means but on its own ground. This seems to the present writer to be the rational meaning of what was somewhat mystically described by Alpha in the spring issue of Living Marxism as the specific task of "shock-troops" in the anti-fascist fight. Alpha anticipated that even if the localized war-of-siege waged during the first seven months of the present conflict were to extend into a general fascist world war, this would not be a "total war" and an unrestricted release of the existing powers of production for the purpose of destruction. Rather, it would still remain a monopolistic war in which the existing powers of production (destruction) would be fettered in many ways for the benefit of the monopolistic interests of privileged groups and classes. It would remain that kind of war from fear of the emancipatory effect that a total mobilization of the productive forces, even restricted to the purpose of destruction, would be bound to have for the workers or, under the present-day conditions of totally mechanized warfare, for the shocktroopers who perform the real work of that totally mechanized war.

This argument of Alpha’s can be applied more widely and much more convincingly. First of all we can disregard for the moment (although we shall have to return to it at a later stage) the peculiar restriction of the argument to the "shock-troops" and to the conditions of war. The whole traditional distinction between peace and war, production and destruction, has lost in recent times much of that semblance of truth that it had in an earlier period of modern capitalistic society. The history of the last ten years has shown that ever since, in a world drunk with apparent prosperity, the American Kellogg Pact outlawed war, peace has been abolished. From the outset Marxism was comparatively free from that simple-mindedness which believed in an immediate and clear-cut difference between production-for-use and production-for-profit. The only form of production-for-use under existing capitalistic conditions is just the production-for-profit. Productive labor for Marx, as for Smith and Ricardo, is that labor which produces a profit for the capitalist and, incidentally, a thing which may also be useful for human needs. There is no possibility of establishing a further distinction between a "good" and a "bad," a constructive and a destructive usefulness. The Goebbelian defense of the "productivity" of the labor spent on armaments in Germany by referring to the amount of "useful" labor spent in the United States for cosmetics had no novelty for the Marxist. Marx, who described the working class in its revolutionary fight as "the greatest of all productive forces" would not have been afraid to recognize war itself as an act of production, and the destructive forces of modern mechanized warfare as part of the productive forces of modern capitalistic society, such as it is. He, like Alpha, would have recognized the "shock-troops" in their "destructive" activity in war as well as in their productive activity in industry (armament and other industries-war industries all!) as real workers, a revolutionary vanguard of the modern working class. Historically it is a well-established fact that the soldier (the hired mercenary) was the first modern wage-laborer.

Thus, the old Marxian contradiction between the productive forces and the given production relations reappears in the warlike as well as in the peaceful activities of modern fascism. With it there appear again the old contrast between the workers, who as a class are interested in the full application and development of the productive forces, and the privileged classes, the monopolists of the material means of production. More than at any previous time the monopoly of political power reveals itself as the power to rule and control the social process of production. At the same time this means, under present conditions, the power to restrict production-both the production of industry in peace and destructive production in time of war-and to regulate it in the interest of the monopolist class. Even the "national" interest that was supposed to underly the present-day fascist war waged by Hitler and Mussolini is revealed by the war itself and will be revealed much more clearly by the coming peace as being ultimately an interest of the international capitalist and monopolist class. Much more clearly than at the end of the First World War it will appear that this war is waged by both parties-by the attacking fascists as well as by the defending "democrats"-as a united counterrevolutionary struggle against the workers and the soldiers who by their labor in peace and war prepared and fought the truly suicidal war.

What, then, is the hope left for the anti-fascists who are opposing the present European war and who will oppose the coming war of the hemisphere? The answer is that, just as life itself does not stop at the entrance of war, neither does the material work of modern industrial production. Fascists today quite correctly conceive the whole of their economy-that substitute for a genuine socialist economy-in terms of a "war economy" (Wehrwirtschaft). Thus, it is the task of the workers and the soldier to see to it that this job is no longer done within the restrictive rules imposed upon human labor in present-day capitalist, monopolist, and oppressive society. It has to be done in the manner prescribed by the particular instruments used; that is, in the manner prescribed by the productive forces available at the present stage of industrial development. In this manner both the productive and the destructive forces of present-day society-as every worker, every soldier knows-can be used only if they are used against their present monopolistic rulers. Total mobilization of the productive forces presupposes total mobilization of that greatest productive force which is the revolutionary working class itself.

Notes

[1] Oeuvres Completes de Proudhon, vol. VIII, Paris, 1868.

[2] First article on Class Struggles in France, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, January, 1850.

[3] The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, February, 1852.

[4] Ignazio Silone, School of Dictators, 1938.

[5] Living Marxism, vol. V, no. I, pp. 44-58.

Karl Korsch Archive

Sunday, January 18, 2026

Is Russia imperialist? A response to Renfrey Clarke


Russian troops

In his article, “The sources of the Ukraine conflict: A reply to Chris Slee,” Renfrey Clarke disputes my contention that Russia is imperialist. Clarke says:

As analysed by Lenin early in the last century, imperialism is a characteristic of the richest and most developed capitalist countries.

However, he acknowledges that Vladimir Lenin regarded Russia as imperialist, despite the fact that the Russian empire of his day remained a “primitive and dependent state”. Clarke recognises that Russia was “a ranking military power, able to keep large non-Russian populations in subjection and to throw millions of soldiers into its wars.”

Clarke also notes that:

In his writings, Lenin never fully untangled this conundrum. But he left us a definite pointer to his views. In articles in 1915 and 1916 he described the Russian imperialism of his time as “feudal” and as “crude, medieval, economically backward”. Clearly, he did not include it in the same category with the modern imperialism of the advanced Western countries.

Instead, the Russian empire was a relic of an earlier, pre-industrial imperialism, based not on finance capital and advanced productive methods, but on peasant rents, handicraft production and merchants’ profits. For Lenin, it may be said, the Russian empire despite its military power belonged in a historical category with such empires as that of the Ottomans.

Military power and foreign interventions as indicators of imperialism

Certainly tsarist Russia was backward and semi-feudal. But some of Lenin’s writings indicate that he regarded military strength and interventions in foreign countries as indicators of imperialism, regardless of the economic system. For example, Lenin wrote:

The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital not of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers enjoys a monopoly. (In Japan and Russia the monopoly of military power, vast territories, or special facilities for robbing minority nationalities, China, etc, partly supplements, partly takes the place of, the monopoly of modern, up-to-date finance capital)

Note the reference to Japan, which at that time was capitalist, though with feudal remnants, and where the development of finance capital was still limited. Despite this, Lenin highlighted its military power and interventions abroad (Lenin mentions China, but Japan had also invaded Korea). Clearly, Lenin regarded military power and foreign interventions as important factors in judging if a country is imperialist.

I am not aware of any writing by Lenin where he gives a full explanation of his views on this question. Lenin’s pamphlet Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism is often quoted as the definitive summary of his views. But Lenin himself noted its limitations. In his preface to the April 1917 edition, he said:

This pamphlet was written with an eye to the tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself strictly to an exclusively theoretical, particularly economic, analysis of facts, but to formulate the few necessary observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in an allegorical language — in that accursed Aesopian language — to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up their pens to write a “legal” work.

Thus, Imperialism only deals with the economic aspects of imperialism. But Lenin’s other writings make clear that imperialism is not just an economic phenomenon. Political and military aspects are also important.

Clarke says:

Russia’s “feudal, medieval” imperialism perished in 1917. To characterise the country today using the tsarist regime as a historical reference is far-fetched.

Russia today is not semi-feudal, as it was in 1917. But its military strength makes it a great power. Lenin wrote: “The epoch of imperialism has turned all the 'great' powers into the oppressors of a number of nations…” This applies to Russia today.

Modern Russia

Clarke notes that:

The return of capitalism to Russia from 1991 saw the Russian Federation emerge as a typical “upper tier” country of the Global South; part of the “semi-periphery” of world capitalism along with countries such as Brazil, Mexico, or Türkiye.

Lenin never used the terms “Global South” or “semi-periphery”. Global South is an imprecise concept, while semi-periphery comes from World Systems Theory, which divides countries into the “core” and “periphery”, with semi-periphery as an intermediate category. This theory implies that the world capitalist system has a single “core” (or centre), ignoring the fact of inter-imperialist rivalry. 

In my view, Turkey, which intervenes militarily in Syria, Iraq and several African countries, is imperialist, even if on a much smaller scale than the United States.

Clarke says:

While Russia in 1991 inherited an industrial economy from the Soviet Union, the level of its technology in all but a few sectors was decidedly backward.

One sector, however, in which Russia was NOT backward was its military industry. This sector is crucial for Russia’s ability to intervene beyond its borders.

Clarke writes:

Entry to the “gated community” of the world’s rich states is effectively locked and barred; the list of genuinely wealthy countries, which apart from mini-states number about 20 in all, has barely altered since Lenin’s time.

Yet imperialism is not static. Japan, once a formerly poor country, is today an imperialist power.

Clarke says:

Imperialist states, if we read Lenin correctly, are marked by a surfeit of underused capital, seeking employment at the rates of profit its owners think they deserve. But the data cited above show that, compared to undoubted imperialist countries, Russia is strikingly capital-poor. Russian industry and infrastructure, the military sector aside, suffer from a severe lack of investment.

Meanwhile, the country is home to legendary natural resources that, in normal times, command high prices on world markets. To the extent that Russian entrepreneurs have capital to invest, they have the opportunity to draw very agreeable rates of profit at home, without the obloquy and vast expense of invading foreign countries.

This assumes that capitalists and their governments always act in a rational manner, avoiding unnecessary risks. In fact, they often act in a reckless and potentially self-destructive manner. Capitalists always want more wealth, and capitalist governments often seek to expand the territory under their control, even if it is unwise to do so. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an example.

Clarke writes:

The charge that Russia launched its “special military operation” in Ukraine from an imperialist drive to territorial expansion is therefore absurd. If we discard (as we should) the “crazed dictator” narratives current in the West, that leaves us compelled to accept that the reason for Moscow’s “special military operation” is exactly what the Russians say it is: a defensive response to determined, persistent Western menaces.

Andriy Movchan has convincingly refuted the idea that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was defensive. Movchan points out that Putin showed little concern when Finland and Sweden joined NATO, even though Finland is very close to St Petersburg.

He argues that Russian chauvinist ideology played a key role. I agree that ideology is important, but would add that this ideology is not simply the result of Putin being a “crazed dictator”. It has a purpose: to unite Russia’s population on a nationalist basis under Putin’s leadership, and thereby suppressing dissent.

Clarke writes:

The World Beyond War site puts the number of US military bases on foreign territory in 2025 at 877, in 95 countries. According to the same source, Russia has 29, the great majority of them inherited from and located in countries of the former Soviet Union. Several more Russian bases are in Syria. Moves by Russia to secure a naval station on Sudan’s Red Sea coast appear to have stalled.

This pattern does not suggest the pursuit by Russia of world hegemony, but rather, a focus on its own security. All of Russia’s military bases, actual or mooted, outside of the former Soviet Union are in the Middle East — a strategically sensitive area of Russia’s “near abroad”.

Many imperialist countries have few, if any, foreign military bases: for example, Japan, Germany and Sweden. Russia has more foreign bases than these countries.

Clarke explains the presence of Russian bases in the Middle East by saying it is “a strategically sensitive area of Russia’s ‘near abroad’.” But the US could say the same about Latin America.

Should the left just accept Russia’s peace terms?

Clarke says:

In any war, after victory has ceased to be a realistic prospect, there comes a point where the implications of continuing to fight approach national extermination. The killing in the Ukraine conflict has been monstrous. Now it must stop, on whatever terms might plausibly be enduring. For the international left that means, in practice, calling for acceptance of the peace terms, outlined above, put forward by the Russian side.

There is no guarantee that such an agreement would be “enduring”. Putin's ideology, which says that Ukraine is not a real nation but a part of Russia that was artificially separated from the rest by the Bolsheviks, implies that he may renew the war when he judges conditions for victory are favourable.

Peace is essential, but there need to be guarantees that Russia will not renew the war. Perhaps an international peace-keeping force sponsored by the United Nations should be considered. This could be combined with referendums in the disputed areas to ascertain which state the people want to join.

Putin would probably reject such a proposal, unless subject to strong pressure from within Russia. The best guarantee of peace would be a strong anti-war movement in Russia, combined with democratic rights enabling such a movement to organise and express its views.

Sunday, January 11, 2026


What past global warming reveals about future rainfall



'Proxies' in geologic record show rainfall was more intense, but less regular during the Paleogene




University of Utah

Trek through Time 

image: 

A detail from The Trek Through Time, a 16-plaque diorama at the U.S. Geological Survey’s headquarters in Reston, Va. This painting by Aldo Chiappe depicts the Paleocene Epoch, 66 to 56 million years ago during the early Paleogene Period.

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Credit: U.S. Geological Survey





To understand how global warming could influence future climate, scientists look to the Paleogene Period that began 66 million years ago, covering a time when Earth’s atmospheric carbon dioxide levels were two to four times higher than they are today.

New research by the University of Utah and the Colorado School of Mines reconstructs how rainfall responded to extreme warming during this period using “proxies,” or clues left in the geological record in the form of plant fossils, soil chemistry and river deposits. The results challenge the commonly held view that wet places get wetter when the climate warms and drier places become drier, according to co-author Thomas Reichler, professor of atmospheric sciences at the U.

“There are good reasons, physical reasons for that assumption. But now our study was a little bit surprising in the sense that even mid-latitudes regions tended to become drier,” Reichler said. “It has to do with the variability and the distribution of precipitation over time. If there are relatively long dry spells and then in between very wet periods—as in a strongly monsoonal climate—conditions are unfavorable for many types of vegetation.”

Rainfall was far more variable

Instead of focusing on the amount of precipitation each year, Reichler’s team explored when rain fell and how often. They found rainfall appears to be much less regular under extreme warming, often occurring in intense downpours separated by prolonged dry spells.

The researchers concluded polar regions were wet, even monsoonal, during the Paleogene, while many mid-latitude and continental interiors became drier overall.

The findings, published last month in the journal Nature Geoscience, are based on a comprehensive analysis of existing research. To conduct the study, Reichler teamed up with Colorado School of Mines geologists, who analyzed proxy data from the fossil record, while Reichler conducted the climate modeling with graduate student Daniel Baldassare.

This study looks back to the warmest time in Earth’s history, the early Paleogene, 66 to 48 million years ago, to understand how rainfall behaves when the planet gets very hot. This period began with the sudden demise of the dinosaurs and saw the rise of mammals in terrestrial ecosystems. This was the time when some of Utah’s notable landscapes, such as the hoodoos of Bryce Canyon and the badlands of the Uinta Basin, were deposited.

It was also a period of intense warming culminating in the well-studied event called the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, or PETM, when levels of heat were 18 degrees Celsius (32 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer than they were just before humans began releasing greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere. Some scientists consider the climate of this period a possible worst-case scenario for future climate change.

Proxies in the fossil record

Since it is not possible to measure precipitation that occurred millions of years ago, scientists examine evidence in the geologic record to draw conclusions about ancient climates. In this case, Reichler’s Colorado colleagues looked at plant fossils and ancient soils.

“From the shape and size of fossilized leaves, you can infer aspects of climate of that time because you look at where similar plants exist today with those leaves. So this would be a climate proxy. It’s not direct measurement of temperature or humidity; it’s indirect evidence for climate of that time,” Reichler said.

Another example is the geomorphology of the landscape, such as river channels.

“When there is intermittent, strong precipitation then followed by long periods of drought, that precipitation is forming the riverbed in different ways because there’s very high amounts of water flowing down and carving it out or transporting the rocks much more vigorously than were it a little drizzle every day,” he said.

These reconstructions are inherently uncertain because they rely on indirect evidence rather, Reichler cautioned, but they provide the best available information about how climate operated under extreme warming.

Understanding Earth’s ancient climates enables scientists to better evaluate how well models predict climate behavior under conditions different from the present. Comparisons with paleoclimate model simulations indicate today’s models underestimate how irregular rainfall can become during extreme warming, according to Reichler.

The dry conditions documented in the study were often caused not by less total rainfall, but by shorter wet seasons and longer gaps between rain events. These patterns began millions of years before the PETM and lasted long after, suggesting that once Earth’s climate system crosses certain thresholds, rainfall behavior can change in surprising and complicated ways.

For a warming world, in other words, the timing and reliability of rain may matter more than yearly averages, and that has important implications for ecosystems, floods, droughts and water management.


The study was posted online Dec. 22, 2025, in Nature Geoscience under the title, “More intermittent mid-latitude precipitation accompanied extreme early Palaeogene warmth.” Funding was provided by the National Science Foundation. Co-authors include sedimentologists Jacob Slawson and Piret Plink-Bjorkund of the Colorado School of Mines. Co-author Daniel Baldassare is now a research scientist with the Woodwell Climate Research Center.

Friday, January 09, 2026

 

Clues from the past reveal the West Antarctic Ice Sheet’s vulnerability to warming



Ancient sediment records show the ice sheet retreated at least five times during warmer periods millions of years ago



University of Toyama

Tracking the West Antarctic Ice Sheet during the Pliocene 

image: 

By studying Pliocene sediments deposited when Earth was warmer than today, the researchers found that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet retreated far inland at least five times. These findings provide critical insight into how the ice sheet may respond to ongoing climate warming and the potential scale of future sea-level rise.

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Credit: Professor Keiji Horikawa from the University of Toyama, Japan




The Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers, located in the Amundsen Sea sector of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS), are among the fastest-melting glaciers on Earth. Together, they are losing ice more rapidly than any other part of Antarctica, raising serious concerns about the long-term stability of the ice sheet and its contribution to future sea-level rise.

To better understand the risks that warmer conditions pose to the WAIS, researchers are looking back to the Pliocene Epoch (5.3–2.58 million years ago), when global temperatures were about 3–4 °C higher than today and sea levels stood more than 15 meters higher, with melted ice from Antarctica contributing to much of that rise.

Now, examining a deep-sea sediment from this region, researchers from the IODP Exp379 Scientists, found that the WAIS margin retreated far inland at least five times during the Pliocene period.

The study was led by Professor Keiji Horikawa from the Faculty of Science, University of Toyama, Japan, and included Masao Iwai (Kochi University), Claus-Dieter Hillenbrand (British Antarctic Survey), Christine S. Siddoway (Colorado College), and Anna Ruth Halberstadt (University of Texas at Austin). The findings, made available online on December 22, 2025, and published in Vol. 123 of the journal PNAS on January 6, 2026, highlight the vulnerability of the WAIS to future warming.

“We wanted to investigate whether the WAIS fully disintegrated during the Pliocene, how often such events occurred, and what triggered them,” says Prof. Horikawa.

The team analyzed marine sediments collected during the IODP Expedition 379. The sediments recovered from the Site U1532 on the Amundsen Sea continental rise act as a historical archive, recording changes in ice sheets and ocean conditions over millions of years.

They identified two distinct sediment layers reflecting alternating cold and warm climate phases: thick, gray, and finely laminated clays from cold glacial periods, when ice extended across much of the continental shelf; and thinner, greenish layers formed during warmer interglacial periods. The green color comes from the microscopic algae, indicating open, ice-free ocean waters. Crucially, these warm-period layers also contain iceberg-rafted debris (IRD), small rock fragments carried by icebergs, that broke off from the Antarctic continent. As these icebergs drifted across the Amundsen Sea and melted, they released this debris onto the seafloor.

The team identified 14 prominent IRD-rich intervals between 4.65 and 3.33 million years ago, each interpreted as a major melt event when the WAIS partially retreated.

To determine how far inland the ice had retreated, the researchers analyzed the chemical “fingerprints” of the sediments. They measured isotopes of strontium, neodymium, and lead, which vary depending on the age and type of the source rock. By comparing these signatures with those of modern seafloor sediments and bedrock samples from across West Antarctica, the team traced much of the debris to the continental interior, particularly the Ellsworth-Whitmore Mountains.

The sediment record reveals a consistent four-stage cycle of warming and cooling. During cold glacial periods, the ice sheet was extensive and stable, covering the continent. As the climate warmed, during the early interglacial stage, basal melting began, leading to the inland retreat of the ice sheet. At peak warmth, during the peak interglacial stage, large icebergs calved from the retreating ice margin and transported sediment from the Antarctic interior across the Amundsen Sea. As temperatures cooled again, during the glacial-onset stage, the ice sheet rapidly regrew, pushing previously deposited sediments toward the shelf edge and transporting them further downslope into deeper waters.

“Our data and model results suggest that the Amundsen Sea sector of the WAIS persisted on the shelf throughout the Pliocene, punctuated by episodic but rapid retreat into the Byrd Subglacial Basin or farther inland, rather than undergoing permanent collapse,” says Prof. Horikawa

The findings indicate that the WAIS has undergone retreats far beyond its current extent, underscoring its extreme vulnerability to future warming and its potential to drive substantial sea-level rise.

 

***

 

Reference
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2508341122      

 

About University of Toyama, Japan
University of Toyama is a leading national university located in Toyama Prefecture, Japan, with campuses in Toyama City and Takaoka City. Formed in 2005 through the integration of three former national institutions, the university brings together a broad spectrum of disciplines across its 9 undergraduate schools, 8 graduate schools, and a range of specialized institutes. With more than 9,000 students, including a growing international cohort, the university is dedicated to high-quality education, cutting-edge research, and meaningful social contribution. Guided by the mission to cultivate individuals with creativity, ethical awareness, and a strong sense of purpose, the University of Toyama fosters learning that integrates the humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, and life sciences. The university emphasizes a global standard of education while remaining deeply engaged with the local community.

Website: https://www.u-toyama.ac.jp/en/

About Professor Keiji Horikawa from the University of Toyama, Japan
Keiji Horikawa is a Professor in the Faculty of Science at the University of Toyama, Japan, and a geochemist specializing in paleoceanography and paleoclimate research. His work focuses on reconstructing past climate and ocean conditions through geochemical analyses of marine sediment cores. He participated in the International Ocean Discovery Program Expedition 379 to the Amundsen Sea in 2019 and studies the response of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet to warm Pliocene climates. He heads the Horikawa Lab for Paleoceanography and Geochemistry, which aims to improve understanding of Earth’s climate system.

 

Funding information
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP21H04924 and JP25H01181 and JP21H03590, JP23K21746, and JP25K03252 and was conducted by the support of Joint Research Grant for the Environmental Isotope Study of Research Institute for Humanity and Nature, and partly carried out under the Joint Research Program of the Institute of Low Temperature Science, Hokkaido University (23G056).

C. Siddoway’s contributions were supported by U.S. NSF awards 1917176 and 1939146 was funded through the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) UK IODP grant NE/T010975/1. E.A. Cowan was supported by a postexpedition award from the U.S. Science Support Program of IODP.

Ancient Antarctica reveals a 'one–two punch' behind ice sheet collapse

Binghamton University

When we think of global warming, what first comes to mind is the air: crushing heatwaves that are felt rather than seen, except through the haziness of humid air. But when it comes to melting ice sheets, rising ocean temperatures may play more of a role — with the worst effects experienced on the other side of the globe.

A new paper in Nature Geoscience, “Spatially variable response of Antarctica’s ice sheets to orbital forcing during the Pliocene,” explores the complicated dynamics.

While Binghamton University Associate Professor of Earth Sciences Molly Patterson is the first author, the 43 co-authors include several Binghamton alumni, such as Christiana Rosenberg, MS ’20; Harold Jones ’18; and William Arnuk, PhD ’24. The study’s results directly address one of the main goals of the International Ocean Drilling Program (IODP) Expedition 374: to identify the sensitivity of the Antarctic ice sheet to Earth’s orbital configuration under a variety of climate boundary conditions. Because of this, all shipboard science team members are included as co-authors because of their contributions to the data sets used in the article, Patterson explained.

Their research considers the Antarctic ice sheet during the Late Pliocene period, from 3.3 to 2.6 million years ago. From 3.2 to 2.8 million years ago, the global average temperatures were around 2 to 3° Celsius higher than pre-industrial values, in line with the “middle of the road” scenario for climate change, in which temperatures are expected to rise around 2.7°C by 2100.

“Thus, Pliocene records are considered to be useful analogues for understanding what a future with this level of warming might be like,” Patterson explained.

Climate forcing refers to any external factor that causes a change in Earth’s energy balance —incoming versus outgoing heat — and ultimately leads to warming or cooling in the Earth system.

Non-human factors that can affect this energy balance include tectonic changes, volcanic eruptions and shifts in the sun’s energy output, such as sunspot cycles that happen every 11 years. Another factor is “orbital forcing,” or changes in Earth’s orbit around the sun; this has typically driven glacial and interglacial cycles, which have lasted around 100,000 years — at least for the last 800,000 years or so.

The non-human factors that affect the Earth’s climate occur on different time scales, Patterson said.

“Here we are using geological archives to test how these important components of the climate system respond naturally to warmer climates,” she said.

Antarctica is primarily divided into two sectors: West Antarctica, where the ice sheet sits in the ocean, and East Antarctica, where the ice sheet primarily sits on land. During the warm periods of the Pliocene, large parts of West Antarctica and some low-lying areas of East Antarctica experienced significant ice-melt, contributing to a 3- to 10-foot rise in global sea levels.

One of the study’s main conclusions: Under warming conditions similar to the Pliocene, the part of West Antarctica located adjacent to the Pacific Ocean will see its ice disappear at a faster rate. Over the long term, however, both oceanic and atmospheric warming will contribute to rising global sea levels.

You can think of it as an equation of sorts: A warmer climate leads to less sea ice around Antarctica, which then causes the ocean to heat up. Due to the warmer water, the parts of the ice sheet sitting on the ocean melt first. Over time, as the climate continues to warm, the ice sitting on land will also retreat.

“In other words, it’s a one–two punch on the system with a consequence of raising sea levels globally,” Patterson said.

What you may not realize: Because of gravitational effects similar to ocean tides, the loss of ice in the Southern Hemisphere actually has a greater impact on coastlines in the Northern Hemisphere. Conversely, when ice sheets lose mass in the Northern Hemisphere, Southern Hemisphere coastlines are affected more.

With that in mind, New York would be more affected by a 7-meter rise in sea levels from the loss of Antarctic ice than a similar rise from melting ice sheets in Greenland, Patterson pointed out.

Geological archives and modeling experiments provide the long-term context needed to evaluate current changes and help scientists identify the mechanisms that drive the climate system. Ultimately, this research may help us formulate more accurate predictions about our climate change future.

“Basically, geological archives serve as a vital tool for testing the accuracy of climate models used to project future scenarios,” Patterson said.

About Binghamton University

Binghamton University, State University of New York, is the #1 public university in New York and a top-100 institution nationally. Founded in 1946, Binghamton combines a liberal arts foundation with professional and graduate programs, offering more than 130 academic undergraduate majors, minors, certificates, concentrations, emphases, tracks and specializations, plus more than 90 master's, 40 doctoral and 50 graduate certificate programs. The University is home to nearly 18,000 students and more than 150,000 alumni worldwide. Binghamton's commitment to academic excellence, innovative research, and student success has earned it recognition as a Public Ivy and one of the best values in American higher education.