It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Tokyo Electric Power Company has begun its internal investigation of Fukushima Daiichi unit 3's primary containment vessel, using palm-sized micro-drones.
(Image: TEPCO)
Tokyo Electric Power Co (Tepco) said the investigation would take approximately two weeks and investigate the conditions inside the reactor as well as the access route for planned fuel debris retrieval, saying "we will continue to move forward safely and steadily with this task".
Air tightness has to be maintained at all times - see Tepco diagram below for more details - and each of the two drones flew for about 8 minutes.
The drones used are 13 centimetres by 12 centimetres, weigh 95 grams including battery, and have cameras and LED lights.
According to the plans, there will be initial flights to determine the range of radio communications in new flight areas, followed by the next stage of flights to obtain footage and then flights for detailed investigations.
According to The Asahi Shimbun, the plan for the drones to make an entire circuit inside the vessel was shortened because of poor communications. It quoted Akira Ono, president of Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Co, as saying: "There may be mist reducing visibility at times. We will make safety our top priority when deciding whether to continue the investigation."
Background
On 11 March 2011 a major earthquake struck Japan. It was followed by a 15-metre tsunami which disabled the power supply and cooling of three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and all three cores largely melted in the first three days. In units 1 to 3, the fuel and the metal cladding that formed the outer jacket of the fuel rods melted during the accident, then re-solidified as fuel debris. Unit 4 does not contain any used fuel or fuel debris as it had already been defuelled before the accident.
There is an estimated total of 880 tonnes of fuel debris in units 1-3. To reduce the risk from this fuel debris, preparations are under way for retrieving it from the reactors.
Tepco succeeded in extracting small samples of fuel debris from the unit 2 reactor in November 2024 and in April 2025. It reportedly concluded after studying the specific removal method that it would take around 12 to 15 years just to prepare for the work. There is a fair amount of uncertainty about the distribution of fuel debris in each of the reactors and decommissioning process is expected to continue into the second half of the century.
Nuclear included in Japan-Canada strategic roadmap
Enhanced cooperation in the area of clean energy, including small modular reactors, is one of the areas highlighted in the Canada-Japan Comprehensive Strategic Roadmap.
(Image: Japan's PM's office)
Details of the bilateral strategic agreement and roadmap were outlined during a visit to Japan by Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney (see picture above).
The roadmap says that "recognising the importance of energy security and food security in an era of heightened geopolitical uncertainty" the two countries will "enhance cooperation on clean energy technologies, including nuclear technologies, (particularly small modular reactors), hydrogen and its derivatives, carbon capture, utilisation, and storage, renewables, and energy-efficient industrial processes".
Carney said: "Japan is a trusted partner and a global leader in innovation, technology, and advanced manufacturing. Together, we are strengthening our economic security, securing resilient supply chains in critical minerals and clean energy, and deepening security and defence cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific."
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said: "Canada is an important partner for Japan in advancing cooperation in the field of economic security ... Canada’s abundant natural resources and Japan’s technological capabilities are complementary, and concrete projects involving companies from both countries are steadily progressing. For example, production at LNG Canada, which is of great significance for Japan’s energy security, began last year, and construction of a small modular reactor - the first of its kind in the G7 - also began in Ontario. In addition, projects related to critical minerals such as graphite are under way."
In their joint statement the two leaders said "we believe the new Comprehensive Strategic Roadmap will serve as an effective guide for ongoing collaboration, enhancing our joint resilience in the face of new challenges and opportunities".
About 15% of Canada's electricity comes from nuclear power, with 17 reactors, mostly in Ontario, providing 12.7 GWe of power capacity. It also has plans to build both new large-scale nuclear capacity and small modular reactors. Japan has 33 operable reactors with a capacity of 31.7 GWe. Of these, 15 reactors have restarted since 2011 and 10 are currently in the process of restart approval. The country's current goal is, with more reactor restarts, for nuclear to generate 20% of Japan's electricity by 2030.
Rook I uranium project gets construction approval
NexGen Energy has received the final regulatory approval for the Rook I uranium project in northern Saskatchewan, and will begin construction later this year.
(Image: NexGen)
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) decision to issue the Licence to Prepare Site and Construct the proposed uranium mine and mill came 14 business days after the conclusion of the last part of the regulator's two-part hearing process. The licence - which is valid until 31 March 2036 - covers site preparation and construction activities under Canada's Nuclear Safety and Control Act: operation of the facility would need NexGen to submit another licence application which would be subject to a future licensing hearing and decision.
Rook I is described by NexGen as the largest development-stage uranium project in Canada. Centred on the Arrow deposit, a high-grade uranium deposit discovered by the company in 2014, the project is in the southern Athabasca Basin, about 155 km north of the town of La Loche. The project is situated on Treaty 8 territory, the Homeland of the Métis, and is within territories of the Denesųłiné, Cree, and Métis.
The Arrow deposit has a resource estimate of 357 million pounds U3O8 (137,319 tU) in the measured and indicated mineral resources category, grading 3.10% U3O8. Probable mineral reserves have been estimated at 240 million pounds U3O8, grading 2.37% U3O8. A 2021 NI 43-101 feasibility study for the project envisages production of up to 14 million kilograms of U3O8 annually for 24 years.
The project received environmental approval from the Province of Saskatchewan in November 2023, and, with all approvals now secured, NexGen said it is set to begin construction. A final investment decision has already been made, and the team, procurement, engineering, vendors, contractors and capital are in place to commence construction activities with advanced site and shaft sinking preparation. Construction will officially begin in this summer, the company said, and construction is expected to take four years to complete.
NexGen founder and CEO Leigh Curyer said the CNSC's approval "represents one of the most rigorous and comprehensive regulatory processes undertaken for a resource project globally" and, as well as acknowledging NexGen's team, expressed the company's "sincere gratitude" to its Indigenous Nation partners, local communities, Premier Scott Moe and the Government of Saskatchewan, Government partners, regulatory bodies, and stakeholders who have contributed to the advancement of the project over the past decade.
"The world is changing fast, and NexGen's Rook I is now ready to be a significant contributor to global requirements for nuclear energy and Canada's role as an energy superpower. As global demand for reliable, clean, baseload nuclear energy continues to accelerate at an unprecedented pace, uranium is the critical fuel for powering industrial electrification and the digital infrastructure of tomorrow. Simply put, energy is the key to our global growth," Curyer said.
In February, Reuters reported that NexGen had held preliminary talks with data centre providers about securing finance for a new mine. Speaking to investors in NexGen's fourth quarter conference call on 4 March - one day before the CNSC announcement - Curyer said the first 12 months of construction is expected to cost around CAD300 million (USD219 million). NexGen is well funded to begin construction thanks to already completed equity raises and offtake agreements. Further offtake agreements are already in advanced negotiation, with contracts expected to be announced this year, he said, but the start of construction or production will not be dependent on those new contracts being in place.
"We know exactly what we're doing every day of that 48-month process, who's doing it, who's responsible for it within NextGen," Curyer said. "And as I said, once we're in that basement rock, the highest risk around cost and schedule has been mitigated."
Curyer told investors the company would issue a detailed construction timeline once the licensing process had concluded.
Korean partnership to consider use of HTGRs
The Korea Chemical Industry Association and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute have signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in studying the deployment of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors in the petrochemical industry.
(Image: Korea Chemical Industry Association)
High-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) are Generation IV, graphite-moderated, helium-cooled reactors (typically 100–600+ MWt) that use TRISO-coated fuel to achieve high outlet temperatures (700°C-1,000°C). They offer enhanced safety through passive heat removal, preventing core meltdowns, and are designed for industrial process heat, hydrogen production, and electricity generation.
The Korea Chemical Industry Association and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) said they signed the MoU to "establish a foundation for mutual technological cooperation related to high-temperature gas reactors capable of supplying high-temperature process heat to strengthen the competitiveness of the chemical industry". They added: "As a carbon-free energy source, [the HTGR] is considered a key alternative for achieving carbon neutrality in the domestic petrochemical industry."
Through the MoU, the two organisations agreed to establish a practical technology cooperation ecosystem to achieve carbon neutrality by promoting realistic HTGR designs that reflect the needs of domestic petrochemical companies, and creating opportunities for commercialisation of HTGR-related technologies.
A signing ceremony for the MoU was held on 6 March and was attended by key officials from both organisations, including Eom Chan-Wang, vice chairman of the Korea Chemical Industry Association, and Lim In-cheol, vice president of KAERI.
"The petrochemical industry is a key customer for the high-temperature gas reactor that the institute is promoting," Lim In-Cheol said. "Based on this agreement, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute will build a close network with the domestic petrochemical industry and create a practical technological cooperation ecosystem."
Eom Chan-wang added: "The chemical industry is being required to achieve carbon neutrality in industrial heat energy amid global environmental regulations. Through this business agreement, we will support the establishment of a technology base that can be practically applied to domestic companies, thereby helping them secure global competitiveness."
Studsvik acquires Swedish SMR project development firm
Swedish nuclear technical services provider Studsvik has announced its acquisition of small modular reactor project development company Kärnfull Next, expanding its role from supporting the world's existing nuclear fleet into the development of new nuclear projects.
(Image: Studsvik)
The enterprise value of Kärnfull Next - which specialises in technology-agnostic small modular reactor (SMR) project development - in the transaction is about EUR6.5 million (USD7.5 million) on a cash-free, debt-free, basis. EUR3 million will be paid in cash and EUR3.5 million in newly issued Studsvik shares at closing. Additional consideration of up to EUR2 million in shares may be payable through staged payments to 2029, alongside performance-based earn-outs of up to EUR14 million linked to the successful development and sale of project development companies.
Subject to customary conditions and regulatory approvals, the transaction is expected to close during the second quarter of 2026.
"The move marks a strategic step as governments and industry increasingly turn to nuclear power to support energy security, electrification, and net-zero ambitions," Studsvik said. "By adding project development capability, Studsvik will now be able to support nuclear projects from their earliest stages through to operation and decommissioning ... the company is expected to announce further partnerships that demonstrate how this expanded capability will be applied in practice."
"Together, Studsvik and Kärnfull Next will build a truly integrated nuclear services platform - and establish Studsvik as the home for entrepreneurial ambition in nuclear," said Daniel Aegerter, founder and CEO of Armada Investment AG and the largest shareholder in Studsvik.
Studsvik AB President and CEO Karl Thedéen added: "Kärnfull Next's project development expertise combined with Studsvik's unrivalled technical capabilities creates a compelling platform for growth."
Under the agreement, Kärnfull Next founders Christian Sjölander and John Ahlberg will join Studsvik's executive team. "Together, we will accelerate Studsvik's transformation into a truly integrated nuclear services champion," they said.
In 2023, Studsvik signed a memorandum of understanding with Kärnfull Next to investigate the possibility of constructing and operating SMRs on the Studsvik industrial site near Nyköping on Sweden's east coast. Studsvik said the site is in a strategic location and houses the company's broad expertise in nuclear technology, including fuel and materials technology, reactor analysis software and fuel optimisation, decommissioning and radiation protection services as well as technical solutions for handling, conditioning and volume reduction of radioactive waste.
In March 2022, Kärnfull Next signed a memorandum of understanding with GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy on the deployment of the BWRX-300 in Sweden.
Kärnfull Next has been conducting site selection and feasibility studies in several municipalities in Sweden since 2022. By establishing multiple SMR parks as part of the same programme, the company expects to achieve economies of scale in terms of technology selection, construction partners, power purchase agreements and financing partners. In February last year, the company secured land rights for the project to build a power plant based on SMRs in the municipality of Valdemarsvik in Östergötland county in southeastern Sweden.
Centrus Energy and Oklo have announced discussions on a joint venture "focused on deconversion services for high-assay low-enriched uranium and the advancement of related fuel-cycle technologies and supply chains".
(Image: Oklo)
The joint venture's activities would take place at Centrus's Piketon site in southern Ohio, which is also near Oklo's planned 1.2 GW power campus.
According to the announcement from the two companies "the potential joint venture would aim to enable an integrated and efficient coupling of uranium enrichment and deconversion to improve efficiency and costs through co-location and expand domestic advanced nuclear fuel capacity to serve Oklo's needs and broader US nuclear deployment".
Deconversion is the step when enriched uranium is converted into a different chemical form, such as uranium oxide or uranium metal, before it is fabricated into fuel.
The two companies believe that having a central hub for deconversion services co-located with high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment would eliminate the need for each fuel fabrication facility to establish its own deconversion line.
Uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel services provider Centrus's CEO and President, Amir Vexler, said: "We look forward to exploring options to co-locate and scale deconversion services to improve efficiency and support growing demand."
Jacob DeWitte, CEO and co-founder of Oklo, said: "This framework supports deeper discussions with Centrus on potential pathways to expand deconversion capacity, strengthen domestic supply chains, and advance a more efficient fuel cycle model that operates from the same location."
As part of the discussions, the two sides will "explore opportunities for potential coordination of regulatory and R&D activities, including joint engagement with US federal agencies to propose solutions that support co-location of deconversion and enrichment services".
In January Meta said it would support Oklo's project to develop a 1.2 GW power campus in Pike County, Ohio, by prepaying for power and providing funding to advance project certainty for Oklo's sodium-cooled Aurora powerhouse deployment.
The same month, the US Department of Energy awarded Centrus Energy's American Centrifuge Operating USD900 million of funding to provide uranium enrichment services. Centrus said that it intended to leverage the funding to support its multi-billion dollar expansion in Piketon, which - as well as producing HALEU - will also include additional LEU production to serve commercial utilities and the existing reactor fleet.
Decommissioning of Finnish research reactor completed
Finland's Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority has declared that the site of the country's first nuclear reactor is no longer classified as a nuclear facility following the dismantling of the Finnish Reactor 1 in Espoo.
The FiR1 research reactor (Image: Fortum)
The Finnish Reactor 1 (FiR1) water-cooled, pool-type TRIGA Mark II research reactor was commissioned by the Helsinki University of Technology in 1962. The reactor was originally built for research and education and was later also used for isotope production and radiotherapy. Operational responsibility for the reactor was transferred to the VTT Technical Research Centre in 1971. Although licensed to operate until 2023, VTT decided in 2012 to stop the use of FiR1 for financial reasons. The reactor - with a thermal capacity of 250 kW - ran for the last time on 30 June 2015. In 2017, VTT submitted an application for permission from the Council of State to decommission the reactor, which was granted in June 2021.
In February 2021, partially used irradiated fuel from the reactor was transported to the USA for use in a TRIGA Mark I research reactor operated by the US Geological Survey in Denver, Colorado. The USGS required additional fuel to continue operating its reactor, but the production of suitable fuel had been suspended for several years.
The dismantling of the FiR1 reactor and the management of nuclear waste were carried out by VTT in cooperation with Fortum between 2023 and 2025.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) supervised the planning and execution of the decommissioning from the beginning. The supervision ended last December when STUK decided to release the research reactor from regulatory control. After the decision, the research reactor is no longer considered a nuclear facility. The dismantled reactor area and premises in Otaniemi, Espoo, do not differ in any way from the surrounding area in terms of radiation safety, it said. The building can now be repurposed.
At the same time as FiR1 was released from regulatory control, STUK also released VTT's materials research laboratory, located in the same building, from oversight. The research laboratory had conducted studies on radioactive materials since the 1970s. The operation and decommissioning of the FiR1 research reactor were regulated by nuclear energy legislation, whereas the laboratory's activities were governed by the radiation act. The decommissioning of the laboratory was also subject to the radiation act and was carried out by VTT alongside the decommissioning of FiR1.
VTT delivered the radioactive waste generated from the dismantling and decontamination of the laboratory to Fortum for disposal at the repository located at the Loviisa nuclear power plant, just as with the reactor's waste. Before releasing the laboratory from oversight, STUK confirmed that the premises were free of radioactive contamination.
FiR1 is the first nuclear reactor to be decommissioned in Finland. The decommissioning of the country's nuclear power plants is not expected in the immediate future, but Finland is currently reforming its nuclear energy legislation and the complementary STUK regulations.
Kai Hämäläinen, a principal advisor at STUK, said the lessons learned from dismantling the FiR1 research reactor and supervising the process have been valuable in this work. "Until now, the law and regulations have not described the final stages of a nuclear facility's life cycle and the technical requirements for decommissioning in much detail. The experience gained has now been used in drafting the new law and in writing STUK's regulations," he said.
GBE-N granted licence to generate electricity
Great British Energy - Nuclear has been granted an electricity generating licence - required by all electricity generating companies - by the UK's gas and electricity markets regulator Ofgem.
How a Rolls-Royce SMR might look (Image: Rolls-Royce SMR)
Gaining such a licence, Great British Energy - Nuclear (GBE-N) said, represents "a landmark moment" in its mission to deliver Europe's first small modular reactors (SMRs). "Acquiring a generation licence is one of the first in a chain of approvals needed to construct and operate power infrastructure in the UK. Having this certification means Ofgem deems GBE-N to be a qualified, well-run organisation, which is capable of meeting national safety standards in electricity generation."
"This milestone reflects the dedication and expertise of our team, whose efforts in technical planning and rigorous compliance have enabled us to meet Ofgem's high standards," said Simon Bowen, Chair of GBE-N. "Our newly secured licence empowers us to contribute significantly to the country's energy security, bolstering grid resilience, and decarbonising our economy. This is another proof-point that we are delivering new nuclear at pace and with focus."
The UK government launched GBE-N in 2023 as an arms-length body that will be responsible for driving the delivery of new nuclear projects, with the aim of increasing the share of nuclear in the UK's electricity mix from the current 15% to 25% by 2050.
In June last year, Rolls-Royce SMR was selected as the UK government's preferred technology for the country's first SMR project. A final investment decision is expected to be taken in 2029.
In November, the government announced that Wylfa on the island of Anglesey, North Wales, will host three Rolls-Royce small modular reactors. It said the site - where a Magnox plant is being decommissioned - could potentially host up to eight SMRs.
GBE-N will start activity on the site this year with the aim for Wylfa's SMRs to be supplying power to the grid from the mid-2030s.
The Rolls-Royce SMR is a 470 MWe design based on a small pressurised water reactor. It will provide consistent baseload generation for at least 60 years. Ninety percent of the SMR - measuring about 16 metres by 4 metres - will be built in factory conditions, limiting activity on-site primarily to assembly of pre-fabricated, pre-tested, modules which significantly reduces project risk and has the potential to drastically shorten build schedules.
Alongside the announcement that SMRs would be built at Wylfa, the government announced that GBE-N had been tasked with identifying suitable sites that could potentially host further large-scale reactor projects beyond the current deployments at Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C. GBE-N will report back by Autumn 2026 on potential sites to inform future decisions in the next Spending Review and beyond. The Energy Secretary has requested this includes sites across the UK, including Scotland.
Haiyang 3 completes cold tests
Cold functional tests have been completed at unit 3 of the Haiyang nuclear power plant in China's Shandong province, State Power Investment Corporation has announced.
(Image: SPIC)
Such tests are carried out to confirm whether components and systems important to safety are properly installed and ready to operate in a cold condition. The main purpose of cold functional tests is to verify the leak-tightness of the primary circuit and components - such as pressure vessels, pipelines and valves of both the nuclear and conventional islands - and to clean the main circulation pipes. The tests mark the first time the reactor systems are operated together with the auxiliary systems.
"The cold test confirmed that the four main coolant pumps and their domestically produced frequency converters of Unit 3 are operating normally, the primary loop pressure boundary integrity is good, the pressure-bearing performance meets standards, and the installation quality of related system equipment is excellent," State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) said. "The test was a success on the first attempt."
Completion of the cold tests lays "a solid foundation for subsequent key milestones such as hot functional testing and reactor fuel loading, as well as high-quality commissioning," it added.
Hot functional tests involve increasing the temperature of the reactor coolant system and carrying out comprehensive tests to ensure that coolant circuits and safety systems are operating as they should. Carried out before the loading of nuclear fuel, such testing simulates the thermal working conditions of the power plant and verifies that nuclear island and conventional equipment and systems meet design requirements.
The construction of two new reactors at each of the Sanmen, Haiyang and Lufeng sites was approved by China's State Council in April 2021. The approvals were for Sanmen units 3 and 4, Haiyang 3 and 4 and units 5 and 6 of the Lufeng plant. The Sanmen and Haiyang plants are already home to two Westinghouse AP1000 units each, and two CAP1000 units - the Chinese version of the AP1000 - were approved for Phase II (units 3 and 4) of each plant.
The first safety-related concrete was poured for the nuclear island of Haiyang unit 3 in July 2022, and in March the outer steel dome of the nuclear island containment building was hoisted into place. Construction of Haiyang 4 began in April last year. The planned construction period for Haiyang 3 and 4 was 56 months, with the two units scheduled to be fully operational in 2027.
Cold functional tests were completed at unit 3 of the Sanmen plant last month.
US establishes Nuclear Energy Launch Pad
The US Department of Energy and the National Reactor Innovation Center are setting up a Nuclear Energy Launch Pad designed to "promote the rapid development and implementation of advanced nuclear technologies by private industry".
(Image: INL)
The Nuclear Energy Launch Pad is intended to build on the Department of Energy (DOE) Reactor Pilot Program - which has 11 projects accepted and a target for three reactors to reach criticality by 4 July - and its Fuel Line Pilot Program, which has had 9 projects accepted and aims to establish a domestic nuclear fuel supply chain for testing new reactors.
The DOE plans to transition the pilot programmes' new and future applicants to the Launch Pad "and expand beyond authorisation to include the testing and operation necessary to scale first-of-a-kind technologies toward widescale commercial deployment. This integrated approach ensures continuity from initial pilot authorisation through extended operational validation, reducing the risk and timelines for advanced reactors and other advanced nuclear facility commercialisation".
There will be two pathways running: the Launch Pad Idaho National Laboratory, which will cover more than 2,000 acres, with eligible projects including advanced reactors, fuel fabrication, recycling, enrichment and other innovations; and Launch Pad USA, which will offer the ability to authorise the operation of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities outside of Idaho National Laboratory.
The DOE will not be providing funding for successful applicants but will be providing resources. Rian Bahran, DOE deputy assistant secretary for Nuclear Reactors, said: "Through this initiative, developers can access infrastructure, expertise, and services essential for the siting, construction, and operation of their nuclear facilities."
Idaho National Laboratory Director John Wagner called it "a significant evolution in the ecosystem for advancing nuclear technologies from concept to deployment" that "offers nuclear developers something unprecedented: An 890-square-mile federal site with more than 75 years of reactor testing experience, existing infrastructure, direct access to national nuclear expertise and streamlined regulatory pathways - all enabling developers to move from demonstration to deployment at the pace America's energy security demands".
The initial request for applications "is expected in the next few months" and it will be an annual process. Applications already submitted to the DOE's pilot programmes may be transferred to the Launch Pad and will not need to reapply.
NRC issues construction permit for first Natrium plant
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved a construction permit for TerraPower's Kemmerer unit 1 project - the first such permit for a commercial-scale non-light water reactor in the country for four decades.
How a Natrium plant might look, with the nuclear island on the right and the energy island on the left (Image: Natrium)
The technology
The Bill Gates-chaired company's Natrium 345 MWe sodium-cooled fast reactor has a molten-salt-based energy storage system which allows it to temporarily boost output to 500 MWe when needed, enabling the plant to follow daily electric load changes and integrate seamlessly with fluctuating renewable resources.
The licensing process
TerraPower submitted its construction permit application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in March 2024 and it was docketed by the NRC and the formal review began in May 2024. The NRC established an initial 27-month review schedule, however the review was completed in 18 months after a streamlined mandatory hearing process.
TerraPower began non-nuclear construction for the Kemmerer, Wyoming, plant in June 2024, and expects the project - which is near a retiring coal plant - to be complete in 2030. It is being developed through the US Department of Energy's Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program.
The NRC said it was the first commercial reactor approved for construction for nearly a decade and the first non-light water reactor in more than 40 years: "This is a historic step forward for advanced nuclear energy in the United States and reflects our commitment to delivering timely, predictable decisions grounded in a rigorous and independent safety review," said NRC Chairman Ho Nieh.
TerraPower's President and CEO, Chris Levesque, said: "Today is a historic day for the United States' nuclear industry. This is the first commercial-scale, advanced nuclear plant to receive this permit. Our team has worked relentlessly for over 4 years with the NRC staff to get to this moment. We had extensive pre-application engagement with the NRC; and we submitted a robust and thorough construction permit application almost 2 years ago. We have spent thousands of manpower hours working to achieve this momentous accomplishment."
What’s next?
Levesque said: "We plan to start construction on the Natrium plant in the coming weeks and look forward to bringing the first Natrium reactor and energy storage system to market in the great state of Wyoming."
The NRC said that TerraPower subsidiary US SFR Owner would need to submit a separate operating licence application which would need NRC approval before the facility could operate.
Last month, social media giant Meta announced that its future nuclear energy plans included funding to support the development in the USA of up to eight Natrium sodium fast reactors - two new units capable of generating up to 690 MW of firm power with delivery as early as 2032, plus the rights for energy from up to six other Natrium units capable of producing 2.1 GW and targeted for delivery by 2035.
The Natrium reactor is a TerraPower and GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy technology. Last month it was accepted into the UK's Generic Design Assessment process.
Largest module installed at second Lufeng unit
The CA20 module - measuring about 20 metres in length, 14 metres in width and with a height of 21 metres - has been hoisted into place at the second unit of the Lufeng nuclear power plant in Guangdong province.
(Image: CNNC)
The 'super module' was hoisted into place on 1 March, China National Nuclear Corporation construction subsidiary CNNC 23 Engineering Co Ltd announced.
(Image: CNNC)
The cuboid-shaped CA20 module - weighing more than 1,000 tonnes - consists of 32 wall modules and 39 floor modules. It will comprise plant and equipment for used fuel storage, transmission, the heat exchanger and waste collection, among other things.
(Image: CNNC)
The proposed construction of four 1250 MWe CAP1000 reactors (units 1-4) at the Lufeng site was approved by China's National Development and Reform Commission in September 2014. However, the construction of units 1 and 2 did not receive State Council approval until 19 August 2024. The first safety-related concrete for the nuclear island of unit 1 was poured on 24 February last year, with that of unit 2 following in December. Approval for units 3 and 4 is still pending. The CAP1000 design is the Chinese version of the Westinghouse AP1000.
The construction of Hualong One reactors as units 5 and 6 at the Lufeng plant was approved by the State Council in April 2022. First concrete for unit 5 was poured on 8 September 2022, with that for unit 6 following on 26 August 2023. Units 5 and 6 are expected to be connected to the grid in 2028 and 2029, respectively.
According to China General Nuclear, once all six units are in operation, the Lufeng plant will generate about 52 TWh, which will reduce standard coal consumption by almost 16 million tonnes and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by more than 42 million tonnes.
ABS & HD Hyundai to Advance Nuclear-Powered Electric Propulsion Systems
(L-R): Matthew Mueller, ABS Vice President, Regional Business Development, Hak-mu Shim, HD HSHI Executive Vice President & Byung-hun Kwon, HD KSOE Executive Vice President
ABS, HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering (HD KSOE) and HD Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries (HD HSHI) signed a joint development project (JDP) for the “Conceptual Design of a Nuclear-Powered Electric Propulsion System.”
The agreement forms a framework to assess the technical feasibility of a nuclear-powered electric propulsion system specific to a 16K TEU container ship.
“This project represents an important step in exploring the potential of a nuclear-powered electric propulsion system for container vessels. By combining HD Hyundai’s shipbuilding expertise with ABS’ deep engineering experience in maritime safety, we aim to evaluate technologies that can support safer, more efficient and lower-emission operations for the next generation of propulsion solutions,” said Matthew Mueller, ABS Vice President, North Pacific Business Development.
Kwon Byung-hun, Head of the Electrification Center at HD KSOE, said: “In response to the growing demand for eco-friendly ships, we are continuously pursuing the development of electric propulsion systems using nuclear energy—a carbon-free energy source. We will expand our R&D efforts to strengthen our technological competitiveness in nuclear-linked electric propulsion.”
Under the agreement, HD KSOE and HD HSHI will develop the basic design, electrical component specifications and arrangement plans for a nuclear-powered electric propulsion system tailored for container ships.
As the marine and offshore industries refocus on nuclear energy, ABS has worked to support its application at sea as well as a series of advanced development projects with leading companies. ABS released a study examining a potential SMR-powered LNG carrier, available here. The ABS Requirements for Nuclear Power Systems for Marine and Offshore Applications are available for download here. ABS also unveiled the industry’s first comprehensive requirements for floating nuclear power plants. The Pathways to a Low Carbon Future Floating Nuclear Power Plant study is available here.
The products and services herein described in this press release are not endorsed by The Maritime Executive
The Question Of The Alevi Minority In Turkey And Their Religious Identity – Analysis
Despite occasional suggestions from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—including floated referendums on EU talks in the mid-2010s—the path to Turkish EU membership remains blocked, fueling debates over whether accession would strengthen European security against radicalism or exacerbate cultural and historical divides.
A current EU political concern is reflected in many controversial issues, and one of those the most important is about whether or not to accept Turkey as a full member state (being a candidate state since 1999). Turkey is, on one hand, governed as a secular democracy by moderate Islamic political leaders, seeking to play the role of a bridge between the Middle East and Europe. However, Turkey is, on the other hand, an almost 100% Muslim country with a rising tide of Islamic radicalism (especially since the 2023 Israeli aggression on Gaza and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Gazans), surrounded by neighbors with a similar problem.
There are two fundamental arguments by all of those who are opposing Turkish admission to the EU: 1) Muslim Turkish citizens (70 million) will never be properly integrated into the European environment that is predominantly Christian; and 2) In the case of Turkish accession, historical clashes between the (Ottoman) Turks and European Christians are going to be revived. Here we will refer only to one statement against Turkish accession: it “would mean the end of Europe” (former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) – a statement which clearly reflects the opinion by 80% of Europeans polled in 2009 that Turkey’s admission to the EU would not be a good thing. At the same time, there are only 32% of Turkish citizens who had a favorable opinion of the EU, and, therefore, the admission process, for which formal and strict negotiations began already in 2005, is very likely to be finally abortive.
Islamic fundamentalism and Turkey’s admission to the EU
The question of Turkish admission to the EU is, by the majority of Europeans, seen through the glass of Islamic fundamentalism as one of the most serious challenges to European stability and, above all, identity that is primarily based on Christian values and tradition. Islamic fundamentalism is understood as an attempt to undermine existing state practices for the very reason that militant Muslims (like ISIS/ISIL/DAESH) are fighting to re-establish the medieval Islamic Caliphate and the establishment of theocratic authority over the global Islamic community – the Umma. Nevertheless, religious fundamentalism first came to the attention of the Western part of the international community in 1979 when a pro-American absolute monarchy was replaced with a Shia (Shiia) Muslim anti-American semi-theocracy in Iran. In other words, Iranian Shia Muslim clerics, who were all the time the spiritual leaders of the Iranians, became their political leaders too. The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 prompted possibilities of similar uprisings in other Muslim societies, followed by pre-emptive actions against them by other governments.
What can be the most dangerous scenario for Turkey from the European perspective if the accession negotiations fail is, probably, Turkish turn towards the Muslim world, followed by rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism, which can be properly controlled by the EU if Turkey were to become a member state of the club? That is, probably, the most important “security” factor to note regarding the EU-Turkish relations and accession negotiations. Namely, following the 9/11 terror attacks (on Washington and New York), it was becoming more and more clear that it was better to have (Islamic) Turkey inside the EU rather than as a part of an anti-Western bloc of Muslim states.
In general, for Western governments and especially for the US and Israeli administrations, Shia Muslims became seen after the 1979 Iranian Islamic (Shia) revolution as the most potential Islamic fundamentalists and the religious terrorists. Therefore, the oppression of Shia minorities by the Sunni majorities in several Muslim countries is deliberately not recorded and criticized by Western governments. The case of the Alevi people in Turkey is one of the best examples of such a policy. However, at the same time, the EU administration is paying full attention to the Kurdish question in Turkey, even requiring the recognition of the Kurds by the Turkish government as an ethnocultural minority (as different from the ethnic Turks). Why are the Alevi people discriminated against in this respect by the EU’s minority policy in Turkey? The answer is because the Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but Alevis are considered a Turkish faction of the (militant) Shia Muslim community within the Islamic world.
In the next paragraphs, I would like to shed more light on the question of who the Alevi people are and what Alevism is as a religious identity, taking into account the fact that religion, undoubtedly, has become increasingly important in both the studies and practice of international relations and global politics. We also have to keep in mind that religious identity was predominant in comparison to national or ethnic identities for several centuries, being the crucial cause of political conflicts in many cases.
What is Alevism?
The Alevi people are those Muslims who believe in Alevism, that is, in fact, a sect or form of Islam. Especially in Turkey, Alevism is a second common sect of Islam. The number of Alevi people is between 10 and 15 million. The name of the sect comes from the term Alevi, which means “the follower of Ali”. Some experts in Islamic studies claim that Alevism is a branch of Shi’ism (Shia Islam), but, as a matter of fact, the Alevi Umma is not homogeneous, and Alevism cannot be understood without another Islamic sect – Bektashism. Nevertheless, Alevi culture produced many poets and folk songs, alongside the fact that Alevi people are experiencing many everyday life problems in living according to their beliefs in Islam.
The Alevis (Turkish: Aleviler or Alevilik; Kurdish: Elewî) are a religious, sub-ethnic, and cultural community in Turkey representing at the same time the biggest sect of Islam in Turkey. Alevism is a way of Islamic mysticism or Sufism that believes in one God by accepting Muhammad as a Prophet, and the Holy Qur’ān. Alevi people love Ehlibeyt – the family of Prophet Muhammad-, unifying prayer and supplication, prayer in their language, to prefer a free person instead of Umma (Muslim community), to prefer to love God instead of God’s fear, to overcome Sharia reaching to the real world, believing in the Holy Qur’ān’s genuine instead of shave. Alevism has found its cure in human love; they believe that people are immortal because a person is manifested by God. Women and men are praying together, in their language, with their music that is played via bağlama, with semah. Alevism is an entirety of beliefs that depends on Islam’s rules, which are based on the Holy Qur’ān, according to Muhammad’s commands; by interpreting Islam with a universal dimension, it opens new doors to the earth. The Alevi system of belief is Islamic with a triplet composed of Allah, Muhammad, and Ali.
There are many strong arguments about the relationship between Alevism and Shi’ism. Some researchers say that Alevism is a form of Shi’ism, but some of them say that Alevism is sectarian. We have to keep in mind that Shi’ism is the second most common type of Islam in the world after Sunnism. This is a branch of Islam which is called the Party of Ali for the reason that it recognizes Ali’s claim to succeed his cousin and father-in-law, the Prophet Muhammad, as the spiritual leader of Islam during the first civil war in the Islamic world (656−661). In most of the Islamic countries, the Sunnis are in the majority, but the Shi’ites comprise some 80 million believers, or, in other words, around 13% out of all the world’s Muslims. The Shi’ites are predominant in three countries: Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. However, Alevism cannot be understood as identical to Sufism, which is the mystical aspect of Islam that arose as a reaction to strict religious orthodoxy. Sufis seek personal union with God, and their Christian Orthodox counterparts in the Middle Ages were the Bogumils.
Undoubtedly, Alevism has some similar issues with Shi’ism; at the same time, there are a lot of differences concerning the general practice of Islam. However, in some Western literature, Alevism is presented as a branch of Shi’ism, or more specifically, as a Turk or Ottoman way of Shi’ism.
Split within Muslims
We have to keep in mind that in this place, the Islamic expansion in the 7th and 8th centuries was accompanied by political conflicts which followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and the question of who is entitled to succeed him is still splitting up the Muslim world today. In other words, when the Prophet died, a caliph (successor) was chosen to rule all Muslims. However, as the caliph lacked prophetic authority, he enjoyed secular power but not authority in religious doctrine. The first caliph was Abu Bakr, who is considered, together with his three successors, as the “rightly guided” (or orthodox) caliphs. They ruled according to the Quran and the practices of the Prophet, but, thereafter, Islam became split into two antagonistic branches: Sunni and Shia.
The Sunni-Shia division basically started when Ali ibn Abi Talib (599−661), Muhammad’s son-in-law and heir, assumed the Caliphate after the murder of his predecessor, Uthman (574−656). The civil war ended with the defeat of Ali and the victory of Uthman’s cousin and governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya Umayyad (602−680), after the Battle of Suffin. However, those Muslims (like the Alevi people, for instance) who claimed that Ali was the rightful caliph took the name of Shiat Ali – the “Partisans of Ali”. They believe that Ali was the last legitimate caliph and, therefore, the Caliphate should pass down only to those who are direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima, and Ali, her husband. Ali’s son, Hussein (626−680), claimed the Caliphate, but the Umayyads killed him together with his followers at the Battle of Karbala in 680. This city, today in contemporary Iraq, is the holiest of all sites for Shia Muslims (Shi’ism). Even though the Prophet Muhammad’s family line ended in 873, the Shia Muslims believe that the last descendant did not die, as he is rather “hidden” and will return. Those basic Shia interpretations of the history of Islam are followed by the Alevi people, and, therefore, many researchers are simply considering Alevism as a faction of Shi’ism.
The dominant branch of Islam is Sunni. The Sunni Muslims, unlike their Shia opponents, are not demanding that the caliph has to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. They are also accepting the Arabic tribal customs in the government. According to their point of view, political leadership is in the hands of the Muslim community as such. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the religious and political power in Islam was never again united into a political community after the death of the fourth caliph.
Alevism in Islam
Alevi people believe in one God, Allah, and, therefore, Alevism, as a form of Islam, is a monotheistic religion. Like all other Muslims, the Alevis understand that God is in everything around them in nature. It is important to notice that there are those Alevis who believe in good and bad spirits (and kind of angels), and, therefore, they often practice superstition to benefit from good ones and to avoid harm from bad ones. For that reason, for many Muslims, Alevism is not a real Islam as it is more a form of paganism imbued with Christianity. However, a majority of Alevis do not believe in these supernatural beings, saying that it is an expression of Satanism.
The essence of Alevism is in the fact that Alevis believe that according to the original text of the Quran, Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, was to be the Prophet’s successor as God’s vice-regent on earth or caliph. However, they claim that the parts of the original Quran related to Ali were taken out by his rivals. According to Alevis, the Quran, as a fundamental holy book for all Muslims, should be interpreted esoterically. For them, there are much deeper spiritual truths in the Quran than the strict rules and regulations that appear on the surface. However, most Alevi writers will quote individual Quranic verses as an appeal for authority to support their view on a given topic or to justify a certain Alevi religious tradition. The Alevis generally promote the reading of the Quran in the Turkish language rather than in Arabic, stressing that it is of fundamental importance for a person to understand exactly what he or she is reading, which is not possible if the Quran is read in Arabic. However, many Alevis do not read the Quran or other holy books, nor base their daily beliefs and practices on them, as they consider these ancient books to be irrelevant today.
The Alevis are reading three different books. If, according to their opinion, there is no proper information in the Quran, as the Sunnis corrupted the authentic words of Muhammad, it is necessary to reveal the original Prophet’s messages by alternative readings. Therefore, Alevi believers are looking to (1) the Nahjul Balagha, the traditions and sayings of Ali; (2) the Buyruks, the collections of doctrine and practices of several of the 12 imams, especially Cafer; and (3) the Vilayetnameler or the Menakıbnameler, books that describe events in the lives of great Alevis such as Haji Bektash. Except for these basic books, there are some special sources to participate in the creation of Alevi theology, like poet-musicians Yunus Emre (13−14th century), Kaygusuz Abdal (15th century), and Pir Sultan Abdal (16th century).
The foundation of Alevism is in the love of the Prophet and Ehlibeyt. Twelve Imams are godlike, glorified by the Alevis. Waiting for the last Imam’s (Muslim religious leader) reappearance, the Shia Muslims established a special council composed of 12 religious scholars (Ulema) that elect a supreme Imam. For instance, Ayatollah (“Holy Man”) Ruhollah Khomeini (1900−1989) enjoyed that status in Iran. Most Alevis believe that the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, grew up in secret to be saved from those who wanted to exterminate the family of Ali. Many Alevis believe Mehdi is still alive and/or that he will come back to earth one day. According to Alevis, Ali was Muhammad’s intended successor, and therefore the first caliph, but competitors stole this right from him. Muhammed intended for the leadership of all Muslims to perpetually stem from his family line (Ehli Beyt) by beginning with Ali, Fatima, and their two sons, Hasan and Hüseyin. Ali, Hasan, and Hüseyin are considered the first three Imams, and the other nine of the 12 Imams came from Hüseyin’s line. Just to remind ourselves, the names and approximate dates of the birth and death of the 12 Imams are:
İmam Ali (599-661) İmam Hasan (624-670) İmam Hüseyin (625-680) İmam Zeynel Abidin (659-713) İmam Muhammed Bakır (676-734) İmam Cafer-i Sadık (699-766) İmam Musa Kâzım (745-799) İmam Ali Rıza (765-818) İmam Muhammed Taki (810-835) İmam Ali Naki (827-868) İmam Hasan Askeri (846-874) İmam Muhammed Mehdi (869-941).
For the Alevis, to be a really good person is an inalienable part of their life philosophy. It is important to notice that the Alevis are not turned to the Black Stone (Kaaba), which is in Mecca in the Sunni Saudi Arabia, and, as it is known, the Muslim community’s member is supposed to visit it for Hajj at least once in their lives. Alevis’ first fasting is not in Ramadan, it is in Muharram, and it takes 12 days, not 30 days. The second fast for them is after the Feast of Sacrifice for 20 days, and another one is the Hizir fast. In Islam, there is a rule that if a person has enough money, he/she should give a specific amount to a poor person, but the Alevis prefer to donate money to Alevi organizations, not to individuals. As they don’t go to Mecca for Hajj, they visit some mausoleums, like that of Haji Bektaş (in Kırşehir), Abdal Musa (in Tekke Village, Elmalı, Antalya), Şahkulu Sultan (in Merdivenköy, İstanbul), Karacaahmet Sultan (in Üsküdar, İstanbul), or Seyit Gazi (in Eskişehir).
Bektashism
Haji Bektash (Bektaş) Wali was a Turkmen who was born in Iran. After graduating, he moved to Anatolia. He educated a lot of students, and he and his students served a lot of religious, economic, social, and martial services in Ahi Teşkilatı. Haji Bektash started to be popular among the Ottoman elite military detachment, the Janissaries. Nevertheless, he was not of the Alevi origin, but he adopted the rules of the Alevi believers into his personal life. That sect, or a form of Islam, was founded in the name of Haji Bektash Wali, whose members depend on the love of Ali and the twelve imams. Bektashism was popular in Anatolia and the Balkans (especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania), and it is still alive today.
Over the course of time, Bektashism was improved by taking some features of the old beliefs of Anatolia and Turkish culture. However, Bektashism is the most important part of Alevism, as many rules of Bektashism are incorporated into Alevism. For the Alevi believers, the mausoleum of Haji Bektash Wali in Nevşehir in Anatolia is an important point of the pilgrimage. Finally, in Turkey, Bektashism and Alevism, in fact, cannot be treated as different concepts of Islamic theology.
Problems and difficulties of Alevis in Ottoman history and Turkey
When the Ottoman state was established at the end of the 13th century and at the beginning of the 14th century, it did not have sectarian frictions within Islam. At that time, Alevis occupied a lot of chairs in state institutions. The Janissaries (originally the Sultan’s bodyguard) were members of Bektashism, which means that even the Sultan tolerated in full such a way of the interpretation of the Quran and the early history of Islam. However, as the Ottoman state was involved in the process of imperialistic transformation by annexing surrounding provinces and states, Sunnism was getting more and more important because the Sunni Muslims were becoming a clear majority of the Ottoman Sultanate and, therefore, Sunnism was much more useful for the state administration and the system of governing. The Ottoman state became involved in the chain of conflicts with the Safavid Empire (Persia, today Iran, 1502−1722) – a country with a clear majority of those Muslims who expressed Shi’ism that is a form of Islam very similar to Alevism. The Alevi group, who complained about being more Sunni in the Ottoman Sultanate, became sympathizing Safavid Shah İsmail I (1501−1524) and his state, as it was based on Alevism. The animosity between the Ottoman Alevis and Ottoman authorities became more obvious in 1514 when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (1512−1520) executed some 40.000 Alevis together with the Kurdish people while going to have a decisive Battle of Chaldiran (August 23rd) in Iran against Shah Ismail I. Till the end of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1923, Alevis have been oppressed by the authorities as the sectarian believers who were not fitting to the official Sunni theology of Islam.
After the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Alevis were glad in the first years of the new Republic of Turkey, which declaratively proclaimed a segregation of the religion from the state, which practically meant that there was no official state religion in the country. The Alevi population of Turkey supported most of the reforms with great hope that their social status would be improved. However, after the first years of the new state, they started to experience some difficulties as, de facto, a religious minority. The 1960s were very important for Turkish society for at least three reasons: (1) The immigration had started from the rural area to the urban area following a new process of industrialization; (2) The immigration abroad, mostly to West Germany, according to the German-Turkish so-called Gastarbeiter Agreement; and (3) A further democratization of political life. As a consequence, in 1966, Alevis established their own political party – Birlik Partisi (Unity Party). In 1969, Alevism, as a minority group, sent eight members to the Parliament according to the results of the parliamentary elections. However, in 1973, the party had sent just one member to the Parliament, and finally, in 1977, the party had lost its efficiency. In 1978, in Maraş, and in 1980, in Çorum, hundreds of Alevi Muslims were killed as a consequence of the conflict with the majority Sunni population, but the most notorious Alevi massacre happened in 1993 on July 2nd in Sivas, when 35 Alevi intellectuals were killed in Madimak Hotel by a group of religious fundamentalists.
Undoubtedly, the Alevi believers still face many problems in Turkey today in connection with freedom of religious expression and the recognition as a separate cultural group. For example, the religious curriculum does not have any information about Alevism, but rather only about Sunnism, which means that Alevism is not studied on a regular basis in Turkey. Alevism is deeply ignored by Turkey’s administration, for instance, by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (est. 1924), which is an institution dealing with the religious questions and problems, but in practice, it is working according to the rules of Sunni Islam. However, on the other hand, there are some improvements in Alevi cultural life, as, for instance, many foundations and other civic public institutions are opened to support it. Nevertheless, Alevis, like Kurds, are not recognized as a separate ethnocultural or religious group in Turkey due to the Turkish understanding of a nation (millet) that is inherited from the Ottoman Sultanate, according to which all Muslims in Turkey are treated as ethnolinguistic Turks. The situation can be changed as Turkey is seeking the EU’s membership and, therefore, certain EU requirements have to be accepted, among others, and granting minority rights for Alevis and Kurds.
Conclusions
Alevism is a sect of Islam, and it shows many common points with Shi’ism. However, we can not say that it is a part of Shi’ism as a whole. Alevi culture has a rich heritage in poems and music because of its worship style. In Anatolia, Bektashism is usually connected with Alevism.
The Alevi people were living in the Ottoman Sultanate and its successor, the Republic of Turkey, usually with troubles, as they, with their religion, did not fit the official (Sunni) expression of Islam.
Today, Alevis in Turkey are fighting to be respected as a separate religious-cultural group that can freely demonstrate their peculiar way of life. As a matter of fact, the Alevi people could not express themselves freely for centuries, including in present-day Turkey, which should learn to practice both minority rights and democracy.
Finally, if Turkey wants to join the EU, surely, it has to provide a maximum of the required standards of protection of all kinds of minorities, including religious and religious-cultural ones. That can be a chance for the Alevi people in Turkey to improve their status within society.
Personal disclaimer: The author writes for this publication in a private capacity, which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his own personal views. Nothing written by the author should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official positions of any other media outlet or institution. The author of the text does not have any moral, political, scientific, material, or legal responsibility for the views expressed in the article.
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Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic
Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.
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