Published: 09 July 2024
![](https://eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2022-03-11T000000Z_2040358977_MT1NURPHO000W5AKAY_RTRMADP_3_SOUTH-KOREA-PROTEST-1024x683.jpg)
Soosun You
University of Pennsylvania
IN BRIEF
South Korea's electoral landscape is changing dramatically, with an ideological gender gap fuelled by anti-feminist rhetoric, economic and demographic changes, and escalating online gender battles. Policymakers need to introduce reforms that address gender bias, including measures like gender legislative quotas and guaranteed paternal leave, recognising that women still face significant inequality.
In South Korea, as in many other countries, a gendered ideological gap is growing as young women become more progressive while young men increasingly shift to the right.
Young men have become significantly more conservative than previous generations when they were the same age. They appear to hold hostilities against women, with men driving the anti-feminist backlash in South Korea. Many young men claim that discrimination against women is an artifact of the past and that they themselves are the marginalised group. Yet South Korea consistently ranks poorly in various gender inequality indicators.
The gender divide peaked in the 2022 presidential election, as the conservative party sought to appeal to the grievances of young men. Campaigning on anti-feminist rhetoric, now-President Yoon Suk-yeol received a majority of votes from young men in their 20s and 30s on the way to victory.
There are several explanations for the growing conservatism of young men in South Korea. One reason may be a backlash against the resurgence of a feminist movement. Starting around 2015, self-declarations of feminism on social media (#IamAFeminist) and the #MeToo movement revealed instances of sexual harassment and violence committed against female celebrities, public officials and political staffers, among others.
Yet feminist movements were themselves ignited by violence committed against women. Notable cases include the Gangnam Station murder, where a man killed a woman and later testified that he had been ignored by women throughout his life. Online forums like MERS Gallery and Megalia were created in response to misogynist rhetoric that spread online in communities such as Ilbe, an alt-right group known for making insulting accusations against women and LGBTQ+ individuals.
Feminist and anti-feminist messaging today often take place online. Many online communities, like Ilbe, are usually dominated by one gender. Misinformation often proliferates in these spaces as views get amplified and regenerated. By fostering an echo chamber of like-minded individuals, the media landscape has also shaped the content and intensity of the gender war.
Political rhetoric has been key in legitimising the views commonly found in such places and bringing them to the forefront of politics. Gender emerged as a prominent political force when Lee Jun-seok, then a 36-year-old politician, became the youngest-ever leader of the People Power Party, the main conservative party in South Korea. Despite opposition from the party establishment, he won by drawing legions of young men into the party membership through championing men’s rights.
A more structural explanation concerns economic changes. Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, job security has dwindled and economic inequality has increased in South Korea, mirroring global trends. Belief in upward social mobility has deteriorated as educational opportunities have become increasingly stratified by family background. An intensely competitive education system, difficulty in attaining coveted jobs and soaring housing prices have fuelled economic anxiety among young South Koreans. This anxiety has led to a backlash against women’s empowerment. Mandatory military service for men may be further feeding into the economic grievances that young men hold, as they are forced to delay their entry to the workforce after typically serving in the military in their early 20s.
Another possibility has to do with the marriage and demographic shifts that have occurred in South Korea since the 20th century. Women are increasingly opting out of marriage, as evidenced in the 4B movement that professes a commitment to not engage in the activities of dating, sex, marriage and having children. In their 20s and 30s, women tend to see marriage as either unnecessary or undesirable at much higher rates than men. In a patriarchal society like South Korea where marriage is deemed crucial, this could activate status threat, intensifying backlash against women’s empowerment in a patriarchal society.
These factors are interconnected. Each is crucial to understanding not only the diverging ideological preferences of South Korea’s young men and women, but also its increasingly polarised political landscape. In the April 2024 legislative election, growing discontent with President Yoon led to a landslide victory for the Democratic Party. Yet largely missing from the election were policy debates. The results reflected not a triumph of democratic values but rather a growing political division and polarisation among the public as well as within parties.
One commonality between young men and women may be that these groups have been for too long ignored by political leaders. Over 85 per cent of elected members of the National Assembly are over the age of 50. Addressing young people’s issues and representing their voices will be crucial going forward. At the same time, politicians and young men must recognise that women still face an uneven playing field. To secure an equal society, policymakers must seek to reform gender bias.
Government policies may be helpful in this regard, such as guaranteed paternal leave and enforcement of gender legislative quotas. But more research is needed to understand the effects of such policies in South Korea. As young women grow more liberal and young men more conservative, a gendered political landscape is increasingly drifting to the fore in South Korea’s electoral considerations.
Soosun You is Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania.
https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1720562400
![](https://eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2022-03-11T000000Z_2040358977_MT1NURPHO000W5AKAY_RTRMADP_3_SOUTH-KOREA-PROTEST-1024x683.jpg)
Soosun You
University of Pennsylvania
IN BRIEF
South Korea's electoral landscape is changing dramatically, with an ideological gender gap fuelled by anti-feminist rhetoric, economic and demographic changes, and escalating online gender battles. Policymakers need to introduce reforms that address gender bias, including measures like gender legislative quotas and guaranteed paternal leave, recognising that women still face significant inequality.
In South Korea, as in many other countries, a gendered ideological gap is growing as young women become more progressive while young men increasingly shift to the right.
Young men have become significantly more conservative than previous generations when they were the same age. They appear to hold hostilities against women, with men driving the anti-feminist backlash in South Korea. Many young men claim that discrimination against women is an artifact of the past and that they themselves are the marginalised group. Yet South Korea consistently ranks poorly in various gender inequality indicators.
The gender divide peaked in the 2022 presidential election, as the conservative party sought to appeal to the grievances of young men. Campaigning on anti-feminist rhetoric, now-President Yoon Suk-yeol received a majority of votes from young men in their 20s and 30s on the way to victory.
There are several explanations for the growing conservatism of young men in South Korea. One reason may be a backlash against the resurgence of a feminist movement. Starting around 2015, self-declarations of feminism on social media (#IamAFeminist) and the #MeToo movement revealed instances of sexual harassment and violence committed against female celebrities, public officials and political staffers, among others.
Yet feminist movements were themselves ignited by violence committed against women. Notable cases include the Gangnam Station murder, where a man killed a woman and later testified that he had been ignored by women throughout his life. Online forums like MERS Gallery and Megalia were created in response to misogynist rhetoric that spread online in communities such as Ilbe, an alt-right group known for making insulting accusations against women and LGBTQ+ individuals.
Feminist and anti-feminist messaging today often take place online. Many online communities, like Ilbe, are usually dominated by one gender. Misinformation often proliferates in these spaces as views get amplified and regenerated. By fostering an echo chamber of like-minded individuals, the media landscape has also shaped the content and intensity of the gender war.
Political rhetoric has been key in legitimising the views commonly found in such places and bringing them to the forefront of politics. Gender emerged as a prominent political force when Lee Jun-seok, then a 36-year-old politician, became the youngest-ever leader of the People Power Party, the main conservative party in South Korea. Despite opposition from the party establishment, he won by drawing legions of young men into the party membership through championing men’s rights.
A more structural explanation concerns economic changes. Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, job security has dwindled and economic inequality has increased in South Korea, mirroring global trends. Belief in upward social mobility has deteriorated as educational opportunities have become increasingly stratified by family background. An intensely competitive education system, difficulty in attaining coveted jobs and soaring housing prices have fuelled economic anxiety among young South Koreans. This anxiety has led to a backlash against women’s empowerment. Mandatory military service for men may be further feeding into the economic grievances that young men hold, as they are forced to delay their entry to the workforce after typically serving in the military in their early 20s.
Another possibility has to do with the marriage and demographic shifts that have occurred in South Korea since the 20th century. Women are increasingly opting out of marriage, as evidenced in the 4B movement that professes a commitment to not engage in the activities of dating, sex, marriage and having children. In their 20s and 30s, women tend to see marriage as either unnecessary or undesirable at much higher rates than men. In a patriarchal society like South Korea where marriage is deemed crucial, this could activate status threat, intensifying backlash against women’s empowerment in a patriarchal society.
These factors are interconnected. Each is crucial to understanding not only the diverging ideological preferences of South Korea’s young men and women, but also its increasingly polarised political landscape. In the April 2024 legislative election, growing discontent with President Yoon led to a landslide victory for the Democratic Party. Yet largely missing from the election were policy debates. The results reflected not a triumph of democratic values but rather a growing political division and polarisation among the public as well as within parties.
One commonality between young men and women may be that these groups have been for too long ignored by political leaders. Over 85 per cent of elected members of the National Assembly are over the age of 50. Addressing young people’s issues and representing their voices will be crucial going forward. At the same time, politicians and young men must recognise that women still face an uneven playing field. To secure an equal society, policymakers must seek to reform gender bias.
Government policies may be helpful in this regard, such as guaranteed paternal leave and enforcement of gender legislative quotas. But more research is needed to understand the effects of such policies in South Korea. As young women grow more liberal and young men more conservative, a gendered political landscape is increasingly drifting to the fore in South Korea’s electoral considerations.
Soosun You is Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania.
https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1720562400
No comments:
Post a Comment