Power, Oil, And ‘End Of The Beginning’: Geopolitics Of State Interest, US Strongman Rule, And Venezuela In Limbo – Analysis
By Jumel Gabilan Estrañero
The political and diplomatic dynamics between the United States of America and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has been strained during the 21st century. But as early as 1stto 4th Quarter of 2025, the United States (US) was rapidly expanding its military presence in the Caribbean, signaling a likely shift from maritime operations to targeted land strikes in Venezuela which busted out as early as 2026. Initially, failed negotiations with President Nicolas Maduro and increasingly aggressive rhetorical acceleration from US from last year’s trajectory.
Heightened U.S. military activity, stalled diplomacy, and consistently confrontational statements combined with wider strategic, political, and economic interests suggest that US has been planning to expand its operations from the Caribbean into strikes on Venezuelan soil not only this 2026 but in the near future.
Since October, the United States has bolstered its regional military footprint, most notably with the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford the largest aircraft carrier in the world to the Caribbean on Nov. 16. While interestingly, U.S. actions that were once limited to maritime operations were poised to expand onto Venezuelan soil.
At the same time, U.S. forces have continued targeting vessels they claim are involved in drug trafficking across the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, carrying out 23 strikes that have reportedly killed 87 people. During the first operation on Sept. 2, U.S. forces launched a secondary strike that may have killed surviving crew members. These actions have generated domestic backlash, triggered congressional investigations and raising serious concerns that U.S. forces may have committed war crimes. To give a context, here are the major highlights of unprecedented event in as far as growing tensions and military pressures are concerned:
January 10, 2025 — Maduro Inaugurated. Nicolás Maduro begins controversial third presidential term amid criticism of electoral legitimacy.
Mid-2025 — Expanded U.S. Military Posture. The United States significantly increases its naval and aerial presence in the Caribbean, launching Operation Southern Spearaimed at countering drug trafficking. U.S. forces conduct repeated lethal strikes on maritime vessels alleged to be involved in narco-trafficking, many linked (by U.S. claims) to Venezuelan networks.
December 10, 2025 — Oil Blockade and Tanker Seizures Begin. The U.S. marine and Coast Guard units intercept and seize oil tankers transporting Venezuelan crude in Caribbean waters as part of an oil blockade tied to sanctions enforcement.
Late December 2025 — Shift Toward Land Targets. The U.S. authorizes its first reported land-based strike on Venezuelan soil, targeting drug flows. This marks a clear escalation beyond maritime interdiction. Remarkably, President Donald Trump publicly states the U.S. will “run Venezuela” until a “safe, proper transition” occurs, implying de facto control over governance and resources
January 2026: Major Escalation and Regime Decapitation
January 3, 2026 — Operation Absolute Resolve. U.S. forces launch a large-scale military operation in Venezuela, striking multiple military sites and extracting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife from Miraflores Palace to New York. The operation, involving U.S. Army Special Forces, air assets, and naval support, results in dozens of fatalities, including Cuban military personnel according to Cuban authorities.
Post-Intervention Developments
Early January 2026 — Regional and Global Reaction. Latin American leaders and international organizations condemn the strike as a breach of sovereignty and international law. Some U.S. allies caution against setting dangerous precedents, while others praise the removal of Maduro.
January 10–15, 2026 — Evacuation and Security Warnings. The U.S. issues travel advisories urging citizens to flee Venezuela amid reports of armed militias (colectivos) searching for Americans.
Mid-January 2026 — Continued Seizures and Political Shifts. The U.S. seizes additional sanctioned oil tankers in the Caribbean, reinforcing the strategic emphasis on controlling Venezuelan energy flows. Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, signals willingness to open the oil sector to foreign investment and pursue diplomatic engagement while condemning Maduro’s detention.
Last semester in my International Political Economy class, I discussed and forecasted that United States is highly likely to escalate military activity from strikes at sea to direct attacks on Venezuelan territory within weeks of December 2025. This is another key topic apart from the current Thailand-Cambodia fallout that has also started in most recent year. Some key manifestations in US-Valenzuela conflict have seen are as follows (as mentioned above): U.S. military presence in the Caribbean especially with the USS Gerald R. Fordcarrier strike group has grown significantly. US has been conducting repeated attacks on vessels allegedly involved in drug trafficking, which have resulted in dozens of deaths and controversy inside and outside the U.S. military and political establishment. Also, there are negotiations between the U.S. and Venezuelan governments failed to de-escalate tensions, while public rhetoric from both sides remains hostile.
Against this backdrop, these military, political, and geostrategic pressures set the conditions for a U.S. decision to strike land targets in Venezuela recently; ostensibly justified as counternarcotics actions but with broader implications.
Now, what are the other things happening right now. The U.S. Military operations have already escalated since December; that carried out repeated strikes on vessels it labels as involved in drug trafficking near Venezuela, as part of Operation Southern Spear a larger military campaign in the Caribbean. Moreover, there are now multiple oil tanker seizures and an imposed blockade on sanctioned Venezuelan oil shipments, reflecting an effort to choke Venezuela’s revenue and influence.
In the meantime, there are already Airspace and Naval Build-Ups. In fact, the U.S. has declared Venezuelan airspace “closed” and positioned a significant naval force offshore, raising the stakes and risk of miscalculation. And apparently, a direct strike has already occurred. Reporting indicates that the U.S. executed an operation that captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, involving extensive military engagement around Caracas. Separate DOJ Memorandums describe U.S. forces planning and anticipating resistance from Venezuelan air defenses during the strike.
There are domestic and international political dynamics occurred too. The U.S. public shows substantial support for intervention, especially when framed in terms of counternarcotics or energy geopolitics. Russia, China, and many Latin American governments strongly condemn U.S. actions as violations of international law and sovereignty.
The political and diplomatic dynamics between the United States of America and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has been strained during the 21st century. But as early as 1stto 4th Quarter of 2025, the United States (US) was rapidly expanding its military presence in the Caribbean, signaling a likely shift from maritime operations to targeted land strikes in Venezuela which busted out as early as 2026. Initially, failed negotiations with President Nicolas Maduro and increasingly aggressive rhetorical acceleration from US from last year’s trajectory.
Heightened U.S. military activity, stalled diplomacy, and consistently confrontational statements combined with wider strategic, political, and economic interests suggest that US has been planning to expand its operations from the Caribbean into strikes on Venezuelan soil not only this 2026 but in the near future.
Since October, the United States has bolstered its regional military footprint, most notably with the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford the largest aircraft carrier in the world to the Caribbean on Nov. 16. While interestingly, U.S. actions that were once limited to maritime operations were poised to expand onto Venezuelan soil.
At the same time, U.S. forces have continued targeting vessels they claim are involved in drug trafficking across the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, carrying out 23 strikes that have reportedly killed 87 people. During the first operation on Sept. 2, U.S. forces launched a secondary strike that may have killed surviving crew members. These actions have generated domestic backlash, triggered congressional investigations and raising serious concerns that U.S. forces may have committed war crimes. To give a context, here are the major highlights of unprecedented event in as far as growing tensions and military pressures are concerned:
January 10, 2025 — Maduro Inaugurated. Nicolás Maduro begins controversial third presidential term amid criticism of electoral legitimacy.
Mid-2025 — Expanded U.S. Military Posture. The United States significantly increases its naval and aerial presence in the Caribbean, launching Operation Southern Spearaimed at countering drug trafficking. U.S. forces conduct repeated lethal strikes on maritime vessels alleged to be involved in narco-trafficking, many linked (by U.S. claims) to Venezuelan networks.
December 10, 2025 — Oil Blockade and Tanker Seizures Begin. The U.S. marine and Coast Guard units intercept and seize oil tankers transporting Venezuelan crude in Caribbean waters as part of an oil blockade tied to sanctions enforcement.
Late December 2025 — Shift Toward Land Targets. The U.S. authorizes its first reported land-based strike on Venezuelan soil, targeting drug flows. This marks a clear escalation beyond maritime interdiction. Remarkably, President Donald Trump publicly states the U.S. will “run Venezuela” until a “safe, proper transition” occurs, implying de facto control over governance and resources
January 2026: Major Escalation and Regime Decapitation
January 3, 2026 — Operation Absolute Resolve. U.S. forces launch a large-scale military operation in Venezuela, striking multiple military sites and extracting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife from Miraflores Palace to New York. The operation, involving U.S. Army Special Forces, air assets, and naval support, results in dozens of fatalities, including Cuban military personnel according to Cuban authorities.
Post-Intervention Developments
Early January 2026 — Regional and Global Reaction. Latin American leaders and international organizations condemn the strike as a breach of sovereignty and international law. Some U.S. allies caution against setting dangerous precedents, while others praise the removal of Maduro.
January 10–15, 2026 — Evacuation and Security Warnings. The U.S. issues travel advisories urging citizens to flee Venezuela amid reports of armed militias (colectivos) searching for Americans.
Mid-January 2026 — Continued Seizures and Political Shifts. The U.S. seizes additional sanctioned oil tankers in the Caribbean, reinforcing the strategic emphasis on controlling Venezuelan energy flows. Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, signals willingness to open the oil sector to foreign investment and pursue diplomatic engagement while condemning Maduro’s detention.
Last semester in my International Political Economy class, I discussed and forecasted that United States is highly likely to escalate military activity from strikes at sea to direct attacks on Venezuelan territory within weeks of December 2025. This is another key topic apart from the current Thailand-Cambodia fallout that has also started in most recent year. Some key manifestations in US-Valenzuela conflict have seen are as follows (as mentioned above): U.S. military presence in the Caribbean especially with the USS Gerald R. Fordcarrier strike group has grown significantly. US has been conducting repeated attacks on vessels allegedly involved in drug trafficking, which have resulted in dozens of deaths and controversy inside and outside the U.S. military and political establishment. Also, there are negotiations between the U.S. and Venezuelan governments failed to de-escalate tensions, while public rhetoric from both sides remains hostile.
Against this backdrop, these military, political, and geostrategic pressures set the conditions for a U.S. decision to strike land targets in Venezuela recently; ostensibly justified as counternarcotics actions but with broader implications.
Now, what are the other things happening right now. The U.S. Military operations have already escalated since December; that carried out repeated strikes on vessels it labels as involved in drug trafficking near Venezuela, as part of Operation Southern Spear a larger military campaign in the Caribbean. Moreover, there are now multiple oil tanker seizures and an imposed blockade on sanctioned Venezuelan oil shipments, reflecting an effort to choke Venezuela’s revenue and influence.
In the meantime, there are already Airspace and Naval Build-Ups. In fact, the U.S. has declared Venezuelan airspace “closed” and positioned a significant naval force offshore, raising the stakes and risk of miscalculation. And apparently, a direct strike has already occurred. Reporting indicates that the U.S. executed an operation that captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, involving extensive military engagement around Caracas. Separate DOJ Memorandums describe U.S. forces planning and anticipating resistance from Venezuelan air defenses during the strike.
There are domestic and international political dynamics occurred too. The U.S. public shows substantial support for intervention, especially when framed in terms of counternarcotics or energy geopolitics. Russia, China, and many Latin American governments strongly condemn U.S. actions as violations of international law and sovereignty.
Some Dynamics and Strategic Analysis
Relative to the counternarcotic narrative, the U.S. frames its operations as targeting drug trafficking networks linked to Venezuela. This narrative aims to build domestic support and provide a legalistic justification for military action. It followed by a regime change pressure. Beyond counternarcotics, U.S. actions suggest an ambition to weaken or remove Nicolás Maduro’s government, a longstanding adversary. This has moved from sanctions and maritime pressure to kinetic operations and, as of January 2026, capture of Maduro. And nonetheless, in terms of energy and economic leverage, Venezuela’s oil reserves are among the largest globally. Control over Venezuelan energy assets could shift global energy markets and reduce U.S. dependency on Middle Eastern supplies, a point raised by some analysts and polling.
There will always be consequences of this geopolitical ramification. Risk-wise, as per regional instability, Venezuelan forces and allied militias may resist fiercely, leading to prolonged conflict. Likewise, civilian harm will escalate even in maritime and ground engagements risk casualties and displacement. And we can see various diplomatic backlash where many governments see such actions as breaches of the U.N. Charter and sovereignty norms.
In longer terms, sustained operations could resemble guerrilla conflicts, similar to Vietnam or Iraq in complexity as military entanglements heighten up. U.S.–Russia/China rivalries could deepen, as both support opposing Venezuelan factions, unfolding a more geopolitical polarization in the region down to domestic political condition. Control over Venezuela’s oil sector will shape both domestic capacities and global market dynamics. Popular sentiment and elite divisions will determine whether the interim government consolidates authority or faces increasing resistance[1]. Russia, China, and regional blocs (CARICOM, MERCOSUR) will compete to define post-Maduro governance norms. Equally, an international legal challenge is brewing as hot military actions without broad international authorization risk labeling the U.S. as a violator of international law as President Trump sets a devastating precedent in Venezuela.
It matters not only in Latin America and nearby American states but across the region. This international crisis is not only an escalation into Venezuelan territorial dispute, but it marks a major shift in U.S. hemispheric strategy, aimed at weakening Maduro and shaping long-term political change. Indeed, such serious and stratified strikes would carry significant geopolitical, economic, and legal consequences but we hope to attract foreign investment (especially in oil) and hoping to flow and stabilize the economy. As way ahead, we can expect more regional tensions ease modestly, though many neighboring countries will push for multilateral oversight beyond this critical crisis overture.
*Ideas and/or views expressed here are entirely independent and not in any form represent author’s organization and affiliation.
Footnote:
[1] The interim Venezuelan government, backed by U.S. influence, initiates political reforms and prepares for new elections under external supervision. Meanwhile, we can expect armed resistance from pro-Maduro factions or foreign volunteer brigades fuel ongoing conflict since infrastructure damage and economic stagnation complicate reconstruction and erode public trust. Interestingly, external actors exploit unrest to push geopolitical agendas.
Jumel Gabilan Estrañero
Jumel Gabilan Estrañero is a defense, security, & political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He has completed the Executive Course in National Security at the National Defense College of the Philippines and has participated in NADI Track II discussions in Singapore (an ASEAN-led security forum on terrorism). His articles have appeared in Global Security Review, Geopolitical Monitor, Global Village Space, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Times, Malaya Business Insights, Asia Maritime Review, The Nation (Thailand), Southeast Asian Times, and Global Politics and Social Science Research Network. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense. He is currently teaching lectures in De La Salle University Philippines while in the government and formerly taught at Lyceum of the Philippines as part-time lecturer. He is the co-author of the books titled: Disruptive Innovations, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A Philippine Terrorism Handbook, and Global Security Studies Journal (Springer Link, United States). He is an alumnus of ASEAN Law Academy Advanced Program in Center for International Law, National University Singapore and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland. He is also a Juris Doctor student.
Venezuela: Overview Of US Sanctions Policy – Analysis
January 17, 2026
By Clare Ribando Seelke
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
In response to Maduro’s repression, Congress enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. §1701 note). Among its provisions, the law required the President to impose sanctions on people the President identified as responsible for significant acts of violence, serious human rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions. Congress extended these sanctions through 2023 in P.L. 116-94. President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to implement P.L. 113-278 in March 2015, and Treasury issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) people involved in actions or policies undermining democratic processes or institutions; serious human rights abuses; actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize freedom of expression or assembly; and public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or former leader of any entity engaged in any of those activities, as well as current or former government officials. To date, OFAC has imposed sanctions on 160 Venezuelans and eight entities pursuant to E.O. 13692, including Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello.
Additional Sanctions
In 2017, President Trump imposed financial sanctions on Venezuela in response to the government’s human rights abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017, President Trump issued E.O. 13808, which largely prohibited access to U.S. financial markets by the Venezuelan government, including state energy company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA). In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token. In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which prohibited transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan debt and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral. OFAC has since issued time-limited licenses preventing the forced sale of CITGO, a U.S. subsidiary of PdVSA, to creditors. In December 2025, OFAC sanctioned an entity and its owner for purchasing drones from Iran pursuant to E.O. 13949 (Iran sanctions).
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
In November 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850. This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in designated sectors of the Venezuelan economy or to engage in corrupt transactions with the Maduro government. In January 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, OFAC designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, and the Secretary of the Treasury determined that the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. The E.O. froze all property and interests in property of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the company. OFAC also sanctioned Venezuela’s Central Bank, National Development Bank, and state-owned gold company, Minerven. To date, OFAC has imposed sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13850 on 27 individuals, 95 entities, and 57 vessels. Since mid-December, the United States has seized six vessels transporting Venezuelan oil. Secretary Rubio has repeatedly asserted that such seizures will continue.
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884, freezing the assets of the Maduro government in the United States. The order prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the Maduro government unless authorized by OFAC. It also authorized financial sanctions and visa restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist the Maduro government. As of January 15, 2026, five individuals, one entity, and several vessels and aircraft were designated under E.O. 13884. OFAC also issued licenses authorizing transactions involving the delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and medicine; remittances; international organizations; and communications.
Licenses Issued and Revoked
During the Biden Administration, OFAC issued and amended licenses to allow certain transactions. In late 2022, after Maduro-opposition negotiations restarted, OFAC issued General License (GL) 41, which allowed U.S. oil company Chevron to resume production in Venezuela and import and export petroleum products at its joint ventures (JVs). In October 2023, Maduro and the opposition signed an agreement that included elections. In response, OFAC issued GL 43, which authorized transactions with Minerven, and GL 44, which authorized transactions by any company involving the oil and gas sector for six months. In January 2024, OFAC revokedGL 43 after Venezuela’s supreme court upheld a ban on the candidacy of María Corina Machado (winner of the 2023 opposition primary). In April 2024, the Administration announced it would not renew GL 44, the oil sector license. Instead, OFAC issued a general license giving companies 45 days to wind down operations authorized by GL 44.
In March 2025, OFAC amended Chevron’s GL to require the company to wind down operations in Venezuela. Most specific licenses that had allowed other companies to operate in Venezuela expired. Since April 2025, any country that imports Venezuelan oil could face a 25% tariff on its exports to the United States. This tariff has been subject to legal challenge. In July 2025, Treasury reportedly issued a specific license allowing Chevron’s JVs to resume operations but prohibiting them from making cash payments to the Venezuelan government.
Post-Maduro Energy Deal
On January 6, 2026, President Trump stated that Venezuelan officials would turn over “Sanctioned Oil,” reportedly worth some $3 billion. According to the U.S.-Venezuela energy deal, the United States would market and sell Venezuelan oil and deposit proceeds into “U.S.-controlled” accounts. Proceeds would be used for the benefit of the “American people and the Venezuelan people.” OFAC reportedly is considering an expanded license for Chevron and has issued new licenses for other companies to import and export Venezuelan oil .
Congressional Considerations
Congress may assess how U.S. sanctions are advancing U.S. interests and consider legislation to expand or ease sanctions on the acting government and/or Venezuela-linked FTOs. Congress also could consider legislation to increase transparency regarding any licenses modified or granted for oil companies to operate in Venezuela. In the 119th Congress, House-passed legislation (H.R. 1486) would authorize targeted sanctions on foreign adversary entities that, among other measures, provide material support to national security entities in Venezuela. Congress also may conduct oversight on how FTO designations are linked to the use of military force and how sanctions may be changed and/or licenses expanded.
Also see, CRS Insight IN12637, Venezuela Oil Sector: Context for Recent Developments; CRS Insight IN12618, U.S. Capture of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro: Considerations for Congress.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
January 17, 2026
By Clare Ribando Seelke
Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Since 2005, the United States has imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuelan individuals and entities that have engaged in criminal, antidemocratic, or corrupt actions. U.S. sanctions have been imposed via both executive and congressional action. Under President Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026), the first Trump Administration expanded U.S. sanctions. The Biden Administration offered limited sanctions relief to try to incentivize Maduro to convene a free and fair presidential election. Maduro claimed victory in the 2024 election even after results indicated he lost. In January 2025, Maduro took office for a third term after a period of postelection repression.
The Trump Administration has designated Venezuela-linked criminal groups as terrorist organizations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has increased sanctions on individuals, firms, and tankers tied to Venezuela’s oil trade. In December 2025, U.S. seizures of sanctioned oil tankers began. On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces capturedMaduro and his wife and transported them to New York to face narco-terrorism charges. President Trump said that Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and oil minister, is willing to work with the United States as acting president. U.S. officials have said they intend to pressure the acting government to, among other aims, allow the United States to direct oil sales and proceeds, thereby limiting the role of U.S. adversaries in the sector.
Sanctions In Force
The United States has imposed individual, financial, and sectoral sanctions on the Venezuelan government, as well as sanctions on the former Maduro government and its supporters. This product does not discuss foreign aid and financing restrictions.
Visa Restrictions
The State Department has privately revoked the visas of thousands of Venezuelans, including current and former officials. It has publicly imposed visa restrictions on 14 Venezuelan officials for corruption or human rights abuses pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures.
Drug-Trafficking-Related Sanctions
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed asset-blocking sanctions on 11 individuals and 27 entities with connections to Venezuela by denoting them as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII, as amended; 21 U.S.C. §§1901 et seq.). In December 2025, OFAC imposed sanctions on two additional individuals under Executive Order (E.O.) 14059.
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination (most recently in May 2025) that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2781). The United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela. In 2008, pursuant to E.O. 13224, OFAC classified two individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) subject to asset-blocking sanctions for financially supporting Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
In February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Tren de Aragua (TDA)—a Venezuela-origin gang—as an FTO consistent with E.O. 14157. This designation enables new sanctions, law enforcement, and immigration actions against TDA and its members. President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act to enable the removal of alleged TDA members to El Salvador; that invocation remains subject to legal challenges. In June and July, OFAC sanctioned TDA leaders, and in December, OFAC sanctioned a network of individuals and entities for providing material support to TDA.
In July 2025, OFAC designated the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. In November, Secretary of State Rubio designated the group an FTO. Since September, the U.S. military has carried out lethal strikes on drug vessels at sea, some purportedly tied to TDA or the Cartel of the Suns.
Export Controls and Non-Proliferation
U.S. Department of Commerce export controls related to Venezuela affect dual-use technology, including expanded restrictions since 2020 on sales to military or military-intelligence end users.
Since 2005, the United States has imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuelan individuals and entities that have engaged in criminal, antidemocratic, or corrupt actions. U.S. sanctions have been imposed via both executive and congressional action. Under President Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026), the first Trump Administration expanded U.S. sanctions. The Biden Administration offered limited sanctions relief to try to incentivize Maduro to convene a free and fair presidential election. Maduro claimed victory in the 2024 election even after results indicated he lost. In January 2025, Maduro took office for a third term after a period of postelection repression.
The Trump Administration has designated Venezuela-linked criminal groups as terrorist organizations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has increased sanctions on individuals, firms, and tankers tied to Venezuela’s oil trade. In December 2025, U.S. seizures of sanctioned oil tankers began. On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces capturedMaduro and his wife and transported them to New York to face narco-terrorism charges. President Trump said that Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and oil minister, is willing to work with the United States as acting president. U.S. officials have said they intend to pressure the acting government to, among other aims, allow the United States to direct oil sales and proceeds, thereby limiting the role of U.S. adversaries in the sector.
Sanctions In Force
The United States has imposed individual, financial, and sectoral sanctions on the Venezuelan government, as well as sanctions on the former Maduro government and its supporters. This product does not discuss foreign aid and financing restrictions.
Visa Restrictions
The State Department has privately revoked the visas of thousands of Venezuelans, including current and former officials. It has publicly imposed visa restrictions on 14 Venezuelan officials for corruption or human rights abuses pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures.
Drug-Trafficking-Related Sanctions
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed asset-blocking sanctions on 11 individuals and 27 entities with connections to Venezuela by denoting them as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII, as amended; 21 U.S.C. §§1901 et seq.). In December 2025, OFAC imposed sanctions on two additional individuals under Executive Order (E.O.) 14059.
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination (most recently in May 2025) that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2781). The United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela. In 2008, pursuant to E.O. 13224, OFAC classified two individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) subject to asset-blocking sanctions for financially supporting Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
In February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Tren de Aragua (TDA)—a Venezuela-origin gang—as an FTO consistent with E.O. 14157. This designation enables new sanctions, law enforcement, and immigration actions against TDA and its members. President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act to enable the removal of alleged TDA members to El Salvador; that invocation remains subject to legal challenges. In June and July, OFAC sanctioned TDA leaders, and in December, OFAC sanctioned a network of individuals and entities for providing material support to TDA.
In July 2025, OFAC designated the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. In November, Secretary of State Rubio designated the group an FTO. Since September, the U.S. military has carried out lethal strikes on drug vessels at sea, some purportedly tied to TDA or the Cartel of the Suns.
Export Controls and Non-Proliferation
U.S. Department of Commerce export controls related to Venezuela affect dual-use technology, including expanded restrictions since 2020 on sales to military or military-intelligence end users.
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
In response to Maduro’s repression, Congress enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. §1701 note). Among its provisions, the law required the President to impose sanctions on people the President identified as responsible for significant acts of violence, serious human rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions. Congress extended these sanctions through 2023 in P.L. 116-94. President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to implement P.L. 113-278 in March 2015, and Treasury issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) people involved in actions or policies undermining democratic processes or institutions; serious human rights abuses; actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize freedom of expression or assembly; and public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or former leader of any entity engaged in any of those activities, as well as current or former government officials. To date, OFAC has imposed sanctions on 160 Venezuelans and eight entities pursuant to E.O. 13692, including Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello.
Additional Sanctions
In 2017, President Trump imposed financial sanctions on Venezuela in response to the government’s human rights abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017, President Trump issued E.O. 13808, which largely prohibited access to U.S. financial markets by the Venezuelan government, including state energy company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA). In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token. In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which prohibited transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan debt and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral. OFAC has since issued time-limited licenses preventing the forced sale of CITGO, a U.S. subsidiary of PdVSA, to creditors. In December 2025, OFAC sanctioned an entity and its owner for purchasing drones from Iran pursuant to E.O. 13949 (Iran sanctions).
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
In November 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850. This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in designated sectors of the Venezuelan economy or to engage in corrupt transactions with the Maduro government. In January 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, OFAC designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, and the Secretary of the Treasury determined that the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. The E.O. froze all property and interests in property of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the company. OFAC also sanctioned Venezuela’s Central Bank, National Development Bank, and state-owned gold company, Minerven. To date, OFAC has imposed sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13850 on 27 individuals, 95 entities, and 57 vessels. Since mid-December, the United States has seized six vessels transporting Venezuelan oil. Secretary Rubio has repeatedly asserted that such seizures will continue.
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884, freezing the assets of the Maduro government in the United States. The order prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the Maduro government unless authorized by OFAC. It also authorized financial sanctions and visa restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist the Maduro government. As of January 15, 2026, five individuals, one entity, and several vessels and aircraft were designated under E.O. 13884. OFAC also issued licenses authorizing transactions involving the delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and medicine; remittances; international organizations; and communications.
Licenses Issued and Revoked
During the Biden Administration, OFAC issued and amended licenses to allow certain transactions. In late 2022, after Maduro-opposition negotiations restarted, OFAC issued General License (GL) 41, which allowed U.S. oil company Chevron to resume production in Venezuela and import and export petroleum products at its joint ventures (JVs). In October 2023, Maduro and the opposition signed an agreement that included elections. In response, OFAC issued GL 43, which authorized transactions with Minerven, and GL 44, which authorized transactions by any company involving the oil and gas sector for six months. In January 2024, OFAC revokedGL 43 after Venezuela’s supreme court upheld a ban on the candidacy of María Corina Machado (winner of the 2023 opposition primary). In April 2024, the Administration announced it would not renew GL 44, the oil sector license. Instead, OFAC issued a general license giving companies 45 days to wind down operations authorized by GL 44.
In March 2025, OFAC amended Chevron’s GL to require the company to wind down operations in Venezuela. Most specific licenses that had allowed other companies to operate in Venezuela expired. Since April 2025, any country that imports Venezuelan oil could face a 25% tariff on its exports to the United States. This tariff has been subject to legal challenge. In July 2025, Treasury reportedly issued a specific license allowing Chevron’s JVs to resume operations but prohibiting them from making cash payments to the Venezuelan government.
Post-Maduro Energy Deal
On January 6, 2026, President Trump stated that Venezuelan officials would turn over “Sanctioned Oil,” reportedly worth some $3 billion. According to the U.S.-Venezuela energy deal, the United States would market and sell Venezuelan oil and deposit proceeds into “U.S.-controlled” accounts. Proceeds would be used for the benefit of the “American people and the Venezuelan people.” OFAC reportedly is considering an expanded license for Chevron and has issued new licenses for other companies to import and export Venezuelan oil .
Congressional Considerations
Congress may assess how U.S. sanctions are advancing U.S. interests and consider legislation to expand or ease sanctions on the acting government and/or Venezuela-linked FTOs. Congress also could consider legislation to increase transparency regarding any licenses modified or granted for oil companies to operate in Venezuela. In the 119th Congress, House-passed legislation (H.R. 1486) would authorize targeted sanctions on foreign adversary entities that, among other measures, provide material support to national security entities in Venezuela. Congress also may conduct oversight on how FTO designations are linked to the use of military force and how sanctions may be changed and/or licenses expanded.
Also see, CRS Insight IN12637, Venezuela Oil Sector: Context for Recent Developments; CRS Insight IN12618, U.S. Capture of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro: Considerations for Congress.
About the author: Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
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