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Sunday, February 15, 2026

MAGA Aesthetics and Fascist Power: Spectacles of White Supremacy


Henry Giroux

February 13, 2026

LONG READ


Spectacles of State Violence and the Culture of Cruelty


The United States is not merely awash in brutalizing and murderous acts of state-sanctioned violence. It is being restructured by them. The killings of Rachel Good and Alex Pretti are not aberrations or tragic mistakes; they belong to a longer and darker history that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People once named with chilling precision. In earlier periods of American turmoil, such killings were called lynchings, acts “carried out by lawless mobs, although police officers did participate, under the pretext of justice.” Today, this violence extends well beyond the bullet and the baton. It takes form in the expansion of prison camps, what Thom Hartmann rightly calls concentration camps, the war on immigrants, and the routine assault on Black and brown lives made disposable through policy, indifference, and neglect. At the same time, the country is saturated with a culture steeped in fascist spectacle and authoritarian display. Under the Trump administration, aesthetics itself becomes a battleground, a weaponized field where power works on desire, memory, bodies, and pleasure to consolidate domination.

As Toni Morrison warned in her Nobel Prize lecture, oppressive language does not merely describe violence; it doesviolence, narrowing thought, erasing responsibility, and preparing the ground for cruelty. For Morrison, this is dead language “that drinks blood, laps vulnerabilities, tucks its fascist boots under crinolines of respectability and patriotism as it moves relentlessly toward the bottom line and the bottomed-out mind… Ruthless in its policing duties, it has no desire or purpose other than maintaining the free range of its own narcotic narcissism, its own exclusivity and dominance.” In his monumental The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Walter Benjamin chillingly grasped this danger with prophetic clarity, insisting that the connective tissue between state violence and the colonization of public consciousness lies in the corporate-controlled pedagogical apparatuses of print culture, screen culture, and social media. In a hyper-mediated society, as the historian Richard J. Evans argues, fascism does not rely solely on force or decree. It aestheticizes politics itself, converting violence into pleasure, domination into entertainment, and obedience into desire. That insight quietly underwrites much of what follows. This fusion of language, image, and power forms the theoretical groundwork for understanding how fascist aesthetics now operate in the United States.

Fascism Educates Before It Governs

We live in an age in which fascist aesthetics has become a powerful tool of authoritarian pedagogy, functioning, in part, to mobilize myth, emotion, ritual, and spectacle in order to celebrate fascist sentiments including white nationalism, racial and ethnic hierarchies, state terrorism, and the performative cruelty of the powerful, but also to crush dissent and prevent the redistribution of power.

Fascism educates before it rules, working through spectacle, cruelty, myth, facile beauty, and erasure long before it consolidates power through formal political institutions. In the Trump era, this spectacle-driven authoritarianism illuminates the aestheticization of power by offering pageantry and the pleasure of submission as beautifying practices that celebrate war, hierarchy, a survival-of-the-fittest ethos, regressive individualism, and the militarization of everyday life. Fascism aestheticizes politics to render domination pleasurable, converting power into spectacle and obedience into desire, and this logic is now unmistakably visible in the visual culture that saturates Trump-era authoritarianism. Politics, in this sense, follows culture because political agency itself is culturally produced, not merely through policy or ideas but through affect, image, and embodiment.

Aestheticizing Power: Trumpism and the Visual Grammar of Fascism

The visual grammar of fascism is on full display in government-produced videos of immigrants filmed in chains and marched onto deportation planes, which transform state violence into spectacle, staging cruelty as administrative order and teaching the public who belongs and who is disposable. Trump’s grotesque, AI-generated fantasy of Gaza, recast as a luxury playground, extends this aesthetic logic outward, laundering colonial devastation through the visual grammar of real estate branding, imperial leisure, and technological fantasy. Violence is not denied in these images; it is aestheticized, stripped of history and consequence, and re-presented as progress itself. Cruelty, deportations, and ICE assaults on immigrants and people of color are recast as reality-TV entertainment through a steady stream of slick propaganda videos produced by the Department of Homeland Security.

White Supremacy as Pedagogy: The Nation as a Biological Project

The same pedagogy of contempt animates the circulation of grotesque spectacles, including images that depict Trump defecating from an airplane onto protesters below, a scatological allegory that converts hatred of democratic dissent into visual pleasure and collective affirmation for his followers. This aesthetic does not merely signal oppression; it luxuriates in it, inviting audiences to take pleasure in humiliation itself. At its core lies an unabashed embrace of white supremacy. MAGA spectacles, racist imagery, and governing policies are organized around the presumption of a racial hierarchy with whiteness fixed at the apex. White supremacy is not incidental to Trump’s politics; it is their animating DNA. As the historian Robert O. Paxton argued in The Anatomy of Fascism, a defining feature of fascism is the redefinition of the nation as a biological rather than a civic entity. Crucially, this redefinition is not transmitted only through doctrine or law but also through a dense pedagogical field of images, rituals, performances, spectacles, and cultural apparatuses that teach audiences how to see the nation, how to recognize enemies, and how to feel righteous in their exclusion.

Under the Trump regime, citizenship is severed from even the fragile promise of shared democratic values and anchored in racial belonging, a violent recalibration that redraws the moral and political map of the nation, determining who counts, who is disposable, and who must be expelled. In this logic, the very claim to citizenship by nonwhite populations is treated as a criminal act, and their presence in the United States is recast as a crime scene. Exclusion is elevated into civic virtue, while assaults on racialized communities are not only permissible but necessary. Such reasoning does more than authorize cruelty; it normalizes the language and practice of racial cleansing and, at its most lethal extreme, summons the specter of genocide itself.

Once the nation is defined as a biological project, exclusion no longer appears as excess but as necessity. What follows is a cascade of policies, images, and performances that give administrative form to racial hierarchy and train the public to accept cruelty as governance. This logic surfaces in policies that welcome only white South Africans as refugees, in the systematic weakening of civil rights protections, and in claims that immigrants with “bad genes” are “poisoning the blood” of the nation. It appears in the deployment of armed federal agents into states with disproportionately nonwhite populations, creating what civil rights advocates have described as a new and terrifying reality for targeted communities. Trump’s racist rhetoric is evident in his disparagement of people from African nations and Haiti as coming from “shithole countries,” and in his dehumanization of Somalis as “garbage.”

Trump’s embrace of white supremacy is further revealed in his claim, in an interview with the New York Times that the civil rights movement and the policies it produced hurt white people who were “very badly treated.” He extended this logic on the global stage, asserting in a speech to the United Nations that Europe faced a civilizational crisis because of mass migration, which he cast as a threat to Western culture itself. This worldview reached its most unvarnished expression when Trump posted on Truth Social a blatantly racist, AI-generated video portraying Barack and Michelle Obama as apes, an image drawn directly from the archive of colonial and fascist racism. Such vile language and imagery would be at home in Ku Klux Klan pamphlets. As Susan Sontag observed, these authoritarian fantasies are inseparable from “the fetishization of dominance found in fascist aesthetics,” where cruelty becomes spectacle and racial hatred is staged as entertainment.

Cruelty as Spectacle: Rallies, Rituals, and Authoritarian Pleasure

Trump’s rallies intensify this toxic authoritarian aesthetic, transforming politics into a mass performance that fuses theatrical cruelty, racial grievance, white supremacy, and ritualized obedience. What emerges is a carnivalesque politics in which humiliation is rewarded, submission is celebrated, and dissent is disciplined through spectacle. This dynamic reaches a chilling apotheosis in the viral video of Kristi Noem posed like a plasticized Barbie doll before El Salvador’s notorious CECOT prison, where mass incarceration and authoritarian punishment are aestheticized as moral clarity, strength, and order. In this grotesque aesthetic performance, state violence is stripped of its brutality and re-presented as virtue, resolve, and national renewal. The scene lays bare a central truth: fascist aesthetics do not vanish with history’s defeat of earlier regimes; they are endlessly reinvented, adapting to new contexts while preserving their core logic of domination, cruelty, and enforced submission.

Taken together, these spectacles form a continuous pedagogical landscape of power, binding cruelty, obedience, and excess into a single visual regime. The gaudy reinvention of Mar-a-Lago as a gilded monument resurrects the visual language of the Gilded Age, converting obscene affluence into political virtue and inequality into patriotic display. A similar aesthetic animates the Jeff Bezos–backed propaganda film Melania, which, as Xan Brooks observes, operates less as a documentary than as “an elaborate piece of designer taxidermy,” ice-cold, grotesquely and spectacularly unrevealing. Brooks likens it to a gilded trash remake of The Zone of Interest, a spectacle in which couture, gold baubles, vacant glamour and designer dresses function as distractions, carefully diverting attention while power consolidates in the background and democratic institutions are quietly dismantled.

Across these images, fascism does not persuade through argument or policy; it stages itself. Power becomes seductive through spectacle, cruelty, and fantasy, teaching audiences not how to think politically but how to feel obedience, admire domination, and mistake violence for destiny. In this sense, MAGA aesthetics functions, borrowing Frederick Exley’s phrase from Pages from a Cold Island, as “a great human fungus” that poisons the atmosphere of society, rendering the present image of the United States “homicidal and menacing.”

What begins as a visual strategy does not remain confined to isolated images. MAGA aesthetics is not an isolated cultural phenomenon or a series of incidental excesses. It derives its power, and increasingly its legitimacy, from a dense ecosystem of authoritarian rituals, images, and performances that circulate across multiple sites and institutions.Nazi salutes by prominent figures such as Elon Musk and Steve Bannon, white nationalist songs embedded in Department of Homeland Security’s official recruitment efforts, fascist slogans and symbols normalized through online subcultures, and slick videos aestheticizing ICE assaults on migrants and protesters all function as mutually reinforcing scenes in a larger authoritarian drama. Amplified by the affective machinery of right-wing media, these rituals do more than communicate ideology, they habituate the public to force, fear, and racialized cruelty as ordinary instruments of governance. What emerges is not mere propaganda but a sprawling pedagogical racist juggernaut, one that saturates the senses, disciplines political imagination, and educates subjects to mistake repression for order and domination for strength. It is through this cumulative cultural/pedagogical conditioning, rather than through law alone, that fascism first secures its foothold.

Fascism does not announce itself only through emergency decrees, mass arrests, or the suspension of rights. It arrives first through images, styles, rituals, and pleasures that train people to experience power as desirable and domination as normal. Long before it rules, fascism educates. It works through spectacle and affect, through pageantry and performance, transforming violence into beauty and obedience into common sense. Sontag’s warning that fascism is the aestheticization of politics remains chillingly relevant because it names not merely a propaganda strategy, but a cultural logic through which social catastrophe is converted into spectacle and collective suffering into fascination.

MAGA Aesthetics and the Authoritarian Body

The resurgence of authoritarian politics in the United States has not occurred only through policy proposals, court rulings, or executive power grabs. It has advanced just as forcefully through images, bodies, performances, and styles that acclimate people to domination before they are invited, if ever, to think critically about it. As Umberto Eco argued in his reflections on Ur-Fascism, authoritarianism often takes hold first as an aesthetic project. Writing about Benito Mussolini’s regime, Eco noted that Italian fascism was “the first to establish a military liturgy, a folklore, even a way of dressing—far more influential, with its black shirts, than Armani, Benetton, or Versace would ever be.” Fascism, in this sense, educates through appearances before it governs through law, habituating subjects to hierarchy, discipline, and submission as matters of taste, identity, and belonging. What Eco identified under Mussolini has not disappeared but migrated, reemerging in contemporary authoritarian movements that similarly treat style, spectacle, and affect as primary instruments of political formation.

Nowhere is this dynamic more visible than in the MAGA aesthetic, a contemporary cultural regime defined by studied ugliness, theatrical cruelty, and the normalization of domination as spectacle. Hyper-stylized faces overwritten with fillers and plastic surgery, square jaws, militarized postures, rigid masculinist displays, and pornographic performances of punishment and control have become central to the visual grammar of Trumpism. These aesthetics do not merely signal political allegiance; they operate pedagogically, shaping desire, disciplining bodies, and rehearsing violence as common sense itself. Long before authoritarianism demanded obedience through policy, it secured consent through culture.

MAGA aesthetics operates as an embodied politics, a way of teaching power through posture, gaze, and gesture rather than argument. It fuses cruelty with glamour, punishment with pleasure, and grievance with entitlement. Bodies are trained to feel dominant, armored against empathy, and hostile to vulnerability. This is not simply bad taste or vulgar display. It is an aesthetic formation that prepares subjects for authoritarian rule by making domination feel natural and resistance feel weak. MAGA aesthetics, in this sense, is violence before the blow, pedagogy before policy.

This cultural logic has a long intellectual genealogy. The MAGA aesthetic is not accidental. Fascist movements have always understood aesthetics as pedagogy, as a way of training people to feel power before they are allowed to think about it. Walter Benjamin warned that fascism aestheticizes politics to mobilize the masses without granting them rights, replacing democratic participation with spectacle, ritual, and submission. Susan Sontag likewise observed that fascist aesthetics glorify obedience, hierarchy, and the eroticization of force, transforming domination into visual pleasure and cruelty into style. As Sontag later argued, this aestheticization of power does not merely depict authority; it trains desire itself. In Sontag’s terms, the spectacle does not merely depict power, it trains the eye to desire it. The MAGA look follows this script precisely. It abandons democracy’s appeal to reasoned judgment, ethical responsibility, and public accountability, substituting civic persuasion with spectacle, visual aggression, and emotional coercion. Its ugliness mirrors its politics with chilling precision: cruel, nostalgic, obsessed with hierarchy, and openly hostile to pluralism. What we see here is not bad taste but a deliberate visual language of authoritarianism, an aesthetic designed to normalize exclusion, glorify force, strip joy and imagination from public life, and prepare the ground for repression.

This contemporary spectacle at work in the Trump regime offers a crucial point of entry into a much older and more dangerous cultural logic. Fascist movements have always understood that power must first be felt before it can be obeyed. Long before authoritarian regimes consolidated themselves through law and force, they worked through culture, mobilizing images, rituals, and pleasures that transform domination into beauty and submission into belonging. It is this deeper aesthetic logic that Walter Benjamin named when he warned that fascism resolves social crises not by redistributing power, but by aestheticizing politics itself.

At its core, MAGA aesthetics pays homage to the fascist subject, disembodied, cruel, racist, morally vacant, and rigidly militarized. It takes shape within a culture of images driven by corporate disimagination machines that dull moral sensibilities and anesthetize the injuries produced by gangster capitalism and its militarized techno-structures of domination and disposability. Within this visual regime, social change is not merely postponed but actively undone through the relentless circulation of images that normalize psychic numbness and political paralysis, training subjects to consume cruelty as spectacle. At the core of the MAGA aesthetic is a stylized performance of authoritarian masculinity that draws on the visual grammar of fascism to aestheticize command itself. It glorifies the body as militarized warrior, disciplined and armored, animated by what Sontag terms a “contempt for all that is reflective, critical, and pluralistic.”

Militarized Style and the Performance of Unaccountable Power

Hyper-controlled bodies, exaggerated rigidity, militarized dress, and resurrected authoritarian silhouettes work together to make domination appear natural, inevitable, and even desirable. Nowhere is this aesthetic more pronounced than in ICE, whose paramilitary uniforms project an image of communal power and solidarity forged through fear, coercion, and sanctioned lawlessness, rather than democratic consent. This logic was on full display in the costumed theatrics of Border Patrol commander Gregory Bovino, whose long black trench coat functioned less as clothing than as a visual performance of unaccountable authority, staging power as spectacle and intimidation as legitimacy. As the Wall Street Journal observed, the coat appeared disturbingly reminiscent of the wardrobe of Hermann Göring, a comparison later sharpened when Gavin Newsom remarked that it was as if the outfit had been lifted from SS regalia. Here, authority is neither argued for nor justified; it is worn. In this aestheticized register, power bypasses reason and forecloses dissent. What emerges is not merely spectacle, but an authoritarian pedagogy that teaches submission through intimidation, trains desire to admire domination, and shapes subjects prepared to mistake force for legitimacy.

What is taking shape in the MAGA aesthetic belongs to a long and well-established tradition in which culture functions as a form of political education, shaping how power is felt, admired, and internalized before it is ever justified. Fascist movements have always understood that domination must first be made emotionally compelling. Images, rituals, styles, and pleasures do the work that arguments cannot, training people to experience hierarchy as natural, discipline as beautiful, and violence as redemptive. This is the cultural logic Susan Sontag identified in her analysis of fascist imagery, where obedience is glorified, force eroticized, and submission transformed into visual pleasure. The sections that follow trace this aesthetic logic across fascist spectacle, eroticized violence, and even oppositional cultures, revealing how domination is learned long before it is enforced.

This logic reached its most refined expression in the films of Leni Riefenstahl, whose choreographed masses, monumental architecture, and hypnotic rhythms did not simply depict Nazi power but actively trained audiences to desire it, binding aesthetic rapture to political submission. That same logic resurfaces in cinema decades later, most disturbingly in The Night Porter, a film I once critiqued in Cineaste, where fascism is wrenched from its historical and genocidal foundations and recast as an intimate, eroticized psychodrama. By privatizing terror and aestheticizing cruelty, the film drains violence of its political meaning, transforming domination into a matter of psychological fascination rather than naming it for what it is: a collective crime organized by the state and sustained through culture. Crucially, even cultures of resistance have proven vulnerable to this aesthetic capture, where dissent itself can be stripped of its political force and refashioned as style.

Yet the struggle over aesthetics does not end with fascist spectacle; it also unfolds within movements that seek to oppose it. Early punk aesthetics, particularly in the work of Vivienne Westwood, sought to desecrate authority through ugliness, sexual provocation, anti-nationalist rage, and a refusal of respectability. As Mika Nijhawan observes, Westwood was a pioneer in producing grass-roots designs during the formative stages of the punk movement. Her clothes did not merely reflect punk fashion; they “dressed the entire movement,” giving visual form to its anger, refusal, and insurgent politics. In its earliest formations, punk was not simply a style but a cultural intervention, an assault on the fascist romance of order, purity, discipline, and heroic masculinity. It rejected the monumental, the uniform, and the disciplined body in favor of fragmentation, irony, and desecration, orchestrating outrage as a counter-pedagogy aimed at making authority appear ridiculous rather than sublime. Yet as punk was absorbed into consumer culture, its oppositional force was hollowed out, preserved as style while its political content was neutralized and repurposed within the very systems it once sought to challenge. Together, these examples reveal how gangster capitalism operates most effectively at the level of feeling, colonizing desire, suspending ethical judgment, and teaching people how to relate emotionally to violence, authority, and belonging long before coercion becomes explicit, normalized, or legally enforced.

Fascist Aesthetics as Political Education

The work of Antonio Gramsci, Paulo Freire, Walter Benjamin, the Frankfurt School, Václav Havel, Stuart Hall, bell hooks, Angela Davis, and others in the cultural politics tradition remains indispensable because it shifts our attention away from fascism as a purely political formation and toward culture as its enabling condition. Fascism does not seek democratic participation or critical consent; it substitutes spectacle for deliberation and affect for reasoned judgment. Politics becomes ceremony, war becomes pageantry, and domination is rendered beautiful, inevitable, and emotionally satisfying. In this sense, aesthetics functions as a form of mass education, a pedagogy that trains people to accept hierarchy as natural, to experience obedience as belonging, and to view violence not as a moral rupture but as a necessary expression of order.

This pedagogical power becomes most dangerous when fascist violence is severed from history and ethics and re-presented as intimate, seductive, or abstracted from collective responsibility. Fascist aesthetics does its most enduring work not through overt propaganda alone, but through cultural forms that dissolve political accountability into private feeling, fascination, and pleasure. As images circulate without context, repetition replaces judgment and affect displaces analysis. What emerges is not ignorance, but a trained indifference, a learned incapacity to connect spectacle to structure, desire to domination, or beauty to brutality.

What this history makes clear is that fascism is not imposed from above by force alone; it is learned, internalized, and normalized through culture. This insight lies at the heart of Gramsci’s insistence that “all politics is pedagogical.” Politics does not simply govern bodies; it shapes consciousness, habits, desires, and modes of identification. Education, universally understood, is the primary terrain on which this struggle unfolds. When schools, media, and cultural institutions discourage critical inquiry and reward conformity, they help produce the passivity and moral numbness on which authoritarianism depends.

Education therefore plays a decisive role in either reproducing or resisting fascist culture. When it challenges taken-for-granted assumptions, cultivates critical literacy, and nurtures solidarity rather than fear, it can disrupt the production of the fascist subject. But resistance to fascism cannot be confined to electoral politics or policy reform alone. Without a cultural foundation that sustains critical thought, collective responsibility, and democratic imagination, political action will remain fragile and easily undone. Fascist pedagogy works slowly, affectively, and persistently; countering it requires an equally sustained struggle over how people learn to see, feel, remember, and judge the world they inhabit.

Erotic Fascism and the Seductions of Cinema

Few cultural texts reveal this danger more clearly than The Night Porter. Often defended as a meditation on trauma, memory, or transgression, the film instead exemplifies how fascist violence can be transformed into a stylized erotic spectacle stripped of historical accountability. By recasting Nazism as an intimate psychosexual relationship between two consenting adults, the film evacuates fascism of its political, institutional, and genocidal realities. The concentration camp becomes a backdrop; the SS uniform, an erotic costume, and systemic terror is displaced by private obsession. Mass murder recedes, historical responsibility dissolves, and power is reduced to aestheticized desire.

This privatization of fascism is precisely what makes the film so dangerous. By aestheticizing domination and sexualizing submission, The Night Porter invites viewers to engage fascism at the level of fascination rather than judgment. Violence is no longer something to be confronted politically but something to be consumed affectively. In this sense, the film does not merely misrepresent fascism; it reenacts one of its central mechanisms, the conversion of terror into pleasure and history into style.

This danger was diagnosed with extraordinary clarity by Susan Sontag in “Fascinating Fascism.” Fascist aesthetics, she argues, eroticizes hierarchy, sanctifies discipline, and promises transcendence through submission. It glorifies the surrender of the self to power, offering ecstatic belonging in exchange for obedience. Fascination, in this account, is not a misunderstanding of fascism; it is one of its primary cultural instruments. When fascism is aestheticized, ethical judgment is suspended, historical memory erodes, and violence becomes thinkable precisely because it has been rendered beautiful.

Riefenstahl and the Architecture of Fascist Spectacle

The aesthetic logic that animates the classic film The Night Porter finds its most explicit historical expression in the films of Leni Riefenstahl. Works such as Triumph of the Will perfected the visual grammar of fascism: choreographed bodies, monumental architecture, rhythmic repetition, and the fusion of individual submission with collective exaltation. These films were not documentaries that happened to record Nazi power; they were propaganda machines that constructed reality to serve the image. As Sontag insisted, the Party rally existed in order to be filmed. The image did not reflect power; it produced it.

Riefenstahl’s films celebrate what Sontag identified as the fascist ideal: life as art, politics as beauty, and community forged through ecstatic self-control and obedience. Strength is eroticized, weakness despised, and critical reflection cast as contamination. The visual emphasis on purified bodies, synchronized movement, and reverent submission to the leader rehearses a political theology in which dissent appears as deformity and pluralism as decay.

The contemporary rehabilitation of Riefenstahl as a “pure artist,” detached from ideology, reproduces a profoundly dangerous fiction, the belief that aesthetics can be separated from politics. This refusal to judge fascist aesthetics politically is itself a political act. It allows authoritarian spectacle to survive as cultural form even when its explicit ideological content is disavowed, ensuring that fascist longings persist at the level of desire, style, and affect long after regimes fall.

Punk, Vivienne Westwood, and the Capture of Dissent

If fascist aesthetics secures power by making domination desirable, then resistance has often sought to disrupt that pedagogy at the level of style and sensation. Yet the now distant history of punk fashion reveals how vulnerable oppositional styles are to appropriation, commodification, and neutralization. Early punk, particularly in the work of the designer Vivienne Westwood, sought to desecrate authority through ugliness, sexual provocation, anti-nationalist rage, and a refusal of respectability. It attacked the fascist romance of order, purity, discipline, and heroic masculinity at its symbolic core by foregrounding disorder, deviance, and bodily excess. Westwood in both her politics and aesthetics embraced “the core of early punk [which] ‘was calculated anger’.”

In its earliest formations, punk was not simply a style but a cultural intervention, or as Malcolm McLaren observed, “It was never about having a Mohican haircut or wearing a ripped T-shirt. It was all about destruction, and the creative potential within that.” Punk rejected the monumental, the uniform, and the disciplined body in favor of fragmentation, irony, and desecration. It was an orchestration of outrage. It mocked nationalism, unsettled gender norms, and exposed the violence hidden beneath claims to moral order. Many punk bands such as The Clash and the Sex Pistols created art, music, and clothes as part of a social movement of which Westwood was a pioneering force in terms of her mix of aesthetics, fashion, and politics. In this sense, punk represented a counter-pedagogy, an attempt to unlearn obedience by making authority appear ridiculous rather than sublime. It was the Sex Pistols and Britain’s major subcultures singing fuck you to bourgeois culture in spite of a bad ending.

Punk’s visual language was gradually detached from its political context and absorbed into consumer culture. What began as an assault on domination was transformed into a marketable aesthetic. Transgression became style, shock became branding, and resistance was preserved only as surface. As Sontag warned in her reflections on photographyand spectacle, shock alone is never enough; it wears off, becomes familiar, and risks reinforcing the very structures it seeks to oppose. Punk’s absorption into fashion culture demonstrates a crucial lesson: fascism does not only impose its own aesthetics; it also colonizes those of dissent, draining them of political meaning while preserving their aesthetic form. In many ways, Westwood’s life offers a warning. Her radical merging of fashion and punk politics did not retain its political purity or even its integrity considering her eventual celebrity, status, business practices, and role in participating in consumer culture at the highest levels of elite participation. At the same time, her role in creating what might be called an anti-fascist aesthetic, her endless participation and support of the environmental movement, her support of sexual and gender freedom, and her support of Julian Assange makes clear that her role as a celebrity fashion designer and activist is no small tribute to her and offers a political and pedagogical example of the merging of the aesthetic, radical political beliefs, and activism.

Conclusion: The Making of the Fascist Subject


The rise of MAGA aesthetics cannot be separated from a longer history of cultural and social reproduction in the United States. Submission to authority, intolerance toward marginalized groups, ultra-nationalism, systemic racism, and rigid hierarchies of gender, race, and class have long been cultivated through schools, mainstream media, and a wide array of cultural institutions. Trump’s appeal to a mythic “better time,” coded as an era of racial dominance, patriarchal order, and unchallenged authority, draws directly from this authoritarian inheritance. Those who challenge these norms are routinely cast as threats to stability, tradition, and national identity, a dynamic that recalls Wilhelm Reich’s warning that fascism flourishes where individuality, sexuality, and dissent are systematically repressed.

The creation of the fascist subject must therefore be understood not as a purely psychological phenomenon, but as the outcome of sustained cultural indoctrination, a far-reaching apparatus of socialization and propaganda. The contemporary educational landscape too often fails to equip young people with the intellectual tools needed to question power, recognize manipulation, and resist domination. Trump’s language of “patriotism,” “traditional values,” and “law and order” feeds this hegemonic pedagogy by framing dissent as dangerous, deviant, or un-American. As Reich and Theodor Adorno recognized in different registers, mass education and mass media function as decisive instruments in producing subjects who come to accept hierarchy, exclusion, and cruelty as normal features of social life rather than as political choices demanding resistance.

MAGA aesthetics makes this process visible by rendering the pedagogy of domination immediate, affective, and embodied. Fascist movements have always understood that power must first be felt through culture. Fascism endures not because it persuades through reasoned argument, but because it seduces through spectacle, training people to experience domination as belonging and cruelty as strength. Images, performances, and styles perform this pedagogical labor long before policies are announced or laws are enforced. Aesthetics prepares the ground on which authoritarian rule becomes thinkable, even desirable, by shaping how people feel power before they are invited to think about it. As Lutz Koepnick argues in his essay “Aesthetic Politics Today: Walter Benjamin and Post-Fordist Culture,” “The fascist spectacle mobilizes people’s feelings primarily to neutralize their senses, massaging minds and emotions so that the individual succumbs to the charisma of vitalistic power” while consolidating state power.

If fascism aestheticizes politics to make injustice palatable, and domination attractive, then resistance must politicize aesthetics, reclaiming culture as a site of memory, ethical judgment, and democratic possibility. This means refusing the separation of beauty from responsibility, affect from history, and spectacle from power. The struggle against authoritarianism is therefore inseparable from the struggle over how power looks, feels, and is learned in everyday life.

The responsibility that falls to educators, cultural workers, and public intellectuals is thus profound. They are among the few agents capable of confronting the images and narratives that normalize authoritarianism while offering alternative visions of agency, justice, and democratic life. This work demands more than critique; it requires reclaiming education itself as a democratic practice rooted in historical consciousness, ethical responsibility, and collective imagination. Fascism triumphs not by persuading people to surrender their rights, but by schooling them, through culture and spectacle, to no longer recognize domination as injustice. Resistance, then, must begin where fascism does, in the struggle over culture itself. Only by reclaiming culture as a radical educational project capable of reshaping how people see, feel, and judge the world can we build a durable resistance, one able not only to confront fascism, but to prevent its endless return in ever more seductive forms.


Henry A. Giroux currently holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest in the English and Cultural Studies Department and is the Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy. His most recent books include: The Terror of the Unforeseen (Los Angeles Review of books, 2019), On Critical Pedagogy, 2nd edition (Bloomsbury, 2020); Race, Politics, and Pandemic Pedagogy: Education in a Time of Crisis (Bloomsbury 2021); Pedagogy of Resistance: Against Manufactured Ignorance (Bloomsbury 2022) and Insurrections: Education in the Age of Counter-Revolutionary Politics (Bloomsbury, 2023), and coauthored with Anthony DiMaggio, Fascism on Trial: Education and the Possibility of Democracy (Bloomsbury, 2025). Giroux is also a member of Truthout’s board of directors.




The process of accumulating wealth in the formation of a new Venezuelan bourgeoisie (2002-2026)

Saturday 14 February 2026, by Luís Bonilla-Molina



Since the beginning of the 20th century, the exploitation of oil in Venezuela has shaped particular characteristics of capitalist development: the formation of social classes and their political representation, the model of bourgeois enrichment, and forms of social control. The Brazilian economist Celso Furtado defined the Venezuelan case as “underdevelopment with an abundance of foreign exchange,” manifested in deindustrialisation, corruption, rapid concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, and severe poverty crises. [1]

Rentier Capitalism

The term Rentier State was popularised by Hossein Mahdavy in 1970 to describe states that receive massive incomes resulting from external rents (oil royalties), which develop unique economic and political patterns, with exacerbated dependence on oil exploitation, clientelistic redistribution and precarious incentives to diversify production. Asdrubal Baptista would develop the concept of rentier capitalism (1997) to describe the mode of bourgeois accumulation and hoarding that occurs in Venezuela, based on external rent rather than internal production, with all that the fluctuations in international crude oil prices mean for the local economy.

Since the Venezuelan bourgeoisie is the result of a rentier enrichment process, typical of the uneven and specific development of capitalism in the country, this makes it impossible to study and understand Venezuelan bourgeois hoarding and accumulation within the strict framework of global or regional patterns. That is why we use the term hoarding to describe the capture and concentration of capital, without denying the need of the bourgeoisie to continue expanding its wealth, using part of this money to promote other mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession, as occurs with imports or financial speculation.

The architecture of the economy-power-politics-society relationship of Venezuelan rentierism was structured from the 1920s onwards, with permanent tensions between dictatorship and democracy, political parties and other instruments of social intermediation, the role of the State and social economy, making rentierism a phenomenon not only economic, but also political, cultural and social. The very way of understanding science, innovation, technological development and education was highly influenced by rent-seeking, which also imposed a consumerist cosmopolitanism in all spheres.

Origins of the current Venezuelan crisis

Oil rentierism experienced an exceptional boom starting with the so-called oil booms of 1973-1974 and 1979-1981, causing GDP to grow strongly until the mid-seventies, with features of macroeconomic stability (low inflation, fixed exchange rate at 4.30 bolivars per dollar since 1964, moderate external debt), but this model proved unsustainable in the long term due to its extreme dependence on oil revenues, with expansive public spending, overvaluation of the bolívar and lack of productive diversification. A significant portion of the income flowed into the mechanisms of political intermediation and social control, consumption schemes, and even the ways of understanding so-called social advancement based on distortions in the way of obtaining and displaying goods.

Towards the end of Carlos Andrés Pérez’s government (1978) and during the mandate of Luis Herrera Campins (1979-1984) there were signs of the collapse of the model, with the contraction of real GDP per capita in some quarters or years, the fall in the rate of capital accumulation, inflation that rose from moderate levels (7% in 1978) to higher levels affecting the quality of life of the population in an accelerated manner, increase in external debt, incipient fiscal and trade deficit. The Venezuelan intellectual Arturo Uslar Pietri used to point out that Venezuela had squandered the equivalent of twenty Marshall Plans during that period.

1979-1983 is a period of acceleration in the crisis of the model as a result of the fall in oil prices (1981-1982) which produced a drop in exports of up to 30%, generated a massive flight of capital that some economists estimate at 8 billion dollars, added to the Latin American external debt crisis which affected the possibility of refinancing, and the abrupt decrease in international reserves (19 billion in 1981 to 4 billion in 1983), giving rise to what the prominent analyst Malfred Gerig calls the long Venezuelan depression. This crisis accelerates and intensifies with the arrival of neoliberal globalisation and its pressures on the nation-state, the dismantling of what was related to the Welfare State and the beginning of the post-Fordist cycle.

What happens as a result of the government measures taken in February 1983 is not only the temporary suspension of the free sale of foreign currency, the effective devaluation of the bolívar, the beginning of the loss of purchasing power of the population (70-75% in just hours for savings and salaries in bolívars), the imposition of restrictions on the outflow of foreign currency, but also the rentier hoarding model collapses. This marks the beginning of Venezuela’s current systemic crisis, which has persisted for forty-three years without resolution. During this period, the so-called Bolivarian Revolution, while an attempt at overcoming this crisis, unfortunately failed to transcend the rentier model, much less consolidate an anti-capitalist solution. This initial crisis has been compounded by other crises [2] that further complicate the solution from a labour perspective.

The Bolivarian Revolution between two turbulent currents

The 2002 coup d’état, which briefly removed Chávez from power and placed Carmona Estanga, leader of the business federation Fedecámaras (with the support of María Corina Machado), at the head of the so-called Government of National Salvation, marked an unprecedented break between the bourgeoisie and political power. This reshaped the way in which the leadership of the Bolivarian Revolution had been relating to the bourgeoisie.

As we have explained in other writings, from 2002 onward, Chávez promoted two parallel projects (in fact, though not explicitly): on the one hand, the construction of popular power and 21st-century socialism, and on the other, the shaping of the revolution’s economic project, creating a new bourgeoisie. This duality expressed one of the forms that the class struggle took in Venezuela during this period.

This situation generated - and continues to generate - a whole debate within the radical left regarding whether or not the Bolivarian revolution should have been supported, especially given this shift (which it is necessary to point out was not evident at that time). A significant portion of the left, as a progressive movement, supports the call to build popular power and then 21st-century socialism, within the framework of the class struggle. Another debate that will be difficult to resolve with consensus is regarding when it was appropriate to continue supporting it, but that is a discussion for another article.

As we mentioned, Venezuela’s model of accumulation and rentier hoarding is a kind of anomaly, which does not correspond to the Fordist models of industrial capitalism, but neither does it fit into the post-Fordism of the production of subjectivities, but rather seems to be a kind of hybrid, with its own identity within the framework of bourgeois accumulation and 21st-century capitalism.

The banking network

In rentier economies like Venezuela’s, the banking system doesn’t always function as an engine of credit for capitalist production, but rather as a conduit or intermediary for rent. Enrichment through banking occurs by manipulating financial variables that only the state controls.

Between 2002 and 2009, a substantial portion of hoarding occurred through various means. The first was arbitrage with debt securities (structured notes), a process in which the government issued bonds of the Republic or of the oil industry (PDVSA) denominated in dollars, but allowed national banks to buy them in bolívars, at a subsidised dollar exchange rate. [3] The banks, and their VIP clients (mostly linked to government hierarchies) acquired these securities and then sold them at their real price on the international dollar market.

The second, through the “float” or management of public funds, whose mechanism allowed ministries and state companies to deposit their budgets in private banks, not in the central bank. The banks used these deposits by investing them in government securities that earned interest (similar to treasury bills). In other words, the bank earned interest by "lending" the government its own money, generating low-risk financial gains.

Third, there is the inflation-indexed and devaluation-linked credit, whereby banks grant loans in bolívars at interest rates that fall below inflation (negative real rates), which means that those who have access to bank credit under these conditions (generally sectors linked to the political elite) use that money to buy assets (real estate) or dollars on the constantly rising black market, which means that at the end of the loan term they return to the bank bolívars that have no value compared to the goods they acquired. This operated as an accumulation by dispossession, transferring wealth from savers (whose money was losing value) to large debtors with political connections.

Fourth, the bank intermediation fees, which were carried out under exchange control schemes such as CADIVI, SICAD or SIMADI, in which the banks acted as operators. Since the bank acted as a filter for a company to access subsidised foreign currency, these financial entities charged "intermediation fees" or required the opening of accounts in foreign banks owned or partnered by local managers, causing oil revenue to flow to tax havens or private accounts under the guise of legal import operations.

Fifth, the so-called “briefcase banking”, financial institutions that were created for the sole purpose of implementing the scheme mentioned in the four previous points. They were not banks in the usual sense, that is, they did not have branches or a network of agencies for the public, but rather they were financial management offices, which also served to legitimise oil revenues obtained through overbilling, public contracts or direct corruption, moving them through the international Swift system before official controls could detect them.

In short, a portion of the banking system operated as a mechanism for capital concentration, fostering the formation of the new bourgeoisie by attracting state deposits, converting bolívars into dollars through arbitrage, capturing the subsidised dollar differential, and facilitating capital flight to the global financial system. From its inception, this new bourgeoisie lacked nationalist characteristics; on the contrary, it quickly integrated itself into the logic of the world-system.

During this period (2004) the Ministry of Food was created, which, as we will see later, would be fundamental to diversifying the bourgeois accumulation and hoarding model.

The new bourgeoisie appears on the public scene

The 2009 banking crisis exposed this form of capital concentration by the new bourgeoisie. The trigger was the structured notes scheme, which had progressed to the purchase of sovereign debt from other countries (especially Argentina and Ecuador) and government bonds, which were then resold to local banks, particularly to the sector where the new bourgeoisie operated. The banks bought these state securities at the official rate of bolívars, and since they were dollar-denominated instruments, they sold them again in US dollars on the parallel market, which increased the profit margin, generating massive instant liquidity, which caused small banks, created or acquired in the period 2002-2009, to go from being modest entities to managing fortunes in just seven years.

This exposed the perversion of buying banks with state funds, or the so-called "self-purchase." New (and old) businessmen with political connections received massive deposits from state entities (such as the finance ministries or PDVSA), which they then used to buy other banks or insurance companies (the state also acquired private insurance policies for its employees, which served as an additional mechanism for hoarding wealth). The new bourgeoisie became owners of banks, using not their own capital but the very funds they were supposed to safeguard. This became evident with the 2009 financial crisis, in which relatives and associates of high-ranking officials appeared as owners of banks and insurance companies that had been established using these schemes.

The mechanism of capital concentration did not stop there; on the contrary, it expanded with the cycle of transferring public deposits to granting loans to own companies. Contrary to the confrontational political discourse, the old bourgeoisie was not uninvolved in this scheme of wealth concentration; on the contrary, it acted as a driving force by serving as correspondents and operators of the large bond issues of the debt that fueled the speculative financial market. Furthermore, seeing the country risk the predatory acceleration that this dynamic imposed, they opted to sell their banking entities to the new bourgeoisie, often at inflated prices.

In the end, faced with this banking crisis that was the face of the new bourgeoisie, the State acted as usual, launching state bailouts and socialising the losses among the common people. When the structured notes scheme ran out, banks began to show capital gaps due to the diversion of funds to personal businesses, which caused the bourgeois hoarding model to collapse. Beginning in November 2009, the Venezuelan government intervened in several banks (Banco Canarias de Venezuela, Banco Confederado, Bolívar Banco, Banpro or Banco Provivienda, Banco Real, Central Banco Universal, Baninvest, and Banorte). While Venezuela’s banking crisis is still feeling the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, it is necessary to analyse it in terms of both its complementary aspects and its unique characteristics.

This bank intervention and the accusations against the so-called "Tsar" of the MERCAL popular food network, revealed how social programmes were being used for this model of accumulation by dispossession, making poverty functional for the origin, development, and growth of the new bourgeoisie. One key element is the exposure of the Public Treasury’s involvement in directing public deposits and allocating structured notes.

This crisis culminated in the creation of Banco Bicentenario (which absorbed and managed the crisis bailout), which was formed from a state-owned bank considered efficient, Banfoandes. The State used oil revenues to return the money to depositors. 2009 was the year in which the existence of two parallel projects within the so-called Bolivarian Revolution became evident and undeniable: the popular-socialist-communal project and the project of creating a new bourgeoisie, which were intended to be combined into a new multi-class model of governance.

Stockbrokers and brokerage firms in hoarding schemes

After the banking crisis, the bulk of the model of capital concentration and bourgeois enrichment (2008-2010) moved to operations in Stock Exchange Houses and Brokerage Companies, a period known as the era of the swap dollar. During this period, accumulation was also achieved through securities arbitrage. Because access to official dollars through CADIVI (the state exchange control agency) was very slow (and preferential), brokerage firms created a legalised parallel market based on the buying and selling of securities denominated in dollars but acquired in bolívars. In this triangulation, the brokerage firms transferred the security to an account abroad (Panama, Switzerland, Miami), selling it at the normal (non-subsidised) dollar rate, allowing the owner of these securities to obtain dollars (capital flight) abroad and the stock exchanges to profit from the intermediation. This led to a widening gap between the official and parallel exchange rates. Meanwhile, bond arbitrage meant that some brokerage firms received direct allocations of bonds from the National Treasury, which they then sold to other market players at inflated prices, with the brokerages pocketing the difference. Some analysts estimate that a single brokerage firm could earn millions of dollars in a single day. Within this framework, the relationship between stockbrokers, government officials, and the new wealthy elite fostered a highly specific model of wealth accumulation.

This created a bubble in brokerage firms between 2008 and May 2010, which operated in luxurious offices without having a real portfolio of minority clients, entities that were used to obtain profits from overbilling of state contracts and to take capital out of the country. This scheme imploded with the so-called Casazo, which led the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) to prohibit brokerage firms from trading securities in dollars, creating the SITME (System of Foreign Currency Transactions) that centralised bond business within the BCV. This demonstrated that the dynamics of capital capture by the bourgeoisie shifted toward where the State was investing the surplus oil revenue.

Exchange controls, imports and hoarding

From that moment (2010) a key aspect of the bourgeois appropriation of rentier capital became the importation of food for the popular sectors, whether given at subsidised prices or through direct delivery at zero cost. This scheme is built from import arbitrage (the CADIVI/CENCOEX era), through international outsourcing and logistics control, using the experience of banking arbitrage for food arbitrage, and placing the income in food boxes.

The death of Chávez (2013) allowed the emergence of Madurismo, a political expression of a new moment of voracious accumulation by the new bourgeoisie and a response to the fall in oil prices, which led this sector to liquidate the part of the national-popular-socialist project promoted by Chávez, in order to concentrate on the consolidation of the process of hoarding by the new rich. Delcy Rodríguez (current acting president), Jorge Rodríguez (president of parliament and Minister of the Interior) and Vladimir Padrino (Minister of Defense), were a structural part of Madurismo, and today they are in the process of mutation and accommodation to the role of the colonial administration board that the United States has assigned to them.

The model of accumulation by dispossession and the Solution to the Food Problem

Starting with the formation and nationalisation of the Local Councils for Food and Planning (CLAP) in 2016, the system shifted from private briefcase companies for imports that served as rent-seeking machines to networks of transnational intermediaries with direct connections to the upper echelons of power. This allowed not only the accumulation of wealth, but also the building of political relationships that had previously been adverse to business sectors internationally linked to social democracy or even the far right (the case of Colombian businessmen associated with sectors accused of links with paramilitarism). These companies bought low-quality products on the global market and sold them as if they were top-quality within the country, quadrupling their profits. Control of logistics (where many companies were linked to military figures) operated as another mechanism for capturing rent through freight and distribution processes in the country (deliveries to community councils or the CLAP programme). Poverty, shortages, inflation, and lack of purchasing power contributed to bourgeois enrichment and the maintenance of the non-ideological power structure.

That is to say, that we have moved from structured notes and bonds to food boxes, from the BCV bank’s spread to the widening of this spread plus surcharges, from financial sovereignty to food sovereignty, especially after the sanctions or unilateral coercive measures applied by the United States and European nations. The sanctions served the purpose of rent-seeking, capital concentration, and the enrichment of the new bourgeoisie. At this stage, hoarding did not require bank intermediation, but rather the existence of an associated company in countries with lax controls, high-level government contacts who could grant import licenses, and access to state-subsidised foreign currency.

The mining arc, gold, rare earths and the digital economy in the consolidation of a new bourgeoisie

When US sanctions came into effect and Venezuela left the Swift system, the mechanisms had to dematerialise (cryptocurrencies) and return to physical values (exploitation and appropriation of gold). When the United States froze the foreign accounts of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) and PDVSA, the Orinoco Mining Arc project was fully activated. Lacking public control and accountability, gold production became the slush fund for the new bourgeoisie and the government, creating a new mechanism for hoarding wealth. There is total opacity surrounding this matter; the current gold reserves are unknown, as is how the precious metal from the Orinoco Mining Arc was sold and stored. Furthermore, the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM) began exploiting rare earth elements, or so-called "black sands," around the Orinoco River, particularly cassiterite, nickel, rhodium, titanium, and other minerals. The exploitation, commercialisation, and revenue generated from these highly deregulated resources contribute to the accumulation of wealth for the emerging bourgeois class.

For their part, cryptocurrencies, especially promoted by the government since 2016-2017, with mining farms, constituted another model of accumulation by dispossession, through speculative financial mechanisms, which allowed the Creole bourgeoisie to "learn" to generate profits in such volatile environments as these. With the creation of the Petro (2017), the Venezuelan cryptocurrency, this digital currency operated as an international trading mechanism that bypassed the controls of countries imposing sanctions. The use of stablecoins (USDT) allowed for the sale of oil and other trade without requiring permission from the global banking system. This scheme collapsed when $23 billion disappeared from public finances, when it became clear that debts were registered as accounts receivable by PDVSA, even though they had been paid off, but the resources for these concepts had been converted into digital currencies by the nouveau riche in high government positions, especially from the state oil company.

The circulation of dollars from gold, cryptocurrency arbitrage, and overbilling generated what economists call "the mirage of recovery," or the consumption bubble, localised and segmented to the radius of action of those who gravitate in this sub-economy. This led to the emergence of the so-called Bodegones, where there were all kinds of imported merchandise, companies that functioned as mechanisms for capturing rent, mostly in the hands of relatives of politicians and military personnel. Similarly, the opening of dealerships for high-end and luxury vehicles served as another means of capturing this type of income. Other outlets for this capital flow included the activation of the real estate market and the construction of large buildings and shopping centers.

When the Attorney General of the Republic reported the imprisonment of those responsible for the cryptocurrency run, he explained that digital currencies and PDVSA funds had been used by the sector accused of corruption to increase the devaluation of the bolívar along with the rise in the price of the dollar, as another mechanism for appropriating income. In other words, the tragedy that the Venezuelan working class was experiencing, a product of the devaluation of the bolívar’s purchasing power and inflation, was not only the result of US sanctions, but also of the hoarding scheme that operated through the constant and upward run of the dollar price by the new bourgeoisie and high officials who controlled cryptocurrencies and oil revenues.

In each of these stages, the proceeds of corruption were legitimised through these mechanisms of expanded rent capture, with the public budget becoming another source of bourgeois enrichment. This explains how Venezuela, despite receiving income equivalent to ten Marshall Plans over the past 25 years, saw its infrastructure rapidly destroyed, along with the material living conditions of its population. The corruption-poverty nexus operated as a system of accumulation by dispossession.

The necessity for inter-bourgeois agreements

The search for inter-bourgeois agreements to maintain power is part of the nature of the bourgeoisie as a social class. That is why, since 2018, the new Venezuelan bourgeoisie has worked intensely to reach an agreement with the old bourgeoisie and form a single class without confrontational divisions. For this purpose it was necessary to rebuild the relationship with the United States, showing that what remained of the Bolivarian revolution had lost all capacity and will for radicalism; the negotiations became public from 2019, when Maduro confirmed that dialogue had begun with the first Trump administration, which would continue with Biden (recognised on March 8, 2022) returning Venezuela to its role as a secure supplier of oil to the United States in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Between 2018 and 2026, there was an accelerated rapprochement between the two bourgeoisies (of the Fourth Republic from approximately 1958-1999 and the Bolivarian Fifth Republic of 1999 onwards), to such an extent that today many of us think that both are practically integrated in their interests and, whose visible face of that fusion is Delcy Rodríguez, the current interim president. Since 2021, Delcy Rodríguez has been a guest of honour at the annual assemblies of the business group Fedecámaras, and after the events of January 3, 2026, she is the one who calls for legal flexibility to promote private, national and international investment with the consensual applause not only of the entire national bourgeoisie but also internationally.

To achieve this bourgeois consensus, between 2018 and 2026 they not only outlawed and intervened in all left-wing parties, but also implemented a package of economic liberalisation, restrictions on union freedoms and the right to strike, limitations on freedom of expression, and usurped popular sovereignty. The Anti-Blockade Law (a euphemism for imposing a new neoliberal adjustment on the Venezuelan economy) and the Law on Special Economic Zones are just two examples of this restructuring.

The Venezuelan bourgeoisie (both of the Fourth and Fifth Republic) accepts the colonial relationship

In the context of the emergence of a new world order, which the United States aspires to lead, the granting of oil rights and the economy that Maduro had promoted was insufficient; the Trump administration wants total access to Venezuelan energy and wealth. The US military offensive in the southern Caribbean begins in August 2025, finding the Venezuelan bourgeoisie unified and attempting to maintain its status quo of wealth accumulation. For this unified bourgeoisie, the democratic closure that began in July 2024 is not a primary concern, nor is it for the United States after the events of January 3, 2026.

In the 30 days following the imperialist attack against Venezuela, the capture and kidnapping of Maduro, and the imposition of a protectorate situation, directly monitored on the territory by the American chargé d’affaires in the country, Laura Dogu, the Colonial Administration Board (Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez, Diosdado Cabello and Vladimir Padrino) has initiated a set of structural legislative reforms, which seek to guarantee that in the new situation of domination, the Creole bourgeoisie receives a part of the rentier hoarding. Trade laws were modified and simplified, and a reform of the Hydrocarbons Law was enacted that broke even with the type of limited nationalism promoted by Venezuelan social democracy in 1943 and 1976, taking the country back to the time when transnational oil companies dictated the relationship with the national treasury. The reduction of royalty rates (from 30% to 15%), the concession to transnational corporations to sell oil directly, and the acceptance of the United States’ authority to decide on the administration of resources derived from oil trade are a shameful attempt by the unified bourgeoisie and the colonial governing body to maintain some level of control over capital accumulation. Now, labour law reform is being announced to end the structural adjustment programme dictated by the Trump administration.

The unified bourgeoisie of today has gone further than the old bourgeoisie of the Fourth Republic, losing all nationalist character and accepting the colonial protectorate status that the US seeks to impose. But the final word will be spoken by the events of the class struggle to come.

11 February 2026

Translated by David Fagan for International Viewpoint.

In Spanish viento sur.


Footnotes

[1Due to the length limitations of this article, we could only address the most representative milestones in the formation of the new bourgeoisie during the period 2002-2026. However, this work should be complemented by an analysis of the tensions this generated with the popular movement at each of these moments, as evidence of the different paths the class struggle takes in each situation and historical moment. There will surely be time and space to undertake this analytical task in the future.

[2These complementary crises arises from the schism of the popular-national State as a result of the Caracazo of 1989 (the notion of the people as a consensus for state control dissolves), the return to the contradiction between the military and civilian world (military uprisings of February 4 and November 27, 1992), the questioning of electoral power by the multitude (1993, expanded in each subsequent election), the first radical distancing between the Creole bourgeoisie and its political representations in government when the rich attempted to break the democratic thread (2002), the process of the emergence of a new bourgeoisie with liquidationist intentions of its predecessor (2002- ), the tensions of the new model of multi-classism that the Bolivarian revolution attempts to promote (representative democracy, communal power, new bourgeoisie), the definitive failure of the exchange control models based on the subsidy of the dollar (as a form of enrichment of the financial bourgeoisie), the problems in the type of price control (capture of surplus income) that led to the shortage crisis and the evaporation of bourgeois developmentalism due to the collapse of basic public services (2014-2026), the escalation of tensions between Venezuela and the United States (2004-2017/ 2018-2025/ 2026 - ) whose trade relationship had been central to the rentier model, the democratic shutdown (2024-2026), and the risk of the Republic’s collapse in the face of US colonial ambitions (with the submission of the governing junta installed on January 3, 2026). Overcoming the Venezuelan structural crisis requires resolving all these problems simultaneously—or at least in a convergent manner—something that will be very complex in a colonial situation like the one that began in January 2026.

[3In Venezuela the dollar was subsidised, placing an official value below its real market value, a difference that operated as a mechanism for capturing oil revenue.