Inside an Italian Police Chase to Stop the Theft of Ugly Sea Creatures

Agostino Petroni and Sandali Handagama, Bloomberg News

(Bloomberg) -- At dusk, a man pulled a jam-packed net from the Ionian Sea into a speed boat headed for Taranto, a city in Puglia, Italy. He’d make a few hundred euros off the catch if he could get it into the right hands without being spotted. His cargo was about 110 pounds of wiggly, slimy sea cucumbers, or—as they are locally called in Italy—“poop of the sea.”  

Arturo Casale, 65, got word of the man’s fishing expedition later that day in the form of a photo. It was too late to catch the thief. As the founder of an environmental nonprofit called Mare Per Sempre (“Sea Forever”), Casale is known locally as the area’s premiere defender of sea cucumbers, which are important in maintaining healthy marine ecosystems and combating effects of climate change.   

News of the illegal harvest reached him in early November last year, just a month before the local government was set to deliberate whether gathering sea cucumbers would continue to be a crime. “It felt like we fell from the clouds,” says Casale. “We were infuriated.”

While most Italians may shiver at the thought of eating sea cucumber, some East Asian countries highly value it in their cuisine and traditional medicine. In 2020, China and Hong Kong were the world’s largest sea cucumber buyers, importing more than 70% of a global supply worth around $270 million. China’s love for sea cucumbers—driven by texture, look, and significance in local medical practices—fuels a complex and unsustainable supply chains that originates in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and the Mediterranean. A kilogram of sea cucumbers can sell for up to $3,000 to Chinese buyers.

In the past decade, local Italian thieves, aided by Turkish and Greek smugglers, have capitalized on the new business opportunity and started plundering the coast of southern Italy.

In Taranto, located in Puglia on the heel of Italy’s boot, Casale’s small team of volunteer “sea sentinels” has been monitoring the coastline for marine poachers. The team’s work was instrumental in orchestrating a nationwide ban on sea cucumber harvesting in 2018. The three-year effort by activists, police, prosecutors, and scientists resulted in Italy becoming the first country in Europe to completely prohibit the extraction and commercialization of the sea cucumber.

However, the ban on sea cucumber harvesting isn’t permanent. It’s a moratorium set to expire in December.

“[Regulators] haven’t issued a definitive one, and every year it’s a battle till the last day,” says Rosalba Giugni, founder of environmental nonprofit association Marevivo, who pushed for the sea cucumber ban back in 2016 and lobbies to continue it.

The fisherman captured on film in November is far from the only one breaking the law: A few days after the incident, Taranto’s financial police arrested 17 people accused of participating in illegal trafficking. Attempts by local criminals to recapture that market haven’t ceased, and seizures keep happening around southern Italy: On March 15, 2021, three tons of live sea cucumber (in 144 plastic buckets) bound for Greece were seized by Brindisi’s port authorities.

In September, a vendor who claimed to be from Taranto advertised on 21food.com, a Chinese food-trading website, that it could process 1,000 kilograms per month of Holothuria tubulosa, a sea cucumber species common to the Mediterranean.

The protection of these mild sea creatures hangs by a thread. It depends on complex and collective efforts by environmentalists, law enforcement agencies, scientists, and lobbyists. Sometimes it’s hard to convince people that sea cucumbers are worth protecting.

“Do you know what [Italians] call sea cucumbers? Dicks of the sea,” says Silvestro Greco, a marine biologist at the Anton Dornh Italian National Institute of Marine Biology. “Who gives a damn about the dicks of the sea, right?”

The sea cucumber is not particularly loved. Slug-like, it lacks the personality of an octopus, the Pixar-fication of the clownfish, or the delight of the starfish, to which it is related. Sea cucumbers don’t attempt to escape their captors, and the ones most popular on the Asian market are smaller than the palm of one’s hand. Only within the past 15 years has it become clear how essential they are to the ocean.

“They have a similar role to an earthworm in that they eat sand and process any of the organic matter and decaying plant matter that's in the sand, and they poop out clean sand,” says Steven Purcell, a professor of marine ecology at Australia’s Southern Cross University who wrote a book on sea cucumbers. In doing so, he adds, the sea cucumber helps clean and oxygenate sediments in marine habitats. Smaller animals like worms, crab and even small fish may live on or around adult sea cucumbers to take advantage of their defensive toxins. 

An abundance of some large species of sea cucumber can help counter ocean acidification, a nasty side effect of climate change that occurs when too much carbon dioxide dissolves in the water. Ocean acidification slows the growth of coral reefs, which host a multitude of marine life. Sea cucumbers, thanks to their mineral-rich poop, can provide corals the calcium needed to help grow their skeletons

“Through their digestion, they actually enhance the alkalinity of the seawater around them. … And so, where you have dense populations of these large sea cucumbers, that might help to buffer some systems from ocean acidification at local scales,” Purcell says.  

For all their importance, stirring interest in conserving sea cucumbers has been somewhat challenging around the world. In the mid 1990s, only about 35 countries harvested sea cucumbers. Today, more than 70 countries are involved in the harvest and trading.  

“They're easy to collect by hand. They don't turn away. They're just sitting there. And if you can dive to the depths where they occur, you just need to pick them up,” says Purcell.

Born and raised in Taranto, Casale made ends meet for 40 years working in auto body repair. In 2014, he closed up shop and decided to dedicate his life to protecting the sea.

“If I spend two days in the city and I do not touch the sea—if I don’t dip my hands in it—I feel sick,” he says.

In early 2015, Casale and fellow Sea Sentinel Sergio Passarelli stood on the Discesa Vasto pier in Taranto, marveling at the scene unfolding before them. In a frenzy, fishermen and townspeople alike were dumping buckets of sea cucumber onto growing mounds stacked along the pier. Boats that had been docked for years were out at sea, busily fetching more.

“We’re talking boats overloaded with sea cucumbers,” says Passarelli, a 39-year-old firefighter and active member of Mare per Sempre. 

At the beginning, there was a mad rush to clean out all the areas in Taranto colonized by sea cucumbers, Passarelli says.

“Kids were involved, too. In about half an hour, they would fill up a bucket with sea cucumber, take it to the fish store or to unauthorized vendors, who would give them €5 [$5.41] or €6, and they would be happy,” Passarelli said.

The rate of harvesting was so intense that Casale and Passarelli feared Taranto’s entire coastal stretch would be wiped clean within six months.

“It was an ugly dream. A nightmare,” Casale says.

At the time, no regulations prohibited or protected the harvest because there had been no need for any. The activists wondered where the mountains of sea cucumber were headed.

Casale and Passarelli sought help from Vincenzo Casaregola, a captain in the Naval Operations Section in Taranto of Guardia di Finanza, Italy’s financial police. Casaregola sent a team led by his deputy, Vincenzo Piccininno, to the scene. Piccininno recalls being confronted with “an astonishing amount” of sea cucumbers.

“But we didn’t know what to do with them,” Piccininno says. “We didn’t understand what all this was about.”

Nonetheless, Taranto’s financial police got to work. A few months later, on July 9, 2015, Casaregola’s team raided a storage unit in Taranto and found 39 people, side by side, cleaning 1,000 kilograms of sea cucumbers. Since the harvesting of sea cucumbers was not illegal then, the police went in under the guise of checking whether the workers had been hired legally. On finding some discrepancies, they seized the sea cucumbers.

That operation set things in motion. A few days later, legislators in Puglia published a notice clarifying that sea cucumbers could not be sold for consumption.

The increased interest from lawmakers allowed the financial police to employ such additional investigative powers as phone tapping, which in turn helped them trace the frenzied harvest to two local criminal organizations. Court records reveal that the groups had fueled the fishing and commercialization of sea cucumbers in Puglia; cargo ships carried $2.7 million worth of cucumbers out of the region that year.

According to the financial police, masses of illegal fishers were selling their harvest at $1 to $3 per kilogram to the criminal organizations in Taranto, which then sold it to intermediaries at about $7 per kilogram for shipment to China and other Southeast Asian countries.

The authorities were able to seize about 40 tons of sea cucumbers of 600 tons that had been harvested. At least 2 million animals were stripped from the Italian coast in only a year.

“To many people, this issue was a joke, but to our working group it wasn’t,” says Piccininno, the police deputy.

Removing 2 million of anything from an ecosystem is likely to permanently alter it, as Italian scientists soon confirmed. Giovanni Fanelli, a researcher and diver at Taranto’s Istituto di Ricerca sulle Acque, witnessed the sudden depletion of sea cucumbers in the Puglian coastal waters.

It’s hard to quantify the damage done, because there are no previous studies on sea cucumber populations in local waters to use in gauging the full impact of harvesting on wild stocks. It was not until 2019 that the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) finally approved the addition of three species of international traded sea cucumber to its list of threatened animals. Still, a majority of sea cucumber species are classified as data deficient, Purcell explains, meaning there isn’t enough biological data on them to decide whether they are threatened.

Starting in 2018, Italy’s Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies began publishing a yearly decree that banned sea cucumber fishing in Italy. The decree has merely been renewed annually since its first approval, and Giugni says the national government is using a lack of research on sea cucumbers as an excuse not to permanently ban their exploitation.

Nonetheless, the harvest and sale of sea cucumbers is an environmental crime, a felony punishable with up to 15 years in prison. According to the financial police, more than $9 million in personal property and assets were seized from the two criminal organizations involved in the harvest, and leaders await trial for environmental crimes.

Despite the felony designation, demand for Italian sea cucumbers has not been curbed. In July 2019, a woman was arrested at Rome’s international airport for attempting to roll a suitcase stuffed with dried sea cucumbers past security. Piccininno, the police deputy responsible for the 2015 investigation, says the dried sea cucumbers were stored as carefully as if they were diamonds.

Italy’s efforts to curb overexploitation of sea cucumber stocks in its waters stand as a testament to what can be accomplished through the effective enforcement of environmental legislation to protect wildlife. But Casale and Passarelli say Italian authorities are understaffed, lack enough boats, and are unable to maintain the oversight needed to stop illegal extraction. Still, they credit the authorities for trying.

“The hope is that a definitive law, no longer annual, will be issued. It will be easier to work with; otherwise, we risk losing valuable time,” says Francesco Sancineto, commander of the financial police Naval Operations Section in Bari.

For Casale and his team, whose lives revolve around swimming, fishing, and diving in the Mediterranean, the fight is all about protecting the sea’s beauty and biodiversity.

“I won’t compromise. Do not touch the sea. If you do, you are done,” Casale says. “The sea is everything to us.”

©2022 Bloomberg L.P.

Legal Implications of the Military Operations at the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plants

Written by Tibisay Morgandi and Batuhan Betin

 April 15, 2022

With the seizure of the Ukrainian Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plants by Russian armed forces on 24 February and 4 March, Europe has once again become haunted by the spectre of radioactive contamination. On 31 March, Ukraine notified the IAEA that while Russian forces maintain uninterrupted control of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, they have left Chernobyl and have returned control of the plant to its Ukrainian personnel.

Russia’s reasons for seizing these power plants are unclear. The Ukrainian ambassador to the UK said that Chernobyl was a weak spot in Ukraine’s defences, since, as a radioactivity exclusion zone, it was unprotected. Chernobyl is also on the most direct route from Belarus to Kyiv. But more sinister motives have been suggested, including that the seizure of these nuclear power plants was a signal to NATO not to interfere militarily, or even that these nuclear power plants could be used as ‘dirty bombs’.

Both attacks have been denounced by Rafael Mariano Grossi, the IAEA Director General. Grossi referred to the 2009 IAEA General Conference’s unanimous Decision GC(53)/DEC, which reiterated that ‘any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency’. This can scarcely be denied. However, these attacks also highlight several failings of special rules of international humanitarian law relevant to nuclear power plants.

Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions

The key provision is Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, to which both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are parties, which gives special protection to nuclear power plants, along with dams and dykes, due to the unusually significant risks that attacks on these installations can have on civilian populations. It states, relevantly:

1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease: … (b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support; …

‘Attacks’ for the purpose of Article 56 are defined in Article 49 as ‘acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence’.

Military operations at the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plants

There can be little doubt that Russian forces ‘attacked’ the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant within the meaning of Articles 49 and 56. This plant was seized after Russian forces shelled and damaged the training centre and administrative building inside the plant and prevailed against the Ukrainian forces attempting to defend it on 3 and 4 March (see here). The Russian seizure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on 24 February may also have been an ‘attack’ within the meaning of this definition, although it is difficult to know how much fighting was involved.

But not every ‘attack’ on nuclear power plants is prohibited; Article 56 only prohibits attacks ‘if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population’. On the other hand, the modal verb ‘may’ indicates that Article 56 will be violated not only if there is a release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses, but also if, at the time of the attacks, there was a risk that this would occur.

To determine this will require a retrospective risk assessment. So far, the shelling of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant has not caused a release of radioactive materials. However, it seems ‘difficult to sustain’ that the Russian forces, at the time of the attacks, were able to determine with a high degree of certainty that a radioactive release was not conceivable.

But, interestingly, and perhaps counterintuitively, it is also possible that the same might apply to the Ukrainian forces defending these installations. This is because Article 49 does not distinguish between ‘attacks’ in the course of offensive or defensive operations. William Boothby confirms that ‘rules that relate to attacks … should be observed equally by troops that are defending themselves and by those engaged in offensive operations’ (Boothby,  81).’ This raises difficult questions as to the extent to which Ukrainian forces were entitled to defend these plants.

Certainly, some defensive measures are permissible. Article 56(5) states that:

[I]nstallations erected for the sole purpose of defending the protected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves be made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected works or installations.

But operationalising this provision, with its references to defensive ‘installations’, and ‘weapons capable only of repelling hostile action’, is far from straightforward, given that the purpose of the overriding obligation, in the case of nuclear power plants, is to prevent the release of nuclear radiation. And this is recognised by the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I, which, strikingly, suggests that in some circumstances a defending party may be best advised to abandon its defence:

[2176] … the Parties to the conflict may be induced to take preventive measures, such as emptying reservoirs or closing down nuclear electrical generating stations; they may also envisage the possibility of not defending such works or installations so that these can be occupied by the adversary without destructive attacks which could release dangerous forces.

The defence of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant by Ukrainian forces, which involved a firefight and artillery, raises the complicated question of what a defending force is able to do without itself violating Article 56. Similar questions arise in the context of the seizure of Chernobyl.

Does Article 56 cover Chernobyl as a defunct nuclear power plant?

The seizure of Chernobyl also highlights a different ambiguity in Article 56, insofar as it applies to ‘nuclear electrical generating stations’. This clearly covers Zaporizhzhya, the largest operating nuclear power plant in Europe. But it is less clear that it covers defunct nuclear power plants, such as Chernobyl, which ceased operations in 2000 and is in the process of being decommissioned. The difficulty is that, textually, the use of the gerund adjective ‘generating’ in Article 56 would seem to mean that a ‘nuclear electrical generating station’ must still be capable of generating electricity. The French and Spanish texts of Article 56, which are equally authentic, refer more generally to nuclear power plants (ie French: ‘centrales nucléaires de production d’énergie électrique’ and Spanish: ‘centrales nucleares de energía eléctrica’), without referring to them being in operation.

Already in 1982, Ramberg Bennett criticised Article 56 for its lack of comprehensiveness on this point, stating that ‘[a]s the protocol now stands, it specifically addresses only one segment of the nuclear fuel cycle: nuclear electrical generating stations. However, large inventories of radioactivity are located in other fuel cycle installations: nuclear spent fuel storage, reprocession plants, waste storage and fuel fabrication facilities. If the prohibition is to be comprehensive, these plants must be included’ (Ramberg, 14).

Still, it can be argued that Article 56 also covers defunct nuclear power plants. The term ‘nuclear electrical generating stations’ was used to denote facilities used for peaceful as opposed to military purposes (Lamm, 4). Further, the object and purpose of Article 56 are expressly to protect civilians from release of dangerous forces into the environment. Nuclear power plants undergoing decommissioning still contain dangerous forces, such as highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel currently stored at Chernobyl. If the purpose of Article 56 is to protect civilians from ‘dangerous forces’ it does not matter if these forces are currently being used for the purposes of generating electricity. The inclusion in Article 56 of dams and dykes, for which no special purposes are indicated, further reinforces this interpretation.

Who would be liable in the event of a nuclear incident?

Another question raised by the Russian forces’ seizure of the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plants concerns the liability for any nuclear damage that might result from a nuclear incident at either of these plants. The relevant law is the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, to which Ukraine and most of its neighbouring countries are Contracting Parties.

This Convention establishes a civil liability regime, which operates under domestic law (here, Ukrainian law), allowing eligible victims of nuclear damage to claim compensation in the courts of a Contracting Party in whose territory a nuclear incident occurs (here, Ukraine’s courts). This regime channels liability exclusively to the operator.

Ukraine has designated Energoatom as the operator of both plants (Articles I(1)(c) and I(1)(d)). Article IV(1) provides for the ‘absolute’ liability of the operator irrespective of any fault on its part, provided that the damage ‘has been caused by a nuclear incident […] in his nuclear installation’ (Article II(1)(a)). Thus, in principle, any liability for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident in either of these plants would be channelled to Energoatom. Relevantly to the present situation, however, Article IV(3)(a) provides for an exception:

[n]o liability under this Convention shall attach to an operator for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection.

Energoatom would thus be exonerated from liability for a nuclear incident (should any occur) that is ‘directly due’ to an act of armed conflict or hostilities. But what this obligation covers is also not entirely clear.

It is relatively straightforward to argue that the seizure of both nuclear power plants is an act of armed conflict or hostilities within the meaning of Article IV(3)(a). The term ‘directly due’, however, suggests that there must be a causal link between the act of armed conflict (or hostilities) and the nuclear incident. The obligation clearly covers incidents that are directly caused by acts of violence on or near a nuclear power plant, for example an artillery strike. But does it extend to incidents caused by other acts, for example if Russian forces interfere with the safe monitoring of the nuclear power plants or are simply negligent in this regard? While Energoatom’s liability would be exonerated in the first of these cases, this is less clear in the other two. In either case, the question would be determined before a Ukrainian court.

It is relevant to note that, on 31 March, Energoatom reported that Russian forces formally returned to it control of Chernobyl. In the absence of further acts of armed conflict or hostilities, liability for any future nuclear incidents should now reattach to Energoatom. The situation is however different at Zaporizhzhya, which is still occupied and controlled by Russian forces. Energoatom would be more likely to remain exonerated from liability for a nuclear incident occurring at Zaporizhzhya.

What, then, would be the legal situation in the event that Energoatom were exonerated? Article XVIII of the 1963 Vienna Convention states that ‘[t]his Convention shall not be construed as affecting the rights, if any, of a Contracting Party under the general rules of public international law in respect of nuclear damage.’ The most relevant rules of this type are Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations.

Article 42 provides that ‘territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’. Ukrainian personnel at Zaporizhzhya are under the authority of Russian forces and respond to instructions of a Russian commander (in lieu of Energoatom). Hence, Russia’s occupation of Zaporizhzhya seems to fall squarely within the definition of Article 42. Article 43 provides that the occupying power ‘shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety’. This encompasses the duty to prevent transboundary harm (Benvenisti, 18 and 84), as reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory Opinion (118) and by state practice in relation to Iraq’s occupation (Longobardo, 174). In relation to transboundary environmental harm, this is confirmed by Draft Principle 22 (‘Due diligence’) of the 2019 Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, adopted on first reading by the ILC, which states that:

An Occupying Power shall exercise due diligence to ensure that activities in the occupied territory do not cause significant harm to the environment of areas beyond the occupied territory.

Hence, so long as Russian forces are ‘in actual control’ (Benvenisti, 50) over the Zaporizhzhya  nuclear power plant, Russia, as the occupying power, is subject to a duty to prevent transboundary harm (including significant harm to the environment) arising from a nuclear incident in the occupied plant. This duty is an obligation of diligent conduct, rather than an obligation of result (Longobardo).

Conclusion

The Russian forces’ seizure and occupation of the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plants have given rise to several mainly unexplored questions about the way in which international law regulates military activities involving nuclear power plants and liability for consequential nuclear damage.

While Article 56 of Additional Protocol I restricts military operations at nuclear power plants, it does not ban them entirely, resulting in a lack of clarity as to what offensive and, most importantly, defensive operations might be legal. International humanitarian law on these matters studiously avoids distinguishing between offensive and defensive operations. But a failure to take a stand creates a dangerous grey zone – and one which, as these events have shown, needs to be navigated on site in the heat of battle.

For its part, the nuclear liability regime set by the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage is also ambiguous when it comes to a nuclear incident caused by an act of armed conflict or hostilities, in that it fails to elucidate, in sufficient detail, when an operator of a nuclear power plant is exonerated from liability. That said, there is at least clarity on the application of the underlying rules governing the responsibility of Russia, as an occupying power, for any potential nuclear damage in Ukraine and in third states, under the Hague Regulations.

Image source: The Guardian. Photograph: Sergei Supinsky/AFP/Getty Images

Tibisay Morgandi

Dr Tibisay Morgandi is Lecturer in International Energy and Natural Resources Law at the Queen Mary University of London School of Law. She is a public international lawyer and teaches

Batuhan Betin

Batuhan Betin is a legal trainee at the European Space Agency and research assistant at Queen Mary University of London.

 

PROVOCATUER

Danish far-right party leader burns Holy Quran under police protection in Sweden

Far-right Hard Line party leader burns Muslim holy book in heavily-populated Muslim area

News Service April 15, 2022

File photo


The Danish leader of the far-right Stram Kurs (Hard Line) party burned a copy of the Holy Quran on Thursday in a heavily-populated Muslim area in Sweden, according to media reports.

Rasmus Paludan, accompanied by police, went to an open public space in southern Linkoping and placed the Muslim holy book down and burned it while ignoring protests from onlookers.

About 200 demonstrators gathered in the square to protest.

The group urged police not to allow the racist leader to carry out his action.

After the police ignored the calls, incidents broke out and the group closed the road to traffic, pelting stones at police.

Turkish-born politician Mikail Yuksel, who founded the Party of Different Colors in Sweden, said the Islamophobic provocations of the racist anti-Islamist politician under police protection continue in cities across Sweden.

Yuksel said Paludan particularly chooses neighborhoods that are heavily populated by Muslims and places near mosques for provocations.

"In Sweden, which defends human rights, freedom of religion and conscience with the highest pitch, the Qur'an is burned in the neighborhoods of Muslims under the protection of the police."

He added that police also call for Muslims to exercise common sense as their holy books are being burned right before their eyes.

Qatar sought Conservative MP as chair of the Qatar APPG ahead of World Cup, sources claim

Catherine Neilan

Alun Cairns MP, who was elected chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Qatar in January 2022. Getty


Qatar wanted a Conservative chair of the APPG ahead of the World Cup, sources have claimed.

Former minister Alun Cairns was deemed "preferable" to incumbent Alistair Carmichael, these sources said.

Doha also suggested a new secretariat, and the hedge fund firm Argo Capital Management was then installed, the sources said.

The Qatari foreign ministry said it wanted the chair of the UK all-party parliamentary group (APPG) to be dropped in favour of a Conservative MP, and to replace the long-term secretariat, sources have told Insider.

Both wishes seem to have come true: Tory former minister Alun Cairns was elected as chair earlier this year, with Argo Capital Management, a hedge fund, appointed as secretariat of the group.

The claim has sparked concern from transparency campaigners, who said that this appears to be an example of the loosely-regulated system of parliamentary groupings being "hijacked."

The changes to the APPG come alongside increased efforts by Qatar to burnish its reputation ahead of hosting the 2022 World Cup, which has been marred by accusations of workers' rights abuses, most recently that conditions "amount to forced labour".

MPs have accepted £220,000 worth of trips funded by Qatar since the start of 2021, official records show.

Insider spoke to several sources involved with the APPG, who believed that Qatar had triggered changes in its parliamentary chairman and also its secretariat — the external body that helps manage the group.

The sources spoke to Insider on the basis of anonymity to speak frankly about their concerns.

One person connected with the APPG told Insider that its former chair, the Liberal Democrat MP Alistair Carmichael, stepped aside after the Qatari government suggested it would be "preferable" for it to be chaired by a Tory. Another source said Carmichael had been "eased out".

A third party recommended Alun Cairns, a Conservative MP and former Welsh secretary, to the Qataris, who then put his name to people in Westminster, two sources said.

Carmichael's departure led to the first of two hotly-contested elections. The first, in spring 2021, saw Cairns beaten by another Tory, Sir David Amess, who one attendee said "packed out the meeting" with his supporters.

Amess served as chairman for only a few months before being stabbed to death by an IS fanatic in October 2021 in his constituency.

This prompted another election in January 2022, which Cairns narrowly won. In an unusually-well attended meeting, he beat another Tory, David Mundell, 46 votes to 45, as reported at the time by the Guido Fawkes blog.

One source told Insider: "The embassy was very happy [with Carmichael] but somebody in Doha decided they wanted it done differently. As is often the case when dealing with countries that are not parliamentary democracies they don't understand how things work here."

Another said: "It came from Doha … The end result was that it was made known to Alistair that they wanted a Tory chair, and it had been decided in Doha … David Amess got elected anyhow, which upset their plans because it certainly wasn't David Amess they had in mind."

Asked if Qatar had expressed a desire for Cairns, specifically, to take over, the source said: "Yes."

The source also told Insider that Qatari officials suggested a change to the secretariat — the body which acts as a liaison between parliamentarians, the embassy and Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Previously the role had been held by Chris Doyle, director of the Council of Arab-British Understanding, who helped found the APPG 20 years ago.

After Cairns took the reins, the secretariat passed to Argo, an emerging-markets-focused hedge fund, the APPG's registration details show.

One of Argo's directors, Jeremy Bradshaw, is listed as the point of contact for the Qatar APPG. He did not respond to Insider's requests for comment.

Bradshaw, also the point of contact for the Conservative Friends of China, once stood unsuccessfully as the Tory candidate for Regent's Park & Kensington North. He runs the Britain Club, a right-wing political "salon".

Bradshaw is a long-time friend of Nigel Evans, deputy speaker of the House of Commons and honorary president of the Qatar APPG. He is also listed as a patron of the Britain Club.

One Labour MP told Insider Bradshaw had been "hanging around" on a Qatar APPG visit — which took place beforeArgo was listed as the secretariat — but had been evasive about his presence.

"He was at every meeting, and I said to him 'could you just explain your role?' and he said 'why?'," the MP told Insider. "I asked him if he was paid, and he said 'no, no, well maybe, sort of, not really."

Two other sources noted the unexplained involvement of another person in recent weeks.

Dominic Armstrong, president of strategic intelligence firm Herminius, took part in a recent APPG trip to Doha, two sources said.

"For some reason, he seemed to be running some of the activities for the MPs," said one, who suggested Armstrong had put together a "parallel programme" that included at least one lunch with a senior Qatari official, Ali Al Thawadi.

The source added: "Some people amongst the delegation were clearly aware who [Armstrong] was — others were not."

Armstrong, brother of the British TV personality Alexander Armstrong, appeared to be the host of the lunch, welcoming delegates and joining the top table alongside Al Thawadi and others. It was only after it had concluded they realised it was "actually not under the auspices of the British Embassy at Qatar", the second source said. It is not clear how he obtained the delegates' contact details.

On its website, Herminius boasts about "operating in some of the most complex environments", with businesses "for whom confidentiality is essential". Armstrong is also the founder of a geopolitical hedge fund called Horatius, and he helped set up the intelligence arm of private security company Aegis with Colonel Tim Spicer in 2002.

Armstrong's name also appears in Department for International Trade records from January to March 2021. He met investment minister Lord Gerry Grimstone alongside representatives of Rolls-Royce, a member of Qatar's ruling family Sheikh Sultan al Thani, and the same Qatari official — Ali Al Thawadi — "to discuss a potential investment opportunity".

In December, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), announced plans to invest £85 million in Rolls-Royce SMR Limited, to help develop a new nuclear power business.

This deal was referenced during the Doha lunch, two sources said. Rolls-Royce's chief technology officer and chairman of the SMR division Paul Stein has also addressed the APPG this year.

Armstrong told Insider he was in Doha, but said: "I have nothing to do with parliament, politics or any APPG delegations ... I was indeed in Doha, but entirely on my own business — I didn't join any political meetings, that's not my world."

He added that "the only hosting I did" was a dinner with a former Rolls-Royce executive on Sunday evening, alongside "a retired soldier, someone in London property and an economist".

Armstrong confirmed he had acted as an adviser on the Rolls-Royce deal.

Neither Cairns nor Bradshaw responded to several requests for a comment. No one from Argo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Doha or the Qatari embassy in London responded to requests for comment.


Steve Goodrich, head of research and investigations at Transparency International UK, told Insider: "While all-party parliamentary groups can play a valuable role in Parliament, they are currently at risk of being hijacked to advance the interests of companies and foreign governments.

"There are perilously few controls on who can administer or support APPGs, leaving them wide open to infiltration and potential influence by those with vested interests. In order to avoid the next big lobbying scandal, there should be much greater openness and accountability over how these groups are run."

Shanghai residents forced from homes clash with police over Covid policy


Scuffles follow complaints of food shortages and over-zealous officials forcing people into quarantine


Police in hazmat suits scuffle with people in Shanghai – video


Agence France-Presse in Shanghai
Fri 15 Apr 2022 

Videos posted on social media have showed residents of Shanghai scuffling with hazmat-suited police who were ordering them to surrender their homes to Covid-19 patients, providing a rare glimpse into rising discontent in the megacity over China’s inflexible virus response.

Shanghai, a city of 25 million and China’s economic engine room, has become the heart of the country’s biggest outbreak since the peak of the first virus wave in Wuhan over two years ago, rattling the country’s adherence to a strict zero-Covid policy.

Residents locked down since early April have complained of food shortages and over-zealous officials forcing them into state quarantine, as authorities rush to construct tens of thousands of beds to house Covid-19 patients with daily infections topping 20,000.

Late on Thursday, videos circulated on social media showing residents outside a compound shouting at ranks of officials holding shields labelled “police”, as the officers tried to break through their line.

In one clip, police appear to make several arrests as the residents accuse them of “hitting people”.

The incident was triggered after authorities ordered 39 households to move from the compound “in order to meet the needs of epidemic prevention and control” and house virus patients in their apartments, according to Zhangjiang Group, the developer of the housing complex.

It has provided a rare window into public anger in China, a country where Communist authorities brook little dissent and censors routinely wipe information relating to protests from the internet as fast as it is uploaded.

In one live-streamed video, a woman can be heard weeping and asking “why are they taking an old person away?” as officials appeared to put someone into a car.

Zhangjiang Group said it had compensated the tenants and moved them into other units in the same compound.

In another video, which was live-streamed, a woman is heard shouting “Zhangjiang Group is trying to turn our compound into a quarantine spot, and allow Covid-positive people to live in our compound.”

The group recognised videos of the compound that had “appeared on the internet” on Thursday and said “the situation had now settled down” after “some tenants obstructed the construction” of a quarantine fence.

China’s censors quickly stepped in to scrub evidence of the clash from Chinese social media sites – as they did with several other videos that have appeared over the last few weeks – with search results for the name of the apartment complex disappearing from the Twitter-like Weibo by Friday morning.

Shanghai residents have vented their anger on social media about food shortages and heavy-handed controls, including the killing of a pet corgi by a health worker and a now-softened policy of separating infected children from their virus-free parents.

Authorities have vowed the city “would not relax in the slightest”, preparing more than 100 new quarantine facilities to receive every person who tests positive – whether or not they show symptoms.

North Sea oil voyage

Contemporary art and the environment

Pieter Vermeulen
15 April 2022

The global trade in fossil-fuels is proving to be far from simple business. In Norway, which almost entirely generates its internal electricity supply from renewable sources, oil has become dirty laundry. But what can turn national embarrassment into real change? Can art as comment apply just the right amount of social pressure?

‘Black, sir?’ The insistent voice of a stewardess wakes me from a shallow sleep. I nod drowsily and glance out of the plane window, as if to make sure this is real: beneath the roaring jet engines stretches an immense blue expanse of gently rippling water, glistening golden in the midday sun. It does not in the least resemble the dramatic, tempestuous colour palette that I normally associate with the North Sea and that many an artist has tried to capture on canvas. But the surface is as effective as it is deceptive: it hides a dark depth from view.

The stewardess hands me a cardboard cup of coffee, black, black as midnight on a moonless night. The lukewarm drink is not that great really, but sometimes bad coffee is better than none. ‘What would the world be without coffee?’, asks an old man sitting next to me, grinning. I take his question too seriously and my mind wanders to the gloomy sight of rundown coffee bars and neglected social lives, to caffeine-free work meetings on Monday mornings, to underproductivity, stagnant global trade flows and waning economies, unmet deadlines, unfinished books, lack of energy and the alternative supply of various kinds of tea.

Monira Al Qadiri, OR-BIT 1-6 (2016-18). 3D printed plastic, automotive paint,

levitation module, Approx. 30 x 30 x 30 cm each. Courtesy of the artist.

Photo: Markus Johansson.

Anyway, I am obviously not travelling for coffee but for oil. Or rather: for art. As we start to descend, the weather has turned grey. A diffuse light spreads across the fjord landscape. In the distance Stavanger comes into view, the fourth largest city in Norway, an immense country with a mere 5.5 million inhabitants. The picturesque town with its colourful facades is also the heart of the oil industry, a multi-billion-dollar business that has transformed the country since the discovery of undersea oil fields in the 1970s.

Profits were nationalized into the state-owned company Statoil, currently renamed as Equinor. Although 95% of Norway’s electricity production comes from hydroelectric power stations, major capital flows in through the export of oil and gas to foreign countries. The extraction of oil and gas has raised the economic standard of living in rural Norway to previously unimaginable heights. But this one-sided perception – both internal and external – is a sensitive issue today; the initial euphoria has gradually given way to a certain sense of embarrassment.

Experiences of Oil, an exhibition at the Stavanger Art Museum, is a visual offshoot of a conference held in November last year. On the first evening of my press trip, Anne Szefer-Karlsen, co-curator of the exhibition (together with Helga Nyman), invites me to dinner. We meet in the solid wood interior of one of the white-painted houses in the historic city centre.

Right from the start, I express my reservations about yet another artistic manifestation that takes a critical stance towards all kinds of -isms – from extractionism to petro-capitalism to ecofascism – painting a hostile image that is as all-encompassing as it is elusive. How can an ensemble of sixteen artistic positions, brought together within a museum exhibition format, make any significant difference to the powerful, omnipresent fossil fuel industry? Does art have an essential role to play, or is it just a drop in the ocean?


Shirin Sabahi, Pocket Folklore (2018). Found objects, vitrines.

Dimensions variable. Mouthful (2018). Digital, color, surround sound,

Farsi, Japanese, English with English subtitles. Duration: 35 min 53 sec.

Works courtesy of the artist. Photo: Markus Johansson.

During our conversation, Szefer-Karlsen manages to assuage my scepticism to some extent. As a self-proclaimed geek, they enthusiastically talk about the industry they have been immersed in over the past years. Szefer-Karlsen leads me along all kinds of political intrigues, engineering feats and personal testimonies, and turns the black gold into a prism of colour – like an oil slick on wet asphalt. How wonderful it is to feel the profound love in their words, even if the object of their affection is as complex as it is problematic.

Yet is that not what we would call, to use a catchphrase, staying with the trouble? Szefer-Karlsen smiles affably when I tell them that, as if they were getting an encouraging pat on the back from an intellectual ally. Donna Haraway is her name, the same person who wrote that language could provide us with a way out of the climate catastrophe we are currently experiencing. Let us assume that her words are more than a simple witticism.

Climate talks

As long as there are empty planes in the air en masse, there is little reason for optimism. The unprecedented scale of planetary ecocide requires, more than ever, a radical transition thinking that prioritizes ecology over economics and long-term vision over short-term gain. However, goodwill in political or diplomatic circles is sorely lacking due to the entanglement of economic, geopolitical and military interests. Nor are we to expect great results from the effects of climate mitigation.

A gradual replacement of fossil fuels by renewable energy is unfortunately too optimistic a scenario. The Third Carbon Age predicts a further proliferation of hydrofracking and the economic supremacy of peak oil. Opinions, however, are divided as to when exactly the latter will take place. Specialist literature speaks of twin peaks: some claim that we are already in the midst of it, others estimate it to occur in around 2030.


Exhibition view Experiences of oil at Stavanger Art Museum.

Artworks from left to right: Farah Al Qasimi, Arrival (2015-2021);

Raqs Media Collective, 36 Planes of Emotion (2011);

Kiyoshi Yamamoto, Fantasia, descoberta e aprendizagem (2021).

Photo: Markus Johansson.

Coincidentally or not, during my visit to Stavanger, there was the COP26 UN climate conference in Glasgow, a fiercely mediatized political spectacle that raised great expectations. Yet at the same time, and despite all good intentions, the UK is planning to give the go-ahead for the exploitation of an oil field to the west of the Shetland Islands in the Scottish North Sea: 800 million oil barrels, the equivalent of twenty-five-years’ energy supply. The hypocrisy of policy decisions such as these will make even the most ardent idealist lose heart.

Material language

In the museum, I am greeted by Raqs Media Collective’s artwork, a modular installation consisting of Plexiglas plates engraved with short phrases. The artists were inspired by a tenth-century Sanskrit manual which aimed to help dancers evoke complex emotions through physical expressions. The way in which language – as an unusual suspect – is poetically linked to oil here is of merit to the curators, also noticeable elsewhere in the exhibition. Raqs Media Collective invited the Norwegian author Øyvind Rimbereid to write a series of new poems, a continuation of his lyrical masterpiece Solaris Corrected (2004), composed in a mixture of Stavanger dialect, German, English, Scottish, Frisian and Old Norse.

Apichatpong Weerasethakul and Chai Siris, Dilbar (2013).

Black-and-white HD video projection with sound, looped, suspended glass pane.

Commissioned by Sharjah Art Foundation.

Courtesy of Sharjah Art Foundation Collection and the artists. Photo: Markus Johansson.

A little further on, Farah Al Qasimi’s works catch the eye: a series of evocative photographs entitled Arrival (2015-2019), interiors from the Gulf region in which the figures portrayed have been cut or left out. The series of images is presented against a background of photographic blow-ups printed on vinyl wallpaper. A powerful visual reflection on Al Qasimi’s cultural identity and the historical convergences of the photography and oil industries in the region.

Curatorial tightrope walking

Also notable is the contribution of Iranian Shirin Sabahi. Sabahi made a film about Matter and Mind (1977), a sculptural installation by Japanese artist Noriyuki Haragushi that he first made for Documenta 6 and that has since been on permanent display at Tehran’s renowned museum of contemporary art. He filled a large metal basin to the brim with more than five thousand litres of viscous motor oil, a perfectly reflective surface that anticipated Richard Wilson’s monumental installation 20:50 (1987) – which has long been on view at the Saatchi Gallery, London.

For the making of her film Mouthful (2018), Sabahi visited the artist in Japan, and followed the restoration process in the museum. Three display cases contain the everyday trinkets that visitors threw into the oil reservoir, like money into a wishing well – or was it to test the all-too-perfect surface? Sabahi’s poetic installation deliberately hovers between past and present, viewer and work of art, East and West, chance and necessity, art and life, sculpture and architecture, utopia and heterotopia.


Otobong Nkanga, Wetin You Go Do? Oya Na (2020).

Multi-channel sound installation, loop 20 min, 28 sec.

Courtesy of the artist. Photo: Markus Johansson.

In their video Dilbar (2013), Apichatpong Weerasethakul and Chai Siris shed light on the daily lives of Bengali workers in the UAE through enchanting black and white images – ghostly manifestations of a repressed reality. Also in Nigerian-Belgian Otobong Nkanga’s work, language is given a prominent place: Wetin You Go Do? Oya Na (2020), a flawless sound installation with voices spread across several channels, voiced by the artist, in a constant improvisation of language, rhythm and intonation. Nkanga draws attention to language as a locus of consensus and dissensus, as an embodied, gendered practice, able to create new worlds.

In my opinion, Experiences of Oil is at its best in that chiastic interplay between language and world that occurs through aísthēsis – the experience. The phenomenon of oil is unravelled in its inherent complexity without making activist claims or assuming too casual an approach. With a loaded theme like this, curatorial tightrope walking is no easy exercise in any case.

Petroleum museum’s ‘success’ story

Monira Al Qadiri presents a series of floating sculptures: 3D plastic prints covered with iridescent paint that imitate the colour palette of oil and water. Her elegant visual language was inspired by the monstrous drill bits used in oil drilling. In a lecture-performance, Al Qadiri imagines how a future civilization might find the drill heads and assume they are some kind of alien technology. The objectophilic seduction of these industrial artefacts is hard to deny. In fact, I recently spotted them in the work of other artists as well: as part of Oliver Ressler’s project Barricading the Ice Sheets at Camera Austria, Graz, and in an installation by Julian Charrière for the Prix Marcel Duchamp at Centre Pompidou.

Exhibition view Experiences of oil at Stavanger Art Museum.

Artworks from left to right: Monira Al Qadiri, OR-BIT 1-6 (2016-18);

Brynhild Grødeland Winther, Drawings on paper. Photo: Markus Johansson.

The curious drill bits are also on display at the Stavanger Petroleum Museum – an integral part of the press programme – where they are presented as heroic attributes in a national saga. The museum mainly focuses on telling and perpetuating a success story – the economic blockbuster entitled Norway’s Oil Fairytale – rather than looking critically at the future. However, the guide does his utmost to emphasize that there is no question of commercial interference, since it is a state-funded museum. Yet with a nationalized fund of 1.4 billion US dollars, there is undoubtedly a lot at stake.

The guide consequently hurries his visitors through the section entitled Future Challenges featuring a portrait of the eighteen-year-old Swedish Greta Thunberg. I look up and read a news ticker with Obama’s popular tweet: ‘We are the first generation to feel the effect of climate change and the last generation who can do something about it.’ The urgency of his words sadly remains hanging in thin air. It was not only I who suffered from a slight sense of disgust after this ideological tour: Lili Reynaud-Dewar (laureate of the Prix Marcel Duchamp 2021) also extensively voiced her disgust on Instagram.
Post-oil without oil?

During a walk, a friend tells me of how he found a large oil painting in the street and brought it home, a generic scene of a sailing boat on the high seas. He shows me a photograph that involuntarily reminds me of the painting that Marcel Broodthaers managed to pick up in the touristy Rue Jacob in Paris and that would later become the central subject in his book-film Un Voyage en Mer du Nord (1973-74).

The American art theorist Rosalind Krauss used Broodthaers’ work to discuss the post-medium condition in which contemporary art seems to have fallen into. This is not all that far removed from the curatorial approach of Experiences of Oil, which ignores the dominance of oil as an economic medium or ecological culprit, and seeks out a well-considered dialogue between various media, with scenographic elements reminiscent of a book. It is precisely between these two poles – book and exhibition – that the whole project is situated.

INFRACTIONS (2019). Video installation, drawing printed on textile.

Duration: 63 minutes. Photo: Markus Johansson.

And yet a post-oil era does not necessarily imply a world without oil. How do we criticize a phenomenon of which we form an inseparable part? In a well-known essay, Irit Rogoff termed this ‘embodied criticality’: ‘living out the very conditions we are trying to analyse and come to terms with’ – words that seem quite appropriate for an exhibition held in the very heart of the oil industry.

The last day of my press trip includes a cruise through the fjords – being a tourist is a guilty pleasure. Together with a few other journalists and a slight hangover, I board the rather modest vessel. Among the passengers, I recognize some of the guests from the hotel where I had been staying: broad-shouldered, pumped-up men and women who have travelled to Stavanger for the IPF World Powerlifting Championship and with whom I shared the dance floor the previous evening. The party mood seems to have subsided. With a white handkerchief and a proper sense of drama, my friend waves us off from the quay.

Our cruise is touristy, as it should be, replete with an Edvard Grieg soundtrack that musically accompanies the most picturesque scenes and dramatic rock formations. As per the programme, we sail past the Preikestolen – a famous Norwegian landmark – and fill a bucket at the impressive Hengjanefossen waterfall, whose spray kitschily brings out the colours of the light spectrum. A dandy photographer from Forbes excitedly tells me how he has already seen five rainbows that day. I laughingly ask him what on earth he is going to do with all that luck while I sip my coffee, which has a slightly fishy taste, or maybe I’m just imagining it.

Success and happiness?

In the taxi to the airport, the radio plays Falling by Julee Cruise while we leave Stavanger behind us. I think back to the Norwegian fairy tale and the simple fishing village that has grown into a rich port city, the city from the popular drama series State of Happiness (Lykkeland). To be honest, I don’t know what to think of this state of happiness.

By nature, I am suspicious of success stories and happiness formulas. To me, they seem too other-worldly. That is why I am trying to compassionately watch over the dubious fate of a Belgian art journalist, who flew in for a few days with money from the embassy to critique an exhibition about oil, and who now, with an indefinable feeling of doubt, is boarding the plane once again and closing his eyes, into the night.

Published 15 April 2022
Original in English
First published by Rekto:verso
Contributed by Rekto:verso © Pieter Vermeulen / Rekto:verso / EurozinePDF/PRINT

War in Ukraine & Rise in Arms Spending Undermine Development Aid to the World’s Poor

By Thalif Deen

Workmen at Dar Es Salaam harbour loading bags of wheat on a truck, in Tanzania. Global food prices have reached “a new all-time high,” the head of the Food and Agriculture Organization Qu Dongyu said, “hitting the poorest the hardest.” 8 April 2022. Credit: FAO/Giuseppe Bizzarri

UNITED NATIONS, Apr 15 2022 (IPS) - The unprecedented flow of arms to Ukraine, and the rising miliary spending by European nations to strengthen their defenses, are threatening to undermine development aid to the world’s poorer nations.

Yoke Ling, Executive Director of Third World Network told IPS the escalating military spending will definitely have a direct impact on a range of spending that the North has committed to developing countries — from official development assistance (ODA) to climate finance, “that is a legal obligation under the climate treaties”.

Even before the Russian-Ukraine war, she pointed out, the North has been reducing development financing. “So, we expect the regression to worsen,” she added.

A UN report, titled 2022 Financing for Sustainable Development Report: Bridging the Finance Divide released April 12, says record growth of Official Development Assistance, increased to its highest level ever in 2020, rising to $161.2 billion.

“Yet, 13 countries cut ODA, and the sum remains insufficient for the vast needs of developing countries”.

The UN also fears “the fallout from the crisis in Ukraine, with increased spending on refugees in Europe, may mean cuts to the aid provided to the poorest countries”.

In the face of a global crisis, near-time actions and additional international support are needed to prevent debt crises and address the high cost of borrowing, the report warns.

“However, the vast majority of developing countries will need active and urgent support to get back on track to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals” (SDGs).

The report estimates that in the poorest countries a 20 per cent increase in spending will be required for key sectors.

A New York Times report on March 29, said across Europe and Britain, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is reshaping spending priorities and forcing governments to prepare for threats thought to have been long buried — from a flood of European refugees to the possible use of chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons by a Russian leader who may feel backed into a corner.

“The result is a sudden reshuffling of budgets as military spending, essentials like agriculture and energy, and humanitarian assistance are shoved to the front of the line, with other pressing needs like education and social services likely to be downgraded,” said the Times.

Frederic Mousseau, Policy Director at the Oakland Institute, told IPS “whereas combination of droughts and conflicts result in massive human suffering and hunger in a number of countries, UN humanitarian appeals for these acute crises are chronically underfunded.”

Last year, he pointed out, only 45% of the UN appeal for Yemen and the Horn of Africa was funded, only 29% for Syria. With such shortfalls amidst the war on Ukraine, it is critical that all donor countries ensure their solidarity and support is focused on all victims.

Increase in military budgets in Europe will automatically result in more sales for the major Western arm exporters, i.e. USA, France and Germany.

The industrial military complex yields increased economic returns for these countries, and fuels conflicts across the world. In 2021, the second largest humanitarian aid requirement was for Yemen, whereas Saudi Arabia, waging war on this country, is the first importer of weapons from Western countries.

It is to be seen, he said, how actual aid budgets will be affected by the war in Ukraine.

“But regardless of what happens in Europe, a major issue that undermines our ability to promote peace and stability in the world -and reduce the need for international assistance, is the US military budget that continues to increase under the Biden administration to reach an all-time record of $813 billion this year”.

This is more spending than the next eleven countries combined, Mousseau pointed out.

“The USA is not just the highest military budget in the world, it is also the largest arm exporter and coincidently the largest aid donor. US international aid, however, represents just 4% of the US military spending. Priorities have to change drastically to meet the humanitarian and environmental challenges of the world’, he declared.

Vitalice Meja, Executive Director, Reality of Aid Africa, told IPS: “We support the humanitarian efforts going towards the Ukrainian people and remain in solidarity with them. We, however, believe that donors must still meet their other obligations on other global wars of poverty, and climate crisis on humanity.”

It is important especially for Africa that ODA remains focused on catalyzing development and tackle the ravaging climate change crisis and the rising inequalities, she said.

“Donors must allocate additional resources towards Ukraine and not simply by militarizing aid or shifting budget items and priorities from other global development challenges in response the War in Ukraine”.

It is key that donors, at the same time without shifting resources, should focus on building and strengthening Africa’s resilience in these times of harsh climate change and mass crop failure.

“They must secure sustainable climate finance and development resources to address the rising cases of inequality, extreme hunger and poverty in this part of the work.”

This is our war and it remains important and relevant. It must be aggressively be fought and won as well, Meja declared.

Jennifer del Rosario-Malonzo, Executive Director, IBON International, told IPS: “We stand in solidarity with the peoples of Ukraine who are bearing the losses from the war. People’s rights and needs—in Ukraine, in Asia, and the rest of the global South—should be a priority over military spending”.

If some developed countries are lavish with their arms spending and military budgets today, while their “humanitarian” response involves cutting from other aid programs, are they saying that security interests come before long-term, public needs? She asked.

Outside the Ukraine war, developed countries have already broken their promise of providing USD100 billion of climate finance by 2020.

Sacrificing development aid budgets and climate finance will deepen poverty, inequalities, adverse climate impacts, and exclusion felt in the global South. Lack of ambition here risks reinforcing the economic and political grievances at the root of armed conflicts in Asia and elsewhere.

Solidarity and justice today call for ambition. We challenge developed countries to fulfill their existing aid commitments (minimum of 0.7% of GNI as ODA), together with providing new funding for people’s needs in Ukraine. We call for new and additional grants-based climate finance to indemnify the most affected peoples and communities suffering from losses and damages due to climate change.

Meanwhile, the UN report on Financing for Sustainable Development also points out that while rich countries were able to support their pandemic recovery with record sums borrowed at ultra-low interest rates, the poorest countries spent billions servicing debt, preventing them from investing in sustainable development.

“The pandemic shock plunged 77 million more people into extreme poverty in 2021, and by the end of the year many economies remained below pre-2019 levels”.

The report estimates that in 1 in 5 developing countries’ GDP per capita would not return to 2019 levels by the end of 2023, even before absorbing the impacts of the Ukraine war.

“As we are coming up to the halfway point of financing the world’s Sustainable Development Goals, the findings are alarming,” UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed said.

“There is no excuse for inaction at this defining moment of collective responsibility, to ensure hundreds of millions of people are lifted out of hunger and poverty. We must invest in access for decent and green jobs, social protection, healthcare and education leaving no one behind,“ she warned.

IPS UN Bureau Report