China’s Cautious Calculus On Trump’s Board Of Peace – Analysis

US President Donald Trump formally launches the first charter of the Gaza “Board of Peace” in a signing ceremony during the annual 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos. Photo Credit: White House video screenshot


February 11, 2026 

Observer Research Foundation
By Antara Ghosal Singh

United States President Donald Trump launched the Board of Peace (BoP) at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2026. This prompted a measured response from China, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson Guo Jiakun merely acknowledging that China received an invitation to join the board.

However, Chinese analysts, citing international concerns, questioned whether the so-called ‘Peace Commission’ would become a “mechanism for the US to seize power”, using it to replace the United Nations and undermine the international order based on international law. Others dismissed the initiative, calling it an imperial project, a “small clique of Trump’s cronies”, a colonial solution, and a mechanism for “plundering” and “extortion”, as well as Trump’s retirement plan. Although the discourse in Beijing may sound similar in other global capitals, China’s concerns about Trump’s Board of Peace run deeper than many would imagine.

China’s Multilateral Vision in the Shadow of Trump’s Peace Initiative

Although Chinese scholars have been particularly critical of President Trump’s Board of Peace, the fact remains that Chinese President Xi Jinping has been a pioneer in shaping global governance and multilateral diplomacy as per China’s terms. China under Xi has strongly reinforced multilateralism with Chinese characteristics and launched a series of programmes and initiatives in the past decade—from the Belt and Road Initiative to the ‘Three Major Global Initiatives’: Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI)—aimed at providing “Chinese solution for building a more just and equitable global governance system and injected Chinese momentum into revitalising the core position and leading role of the United Nations”. Notably, China has leveraged its growing influence in the United Nations (UN) creatively to launch, legitimise, and popularise some of its private initiatives.

For example, China claims that BRI has already received endorsement from more than 150 countries and 30-plus international organisations, including the UN. Beijing further argues that the GDI has also secured support from various countries and international organisations, with the UN among participating bodies. Similarly, GSI, under which China is taking measures on various global hotspot issues shaping the UN system—from Ukraine to Afghanistan, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the Iran-Saudi rapprochement—is reportedly supported by the China-UN Peace and Development Fund.

President Xi recently introduced the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) and its five core concepts—sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centred approach, and taking real actions. To implement GGI, China has launched the ‘Group of Friends of Global Governance’ at the UN headquarters, comprising 43 countries, including Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mongolia, and Pakistan, among others, who are mandated with collectively upholding the post-World War II international order, through a reformed and improved global governance system.

China also launched the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) in 2025 to rival established international bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ). IOMed, headquartered in Hong Kong, is designed to mediate disputes between states, between states and foreign investors, and over international commercial disputes. China asserts that IOMed is based on Article 33 of the UN Charter, which prioritises mediation as one of the first means for seeking peaceful solutions to international disputes.

Trump’s Encroachment on China’s Strategic Partners

The other concern for China is that the members of Trump’s Board are all countries with strategic ties to China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During the signing ceremony, Trump was accompanied not by the usual US allies—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea—but by countries long aligned with China, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan. Pakistan forms the core of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with China investing hundreds of billions to help it build roads and ports; Saudi Arabia and China have signed numerous energy agreements, with RMB settlement for oil transactions becoming commonplace; Indonesia’s Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway and nickel mines are all substantial Chinese investments. Uzbekistan is an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and controls key transportation routes in Central Asia; Mongolia has increasingly close ties with China in railway and mining cooperation. Chinese observers wondered why these countries are willing to align with the US despite having close ties with China, considering whether this reflects coerced cooperation, quietly shifting allegiance, or a part of their shrewd hedging strategy in major power competition. Shifting loyalties of traditional SCO allies and partners is a new reality facing China, particularly under Trump 2.0.

China’s Middle East Strategy in the Shadow of US Influence

Chinese observers further noted that the list of participants in Trump’s Board of Peace not only included the most influential core countries in the Arab world but also major Islamic powers such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Long influential in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these countries’ collective joining of the newly established US-led ‘Peace Commission’ constitutes a strong political statement.

The participating countries—including regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, dominant countries from different sectarian groups and aligned along different geopolitical axes such as Turkey and Egypt—demonstrate a willingness among these nations to set aside internal disputes and join the ‘Peace Committee’. For them, joining the Board does not necessarily mean they will accept all of the US’s proposals; they aim to influence the process from within, ensuring that the resulting outcome does not deviate completely from their core interests. This adds to China’s dilemma, as not joining Trump’s BoP could cost China an important leverage point in the Middle East. However, joining could pose new challenges, from being asked to deploy personnel for the international stabilisation force under Israeli coordination to having Trump directly intervening in all global hotspots from Ukraine to the South China Sea.

Overall, China’s attitude towards Trump’s BoP remains particularly cautious. First, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with veto power, China has little rationale for participating in an organisation dominated entirely by Trump. Secondly, China under Xi has prioritised providing ‘Chinese solutions’ to global problems, seeking to offer an alternative to US-led solutions and expand its influence in global governance. China has achieved notable success, initially through BRICS and the SCO, and later via initiatives such as the BRI, GSI, and GDI.

Given the trend, China’s joining President Trump’s Board looks rather counterintuitive. However, China is unlikely to counter Trump publicly on this issue, given that doing so might impact its ongoing trade negotiations with the Trump administration. China, therefore, is taking a wait-and-watch approach, quietly biding its time and hiding its disapproval behind global scepticism around Trump’s Board of Peace.

About the author: Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


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