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Showing posts sorted by relevance for query PRIVATE ARMIES. Sort by date Show all posts

Tuesday, December 26, 2023

War for Profit: Implications of the Growing Private Security Industry

They not only work regarding battlefield operations, but also offer knowledge and strategies on how to attack and defend in different types of conflicts.


BYMARTHA GARCIA
DECEMBER 6, 2023


The private security industry mostly entails Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) which offer military services all around the world to national governments, international organizations and non-state actors in exchange for monetary profits. They engage in various activities, from conducting small training missions to deploying combat units comprising several hundred trained soldiers armed with some of the best weaponry, including tanks and attack helicopters. However, they not only work regarding battlefield operations, but also offer knowledge and strategies on how to attack and defend in different types of conflicts.

For most of the 20th century, the privatization of war was not a viable option and nearly all of the use of military power was restricted to state agencies, yet the Cold War changed it all. By the end of 1991, the market was full with military specialists and armament with no immediate use anymore. Additionally, several small-scale wars and civil armed conflicts erupted around the globe, mainly in Africa. Consequently, Private Military and Security Companies gained strength and became popular. Companies from the U.S. and United Kingdom, such as Sandline International, even gained popularity worldwide. Today, more than 150 private military companies exist and offer their services in around 50 countries. The size of the industry is quickly evolving: by 2020, 223 billion dollars worth of services were sold; an amount estimated to double by 2030.

Within this framework, many politicians and government officials seem to support the precision and effectiveness of PMSCs, but there are still a lot of questions that need to be answered and situations to be acknowledged for this to be true. For starters, Private Military and Security Companies are bound by the laws of the country where their operations are established. Nonetheless, the legality of their actions becomes a subject of scrutiny when they operate in regions beyond their home country. Some of these companies are no strangers to violating international humanitarian and human rights laws, as long as they meet the needs of their clients so they can get paid.

For example, in 2004 muslim prisoners from Abu Ghraib prison in the hands of personnel from the United States’ contractor CACI International were brutally tortured; soldiers even took pictures with the detainees making fun of them. Despite that, CACI International received no punishment, asked the accusers for a refund due to legal expenses, and continued to carry out contracts with the U.S. worth 23 million dollars. In the same context, the privatization of the United States army itself is a confusing and concerning issue. There are no concrete laws still, hence, it is difficult to prosecute those who commit crimes; and even so, it is rarely done. In 2019, it was reported that around half of the Department of Defense allocations were spent in paying private contractors. In like manner, it is widely unknown the backgrounds, context, locations and activities of Private Military and Security Companies even though they outnumber soldiers. On numerous occasions, there were several PMSCs active in Iraq and Afghanistan, at the same time employing over 200,000 private contractors’ personnel. These contractors originated from various countries, including Nepal, Serbia, South Africa, Fiji, Chile, and nearby nations in the Middle East. Limited information was available regarding their past training, employment background, or criminal records.

Likewise, another concerning inquiry is the known employment of mercenaries by PMSCs as soldiers and strategy personnel. The international market for mercenaries and private military contractors is exceeding 100 billion dollars, and discerning a clear difference between the two is becoming more and more difficult every time. Mercenaries are more powerful and organized than state officials would like to admit. Nowadays, groups of mercenaries are called private armies and they possess the same skill set as PMSCs; the main difference is who they agree to work for, but even then there is no clear line. As a result, in April of 2005, the United Nations came up with Resolution 2005/2 on the use of mercenaries within armies or as soldiers. The document urges all states to be vigilant regarding the employment of mercenaries done by private companies offering international military consultancy and security services. Also, in September of 2008, the Montreux Document was published by Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross with recommendations so states can regulate PMSCs properly.

As a case point, Sierra Leone is one of the countries with the most negative consequences due to the intervention of Private Military and Security Companies. This case study demonstrates how self-interested the private security industry truly is. Executive Outcomes and Sandline International were both involved in the civil war of the country, which took place from 1991 to 2002, employed by the government. Their operations were executed on the beliefs of working regarding seven sectors: competence, effectiveness, flexibility, field cooperation with regular forces, cost efficiency, impact on national military and political control over contractors. The government wanted to fight off rebel forces, nevertheless, the methods employed and taught by the private sector personnel and soldiers were, questionable at best, inhumane at worst. Serious ethical concerns were signaled by those involved in the armed conflict, but what caused the most commotion was the use or mercenarism. Mercenaries fought against rebel groups as part of the PMSCs soldiers, and paramilitary groups as well. So much so, that some scholars even called and referred to PMSCs at the time as mercenary companies.

Partially, due to what happened in Sierra Leone, and many other countries around those years such as Papua New Guinea also with Sandline International involvement, the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries was published by the United Nations (UN) in 2001. Even so, the United States, along with other nations possessing substantial military forces such as China and Russia, dismissed the characterization of Private Military and Security Companies’ activities as mercenary and refrained from endorsing and ratifying the convention. As a result, still today, the employment of PMSCs creates a situation where states can engage in otherwise illegal warfare activities, while assigning accountability for such actions to the growing private security industry. Private Military and Security Companies particularly those operating in Africa, continue to be implicated in several human rights violations.

Furthermore, Private Military and Security Companies, impose a huge challenge for international law and international relations. Most of international diplomacy bets for law prohibiting the use of force within international relations, but traditionally is only addressed to states. There is still no proper regulation for PMSCs as worldwide actors and their entire sector. The predominant trend is spearheaded by four countries, collectively constituting approximately 70% of the market: the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and South Africa. Correspondingly, the U.S. is home of the largest Private Military and Security Companies in the world, as well as a major client, and still, there is no individual law in the United States that comprehensively addresses the complete range of services provided by these companies. Therefore, American contractors often market their services overseas with minimal supervision. It is urgent for laws to cover the entire sector, but mainly three aspects of this industry: limitations and implications for contracting states (countries hiring PMSCs), territorial states (countries where PMSCs operate), and home states (countries where PMSCs are headquartered).

Private Military and Security Companies are becoming so relevant that even the United Nations have employed them. From 2012 to 2017, the UN self-reported a total of 166 million dollars paid for PMSCs services. The United Nations frequently justifies its dependence on PMSCs by pointing to gaps in both quantity and quality within traditional peacekeeping forces. It is believed that private military contractors’ services compensate for internal incapacities and these faults to be addressed by the expertise and efficiency of private companies. However, since there are no clear laws neither for PMSCs and international organizations’ relationship, this becomes dangerous, mainly by challenging the legitimacy of the United Nations within the international arena.

In nations such as Afghanistan and Somalia, the UN is cautious about depending on local police forces. Hence, the organization turns to PMSCs to safeguard its personnel and facilities, while helping with combat strategies. Regardless, this decision did not turn as expected, nor resulted as wished. Peacekeeping operations are starting to turn into a lobbying industry for military powers and civilians’ wellbeing is getting caught in the middle. Similarly, in 2011, the UN Department of Safety and Security began crafting a policy proposal that provides suggestions for adopting more responsible and unified contracting practices with Private Military and Security Companies. The extent to which this initiative, once completed, will find acceptance and support across the international organization remains uncertain.

Governments and international organizations or non-state actors frequently employ PMSCs motivated by factors like cost-effectiveness, flexibility, and the ability to tap into specialized expertise and advanced technology. This alters the distribution of military power, moving it away from conventional state-centric frameworks, thereby prompting worries about accountability and adherence to international standards. The increasing dependence on private entities adds intricacies to decision-making processes, potentially aligning state interests with corporate interests. Primarily, the services offered by these companies are distinct from any other industry. Comparable to firearms, they pose significant dangers and can be highly destructive when misused. For instance, the U.S., Russia, China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have employed the private military industry to carry out ruthless regimes bypassing all legal restrictions. The rapid expansion and normalization of the use of PMSCs has allowed numerous bad actors to exploit it, as it essentially trades not just in weapons but also in knowledge. They offer a scapegoat for governments and non-state actors to surpass domestic and international laws to obtain their personal bidding. As a result, there is a dangerous gap and huge incomprehension regarding this evolving threat.


Martha Garcia Torres Landa has a bachelor's degree in International Relations at the Tecnologico de Monterrey University in Queretaro, Mexico. During her undergraduate degree she has specialized in conflict and peace studies. Likewise, she has taken several creative writing courses and workshops in both Mexican universities and abroad. Her research interests include feminism, social activism, World History and Human Rights.


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Saturday, July 17, 2021

Dutch F-16s were sold to a private military company in Florida, USA

By TOC On Jul 5, 2021

AMSTERDAM, BM,  – The Dutch Ministry of Defense has announced the sale of twelve Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcons to Draken International LLC., a US company headquartered at Lakeland Linder International Airport, Florida.

Draken, with a fleet of used military aircraft, offers air support, flight training, air threat simulation, electronic warfare, and air refueling. Draken employees also conduct research and testing for the US Department of Defense, defense contractors, and aerospace companies.

It is noted that the delivery of F-16 fighters and related equipment to Draken International will begin in 2022. The agreement includes an option to resell an additional 28 F-16s. The second group of fighters is expected to be phased out of the Netherlands by May 2024.

As we reported in May, the American private company Top Aces, a private Air Force company, has acquired a 4th generation F-16 fighter and will be the new strike force of the private military. Top Aces and F-16 go down in history as the first private army to acquire this type of fighter.

The delivery of the four second-hand F-16A / B ‘Netz’ fighters, which belonged to the Israeli Air Force, took place earlier this year, and the first test flight took place this month.

Top Aces is a private US air force operating various warplanes. The Pentagon often hires this company to support the regular US Air Force in different parts of the world. Top Aces is expecting to continue to support the Pentagon’s ground, air, and naval operations with the new acquisition.

There are many private armies in the world. The most famous Russian private army, for example, is Wagner. Unlike his American counterparts, however, Wagner operated primarily on third-generation fighters, such as improved versions of the MiG-29.
The private air force receives large contracts with the Pentagon

In the United States and the production of weapons technology, private companies are another profitable business. The Pentagon has never hidden the use of such services. In 2020, for example, it became clear which private sector companies will provide support to US troops around the world.

Draken International, Airborn Tactical Adventure Company, and Tactical Air Support were funded for the next five years by nearly $ 430 million, each with a specific mission. The funds will go mainly to train new personnel enlisted in the US Army, and for this purpose, the companies will use five air bases selected by the Pentagon.

Separately, the United States is providing about $ 6.4 billion to other private companies with more specific and dangerous missions around the world. Analysts at The Drive say the business is starting to multiply. It is only a matter of time before seeing the first fifth-generation fighter in the private air force. Will it be an F-22 or an F-35? Time will tell.

Sunday, April 17, 2022

The rise of mercenary armies in Africa

More African countries are turning to foreign security companies to protect leaders or deploy them in conflict zones. However, criticism of the use of mercenaries, who some accuse of impunity, is growing louder.

A number of African leaders are opting for foreign private security firms for protection

They protect influential African leaders and their properties, secure foreign investments, and intervene in intra-African conflicts — usually without regard for losses.

Foreign private military companies are being deployed in more and more crisis-ridden countries in Africa.

But many mercenaries do not shy away from crimes and human rights violations, according to a recently published study by the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP), an independent research institute based in Brussels.

"Private military companies have increased their power and influence in many African countries over the past few years," Amandine Dusoulier, author of the GRIP study, told DW.

She warned that in some African countries, the [mercenary groups] had become a kind of state within a state, thereby threatening the countries' sovereignty.

Russian private security company Wagner Group has increased its presence in Africa

Shadowy mercenary missions

It is still difficult to estimate the number of private soldiers on the African continent. Many of these companies operate in the shadows, says Jade Andrzejewski of the French Observatory for International Relations, OERI. "There is no detailed information about private military companies operating internationally."

Andrzejewski told DW that the companies often operate unofficially and camouflage their activities.

The shadowy Russian mercenary group, Wagner, reportedly working in Libya, Mozambique, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali, is the main object of criticism.

Wherever Wagner mercenaries appear, they make negative headlines. But other private military and security companies — including those from the US and Europe — are also active in Africa and do not always take human rights seriously either, according to the GRIP study published in March 2022.

The US' Blackwater private security firm was accused of human rights violations in Iraq

UN concerns

Last September, a United Nations working group also expressed concern about "the increasing involvement of private military and security providers in humanitarian operations."

The UN group called for a "binding international legal framework" for private security companies.

In its report, the UN working group recalls human rights violations committed in the past by private military companies in various regions of the world. 

For example, in 2007, guards from the US security firm Blackwater fired indiscriminately on Iraqi civilians and killed 14 people, including children.

These atrocities made international headlines. But similar atrocities are still being committed, including and especially in Africa, the UN working group said.

"In Africa, the activities of mercenaries continue to be a matter of serious concern," said United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on the occasion of the working group's report.

The African Union Commission Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat stressed that the fight against mercenaries must be seen in the context of promoting peace and security on the continent.


AU President Mahamat says mercenary groups must contribute to Africa's peace

Wagner, DAG, Asgaard & Co.

The list of accusations against private security companies is long: Mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group have repeatedly committed serious human rights violations against civilians in the Central African Republic, among other places, according to the United Nations document.

The Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) is also in the pillory. The Mozambican government had hired the South African security firm to combat Al-Shabaab jihadist violence in Cabo Delgado in the north of the country.

The UN paper said that instead DAG operatives killed civilians indiscriminately in June 2020 and did not distinguish between civilian and military targets.

US companies CACI and Academi are among the most prominent private military companies present on the African continent, apart from Russia's Wagner Group. 

In addition, the French company Secopex, Great Britain's Aegis Defence Services and G4S are also active in Africa. Others are Omega Consulting Group from Ukraine, South Africa's Dyck Advisory Group, and from Germany, Xeless.

Germany's mercenary involvement

Jade Andrzejewski of OERI

OERI expert Andrzejewski says most mercenary companies hide their activities

Asgaard, another German private security company, recruits mainly former Bundeswehr soldiers and police officers for security duties. This company is mainly active in Sudan, Libya, Mauritania and Egypt.

The private security industry has a long history on the African continent, says GRIP researcher Dusoulier, whether in the Sahel, Mali, or the Central African Republic.

"This state of affairs is fostered by two factors: the weakness of government institutions in some countries and the continent's wealth of mineral resources," Dusoulier points out.

The OERI expert listed Angola, Sierra Leone, G5 Sahel nations, Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and CAR as some of the African countries that have resorted to the services of private mercenary forces in the past.

But criticism of using mercenaries in Africa is growing. At the African Union summit in early February, the AU commissioner for political affairs, peace, and security, Bankole Adeoye of Nigeria, called for the "complete exclusion of mercenaries from the African continent."

This article was translated from German.

Edited by: Chrispin Mwakideu

Sunday, November 24, 2024

What happens when China puts boots on the ground in Myanmar?


The move represents direct intervention by China, whose troops will have to conduct offensive operations.


Images by AP (Amanda Weisbrod/RFA)

It now appears to be a question of “when, not if” Chinese security personnel will arrive in Myanmar, with Beijing looking to secure its strategic interests in the war-torn country and those of its ally, the military junta that has lost large chunks of the country since the 2021 coup.

The Irrawaddy online news outlet reported that the junta formed a 13-member working committee on October 22 to prepare the groundwork to establish a “joint security company” with China.

According to the report, the committee, chaired by Major-General Toe Yi, the junta’s deputy home affairs minister, is currently tasked with “scrutinizing the importing and regulating of weapons and special equipment” until Beijing signs a drafted MOU on forming a “security company.”

After that, according to the narrative from Beijing and Naypyidaw, Chinese personnel would join a “company” — more like a militia — alongside junta troops, which would be tasked with defending Chinese strategic and economic interests in the country.

I’m told that China will send troops from the military and police in a “private” capacity, giving the fiction of detachment.

Yet this would not be a joint venture in anything but name.

Soldiers of Chinese People's Liberation Army fire a mortar during a live-fire military exercise in Anhui province, China May 22, 2021. (Reuters)
Soldiers of Chinese People's Liberation Army fire a mortar during a live-fire military exercise in Anhui province, China May 22, 2021. (Reuters) (Reuters)

Does one seriously think that Chinese troops or police are going to listen to the Myanmar generals who have lost battle after battle to ethnic armies and ill-trained civilian militias over the past four years?

Moreover, there is no reason to think that the China-junta “militia” will stick to merely protecting Chinese nationals and Chinese-owned businesses in Myanmar.

Chinese projects delayed

It is true that Chinese assets have come under increased levels of attack from anti-junta forces in recent months.

There is some logic, if you’re sitting in Beijing and Naypyidaw, in wanting to allow Chinese forces to help command most of northern Myanmar, giving junta forces a better chance of mopping up rebel forces elsewhere.

The civil war has delayed key Chinese projects in the country, such as the long-planned China-Myanmar Economic Corridor between China’s Yunnan province and Myanmar’s Indian Ocean coast.

Strategically key for Beijing is a port it wants to build in Rakhine state, allowing China to import oil and gas from the Middle East without ships needing to pass through the Malacca Strait, a potential chokepoint.

This would be essential in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea, during which the Philippines or Taiwan could try to blockade Chinese trade, including oil and gas imports on which China’s economy depends.

My sources say that the majority of the PLA contingent will be deployed to Rakhine state.

According to statements released by Beijing, almost certainly intended to construct a peace narrative ahead of the deployment, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told junta leader Min Aung Hlaing in August that he hoped “Myanmar will earnestly safeguard the safety of Chinese personnel and projects.”

When Min Aung Hlaing visited China earlier this month, his first visit since the coup, Chinese Premier Li Qiang instructed him to “take effective measures to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals, institutions, and projects in the country.”

The reality, as Beijing knows well, is that the junta cannot ensure these things.

That’s the entire reason why the “security companies” are deemed necessary by the Chinese government.

Offensive operations

Once Chinese security personnel are on the ground in Myanmar, the fiction that they’re just standing guard outside a few industrial compounds or pipelines will become difficult to maintain.

Indeed, they’re likely to have no choice but to mount offensive operations.

The most obvious reason to expect this is that many Chinese-run enterprises are in territory currently controlled by resistance groups that will presumably need to be taken by Chinese forces.


If not, why would Beijing make a u-turn on its existing policy, which had been to cajole and pay the ethnic militias to leave Chinese entities out of their fight with the junta?


Secondly, after years of dallying, Beijing now clearly thinks that it cannot trust the anti-junta National Unity Government (NUG), presumably because it’s too pro-Western, nor most of the anti-junta ethnic militias – even those who have taken money from Beijing.

Chinese authorities reportedly detained Peng Daxun, the leader of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a militia that has inflicted heavy casualties on the junta, after he was summoned to Yunnan for a parlay last month.

This may be a temporary detention pour encourager les autres, or it may be Beijing trying to dismantle disloyal militias more permanently.

Yet, in essence, Beijing has now thrown its weight behind the junta because it presumably believes China’s interests would be best served by an outright junta victory.

So if Beijing thinks the ultimate way of protecting Chinese business interests in Myanmar, for now and in the long term, is for the civil war to be ended and for junta forces to win the conflict decisively, the difference between Chinese security personnel conducting defensive and offensive operations is paper thin.

Why wouldn’t Beijing use its troops to bring about its overarching goal? Why would Beijing overlook the opportunity to end a civil war that it wants over?

Anti-China sentiment

Why would Beijing merely send personnel to defend Chinese factories and pipelines for a few months or years if it thinks there is the possibility that forces hostile to Chinese interests could eventually take power nationally?

Under these circumstances, Chinese personnel would think it justified, under the narrative of “safeguarding the safety of Chinese nationals, institutions and projects in the country,” to wage offensive assaults against anti-junta forces across Myanmar.


Granted, the junta is touchy about being seen as a lackey of Beijing — or about Myanmar becoming a protectorate of China.

That is why Beijing has offered platitudes of a joint “security company,” a fiction to get around Myanmar’s constitution that forbids the deployment of foreign troops.

But what position will the junta be in to dictate what Chinese personnel can do or where they can go once they are in Myanmar?

Lastly, does one imagine that anti-junta forces won’t retaliate against Chinese intervention, especially when that intervention is so clearly on behalf of the regime?

Anti-China sentiment is running high in Myanmar and will boil over once Chinese troops and police step foot in the country.

One can very easily imagine an escalating campaign of attacks by anti-junta forces on Chinese interests – increasing the incentives for Chinese security personnel to launch offensive operations.

Once Chinese boots are on the ground in Myanmar, this means direct intervention by China – not merely an economic peacekeeping effort by joint “security companies.”

And Chinese personnel will have to conduct offensive operations – not just stand guard at Chinese-run factories and pipelines.

David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.


Are Chinese private armies entering the fray in Myanmar?


Deployment of PMCs demonstrates Chinese unease and junta desperation.

Images by AP, Adobe Stock (Amanda Weisbrod/RFA)

Between the high level visits of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Naypyidaw and Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to China, the neighbors struck one piece of business – a deal to allow the deployment of Chinese private military corporations (PMCs) to operate within Myanmar.

The BBC-Burmese Service, which first broke the story, reported that there are already four Chinese private security companies that are operating in Myanmar, doing static security work.

The deployment of mercenary forces is a telling sign of China’s unease and of the desperation of the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally called.

China is obviously very concerned about the junta’s ability to protect Chinese interests in the war-torn country, but a deployment of private Chinese armies is nothing less than a complete humiliation for Min Aung Hlaing.

Despite the military’s bravado, over half of Myanmar is now in opposition hands, and junta forces have failed to retake most of the territory they have lost since the Three Brotherhood Alliance commenced Operation 1027 in October 2023.

The Chinese deployment is a stark admission on the part of the February 2021 coup leader that his forces are spread too thin. Despite the monthly induction of 5,000 conscripts, battlefield losses, and defections are cutting into the regime’s numerical advantage.

The Irrawaddy reported that on October 22, the junta established a 13-member working committee composed of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs and other ministries to draft the memorandum of understanding on the military company’s establishment and import of weaponry and communications devices.

The committee would also determine where and how the Chinese PMC could be deployed.

Chinese PMCs

The new PMC has not been established, but chances are it would be a subsidiary of or a joint venture with one of China’s large existing PMCs, which have proliferated since the 1990s when a set of laws created the framework for their operation. Those laws were amended in 2009.

Today, there are roughly 20 Chinese PMCs operating in 40 countries, mostly in Africa, to provide security for Belt and Road Initiative projects.




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The big players in the market are De Wei Security Group Ltd, Hua Xin China Security, Guan An Security Technology, China Overseas Security Group, and Frontier Services Group.

Chinese PMC do not have the same business model as Russia’s Wagner Group, which really is used more as an expeditionary fighting force that gives the Russian government a fig leaf of plausible deniability, in pursuit of the Kremlin’s broader foreign policy interests.

Wagner’s business model is also based on the extraction of natural resources. Chinese firms, to date, have operated more on a contractual basis and have focused much more on the protection of China’s economic interests under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Chinese soldiers of the People's Liberation Army sit on the back of a truck on the highway to Nyingchi, Tibet Autonomous Region, China, October 19, 2020)
Chinese soldiers of the People's Liberation Army sit on the back of a truck on the highway to Nyingchi, Tibet Autonomous Region, China, October 19, 2020) (THOMAS PETER/Reuters)

The attempted mutiny by Wagner’s CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023 has probably shaped Chinese leadership thinking about PMCs, likely prompting the Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army to step up their controls.

The firewall between the PMCs and the People’s Liberation Army has always been thin. Much of the corporate leadership as well as rank and file came out of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, or other Chinese security ministries.

The regular targeting of Chinese citizens and economic interests along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by Baluchi militants may be prompting a rethink in how and when Chinese PMCs can use force, and what the rules of engagement are.

Legitimately concerned about Min Aung Hlaing and the military’s competence, Beijing will be pushing hard for robust rules of engagement, and the ability to conduct offensive operations around their key economic interests.

Major Chinese interests

China has a wide range of economic interests in Myanmar.

These include their special economic zone and proposed deep-water intermodal container port in Kyaukphyu, the Wanbao copper mines, hydro electric plants in Kachin and northern Shan states, oil and gas pipelines that extend to Kunming in southwestern China, and jade and rare earth mines in Kachin.

But almost all of those projects are in areas that have come under the control of the opposition National Unity Government and its people’s defense forces, or allied ethnic resistance organizations.

Indeed, 90% of Myanmar’s natural resources are outside junta control, or in contested spaces.

What does that mean for Chinese PMCs?

If they are deployed in contested areas, such as the mines in Mandalay, Magway, or Sagaing, will they be fighting alongside junta forces?

Or will they simply be defending China’s economic interest which would free up regime troops?

Will there be intelligence sharing and targeting information, or tactical-level embedded deployments?

Ethnic rebel group Ta'ang National Liberation Army patrol near Namhsan Township in Myanmar's northern Shan State. (AFP)
Ethnic rebel group Ta'ang National Liberation Army patrol near Namhsan Township in Myanmar's northern Shan State. (AFP)

Given the close relationship between Chinese PMCs and the PLA, one has to look at this as the de facto deployment of PLA forces into Myanmar.

The Burmese language Khit Thit Media reported that a deal to establish a Chinese PMC in Kyaukphyu was signed this month between Gen. Kyaw Shwe Htun, the chairman of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone management sub-committee, and officials from the Chinese CITIC Group Company.

The Arakan Army has surrounded Kyaukphyu, where construction on a special economic zone and port has stalled, but has made no attempt to enter it.

Would Chinese PMCs be allowed to go outside the perimeter? Could they provide intelligence, signals intercepts or targeting information to junta forces?

Punishing the ethnic armies

It’s hard to imagine that the ethnic armies will allow the deployment of Chinese PMCs in their territory.

China has already made it clear that it is doubling down on the junta, while the opposition NUG and ethnic armies have repeatedly defied Beijing by continuing to fight the military regime and reject calls for nationwide elections under junta terms.

China has tried to punish the ethnic armies by shutting down border trade, which impacts the local communities that are dependent on the flow of commerce. They have shut down the internet and electric power for many border towns.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends a meeting with Russia's President in Saint Petersburg on Sept. 12, 2024. (AFP Photo/Kristina Kormilitsyna)
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends a meeting with Russia's President in Saint Petersburg on Sept. 12, 2024. (Kristina Kormilitsyna)

The Chinese are now taking their pressure campaign to the next level.

On Nov. 18, Myanmar-Now reported that the Chinese had placed the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) commander, Peng Daxun, under house arrest after summoning him to Kunming for talks.

China later denied Peng was under house arrest, saying he was receiving medical treatment.

This major escalation – coupled with additional support for the junta, including weaponry and drones, and negotiations about the deployment of private armies – should leave no one guessing as to what China’s position on Myanmar is.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia.