US Military Options For Kharg Island And The Strait Of Hormuz Under Review – Analysis

March 31, 2026 
 Hudson Institute
By Can Kasapoğlu

The Military and Geopolitical Perspective on Iran’s Coercive Island Network

The ongoing American–Israeli campaign against Iran has been operationally effective in degrading the Islamic Republic’s destructive military capabilities. Yet Washington will face difficulty compelling Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to stand down so long as Tehran retains the ability to disrupt maritime economic activity through the Strait of Hormuz.

The strait, while still susceptible to Iranian threats, remains the central vulnerability in the global economy. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, a substantial share of global shipping transited this narrow maritime corridor—including roughly one-quarter of global seaborne trade, one-fifth of the world’s oil supply, one-fifth of the world’s liquid natural gas (LNG), and a wide range of other critical goods such as fertilizers. This concentration of maritime traffic along predictable sea lanes has created a structural exposure: a disruptive and hostile actor with continued access to the strait can impose disproportionate effects on a global scale. Iran’s military and strategic approach to the current conflict rests squarely on this stark geopolitical reality.

In any potential effort to disrupt Iran’s control over the strait, Kharg Island looms large. Located deep in the Persian Gulf, some sixteen miles off the coast of Iran and roughly four hundred miles northwest of the Strait of Hormuz, the island spans only about eight square miles. Despite its small size, Kharg functions as the primary hub for Iran’s oil exports and serves as an economic center of gravity underpinning the IRGC’s coercive power.

Any serious effort to dismantle Iran’s leverage over global energy flows must address the broader network of Iranian-controlled islands in the Gulf rather than focus on a single node. Qeshm Island, positioned closer to the entrance of the strait, extends Iran’s surveillance reach and supports naval drone operations and anti-ship missile coverage. The islands of Abu Musa, Larak, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb sit astride the strait’s entrance, providing Tehran additional reach along this sensitive maritime corridor. Together, these positions allow Iran to maintain persistent surveillance, deploy missile systems, and conduct interdiction efforts against passing vessels.

Even as US Marines were en route to the Gulf aboard the USS Tripoli, Washington was already shaping the battlespace and setting conditions for the opening phase of a potential campaign. US strikes have targeted high-value Iranian military defense infrastructure on offshore islands. Additionally, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has announced the killing of Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri, commander of the IRGC navy. Although decapitation strikes have inherent limitations, Tangsiri’s death could have a detrimental effect on Iran’s island defense plans.

A coordinated campaign against multiple Iranian positions could further alter the geometry of the war by compressing Iran’s operational space and complicating its ability to sustain maritime pressure. Seizing and holding Kharg Island for a sustained period could even serve as a catalyst for internal political instability or regime change within the Islamic Republic.

Yet the seizure of terrain, whether inside mainland Iran or on its offshore islands, would be only an initial step. Holding that ground amid persistent missile and drone salvos and a barrage of asymmetric threats would likely require a prolonged campaign. Absent robust force protection, layered air and missile defenses, counter-drone capabilities, and continuous resupply operations, any initial gains could erode quickly, leaving US forces dangerously exposed.

The Military Buildup

The USS Tripoli arrived in the Middle East on March 27 carrying thousands of Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This force package is configured for rapid-response contingencies across littoral environments and is designed for insertion, limited-objective operations, and crisis response.

The Tripoli’s design shapes how it is likely to be employed. The ship is configured without a well deck, a choice that maximizes its naval aviation capacity and allows it to operate as a high-density platform for F-35B aircraft. As a result, the vessel functions as a light carrier, prioritizing sortie generation and sustained air pressure over surface insertion capacity. The USS Boxer, a Wasp-class amphibious assault ship with the 11th MEU, has also departed San Diego for the Middle East. The two formations appear to be moving toward the region on a staggered timeline.

An MEU provides a modular, multidomain force designed for rapid combat operations. In a strike-forward configuration, embarked F-35B Lightning II aircraft can extend the force’s reach inland while supporting maritime control, including engagements against fast-attack craft. Attack helicopters can deliver persistent coverage in littoral areas, reinforcing interdiction and close-in protection. In an assault posture, an MEU can insert Marines across extended distances using MV-22 Osprey and CH-53E Super Stallion platforms, enabling distributed entry options beyond the immediate shoreline.

This maritime posture is unfolding alongside signs of parallel land-force readiness. Elements associated with rapid-response formations, including detachments from the 82nd Airborne Division, have been described in open-source reporting as part of a broader contingency posture in the region. Taken together, these developments reinforce the idea that Washington is positioning scalable and deployable forces into the Gulf for crisis response rather than preparing for immediate large-scale war. These movements expand the menu of options available to US planners.

A Dangerous Naval Threat Landscape

To date, CENTCOM’s sustained campaign has hampered Iran’s naval, missile, and drone capabilities, degrading Tehran’s ability to mass fires and coordinate effects at scale. Nonetheless, the Islamic Republic retains serious residual threats. Even in a weakened state, Iran’s layered denial architecture—mines, missiles, and drones—continues to impose real operational risks on any force operating in the Gulf.

Easy to deploy and highly effective in the narrow approaches to the Strait of Hormuz that amphibious units must traverse, naval mines represent the least expensive means of threatening a moving amphibious force. The Islamic Republic has a variety of these mines in its inventories. While none are state of the art, they remain dangerous.

Mines do not need to win the fight to be effective—they need only complicate an adversary’s efforts sufficiently to deter action. This principle has been demonstrated repeatedly in modern warfare. During the Korean War, dense minefields delayed US amphibious operations at Wonsan in 1950 and stripped the landing of its operational value. After that operation, US Admiral Allan E. Smith identified the disproportionate impact mines can have with characteristic acerbity: “We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using a pre–World War I weapon, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”

Beyond naval mines, Iran’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) pose critical threats in the theater. Satellite imagery suggests that Iran has installed a significant portion of its ASCM capabilities in subterranean launch positions on Qeshm Island.

The Islamic Republic’s ASCM baseline has long borne evidence of Chinese DNA. The Quds Force, a branch of the IRGC specializing in unconventional warfare and subversive military intelligence operations, has transferred some of these systems to Iran’s proxies across the region, including the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In 2006, Hezbollah successfully struck an Israeli Navy platform, the INS Hanit, with a Noor missile, a derivative of the Chinese C-802 ASCM.

While Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles have historically been limited to subsonic categories, expert assessments suggest that the IRGC has recently explored supersonic options, including variants equipped with ramjet power packs—air-breathing propulsion systems that compress incoming air at high velocity before combustion. More alarmingly, reporting indicates that China may have transferred YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran before Operation Epic Fury began. While no open-source intelligence confirms Iranian forces have used such weapons to date, this would mark a true capability leap for Tehran.

Anti-ship missiles, however, are only effective as the kill chains that enable them. In 2025, the US Department of State publicly accused Chinese satellite companies of providing the Houthis with targeting data. Moreover, ongoing monitoring suggests that the IRGC has long sought access to military-grade data flow from companies linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Additionally, reports that Russia has provided Tehran with targeting data to support its operations against US forces have already made headlines. In any potential marine assault scenario, it would be naïve to assume that China and Russia would remain idle or decline to provide Tehran with real-time actionable intelligence.


ASBMs present an additional challenge for US forces in any effort to seize Kharg Island. Unlike high-end ASCMs, ballistic missiles do not hug the sea or maneuver extensively. Instead, they rely on speed. Some exit the atmosphere and reenter on a steep terminal trajectory, compressing reaction times and striking a target at extreme velocity.

Interception windows against such projectiles are narrow, and the effects of ASBM warheads are correspondingly severe. Yet physics cuts both ways. Ships are moving targets by nature, and a ballistic missile lacking terminal sensors or real-time updates can easily miss a maneuvering vessel.

Once again, the decisive variable in such operations is the kill chain, a systematic, sequential process for identifying, tracking, targeting, engaging, and destroying an enemy. Persistent drone coverage fused with disciplined signals intelligence can convert speed into accuracy. In confined waters, volume can accomplish what imprecise weapons cannot. A coordinated salvo layering ASBMs with loitering munitions and ASCMs increases the probability of a successful strike and taxes defensive magazines.

Iran’s proxy network has demonstrated a willingness to employ ASBMs. In 2023, the Houthis fired ASBMs at the vessel Maersk Hangzhou. The US Navy destroyers USS Gravely and USS Laboon intercepted the inbound missiles, whereupon the engagement shifted to close quarters. Houthi boats closed to within meters of the merchant vessel, prompting US naval helicopters to counterattack, destroying multiple platforms and killing ten enemy fighters.

In 2024, the Houthis also struck the Greek-owned bulk carrier Zografia. Open-source intelligence suggests that the weapon the Iranian proxy employed was an ASBM—probably a Khalij Fars, the anti-ship derivative of the Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile.

Finally, Iran retains naval drones, or unmanned surface vessels (USVs). These robotic platforms have scored kills on commercial vessels during Operation Epic Fury, and have also constituted a key part of the Houthis’ campaign in the Red Sea. Visual evidence suggests that Iran has deployed naval drones in underground sites along its coastal areas and islands. Open-source battle damage assessments show that repeated attacks on these hardened underground ASCM and USV facilities have failed to destroy them entirely, in part due to limited penetration into the core architectureprotecting these installations.
Air Assault Options and Likely Concepts of Operations

At present, the Pentagon is weighing the deployment of up to 10,000 additional ground troops to the Middle East. Such a move would expand the range of military options available to US President Donald Trump. In the meantime, open-source tracking suggests that strategic US drones have conducted frequent surveillance flights above Kharg Island.

While Iran’s coastal islands offer suitable shores for amphibious landings, US forces could likely insert Marines more effectively by air. In any operation targeting Kharg or Iran’s other islands, US forces would likely approach at low altitudes using tilt-rotor aircraft such as the MV-22, the Marine Corps variant of the V-22 Osprey. Elements from the 82nd Airborne Division and select Special Forces detachments would likely join these raids.


Almost certainly, any such campaign would be preceded or accompanied by a strategic-scale shock elsewhere in Iran—perhaps including a massive attack on the country’s electrical grid that could cause widespread blackouts. In addition, while high-command decapitation strikes would not paralyze the IRGC, targeting sector commanders in the Hormuz area and senior leaders of Tehran’s naval forces could open a window for US forces to strike Kharg.

Although US strikes have largely degraded Iran’s strategic air-defense network, residual elements of Tehran’s asymmetric systems remain active and could strike with little warning. High-end Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) would continue to pose a persistent threat to low-flying aircraft, while more unconventional systems—such as the 358 loitering “air-defense” drone—introduce an added layer of unpredictability to any US air-assault effort.

Together, these threats would complicate US air-assault operations, particularly during the most vulnerable phases of insertion and resupply. Notably, by the end of 2025, Iran had officially made a move to acquireRussian Verba high-end MANPADS, systems capable of imposing serious risks on air assault platforms operating at low altitude.

Once on the ground, any forcible-entry formations would disperse to secure critical infrastructure on Kharg Island or other target locales. This move would force Revolutionary Guard units into a stark choice: strike Iran’s own key economic infrastructure to dislodge invading forces, or hold fire and risk losing control of the regime’s primary export nodes.

If an expeditionary force successfully completes forcible-entry operations on Kharg and secures the island’s export infrastructure, the campaign will transition from seizure to consolidation. The principal task in this phase would be to hold the island and prepare it for follow-on forces. This effort would prioritize force protection under sustained Iranian interdiction. At that stage, the IRGC would likely initiate layered fires, including drones and ballistic missiles, to degrade the US foothold on the island.

The IRGC could then attempt to shift its ground-warfare efforts to irregular operations, using residents and oil workers as human shields. Recent operations in Iraq have demonstrated this approach, with Iranian paramilitary groups there using first-person view (FPV) drones, mirroring a key trend in the war between Russia and Ukraine. A similar concept of employment (CONEMPS) should be anticipated in the Revolutionary Guards’ island-defense efforts, alongside the use of tactical weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) that could produce asymmetric effects.

Sustainment Under Fire: From Seizure to Vulnerability

If US forces are successful in seizing Kharg Island or other similar objectives, their operation would shift into the sustainment phase. During this period, three Iranian capabilities could threaten US marines and airborne troops.

The first is Iran’s supply of short-range ballistic missiles: road-mobile, solid-fueled, and relatively precise Fateh-110 derivatives, including the Fateh-313, the Zulfiqar, and other variants optimized to strike fixed positions, logistics hubs, and airfields with minimal warning. Iran also possesses an anti-ship variant of this ballistic missile family, a capability which should not be underestimated.


The second threat comes from Iran’s Shahed family of drones. Russian combat experience in Ukraine has demonstrated how these munitions can be effective as expandable strike systems. Ongoing Russian–Iranian adaptation of Shahed drones likely points to the emergence of variants that can carry expanded payloads, including heavier and thermobaric warheads, in innovative concepts of operations (CONOPS).

Third, US forces attempting to hold Iran’s offshore islands could be threatened by heavy ballistic missile warheads equipped with submunitions. These weapons are designed for saturation rather than precision. In an island battle space, these systems could blanket critical areas, stress US naval air defenses, and degrade operational tempo.

Against these threats, the energy infrastructure on Iran’s islands remains both the key objective and the most acute vulnerability. Any Iranian strike against this infrastructure on Kharg Island would not only shape the tactical fight locally, but also transmit immediate shocks to global energy markets.

Access Under Fire: Pathways and Strategic Tradeoffs in the Strait of Hormuz

Any operation targeting Iran’s island oil infrastructure would begin with a shaping phase—cyber and electronic warfare efforts to disrupt sensors and networks, followed by precision strikes to degrade air defenses and isolate the objective. Without these preparations, US forces would enter a contested battle space with high exposure. Any US campaign in the region would likely center on two decisive islands: Kharg and Qeshm.

Kharg is Iran’s economic center of gravity. Seizing it would place Tehran’s oil exports under direct pressure, generating coercive leverage rather than territorial gains. The approach to taking Kharg would likely rely on vertical insertion from regional bases, minimizing the exposure of large amphibious platforms in the Strait of Hormuz.

The potential payoff to capturing Kharg is significant, but so too is the risk of escalation. Even if US forces secured the island, the IRGC would retain the capacity to retaliate across the Gulf by striking the region’s energy, water desalination, and civilian infrastructure. This could expand the conflict into a broader economic war.

Qeshm, by contrast, is the IRGC’s primary denial hub. It anchors Iran’s ability to threaten maritime traffic with missiles, drones, mines, and fast-attack craft supported by hardened and often underground infrastructure. Taking Qeshm is also most likely the harder fight. The island’s size, terrain, and proximity to the mainland favor the defender. Iranian reinforcement efforts there would likely be continuous. Even if seized, holding Qeshm would impose a heavy burden for a relatively limited strategic return.

Ultimately, the decisive challenge in taking either island is one of sustainment. Seizing ground is feasible, but holding it is more difficult. Continuous resupply, medical evacuation, and air- and missile-defense efforts would strain US capacity, while US bases in the region would remain vulnerable to Iranian strikes. Distributed Iranian operations, including decentralized missile and drone units, would enable Tehran to exert persistent, multi-directional pressure on any opposing forces.

Yet, while Iran retains control of the Strait of Hormuz, it retains the strategic leverage necessary to help it forestall geopolitical defeat. Washington’s path to victory runs through the strait, in one form or another.

About the author: Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions. He specializes in open-source defense intelligence, geopolitical assessments, international weapons market trends, as well as emerging defense technologies and related concepts of operations.

Source: This article was published at the Hudson Institute

Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom.

Israel, US have armed themselves for the wrong war

America has the biggest and best weapons in the world but in an asymmetric war it's not about having the best weapons it's about having the right weapons. Israel and the US have armed themselves for the wrong war. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin March 27, 2026

Hezbollah published footage of striking an Israeli Merkava tank in the town square of Taybeh, southern Lebanon on March 26.

The Israeli Army took its heaviest tank losses in over 40 years after Hezbollah ambushes destroyed 21 Merkavas main battle tanks in a single day on March 26.

Multiple ambushes launched against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon caught them off guard and destroyed the tanks using a mixture of drone and infantry attacks. Independent verification of the scale of damage and weapons used remains limited.

According to local reports, cheap anti-tank guided missiles and drones were effectively used to destroy the large main battle tanks valued at several million dollars each.

It was an engagement strongly reminiscent of the opening stages of the war in Ukraine, Russian forces were also wrong-footed by lightly-armed Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) using US-supplied Javelin missiles that “popped the tops” or Russia’s heavy tanks in fast moving but devastating attacks.

Hezbollah’s weapons have been upgraded, and in addition to shoulder-fired missiles it has gone straight to the drone phase of the war using its advanced drone technology and that supplied by Russia.

Other footage released on social media has shown Iranian forces flying First Person View (FPV) drones, guided by an unjammable fibre optic wire controls system that have stuck and destroyed US Black Hawk helicopters inside a US Gulf base.

The fibre optic guidance system was a Russian innovation that was initially scorned by the AFU, then adopted wholesale by the Ukrainian forces. Since these technological advances both Russia and Ukraine have developed myriad new systems and countermeasures, but it appears that both the US and Israel are still relying on old school thinking and armed themselves with heavy mechanised armour that is increasingly helpless in the rapidly evolving modern warfare techniques developed in the wheatfields of Ukraine.

As bne IntelliNews reported, in a modern asymmetrical war it is not about having the best and most powerful weapons, but having cheap, but “good enough” weapons in massive numbers. The old school “Command of the Commons” military doctrine that emphases military “primacy” that has been standard for decades, has given way to the “Command of the Reload” since the short war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020 pioneered drone-use, where the emphasis is on overwhelming your opponent with an almost limitless supply of cheap but deadly drones.

Iran and its proxies like Hezbollah have adopted these tactics and have largely been able to negate the US and Israeli advantages in the sophistication of their weapons.

As Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi wrote in an editorial recently: “The large-scale changes that have occurred on the battlefields of the Russian-Ukrainian war have changed the paradigm of how warfare is waged… Today, in a relatively cheap way, any country can have combat capabilities that completely outstrip its economic or demographic situation if there is a desire and political will for it.”

Israel found this out to its cost after Hezbollah destroyed 21 Merkava main battle tanks in less than a day between the towns of Taybeh and Qantara on March 26. Other reports claim Hezbollah destroyed more than 100 tanks in total in 48-hours, according to Iran’s state-run Press TV.

Hezbollah artillery units also targeted Israeli command positions in the Taybeh region, Rab Thalathin and Oudaiseh, while also firing on Israeli reinforcements that were dispatched to evacuate casualties, Military Watch reports. Hezbollah attacks were supported by longer-range missile strikes against Israeli positions by Iran.

As bne IntelliNews reported, Israel launched a large scale invasion of southern Lebanon after Hezbollah fired rockets in retribution for the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The IDF has been targeting civilians as part of a drive to depopulate the region and take complete control up to the Litani river. More than one million people have already been displaced as Israel adopts tactics similar to those used in Gaza by flattening residential buildings and destroying local infrastructure.

The success of the Hezbollah counterblow represents the most extreme losses Israeli armour has suffered in over 40 years since the early stages of the Lebanon War when Merkavas and older US-supplied tanks engaged newly supplied Syrian Army Russian-made T-72 tanks and anti-tank guided weapons.

Ammo running low

To compound the attacking coalitions problems, they are already running low onf the very powerful ammunition they put such store in. A new report from the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security warns that Israel has used most of its Arrow 2 and 3 interceptors, while U.S. THAAD missiles protecting Gulf allies are heavily depleted.

A previous report from The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the Payne Institute also identified critical shortages in 14 of the 35 munitions used in Iran after just the first 96 hours of fighting.

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security estimates that Israel has already fired 80% of its Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors, 54% of its David’s Sling missiles, and 45% of the American-made THAAD interceptors it operates. By contrast, only 20% of Iron Dome interceptors have been used. The institute estimates that 60% of the THAAD missiles deployed to protect Gulf states from Iranian attacks have already been expended.

Israel’s stockpiles of offensive weapons remain in better shape; for instance, only half of its Rampage missiles have been launched, Haaretz reports.

Israel’s interception capabilities are finite and cannot match the rate at which Iran is launching missiles at Israel and the Gulf states. Each Arrow interceptor costs between $2mn and $3mn, limiting how many Israel can afford. The cost of the missiles and the size of the stockpile — which cannot be expanded quickly — put a mathematical limit on how long the war can run using the current mix of weapons and methods.

The institute estimates that it could take the United States up to five years to restore its Tomahawk missile reserves.

IDF sources responded last week to reports suggesting Israel’s interceptor stockpiles are running low, but did not give any details.

In addition to running short of interceptors, Iran’s latest missiles have received a technological upgrade and have proven able to evade interceptors and hit their targets. All 13 of the US Gulf bases have been badly damaged by Iranian strikes, and most are now largely without staff.

IDF under pressure

Israel’s military leadership has warned the government that after roughly 900 days of near-continuous conflict, the army is approaching a breaking point. In remarks delivered to ministers, the IDF Chief of Staff set out a picture of a force stretched across too many fronts, with too few people, and no clear relief in sight.

Reservists are now deployed simultaneously across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and, increasingly, in preparation for a direct confrontation with Iran. Senior IDF officials have warned of a “manpower crisis” as repeated call-ups stretch the system beyond its design limits. What was once a surge force has become a standing one. The system was not designed for that.

At the same time, a structural gap remains unresolved. No ultra-Orthodox conscription law has been passed, leaving thousands effectively outside the draft. Israeli defence officials have warned that without changes to conscription policy, “the model will not hold”. The political compromise that sustained this arrangement in peacetime is colliding with wartime reality.

Pressure is also being generated internally. The cabinet’s decision to legalise dozens of additional outposts and farms in the West Bank has created new security obligations, each requiring troops on the ground. Parallel to this, a rise in Jewish nationalist violence in the territory has already forced the deployment of an additional battalion, with the prospect of more to follow. Military officials have described the current operational tempo as “unsustainable over time”.

And then there is a manpower problem. Mandatory service is set to fall to 30 months from January 2027, moving in the opposite direction to the military’s request to extend it to 36 months. Fewer soldiers, staying for less time, entering a system already under strain. Former and current officials have warned of an “erosion of readiness” if forces remain continuously deployed.

Key legislation covering conscription, reserve mobilisation and service length has been delayed, in large part due to tensions surrounding exemptions for the Haredi community. The issue has been described internally as “no longer tenable in wartime conditions”. The result is a widening gap between operational demand and legal supply. The commitments are expanding faster than the force that sustains them.

The warning from the Chief of Staff is stark: without a reduction in operational scope, the system will begin to fail under its own weight.

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Selected leading Iranian weapons systems

Missiles (ballistic and hypersonic)

Fattah-2 hypersonic missile: Iran’s Fattah-2 is presented as a next-generation hypersonic system designed to evade air defences through high speed and manoeuvrability, using a glide vehicle that can adjust its trajectory in flight.

Khorramshahr intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): A heavy missile capable of carrying a 2-tonne cluster munition warhead, prioritising payload over precision and designed for high-impact strikes over intermediate ranges.

Kheibar Shekan: Unveiled in 2022, this newer-generation ballistic missile carries a one-tonne warhead and reflects a shift towards greater accuracy and mobility.

Sejjil missile: A solid-fuel ballistic missile offering faster launch times and greater survivability compared with liquid-fuel systems, forming part of Iran’s more modern strategic capability.

Fateh-110 family: A highly accurate, short-range ballistic missile and one of the most widely used systems in Iran’s arsenal, forming the backbone of its regional strike capability.

Zolfaghar: An extended-range variant of the Fateh family, with a range of around 700km, designed for precision strikes and used in operational deployments.

Qiam-1: A liquid-fuel missile derived from Scud designs but modified for greater efficiency, notably lacking stabilising fins, and used in several real-world strikes.

Shahab-3: One of Iran’s earliest medium-range ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 2,000km, forming a core part of its long-standing deterrent despite being less advanced.

Emad missile: An upgraded version of the Shahab-3 with improved guidance systems, marking a transition towards more precise targeting capabilities.

Nasrallah system missile: A newly identified system reportedly used in a strike on the Haifa refinery in Israel, signalling continued development of Iran’s strike arsenal, though details remain limited.

 

Cruise missiles and anti-ship systems

Soumar / Hoveyzeh cruise missiles: Long-range land-attack cruise missiles, believed to be derived from older Soviet designs, capable of flying at low altitude and evading radar.

Noor / Qader anti-ship missiles: Key components of Iran’s naval strategy, designed to target vessels in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, reinforcing its ability to threaten maritime traffic.

Drones and unmanned systems

Shahed-136 MS series: A loitering munition equipped with an improved eight-channel, jam-resistant satellite navigation system known as Nasir, reflecting upgrades made following recent conflicts.

Mohajer-6: A surveillance and strike drone capable of carrying precision-guided munitions, widely used in regional operations.

Shahed-129: A longer-range unmanned aerial vehicle designed for reconnaissance and strike missions, comparable in role to US Predator-type systems.

Azhdar underwater drone: An unmanned underwater vehicle intended for reconnaissance and potential attacks on maritime infrastructure, forming part of Iran’s asymmetric naval toolkit.

Naval platforms and asymmetric warfare

Kilo-class submarines: Russian-built diesel-electric submarines known for their relative stealth, providing Iran with a conventional undersea warfare capability.

Ghadir mini-submarines: Smaller, domestically produced submarines optimised for shallow waters, suited to ambush tactics and operations in the Gulf.

Fast attack craft (IRGC Navy): Small, heavily armed boats designed for swarm tactics, central to Iran’s strategy for confronting larger naval forces in confined waters.

Naval mines: A critical but often overlooked capability, allowing Iran to disrupt shipping lanes and potentially close chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

Beyond Technology: The ‘Way Of War’ In The Iran Conflict – Analysis

March 28, 2026 
 Observer Research Foundation
By Rahul Rawat


The ongoing US-Israel-led military operation against Iran has expanded significantly both in terms of the scope of battlefield operations and strategic objectives of the war. What began as a short-term, decisive, high-intensity operation by the Trump administration has now lasted for three weeks. The conflict has observed the use of a diverse set of military capabilities, predominantly modern technology, adding a degree of sophistication to conventional military power.

However, military power is an aspect of military strategy characterised by an interplay of means, ways, and ends. To secure the ends, it is important to get both means (capabilities) and ways (organised application) right. The Iran war shows that the ‘way of war’ is critical for determining and subsequently framing the engagement in relation to the nature of the adversary. The US military’s Operation Epic Fury and Iran’s subsequent response demonstrate that technological superiority alone does not guarantee strategic victory. But how states organise capabilities and employ military power as a subset of military strategy helps determine decisive victory (beyond the battlefield).
Differing Battlefield Technologies and Targeting

The US-Israel front, as part of an ongoing military contestation, has observed demonstrations of costlier and more sophisticated technological systems on the battlefield. On the other hand, Iran, drawing lessons from the 12-Day War, has framed a relatively time-sensitive and asymmetric counter-response. Iran has translated the lessons to use military technologies for attrition and tilt the overall cost economics of war against the US interests.

On the battlefield, drones have been central to the debate over their effects, tilting the balance of power in favour of the aggressor. There is a clear shift in the use of drones from the ‘War on Terror’ era, thanks to lessons learnt from the Ukraine war. The US deployed the Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System(LUCAS) as a solution; however, it remains a short-term measure against the cost-effective and scalable Shahed drones. Iran has developed the ecosystem of Shahed drones and cluster munitions to traffic as well as infiltrate the US and Israeli air defence mechanisms.


Specifically, a Shahed-136 costs a fraction of a cruise missile or ballistic missile, between US$20,000 and US$50,000 per unit, has a range of up to 2,000 kilometres, and has precision guidance. The Iranian drone element carries an element of precision mass to cater to the changing character of warfare. Through targeted drone attacks, the Iranian military has reduced the cost of offence for maintaining its campaign cost while simultaneously raising the cost of defence for the US and Israel (led partners).

Even though most of the drones have been intercepted at a decent rate of 80-85 percent, Iran’s use of drones with a few ballistic missiles has been able to strain the resources as well as hit targets in Israel, the US military and its allies in the region. The cost of interception for the US-Israel front through the use of costlier Patriot-like systems multiplies exponentially against cheap Shahed drones and relatively inexpensive ballistic missiles based targeting by Iran. Washington, in other words, despite its lead in developing and deploying sophisticated capabilities, lacks low-cost, increasingly autonomous drones for surveillance and short- and long-range strikes.

Figure 1: The extensive US and Israeli strikes on Iranian Retaliatory Capabilities

Source: ISW


The US and Israel have hit targets, including those inside Iran, with both precision and depth. It has degraded Iranian capabilities to a substantial extent but has not eliminated its bases of power. On the other hand, the US military’s long-range vector power, along with the associated cost elements (as shown in Figure 2 below) and industrial base production capabilities to scale products, has emerged as a serious limitation.

Figure 2: Estimated Munitions Usage (figures in USD millions)

Source: CSIS

Finally, Iran has relied on the Chinese BeiDou network for real-time military targeting. The US military, through its cyber operations and the deployment of AI, has enabled real-time targeting and prioritisation across a range of assets. Primarily, the US military has been using AI to support decision-making purposes. This element has remained the key advantage of the US military, not just in capabilities but also in how it has adopted and integrated AI into its doctrinal and warfighting philosophy.
Differing Ways of War

The way of war is determined by how military power is organised and employed to achievethe objectives in a conflict. The US-Israel and Iranian ways of war differ in several ways.


First, the US-Israel war against Iran is centred not on Iran’s intentions but its potential to enhance its ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities. To this end, the conflict has showcased the decapitation strikes against the apex leadership and precision-based targeting of missile facilities across the geographical expanse of Iran. Iran, however, is not Venezuela and is in a war for (regime) survival against the US-Israel-led united front. Unlike the 12-Day War, Iran framed a quick response and so far, has relied on vertical as well as horizontal escalation-based response against the US and Israel-led military front.

Second, Trump-led American military thinking is premised on hitting hard to deliver a decisive blow against the adversary. This thinking also stems from an overreliance on technological superiority, however, this approach to warfare faces a challenge with the threat of attrition to the US military. Iran, on the other hand, has, since day one, adopted calibrated retaliation to spiral escalation against its adversaries.

Third, apart from the use of force backed by technological capabilities, the US could not secure clear support from its partners in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere. This takes the form of higher costs on the battlefield and beyond, as fissures emerge in political support for the US-led military operations. To this end, Tehran has led a war of attrition by widening and deepening the conflict by targeting Israel as well as the US military assets in the Middle East region.

Fourth, against a multi-domain US military-led operation against the political regime, Iran, in the aftermath of the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, made a swift transition from a ‘unity of command’ to a ‘unity-of-effort’ led model. This model created multiple yet simultaneous decision-making centres, enabling the IRGC to continue warfighting while divesting resources and diluting the focus of its adversaries.

Fifth, the US had to ensure there was no geographical spillover of the conflict, as it would hurt the interests of its partners and allies in the region and beyond. To this end, the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was an ultimate test of resolve, pressuring the US to the point of reaching out to its European allies without any credible commitments in return.

Sixth, the determined use of military power by the US amid its maximalist, shifting strategic goalposts, over time, has made it difficult to claim a decisive victory against Iran. On the other hand, Tehran has so far maintained internal cohesion, which has supported its resilience and will to fight the US-Israel-led military alliance. For Iran, in a war of survival, prolonging the military conflict and denying the US victory through ‘regime change’ becomes no less than a strategic victory for Iran.

The above factors reveal that, while rapidly evolving military technology offers advantages, it has encountered limitations in achieving strategic objectives due to differing ‘ways of warfare’. Iran is fighting for regime survival and its significance in an emerging regional order in the Middle East. Military technology has not enabled the surrender of the adversary or a decisive victory for the US military.
Conclusion

Notwithstanding the potential and demonstrable effects of battlefield technologies, the Iran war shows that differing ways of war remain critical in the conduct of war and in decisive outcomes. This war is yet to push Iran to surrender and present a decisive victory to its adversaries. Herein, the limitations of military technology and power are reflected against the lack of a way of war towards the strategic endgame. Iran has targeted the US military assets with an expanding targeting list to bring a second-order coercion to bear on the US’s allies and partners in the Middle East. The expansion of territorial and political limits of war has led the European and Indo-Pacific allies to lend support to the Trump administration-led conflict against Iran. Iran’s staggered use of drones and missiles amid a prolonged war, with some reserve of capabilities, is likely to be meant to gain political momentum in the war.


For the US, a decisive end to the conflict seems elusive from the battlefield viewpoint, along with the goal of regime change. However, the sustainment of attrition and the will to fight by either party would become influential factors in concluding the conflict on terms and conditions of their choosing. Whether and to what extent the war against Iran to degrade its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes would put a stop to Tehran’s long-term ambitions remains a dilemma for the Western technology-fueled military power. The drivers of real change on the battlefield to yield strategic outcomes lie more in doctrine, warfighting culture, and operational concepts, not in tech gadgets. The bottom line is that technology remains only an enabler and cannot, by itself, become the way of warfare.

About the author: Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

Observer Research Foundation

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.

ANALYSIS

How Hezbollah is rebuilding its military power despite political isolation


Beirut – Hezbollah is facing growing isolation in Lebanon, with political leaders and the government turning against it. But despite that pressure – and heavy losses in war – the group has continued to show unexpected strength on the battlefield.


Issued on: 26/03/2026 - RFI

Hezbollah fighters attend the funeral of three of their members, including Haitham Tabatabaï, a senior military commander, in November 2025. © Hussein Malla / AP


Once respected, admired or feared, Hezbollah is now facing more criticism than ever before. Leaders, politicians, journalists and analysts are no longer mincing their words when it comes to their views on the Shia Islamist party and its paramilitary wing.

The party, which has a large parliamentary group and two ministers in the Lebanese government, finds itself isolated, almost ostracised. Its representatives are no longer welcome on television programmes, its leaders accused of "anti-patriotism".

And this wave of anti-Hezbollah sentiment, unprecedented in Lebanon, is not confined to criticism in the media.


Ambassador expelled


On Tuesday, Foreign Minister Joe Raggi – who is close to the Christian Lebanese Forces party – announced that the Iranian ambassador’s accreditation had been withdrawn and gave him until Sunday to leave Lebanese territory.

On 2 March, soon after the outbreak of the war on Iran being waged by Israel and the United States, the Lebanese government outlawed Hezbollah's military wing and declared its security activities "illegal", instructing the army to enforce these unprecedented measures.

A few days later, three Hezbollah fighters who had been arrested in possession of weapons whilst travelling to southern Lebanon to confront Israeli troops were brought before the military court, a special tribunal responsible for hearing cases relating to state security.

While the three men were released on bail equivalent to $20, the fact that they were brought to trial was in itself unusual.

"I would have liked to implement the decisions more quickly, but we inherited many years of inaction and have begun arresting Hezbollah members in possession of illegal weapons,” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said in an interview with TV channel al-Hadath.

Hezbollah, through its secretary-general Naim Qassem and several of its leaders, has rejected all these accusations.

It claims to have started the war to “defend Lebanon” and to retaliate against “the Israelis’ ongoing violations of the ceasefire” – referring to the fact that in the past 15 months, Israel has killed some 400 of its members in strikes carried out across Lebanon, despite the truce agreed on 27 November 2024.

Weakened by war

Hezbollah’s political decline, however, stands in stark contrast to its military performance, which has taken observers – including those in Israel – by surprise.

The party had emerged severely weakened from the war with Israel between October 2023 and November 2024. Its charismatic secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated on 27 September 2024, followed by his designated successor Hashem Safieddine on 5 October.

There were heavy losses from its ranks, estimated at 4,000 dead and 10,000 wounded.

Following the ceasefire, the Lebanese army dismantled Hezbollah's infrastructure south of the Litani River with support from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Nearly 700 tunnels, depots and weapons caches were discovered, destroyed or neutralised during the operation.

Four hundred deaths were recorded following the truce, during which UNIFIL reported 7,500 Israeli airspace violations and 2,500 ground incursions.

In addition, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria on 8 December 2024 saw disruption of Hezbollah's land supply lines.

Written off as finished, the group surprised observers by deploying significant firepower, using weapons it was previously unknown to have, and engaging Israeli troops at the border – the very place it was supposed to have no presence left.

Opportunity to rebuild


“It is clear that Hezbollah has rebuilt its military capabilities based on the concept of decentralisation,” explained Elias Farhat, a retired general in the Lebanese Army.

“It has deployed its forces in small units and adopted a strategy of mobile defence. This was evident in the fighting, particularly in the battles that took place at Taybeh [5km from the border], where it destroyed six Israeli tanks in 90 minutes.”

This nighttime battle was filmed using thermal cameras and the video was widely circulated.

In recent weeks, sources close to Hezbollah have spoken of a “major step forward in the reconstruction of military capabilities”. Many analysts dismissed these claims as propaganda aimed at boosting the morale of a weary and vulnerable grassroots support base. However, events on the ground have proven them wrong.

Hezbollah's military and security apparatus has been taken over by a third generation of commanders, aged between 30 and 40, who have completely reorganised its structures, sought to address weaknesses – particularly regarding exposure to Israeli intelligence services – and overhauled its military doctrine.

“The party has rebuilt its chain of command and appointed replacements for the commanders who were killed,” said Farhat. “These new commanders are young, have completed higher education and hold degrees in scientific and technical fields. Clashes with the Israeli army demonstrate their professional conduct and extensive military knowledge.”

Hybrid warfare

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, an expert on Hezbollah and author of Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, has examined the new combat doctrine it is employing in the current war. In a post on X (formerly Twitter), she refers to a “return to forms of hybrid warfare that predate the current conflict by a considerable margin”.

She says Hezbollah has shifted to “smaller cells, streamlined chains of command, mobile warfare and surprise attacks”.

These adjustments represent “a return to what Hassan Nasrallah called ‘Imad Mughniyeh’s school of war’, which characterised the 2006 conflict” – during which Hezbollah thwarted all Israeli attempts at ground advances.

The "Mughniyeh model" – named for the Hezbollah military commander assassinated in Damascus in February 2008 – is based on dispersed forces organised into small units, combining guerrilla-style mobility and tactical surprise with the military capabilities typical of regular armies.

According to Saad-Ghorayeb: “This unique hybrid model developed by the former Hezbollah commander was studied in American military manuals precisely because it challenged the traditional distinction between conventional and unconventional warfare on which American military doctrine was based.”

To counter the systematic infiltration of its intelligence and communications systems – which enabled the Israelis to locate and assassinate a large number of its commanders during the last war – Hezbollah now relies on handwritten notes, human couriers or other forms of communication with a low electronic signature.

This explains why, despite the intensity of its air strikes, the Israeli military has not yet managed to identify and eliminate the new senior commanders.

Firepower


Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s sustained barrage of rockets and missiles on northern Israel – more than 2,000 projectiles have been fired since 2 March – demonstrates significant firepower, despite the depots destroyed by the Israelis and those seized by the Lebanese army.

The type of weaponry used is also notable. In addition to variants of Russia's Kornet anti-tank missiles, it has introduced Iranian Almas 2 and 3 missiles, which are capable of defeating the Trophy protection system deployed by Israel's Merkava 4 tanks.

On 18 March, Hezbollah fired a projectile for the first time at the Israeli city of Ashkelon, 200km from the border, demonstrating that it possesses long-range, high-precision missiles.

According to Farhat: "Based on Israeli sources which, prior to the last war, put the figure at 150,000 projectiles, and Israel’s announcement that 70 percent of the arsenal had been destroyed, 45,000 missiles may still remain. That would be enough to sustain the war effort for months."

This article has been adapted from the original version in French by RFI's correspondent in Beirut, Paul Khalifeh.

China Seeks To Leverage Pakistan’s Strong Relationships With Middle Eastern And Islamic Countries To Bolster Its Geostrategic Influence – Interview



Dr. Nadia Helmy


March 26, 2026 

By A. Jathindra

Dr. Nadia Helmy is an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics, the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, and Asian affairs. She currently serves as Professor of Political Science at Beni Suef University, Egypt. In addition, she is a Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES), Lund University, Sweden, where she also directs the South and East Asia Studies Unit.






For much of the late 20th century, Western security services regarded Chinese intelligence as primarily focused on domestic stability. In recent years, however, allegations of espionage, cyber operations, and covert activities have reshaped this perception. Today, China’s intelligence apparatus is seen as an increasingly active global player, though far less publicly discussed than agencies like the CIA or Mossad. How should we understand Chinese intelligence—its tactics, methods, and strategic objectives?

The world’s perception of Chinese intelligence has shifted from a closed, inward-looking apparatus to a transnational superpower. To understand this entity, it must be viewed as a system that does not separate national security, economic growth, and political stability. A simplified analysis of their methods and objectives can be achieved by understanding their strategic goals, namely the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation. Chinese intelligence operates to achieve three major objectives: (Ensuring the Survival of the Regime): monitoring dissidents abroad, such as the (Falun Gong movement or Uyghur and Tibetan activists), (Technological Superiority): acquiring Western technological secrets (artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and renewable energy) to bridge the technological gap, and (Political Influence): influencing decision-making centres in Western countries to ensure pro-China policies.

To this end, Chinese intelligence agencies employ a strategy of tactics and methods known in intelligence circles as “a thousand grains of sand”. China employs a unique strategy that differs from the traditional James Bond approach,through:A whole-of-society approach: Instead of relying solely on professional officers, China leverages “non-traditional sources” such as academics, students, and businesspeople, sometimes referred to as the “thousand grains of sand” theory (collecting small pieces of information from a large number of sources to form a complete picture).
Professional cyber espionage: China possesses one of the world’s largest cyber attack armies, primarily focused on corporate espionage and intellectual property theft, not just military secrets.
Human intelligence (HUMINT): This involves cultivating long-term relationships with former officials or academics through professional networking platforms like LinkedIn to offer seemingly legitimate research or consulting services.


Finally, the (institutional structure) plays a vital role in the success of Chinese intelligence agencies. The main driving force is the (Ministry of State Security) “MSS”, which combines functions similar to those of the CIA and FBI. But what is unique is the role of the United Front Work Department, a Communist Party agency that aims to neutralize adversaries and garner support among Chinese communities abroad and foreign elites.

What makes the work of Chinese intelligence agencies “different” is that while Mossad, for example, focuses on kinetic operations and assassinations, and US intelligence focuses on military-technological superiority, China focuses on economic intelligence. They see economic power as the foundation of sovereignty, so stealing an aircraft engine blueprint or a chemical formula is no less important than stealing a war plan.
China is often portrayed as a cyber power, using dual‑purpose technologies. In this context, what role do hackers play within its intelligence system?


Cyber ​​hackers play a pivotal role in China’s strategy as a cyber superpower, serving as an operational tool within a complex intelligence system that integrates military, economic, and political objectives. As of 2026, these roles have evolved to become more specialized and integrated with artificial intelligence technologies. Their role within the intelligence system can be summarized as follows: (Economic and Industrial Espionage): Stealing intellectual property and trade secrets is a key task for Chinese hackers to support national strategies such as “Made in China 2025”. They target advanced technology sectors such as semiconductors, renewable energy, and pharmaceuticals to reduce domestic research and development costs. (Pre-positioning Critical Infrastructure): Recent reports in 2025 and 2026 (such as those concerning the “Volt Typhoon” group) reveal a shift in objectives from mere espionage to “positioning”themselves within the electricity, water, and telecommunications networks of Western countries. The goal is to possess the capability to physically disrupt these facilities in the event of a future military conflict. In addition to hybrid intelligence operations, tasks are divided among various entities, such as:The Ministry of State Security (MSS): Focuses on foreign espionage, political intelligence gathering, and targeting government institutions and global corporations.
The People’s Liberation Army Cyber ​​Force (CSF): Primarily focuses on military targets and defense networks.
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS): Handles domestic intelligence operations and surveillance of dissidents.
Exploiting dual-use technologies: Hackers use legitimate tools pre-installed on systems (a technique known as “Living off the Land”) to avoid detection, making it difficult to distinguish between ordinary cyber activity and intelligence attacks. Artificial intelligence is also integrated to automate vulnerability detection and customize phishing attacks.
Monitoring transnational opposition: Hackers are tasked with tracking and monitoring Chinese activists and dissidents abroad, such as those involved in Taiwanese and Hong Kong independence movements, to ensure the regime’s political stability.

During the ongoing conflict involving Iran, some observers suggest that China has remained relatively detached. Yet you argue that Chinese intelligence in the Middle East is actively working to counter Mossad’s operations. How do you assess China’s espionage interventions in this war?

A crucial point has been raised regarding the “silent engagement” in the region. While Beijing publicly adopts a cautious diplomacy to safeguard its economic interests, security analysts believe its behind-the-scenes intelligence activities take on a completely different character.

China’s espionage interventions in this context can be assessed from (three main angles): First, (securing the “informational Silk Road”): China is not acting on behalf of Iran as an “ideological” ally, but rather as a “geopolitical”partner. Chinese intelligence focuses on monitoring movements that could destabilize energy supplies. This requires close tracking of Mossad operations targeting Iranian facilities to prevent the region from sliding into a full-blown war that would harm Beijing’s interests. Second, (technological and cyber superiority): China is emerging as a powerful player in the field of cyber espionage. Reports indicate that Beijing shares advanced surveillance technologies with its regional partners, limiting Mossad’s ability to operate freely in the digital realm. This type of intervention is a “proxy confrontation” conducted through technological means rather than direct conflict. Third, (neutralizing influence and expanding its regional role): China views international intelligence activities in the region as part of the global balance of power. Therefore, understanding and disrupting certain intelligence operations could be seen as an indirect way to bolster Beijing’s position as an independent great power in the Middle East, thus positioning itself as an alternative “stabilizing force” focused on economic development.


In short, the Chinese position can be described as “strategic neutrality”. It maintains an equidistant military and political stance publicly, but remains actively engaged in intelligence gathering to protect its massive investments and ensure the security of international trade routes.
Building on that, do you observe any indications of collaboration between China and Pakistan in shaping intelligence strategies concerning the Middle East?

Evidence points to close strategic and security cooperation between China and Pakistan, extending beyond economic aspects to include intelligence coordination. China leverages Pakistan’s historical ties in the Middle East, and the two countries are working together to enhance regional influence, secure the (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) “CPEC”, and address shared security challenges, according to strategic analyses. Key indicators of this strategic and intelligence cooperation, include: (Close security and military coordination): Both countries have pledged to strengthen cooperation in security and trade, and defense relations are developing robustly, paving the way for high-level intelligence coordination. Furthermore, (Utilizing Pakistani influence): China seeks to leverage Pakistan’s strong relationships with Middle Eastern and Islamic countries to bolster its geostrategic influence. And (Securing joint projects): The (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) “CPEC” is a central pillar of this cooperation, requiring joint intelligence to safeguard Chinese infrastructure and labor in Pakistan. With regard to coordination on important regional issues such as Afghanistan: Reports indicate Chinese mediation in bridging the gap between the Taliban and Pakistan, reflecting an exchange of information and coordination of strategies for dealing with Middle Eastern and South Asian issues. With regard to strategic trust between China and Pakistan: Pakistan affirms that its partnership with China is based on “strategic trust and alignment”, which strengthens intelligence sharing.


This cooperation is viewed within the context of “friendship under all circumstances” and the shared goal of creating a balance of regional power, particularly in the face of Western and Indian influence.
You have also noted that Chinese intelligence and defense think tanks closely study the performance of Israeli, Western, and American weapons in conflicts such as Ukraine, and now apply similar analysis to Iran. Their aim is to adapt these lessons to strengthen China’s own defense systems, particularly through artificial intelligence. In your view, does this suggest China is preparing for a military campaign against Taiwan?

Yes, this behavior indicates that China places the “military option” against Taiwan at the heart of its strategic plans, but it does not necessarily mean an imminent attack. Researchers and planners in Beijing view current conflicts as “living laboratories” to test the effectiveness of both Western and Chinese technology. Here are some key takeaways from this Chinese approach: (Bridging the technological gap through “proxy laboratories”): Chinese research centers consider current wars (Ukraine and the tensions between Iran and Israel) to provide invaluable data on how American weapons, such as: (Patriot missiles, HIMARS, and drones) perform against defensive and offensive systems similar to those possessed by China.On the Iranian side: Beijing is studying the ability of Chinese radars, such as: (the YLC-8B) to detect (American stealth fighters and the resilience of the BeiDou-3 navigation system as a Chinese alternative to GPS) against Western jamming.
On the Ukrainian front: China is analyzing the failures of joint operations and Russian logistics to avoid repeating them in the Taiwan scenario, which requires a complex amphibious landing.

Herein lies the role of artificial intelligence as a force multiplier for China. Integrating AI into Chinese defense systems is part of its “intelligentized warfare” strategy. The objectives are: (speed of decision-making): developing algorithms that surpass human commanders in managing and coordinating massive, simultaneous attacks, and (scenario simulation): using real-world data from the battlefields to feed Chinese simulation systems, thus bridging the gap resulting from the Chinese military’s decades-long lack of actual combat experience.

This is preparation for a potential Chinese military campaign against Taiwan should Taiwan persist in its secession from mainland China and deviate from the “One China” principle. These Chinese moves indicate strategic readiness rather than an announcement of an attack’s timing. Through its deterrence strategy, China hopes to convince the United States that the cost of intervening to defend Taiwan would be prohibitively high by developing systems to counter Western weapons. And (Preparing for a Protracted Conflict): China has adjusted its plans from the concept of a “rapid invasion” to preparing for a high-intensity, sustained conflict, after witnessing how the conflict in Ukraine has devolved into a war of attrition. With a (diversionary strategy): China supports its allies. such as (Iran) to keep American military and political resources stretched thin in the Middle East, thus weakening Washington’s ability to fully focus on the Pacific region.


Therefore, we can conclude that China’s meticulous study of weapons performance in Ukraine and Iran is an attempt to minimize the “unknowns” in any future conflict over Taiwan. China is not merely preparing to launch a campaign, but rather preparing to ensure victory with minimal losses and in the shortest possible time, through information and technological superiority.

This article was published at TCSS

A. Jathindra

A. Jathindra is the head of the think tank Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TSST) and a Sri Lankan-based independent political analyst.

The First AI War: The Dilemma Of Military Autonomy – Analysis

A rendering of what someone using the new Project Overmatch capability known as Maven would look like. A unified tactical display that provides insight on vessels across the world, the Maven program overlays real-time ship readiness and sustainment data right at the user’s fingertips by utilizing artificial intelligence. It was created by Project Overmatch and Palantir in collaboration as the first of many projects that integrate commercial tech at commercial speeds for government use to ensure interoperability. 

Credit: Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR)

March 25, 2026 

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

By Meghna Pradhan


The eruption of high-intensity hostilities in the Persian Gulf in late February and early March 2026, initiated jointly by the US and Israel and dubbed ‘Operation Epic Fury’ or ‘Operation Roaring Lion’ by respective nations, represents a watershed moment in the history of armed conflict. Aimed at conducting ‘decapitation strikes’[1] on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, command-and-control centres and senior leadership, the conflict has seen a rapid escalation in kinetic and cyber domains. More importantly, the event served as kindling for what is being called the first full-scale ‘AI war’.[2]

The designation is not purely rhetorical. There has been unprecedented use of AI-driven assets as Decision Support Systems (DSS), not merely as secondary analytical tools but as active enablers of kill chains. Typically, the process of gathering intelligence, identifying targets, conducting simulations and damage assessments, performing predictive analyses, assigning weapons, and executing missions took weeks, if not months, of human deliberation. However, the current war has seen attacks executed faster than ‘the speed of thought’, exemplified by the US conducting almost 900 strikes on Iranian targets in the first 12 hours alone and over 5,500 strikes in the first 10 days.[3]

To achieve such unprecedented scale, precision and velocity in attacks, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) leveraged advanced AI tools, such as Palantir’s MAVEN Smart System (MSS), which was integrated with Anthropic’s Claude LLM. These assets were using troves of unstructured, classified data from satellites, surveillance and other intelligence, helping to provide pattern development, real-time targeting and target prioritisation.[4] For instance, the precision strikes that led to assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei[5] and marked beginning of the war, was done by methodical use of AI and cyber espionage—the cameras in Tehran were hacked over the years, recording and feeding massive amounts of presumably mundane data (parking, personnel, traffic light timings, etc.) to Israel. This data, in turn, was used to map patterns and layouts, and ultimately to run predictive analyses for simultaneous and precise strikes.

The US has also developed and deployed Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS), a ‘Kamikaze’ drone system, as a cost-efficient high-volume defence asset against Iran. At a production cost of US$ 35,000, these drones offer a lower-cost alternative compared to US Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, which cost upward of US$ 2.4 million per shot.[6] Interestingly, LUCAS drones were reverse-engineered from Iran’s HESA Shahed-136 drones, which have gained notoriety in the Ukraine–Russia war. These drones are equipped with artificial intelligence that enables them to perform autonomous and swarm manoeuvres. The integration of LUCAS marks significant departures from the conventional understanding of asymmetric warfare. One, there is a realisation in the US that sophistication is not the only benchmark of military capability, and that cost and mass can be decisive factors. Secondly, the earlier logic of the flow of technology from more advanced to less advanced states no longer necessarily hold.[7]


Iran has similarly leveraged drone saturation and cyber warfare against the US and Israel. Iranian drone strikes have allegedly been responsible for the deaths of six US military personnel in Kuwait.[8] These attacks are also being used for targeting data infrastructures; of the six data facilities that the US company Amazon has in the UAE, three were allegedly struck by Iranian drones.[9] Iranian hacker group Handala has also reportedly targeted US and Israel-based entities, including Israel’s Air Force personnel, Israel Meteorological Systems, US-based medical technology firm Stryker and Hebrew University.[10] There are indications that the diminished timeline for their scale of attacks may be due to AI-assisted reconnaissance.[11] Furthermore, allegations have emerged that Iran has been actively leveraging AI for disinformation campaigns in the media.[12] Notably, Iran is currently facing an internet blackout, indicating that these cyberattacks are occurring through proxies distributed outside the country, indicating a significant degree of diffusion in its asymmetric cyber and autonomous capabilities.

The advantages of AI and drones, such as decision compression and low-cost saturation, have also proven to come with high human costs. The hyper-condensed decision-making cycle leaves little room for the human operator to cross-verify. Reliance on AI-accelerated decision-making, which is often plagued by outdated data and a lack of rigorous human verification, has direct implications for human casualties. The March 2026 war has illustrated these costs, as drone attacks from both sides of the war have hit civilian infrastructure and population directly, or have caused damage due to ensuing debris, shrapnel and fires.


For instance, on 28 February 2026, a Tomahawk cruise missile reportedly hit near Shajareh Tayyebeh Girls’ Primary School in Minab, causing over 170 casualties, mostly consisting of children under the age of 12.[13] The school was located near an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) facility. It was likely not recognised by AI-driven target identification systems as a separate building because of outdated intel dating back to 2016.[14] Similarly, in a bid against military infrastructure in Tehran, a residential complex in Resalat Square, Tehran, had also become a site for airstrikes, leading to over 40 civilian casualties.[15]

Multiple reports suggest that the US and Israeli warheads have been hitting civilian sites such as schools, hospitals,[16] as well as protected structures and historic landmarks such as Golestan Palace in Tehran, and Chehel Sotoun Palace in Isfahan. Iran has, in retaliation, initiated strikes in the UAE, leading to fires near the US Consulate in Dubai and impacting civilian areas like Burj Al Arab, Dubai Airport and Jebel Ali seaport.[17] In Israel, Iranian drone-based retaliation has reportedly caused over 18 deaths and 3,100 injuries among civilian and military personnel alike.[18]

These caveats have also extended to the battlefield. For instance, the increased use of drone swarming tactics may overwhelm airspace and overload signature interception for defence systems. The downing of three US F-15E Strike Eagles in friendly fire by Kuwaiti F/A-18 on 1 March 2026, exemplifies this perfectly. As an active target of Iran’s missile and drone attacks, Kuwait’s air defence was primed to attack. It mistakenly targeted US fighter jets during a high-tension, active combat situation.[19]

These incidents have therefore underscored an important aspect of AI-driven warfare: while AI may guarantee decision compression, it does not necessarily prevent catastrophic human costs. The technology continues to develop and remains vulnerable to ‘algorithmic brittleness’,[20] thereby frequently leading to violations of International Humanitarian Law. The very foundational promise of AI in warfare, of reduction in collateral damages due to precision, elimination of human error, and making combat operations safer for civilians and military personnel alike, seems to have remained considerably unfulfilled.


Additionally, the unprecedented speed and scale afforded by AI seem to have accelerated speed for resultant casualties; deaths that might have previously occurred over the course of a month can now happen in a matter of hours or days. Taken together, it is clear that integrating highly sophisticated tools and greater machine autonomy, without appropriate guardrails and meaningful human oversight, may likely worsen the overall human cost of war rather than reduce it.

Notably, several critical diplomatic initiatives were unfolding concurrently with the war in West Asia, grappling with these exact dilemmas. In February, weeks before the conflict broke out, global leaders had convened at A Coruña, Spain, for the Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) Summit. Similarly, just a couple of days after Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion was initiated, the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) held its Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) session on autonomous weapons in Geneva.

There is a stark sense of irony to the timing of these events: as diplomats debate the nuances of human–machine interaction, legal reviews and definitions of autonomy, major powers are actively leveraging these systems unchecked on the battlefield. Furthermore, even as the urgency to regulate military AI peaks, the number of signatures on instruments that actively advocate for responsible military AI has declined. The ‘Pathways to AI’, formulated after REAIM 2026 in Spain, received only 35 signatures out of the over 80 countries attending, with total abstention by major powers (including the primary countries engaged in the current conflict).[21] Dutch defence minister Ruben Brekelmans mentioned how governments face a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, where they are caught between setting limits in military AI and avoiding restrictions that, amidst an escalating arms race, their rivals may ignore.[22]

The ‘first AI war’, therefore, has created a significant paradox: on one hand, the ongoing (and unchecked) expansion and use of military AI has severely undermined global diplomatic efforts. It calls into question the efficacy of processes that discuss theoretical constraints and debate semantics, which state actors may readily abandon in favour of overwhelming tactical advantages. On the other hand, the civilian casualties and socio-cultural losses wrought by the Iran war underscore the very necessity of these discussions and debates. Even as forums like UNCCW and REAIM struggle to keep pace with the integration of AI into military operations, forging consensus on robust guardrails that balance the expansion of autonomous capabilities with clear human accountability has become increasingly urgent.

The March 2026 conflict in West Asia, therefore, has fundamentally altered perceptions and calculations about modern warfare. As the proclaimed first full-scale ‘AI war’, it has served as a proving ground for artificial intelligence and autonomous systems in a military context. We are witnessing, in real time, the capabilities of algorithms to be a decisive factor in military engagement by accelerating military operations beyond the capabilities of human cognition. Yet, when seen in the context of the friendly fire incidents and civilian casualties, the delegation of decisions regarding military engagement and lethality to machines also comes with damning costs and critical accountability gaps.

There is thus a need to strike a balance between the necessity of AI and autonomous systems for decision speed and the need for guardrails to prevent human cost and uphold IHL. In the face of real-time geometric growth and proliferation in military AI, the international community faces a challenge of creating frameworks that ensure ethical and legal compliance and meaningful human control over these systems, before human oversight becomes obsolete.
About the author: Meghna Pradhan is a Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi. She is currently pursuing her PhD at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, with her thesis focused on how emerging technologies such as AI affect political processes. She holds an M.Phil. in Korean Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, an M.A. in East Asian Studies from the University of Delhi, and a B.Sc. in Economics from Symbiosis School of Economics.
Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis

[1] Graham Scarbro, “Iran-Israel Conflict: A Quicklook Analysis of Operation Rising Lion”, US Naval Institute, June 2025.

[2] Larisa Brown, “The First AI War: US and Israel Use Iran to Test Autonomous Tech”, The Times, 10 March 2026.

[3] “US Says 5,500 Targets Hit in Iran as Operation Continues”, Middle East Monitor, 11 March 2026.

[4] Tara Copp, Elizabeth Dwoskin and Duncan, “Anthropic’s AI Tool Claude Central to U.S. Campaign in Iran, Amid a Bitter Feud”, The Washington Post, 4 March 2026.

[5] Mehul Srivastava, James Shotter, Neri Zilber and Steff Chávez, “Inside the Plan to Kill Ali Khamenei”, Financial Times, 2 March 2026.

[6] Zita Ballinger Fletcher, “America Reverse-Engineered Iran’s Most Decisive Weapon—Then Launched It Against Its Creators”, Popular Mechanics, 13 March 2026.

[7] Steve Feldstein and Dara Massicot, “What We Know About Drone Use in the Iran War”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 March 2026.

[8] Abené Clayton, “Pentagon Releases Names of Final Two Soldiers of Six Killed in Kuwait”, The Guardian, 5 March 2026.

[9] Julian Fell, Ashley Kyd, Jarrod Fankhauser and Matt Liddy, “AI is Helping Choose Targets in Iran War — Now It’s a Target Too”, ABC News, 15 March 2026.

[10] Andy Greenberg, Matt Burgess and Lily Hay Newman, “How ‘Handala’ Became the Face of Iran’s Hacker Counterattacks”, The Wired, 12 March 2026; Aakash Sharma and Khooshi Sonkar, “Pledged to Iran’s New Leader, Hackers Wage Digital War on US and Israel”, India Today, 16 March 2026.

[11] Ibrahim Saify, “AI, the Iran-US Conflict, and the Threat to US Critical Infrastructure”, CloudSEK, 6 March 2026.

[12] Kenrick Cai, “Trump Accuses Iran of Using AI to Spread Disinformation”, Reuters, 16 March 2026.


[13] Malachy Browne and John Ismay, “U.S. Tomahawk Hit Naval Base Beside Iranian School, Video Shows”, The New York Times, 8 March 2026.

[14] Elizabeth Melimopoulos, “Who Bombed the Iranian Girls’ School, Killing More Than 170? What We Know”, Al Jazeera, 12 March 2026; “Al Jazeera Investigation: Iran Girls’ School Targeting Likely ‘Deliberate’”, Al Jazeera, 3 March 2026.

[15] Mahmoud Aslan, “Rescue Efforts in Tehran After a Triple Strike Hit Apartment Buildings, Killing 40”, Drop Site, 12 March 2026.

[16] Paul Brown, Shayan Sardarizadeh and Matt Murphy, “Iranian Schools, Hospital and Landmarks Among Civilian Sites Hit During US-Israeli Strikes”, BBC, 6 March 2026.

[17] “Iran Attacks Rock Dubai’s Palm, Burj Al Arab, Airport”, The Hindu, 2 March 2026.

[18] Moiz Mustafa, “Breaking Down the Israel–Iran Conflict: What We Know So Far – Day 16”, Daily Mirror, 16 March 2026.

[19] “US-made Kuwaiti Jet Mistakenly Shot Down Three US F-15s, Probe Finds: WSJ”, The Economic Times, 4 March 2026.

[20] This refers to a condition where an algorithm may not be able to generalise or adapt to conditions outside a narrow set of assumptions. In such a situation, while AI may perform well under certain conditions, especially during training, it may not perform optimally, or even fail, when exposed to new, unexpected, or slightly modified inputs.


[21] Oumaima Moho Amer, “Morocco Joins 34 Countries in Endorsing ‘Pathways to Action’ Pact Towards Safe Governance of Military AI”, Morocco World News, 6 February 2026.

[22] “AI Weapons Regulation: Nations Divided as US, China Skip Global Pledge”, ET Enterprise AI, 6 February 2026.

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

Signals Before Strikes: Electronic Warfare In The Iran War – Analysis

March 25, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Soumya Awasthi



The US-Israel war on Iran is being fought with missiles and drones, but some of the most consequential battles have remained invisible. The electromagnetic spectrum has emerged as a primary domain of strategic competition, operating beneath the threshold of declared hostilities while producing effects of profound operational consequence. This convergence of electronic warfare, cyber operations, and information dominance, executed deliberately below the threshold, represents what scholars of grey zone conflict have long theorised but rarely observed at this scale or level of sophistication.

This has profound implications for how all states must think about modern warfighting. When the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury on 28 February 2026, the opening moves were not the B-2 bombers or the Tomahawk missiles. Rather, it was an invisible strike that defined the next phase of the conflict. Before the first strike aircraft crossed into Iranian airspace, the electromagnetic environment over Iran had already been systematically dismantled, with radars blinded, command-and-control links severed, and communications networks taken down. The kinetic campaign that followed was, in a very real sense, merely the visible layer of a battle that had already been decided in the spectrum.

This is not a footnote to the Iran conflict; it is among its central lessons. The convergence of kinetic, electronic, and cyber operations that has defined this war represents a significant evolution in how modern conflicts are fought, one that challenges long-held assumptions about military power, deterrence, and the vulnerability of civilian infrastructure. Understanding this convergence is not optional for any state that takes its own security seriously.

The US-Israel Campaign in the Electromagnetic Spectrum

The EA-18G Growler, the US Navy’s dedicated electronic warfare aircraft, was central to suppressing Iranian air defence radars and communications in the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury. Reportedly, the United States deployed stealth aircraft, including the B-2 Spirit bomber and F-35 fighters, alongside the dedicated EA-18G Growler, whose primary function is to jam enemy radar and communication systems. Space-based assets, including the US Space Force’s satellite constellation, provided real-time missile warning and intelligence support. The operational sequence was clear: suppress, blind, then strike.

Within hours of the strikes, Iran’s communications were severely degraded. Iran’s internet connectivity dropped to approximately 4 percent of normal traffic levels. Government services were disrupted, and state television satellite feeds were hijacked to broadcast pro-regime-change messages.

Critically, the Bade Saba Calendar, a simple religious app used by millions of Iranians, became the perfect vehicle for a sophisticated cyber-psychological operation. Israel compromised the application, and users received messages that read, in translation: “Help has arrived. Do not fear.” It was a pre-planned psychological operation executed in coordination with the kinetic campaign, suggesting months of prior access and preparation.

Previously, in June 2025, during Operation Rising Lion, Israel’s 5114th Spectrum Warfare Battalion used real-time electromagnetic spectrum manipulation to neutralise a substantial proportion of the drone threats launched against Israeli territory. Following that campaign, the IDF restructured its C4I directorate, formally establishing dedicated AI and Spectrum Divisions — an institutional acknowledgement that electronic warfare (EW) and artificial intelligence are now primary instruments of air defence rather than merely supplementary capabilities.

Iran’s Search for Asymmetric Advantage

Iran’s EW response has been constrained but not negligible. Its greatest success has come not in the air but at sea. The Strait of Hormuz, a 39-kilometre-wide chokepoint through which around 20 percent of the world’s oil moves, has witnessed sophisticated electronic interference affecting both military and commercial shipping since February 2026. According to open-source intelligence tracking, within 24 hours of the first US-Israeli strikes, more than 1,100 commercial ships in UAE, Qatari, Omani, and Iranian waters reported navigation failures. Onboard GPS systems placed vessels at airports, nuclear plants, and landlocked locations, a classic signature of active spoofing. By the end of the first week, Lloyd’s List Intelligence had logged 1,735 interference events affecting 655 vessels, with daily incidents nearly doubling.

Iran also targeted data centres in the Gulf, including Amazon Web Services (AWS) facilities in Bahrain. These were not military installations, raising questions about the resilience, sovereignty, and security of digital infrastructure. Since 2011, Iran has steadily invested in GPS spoofing and jamming infrastructure to offset the United States’ advantages in air- and space-based EW capabilities. The effects rippled outward: energy prices spiked, insurance rates for Gulf shipping increased, and several major carriers diverted routes, adding time and cost to global supply chains.

Iran also attempted to disrupt Starlink terminals by using 7787 military-grade “kill switch” GPS jammers, slowing internet performance across the country and demonstrating that Iranian EW planners were thinking creatively within their constraints. In the cyber domain, Iran-aligned groups launched distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) campaigns, website defacements, and data-wiping operations against US targets and entities across Gulf countries. The most significant incident so far has been the March 2026 attack by the Iranian hacker group Handala on Stryker Corporation, a major US medical technology firm, which disrupted global operations and resulted in the exfiltration of large volumes of sensitive data.

Implications for Warfighting

The current hostilities demonstrate that EW is no longer a support function; it is among the primary enablers and force multipliers of modern combat. The US-Israel coalition’s decision to begin the campaign by dismantling Iran’s electromagnetic environment before firing a single kinetic weapon was not merely a tactical choice but a doctrinal statement. Control of the spectrum precedes control of the sky, the sea, and the ground. Any military that cannot contest the spectrum at the outset of a conflict will fight blindly, as Iran has largely been forced to do.

Second, asymmetric EW is a genuine equaliser, albeit within limits. Iran’s GPS spoofing campaign demonstrated that a state without air superiority or space-based EW assets can still impose high tactical and strategic costs through targeted electromagnetic disruption of civilian systems. The disruption of shipping traffic and the effective closure of the world’s most critical oil lane are not trivial achievements. However, once the IRGC cyber headquarters was destroyed in a kinetic strike, Iran’s ability to centralise and coordinate EW operations was severely degraded. Therefore, no matter how effective asymmetric EW capabilities are, they remain vulnerable to kinetic dominance.

Third, the civilian-military divide in EW has largely dissipated. Interconnected digital infrastructure — including data centres, navigation systems, power grids, hospitals, and communications networks — is a civilian asset first and a military target second. Collective hacktivist umbrellas such as the Cyber Islamic Resistance illustrate how boundaries between civilian and military spheres have blurred, bringing collusion between state and non-state actors to the forefront.

Populations bearing the costs of EW warfare through fuel shortages, flight disruptions, and cascading supply-chain failures have become indirect casualties of the conflict. Countries that fail to take cognisance of these new realities in their policymaking risk operating under a dangerous illusion.

Rethinking Security in the Age of Electromagnetic Warfare

The Iran conflict makes one thing distinctly clear: states that cannot protect their electromagnetic environment, navigation systems, communications, or critical data infrastructure are strategically vulnerable in ways that no degree of conventional military investment can compensate for. This is not a problem unique to states in the Middle East. It is a challenge for every nation that operates GPS-dependent infrastructure, relies on commercial cloud computing, or has not yet invested in GNSS-independent navigation backup systems.

For India, this lesson is reinforced by the experiences of the Galwan Valley conflict in 2020 and Operation Sindoor in 2025, which demonstrated the battlefield effectiveness of India’s indigenous EW systems. However, the Iran conflict shows that the next frontier is not the battlefield itself but spectrum dominance — controlling data centres, communications, and command-and-control systems before moving towards kinetic build-up.

Further, civilian infrastructure is now a primary target rather than collateral damage. India’s coastline, Indian Ocean shipping lanes, and GNSS-dependent aviation and energy systems face similar vulnerabilities from adversaries such as China, which possesses considerably more sophisticated EW capabilities than Iran. Understanding this shift — from non-kinetic to kinetic operations, and the growing collusion between state actors and hacktivist or other non-state actors — is vital for building the doctrine, infrastructure, and institutions needed to respond to the security challenges of the decade ahead.

About the author: Soumya Awasthi is a Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

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