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Saturday, February 07, 2026

Trump’s $1.5 Trillion ‘Dream’ Military’


by   | Feb 6, 2026

Reprinted from TomDispatch

What constitutes national security and how is it best achieved? Does massive military spending really make a country more secure, and what perils to democracy and liberty are posed by vast military establishments? Questions like those are rarely addressed in honest ways these days in America. Instead, the Trump administration favors preparations for war and more war, fueled by potentially enormous increases in military spending that are dishonestly framed as “recapitalizations” of America’s security and safety.

Such framing makes Pete Hegseth, America’s self-styled “secretary of war,” seem almost refreshing in his embrace of a warrior ethos. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham is another “warrior” who cheers for conflict, whether with Venezuela, Iran, or even — yes! — Russia. Such macho men revel in what they believe is this country’s divine mission to dominate the world. Tragically, at the moment, unapologetic warmongers like Hegseth and Graham are winning the political and cultural battle here in America.

Of course, U.S. warmongering is anything but new, as is a belief in global dominance through high military spending. Way back in 1983, as a college student, I worked on a project that critiqued President Ronald Reagan’s “defense” buildup and his embrace of pie-in-the-sky concepts like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as “Star Wars.” Never did I imagine that, more than 40 years later, another Republican president would again come to embrace SDI (freshly rebranded as “Golden Dome”) and ever-more massive military spending, especially since the Soviet Union, America’s superpower rival in Reagan’s time, ceased to exist 35 years ago. Amazingly, Trump even wants to bring back naval battleships, as Reagan briefly did (though he didn’t have the temerity to call for a new class of ships to be named after himself). It’ll be a “golden fleet,” says Trump. What gives?

For much of my life, I’ve tried to answer that very question. Soon after retiring from the U.S. Air Force, I started writing for TomDispatch, penning my first article there in 2007, asking Americans to save the military from itself and especially from its “surge” illusions in the Iraq War. Tom Engelhardt and I, as well as Andrew Bacevich, Michael Klare, and Bill Hartung, among others, have spilled much ink (symbolically speaking in this online era) at TomDispatch urging that America’s military-industrial complex be reined in and reformed. Trump’s recent advocacy of a “dream military” with a proposed budget of $1.5 trillion in 2027 (half a trillion dollars larger than the present Pentagon budget) was backed by places like the editorial board of the Washington Post, which just shows how frustratingly ineffectual our efforts have been. How discouraging, and again, what gives?

Sometimes (probably too often), I seek sanctuary from the hell we’re living through in glib phrases that mask my despair. So, I’ll write something like: America isn’t a shining city on a hill, it’s a bristling fortress in a valley of death; or, At the Pentagon, nothing succeeds like failure, a reference to eight failed audits in a row (part of a 30-year pattern of financial finagling) that accompanied disastrous wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Such phrases, no matter how clever I thought they were, made absolutely no impression when it came to slowing the growth of militarism in America. In essence, I’ve been bringing the online equivalent of a fountain pen to a gun fight, which has proved to be anything but a recipe for success.

In America, nothing — and I mean nothing! — seems capable of reversing massive military spending and incessant warfare. President Ronald Reagan, readers of a certain (advanced) age may recall, was nicknamed the “Teflon president” because scandals just didn’t seem to stick to him (at least until the Iran-Contra affair proved tough to shed). Yet history’s best candidate for Teflon “no-stick” status was never Reagan or any other president. It was and remains the U.S. warfare state, headquartered on the Potomac River in Washington, D.C. And give the sclerotic bureaucracy of that warfare state full credit. Even as the Pentagon has moved from failure to failure in warfighting, its war budgets have continued to soar and then soar some more.

Forgive the repetition, but what gives? When is our long, national nightmare of embracing war and (wildly overpriced) weaponry going to end? Obviously, not anytime soon. Even the Democrats, supposedly the “resistance” to President Trump, boast openly of their support for what passes for military lethality (or at least overpriced weaponry), while Democratic members of Congress line up for their share of war-driven pork. To cite a cri de coeur from the 1950s, have they no sense of decency?

The Shameless Embrace of Forever War and Its Spoils

I’m just an aging, retired Air Force lieutenant colonel. Who cares what I think? But America should still care about the words of Dwight D. Eisenhower, also known as Ike, the victorious five-star general of D-Day in 1944 and beyond, and this country’s president from 1953 to 1961. Ike was famously the first significant figure to warn Americans about the then-developing military-industrial complex (MIC) in his farewell address to the nation. Yet, even then, his words were largely ignored. Recently, I reread Ike’s warning, perhaps for the 100th time and was struck yet again by the way he highlighted the spiritual dimension of the challenge that is, all too sadly, still facing us.

In case you’ve forgotten them (or never read them), here are Ike’s words from that televised address in January 1961, when he put the phrase “the military-industrial complex” in our language:

“This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

“We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.”

Those were the prescient words of the most senior military man of his era, a true citizen-soldier and president, and more than six decades later, we should and must act on them if we have any hope left of preserving “our liberties and democratic processes.”

Again, wise words, yet our leaders have seldom heeded them. Since 1961, the “disastrous rise of misplaced power” when it comes to the MIC has infected our culture, our economy, even — to steal a term from the era of the disastrous American war in Vietnam — our hearts and minds. Indeed, despite the way the MIC failed so spectacularly to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese, the Afghans, the Iraqis, and other embattled peoples across the globe in various misbegotten and mendacious wars, it did succeed spectacularly over the years in winning the hearts and minds of those who make the final decisions in the U.S. government.

In an astonishing paradox, a spendthrift military establishment that almost never wins anything, while consistently evading accountability for its losses, has by now captured almost untrammeled authority within our land. It defies logic, but logic never was this country’s strong suit. In fact, only recently, we reached a point of almost ultimate illogic when America’s bully-boy commander-in-chief insisted that a Pentagon budget already bloated with cash needs an extra $500 billion. That, of course, would bring it to about $1.5 trillion annually. Apologies to my Navy friends but even drunken sailors would be challenged to spend that mountain of money.

In short, no matter what it does, the Pentagon, America’s prodigal son, never gets punished. It simply gets more.

More, More, More!

Not only is such colossal military spending bad for this country, but it’s also bad for the military itself, which, after all, didn’t ask for Trump’s proposed $500 billion raise. America’s prodigal son was relatively content with a trillion dollars in yearly spending. In fact, the president’s suggested increase in the Pentagon budget isn’t just reckless; it may well wreck not just what’s left of our democracy, but the military, too.

Like any massive institution, the Pentagon always wants more: more troops, more weapons, more power, invariably justified by inflating (or simply creating) threats to this country. Yet, clarity of thought, not to speak of creativity, rarely derives from excess. Lean times make for better thinking, fat times make for little thought at all.

Not long ago, Trump occasionally talked sense by railing on the campaign trail against the military-industrial complex and its endless wars. Certainly, more than a few Americans voted for him in 2024 because they believed he truly did want to focus on domestic health and strength rather than pursue yet more conflicts globally (and the weapons systems that went with them). Tragically, Trump has morphed into a warlord, greedily siphoning oil from Venezuela, posturing for the annexation of Greenland and all its resources, while not hesitating to bomb IranNigeria, or most any other country. Meanwhile, China and Russia lurk in the wings as scary “near-peer” rivals and threats.

Although Trump’s supporters may indeed have been conned into imagining him as a prince of peace, this country’s militarism and imperialism clearly transcend him. Generally speaking, warfare and military boosterism have been distinctly bipartisan pursuits in America, making reform of any sort that much more difficult. Replacing Trump in 2028 won’t magically erase deep-rooted militarism, megalomaniacal imperial designs, or even the possibility of a $1.5 trillion military budget. Clearly, more, more, more is the bipartisan war song being sung inside the Pentagon, Congress, and the White House these days.

Taking on the MICIMATTSHG, or Blob

Ex-CIA analyst Ray McGovern coined a useful acronym from the classic military-industrial complex, or MIC. He came up with MICIMATT (the Military-Industrial-Congressional-Intelligence-Media-Academia-Think-Tank complex) to highlight its blob-like growth. And it’s true that Congress and the rest are all deeply implicated in the blob. To which I’d add an “S” for the sporting world, an “H” for Hollywood, and a “G” for the gaming sector, all of which are implicated in, influenced by (as well as influencing), and often subservient to Ike’s old MIC. So, what we now have is the MICIMATTSHG. Recall that Ike warned us about the “disastrous rise of misplaced power” if we failed to challenge it back in 1961. Recall that he also warned us that the MIC could change the very structure of our society, making America far less democratic and also far less free. And most subtly, he warned us that it might also weaken America spiritually.

What did he mean by that? To reference a speech Ike made in 1953, he warned then that we could end up hanging ourselves from a cross of iron. He warned that we could become captives of militarism and war, avid believers in spending the sweat of our laborers, the genius of our scientists, and the blood of our youth, pursuing military dominance globally, while losing our democratic beliefs and liberties at home in the process. And that, it seems to me, is exactly what did indeed happen. We the people were seduced, silenced, or sidelined via slogans like “support our troops” or with over-the-top patriotic displays like military parades, no matter that they represented something distinctly less than triumphant in their moment.

And it never ends, does it?  Americans in various polls today indicate that they don’t want a war against either Venezuela or Iran, but our opinions simply aren’t heeded. Increasingly, we live in a “might makes right” country, even as military might has so regularly made for wrong since 1945.

And what in the world is to be done? Many things, but most fundamentally it’s time as a society to perform an “about-face,” followed by a march in double-time away from permanent war and toward peace. And that, in turn, must lead to major reductions in Pentagon spending. The best and only way to tackle the inexorable growth of the blob is to stop feeding it money — and stop worshipping it as well. Instead of a $500 billion increase, Congress should insist on a $500 billion decrease in Pentagon spending. Our task should be to force the military-industrial complex to think, improvise, become leaner, and focus on how most effectively to protect and defend America and our ideals, rather than fostering the imperial dreams of the wannabe warlords among us.

Trump’s current approach of further engorging the imperial blob is the stuff of national nightmares, not faintly a recipe for American greatness. It is, in fact, a sure guarantee of further decline and eventual collapse, not only economically and politically but spiritually as well, exactly as Ike warned in 1961. More wars and weapons simply will not make America great (again). How could they when, as Civil War General William T. Sherman so famously observed, war is “all hell”?

Americans, we must act to cut the war budget, shrink the empire, embrace diplomacy, and work for peace. Sadly, however, the blob has seemingly become our master, a well-nigh unstoppable force. Aren’t you tired yet of being its slave?

On the 250th anniversary of America’s founding, which was predicated on resistance to empire and military rule, it should be considered deeply tragic that this country has met the enemy — and he is indeed us. Here the words of Ike provide another teachable moment. Only Americans can truly hurt America, he once said. To which I’d add this corollary: Only Americans can truly save America.

As we celebrate our nation’s birthday this July 4th, wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could save this deeply disturbed country by putting war and empire firmly in the rearview mirror? A tall task for sure, but so, too, was declaring independence from the mighty British Empire in 1776.

Copyright 2026 William Astore

William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF) and professor of history, is a TomDispatch regular and a senior fellow at the Eisenhower Media Network (EMN), an organization of critical veteran military and national security professionals. His personal substack is Bracing Views. His video testimony for the Merchants of Death Tribunal is available at this link. His new book, made up of the 110 pieces he wrote for TomDispatch, is American Militarism on Steroids: The Military-Industrial Complex, Unbounded, Uncontained, and Undemocratic.

Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel, Songlands (the final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s novel Every Body Has a Story, and Tom Engelhardt’s A Nation Unmade by War, as well as Alfred McCoy’s In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power, John Dower’s The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War IIand Ann Jones’s They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from America’s Wars: The Untold Story.'





Monday, February 02, 2026



Volunteering in Wartime Ukraine

Interview with Daria Saburova

Saturday 31 January 2026, by Daria Saburova



How does volunteer labor today become a site of gender and class tensions? What are the specific features of class relations in contemporary Ukraine? And how do French leftists view the war in Ukraine? The editorial team at Posle spoke with Daria Saburova, PhD, a researcher at Central European University and a member of the editorial board of the Ukrainian leftist journal Spilne (Commons), as well as the author of Travailleuses de la résistance (Women Workers of Resistance).

— Hello, Daria, thank you for agreeing to this interview. Your book feels particularly timely today as it shows how volunteer and activist labor is shaped by labor relations, class divisions, and gender inequality. Could you tell us what you were working on before the publication of Travailleuses de la résistance, how France fits into your biography, and how your interest in Marxism developed?

— At the time I was writing the book, I was a doctoral student at Paris Nanterre University, working on a dissertation about the anthropological and political dimensions of Marxist theories of labor. In that sense, I was primarily engaged with philosophy. Of course, I read a great deal of sociology, history, and labor psychology, but I had never conducted empirical research myself. This book became my first ethnography. You could say it was an amateur approach to ethnography, I was learning both the methods and the theory as I went along.

I was born and raised in Kyiv, but I have lived in France since 2009. Until 2022, I traveled to Ukraine relatively infrequently. The full-scale invasion brought me back, and I began traveling there much more often and for longer periods. Around the same time, I joined the editorial board of Spilne. Before that, I was part of the editorial collective of the French leftist journal Contretemps, which also has a Marxist orientation. I left that journal because I disagreed with how the Ukrainian question was being covered.

When the war began, I realized that I would not be able to focus on purely theoretical work for some time. It felt far more important to engage directly in political debate.

I continued teaching, but I also joined the European Network for Solidarity with Ukraine, where I was frequently invited to participate in discussions within French left-wing activist circles. There, I repeatedly encountered French leftists who either adhered to campist positions, abstract pacifism, or revolutionary defeatism. By late 2022, it became clear to me that these debates were losing their substance, people had largely settled into fixed positions, and trading abstract theses no longer seemed productive.

It was around that moment, at the end of 2022, that a small French publisher, Croquant, contacted me with a proposal to write a book about Ukraine. I saw this as an opportunity to move beyond speculative reasoning, media commentary, and conversations with Ukrainian leftist and union activists and instead to conduct fieldwork.

French leftists often invoke the Ukrainian working class without any real interest in local dynamics or real people.

I wanted to understand how people from the actual, not textbook, working class perceive the situation and what forms of resistance they develop in response to the Russian invasion.

Initially, the book was aimed primarily at a French audience. The foreword was written by Étienne Balibar, situating the book within a specific debate taking place in France about the war in Ukraine.

In the end, however, the book turned out to be less of a political polemic and more of a sociological study. I tried to show that wartime volunteering is not merely a civic stance, but also unpaid labor, one characterized by hierarchies, unequal access to resources, and complex relationships with international humanitarian organizations, the state, and local authorities.

I was especially interested in understanding the specific nature of working-class volunteerism, a topic that is rarely discussed.

Most sociologists and political scientists studying volunteering in Ukraine focus on middle-class initiatives, which since 2014 have been the main driving force behind the Maidan protests and the core of volunteer battalions in eastern Ukraine.

— Could you elaborate on what distinguishes volunteerism in Ukraine in the context of the Russian invasion?

— I wanted to challenge the idea that today’s wave of volunteerism in Ukraine is simply a direct continuation of the volunteer traditions that emerged during the Maidan protests and resistance to separatism in Donbas. There is a widespread assumption that activist structures and practices created by the urban middle class in Kyiv and other large cities were simply passed on to a broader population after the full-scale invasion in 2022.

I wanted to show instead that the new people who joined the volunteer movement, working-class residents of small towns and villages, brought with them their own traditions, moral frameworks, and political views. For example, in the volunteer organizations in Kryvyi Rih that I studied, people primarily spoke Russian or Surzhyk and saw nothing problematic about not switching to Ukrainian. On the contrary, many viewed calls to abandon Russian with scepticism, at least in early 2023.

Most of my interlocutors had a negative view of the Maidan protest movement [author’s comment: the events of late November 2013 through February 2014, which became known in Ukrainian history as the Euromaidan, entailed mass protests on Independence Square in central Kyiv and in other cities across Ukraine]. Some had even participated in the local “Anti-Maidan” at the time. Miners still recalled the [Viktor] Yanukovych years as the most socially and economically stable period of their lives.

For them, the Soviet period remains a benchmark for assessing the growth of social inequality in post-independence Ukraine.

In other words, they retain a distinct local identity that combines these seemingly contradictory elements. This sharply distinguishes them from the volunteer identity commonly described by political scientists and sociologists. The traditions Kryvyi Rih volunteers draw upon also reflect a specific local class experience. On the one hand, many work at the same mine, live in the same neighborhoods, and are accustomed to mutual aid at the mining site level. On the other hand, before the full-scale invasion, mines in Kryvyi Rih regularly went on strike, and women played a central role in sustaining those strikes.

How do miners strike? They stay underground, sometimes for days or even months. The last such strike at the Kryvyi Rih Iron Ore Plant in 2020 lasted 43 days. During these periods, wives and mothers organize to send food, mattresses, and other supplies down to the miners. They also take on the political dimension of the protest, demonstrating at company offices or city hall and presenting workers’ demands: higher wages, better working conditions. This local tradition of self-organization now helps them structure their volunteer efforts in support of the front.

— You mentioned that most of your respondents did not support the protest movement that began on the Maidan in 2014. What arguments did they give?

— First, as Denys Gorbach notes in his book on the working class in Kryvyi Rih, there is a deep distrust of any authority and, more broadly, a rejection of politics as such. One common argument was that the Maidan protest movement served as a tool that allowed the political opposition to come to power, while, in essence, nothing really changed and people died for nothing.

Some respondents criticized not only the outcome of the Maidan but the movement itself. In today’s official discourse, the Maidan is presented as the birth of genuine Ukrainian direct democracy. My interlocutors, however, argued that the violent change of power was undemocratic in nature and that Yanukovych should have been removed through elections.

This argument can certainly be seen as reactionary. It suggests that today the Ukrainian working class does not support the idea of revolution as such, rejecting the possibility of radical change through revolutionary means. But behind these arguments lies something more fundamental: for many people in eastern Ukraine, the Maidan protests of winter 2013–2014 felt distant and alien, events that did not necessarily reflect their interests.

The protests articulated abstract liberal-democratic demands: rule of law, opposition to police violence, democracy, freedom. They were later joined by a nationalist agenda that was also foreign to my respondents.

In interviews, we spoke extensively about wages, pensions, and the state of healthcare. For miners, issues such as special pension regimes and benefits are especially important, and these concerns were entirely absent from the Maidan protests.

At that time, there was also little sense of Ukrainian national identity among these people. One respondent put it bluntly: “Before February 2022, hardly any of us even knew what Ukraine was. We never called ourselves Ukrainians or anything else. We earned good money working in the mines, and that was enough for us.”

— In the book, you argue that after the Maidan events there was nevertheless a redistribution of class relations, one that further elevated elites and the middle class as the drivers of political progress. Could you elaborate on this?

— The most accurate class and political-economic analysis of Ukraine from independence to the present can be found in the work of Denys Gorbach. After independence, Ukraine developed a specific alliance, or social contract, between paternalistic capitalists, especially in industrial cities such as Kryvyi Rih, Donetsk, and others, and the local working class. In other words, these enterprises and cities were not subjected to abrupt neoliberal restructuring of management and governance. Companies continued to prioritize workforce retention over technological innovation that would lead to layoffs. They also continued to provide workers with certain social benefits.

This compromise between capitalists and the working class, as well as public sector employees, crystallized politically in the form of specific political forces. Above all, it was promoted by the Party of Regions, led by Yanukovych.

On the one hand, pressure from Western institutions and the International Monetary Fund intensified; on the other, internal political obstacles to a broad package of reforms were removed. These included reforms in education, healthcare, social welfare, gas price liberalization, and more. The war and the choice of a European path served as a justification for these reforms. This process was compounded by the economic crisis, inflation, and the social consequences of the armed conflict, all of which altered class relations as they had existed prior to 2014 and reshaped the political landscape.

It can be said that, through these processes, the paternalistic industrial bloc was defeated. Industrial workers lost out, as did the Ukrainian working class as a whole, which experienced widespread impoverishment. Industrial oligarchs also lost ground: due to the war, they not only lost parts of their physical assets in eastern and southern Ukraine but also much of their political influence. At the same time, other groups strengthened their economic, political, and symbolic capital. Representatives of the educated, urban middle class began to take up positions in government and in the rapidly expanding NGO sector, which is largely funded by European and American donor organizations.

— Do you think this gender and class imbalance in volunteer labor is specific to Ukraine, or is it a global phenomenon?

— Viewing volunteerism as unpaid labor is not a new approach. The concept of volunteer labor has been used at least since the 1980s, and these issues are now actively analyzed in global sociology. From a class perspective, scholars emphasize that among upper social strata, volunteer work often takes the form of leisure, whereas for the working class it frequently becomes what is known as “hope labor” – work performed in the hope of improving one’s résumé or securing a foothold in the labor market. In such cases, it is no longer truly volunteer activity, but rather a form of unpaid labor exploitation.

In some countries, volunteer labor is a condition for receiving unemployment benefits. For migrants, it often becomes a way to integrate into society and to demonstrate that they are deserving of citizenship. All of this must be understood in the context of increasingly restrictive migration policies and austerity politics.

At the same time, approaches that analyze volunteer labor through the lens of social reproduction, that is, care for people and human relationships, are also developing rapidly.

Volunteerism certainly includes many functions traditionally associated with male labor. In Ukraine, this includes activities tied to the military sector: drone production, crowdfunding, equipment procurement. Still, the majority of volunteer work is care labor. And this work is performed primarily by women: cooking for soldiers, caring for internally displaced people, setting up and running reception centers. It also includes psychological support and work with children, the elderly, and veterans.

This category also encompasses productive labor historically associated with the domestic sphere, such as weaving camouflage nets or knitting socks. Much of what is done for the front is very often based on unpaid female labor.

In this book, I did not set out to solve complex theoretical problems. On the contrary, I rely on a classic Marxist-feminist framework: Silvia Federici [1]Mariarosa Dalla CostaSelma James [2], who viewed domestic labor as a form of exploitation. I believe this analytical framework is particularly well suited to Ukraine. Sociologists Oksana Dutchak, Natalia Lomonosova, and Alona Tkalich have worked on this topic for many years and show that in Ukraine, as elsewhere in the world, the impoverishment of the working class has, first and foremost, a female face.

The entire working class suffers from the war and from reforms. Of course, women in Ukraine are not forcibly mobilized to the front. But they bear the full burden of reproductive labor and responsibility for children, the elderly, and the sick. Women who leave for Europe often have to support their families on their own. Life expectancy among women in Ukraine remains higher, and the majority of pensioners are women. It is among female pensioners that poverty rates are highest. These are women who spent part of their careers caring for children and occupying lower-paid positions, and as a result receive significantly lower pensions.

Moreover, women are disproportionately employed in the lowest-paid sectors, above all in the public sector: teachers, childcare workers, nurses, social workers, and others. As a result, women in Ukraine constitute the most precarious and least protected segment of the working class.

This is precisely why it is considered more socially acceptable for women to engage in volunteer work. Men are expected either to fight or to work in the mines and earn money. Even when men are retired, they are more likely to seek paid work than to engage in volunteer activities.

Because women already provide unpaid care labor in the private sphere, it is assumed that they will continue to provide unpaid care for the military in the volunteerism public sphere as well.

— At times, European leftists say they do not want to take sides in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. Could you explain in more detail what different segments of the French left think about the war in Ukraine? And how do you personally view the anti-militarist rhetoric of the European left?

— I was very actively involved in these debates during the first two or three years of the invasion. Over the past year, I have stepped back somewhat and no longer follow developments in detail. But in France, there has been a wide range of positions, really a full spectrum, with room for debate among different segments of the left. The position you describe does exist, but I would say it is relatively marginal.

Even if we look at the largest party engaged in public politics in France, La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), it would be incorrect to say that there is a single, unified position within the party. Of course, from its leader

Jean-Luc Mélenchon

and for Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (New Anticapitalist Party-l’Anticapitaliste), which, in my view, consistently adopt politically sound positions within an internationalist framework. For them, solidarity with Ukraine and Palestine is genuinely a priority. And this solidarity is not merely declarative, it is active. They bring this agenda into French society through educational materials, marches, and solidarity events. They have also repeatedly traveled to Ukraine and continue to maintain close contact with local activists and organizations. This is what can be described as concrete solidarity within the limits of available resources.

At the same time, the positions of French parties on the war in Ukraine need to be understood in relation to their broader domestic political agendas.

These stances are tied to their strategic positioning within France’s political landscape. For example, La France Insoumisehas historically taken a sovereignist stance, particularly with regard to US policy. For them, it is important to emphasize that social spending should not be sacrificed and that austerity policies should not be imposed in the name of militarization, securitization, and the expansion of the repressive state apparatus. Compared to this agenda, which can directly mobilize French voters, the issue of military assistance to Ukraine tends to play a secondary role.

— What are your connections to the left in Ukraine, and what prospects do you see for it? Will your book be translated into Ukrainian?

— I am a member of the editorial board of Spilne. This form of engagement is closer to me than direct political activism, and I am very glad to be part of this journal. In my view, it is the most interesting and highest-quality analytical publication in Ukraine, one that seeks to reach a broad audience while maintaining high intellectual standards.

On the one hand, our task is to explain to Ukrainian readers what is happening in Ukraine and globally from the perspective of the social and economic problems faced by ordinary people and from a progressive political standpoint. On the other hand, we aim to introduce the international community to developments in Ukraine.

We publish materials in Ukrainian, Russian, and English.

The journal provides a platform for various political and trade union organizations in Ukraine. above all Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement), solidarity collectives, the student union Pryama Diya, and the nurses’ union Be Like Us. I very much hope that my book will soon be published in Ukrainian. Above all, I am interested in how the people I wrote about will respond to my description and analysis of their own activities.

One chapter, devoted to the language question, has already been published in an abridged form on the Spilne website. To be honest, I expected much more criticism. In that chapter, I argue that today the shift to Ukrainian has become a condition for social mobility, especially in the cultural sphere, and that a principled rejection of Russian is most common among the middle class. Instead, I received mostly positive feedback. When arguments are presented in a well-reasoned way, they tend to be received more calmly.

1 January 2026

Source: Posle media.

Footnotes

[1Federici, Silvia. Wages Against Housework. Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1975.

[2Costa, Mariarosa D., and Selma James. The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community. Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1972.