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 VP Vance Acknowledges "Details" to be Resolved on Alaska LNG Investment 

THE GRIFT

File illustration courtesy Alaska LNG

Published Oct 5, 2026 11:26 PM by The Maritime Executive

Just days after President Donald Trump unveiled a multi-billion-dollar South Korean investment in the Alaska LNG pipeline megaproject, officials in Seoul and the United States are walking back the timing and review status of the commitment. On Monday, Vice President JD Vance acknowledged to Reuters that there are still "details" to work out on the agreement. 

Alaska LNG is among the most ambitious infrastructure proposals in the United States, an 800-mile line connecting gas fields on the Artic tundra of the North Slope with a liquefaction plant on the Gulf of Alaska. It would be a big boost for Alaska's economy and state budget, but it would also be a major commitment of capital. At inception, the proposal had big-name backing, at one time boasting involvement from BP, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. All three oil majors backed out by 2016. At present, the investment company Glenfarne Group and the state-owned Alaska Gasline Development Corporation are in charge of pursuing permits, investors and customers, with considerable assistance from the state and the White House. 

If built, the project would deliver 20 million tonnes per annum of LNG to buyers in Asian markets, but at considerable financial cost and risk. The pipeline route has to traverse remote, rugged areas of central Alaska, where logistics are difficult and seasonal weather is harsh. With the need to construct a treatment plant at the North Slope side of the project, then build an overland supply pipeline, the megaproject is expected to cost $45-55 billion. This works out to as much as $2.7 billion per mtpa - approaching three times the capex required for Gulf Coast LNG projects, according to Reuters. So far, the sponsors have preliminary commitments for offtake totaling about 13 mtpa - but no binding sales contracts. 

Accordingly, energy analysts and South Korean regulators are looking closely at the financial details. Korea's energy ministry says that it will need a complete commecial feasibility study before it can commit to an investment decision. Multiple analysts predict that the LNG will have be more expensive at the pier because of the capex of the treatment and pipeline system, so other factors will have to determine the decision - like the short shipping distance, the available alternatives in British Columbia, and the strategic benefits of having a new U.S. supplier. 

"Currently, there is no evidence that any entity is willing to fund this project, nor is there any evidence that customers have stepped forward to purchase the gas," one former senior State of Alaska official with experience on Alaska LNG told Chosun Ilbo. 

South Korea's government has stated that the deal described by the White House last week is not yet finalized. "We are initiating a review premised on commercial rationality and domestic legal procedures, and neither the decision on whether to invest nor the scale has been determined," South Korea's Ministry of Trade said in a statement. 

Lawmaker Choi Su-jin of the conservative People Power Party (the country's main opposition party) objected strongly to the terms as currently proposed. Choi told Korean outlet MK that the U.S. government has not historically been willing to underwrite Alaska LNG's performance with its own public funds, and it is unclear why Korea should take on that risk itself. 

"It is a typical unfair and toxic contract in which the South Korean government fully assumes the astronomical funds and risks of $50 billion . . . without any U.S. federal guarantee," Choi said. 

On Friday, President Trump threatened to penalize South Korea's government if it did not follow through on his announcement of a final deal on Alaska LNG. "If they don’t want to do it, that’s OK with me. I’ll just charge them more. Tell them if they don’t sign shortly, I’m going to double it up," Trump told reporters. 

On the same day, he announced an $8.4 billion Korean investment in an enhanced oil recovery project; this was reportedly disputed by South Korea's Industry Ministry, according to Chosun. 

Who Is Going to Pay for Alaska LNG?

By Natalia Katona - Oct 07, 2026

• Washington’s tariff pressure is pushing South Korea toward Alaska LNG, but Seoul’s conditional interest falls short of financing a project costing up to $54 billion.
• 
  
• Alaska’s costly pipeline and difficult terrain threaten to outweigh its shipping advantage, with capital costs approaching $2.7 billion per million tonnes of annual LNG capacity.
• 
  
• Weakening Korean gas demand and competing Canadian supplies undermine Alaska’s investment case, giving Seoul reasons to seek a less costly way to satisfy Washington.
• 
  

Washington’s tariff pressure is giving Alaska LNG something its economics have struggled to secure: a potential investor. Discussed for decades, the costly and technically complex project has regained momentum under President Donald Trump, who is using tariff threats to press foreign partners into backing it. South Korea is now at the centre of that effort, as Seoul’s bid to protect access to the US market becomes a negotiation over financing one of America’s most expensive energy developments.

The question is whether that pressure can produce a commercially viable investment. Washington’s threat of 25% tariffs on Korean exports led to an arrangement, lowering the rate to 15% in exchange for $350 billion in investments and $100 billion in US energy purchases. South Korea’s parliament passed corresponding legislation in March 2026, with negotiations moving toward specific energy projects in September.

On October 1, Seoul outlined potential investments including a 6.47 GW gas-fired power project in Texas serving AI data centres from 2029, and eight US nuclear reactors costing a combined $120 billion, including two using Korea’s APR-1400 design. Alaska LNG was also under review, conditional on commercial and legal requirements being met and that condition is what matters. In September, President Trump had already announced that South Korea was to pay more than $50 billion toward Alaska LNG at an event attended by Alaska officials and Glenfarne Chief Executive Brendan Duval. Seoul’s conditional review falls well short of that commitment.

Owned 75% by Glenfarne and 25% by the state of Alaska, the proposed $45 billion–$54 billion development would transport North Slope gas to domestic consumers and ultimately an export terminal at Nikiski in south-central Alaska. However, the project has a fundamental disadvantage which is in its immense cost of connecting remote reserves to customers: treatment facilities and a roughly 1,300-kilometre (807-mile), pipeline must precede export revenues.

Geography of the project is the main issue. Much of the pipeline would be buried across difficult terrain, including shifting permafrost and mountain crossings reaching 1.5 km (5,000 feet). About 54% can be constructed only during summer, making missed construction windows a significant delay risk. Unresolved state-tax arrangements and domestic cost allocations add uncertainty over who absorbs possible overruns, including whether Alaskan households could face higher gas and electricity bills. Alaska must build exceptionally expensive infrastructure simply to reach the starting point of competing exporters.

Capital intensity approaches $2.7 billion per million tonnes of annual LNG capacity (in comparison to an $898 million/tonne for Qatar’s North Field East and $762 million/tonne for Cheniere’s Corpus Christi Stage 3). Development would proceed in phases, beginning with the pipeline that would feed the local market before the larger export component (first exports are targeted for 2031). This means that financing and cost recovery during the domestic-supply phase is yet another complication for the matter.

Asian commitments have so far been considerably narrower than Trump’s announcements. In July 2025, he said Japan would form an Alaska LNG joint venture under its $550 billion US investment vehicle. Alaska LNG subsequently disappeared from Japan’s list of potential investments. Japanese participation instead centred on an autumn 2025 letter of intent involving Jera and Tokyo Gas to purchase 1 million tonnes of LNG annually for 20 years.

Korea’s Posco International has similarly signed a non-binding agreement to buy 1 million tonnes annually for 20 years and supply a significant share of pipeline steel. Taiwan, Thailand and TotalEnergies have also expressed potential buying interest. Such arrangements indicate demand, but do not settle construction financing or risk allocation.

South Korea nevertheless still has substantial reasons to maintain access to American LNG. Its annual demand of 47.8 million tonnes dwarfs Posco’s proposed Alaska purchases. In 2025, the US supplied 4.4 million tonnes, behind Australia’s 14.7 million, Malaysia’s 7.9 million and Qatar’s 7.2 million. That balance shifted after the US-Iran conflict began in late February and Qatar effectively stopped exporting LNG. Korean imports from the US rose from 200,000 tonnes in March (out of total 3.1 million tonnes), to 1 million tonnes in July (out of 3.7 million tonnes). America became a leading supplier alongside Australia.

Yet greater reliance on US supply coincides with weakening Korean LNG demand. Net-zero policies are gradually reducing consumption, while wartime price increases prompted temporarily higher coal-fired generation and subsequent lower gas burning. Over the summer months, South Korea’s gas-fired power generation fell 9% year-over-year to an average 13 GWh. For reference, Korean coal usage is so far up 18% in 2026 to date, averaging almost 15 GWh throughout January-July. Milder summer temperatures also softened electricity demand during the usual summer and early-autumn peak.

When it comes to competing with European buyers of US LNG, Alaska offers a tangible advantage. US Gulf Coast shipments to South Korea around the Cape of Good Hope take approximately 40–45 days, with current freight estimated at around $42,000/day. Panama offers a shorter route, but transit restrictions, queues and canal charges make it less attractive even in comparison to the Cape of Good Hope route. In contrast, possible Nikiski-to-Korea voyages would take roughly 10–12 days, avoiding canals and major chokepoints.

However, South Korea can already access Pacific LNG without financing Alaska’s pipeline. LNG Canada, the venture backed by Shell, Petronas, PetroChina, Mitsubishi and Korea’s own KOGAS, began exports in July 2025 and already shipped 1 million tonnes to Asian markets this September. Its upcoming expansion to 28 million tonnes annually (approved late last month) would increase competition for the buyers Alaska needs. Shorter voyages are valuable, but Alaska has no monopoly on them.

Seoul’s caution therefore predates the current negotiations. Last year, South Korea’s trade and industry minister described Alaska LNG as high risk and an unviable investment option. However, tariff pressure has made repeating that judgment diplomatically harder, without resolving the underlying economics.

For now, Seoul will most likely try to gain time before making a diplomatically risky announcement of not participating in the project. Trump’s signalling of Korean investment into an unspecified $8.4 billion enhanced oil recovery project could offer this alternative. Such projects use injections of steam, gases or chemicals to extract additional crude. Too few details are available to assess this proposal, but it could give Seoul another way to demonstrate investment cooperation while limiting exposure to the commercially questionable Alaska LNG project.

By Natalia Katona for Oilprice.com

Billion-dollar federal contracts tied to Trump allies and family members

REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein

Robert Reich

October 01, 2026

ALTERNET

Democratic candidates should be talking about ONLY two things in these last five weeks before the midterms, and show how they’re connected: higher prices and Trump-Republican corruption.

Consider:

1. The Trump-Republican war on Iran has been a huge windfall for Big Tech supplying the military — such as Palantir, a core artificial intelligence and data-integration partner for the U.S. Department of Defense, founded by Trump and JD Vance buddy Peter Thiel. But it’s costing Americans dearly.


At the same time, investment companies backed by Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump have accumulated at least $3.2 billion to $6.3 billion in direct Pentagon contracts, current funding, and future contract options since January 2025.

But Trump’s Iran war is causing Americans to spend some $1.50 a gallon more on gas (gas was $2.98 per gallon before the war; it’s now $4.42 to $4.47 per gallon). Since the war began, Americans have spent $65 billion more on gas.


The price of diesel fuel has soared to an average of $7.00 a gallon — and because trucks that transport everything to retail stores now pay so much more to get it there, this price increase is also being passed on to consumers.

2. Trump has given out tariff waivers and carve-outs to industries and companies making kickbacks to him, while the tariffs have jacked up prices overall.

For example, when polyethylene terephthalate, the thermoplastic used to make plastic bottles, got a tariff exemption, it was a win for Reyes Holdings, a Coca-Cola bottler that ranks among the largest privately held companies in the U.S. and is owned by a pair of brothers who have donated millions of dollars to Republican causes.


Just after Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, dumped $1 million into Trump’s inauguration, Apple got tariff exemptions for its products.

After Elon Musk sank a quarter of a billion dollars into Trump’s 2024 campaign, Tesla got a tariff exemption for electronics.

And so on.


But the worldwide tariffs that made these corrupt exemptions possible have increased annual household costs by an estimated $1,100, according to The Budget Lab at Yale.

3. Trump’s support for artificial intelligence is another form of corruption that’s pushing up prices.

The AI industry’s war chest for the 2026 midterms is projected to exceed $200 million, with almost all of it going to Republican candidates and Trump’s own super PAC.

But AI is already harming average Americans by increasing borrowing costs. Together with the costs of Trump’s war in Iran, Big Tech’s huge borrowing — over $500 billion so far this year — is crowding out other borrowers, thereby contributing to sky-high interest rates on mortgages, auto loans, and credit-card overdrafts.


In addition, Trump’s encouragement of AI data centers is raising electricity prices in areas where data centers are sucking up energy.

4. Trump’s tariffs and support for AI are increasing the costs of housing.

Housing affordability is among voters’ top concerns this election cycle, yet:

— The average 30-year fixed mortgage rate is now 7.33 percent — higher than at any point since late 2023 — due in part to Trump’s war and his encouragement of AI borrowing.


— The prices of lumber and building materials have soared because of Trump’s tariffs. The National Association of Home Builders estimates that tariffs on lumber and building materials have added $10,900 to the cost of constructing a new U.S. single-family home.

— The price of copper, a key material for electrical wiring in residential and commercial construction, has soared 40 percent in the past year due to Trump’s tariffs and data center demands — adding even more costs to building a typical home, which requires hundreds of pounds of copper.

5. Trump’s tax cuts for America’s wealthiest corporations and individuals have come at the expense of healthcare and health insurance for average Americans.

To pay for the tax cuts for America’s wealthiest families and corporations — including their largest donors — congressional Republicans slashed Medicaid and failed to renew healthcare tax credits, forcing millions of Americans to spend more for coverage or forgo it altogether.


Trump and congressional Republicans passed the biggest Medicaid cut in history, which will result in 10 million people becoming uninsured and make healthcare providers that serve low-income populations vulnerable to private equity takeovers.

Millions of Americans will spend an average of $2,136 in annual Affordable Care Act (ACA) premiums this year — 58 percent more than last year (in some states they’re paying up to 220 percent more). Nearly 5 million Americans will lose healthcare coverage this year because congressional Republicans failed to renew the Premium Tax Credit. Additionally, at least 115 hospitals and clinics across 32 states have closed or reduced services as a result of the Republican healthcare cuts.

The corruption runs even deeper. When Trump rolled out TrumpRx earlier this year, he claimed Americans would get access to more affordable prescription drugs. But the platform fails to disclose information about less expensive generic alternatives and in some instances charges consumers more for products that are available for less elsewhere.

As the Groundwork Collaborative has shown, the biggest winners from TrumpRx are the Trump family and Big Pharma. Donald Trump Jr. is on the board of drug platform BlinkRx, which benefits from the regime’s promotion of direct-to-patient medicine sales. BlinkRx donated $50,000 to the Trump inaugural committee. When patients use TrumpRx instead of insurance, they have to cover the drug cost themselves — saving money for insurance companies as they continue to rake in premiums.

And despite Trump exempting 17 of the largest pharmaceutical companies from his threatened pharmaceutical tariffs, these firms have continued to raise prices on nearly 900 different drugs. At least three of these firms — Gilead, Merck, and Pfizer — each donated $1 million to the Trump-Vance inaugural committee, alongside the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, which lobbies on behalf of Big Pharma.

These connections between the higher prices Americans are paying and the corruption of the Trump regime and its Republican enablers need to be widely understood. The richest Americans and biggest corporations have made out like bandits — and average working Americans are paying dearly for what the bandits have stolen.

Less than five weeks until the November 3 midterm elections, Democrats must show Americans not only that they’re paying more for just about everything, but that the reason they’re paying more is the rot at the heart of Trump-Republican deal.

Robert Reich is a professor of public policy at Berkeley and former secretary of labor. His writings can be found at https://robertreich.substack.com/.

Trump’s 'so-called businessman' myth in ruins as he wrecks economy: experts

US President Donald Trump speaks to the media as he departs the White House on the South Lawn in Washington, DC, US, September 26, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon

Nick Hilden

September 28, 2026 

ALTERNET


In 2024, President Donald Trump was elected largely because voters hoped his background in business would equip him to help bring down prices. But by September of 2026, writes the New Republic editor Michael Tomasky, the myth of “so-called businessman” Trump’s financial acumen has been destroyed as a growing number of experts admit that his policies have a recession on the way.

“About once a month,” explains Tomasky, “I go to Google News and type in the single word ‘recession’ just to see what comes up. Most of the time, the headlines are reassuring: ‘Despite downturn, experts don’t see recession coming’ — that sort of thing. Sunday, the headlines read a little differently. ‘Is the World Staring at a Big Stock Market Crash — and Recession? 5 Uneasy Signs.’ ‘The Fed Just Raised Interest Rates. Recession Is Next.’ ‘Billionaire investor Leon Cooperman sees a recession in 2027 and a stock drop ahead.’ ‘Legendary economist Gary Shilling says consumer signals point to a recession in the next 12 months.’ And so on.” While many factors can contribute to a recession, according to Tomasky, the driving force behind the current economic decline is obvious: the whole thing has been caused by Trump.

“Every decision he makes is the wrong one and makes the situation worse,” writes Tomasky. “Take the tariffs. The Tax Foundation keeps track of the economic impact of the tariffs Trump promised would ‘liberate’ us. Short answer? They’ve been a disaster. They increased taxes on the average American household by $1,000 in 2025, will reduce long-run gross domestic product by 0.4 percent, and more.” Then there’s the war with Iran, which has wrought wide-ranging economic damage. Even so, Trump has just rejected Iran’s latest offer for negotiations and to end the war within seven days, apparently because he thinks he can secure a better deal.

According to Tomasky, the list of Trump’s economic missteps goes on, but it all comes down to one thing: “Trump is wrecking the economy. And he’s wrecking the economy for the same reason that most Republican presidents wreck the economy.” As Tomasky explains, ever since the GOP began emphasizing unregulated markets in the 1970s, Republican presidents have consistently presided over “economic calamities,” with five of six seeing the economy crumble under their watch. According to Tomasky, “It’s not a coincidence that the last five recessions, and seven of the last eight, have happened under Republican presidents.”

“The reason is that they believe in economic nostrums that are either lies or fairy tales,” asserts Tomasky. “Lie: that lower taxes can produce revenues equal to or even greater than higher taxes. Fairy tale: that the unregulated free market will unfailingly find solutions to society’s problems. As we’re seeing right now with cryptocurrencies and AI, the unregulated free market of the sort we have in this country now creates more problems than it solves.”

While Trump’s previous term saw one such economic calamity, it was caused in large part by pandemic pressures beyond his control. But as experts are once again warning that recession looms, this time, concludes Tomasky, “it will be entirely on him. He may have driven the country into the ditch, but at least he will have exploded the ‘we need a businessman’ myth.”

How Much Is Trump’s Senseless Iran War Costing Americans Personally?

To be clear, this isn’t the cost of the weapons and soldiers fighting the war, which the Pentagon estimates to be around $44 billion. This is the higher cost you’re paying to fill up your gas tank and to buy products that cost more to move.


A truck with an image of US President Donald Trump and rising gas prices drives past during a rally for Al Quds Day on March 13, 2026 in New York City.
(Photo by Adam Gray/Getty Images)

Amy Hanauer
Oct 01, 2026

OtherWords


Affordability is getting worse, especially if you have to drive to work or anywhere else.

By late September, the total cost of the higher gas and diesel prices triggered by President Donald Trump’s war against Iran exceeded $103 billion, according to my organization’s analysis of the federal government’s energy data. And those higher prices aren’t showing any sign of slowing. If current trends hold, the price tag by the end of this year will approach $180 billion.

For the average household, that comes out to $750 extra so far, and that figure is on pace to top $1,300 by year’s end.

If life feels more expensive today, that’s because it is.

For a family of four with two drivers, those costs are even higher, topping $1,000 already and slated to be over $1,700 by the end of the year if the war continues. Our interactive tool, online at itep.org/iran-war-fuel-cost, lets you punch in your region and household size to get a sense of how much your family’s costs are rising.

To be clear, this isn’t the cost of the weapons and soldiers fighting the war, which the Pentagon estimates to be around $44 billion. This is the higher cost you’re paying to fill up your gas tank and to buy products that cost more to move.

In a normal year, fall is when drivers get some reprieve at the pump. As summer travel winds down, demand for gas falls, and prices should fall too. But not in 2026.

According to AAA, Americans have never paid this much for gas at this time of year. The national average gas price is $4.47 per gallon as of this writing, and a growing number of states are seeing average prices top $5 per gallon.

Equally troubling is the sky-high price of diesel fuel, which has hit record highs this year and now stands at $6.45 per gallon. When diesel prices rise, the cost of making and shipping products rises too. While most of us don’t buy diesel fuel ourselves, this raises the cost of everything else, bumping up the high rate of inflation we’ve already been seeing.

These soaring fuel costs hurt businesses, local governments, and families.

Businesses have had to shell out $48 billion extra for motor fuel this year, mostly on diesel, because of the Iran War.

Local governments also feel the squeeze. Higher fuel prices make it more expensive to operate school buses, garbage trucks, construction equipment, fire trucks, police cars, and other vehicles and machinery. So far this year our local and state governments have had to pay over $2.7 billion extra for fuel because of the Iran War, and we expect that figure to top $4 billion by the close of the year. This expense, of course, ultimately falls on local taxpayers.

These expenses come on top of other new costs for households like rising interest rates, the Trump administration’s widespread tariffs on products you buy every day, and high healthcare prices, made worse by cuts to government programs like food assistance and Obamacare.

If life feels more expensive today, that’s because it is. The higher price you’re paying for gas because of the Iran War isn’t the whole reason for that. But it sure doesn’t help.


This column was distributed by OtherWords.


Amy Hanauer
Amy Hanauer joined ITEP in 2020, bringing nearly 30 years of experience working to create economic policy that advances social justice. As executive director of both ITEP and Citizens for Tax Justice, Amy provides vision and leadership to promote fair and equitable state and national tax policy.
Full Bio >

 Allies Refuse to Visit U.S. in ‘Mind-Boggling’ Collapse Under Trump

Martha McHardy
Mon, September 28, 2026



Evan Vucci / REUTERS

America's closest allies are increasingly looking elsewhere for their vacations.

Despite hosting the World Cup this year, the U.S. has suffered through a slump in international tourism.

Visitors from Canada are down 23 percent over the past two years, while travel from Germany and France has dropped 16 percent and 15 percent year-to-date, respectively.

Overall, the country is on pace to welcome 2 million fewer international visitors than last year, when approximately 68 million tourists came to the U.S.

That would put overseas visits roughly 20 percent below the 2019 peak of 79 million visitors.

"We're the only major country in the world losing visitation," Geoff Freeman, president and CEO of the U.S. Travel Association, told Axios. "It's mind-boggling."

The Daily Beast has contacted the White House for comment.

The decline follows an already brutal 2025 for American tourism. The U.S. welcomed roughly 4 million fewer international visitors last year than in 2024, a 5.5 percent drop in overseas tourism, according to CNN.

Foreign visitor spending fell by more than $8 billion during the same period.


Aside from the collapse in international travel during the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2025 decline marked the sharpest annual drop in overseas tourism in roughly two decades.

The largest drop came from Canada, with far fewer Canadians traveling to the United States.

Trump welcomes Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney at the White House last year. / Evelyn Hockstein / REUTERS

Data from mobile tracking firm Cuebiq suggests Canadian travel to major U.S. cities may have fallen by as much as 42 percent over the past year.

Relations between the U.S. and Canada, historically close allies, have broken down since Trump began his second term.

Trump has floated the idea of annexing the country and making it the 51st U.S. state, and slapped tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, and automobiles.

After Trump imposed tariffs on Canada last year, visits from Canadians fell by 17 percent, contributing to a 7.5 percent overall decline in tourism, Politico reported.

But the U.S. has also seen a decline in visitors from many European countries like France and Germany.

Trump tries — and fails — to make a handshake look normal with Macron. / LUDOVIC MARIN / via REUTERS

German visits to the U.S. fell about 12 percent in 2025, according to figures cited by Le Monde. French visits fell nearly 7 percent.

Trump has raised tensions with his European allies since the beginning of his second term.

France and Germany were among eight European countries Trump threatened with a 10 percent tariff, potentially rising to 25 percent, because they opposed his threat to annex Greenland.

And in June 2026, Trump threatened major tariffs on French wine and champagne after French President Emmanuel Macron opposed the U.S. approach to Greenland.

"I asked them not to charge American companies, and if they do, I have no choice but to charge a 100 percent tariff on all champagnes and all wines coming out of France," the 80-year-old president told the New York Post. "All [French President Emmanuel Macron] has to do is get rid of the sales tax, and he wouldn't have that kind of pressure."

Meanwhile, Trump publicly lashed out at German Chancellor Friedrich Merz after Merz criticized U.S. strategy in the Iran war.

Trump called Merz "totally ineffective." The confrontation was followed by the Pentagon announcing plans to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in Germany by 5,000.

 Trump's tariffs are back in court

Elisabeth Buchwald, CNN
Updated Wed, September 30, 2026 


Containers are seen at the container terminal of Nanjing Port, in China's eastern Jiangsu province on September 8, 2026. Most Chinese goods shipped to the United States have faced a minimum 12.5% tax. - AFP/Getty Images

Here we go again: President Donald Trump's sweeping global tariffs are back under the legal microscope.

On Wednesday, a three-judge panel at the US Court of International Trade is set to hear arguments in a case that could determine whether the president can use a 1970s trade law to impose tariffs on nearly everything the United States imports.

Since late July, goods from 80 countries, including China, India and Japan, have faced tariff rates ranging from 10% to 12.5%. The administration imposed the duties after determining that those countries had allegedly failed to address the use of forced labor in producing goods shipped to the US. The US Trade Representative recommended the tariffs as a remedy, with higher rates applying to countries deemed the "worst offenders."

The rollout of these tariffs coincided with the lapse of a separate 10% near-blanket duty Trump had imposed earlier in the year under a different legal authority. The Supreme Court later ruled that Trump had overstepped his authority, which immediately invalidated the tariffs and triggered $168 billion worth of refunds for importers.


The complaint, filed by the Liberty Justice Center, a libertarian public-interest law firm that successfully won the landmark Supreme Court tariff case, argues that the administration is moving to preserve a predetermined global tariff policy. That, they argue, is an improper use of the trade law commonly referred to as Section 301.

Administration officials, meanwhile, told reporters previously that the timing was to "avoid complexity" that would come from layering the new levies on top of the then-10% duties.

"The real message here that everyone needs to take away is the president is going to always use the tools at his disposal to achieve his trade policy objectives," administration officials said on a briefing call with reporters shortly before the 10%-15% duties took effect.

While Wednesday's arguments may offer clues about how the judges view the case, a ruling could still take weeks — if not months. Either side could then appeal the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which could also decide whether to pause enforcement of the tariffs while the case proceeds.

The fight could eventually reach the Supreme Court, extending the legal battle for several months more.

By the time it concludes, Trump may have already enacted a slew of new duties. Already, there are several pending Section 301 investigations that are widely expected to lead to higher border taxes. Beyond that, Trump has also tapped in to a Great Depression-era trade law to impose 50% duties on $20 billion worth of goods from Canada and issued widespread import bans from there.

CNN.com

 

Constellium may drop EU metal recycling plans due to scrap squeeze, CEO says

Reuters | September 22, 2026 | 

Credit: Constellium

Aluminium products maker Constellium may drop plans to expand recycling in the European Union unless policymakers resolve a scrap shortfall linked to used metal being exported overseas, its CEO said on Tuesday.

The European Commission angered industry representatives this month by abandoning plans to impose an export duty on aluminium scrap, which the industry says is crucial to keeping more of the low-cost raw material in Europe. The EU’s executive is now proposing to curb scrap outflows through waste shipment rules.

Constellium, like other producers in Europe, is sceptical about the waste approach given a large number of non-OECD countries seeking exemptions, CEO Ingrid Joerg told Reuters.

“We have several recycling projects in the pipeline that we are investigating. But if there’s no scrap, they’re not going to happen,” she said.

The projects covered Constellium’s different market segments, such as packaging, auto and aerospace, and could be larger or smaller than a previous €130 million ($148.82 million) recycling expansion at its Neuf-Brisach plant in France, she said, declining further details.

Constellium recycles some of its production in a closed loop but also relies on external scrap.

The loss of scrap to exports is among grievances of an EU aluminium sector also grappling with the bloc’s carbon border-tax scheme and soaring energy prices.

Constellium welcomed changes to the carbon border levy voted by the European Parliament last week, but final adoption was needed swiftly to close loopholes, Joerg said.

The border levy is expected to push up European aluminium premiums, adding to global inflation pressures linked to energy costs, tariffs and Mideast disruption, she said.

Constellium’s US operations were benefiting overall from tariffs, with a high recycling rate and US retention of scrap offsetting the impact of tariffs on Canadian aluminium, she added.

($1 = 0.8735 euros)

(Reporting by Gus Trompiz; Additional reporting by Kate Abnett; Editing by Susan Fenton)

When Everything Becomes a National Security Threat

by John W. Whitehead and Nisha Whitehead | Sep 25, 2026 | 

“The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.” ~ Justice Hugo Black, New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)

“National security” has become the government’s all-purpose permission slip to behave badly.

They have become the magic words that can make constitutional restraints disappear – especially when the courts defer to claims of national security. Courts have historically been reluctant to second-guess the executive branch when government officials invoke military necessity, classified information, foreign affairs or national security.

Given the judiciary’s longstanding reluctance to second-guess presidential power grabs involving national security, the national-security state has repeatedly used that deference to expand both its own reach and the power of the presidency.

Call something a matter of national security and the normal rules start disappearing: Courts defer. Congress retreats. Secrecy expands. Executive power grows.

“National security” has been used as the justification for surveillance, secret courts, classification, warrantless spying, military intervention, watchlists, detention, border searches, censorship claims and the concealment of government misconduct.

That game is hardly new.

Nixon played it. Bush played it. Obama played it. Biden played it.

Trump may not have invented the national-security dodge, but he has taken it to increasingly absurd extremes.

Under Trump 2.0, almost everything gets branded a matter of national security in order for the president to sidestep as many parts of the Constitution as he finds inconvenient.

At one point, the government even invoked national security to justify proposed tariffs on trumpets, trombones and tubas because the instruments depend on foreign copper alloys.

This would almost be laughable if the consequences were not so serious.

Trump wants greater control over the U.S economy? Declare a national emergency and seize the power to levy tariffs in the name of national security.

Trump is disgruntled over relations with Canada? Declare a national security threat and claim executive authority to levy tariffs without going through Congress.

Trump wants to build a lavish ballroom? Stick a bunker below it and a droneport on top, and call it national security.

Trump wants to erect a massive ceremonial arch? Turn it into a military installation, complete with drones, snipers and ammunition, and chalk it up to national security.

Trump doesn’t like unfavorable press coverage? Ban reporters from the White House and characterize the press as a national-security threat.

This is not merely another Trump deflection.

It is the logical culmination of decades spent allowing presidents of both parties to invoke national security whenever they want more power, more secrecy and less accountability.

Trump is demonstrating just how much damage can be done once a president decides that virtually anything he wants can be recast as necessary for national security.

Consider how far down the road we have already traveled under the Trump administration.

Tariffs on allies have been justified as national security. Annexing Greenland has been characterized as vital to national security. Offshore wind projects have been halted on national-security grounds.

Coal plants have been kept operating longer in the name of national security.

Artificial-intelligence infrastructure and massive data centers have been elevated to matters of national security.

Even federal workers’ collective-bargaining protections have been stripped away after agencies were classified as performing national-security work.

And the list keeps growing.

National security has become Donald Trump’s fail-safe strategy for defying the Constitution.

As Sophie Hurwitz writes for Mother Jones, “Trump is using agencies and emergency powers that sprung up in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks – and have never been abolished or repealed – to threaten domestic dissidents and anyone else he views as an enemy, claiming that those who oppose his policies constitute threats to America.”

Shortly after returning to office, Trump invoked emergency powers to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China, declaring drug trafficking and illegal immigration an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.

Then came the White House ballroom.

What began as a proposal for a lavish space to entertain dignitaries eventually became, amid legal challenges over presidential authority to proceed without congressional approval, a “desperately needed National Security structure” containing hardened construction, bomb shelters, military facilities, drone defenses, sniper positions and other protective features.

Now Trump’s proposed 250-foot triumphal arch in Washington – a monumental project conceived in connection with America’s 250th anniversary – is also being recast as a national-security necessity. According to Trump, the arch will double as a “top grade Military Complex” capable of housing large numbers of drones, snipers and ammunition.

And now the logic is being turned against the press.

After barring CNN, MS NOW and Politico from the White House over coverage he labeled “fake news,” Trump insists that what he calls “fake news” is “a threat to our National Security, and must be stopped, NOW!”

The move prompted CNN, MS NOW and Politico to sue, while the major television networks – including Fox News – suspended their participation in pooled presidential coverage in protest.

The press dispute may be resolved quickly enough.

The courts, historically inclined to defer to the government when national security claims are invoked, have shown a glimmer of backbone in challenging Trump’s most far-reaching claims of national security.

In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 against Trump’s imposition of global, reciprocal tariffs under an emergency powers law.
In August 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the Trump Administration’s national security justifications for demolishing the East Wing of the White House and replacing it with a ballroom. “While this court accords great weight and deference to invocations of national security and the safety of the President, such arguments are not an automatic get-out-of-law-free card,” Judge Patricia Millett wrote for the majority.

That ruling was later overturned by the Supreme Court.

Unfortunately, that hasn’t stopped Trump from attempting to use national security concerns to sidestep the law at almost every turn. As Axios journalist Avery Lotz explains, national security has become “Trump’s executive sledgehammer.”

Say the magic words and an ordinary policy dispute becomes a national emergency. A legal obstacle becomes a threat to the nation. A constitutional restraint becomes a luxury the president claims the country cannot afford.

For decades, Congress has helped build this monster, repeatedly surrendering extraordinary powers to the Executive Branch whenever presidents invoke war, terrorism, emergency or national security.

Secrecy reinforces the problem.

When the government claims that revealing evidence would itself threaten national security, the public may never know enough to challenge the claim. When courts defer because judges supposedly lack the expertise to evaluate security judgments, meaningful judicial review can shrink. When Congress hands presidents open-ended emergency powers, legislative oversight becomes an afterthought.

The result is a dangerous constitutional equation: the more serious the government says the threat is, the less accountable the government becomes for proving that the threat actually exists.

That turns the constitutional order on its head.

In a free society, extraordinary government power should require extraordinary justification.

In the national-security state, merely invoking an extraordinary threat increasingly becomes the justification.

And that brings us to the far greater danger: a government that can declare anything a national-security concern can eventually declare anyone a national-security threat.

Because the question is no longer merely what constitutes a threat. It is who gets to decide who is one. Who decides who is an enemy? Who decides who is dangerous? Who decides when the normal rules no longer apply?

Once you accept that the president may invoke national security to move outside the ordinary restraints of the criminal justice system, everything depends on who gets classified as a threat.

Governments are always expanding both the definition of “threat” and the universe of people who fit the label. First, it was foreign terrorists. Then sympathizers and associates. Then domestic extremists. Then protesters, journalists, whistleblowers, immigrants, activists and political dissidents.

The targets may change from crisis to crisis, but the machinery for labeling someone a threat remains.

This is why the language matters.

The government does not have to call you a criminal if it can call you a threat. And once you are classified as a threat, the government does not necessarily have to wait for you to commit a crime before it begins treating you like one.

That is the danger when “national security” becomes the exception that allows the government to bypass the rule of law.

The fact that the government does not have to build that machinery from scratch – it already has it – makes our current state of affairs that much worse.

Long before “national security” became the justification for presidential ballrooms, triumphal arches and retaliation against unfriendly journalists, the government had already spent decades constructing a machinery for identifying, monitoring and neutralizing people it deemed potential threats.

Connect the dots.

Start with the Patriot Act and the surveillance powers unleashed after 9/11.

Add the government’s ever-expanding definitions of “extremism” and “domestic terrorism.” Add the NDAA and the normalization of military detention authority in the name of national security. Add the NSA, fusion centers, and government watchlists.

Then layer on facial recognition, artificial intelligence, biometric surveillance, automated license plate readers and predictive-policing technologies capable of identifying and tracking people at a scale unimaginable a generation ago.

What emerges is not merely a government capable of investigating crimes after they happen. It is a government increasingly capable of identifying people as potential threats before they have committed one.

That distinction matters.

Criminal law traditionally asks what you did. The national-security state increasingly asks what you might do, who you associate with, what you believe, what you say, where you go and whether someone inside the government considers you dangerous.

That is the essence of precrime.

It substitutes prediction for proof, suspicion for guilt and risk assessment for due process.

And we have already seen where that mindset leads.

In the years after 9/11, the government loosened investigative safeguards so that national-security investigations did not always have to begin with evidence that a crime had actually been committed.

The focus increasingly shifted from investigating wrongdoing to identifying people and communities thought to present a potential risk.

Muslim Americans were subjected to sweeping surveillance, questioning, watchlisting and infiltration of mosques and community organizations. Government programs attempted to identify supposed warning signs of future radicalization even while acknowledging there was no reliable way to predict who would become a terrorist.

Racial justice protesters were monitored under the banner of counterterrorism. Political movements were scrutinized as potential sources of domestic extremism. Scientists and academics with ties to China found themselves subjected to heightened suspicion in the name of protecting national security.

The groups change. The rationale does not.

Label a group potentially dangerous. Invoke national security. Loosen the rules. Expand surveillance. Insist that the threat is too serious to wait for an actual crime.

That is how a free society becomes a suspect society.

And once government is permitted to investigate people not because of what they have done but because of who they are, what they believe, whom they associate with or what officials fear they might someday do, the distinction between protecting national security and policing dissent becomes dangerously thin.

Government agencies already possess the technology and legal authorities to identify, label, track and target individuals viewed as potential threats. With every passing day, the technology becomes more powerful, the surveillance more pervasive, and the language of national security even more elastic.

That should concern us far more than any single ballroom, tariff, monument or press dispute.

Because once the government has both the power to define the threat and the machinery to act against it, the most important question is no longer what constitutes a threat.

It is who gets to decide.

This is where Americans make a dangerous mistake when they treat abuses of presidential power as partisan questions.

If you approve of the president, you may not care how broadly he defines national security. If you trust his judgment, you may not object when he stretches emergency powers, sidesteps Congress, attacks the press or argues that the courts should defer to him.

But presidential power does not disappear when your preferred president leaves office. It passes intact to the next one.

Every shortcut becomes a precedent. Every emergency power becomes part of the presidential toolbox. Every expansion of surveillance becomes available to the next administration. Every definition of “threat” can be rewritten. And every power surrendered to a president you trust does not disappear when a president you distrust takes office.

That was the danger embedded in the national-security state long before Trump returned to office.

Trump is simply showing us how far the logic can be pushed.

A ballroom becomes national security. A monument becomes national security. Trade policy becomes national security. Journalists become national-security threats.

Where does it end?

Government critics? Religious groups? Political opponents? People whose online activity triggers an algorithm? Americans whose associations, purchases, travel patterns or communications cause them to be classified as suspicious?

The question is not who has already been swept into this machinery. It is who will be targeted next.

Because, as I make clear in my book Battlefield America: The War on the American People and in its fictional counterpart The Erik Blair Diaries, once the government gets a taste for tyranny, there is always a “next.”

Trump will not be president forever. The powers he is expanding will outlast him.

That is the danger.

What we must ask ourselves is whether constitutional government can survive when the government is permitted to decide for itself when the Constitution becomes inconvenient.

The Constitution was written precisely because the Founders understood that government officials cannot be trusted to determine the limits of their own power.

That is why power was divided.

Congress makes the laws and controls the purse. Courts review government action. The First Amendment protects critics. The Fourth Amendment requires government to justify its searches. The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process.

None carries an asterisk reading: “unless the president invokes national security.”

Yet that is increasingly how the government behaves.

National security is supposed to protect the constitutional republic. It must not become the excuse for dismantling the constitutional restraints that make the republic worth protecting.

Follow this logic far enough and eventually the issue is no longer what the government wants to build, tax, censor, surveil or conceal.

The issue is whom the government decides it must target and control.

A government that can declare anything a national-security concern can eventually declare anyone a national-security threat. And once “national security” becomes the magic phrase that makes constitutional restraints disappear, all of us are potential threats.

Constitutional attorney and author John W. Whitehead is founder and president of the Rutherford Institute. His new book, The Freedom Wars, (TRI Press) is available online at www.amazon.com. Whitehead can be contacted at johnw@rutherford.org. Nisha Whitehead is the Executive Director of The Rutherford Institute. Information about the Rutherford Institute is available at www.rutherford.org.