Trump’s “National Socialism” Agenda

David Rosen

August 12, 2026

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Photograph by Nathaniel St. Clair

For those who might not remember, “National Socialism” was the political ideology of the Nazis movement during the 1933-1945 period.  It was based on a belief in antisemitism, Social Darwinism and that Germany needed to expand by controlling more of eastern Europe.

With regard to the economy, as a recent Columbia University study reports:

“…. once Hitler took power, the National Socialist government privatized rather than nationalized financial, banking, and heavy industries, eviscerated labor organizing, and enabled the formation of goliath corporate monopolies, such as the I.G. Farben and the Krupp works, that operated freely but under the thumb of the Nazi state.”

It adds, “In effect, Nazi leaders put in place a centralized war economy but allowed private enterprise to do its bidding. As a centralized form of capitalism that included both state planning and private enterprise ….”

The White House reports – in an undated post — that total “U.S. and Foreign Investments” are $10.7 trillion to both independent countries (e.g., UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) and private companies (e.g., Apple, Amazon, AT&T and many, many others).

On his Substack post on June 15, 2026, the economist Robert Reich identified Pres. Trump’s economic policies as “national socialism.”  As he wrote, “Trump’s national socialism is concentrating ever more power in Trump’s hands.  A whole new range of decisions is being made about the U.S. economy but without any congressional oversight or public knowledge.”

Reich then added, “Trump’s national socialism is making fortunes for a small group of top executives who were already fabulously wealthy, while the democratic socialists in the Democratic Party want to tax the wealthy to provide funds for better schools, better wages, and healthcare for all.”

The process of corporate nationalization evolved over the last nearly two decades. In 2008, Pres. George W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a $700 billion bailout of the financial services industry in the face of what was dubbed the “Great Recession.”

In 2009, the Obama administration directly intervened in the auto industry through the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP), investing approximately $80 billion into the auto industry, including General Motors and Stellantis (i.e., Chrysler).

Reich stresses that the Trump 2.0 regime has escalated federal investment in – and equity ownership of – traditionally private corporations.  He points out that in 2025 “the U.S. government converted $9 billion in federal grants to Intel into a 10 percent stake in the company, thereby becoming Intel’s single largest shareholder.”

Also in 2025, it signed off on Japan’s Nippon Steel acquisition of U.S. Steel for $15 billion.  Terms of the agreement include a “golden share” arrangement under which the U.S. government is to have certain rights with respect to USS, including those “relating to governance, domestic production and trade matters.”

Reich notes that the U.S. “invested” $400 million in MP Materials in 2025, the only U.S.-based rare earth miner, becoming its largest shareholder.  The U.S. secured 15 percent of preferred stock.

In 2026, the AI chip manufacturer Nvidia got approval from Trump to sell its H200 AI chip to China.  To secure the deal, “after agreeing to two conditions. First, the United States government would get 25 percent of all profits from Nvidia’s sales in China. Second, Nvidia would invest $5 billion in Intel and buy its custom data center chips.”

In April 2026, the Dept. of Defense established the “Economic Defense Unit.”  Its newly appointed leader, Def. Sec. Steve Feinberg, announced the Unit’s role is:

“… to coordinate and deliberate application of economic tools including capital, procurement, policy, trade, tariffs, regulatory authorities, export controls, and other potential economic activities to expand the United States’ economic advantage by deterring, denying, disrupting, and helping to defeat adversaries through economic means.”

And in June, the Dept. of Energy announced the establishment of a $17.5 billion “American Nuclear Supply Chain Loans” program for Westinghouse and local utility and energy companies to build 10 large-scale commercial nuclear reactors across the country.

(Senate Bill S. 4783, National Defense Authorization Act for 2027, is currently stalled in Congress.  However, as Eric Boehm notes, it includes “a provision to create a new slush fund within the U.S. Treasury for the purpose of buying stakes in more private businesses.”)

Arnab Datta, of Employ America, points out, “Not since the Great Depression has the government taken ownership stakes in private corporations at such scale and speed, and in this case, without explicit Congressional authorization.”

The Council on Foreign Relations further clarifies this development. “Since January 2025,” it states, “the U.S. government has announced investments worth $26.7 billion across thirty deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit that has traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives.”  It detailed 30 federal investments on what it calls “CFR’s U.S. Government Deal Tracker.”  Among the investment methods are equity, warrants, loans and what are identified as “Golden Shares,” “Offtakes” and “Price Floors.”

Charles Wessner, of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, distinguishes the types of investment:

“An equity stake represents ownership in a company and entitlement to the company’s future profits. Unlike loans that must be repaid or grants which in principle are given freely ….”

He also insists:

“… the Trump administration’s decision to take an equity stake in private companies deemed strategic is not a bailout but a proactive investment to secure, or at least support, U.S. capabilities in critical sectors and prevent further reliance on supply chains anchored in China.”

Adding to this, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), a conservative think tank, identified this development as the “Portfolio State”.  It claims this development “is neither command-and-control nor laissez-faire, but a hybrid architecture: public capital acquiring minority stakes to secure supply chains, shape market outcomes, and anchor domestic capacity.”

Mayer Brown, a New York-based corporate law firm, is far more cautious regrading this development. It warns, “This is not an episodic intervention. It instead reflects a structural shift in how the federal government is managing supply-chain risk—and it has direct consequences for how mining and energy transactions are structured, financed and exited.”

Going further, it points out: “Equity and equity-linked instruments reshape ownership dynamics. Equity investments affect economic terms and governance rights on day one, while dilution from the conversion or exercise of convertible or equity-linked instruments can further alter governance thresholds, supermajority voting mechanics and board composition.”

In conclusion, as Robert Reich warned, “This isn’t capitalism, folks. It’s government becoming the major shareholder of the biggest chip-making in America ….”  Its Trump’s 21^st century national socialism.

David Rosen is the author of Sex, Sin & Subversion:  The Transformation of 1950s New York’s Forbidden into America’s New Normal (Skyhorse, 2015).  He can be reached at drosennyc@verizon.net; check out www.DavidRosenWrites.com

China’s Electric Mobility Strategy In South Asia: Opportunities, Dependence And Challenges For India – Analysis

An XPeng electric car showroom at the Taikoo Li Sanlitun shopping center in Beijing, China. Photo Credit: Raysonho, Wikipedia Commons


August 10, 2026

By Dr. Sharanpreet Kaur

Key Takeaways:

China has built global EV dominance through massive state investment and now exports an integrated ecosystem (vehicles, batteries, charging and software) that is rapidly penetrating South Asian markets where demand for affordable clean mobility is rising.

Competitive pricing, local assembly arrangements and favourable policy environments in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and others are creating long-term dependence on Chinese technology, standards and supply chains.

For India, this expansion poses both economic and strategic challenges by reducing regional market opportunities and increasing Chinese technological and political influence in its neighbourhood, requiring stronger domestic capabilities and alternative partnerships.

China has rapidly emerged as the global leader in the electric vehicle (EV) industry, and its growing presence in South Asia reflects a broader geopolitical and economic strategy. As of April 2026, Asia became the largest importer of Chinese EVs following a significant increase in Chinese vehicle exports. South Asian countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives have become increasingly important destinations for these exports.

Rather than exporting only vehicles, China is introducing an integrated EV ecosystem that includes batteries, charging infrastructure, software platforms, and digital technologies. This strategy is creating long-term dependence on Chinese standards, technologies, and supply chains, raising concerns over economic vulnerability, technological dependence, and regional security. It also poses strategic challenges to India’s economic and geopolitical influence in its immediate neighbourhood.

China’s dominance in the EV sector is the result of decades of deliberate industrial planning and substantial state support. Between 2009 and 2023, the Chinese government invested more than US$230 billion in developing the EV industry. Public funding, tax incentives, purchase subsidies, scrappage schemes, and performance-linked incentives have accelerated both production and domestic adoption of electric vehicles. China has also invested heavily in charging infrastructure, accounting for approximately 80 percent of the world’s installed charging stations. These measures have enabled China to become the world’s largest EV market, selling around 13 million electric vehicles in 2025, representing nearly two-thirds of global EV sales. This figure is expected to continue rising. Chinese automobile manufacturers such as BYD, SAIC, Geely, Changan, NIO, and Xpeng have expanded their global footprint, while battery manufacturers like Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL) dominate the international battery market through vertically integrated production systems.


South Asia has become an attractive destination for China’s EV expansion due to a combination of market demand, policy support, and geopolitical circumstances. Unlike Western markets, which have imposed tariffs and regulatory restrictions on Chinese electric vehicles, South Asian countries generally provide more favourable conditions for Chinese investment and exports. Governments across the region are promoting cleaner transportation to reduce fuel imports, lower carbon emissions, and meet climate commitments. Nepal has set ambitious carbon neutrality goals, Sri Lanka aims to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, Bhutan continues to prioritise environmental sustainability, and Bangladesh has established targets for increasing electric vehicle adoption. These national strategies, combined with rising fuel costs and economic pressures following the COVID-19 pandemic, have accelerated the demand for affordable electric mobility solutions. China has successfully positioned itself as the leading supplier capable of meeting these requirements.

Competitive pricing has been one of China’s strongest advantages in expanding its presence across South Asia. Chinese electric vehicles are generally more affordable than competing models because of economies of scale, lower production costs, integrated supply chains, and cheaper battery manufacturing. In countries such as Nepal, Chinese brands dominate new EV sales largely because consumers find them more affordable and dealers receive higher profit margins. Low battery prices further enhance China’s competitiveness, making electric vehicles more accessible to price-sensitive markets.


Chinese firms are also establishing a local industrial presence in selected South Asian countries through assembly plants, distribution networks, and investment proposals. Pakistan hosts a BYD assembly facility, although local manufacturing remains limited and largely dependent on imported Chinese components. Bangladesh has similarly attracted Chinese interest through its National Electric Mobility Action Plan, with companies exploring battery assembly and distribution operations. However, most activities remain focused on assembly rather than developing indigenous manufacturing capabilities, research, or technological innovation. Existing economic ties and dependence on Chinese investment across various sectors provide Chinese firms with relatively easier market access than many international competitors. Local partnerships also facilitate the integration of software systems, connected charging infrastructure, and digital mobility platforms that reinforce China’s technological ecosystem.

Trade trends indicate that China’s influence in the South Asian EV market has expanded significantly over recent years. Since 2019, both the value and volume of Chinese EV exports to South Asia have grown substantially. Countries such as Nepal and Bhutan import a particularly high proportion of electric vehicles from China, while Sri Lanka has experienced especially rapid growth in Chinese EV imports. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have also recorded steady increases, although Bangladesh’s progress has historically been slower due to limited policy support and lower public demand. Nevertheless, recent policy reforms suggest that Bangladesh is likely to become a larger market for Chinese EVs in the future.

Chinese electric vehicles now account for a dominant share of the EV market in several South Asian countries. Nepal has emerged as one of the strongest examples of Chinese market penetration, while Bhutan has also embraced Chinese electric mobility as part of its environmental strategy. The Maldives remains relatively different because Japanese vehicles and two-wheelers continue to dominate its transport sector, although Chinese participation is gradually increasing. Bangladesh, despite initially lagging behind due to weaker policy incentives and consumer awareness, is beginning to experience stronger demand as government support for electric mobility expands.

For India, China’s expanding EV presence in neighbouring countries carries important strategic implications. Economically, it weakens India’s opportunities to develop regional manufacturing and export markets for electric vehicles and related technologies. Strategically, China’s growing technological footprint strengthens its influence across South Asia and deepens economic linkages that may translate into greater political leverage. The spread of Chinese digital platforms and connected mobility systems may also raise cybersecurity and data governance concerns, particularly as vehicles become increasingly software-driven and digitally connected. Consequently, China’s EV expansion represents not only an economic challenge but also a broader geopolitical development that could reshape regional technological standards, supply chains, and patterns of influence. India will therefore need to strengthen its own EV manufacturing capabilities, expand regional partnerships, and offer competitive technological alternatives if it aims to preserve its strategic position in South Asia.


About Dr. Sharanpreet Kaur
Dr. Sharanpreet Kaur is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at School of Social Sciences, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar (Punjab) and her thrust area of research is India’s Foreign Policy with specialisation in Indo-US Nuclear and Defence Cooperation. She is the author of the book “India’s Soft Power Diplomacy: Prospects, Challenges and Way Forward”. She is also a columnist for The Daily Guardian and has written on issues related to India's Foreign Policy. She has also been the Subject Expert for 5 Social Impact Assessment projects for Land acquisition under Punjab Government and has contributed chapters for Reports regarding the same. She has been actively involved with the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and think tanks like Centre for Civil Society and Students for Liberty. Dr. Kaur's research and writing modules include Diplomacy, India's Foreign Policy, Politics of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. She has been awarded the Young Researcher Award 2023 by Institute of Scholars (InSc), an ISO certified and registered body under Ministry of MSME and Corporate Affairs. She has also been awarded for her Contribution to Education Community by Women Leaders Forum. She has also been featured among 100 Inspiring Women 2023 by Fox Story India.
View all posts by Dr. Sharanpreet Kaur →

CU

Codelco’s El Teniente two-year setback deepens copper fears

Staff Writer | August 5, 2026 | 

El Teniente underground. (Image courtesy of Codelco | Flickr.)

Suspended development of the Andes Norte section at Codelco’s flagship El Teniente mine could last as long as two years, according to a union leader, compounding production challenges at the world’s largest underground copper mine and tightening an already strained global copper market.

The expansion pause follows new geological studies showing greater seismic risks than previously understood. The Chilean copper giant said the decision was made to protect workers after six months of analysis identified an emerging seismic phenomenon associated with the greater depth of the Andes Norte project.

“The available evidence is consistent with the possible existence of an emerging risk associated with the greater depth of the Andes Norte project,” the company said. “These analyses have identified the existence of an emerging seismic phenomenon with characteristics different from the risks that have historically been known and managed in the operation.”

The project is adjacent to the Andesita and Teniente 7 mining areas, where a rockburst on July 31, 2025, killed six workers and halted production across parts of El Teniente. The collapse, equivalent to a magnitude-4.2 earthquake, remains under criminal, regulatory and technical investigation.

Supply squeeze

The latest setback comes as Codelco is already struggling to restore production after output fell to a 25-year low. El Teniente’s copper production was about 27% lower year over year in the first five months of the year, while the company’s new chairman has acknowledged its goal of returning to 1.7 million tonnes of annual copper production by 2030 is no longer achievable.

The disruption adds to mounting concerns over global copper supply. Miners worldwide are pushing deeper underground as ageing operations become depleted, increasing exposure to geotechnical risks similar to those emerging at El Teniente, a century-old mine with more than 4,500 km of tunnels beneath the Andes.

At the same time, physical copper markets are tightening. CRU’s latest Copper Monitor warned of a growing risk of a near-term squeeze on the London Metal Exchange, citing low on-warrant inventories, dwindling visible Chinese stocks and heavy US imports ahead of a possible tariff decision. The report also noted that one participant now controls between 50% and 79.99% of live LME copper warrants, while nearby futures positions are concentrated among a handful of long investors.

The tightening supply outlook helped lift Comex September copper to an intraday record of $6.7045 per pound ($14,781 per tonne), surpassing the previous high set in May. 

The contract later traded at $6.683 per pound, up 0.6% on the day, 7.3% over the past month and more than 50% from a year earlier. Chile, meanwhile, has just reported its weakest second-quarter copper production in almost two decades.

Copper markets are increasingly being driven by supply risks rather than demand, with Codelco’s prolonged disruption adding fresh uncertainty as inventories remain historically tight and traders continue to shift metal into the US ahead of potential import tariffs.

Codelco halts El Teniente mine expansion over seismic risk

Reuters | August 4, 2026 | 10:19 am Top Companies Latin America Copper 

El Teniente operation. Photo by Codelco.

Chile’s state-run copper miner Codelco has paused one of its expansion projects at its flagship El Teniente mine a year after a deadly collapse, saying recent studies show greater seismic risk than initially thought.

An accident on July 31, 2025, killed six workers and forced Codelco to halt production throughout various sections of El Teniente, the world’s biggest underground copper mine, just as it was grappling with lifting production from quarter-century lows.

Codelco said it opted to put expansion works within the Andes Norte section of the mine on hold to ensure worker safety, citing analyses over the past six months that point to seismic risks related to the depth of the deposit, different from those that had been previously identified and monitored.

“The available evidence is consistent with the possible existence of an emerging risk associated with the greater depth of the Andes Norte project,” Codelco said in a statement, adding that it would continue to study the issue.

“These analyses have identified the existence of an emerging seismic phenomenon with characteristics different from the risks that have historically been known and managed in the operation,” it said.

Andes Norte sits near the Andesita and Teniente 7 sections that were most affected by the collapse, which packed an impact equivalent to a 4.2-magnitude earthquake. Codelco faces criminal, regulatory and technical investigations and is still investigating the precise cause of the disaster.

Mining companies worldwide are increasingly turning to very deep underground operations in an attempt to boost output, in some cases compensating for aging, depleted mines.

El Teniente, which is more than a century old, spans more than 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles) of tunnels and underground galleries in the Andes mountains. It sits about 75 kilometers (47 miles) southeast of Chile’s capital Santiago.

(Reporting by Daina Beth Solomon in Mexico City and Fabian Cambero in Santiago, Editing by Iñigo Alexander and Lisa Shumaker)

Copper market crunch brews as US and China compete for metal

Bloomberg News | August 7, 2026 | 10:09 am Markets China USA Copper 

Stock image.

The copper market is tightening fast, with a surge in shipments to the US and rising orders in China setting the stage for a rally that could take global benchmark prices to all-time highs. 

Futures in London this week pushed past $14,000 a ton, a ceiling that had only been breached on a handful of days this year, and many traders see prices soon surging past the record $14,500-plus level reached briefly during a bout of speculative buying in China at the end of January. 

This time around, the upswing has more to do with trade dislocations caused by the gravitational pull of the world’s two largest economies. While an unprecedented hoarding of copper on US shores has sped up in anticipation of a tariff decision, traders have been stepping up shipments to China to alleviate tightness there. 

The flows to China come on top of an arbitrage trade that’s encouraging cargoes to the US and drove futures on New York’s Comex to a record on Wednesday. That has been going on since last year but has accelerated to the fastest pace in at least 12 years as traders await a White House decision on whether to extend duties on semi-finished copper products to raw metal. 

There’s been no indication when or whether US President Donald Trump plans to announce a decision on tariffs, which have been a core policy tool in his effort to shore up industrial supply chains.

The president will be holding a meeting with mining executives on Friday in Washington, in a bid to showcase efforts to help spur critical minerals development and processing, with plans to unveil a handful of a deals and memoranda of understanding.

(By Julian Luk)

China’s copper smelting grip worries veteran metallurgist

Staff Writer | August 5, 2026 | 

Metallurgist and Canadian Mining Hall of Fame inductee Phillip Mackey. (Image courtesy of The Northern Miner Podcast.)

China has built a commanding grip on global copper processing that could take the West decades and billions of dollars to challenge, veteran metallurgist Phillip Mackey has warned.

China now smelts about 60% of the world’s copper and refines a similar share after a 25-year expansion that has left Western miners shipping concentrate to the very country their governments are trying to rely on less. 

Mackey, a copper smelting specialist with more than five decades in the industry and a past president of the Metallurgy and Materials Society of the CIM, said China produces about 12 million to 13 million tonnes of refined copper annually, compared with roughly 26 million tonnes worldwide, using about 45 smelters, several among the largest ever built. Chile, the world’s largest copper producer, now operates four after closing capacity.

“They’re the Saudi Arabia of copper smelting, if you like,” Mackey said on The Northern Miner Podcast. “They control the market.”

China mines only about 8% of global copper but processes well over half of it, importing concentrate from Chile, Peru and other producers to feed a smelting industry that now dictates processing economics across the sector. The imbalance underscores how Western governments remain dependent on Chinese refining even as they push to secure domestic critical mineral supply chains.

Decades-long build

Mackey said China’s dominance was built steadily beginning around 2000 by combining proven smelting technology with state-backed financing and massive industrial scale rather than technological breakthroughs. During the same period, the US reduced its copper smelting fleet from about a dozen facilities to just two as environmental permitting, soaring capital costs and decade-long construction timelines discouraged investment.

The result has been a collapse in treatment and refining charges as Chinese smelting capacity outpaced concentrate supply. Those fees, which miners pay smelters to process concentrate, have fallen to near zero and at times below zero, leaving Chinese overcapacity—not Western competition—to determine pricing. Mackey said the economics are unlikely to remain sustainable indefinitely, but they continue to reinforce China’s market power.

Slow rebuild

Mackey said rebuilding Western smelting capacity is achievable but would require long-term political commitment and substantial financial support.

“We’re mining the copper and then shipping it to China to be smelted and refined and then bringing it back,” he said. “It doesn’t make sense in the long term.”

A modern copper smelter costs several billion dollars and typically requires close to a decade to permit, build and commission. While governments have introduced critical minerals initiatives and supply-chain policies, Mackey said they have yet to match those ambitions with the funding and permitting reforms needed to support large-scale domestic smelting projects.

He compared the situation with rare earths, arguing that although copper remains abundant and widely traded, the strategic vulnerability is similar because Western countries continue exporting raw materials while importing higher-value refined products. He identified copper recycling as one area where North America and Europe retain an advantage because scrap can be processed at smaller scale and lower cost than building new smelters, although recycling alone cannot eliminate the processing gap.

Demand for copper continues to rise as electrification, renewable energy and data centres expand, making new refining capacity increasingly important. Mackey said the technology and concentrate supply already exist, but governments and industry must decide whether they are prepared to invest the time and capital needed to compete with China’s established dominance.

“It’s going to take, I think, an effort by governments and industry to move it along,” Mackey said. “There’s a lot of interest, but interest and doing are two different things.”

Zambia miners eye election with hopes for support for copper expansion

Reuters | August 4, 2026 | 

Konkola Copper Mines smelter. (Photo: Vedanta)

For mining firms in Zambia, priorities for next week’s elections include stronger incentives for processing minerals, reviving exploration and expanding power generation, measures they say are needed to deliver the country’s goal of tripling copper output.

Africa’s second-largest copper producer is targeting annual output of 3 million metric tons, nearly triple current levels, as it seeks to capitalize on growing demand for the metal used in EV, power networks and construction.

That demand has spurred a more than 40% jump in benchmark copper future prices in the past year to $14,000 a ton.

“The ambition to triple copper production will require stronger incentives for exploration, local manufacturing and value addition, alongside major infrastructure investments,” said Ayo Sopitan, chief executive of mid-tier miner Metalex Commodities.

Sopitan said Zambia also needed stronger rule of law and dispute-resolution mechanisms, while export duties on concentrates continued to weigh on producers without refining capacity.

Anthony Malenga, president of Zambia’s Chamber of Mines said high investor confidence through tax reforms and closer engagement with miners has helped attract more than $10 billion in investment since the 2021 election.

He said policy discussions between government and miners are helping address most outstanding issues on competitiveness, but Zambia’s growth ambitions now depend on maintaining a robust exploration pipeline.

“The mining industry needs real growth and this can only happen with increased spending on greenfield exploration,” Malenga said, adding that licensing reforms should ensure exploration permits are held by companies with the capacity to develop projects.

Over 8 million Zambians to vote

Mining is the backbone of Zambia’s economy, contributing about 9% of GDP, generating 72% of export earnings and accounting for nearly half of government revenue.

More than 8 million Zambians are registered to vote on August 13 to elect a president, lawmakers and local government representatives.

Analysts expect President Hakainde Hichilema to secure re-election in a peaceful poll, pointing to broad policy continuity for investors.

A senior industry source said Zambia had introduced several significant reforms over the last four years, including currency regulations, local-content rules and fuel-cost measures.

While investors expect limited changes to the fiscal regime after the election, Menzi Ndhlovu, lead analyst at Signal Risk, said power shortages and labour pressures pose the biggest threats to Zambia’s copper growth ambitions.

Power generating capacity may be inadequate to support major mining expansion without significant new investment while labour unions could seek wage increases amid rising mining activity, Ndhlovu said.

Zambia’s mines ministry did not respond to a Reuters request for immediate comment.

Industry executives estimate Zambia needs at least 2,000 megawatts of additional capacity to support its production targets, though recent investments should ease supply pressures.

(By Chris Mfula and Maxwell Akalaare Adombila; Editing by Jason Neely)