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Saturday, November 14, 2026

 

Next year can we please have a brave politician condemn war


By yvesengler on November 14, 2026

Remembrance Day highlights the immense power of militarism and imperialism in Canada. Almost every significant political force promotes militarist nationalist mythology, including the primary victims of the Canadian state.

To mark Remembrance Day CTV published an article on “A generation apart, these Palestinian Canadians found purpose through the military”. The article quotes George Al-Koura, who became a signals intelligence officer, saying “we have inconveniences, but Canada allows us to be ourselves and gives us the freedom to live without essentially warfare in the background of our lives.”

But Al-Koura deployed to the Middle East and the Canadian military bombed Iraq, Syria and Libya as well as occupied Afghanistan. Additionally, since Royal Military College of Canada graduate Charles Macpherson Dobell commanded Britain’s 1917 Second Battle of Gaza and hundreds of Canadians fought with General Allenby in the subsequent successful conquest of Palestine this country has supported violence against Palestinians. Hundreds of Canadians, mostly World War II veterans, fought to ethnically cleanse Palestine in 1948.

On Wednesday The Maple reported on briefing documents “showing that a Canadian defence official travelled to Israel for a “strategic dialogue’ at the height of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and weeks after Israel killed a Canadian army veteran. The meeting reflected the fact that ‘Israel remains a priority defence engagement country for Canada due to its reliability and mutual commitment to regional security in the Middle East,’ according to the documents.”

While it’s absurd for a media outlet to put a Palestinian gloss on a Canadian military celebration, it doesn’t compare to the relatively widespread phenomenon of indigenous leaders promoting militarist nationalism.

Rooted in a British force that conquered today’s Nova Scotia by putting the heads of Mi’kmaq soldiers on spikes and suppressed First Nations in British Columbia through ‘gunboat diplomacy’, thousands of Canadian troops were deployed to counter Mohawk opposition to the expansion of a golf course and housing on an Indigenous burial ground in 1990. The Canadian Forces (CF) have played a smaller role in recent conflicts with Indigenous communities at Gustafsen Lake, Ipperwash and Elsipogtog as well as in monitoring Indigenous groups. Canadian military intelligence spied on Idle No More and a draft version of the military’s 2007 counter-insurgency manual highlighted “radical Native American Organizations, such as the Mohawk Warrior Society” as potential military targets.

On Wednesday the head of the Assembly of First Nations formally participated in the official Remembrance Day ceremony in Ottawa. After a multiyear battle, the AFN won the right in 1995 to lay a wreath at the National War Memorial as part of a ritual organized by the reactionary, militarist Royal Canadian Legion.

For three decades November 8 has been National Aboriginal Veterans Day. At a previous National Aboriginal Veterans Day ceremony, Grand Chief of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Stewart Phillip said Indigenous soldiers were “fighting for the common good” and were “on the right side of history.” But Canadian soldiers have only fought in one war that could be considered morally justifiable: World War II. Ignored in the Remembrance Day style commemoration are the Afghans or Libyans killed by Canadians in recent years, the Serbians and Iraqis killed two decades ago, and the Koreans killed in the 1950s and the Russians, South Africans, Sudanese and others killed before that.

With large numbers of Indigenous people having fought in Sudan, South Africa, World War I, World War II and Korea, cenotaphs in many Indigenous communities commemorate those who fought in Canadian/British wars. The Millbrook band council placed 27 Millbrook Remembers banners to “honour and remember our veterans who served in the First World War, Second World War, Korean War, Vietnam War, NATO conflicts; Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and also those who served during peacetime operations.”

A growing number of landmarks bear the names of Indigenous soldiers and most of the books and articles detailing First Nations’ contribution to Canadian/British wars echo the military’s perspective of those conflicts. So, ironically, while First Nations have more reason than most to reject the Canadian state’s use of force to enforce a neo-colonial world order, ties to the military have shaped the outlook of many of their organizations.

A slew of unions and left politicians also reinforced militarist mythology on Wednesday. In an embarrassing example, former NDP MP Peter Julian posted, “Today at 11:00 AM, Canadians across our nation pause to honour Remembrance Day, and pay tribute to the millions of soldiers throughout Canadian history who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to our country and in defence of the rights and freedoms we enjoy today.”

Is Julian referring to the 2011 destruction of Libya, which he voted for? Or the occupation of Afghanistan, which the NDP backed for several years?

Even internally, Canada’s military has undercut Canadians “rights and freedoms”. They have been used to clamp down on social movements with military intelligence in recent years caught spying on Black Lives Matter, Occupy and peace activists. Between 1867 and 1933 the military was involved in suppressing dozens of labour strikes and was later used against Québecois nationalism. They killed at least four anti-conscription protesters in Québec City in March 1918 and thousands of troops were deployed to the streets of Montreal under the repressive War Measures Act in 1970.

Among Canadian politicians with some power, BC Green party leader and MLA Emily Lowan released the best (least bad) statement I saw. But leftist French leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is polling second in that country’s presidential race, puts them all to shame. On Wednesday Mélenchon travelled to a memorial inscribed with “Maudite soit la guerre” (Cursed be war) and depicting an orphan raising his fist towards the names of soldiers killed in combat. Mélenchon stated, “Down with war! We will not wage it, we will not organise it, we will not prepare it!”

If we work at it maybe at a Remembrance Day ceremony next year a major Canadian politician could say the same.

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Analysis

‘Labelled terrorists’: How France is using anti-terror powers to deter protests

The French government has been accused of weaponising an anti-terror law adopted in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks to keep dozens of people away from massive protests sweeping the country. Lawyers and rights groups denounce an abuse of power with potentially dangerous repercussions for individual liberties and the right to protest.



Issued on: 12/11/2026 
FRANCE24
By: Benjamin DODMAN

A protester uses an umbrella as a shield against a water cannon at a protest in Paris on October 24, 2026. © Aris Messinis, AFP


The protests roiling France over the past two months have seen hundreds of thousands of demonstrators march in towns and cities across the country, exercising a cherished right to voice discontent over underfunded schools, the cost of living and police brutality.

Some, however, have been stripped of that right, in the name of the fight against terror.

After peaceful rallies gave way to widespread rioting and looting on October 17, the government began using special anti-terror powers to bar several dozen people from attending further demonstrations – without prior approval from judges. They included students, trade unionists, far-left activists and environmental campaigners with no criminal record, most of whom had never been investigated for terrorism.

It marked the largest use of such discretionary powers since the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Paris, when more than 500 people were ordered to stay home or barred from getting anywhere near the venues, leading several to lose their jobs.

For lawyers, unions and rights groups, it also marked a turning point in the policing of protest movements.

“It’s the first time such measures are taken against political activists, by attempting to put a ‘terrorist’ label on them,” said Aïnoha Pascual, a lawyer representing several people barred from attending nationwide protests on October 24 and 31. She denounced “a complete perversion of counterterrorism laws”, part of a growing list of government measures aimed at stifling protests.

Emergency powers

The power used to restrict people’s movement is called an “individual measure of administrative control and surveillance”, known by the French acronym, MICAS. It is a legacy of the sweeping house arrest orders issued under a state of emergency declared in the early hours of November 14, 2015, in the wake of France’s deadliest ever terrorist attacks.

Certain emergency powers were enshrined in French law under a Counter-Terrorism Act adopted two years later, allowing the Interior Ministry to restrict people’s movements when there are “serious reasons” to believe they constitute a grave security threat and have terrorist ties.

People hit by MICAS orders are required to report at the local police station on a weekly or daily basis, and sometimes twice a day. Failure to abide by the restrictions can result in a three-year prison sentence and a €45,000 fine.

A protester dressed as the superhero Deadpool rides a toy unicorn during a rally in Lyon, France's third-largest city, on November 5, 2026. © Laurent Cipriani, AP

The law states that such powers are intended “solely for the purpose of preventing acts of terrorism from being committed” – which lawyers say is clearly not the case with the current MICAS orders.

Instead, “they are being used in situations where there is absolutely no terrorist threat whatsoever, against people who are not terrorists,” said Jean-Baptiste Soufron, a lawyer and member of the Association for the Defence of Constitutional Liberties (Adelico).

“They’re not even aimed at rioters,” Soufron added. “They clearly target political activists, barring them from attending demonstrations in the hope that this will weaken the protest movement.”

Terror threats – or ‘small fry’?


The decision to issue a MICAS order is based on intelligence reports and can target individuals with no criminal record. It does not require prior approval by a judge, though it can be challenged afterwards in court.

Souffron noted that the recent orders barring people from attending protests were often issued at the last minute, “effectively making it impossible for a judge to examine them in time”.

The ability to bypass judicial supervision, at least for a short time, hands the government considerable discretionary powers, said Nicolas Klausser, a researcher at the Centre Marc Bloch whose work specialises in the legal ramifications of state surveillance.

“The measure effectively allows the Interior Ministry to determine for itself who constitutes a terrorist threat, whereas normally, in criminal matters, it is up to a judge to rule,” he explained. “In this case, we can see that the authorities are trying to establish a direct link between taking part in protests and terrorist acts.”

When lawmakers grilled Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez on the matter on November 3, he said he had signed “more than a hundred” MICAS orders related to the protests.

He added that they targeted “the upper end of the spectrum”, implying they involved people high up on the radar of French counterterrorism.


Cover image: People attend a demonstration, as part of a new day of protests against the cost of living and rising fuel prices organised by the "Yellow Vests" movement and labour unions and joined by high school and university students, in Paris, France, November 7, 2026. © Stephanie Lecocq, Reuters
42:26

Sources contacted by newspaper Le Canard enchaîné told a different story.

According to the investigative and satirical weekly, “only a handful” of those targeted are actually being monitored by counterterrorism services. It described the rest as “small fry linked to far-left groups”.

In its latest edition on Wednesday, Le Canard enchaîné said the idea to deploy MICAS measures against protesters had come from Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin, who ordered their mass use when serving as interior minister during the Paris Olympics. The report, which cited “several senior civil servants”, said the government has since decided to suspend their use against protesters following public outcry.

The alleged direct involvement of senior ministers underscores the potential to weaponise such anti-terror powers for political purposes, said Klausser.

“While Micas would normally emerge from the bottom up, based on intelligence warnings that climb up the chain of command, in this case it appears the order came from above,” he explained. “Critics of the 2017 law had warned that it left ample scope for abuse of power. They’ve been proven right.”

‘Ecoterrorists’


Klausser said the use of MICAS orders is part of ongoing government efforts to “legitimise” the notion that certain far-left activists present a grave threat to public order. Darmanin has repeatedly flagged the threat from so-called “ecoterrorists”, a term he first used in 2022 in the wake of violent clashes between police and demonstrators opposed to the construction of giant reservoirs for agricultural irrigation.

Following the violent unrest on October 17, ministers were quick to pin the blame on “ultra-left” groups. At subsequent fast-tracked trials, however, most of the people convicted turned out to be opportunistic looters with no political leaning.

“Terms such as ‘ecoterrorism’, ‘insurrection’ and ‘sabotage’ are routinely brandished as bogeymen to instil fear and then justify labelling political activists as terrorists,” said Pascual, who has defended several activists branded as “ecoterrorists” over the years.

“Either the government is pretending they’re terrorists because they have no other way of barring them from protests, or they genuinely believe that what happened on October 17 was terrorism – or perhaps a bit of both,” she added. “Either way, it takes some nerve to claim that political violence and looting shops constitutes terrorism, particularly on the eve of commemorations for victims of the November 13 attacks.”

In statements defending its use of MICAS orders, the Interior Ministry has argued that the “insurrectionary” nature of the protests constitutes a terror threat. It has pointed to the fire that ravaged the town hall of Limoges on October 17, and online calls to target symbols of capitalism and the state, as evidence of an intent to “seriously disrupt public order by intimidating the population and the public authorities”.

Protesters stand amid tear gas during a demonstration in Lyon on November 5, 2026. © Laurent Cipriani, AP

The ministry’s arguments were broadly rejected at a court hearing in Paris on Tuesday, including by the public rapporteur, a judge tasked with giving an independent opinion on the case.

“Not all violence directed against the state, nor all political violence, is necessarily of a terrorist nature,” said the rapporteur, according to a Mediapart journalist who attended the hearing. Protest calls “cannot be regarded as intended to sow terror, but rather as an expression of intense anger towards the ruling authorities and as a means of placing them in great difficulty”, she added.


Government in ‘panic’ mode


To suggest that the protest movement has placed the authorities in “great difficulty” is an understatement. The violence witnessed on October 17, coupled with weeks of mass protests and school blockades, has piled pressure on France’s embattled minority government as it struggles to win support for a deficit-cutting budget.

The widespread rioting sparked “a moment of panic, prompting the Interior Ministry to explore all options at its disposal”, said Klausser. “And they’ve made full use of those options.”

The MICAS orders come on the heels of a slew of other measures critics say have severely curtailed the right to protest. They include outright bans on rallies, changes to protest routes and localised curfews.

“The use of such an arsenal, over such a long period, is indicative of a permanent state of emergency,” Marion Ogier, a lawyer for France’s Human Rights League (LDH), told a press conference earlier this month.

Rights groups have also denounced the widespread use of police custody to deter student protesters who kicked off the movement at high schools across France. In the three weeks leading up to October 14, police detained 6,877 people at school blockades and marches, 86 percent of them minors. It was more than the number detained during 18 months of often violent clashes with Yellow Vest protests that began in 2018.

While the authorities have highlighted the “serious acts of violence” committed by protesters, lawyers have denounced a weaponisation of police custody to intimidate protesters, stressing that the majority of those detained were later released without charges. They have also accused police of abusing minors held for up to 48 hours, alleging insults, beatings and depriving them of food and sleep.

“That’s on top of the repression witnessed at protests themselves,” said Pascual, referring to police’s ample use of “non-lethal” weapons that have maimed dozens of protesters. “When attending a protest can result in being teargassed, injured or ending up in jail, quite a few people are likely to stay away.”
'A moral red line'? World on cusp of autonomous weapons revolution

Paris (France) (AFP) – Lethal autonomous weapons powered by artificial intelligence are set to revolutionise warfare but there is no proper regulatory or legal framework governing the new technology.


Issued on: 14/11/2026 - RFI


Drones have been used widely in Russia's war against Ukraine and the US war against Iran © Roman PILIPEY / AFP

A conference starting Monday at the United Nations in Geneva will discuss how to establish curbs and prohibitions on such weapons, called killer robots by some.

But some analysts doubt the discussions at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) will keep pace with the fast-changing weapons.

AFP looks at three key questions ahead of the conference.

- What are LAWS? -

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) "
can identify, select, and engage a target without the intervention of a human operator in the execution of these tasks," said Jean-Marc Rickli, head of global and emerging risks at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Autonomous weapons have long existed. An anti-personnel mine "is an autonomous weapon in the sense that it explodes when someone steps on it," said Laure de Roucy-Rochegonde of the Centre for Geopolitics of Technology at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI).

But with the proliferation of AI-enhanced drones, such weapons are now "capable of selecting and engaging a target that was not predetermined, adapting to their environment without human intervention," said Rickli.

So the critical issue for potential regulators lies in determining the level of human control over the decision to employ such a weapon.

The United States refers to an "appropriate levels of human judgement" in the use of autonomous weapons.

France maintains that a human must remain in the decision-making loop and bans "lethal autonomous weapons systems" (LAWS) but permits "partially autonomous" systems known as PLAWS.

"The human role is always ensured through what is termed 'appropriate control' by a military commander -- a concept that varies in scope depending on the system's criticality and the operational context," said Rear Admiral Vincent Sebastien, deputy director of the French defence ministry's Agency for Defence Artificial Intelligence (AMIAD).

- The ethical issues?

"We are now dangerously close to crossing a moral red line: the autonomous targeting of humans by machines," UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and International Committee of the Red Cross president Mirjana Spoljaric warned in a joint statement in August.

But analysts said the Geneva discussions, while important, will touch only part of the issue.

Today, the diminishing role of humans is being driven by the growing use of AI in analysis and targeting.

Rickli said the scope of the agenda in Geneva is "very narrow".

"It fails to encompass the full range of issues surrounding AI on the battlefield" -- an area where its use is expanding, particularly in target generation.

He said this was seen in the US-Israeli war against Iran this year "where the Americans engaged as many as 1,000 targets per day" inside Iran.

"There are a host of problems and unacceptable risks associated with targeting and decision-support systems," added de Roucy-Rochegonde. "Part of this debate concerns systems that are already widely deployed on the battlefield."

"What kind of human supervision is required to ensure that the operator is genuinely exercising their own judgement rather than simply providing a rubber stamp for the machine's recommendations?" she asked.

- How quickly is the situation changing?

The autonomous weapons to be discussed in Geneva are not yet in widespread use, although analysts have noted that they have been deployed by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine as well as US attacks in Iran.

But the spread is inevitable.

"Autonomy will very quickly become a reality on the battlefield," warned rear admiral Sebastien.


"Autonomous weapon systems are not part of a distant future -- a race towards greater autonomy in weapons systems is already well underway," Guterres and Spoljaric said in their statement.

Yet significant doubts and dangers remain, Dario Amodei, head of the AI giant Anthropic, warned this year: "Today, frontier AI systems are simply not reliable enough to power fully autonomous weapons."

But ultimately, the incentive for major powers is too strong.

Swarms of autonomous drones -- which "aim to neutralise an adversary through saturation" -- would be highly effective, and some states view them as a crucial strategic advantage, said Rickli.

In January, the Chinese defence ministry described swarms of autonomous drones as the "new face of warfare."

"In an era of sharp military competition, the first state to normalise fully autonomous lethal strikes will reset expectations for everyone else," said Gerald Mako, a research affiliate of Cambridge University in the Small Wars Journal.

© 2026 AFP


Autonomous Electromagnetic Dominance At Sea – Analysis



Image: Grok

November 14, 2026

 Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

By Vishnu B. Nair


Key Takeaways:

The brief argues that maritime electronic warfare needs an edge-deployed multi-agent architecture combining digital arrays, compressive sensing, deep learning, a domain language model and reinforcement learning to close the gap between detecting agile emitters and countering them.

It proposes specialized sensory, support, decision and attack agents running on warships and coordinated UAV swarms, with uncertainty gating and adversarial defenses to keep autonomous actions inside human-set bounds.

For India it recommends edge-hardware retrofits, open architectures, sovereign synthetic RF data, an independent red team and a joint test establishment so the system is proven against local emitters and rules of engagement.


The contest for the EM spectrum has moved from the physics of jamming to the speed of decision. An edge-deployed, multi-agent architecture that senses with a digital array, reconstructs with compressive sensing and classifies with deep learning, decides with a domain language model, and attacks with reinforcement learning can close the gap between detecting an emitter and countering it in crowded littoral waters.
Introduction

Control of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum is no longer a supporting function of naval operations. It is the condition on which they rest. The same spectrum carries the sensors, communications and networks on which action in the sea, land, air, space and cyber domains depends, and a force that loses it fights blind and mute. Yet the maritime environments in which navies now expect to operate, such as the approaches to choke points, disputed littoral waters, and the crowded sea lanes of the Indian Ocean Region, are dense with emitters, many of them civilian and many reconfigurable in software. The volume and agility of the Radio Frequency (RF) traffic they generate have outrun both the rule-based Electronic Warfare (EW) suites built to interpret it and the human operators who supervise them.[1]


This brief argues that the gap is integrative rather than inventive. Classification, coordination, distributed attack and model robustness have each been demonstrated, and each is represented in the literature. What does not exist is an architecture that holds them together under the conditions the maritime environment imposes: intermittent connectivity, severe size, weight, power and cost (SWaP-C) limits, and an adversary who may attack the models themselves. What follows describes that architecture, the distributed platforms that carry it, the safeguards that keep it trustworthy and what India should do about it.


The Maritime Electromagnetic Battlespace

Spectral congestion in the littoral is structural, not accidental. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) allocates the spectrum among services through its Table of Frequency Allocations, and national allocations, including India’s National Frequency Allocation Plan (NFAP), are drawn from it. Interference nonetheless arises at the edges of that framework. Many bands are shared on a primary or secondary basis, transmitters radiate beyond their assigned bandwidth through sidebands and out-of-band emissions, and a strong signal in an adjacent band can saturate a receiver tuned elsewhere. Military emissions add further complication, since not every military system operates within a civil allocation.[2]


The margin is narrower than it looks. In the United States, 5G transmissions in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band were found to interfere with aircraft radar altimeters operating at 4.2–4.4 GHz, a separation of only about 220 MHz. India’s C-band allocation of 3.3–3.67 GHz leaves a gap of about 530 MHz, and no comparable incidents have been reported here. Even so, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has issued an airworthiness directive requiring radio-altimeter tolerance in Indian airspace, which treats the margin as a safety matter rather than dismissing it.[3] A warship’s electronic support receiver, asked to work in the same bands under wartime conditions, has no such protection.

The emitters themselves have changed. Hardware-defined, single-function radars have given way to software-defined Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) systems that can alter their operating parameters pulse by pulse, and can search, track, guide a missile and jam at the same time.[4] They radiate Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) and Low Probability of Detection (LPD) waveforms such as frequency-agile carriers, non-linear frequency modulation, pseudo-random pulse repetition interval stagger and ultra-wideband spread spectrum, distributing their energy across a wide bandwidth or below the noise floor so that a conventional receiver never registers them at all.

Against this, legacy electronic support measures are federated and hardware-centric. They capture RF energy, down-convert it, extract pulse width, time of arrival, frequency and angle of arrival, and match the result against a static, pre-programmed Electronic Order of Battle (EOB).[5] When a waveform is not in the library, two failures follow. The suite ignores the threat, or it forces the signal into the nearest entry and treats it as that emitter. The second is the more dangerous. A missile-guidance radar catalogued as a surveillance radar draws a countermeasure that has no effect, while the operator sees a track that appears to have been dealt with. Because threat libraries are built by offline laboratory analysis and updated by hand, no such system can respond to a zero-day or dynamically reconfigured waveform in real time.


A platform may face dozens of simultaneous emitters from surface vessels, aircraft and incoming anti-ship missiles, and the Pulse Descriptor Words (PDW) generated by modern wideband receivers saturate both the processing buffers and the operator.[6] Legacy suites do offer automatic modes for countermeasure selection, power assignment and effectiveness assessment, but those modes execute pre-programmed responses drawn from the same static library. With anti-ship missiles at supersonic or hypersonic speed, the response window falls to a fraction of a second, which is too short for a human to intervene and too short to correct an automatic mode that has chosen wrongly.

The operating environment compounds the problem. A contested EM environment implies intermittent or total loss of satellite and shore connectivity, whether from jamming or from cyber attack.[7] Forward units must therefore work on the principle of mission command, with authority delegated downward. The EW suite must become an island of intelligence at the edge, perceiving, deciding, and acting on local computation alone.

Table 1. The Cognitive Gap in Maritime EW

Existing approach What it delivers What remains unresolved
Rule-based EW with static threat libraries Fast, predictable and verifiable responses to emitters already catalogued Cannot classify or counter a waveform absent from the library; cannot adapt without a manual update
Machine-learning signal classification High accuracy in modulation classification and emitter identification, including at low signal-to-noise ratio Treats classification as an end in itself; no closed loop from classification to countermeasure selection
Multi-agent orchestration with large language models Coordination of distributed EW assets and reasoning over tactical options Assumes reliable connectivity and substantial computing power; untested against adversarial manipulation
UAV swarm electronic warfare Distributed jamming power; relief from the SWaP-C limits of individual platforms Addresses the attack function alone; no integrated sense–decide–act loop
Adversarial-AI defence and explainability Model robustness and transparency, considered in isolation Not embedded in an operational EW architecture; no defined handover of authority to a human operator
Source: Author’s synthesis of the literature surveyed in this brief.


No single row of the table is the problem. Classification without a closed loop to the countermeasure, orchestration that assumes connectivity it will not have, jamming without sensing and robustness designed in isolation — each solves one part of the problem while assuming the rest are solved elsewhere. The gap lies between the rows. Each gap has a corresponding answer in the design. The ES Agent’s compressive-sensing receiver and its convolutional and recurrent classifiers handle waveforms absent from the library, working from the signal itself rather than a stored template.

The missing link from classification to countermeasure is closed by the Decision and EA Agents, which turn a classification into a selected technique and then measure its effect. The assumption of reliable connectivity is removed by placing the entire stack at the edge and linking the swarm by mesh. The swarm does not decide on its own: the Decision Agent on the host platform assigns the mission. At the same time, each node executes its assigned role locally and shares track state over the mesh, so that decisions are taken where the latency budget allows and coordinated where it does not. The gap between a robust model and a robust architecture is closed by embedding adversarial training, uncertainty gating and explainability in the same agent structure, with authority returning to the operator wherever confidence falls.

A Multi-Agent Architecture for the Edge

The proposal is a decentralised, edge-deployed multi-agent system integrated into the platform’s Combat Management System (CMS).[viii] A monolithic model would concentrate failure and add latency; dividing the mission among specialised cooperative agents avoids both. The agents run concurrently on heterogeneous edge hardware and communicate over standard vehicle buses such as the NATO Generic Vehicle Architecture.

The Sensory Agent manages a multi-channel digital antenna array. Where analogue receivers scan slowly and see a narrow instantaneous bandwidth, the array samples RF directly at the element level through high-speed analogue-to-digital converters. The agent runs digital beamforming to form several independent beams at once. When it detects a jammer or missile seeker, it places deep spatial nulls in that direction, shielding its receivers from saturation while keeping sensitive beams elsewhere.

The Electronic Support (ES) Agent turns those samples into identifications. Direct sampling at the antenna produces data at a rate no shipboard processor can handle in full. Since most real signals are sparse, the receiver reconstructs them from far fewer samples than the Nyquist rate would demand, reducing converter power and computational load. Sparse Bayesian Learning performs reconstruction at the edge and does not need to be told in advance which representation makes the signal sparse.[ix] The reconstructed signal then passes through a staged pipeline. A one-dimensional convolutional neural network performs automatic modulation classification with over 90 per cent accuracy even below 0 dB Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR).[x] Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) maps the signal to a physical platform, and a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network, trained on sequential pulse-interval data, predicts the radar’s next frequency hop or pulse repetition mode so that countermeasures can be scheduled in advance.[xi]

The Decision Agent is the cognitive core. It runs a domain-specific transformer over a Mixture of Experts (MoE) framework, sized for field conditions rather than for a data centre. A Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipeline connected to the platform’s local signal library converts an unknown emitter’s metadata into vector embeddings and retrieves historical tactics and recommended responses. The mixture routes the threat profile to specialised models: one weighs lethality through fuzzy logic, one schedules countermeasure resources, and one deconflicts distributed assets.[xii] The computational weight of this layer is the least settled part of the design. Unlike the ES classifier, whose compression to a fraction of a megabyte is demonstrated in the literature, a Mixture-of-Experts transformer with a vector-search retrieval pipeline and three further sub-models has no comparable published footprint at the edge. Whether it can run within the power, cooling, and space available on a warship is an open question, and a prototype would have to settle it before the architecture could be fielded.


The Electronic Attack (EA) Agent executes. It uses deep reinforcement learning of the policy-gradient kind, in an actor–critic arrangement, where a learned value estimate serves as a baseline that reduces the variance of the policy update.[xiii] Operating in a continuous action space, it selects waveforms and schedules power and frequency to avoid disrupting friendly communications.[xiv] It then uses the victim radar’s own behaviour, losing track or reverting from track to search, as the reward signal that tells it whether the technique worked.[xv]

Figure 1. Multi-Agent Architecture of an Edge-Deployed Cognitive EW Suite Source: Author’s original synthesis, informed by Kozlov and co-authors (2025) and the sources cited throughout this section. The classified element of the suite is not depicted; it sits at the interface between the Decision Agent and the combat management system, where mission data and rules of engagement apply.

Distributed Nodes: UAV Swarms in the Electronic Attack Role

A micro-UAV cannot carry the cooling, generation and aperture needed to jam a multi-megawatt naval air-defence radar. The answer is not a bigger drone but a different division of labour: a distributed autonomous system of dozens of low-cost, expendable nodes, some carrying wideband ES receivers and others low-power software-defined jammers, whose coordinated action synthesises a high-power, multi-directional attack.[xvi]

Distributed jamming also answers the counter. A single continuous jammer is a beacon for an anti-radiation missile or a passive Home-on-Jam (HoJ) seeker. A swarm can instead ‘flicker in space’, where node A radiates for a few milliseconds and goes silent, node B radiates from a different position, then node C. To the seeker, the emission appears continuous but jumps between physically separated points, so no stable track forms and the missile passes through the space between the nodes.[xvii]


None of this survives without a self-repairing network. The swarm forms a local ad hoc mesh and routes with Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR). Raw sensor data moves over the data distribution service, where latency matters most, while command messages and track states go over the lighter Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol.[xviii] The swarm also optimises its geometry, computing how sensitive the jamming effect is to each node’s position and moving the node in the direction that has the most effect for the least displacement, so it sits inside the victim radar’s main lobe or its more sensitive sidelobes.


Reading the Emitter: Radar Fingerprinting at the Edge

Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) deserves separate treatment, because it changes what electronic support can produce. No two transmitters are identical. Manufacturing tolerances, chemical variance in silicon wafers, microscopic imperfections in metal cavities and differences in transformer windings leave each unit with its own analogue anomalies.[xix] The combined effect is Unintentional Modulation on Pulse (UMOP)—microscopic ripples in the envelope and intra-pulse phase that are fixed by the physical geometry of the transmitter, and therefore stable, repeatable and very hard to counterfeit.

That signature does three things a waveform parameter cannot. It exposes decoys and radar spoofing, where an adversary mimics a friendly emission. It holds an accurate EOB even while radars are frequency-agile or operating at low probability of intercept. It converts passive detection into platform-level tracking, letting a warship isolate hostile units from the hundreds of merchant and fishing vessels around it and maintain a targeting-grade passive track.[xx]

The classical approach of hand-extracted features such as pulse rise time, settling time and envelope asymmetry is cheap but brittle. Multipath reflection, sea clutter and atmospheric fading warp the transient envelope, and accuracy falls away precisely at the ranges where the SNR drops below 10 dB. Deep networks such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and self-attention transformer encoders fare far better, as they weigh every sample in the sequence against every other.[xxi] The caveat, however, is data. Accuracy depends on the number of observations and the number of samples per observation, and AI methods still trail classical ones in dense, low-signal conditions. Hybrid approaches are therefore the more promising near-term direction.[xxii]

More than accuracy, deployment is the binding constraint. Running these models on a warship means processing millions of pulses per second without server racks. Compression under the TinyML framework, such as TensorFlow Lite, closes the gap by quantising weights from 32-bit floating point to 8-bit integers. A baseline convolutional model shrinks from about 1.4 MB to 123.8 KB, and a transformer encoder to 73.27 KB, with no material performance loss.[xxiii]


Securing the Cognitive Suite

A suite that is autonomous but open to manipulation is more dangerous than the rule-based system it replaces, because it will act quickly and confidently on a false picture. Four threat vectors matter. In model evasion, an adversary shapes its own radar pulses so that the classifier returns a confident but wrong label, and the correct self-defence measure is never released. Secondly, in data poisoning, deceptive or mislabeled emissions radiated in peacetime enter the local training set and shift the decision boundary, leaving a trigger waveform that opens a backdoor later. In model inversion, structured probe signals and the countermeasures they draw allow an adversary to reconstruct the network’s weights and map its blind spots. Lastly, in supply chain compromise, backdoors enter through open-source libraries or pre-trained foundation models.[xxiv]


These defences applied together are proportionate. The first is RF-specific adversarial training, in which gradient-based perturbations generated by the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) are mixed into the training set, forcing decision boundaries that generalise against deception. The second is uncertainty-based action gating. Models emit a confidence or entropy measure alongside the classification; when uncertainty crosses a threshold, the suite is barred from autonomous action, falls back to a deterministic, rule-based safe state, and alerts the operator.[xxv]

Gating on uncertainty is necessary but not sufficient, because it works only where the model recognises that it is unsure; an input unlike anything in its training data, or one deliberately crafted to deceive, can produce a confident error that never trips the threshold, and a fixed floor such as 85 per cent carries the same weakness. It must therefore be paired with checks that do not depend on the model’s own self-assessment: flagging inputs that fall outside the distribution on which the model was trained, corroborating a classification against a second model or an independent sensor, and testing the deployed suite against deliberate deception rather than only against representative signals. The third is explainability. A saliency map laid over the spectrogram, or the attention weights of a transformer, shows the operator which part of the signal drove the call.[xxvi] This is not proof of why the model concluded, but where the model looked, and it serves as an aid to judgement rather than a substitute for it.


Autonomy and Its Limits

The objection to all of this is serious and should be stated in its strongest form. Deep reinforcement learning agents are probabilistic and lack formal verification, so a change of sea state or a domain shift could produce erratic jamming that disrupts friendly command links or escalates a situation nobody intended. A black-box failure cannot be diagnosed in real time, eroding situational awareness and deskilling the crew who must take over. And integrating AI merely trades conventional cyber vulnerabilities for adversarial ones, which a capable opponent can exploit to paralyse a multi-million-dollar platform. On this view, a deterministic rule-based system is slower but wholly predictable, verifiable and under human command, and therefore safer.

The rebuttal rests on three points. First, the rule-based alternative is not slow but blind: against a waveform not in the library, it offers nothing, and the certainty it provides is the certainty of not seeing the threat. Second, the choice is a false binary. Coupling deep-learning classification with deterministic safety boundaries and uncertainty gating produces a hybrid in which the AI operates inside a sandbox and surrenders control the moment confidence falls.

Third, the architecture elevates the human, rather than removing them completely. An operator freed from reading pulse trains becomes a supervisor of the machine’s reasoning rather than a component in its processing chain. This is consistent with the sub-second window described earlier only because the two refer to different decisions. Responses inside the engagement window, such as countermeasure selection and release, are automatic and bounded by the rules the operator has set in advance. Everything slower—changes to those rules, the authorisation of a new technique, the review of what the suite did and why—waits for the operator. The human supervises by setting the boundary before the engagement and auditing the record afterwards, rather than by intervening during it. The safeguard is not the existence of the mechanism but the discipline of its use, and that is a question of doctrine and training as much as of software.

Recommendations

At the tactical level, existing naval platforms should be retrofitted with heterogeneous edge accelerators such as neuromorphic processors or low-power tensor processing units that can run wideband convolutional and recurrent models locally within SWaP-C and thermal limits. Onboard, EW subsystems should adopt open-architecture interfaces such as the NATO Generic Vehicle Architecture so sensing, classification, and execution modules can exchange data at low latency. Uncertainty gating should be built into the CMS as a hard interlock, blocking autonomous jamming or chaff release and handing control to the operator whenever classification confidence falls below a defined floor. A starting point such as 85 per cent, to be calibrated through trials.

At the operational level, UAV swarms carrying lightweight software-defined cognitive payloads should be developed as forward-deployed sensing and cooperative jamming nodes for task groups, with endurance addressed through hydrogen fuel-cell propulsion. Self-healing mesh protocols should be standardised across uncrewed assets so that the local network survives jamming and node loss. No such suite should enter service without closed-loop, high-fidelity simulation that exposes the models to diverse adversarial waveforms and realistic sea-state noise.

At the strategic level, three investments matter more than any single platform. First is sovereign synthetic RF data generation, where labelled emissions from a real adversary are classified or unobtainable in peacetime. High-fidelity national electromagnetic simulators are the only way to train models before contact, and the simulator becomes a strategic asset in its own right. Second, India must establish a standing, independent RF red team, empowered to test deployed models for evasion, poisoning, and extraction both before fielding and continuously afterwards. Third, India needs a settled legal and policy position. Autonomous spectrum decisions need defined accountability, and India should shape international guidelines rather than receive them. Domestically, a joint EW test and evaluation establishment should carry these strands through the indigenisation routes already in place, so the architecture is proven against Indian emitters, Indian sea states, and Indian rules of engagement rather than imported wholesale.
Conclusion

The contest for the EM spectrum has moved from the physics of jamming to the speed of decision. Legacy suites were built on the assumption that the threat could be catalogued before the fight began, and that assumption no longer holds. An edge-deployed, multi-agent architecture that senses with a digital array, reconstructs with compressive sensing and classifies with deep learning, decides with a domain language model, and attacks with reinforcement learning offers a way to close the gap between detecting an emitter and countering it. None of it is safe unless the suite can also be trusted: adversarial training, uncertainty gating and honest explainability are not additions to the architecture but part of it. The risk of fielding such a suite is real, but the certainty of meeting agile, software-defined threats with static libraries is worse.About the author: Cdr Vishnu B Nair is a Communication & Electronic Warfare specialist, presently undergoing the 33rd Naval Staff and Technical Management Course (NSTMC-33) at the Naval War College, Goa.
SourceL This article was published by Manohar Parrikar IDSA


Endnotes:Alida Monica Doriana Barbu, “The Cognitive Electronic Warfare in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”, Strategies XXI, no. 15, 2024; Nicolae Sfetcu, Electronic Warfare and Artificial Intelligence, MultiMedia Publishing, Craiova, 2024.
Stéphane Ricciardi and Cédric Souque, “Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield”, PRISM, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2021.
ET Infra Desk, “DGCA Sets 2027 Deadline for Aircraft Upgrades to Address 5G Interference”, ETInfra, 9 April 2026.
David L. Adamy, EW 101: A First Course in Electronic Warfare, Artech House, Norwood, MA, 2001; Purabi Sharma, Kandarpa Kumar Sarma and Nikos E. Mastorakis, “Artificial Intelligence Aided Electronic Warfare Systems — Recent Trends and Evolving Applications”, IEEE Access, Vol. 8, 2020.
Karamtot Krishna Naik, “Simulation of Cognitive Electronic Warfare System With Sine and Square Waves”, Defence Science Journal, Vol. 73, No. 4, 2023.
Nicolae Sfetcu, Electronic Warfare and Artificial Intelligence, no. 1.
Stéphane Ricciardi and Cédric Souque, “Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield”, no. 2, p. 136.
Vadym Kozlov, Vadym Slyusar, Volodymyr Tverdokhlibov and Zoia Andriichuk, “Integration and Coordination of Electronic Warfare Assets Through Large-Scale Language Models”, Technology Audit and Production Reserves, Vol. 1, No. 2(81), 2025.
Purabi Sharma, Kandarpa Kumar Sarma and Nikos E. Mastorakis, “Artificial Intelligence Aided Electronic Warfare Systems — Recent Trends and Evolving Applications”, no. 4; Tanner McWhorter et al., “Machine Learning Aided Electronic Warfare System”, IEEE Access, Vol. 9, 2021.
Purabi Sharma, Kandarpa Kumar Sarma and Nikos E. Mastorakis, “Artificial Intelligence Aided Electronic Warfare Systems — Recent Trends and Evolving Applications”, no. 4.
Tanner McWhorter et al., “Machine Learning Aided Electronic Warfare System”, no. 9.
Vadym Kozlov, Vadym Slyusar, Volodymyr Tverdokhlibov and Zoia Andriichuk, “Integration and Coordination of Electronic Warfare Assets Through Large-Scale Language Models”, no. 8, pp. 56–57.
Suleiman G. Suleiman, A. E. Airoboman and Nathaniel Dalla, “Artificial Intelligence-Driven Electronic Warfare Systems: The Future of Spectrum Dominance in Modern Conflict”, Journal of Engineering Logic and Modelling Research, Vol. 10, No. 5, 2025.
Reeshen Reddy and Saurabh Sinha, “State-of-the-Art Review: Electronic Warfare Against Radar Systems”, IEEE Access, Vol. 13, 2025.
Shafei Wang, Yanfei Bao and Yan Li, “The Architecture and Technology of Cognitive Electronic Warfare”, Scientia Sinica Informationis, Vol. 48, 2018, pp. 1603–13.
Vadym Slyusar, Vadym Kozlov, Serhii Pochernin and Iryna Nalapko, “Conceptual Foundations of the Swarm Employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Intelligent Means of Electronic Warfare”, Technology Audit and Production Reserves, Vol. 3, No. 2(83), 2025.
Reeshen Reddy and Saurabh Sinha, “State-of-the-Art Review: Electronic Warfare Against Radar Systems”, no. 14, p. 35562.
Vadym Slyusar, Vadym Kozlov, Serhii Pochernin and Iryna Nalapko, “Conceptual Foundations of the Swarm Employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Intelligent Means of Electronic Warfare”, no. 16, p. 73.
M. A. S. Pathania, “Machine Learning and RF Fingerprinting for Signal Intelligence and Tactical Communication Systems: A Review”, International Journal of Creative and Open Research in Engineering and Management, Vol. 2, No. 6, 2026.
Maj Ankur Singh Pathania, “Machine Learning and RF Fingerprinting for Signal Intelligence and Tactical Communication Systems: A Review”, International Journal of Creative and Open Research in Engineering and Management, Vol. 2, No. 6, 2026; Saeif Al-Hazbi, “Deep-Learning-Based Cross-Layer Fingerprinting for Secure and Trustworthy Communication Systems”, PhD Thesis, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, 2025.
Ahmed Mohamed Hussain, Nada Abughanam and Panos Papadimitratos, “Edge AI-based Radio Frequency Fingerprinting for IoT Networks”, arXiv:2412.10553, December 2024.
Karen Zita Haigh and Julia Andrusenko, Cognitive Electronic Warfare: An Artificial Intelligence Approach, 2nd ed., Artech House, Norwood, MA, 2025.
Ahmed Mohamed Hussain, Nada Abughanam and Panos Papadimitratos, “Edge AI-based Radio Frequency Fingerprinting for IoT Networks”, n. 21.
Mathew J. Walter, Aaron Barrett, David J. Walker and Kimberly Tam, “Adversarial AI Testcases for Maritime Autonomous Systems”, AI, Computer Science and Robotics Technology, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2023.
Suleiman G. Suleiman, A. E. Airoboman and Nathaniel Dalla, “Artificial Intelligence-Driven Electronic Warfare Systems: The Future of Spectrum Dominance in Modern Conflict”, no. 13.
Nicolae Sfetcu, “Challenges and Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Electronic Warfare”, IT & C, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2025.


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Argentina slides into technical recession as Milei's reforms stall - IntelliNews Lambda

Argentina slides into technical recession as Milei's reforms stall - IntelliNews Lambda
Two quarters of contraction, inflation stuck above 30%, falling formal employment and a country risk premium back above 900 points have taken the shine off the Milei programme a year before the 2027 election. / bne IntelliNews
By Ben Aris in Berlin November 13, 2026

Argentina's economy has slipped into a technical recession, with leading private consultancies estimating a second consecutive quarterly contraction in July-September, La Reforma reported on November 1.

The General Activity Index compiled by consultancy Orlando Ferreres y Asociados shows a 1.2% fall in the third quarter, while the Center for Quantitative Studies in Business (CECN) at the University of San Andres estimates a drop of up to 2.66% from the second quarter, the paper reported. Analysts have cut their forecasts for 2026 growth to about 1% or less: Eco Go now expects 0.8%, Equilibra, FIEL and Empiria about 1%, and LCG treats 1% as a ceiling.

The International Monetary Fund had already cut its forecast for Argentine growth this year to 2.1% from 3.5% in its World Economic Outlook on October 13 [5], and the central bank's own survey of analysts lowered its estimate to 1.5% in early October.

Nearly three years into President Javier Milei's programme, the shock therapy that balanced the budget and broke hyperinflation has not delivered growth. The data now point the wrong way on almost every front at once: output is falling, disinflation has stalled above 30%, formal jobs are disappearing, peso lending is shrinking in real terms and the country risk premium has more than doubled since July. Milei has rejected the diagnosis, insisting in September that "there is no recession", only "a slowdown in the pace of expansion", and has challenged the official data that show it.

Two quarters of contraction

The official monthly economic activity estimator (EMAE) fell 2.8% m/m in seasonally adjusted terms in July and rebounded by only 0.1% in August, statistics agency INDEC reported on October 21 [1]. Activity was 1.7% lower y/y in August, the steepest annual fall of the year, after a revised 1.5% drop in July. Growth for the first eight months slowed to 1.2% from 1.7% in January-July. Manufacturing fell 3.2% y/y and wholesale and retail trade 3.5%, together knocking 0.9 percentage points off the annual rate, while mining grew 11.1%.


For the third quarter to avoid a fall, September would have needed growth of around 8.5%, which analysts considered unfeasible, La Reforma reported. Official third-quarter GDP figures are due in December. GDP had already contracted 0.6% q/q in seasonally adjusted terms in the second quarter, although it was still 2% higher than a year earlier [2]. Private consumption fell 2.4% q/q, and fixed investment has now fallen for five consecutive quarters and was 11.1% lower y/y [2].

Argentina's GDP, private consumption and fixed investment, seasonally adjusted % change q/q. Source: INDEC via IntelliNews Lambda

Economy Minister Luis Caputo has argued that the country is not in recession but growing more slowly because of external shocks, and has said the government gives more weight to the EMAE's trend-cycle measure, which was flat in July and August [1]. "Argentina's economy is technically in a moderate recession," Ricardo Delgado, head of consultancy Analytica, told Reuters earlier this month as the austerity-hit economy drew warnings from economists.

Inflation stops falling

The fiscal shock delivered the fall in inflation that won Milei his political capital: annual consumer price growth dropped from 289.4% in April 2024 to 31.3% in October 2025 [3]. Since then it has gone sideways. Prices rose 33.4% y/y in September 2026, higher than a year earlier, and monthly inflation has not fallen below 1.7% this year [3]. It accelerated to 1.9% in September, and consultancy FIEL estimated October at 2%, a third consecutive monthly acceleration.

Argentina's consumer price inflation, annual and monthly. Source: INDEC via IntelliNews Lambda

The government's 2027 budget assumes inflation will fall to 18% next year alongside 4% growth.

Jobs and wages

About 13,000 registered private-sector salaried jobs were lost in July, according to La Reforma. Registered employment has fallen 0.9% since Milei's labour reform became law in March and private formal employment has declined for 13 months in a row, according to the Instituto Argentina Grande, while informal work has risen to a record 45% of the employed. Unemployment rose to 7.9% in the second quarter from 7.6% a year earlier [4].

Wages are the one brighter spot. The purchasing power of formal workers improved in June, July and August, rising by 1% in August, the paper reported.

Credit dries up

Lending, which was supposed to drive the recovery, has not picked up since mid-2025. Dollar loans have grown, but peso loans, including consumer credit lines, have fallen in real terms once seasonal effects are stripped out, La Reforma reported. Consumer lending was 9.6% lower y/y in real terms in September and retail sales tracked by the CAME business federation were down 9.2% in the first nine months, according to the ECOSUR Foundation.

Markets lose faith

Investors have taken fright. The JP Morgan country risk index for Argentina crossed 700 basis points in late October and hit 925 points on November 5, its highest since October 2025, before easing to 856 points on November 10. It stood at about 400 points in July.

Caputo has blamed political uncertainty over the October 2027 presidential election rather than the economy. Bond prices now imply a 41-52% probability of an adverse scenario after the election, up from 11-20% three months earlier, although that is not a default forecast, Morgan Stanley said. Investors are also questioning how the government will find the dollars to meet its 2027 foreign-currency debt payments.

The Brazil comparison

Next door, Brazil has taken the opposite route and is not doing worse for it. Its economy grew 2% y/y in the second quarter, the same pace as Argentina's, with inflation of 4.6% in October against Argentina's 33.4% [6]. Argentina has the cleaner budget, Brazil the deeper savings, a floating currency and a much wider spread of trade partners.

The fiscal surplus that anchors Milei's programme has not translated into the investment boom he promised. Argentina's public sector financial deficit could reach about 4% of GDP by the end of 2026 once capitalised interest on government securities is counted, Tiempo Argentino reported in October, and fixed investment is falling. Brazil's real weakened after Lula's re-election in late October, which poses challenges for Argentine exporters to their biggest market.

Exports are the part of the economy still growing, with agro-exports posting their best October in 25 years and mining and energy expanding. Those sectors employ few people and have not been enough to offset the slump in manufacturing, retail and construction, where most Argentines work, and the recession has arrived a year before voters decide whether Milei gets a second term.

Sources

[1] INDEC, Estimador mensual de actividad economica, August 2026, published October 21, 2026.

[2] INDEC, Informe de avance del nivel de actividad, second quarter of 2026, September 2026.

[3] INDEC, Indice de precios al consumidor, national coverage, series to September 2026.

[4] INDEC, Mercado de trabajo, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, second quarter of 2026.

[5] International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2026.

[6] IBGE/Banco Central do Brasil, IPCA consumer price index, October 2026; IMF quarterly national accounts.

This article was produced with the help of the IntelliNews Lambda analytical tool