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Thursday, August 06, 2026

 

Well-worn wins: Wild capuchin monkeys prefer stones with a proven track record of cracking nuts



New study reveals that visible traces of past tool use can outweigh material properties when primates select tools




Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology

Capuchin monkey cracks open a nut 

image: 

This capuchin monkey cracks open a cashew nut using the "experimental stones". It achieves this by placing the nut on a soft anvil and striking it with a hard hammerstone.

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Credit: © Tiago Falótico





To the point

  • Tool selection strategies: Wild bearded capuchin monkeys match the hardness of stones to their intended function. When given a free choice, they prefer to use softer stones as anvils and harder stones as hammers.
  • Trusting the evidence: Monkeys prefer "used" stones that show visible signs of previous successful nut-cracking over raw ones, even when the material properties are less than ideal.
  • Indirect social learning: The findings suggest that capuchins can learn from the lasting environmental traces left by others without ever having observed the event of tool use itself.
  • Implications for human origins: The study provides a fresh perspective on interpreting early hominin archaeological sites, where the accumulation of used stones may have attracted repeated visits and reuse.

A new study provides experimental evidence that wild capuchin monkeys use more than just physical cues when selecting stone tools; they also rely on visible signs that a stone has previously been used for this purpose. Researchers from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology and the University of São Paulo investigated how nut-cracking capuchin monkeys choose between stones of different hardness and appearance, examining whether evidence of prior use, as indicated by percussive damage, can override the influence of a stone's intrinsic material properties.

The team studied two wild populations of bearded capuchin monkeys (Sapajus libidinosus) in Brazil and presented them with standardised stones in three experimental tasks. For each task, the monkeys could choose between raw, unmodified stones and stones bearing visible signs of previous nut-cracking activity.

Matching materials to the task

In the first task, when all the stones were unused, the monkeys consistently selected different materials for different purposes: softer stones for anvils and harder stones for hammerstones. This suggests that capuchins have an understanding of how material properties relate to mechanical function.

"What surprised us was how consistently the monkeys distinguished between stone types based purely on hardness, with no prior visible use," says Johanna Henke-von der Malsburg, the study’s first author and a former postdoctoral researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology who is now a postdoctoral researcher at the Research Institute for Farm Animal Biology. "This suggests that functional stone selection is not just a habit; it demonstrates genuine awareness of the physical requirements of the task."

When evidence of use takes over

In the second experiment, the monkeys were given a choice between an entirely unused nut-cracking site and one that already contained battered stones and broken nutshells. The monkeys showed a strong preference for the previously used site and, within it, continued to favour softer anvils and harder hammer stones, as well as stones that showed visible wear.

The third task pitted raw and used stones against each other directly. Here, the pattern shifted: for anvils, signs of previous use were favoured over material hardness, with monkeys preferring used stones even when they were not the mechanically optimal choice. However, no clear preference for hardness emerged for hammerstones once visible use entered the equation.

"This is a striking case where social information appears to override an individual's assessment of physical properties," explains Lydia Lunz, the study's senior author and a research group leader at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. "The monkeys didn't need to see another individual crack a nut. The traces left behind — the damage to the stone — were enough to guide their decision. This is a subtle yet powerful form of social learning."

Learning from traces, not just demonstrations

The three experiments together demonstrate that social learning in wild capuchins does not always require the direct observation of another individual's behaviour. Instead, durable physical traces, such as battered stones and discarded nutshells, can transmit information about how and where a task has been successfully completed in the past.

This form of indirect social information may play a significant yet often overlooked role in transmitting and maintaining tool-use traditions across generations of primates. This allows behaviours to persist and spread even in the absence of direct teaching or imitation.

Rethinking the archaeological record

The findings may also provide archaeologists studying early hominin sites with new interpretive tools. Accumulations of modified stones at particular locations have traditionally been interpreted primarily in terms of the availability of raw materials or the practical demands of the task at hand. However, this study suggests an additional factor: the mere presence of visibly modified stones that had previously been used may have actively drawn early hominins back to specific places, encouraging the reuse of both the location and its available materials.

"If modern wild primates can be guided by the accumulated evidence of past tool use, this raises important questions about how early hominins may have related to their discarded tools and worked stones," says Lunz. "The archaeological landscape itself may have functioned as a kind of external memory, influencing where and how tool traditions emerged and persisted."

 

Historic discovery finds 19th-century estate agent used peepshow technology to create proto version of Rightmove






University of Exeter

Advert from Brooks and Green 

image: 

The Brooks and Green advert, taken from The Patriot, dated 4 April, 1842

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Credit: ‘Brooks and Green’, The Patriot, 4 April 1842, 1.






A 19th-century estate agent created the world’s first version of Rightmove more than 160 years before the birth of online property previews.

Brooks and Green, a high-end estate agent based in Old Bond Street, London, used an early form of immersive visual technology called a cosmorama to offer prospective buyers a virtual tour of the properties they were selling.

New research by the University of Exeter has discovered that for 20 years during the 1840s and 50s, decades before photography was used for advertising property, Brooks and Green had created their very own version of a ‘digital walk-through’.

The discovery has emerged as part of a broader study of the history of the cosmorama across Europe and its contribution to the development of ‘show-business’. It’s been published in a special themed edition of Early Popular Visual Culture.

“For half a century, the cosmorama was one of the most common forms of visual show across Europe and the Americas,” said Professor John Plunkett, an expert in 19th-century visual media, and lead author of the paper. “Similar in format to other early forms of immersive entertainment, such as the peepshow, the cosmorama offered picture galleries for the people, tapping into an era of greater travel and offering views of international tourist sites and scenes from across the British Empire. What we’ve discovered through this latest research project, however, is that its use extended beyond simple entertainment: the appeal of cosmoramas was that they sold an experience of virtual travel. This was utilised by one of a new type of dedicated estate agents seeking to sell a growing number of luxury properties and country estates.”

These new insights have emerged through the European research project, CURIOSITAS: Peeping Before Virtual Reality. A Media Archaeology of Immersion Through VR and the Iberian Cosmoramas led by the Universidade Lusófona in Lisbon.

Professor Plunkett worked with the project team to investigate the history of this visual technology in the UK and Ireland. By analysing newspaper archives containing adverts and articles, he mapped its emerging use, particularly from the 1820s onwards. The research project catalogued over 650 cosmoramas in Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, with many others exhibited in countries as far apart as North America, Brazil, Cuba and Australia.

In cosmorama galleries, the paintings were not immediately visible. They were hidden behind walls and viewed through convex lenses that enlarged them and enhanced their depth effects. With the addition of clever lighting effects, the viewer enjoyed an immersive experience. From lens to lens, the viewer would embark on a picturesque journey around the world.

Professor Plunkett found examples of cosmorama galleries in cities across Britain and Ireland. The paper explores how cosmorama began appearing in urban bazaars – the 19th-century equivalent of a department store – as well as becoming a popular feature of the touring shows that travelled around Britain.

And it was during this research that Professor Plunkett, of Exeter’s Department of English and Creative Writing, found evidence that a London business was using a cosmorama in a truly innovative way. Advertisements in London newspapers in the late 1830s revealed that auctioneer and surveyor Brooks and Hedger (later, Brooks and Green), on Old Bond Street, close to the Cosmorama Rooms of Regent Street, were offering cosmoramic views of some of the properties and estates they were selling.

The firm advertised their cosmoramic views until at least 1859. They claimed that their gallery included ‘several Hundred Views of different estates’ from an ‘Aerial Perspective’ showing the house and relevant grounds. Professor Plunkett said that for each view produced, an artist would have had to spend time at the property, making it a labour-intensive process likely reserved for the more exclusive sales.

He said: “In contemporary life, prospective purchasers of real estate are usually aided by a full suite of photographs and floor plans, and often an online video walk-through. Nineteenth-century buyers had no such advantages.

“But the founding of the first specialised estate agents set in motion a more professional approach to marketing property, fuelled by population growth, urbanisation and improved transport links. In that context, we can see how Brooks and Green pioneered the virtual tour, over 150 years before digital technology would fully realise the potential.”

Cosmoramas, Immersive Viewing and the Co-Evolution of the Peepshow is published in Early Popular Visual Culture.

An illustration of a cosmorama, taken from the women's magazine, La Belle Assemblee

Credit

C. Blunt, ‘popular description of the cosmorama’, La Belle Assemblée, nº155, vol. 24, November 1821, 233.

Wednesday, August 05, 2026

Hinge, Not Pole: India in a Fragmenting Global Order

Wednesday 5 August 2026, by Sushovan Dhar



The first year of Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency has accelerated an ongoing transformation: the disintegration of US-led neoliberal globalisation. From the 1990s through the post-2008 period, global capitalism was organised through a structured hierarchy, with US financial dominance, global value chains, and multilateral institutions that secured the conditions for capital accumulation. That architecture is now visibly fraying.

What is emerging is often described as ‘multipolarity’, as if a more balanced order were taking shape. But this language obscures the central dynamic: not the disappearance of hierarchy, but its reorganisation under intensified inter-imperial rivalry. Trade, finance and technology are no longer governed primarily by the imperatives of market integration. They are increasingly subordinated to strategic competition, evident in export controls on advanced technologies and efforts to restructure supply chains. The shift is not from globalisation to fragmentation but from relatively open circuits of accumulation to more managed, politicised interdependence.

Trump’s second term should be understood in this light—as an accelerant rather than a rupture. The turn toward protectionism, supply chain restructuring, and economic nationalism predates his return, rooted in the long crisis of profitability and the strategic challenge posed by China’s rise. What has changed is the explicitness with which major powers are now willing to weaponise interdependence and redraw the terms of global integration.

In this context, the question is not simply which state will dominate the emerging order but how different states operate within it. It is here that countries such as India assume a particular significance: not as alternative centres of power, but as actors navigating—and seeking advantage within—the fractures of a recomposing global hierarchy.

Why India Matters Now

India’s growing centrality in global economic and geopolitical debates is not simply a function of its size but of its place in this order. With a large domestic market, a substantial workforce, and an expanding digital and infrastructural base, India emerges as a potential site for the partial reorganisation of global value chains, reflected in the rapid expansion of electronics assembly and Apple’s shift of part of its iPhone production to India. The search for alternatives to China has elevated India’s profile, but meaningful relocation of production remains limited.

At the same time, India occupies a distinctive geopolitical space. It is neither integrated into Western alliance structures nor aligned with China. Its participation in groups like the QUAD [1] and BRICS [2] is a condition of its relevance, not a contradiction.

This duality—economically attractive to global capital and politically mobile across geopolitical divides—has made India an increasingly important interlocutor. It is courted by the United States and its allies, while simultaneously maintaining ties with Russia and projecting itself as a voice of the Global South. In moments of systemic transition, such positions become more important.

Yet it would be misleading to read this prominence as evidence of an impending transition to Indian hegemony, or even to a stable multipolar equilibrium in which India emerges as one pole among others. India’s importance lies less in reordering the system than in how it operates within it. It is not simply rising; it is positioning itself within the constraints and opportunities produced by an increasingly fractured global order.

India as a Hinge State

India’s current role is best understood not through “non-alignment” or alliance formation, but as that of a hinge state. India today moves across blocs, unlike the non-aligned posture of the Cold War, which sought to maintain distance from them. However, it refrains from making binding alliance commitments. This reflects an effort to extract material and strategic gains from a context in which major powers are competing to secure partners, markets, and influence.

Following the war in Ukraine, India sharply increased its imports of discounted Russian oil, with Russia becoming its largest supplier in 2023, much of it refined and re-exported to Western markets as petroleum products, even as Western sanctions sought to isolate Moscow. These purchases also helped stabilise domestic energy prices and supported economic growth. Simultaneously, India deepened its strategic partnership with the United States through the QUAD—an Indo-Pacific strategic grouping—while broader Western security initiatives such as AUKUS have taken shape alongside it. It has expanded defence cooperation and positioned itself as a critical node in efforts to reconfigure supply chains away from China. What appears as inconsistency is strategy. India leverages geopolitical tensions without fully committing to any single camp.

This hinge function extends beyond energy and security. India actively courts investment, promoting itself as an alternative manufacturing destination through state-led initiatives such as production-linked incentive schemes. At the same time, it continues to participate in BRICS, endorsing projects even as its integration into US-led capital circuits deepens. The coexistence of these orientations is not transitional but constitutive of its current role.

To describe India as a hinge state is to recognise a specific mode of insertion into the global order—one that relies on movement between centres of power and the capacity to translate systemic fragmentation into strategic advantage.

The Limits of Autonomy

The language of ‘strategic autonomy’—India’s claim to act independently of competing blocs—overstates the freedom implied by its hinge position. Its capacity to manœuvre is real, but exercised within structural constraints. The hinge can pivot—but only within the frame that holds it. This room for manœuvre is also subject to pressure, as the United States increasingly links strategic partnership to expectations around trade, technology, and sanctions compliance.

India’s growth remains tied to global circuits of capital, technology and demand. Its appeal as an alternative manufacturing hub rests on low labour costs and state-led incentives; its industrial base remains uneven, with strength in areas such as pharmaceuticals and services but gaps in advanced manufacturing, and its integration into global value chains depends on imported components, foreign investment, and external markets. Efforts to attract supply chain relocation, whether in electronics, pharmaceuticals or semiconductors, yield partial gains but fall short of a structural transformation.

Ambitions of digital sovereignty coexist with reliance on external capital and infrastructure. Partnerships with US firms and alignment with Western technology ecosystems have enabled expansion in sectors such as digital services and telecommunications but also reinforce asymmetric dependencies in areas such as advanced manufacturing, chip design and critical technologies. This is not autonomy but negotiated insertion.

Sustained growth rates of around 6–7% coexist with persistent inequality, agrarian distress, and a labour regime characterised by informality and precarity, with over 80% of employment remaining informalised. Much of India’s comparative advantage in global production continues to depend on the reproduction of low-cost labour under conditions of limited social protection. The uneven distribution of the benefits of its geopolitical positioning raises the question of whether “national” strategic gains translate into broader social advancement.

Finally, India’s expanding international role is accompanied by the consolidation of political power domestically, with increasing centralisation and repression of dissent. These shifts underpin India’s capacity to present stability to global capital and act decisively in geopolitical negotiations. Autonomy at the level of the state can thus coexist with deepening asymmetries within society.

Implications for the Global South

India’s trajectory as a hinge state raises broader questions about the possibilities facing the Global South. Its ability to navigate between competing blocs, extract concessions, and maintain a degree of strategic flexibility may appear, at first glance, as a model for other postcolonial states seeking to avoid subordination within any single bloc. Yet such a reading risks mistaking a structurally specific position for a generalisable strategy.

India’s ability to act as a hinge is closely tied to its size. Few states possess the strategic location that allows India to be simultaneously courted by multiple centres of power. For smaller and more economically vulnerable countries, the fragmentation of the global order is more likely to narrow the space for manœuvre—pushing them toward selective alignment or dependent integration.

This may deepen differentiation within the Global South. While some states are able to leverage inter-imperial rivalry to secure investment, technology transfers, or diplomatic concessions, others face intensified pressures to conform to the strategic and economic priorities of dominant powers.

The fragmentation of globalisation does not automatically translate into greater autonomy for the Global South; it may instead produce more complex and differentiated forms of dependency, mediated through regional powers and hinge states.

Conclusion

India’s emergence as a hinge state does not herald the arrival of a new, stable multipolar order. It reveals the character of the transition underway. What is taking shape is not the displacement of hierarchy, but its reconfiguration through intensified rivalry, selective decoupling, and uneven forms of interdependence. States like India matter less for transcending the system than for how they operate within its fractures.

The hinge can move. But it does not determine the door.

17 April 2026

Source : CADTM.

Footnotes

[1] Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is an informal cooperation framework with Australia, India and Japan, aimed at promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific space in response to China’s growing influence, with a focus on maritime security, technological cooperation (5G, semiconductors), infrastructure and democracy. It is a key component of the US policy of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, complementing other alliances such as AUKUS.

AUKUS: In US strategy, AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) is a crucial trilateral security pact to contain Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific, providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, thereby strengthening regional deterrence and integrating Canberra more closely into the US security architecture vis-à-vis Beijing. It is a pillar of US policy aimed at projecting advanced military force in the region.

[2] The BRICS are a bloc of emerging economies and geopolitical powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and, from 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Indonesia).