Turkish authorities have blocked a convoy carrying aid to Kobane, a predominantly Kurdish town in northern Syria encircled by the Syrian army
The New Arab Staff & Agencies
31 January, 2026
Turkish authorities have blocked a convoy carrying aid to Kobane, a predominantly Kurdish town in northern Syria encircled by the Syrian army, NGOs and a Turkish MP said on Saturday.
They said the aid was blocked before it reached the Turkey-Syria border, despite an agreement announced on Friday between the Syrian government and the country's Kurdish minority to gradually integrate the Kurds' military and civilian institutions into the state.
Twenty-five lorries containing water, milk, baby formula and blankets collected in Diyarbakir, the main city in Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast, "were prevented from crossing the border", said the Diyarbakir Solidarity and Protection Platform, which organised the aid campaign.
"Blocking humanitarian aid trucks carrying basic necessities is unacceptable, both from the point of view of humanitarian law and from the point of view of moral responsibility," said the platform, which brings together several NGOs.
Earlier this week, residents of Kobane told AFP they were running out of food, water and electricity because the city was overwhelmed with people fleeing the advance of the Syrian army.
Kurdish forces accused the Syrian army of imposing a siege on Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab in Arabic.
"The trucks are still waiting in a depot on the highway," said Adalet Kaya, an MP from Turkey's pro-Kurdish DEM party who was accompanying the convoy.
"We will continue negotiations today. We hope they will be able to cross at the Mursitpinar border post," he told AFP.
Mursitpinar is located on the Turkish side of the border, across from Kobane.
Turkish authorities have kept the border crossing closed since 2016, while occasionally opening it briefly to allow humanitarian aid to pass through.
DEM and Turkey's main opposition CHP called this week for Mursitpinar to be opened "to avoid a humanitarian tragedy".
Turkish authorities said aid convoys should use the Oncupinar border crossing, 180 kilometres (110 miles) away.
"It's not just a question of distance. We want to be sure the aid reaches Kobane and is not redirected elsewhere by Damascus, which has imposed a siege," said Kaya.
After months of deadlock and fighting, Damascus and the Syrian Kurds announced an agreement on Friday that would see the forces and administration of Syria's Kurdish autonomous region gradually integrated into the Syrian state.
Kobane is around 200 kilometres from the Kurds' stronghold in Syria's far northeast.
Kurdish forces liberated the city from a lengthy siege by the Islamic State group in 2015 and it took on symbolic value as their first major victory against the militants.
Kobane is hemmed in by the Turkish border to the north and government forces on all sides, pending the entry into the force of Friday's agreement.
Reshaping Syria's northeast: What now for the SDF?
The government's push into the northeast is reshaping Syria's balance of power, leaving the SDF's future and the country's reunification hanging in the balance
Analysis
Cian Ward
29 January, 2026
Deir Az-Zour, Syria - Two nail-biting hours after the deadline for last week's ceasefire in northeast Syria expired on Saturday, Syria’s Ministry of Defence announced that they had decided to extend the truce for an additional 15 days.
The announcement came following a major conflagration in Syria since mid-January, when the government launched an offensive against the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria’s northeast.
It followed a week of clashes in Aleppo’s Kurdish neighbourhoods of Achrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud, and a government offensive in SDF positions in eastern Aleppo.
Just under a week into the operation in northeast Syria, tribes in the largely Arab provinces of Raqqa and Deir Az-Zour, who had been allies with the SDF for years, defected to the side of the government. This forced the SDF to retreat to Kobani, Qamishli, and Hasakah, where larger populations of Kurds are situated.
On 18 January, a 14-point peace deal was agreed between the two sides that stipulated the SDF’s integration, but it was never effectively implemented on the ground as both sides kept fighting.
A second deal was then announced that provided the SDF with four days for “internal consultations” to develop a concrete plan on how they could integrate. On Saturday, the deadline expired without response, and for two hours the country held its breath, not knowing if the northeast was about to be plunged back into war. At the 11th hour, the ceasefire was eventually extended, and is now due to expire on 8 February.
SDF commander Mazloum Abdi was in Damascus on Tuesday for further talks as part of efforts to reach a new security arrangement in the northeast.
A source close to the Kurdish side told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, The New Arab's sister site, that the government’s internal security forces are expected to enter Hasakah city alongside the SDF’s internal security - perhaps as soon as the next 48 hours.
Cian Ward
Washington's shifting loyalties
The US announced plans last week to transfer 7,000 Islamic State (IS) prisoners from detention facilities under the control of the SDF to Iraq. The 15-day ceasefire extension was ostensibly to provide the US military time to achieve this.
Washington’s decision could signal a degree of pessimism about the ability of the SDF and the government to agree on an integration deal, alongside its diminished trust in the SDF’s capacity to guarantee the security of its prisons in the face of continued fighting.
According to Reuters, the US had reportedly given Damascus the tacit green light to launch the recent operation against its erstwhile ally.
The SDF have lost significant amounts of territory that they held in northeastern Syria following the government's recent offensive. [Getty]
The US played a role in the very formation of the SDF in 2015 by pushing a collection of left-leaning Kurdish-dominated groups - the largest of which was the YPG - into forming a more coherent military and political structure.
The SDF became Washington’s preferred security partner and was provided with large amounts of US weapons, training, and military support to pursue its fight against IS in Syria.
It is clear that Washington still hopes for a deal between the two sides, with Tom Barrack, US Special Envoy to Syria, posting on X that, “the ceasefire represents a pivotal inflection point, where former adversaries embrace partnership over division”.
However, what is also evident is that the US has switched its allegiance and now views Damascus as its primary partner in Syria moving forward - ultimately deeming that its interests lie in the SDF’s complete integration, rather than Syria’s continued fragmentation.
For many on the SDF side, however, this has come as an abject betrayal of years of blood, sweat, and tears that they have spent fighting IS on Washington’s behalf.
At the same time, the US administration was reportedly angry that Syrian forces had encircled Kurdish-majority cities despite the 18 January truce, with officials considering reimposing sanctions if mass violence against Kurds takes place and fighting continues.
The US played a role in the very formation of the SDF in 2015 by pushing a collection of left-leaning Kurdish-dominated groups - the largest of which was the YPG - into forming a more coherent military and political structure.
The SDF became Washington’s preferred security partner and was provided with large amounts of US weapons, training, and military support to pursue its fight against IS in Syria.
It is clear that Washington still hopes for a deal between the two sides, with Tom Barrack, US Special Envoy to Syria, posting on X that, “the ceasefire represents a pivotal inflection point, where former adversaries embrace partnership over division”.
However, what is also evident is that the US has switched its allegiance and now views Damascus as its primary partner in Syria moving forward - ultimately deeming that its interests lie in the SDF’s complete integration, rather than Syria’s continued fragmentation.
For many on the SDF side, however, this has come as an abject betrayal of years of blood, sweat, and tears that they have spent fighting IS on Washington’s behalf.
At the same time, the US administration was reportedly angry that Syrian forces had encircled Kurdish-majority cities despite the 18 January truce, with officials considering reimposing sanctions if mass violence against Kurds takes place and fighting continues.
Shelly Kittleson
The SDF's next move
One of the biggest questions is what comes next. Will the SDF lay down its weapons or will it continue its fight for a decentralised Syria? Could internal disagreements cause a split within the movement itself?
Following the 20 January ceasefire, decisions about the future now rest with the SDF. This period of internal consultation is due to them “hypothetically trying to get everyone who has power within the movement on board with the deal,” Alexander McKeever, researcher and author of the This Week in Northern Syria newsletter, told The New Arab.
He notes that whilst the SDF and their civilian government have official transparent hierarchies, “it is unclear if that has any bearing on how decisions are made. Instead, decision making is made by a number of senior cadres,” whose influence isn't necessarily reflected in their position.
There is a common line given by the pro-government side that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi is a moderate who is seeking a deal, but is being spoiled by others, perhaps with PKK ties, behind the scenes. However, according to McKeever such claims are entirely unsubstantiated.
The US has switched its allegiance and now views Damascus as its primary partner in Syria moving forward. [Getty]
In reality, it is notoriously difficult to assess the internal divisions within this shadowy network of cadres as they are extremely effective at showing a united front publicly.
“At the end of the day, this is a well-disciplined guerilla movement in which every major decisionmaker has spent years in the mountains socialised within the organisation [fighting the Turks,]” he adds.
This makes it “quite hard to predict whether or not they could be a split,” he explained to TNA. The SDF has no track record of public splits, however, the government's offensive represents the single gravest existential threat it has ever faced, and so the possibility can’t be ruled out.
In reality, it is notoriously difficult to assess the internal divisions within this shadowy network of cadres as they are extremely effective at showing a united front publicly.
“At the end of the day, this is a well-disciplined guerilla movement in which every major decisionmaker has spent years in the mountains socialised within the organisation [fighting the Turks,]” he adds.
This makes it “quite hard to predict whether or not they could be a split,” he explained to TNA. The SDF has no track record of public splits, however, the government's offensive represents the single gravest existential threat it has ever faced, and so the possibility can’t be ruled out.
Islamic State prisoners
The government’s offensive caused several IS prisons to be abandoned by the SDF as it withdrew, with a number of IS detainees and family members escaping over the last week.
At al-Shaddadi prison in Hasakah province, 120 IS members escaped after Arab tribal elements reportedly seized the facility and released those inside. According to the government, 83 of those have since been recaptured.
Despite this, it remains unclear how many of those accused of IS affiliation inside the SDF’s prison network are actually members of the group. Large families gathered outside al-Aqtan prison in Raqqa province last week demanding the release of their relatives, as a component of SDF fighters holed up inside negotiated their safe transfer to SDF territory.
Paul Iddon
Those families denied that their imprisoned relatives were members of IS, instead claiming that they had been unjustly targeted by the SDF as part of a broader pattern of systematic discrimination against the Arab community in SDF-controlled territory.
Following the successful negotiation of the SDF fighters’ safe departure to Kobani province, it emerged that Syrian authorities had found and released 120 underage prisoners inside al-Aqtan, many of whom had been accused of being members of IS.
The government also took control of the infamous Al-Hol camp, and the government has since decided to bring these detention facilities under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, potentially signalling that it is seeking to resolve the file and free the prisoners from years of political limbo. What form that takes, however, is yet to be determined.
An existential war for Kurds
Many Kurds, meanwhile, consider the threat posed by Damascus’ new government to be existential.
“We don’t know what will happen to our families,” one man, Daher, told TNA in Kobani. The city is surrounded on three sides by the Syrian government and on the fourth by Turkey, who consider the SDF as an arm of the PKK - a group that has fought a decades-long insurgency against Ankara.
Under siege for at least a week, it was only on Sunday that the Syrian government opened two humanitarian corridors into the region.
“These are the same people who massacred thousands on the coast and in Suweida,” Daher told TNA. “We are terrified that if they come, there will be massacres.”
If there is no deal to be made, this fight-or-die mentality will certainly strengthen the resolve of the SDF and the Kurdish populations living under their control in the face of a renewed government offensive.
Last week, the SDF issued a general mobilisation, calling on “all segments of our people to arm themselves and prepare to confront any potential attack”. Daher says he witnessed hundreds of residents in Kobani bringing their weapons to enlistment centres to sign up with the SDF.
“These people are now our reserves; they are currently on standby in case the enemy attacks, after which they will join the fight,” he told TNA. “How can I live in peace with those terrorists? They are no better than IS.”
Many Kurds consider the threat posed by Damascus' new government to be existential. [Getty]
It is a common sentiment in some parts of Syria, from Alawite areas on the coast to Druze-majority Suweida, pointing to a broader disaffection among many minority communities as Damascus seeks to centralise authority by force under the rhetoric of national unity.
This pattern of using repeated coercion to bind the country together, without providing an effective sense of justice, has been criticised by many for papering over the cracks that ripped the country apart over a decade of civil war.
Damascus may be able to extend its authority to the northeastern borders of Syria, but that doesn't necessarily mean it will be able to bring the four corners of the country into the centralised authority’s fold.
Suweida, for example, remains an open wound, while on the coast, widespread dissatisfaction amongst Alawites triggered protests last December, with calls for federalism amid an ongoing low-level insurgency.
Even if the government does win a war against the SDF, it doesn’t necessarily mean the bloodshed will stop in Syria’s northeast.
Cian Ward is a journalist based in Damascus, covering conflict, migration, and humanitarian issues
Follow him on X: @CP__Ward
It is a common sentiment in some parts of Syria, from Alawite areas on the coast to Druze-majority Suweida, pointing to a broader disaffection among many minority communities as Damascus seeks to centralise authority by force under the rhetoric of national unity.
This pattern of using repeated coercion to bind the country together, without providing an effective sense of justice, has been criticised by many for papering over the cracks that ripped the country apart over a decade of civil war.
Damascus may be able to extend its authority to the northeastern borders of Syria, but that doesn't necessarily mean it will be able to bring the four corners of the country into the centralised authority’s fold.
Suweida, for example, remains an open wound, while on the coast, widespread dissatisfaction amongst Alawites triggered protests last December, with calls for federalism amid an ongoing low-level insurgency.
Even if the government does win a war against the SDF, it doesn’t necessarily mean the bloodshed will stop in Syria’s northeast.
Cian Ward is a journalist based in Damascus, covering conflict, migration, and humanitarian issues
Follow him on X: @CP__Ward
A pro-Palestinian activist is arrested during a demonstration in London earlier this month [Getty]
