From Chip Wars to Rare Earth Wars

Prabir Purkayastha | 16 Aug 2025

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The strategic issue today is not who controls our future but who controls it now. This is the larger strategic battle being waged in the chip and energy wars today.

Representational Image. Image Courtesy: Needpix.com

The world of technology wars has spilt over from chips to a relatively less-known and even less-understood arena of rare earths. For most who are unfamiliar with chemistry and the periodic table, rare earths seem to be some mysterious elements that have suddenly become a new tech battlefield between nations.

We are now realising that not only are rare earths indispensable for a variety of devices that have entered our everyday lives, but they also form the foundation of renewable energy technologies. According to Prof. Adam Tooze of Columbia University, if fossil fuels heralded the industrial revolution with the West leading it, the green energy transition is clearly being led by Asia, with China as its global leader.

Rare earths not only provide the base for renewables, but they are also indispensable for a variety of applications, particularly for producing electromagnets. Such electromagnets are embedded in our mobile phones, electric vehicles, military applications and many devices in our everyday use. Not surprisingly, they have also entered the technology and economic war that the US is waging against China. The US clearly holds the upper hand in the chip wars by its control over the technology of cutting-edge lithographic tools. The scenario is quite different in the energy wars, particularly the one being fought over renewable energy and rare earths.

As we have written in these columns, the ultraviolet light sources that the Dutch company ASML uses are under US patents, bringing them under US government laws. ASML is the leading manufacturer of lithographic tools and has a monopoly on extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithographic machines. If the Western companies have a clear edge in chip wars, the Chinese appear to have a near monopoly over the entire rare earth supply chain, including the production of high-efficiency magnetic motors. These motors power a range of applications: from electric vehicles, wind turbines, aero-engines, mobile phones, etc.

Just as the US did not ban outright the export of chips to China but imposed export controls on them, so has China. China requires extensive export registration licensing requirements for the export of certain kinds of rare earth products, making clear that, in technology wars, it is not just the West; they also hold some important cards.

So let us dive straight into what rare earths are and why they are so important. Rare earths are a group of 17 elements in the periodic table, out of which 7 have been put on the restricted list by China. Mirroring the US technology regime, it requires that parties seeking export of such "restricted" materials from China will have to furnish detailed documents of their immediate and also the end-use parties.

The key pressure point is in importing neodymium iron boron (Ne-Fe-B) electromagnets. These neodymium magnets contain two rare earth elements—dysprosium and terbium—which are on the restricted list, and China controls nearly 100% of their production. The neodymium magnets with dysprosium and terbium have superior magnetic performance, are lighter and stronger, can be engineered into any shape or size and also withstand much higher temperatures.

So why are these elements so important and for which industries? The Chinese monopoly currently in the news is the monopoly over the production of high-efficiency electromagnets, which are at the heart of many devices, including renewable energy, mobile phones, and the military sector.

The efficiency of an electric motor is crucial in applications like electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, etc. In our cell phones, the efficiency of the motor decides how long the device will last before it needs to be recharged. In the case of a wind turbine or an electric vehicle, the efficiency of the magnet decides the efficiency of the device and, therefore, is of critical importance to the user.

Cheap and efficient magnets are therefore critical to the expansion of the renewable energy industry as well as the mobile phone market. That is not all. Such efficient magnets are also crucial to the aerospace industry, drones and missiles. If chips have entered virtually every modern device, so have devices using rare earths.

So, does China have a near monopoly over rare earth sources? No, China does not have a monopoly over the sources of rare earths. Though they have about 44% of the world's reserve, they are followed by Vietnam (22%), Brazil, Russia (21% each), India (6.9%), Australia (5.7%) and others. What they have is a near-global monopoly on the separation of rare earth materials from the other materials and the supply chain of a variety of products built on top of the rare earth materials that are at the core of many industrial and military applications.

Though they are termed rare, these materials are actually widely available in the Earth's crust. The problem is that they are available in a highly diluted form and often mixed with radioactive elements, e.g., monazite sand in India, which contains the radioactive element thorium. Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL) has a long history of expertise in this area, but its focus was primarily on the production of thorium as its primary goal. That meant that IREL did not focus on the rare earths themselves—which are associated with thorium in the monazite sand—as an important product in their own right, particularly in the age of renewable energy.

How did China build its rare earth sector and its near monopoly over certain rare earth products, considering that the raw materials are widely available, including in Australia, a very close US ally and its defence partner in the Indo-Pacific?

From the 1950s to 1980s, the US was the leading producer of rare earths. The rare earths had then also a variety of uses: from colour television to colouring glass, oil cracking (splitting oil to its lighter fractions), etc. Today, rare earth materials are vital for a myriad of industries: from wind turbines, electric vehicles, aircraft, robotics, etc. In the military, they are used in missiles, lasers, vehicle-mounted systems such as tanks, and military communications.

Though China produces about 60% of all rare earths itself, it processes nearly 90%, meaning it also processes rare earths produced by countries like Myanmar, Australia, Vietnam, etc. For heavy rare earths, used for example in the magnets that we have talked about, China's monopoly is even higher: over 99% if not 99.9%!

How critical are these rare earth elements for the US military? According to the Centre for Strategic & International Studies, a US think tank, "REEs are crucial for a range of defense technologies, including F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition series of smart bombs. For example, the F-35 fighter jet contains over 900 pounds of REEs. An Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 destroyer requires approximately 5,200 pounds, while a Virginia-class submarine uses around 9,200 pounds."

If we leave out capital equipment like ships, submarines and aircraft and look at military consumables—only missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and smart bombs, etc.—right now neither the US nor its allies have any facilities to produce heavy rare earth magnets. Even if the US facility comes on stream by the end of 2025, it will only produce 1% of what China produced in 2018! Though Australia's Lynas Rare Earths is the largest producer of rare earths outside of China, it still sends its intermediate rare earth materials for its final processing to China.

None of the technologies, either for chips or for rare earths, will remain permanently the monopoly of a nation-state. For continental-sized economies such as the US, China or India, neither chips nor rare earth magnets can remain technology monopolies. But yes, chip or magnet restriction can slow a country down for the time being, and provide a short-term advantage to one or the other country. But not for long, certainly not for every product or country. The nuclear denial and missile denial regimes that the US and its allies imposed on countries like India did not work even earlier. To believe that they will work today or for the foreseeable future is to believe in fairy tales.

As Keynes said in his famous quote on the long-term view of the economy, "But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run, we are all dead." The strategic issue today is not who controls our future but who controls it now. This is the larger strategic battle being waged in the chip and energy wars today.

 

The Monsters of the Global Crisis Interregnum

Carmen Navas Reyes | 16 Aug 2025

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Between capitalism in decline, expressed in wars and neo-fascism, and the left calling for reconstruction, people resist.

Protesta por la crisis del G20 en Londres en abril de 2009. Foto: Wiki commons

The famous quote by Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci seems to have been written for the moment humanity is currently experiencing: “The old is dying, and the new cannot be born. In this interregnum, monsters arise.”

The world is going through a civilizational crisis in which the neoliberal capitalist order, although mortally wounded, continues to impose its predatory logic, that of the use of force and the resurgence of fascism, while emancipatory alternatives fail to consolidate. In this vacuum, monsters proliferate: wars and attempts at recolonization, climate crisis, structural hunger, collapse of multilateralism and international law placed at the service of the world’s powers that be.

Capitalism and its “terminal crisis”

According to Brazilian theologian Leonardo Boff, the globalized capitalist system has been showing terminal signs for more than a decade: the obscene concentration of wealth, parasitic financialization, planetary catastrophes, and the precariousness of life have led to this crisis, but it has not been strong enough to finally bury this system. Western imperialism – today embodied in NATO and its imposition of increased war budgets on member countries, in the US economic war, especially against China, and in the European Union’s sanctions against Russia – can no longer flaunt itself as before, but it refuses to die. Its decline is evident in global inflation, the return of Cold War geopolitics, and the rise of neo-fascisms as fictitious “solutions” to inequality.

Is the left also in crisis?

While capitalism seems to be moving towards its decomposition, the left is unable to articulate a hegemonic project. Progressive experiences in Latin America face economic siege, blockades, unilateral coercive measures and judicialization, divisions and popular demobilization; European social democracy is surrendering to neoliberalism and anti-capitalist alternatives still lack global strength. Fragmentation and what appears to be a lack of strategies in the face of new forms of domination (such as the digital divide, corporatist government, and the rule of Big Tech) weaken the possibility of the emergence of a new order.

The monsters of the “interregnum”

In this historical limbo, crises are multiplying:

Wars and neocolonialism: Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan, the Sahel, conflicts where resources are plundered under the rhetoric of “defending democracy” or simply betting on chaos and the disappearance of states.

Environmental catastrophe: Capitalism has turned nature into a “commodity,” and now the planet is suffering countless fires, floods, and desertification.

Hunger and inequality: The 1% owns more than the 99%, while the UN reports that 735 million people suffer from chronic hunger, billionaires break records in profits and gain support from media corporations and politicians.

The failure of international law: The International Criminal Court prosecutes Africans but ignores the crimes of Israel and the US, while the Security Council has become a veto club. Furthermore, reform of the United Nations has become a key issue for the Global South, as seen at the last BRICS meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Criminalization of migrants: In the first six months of his second term, President Donald Trump has launched a strong public campaign against the presence of migrants, especially Latin Americans, in the United States. This campaign has also been the basis for an aggressive anti-immigration policy that ranges from the revocation of programs such as Humanitarian Parole, the cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS), mass deportations, family separation, and the removal of infants from their parents, to the establishment of a highly sophisticated international prison system that violates human rights.

However, this policy is not exclusive, nor was it initiated by the Trump administration, as noted in the testimony of Gladys Caricote, one of the Venezuelan women deported from the United States to Venezuela. In her testimony, she details the discriminatory policy of US governments after being held in an immigration detention center (ICE) for more than 10 months, which means that it was under the administration of Joe Biden, the 46th President of the United States (Democratic Party, 2021-2025), when this restrictive policy towards migrants from Venezuela was tightened.

Is there a way out?

What is needed to build alternatives? How can the Global South help? Is there any point in creating new forms of democracy, popular organization, and class internationalism?

The BRICS summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 6 and 7 was a key event, as it represented a counterweight to the Western-dominated economic and political order, Similarly, its progressive expansion (in 2023-2024, the BRICS accepted new members such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), despite differing criteria among member countries on this issue, has meant greater representation for the Global South, even if it is not without tensions, such as Brazil’s opposition to Venezuela’s entry.

This summit, which issued a 126-point declaration, was quickly responded to by President Donald Trump, who described the proposal to de-dollarize the group’s economic transactions, promoting payments in local currencies and mechanisms such as the New Development Bank (NDB), as a threat to the United States and threatened to increase tariffs on countries that support this action.

Another important event, highlighted in the final declaration of this meeting, was the session of the Civil Council, which the movements present in Brazil have called the “BRICS People’s Council,” promoted at last year’s meeting in Kazan, Russia, as a Civil Forum, even though it is not institutionalized in any instance of the political bloc. However, the potential of this Council, not only for the BRICS countries themselves, but also for our countries in the South, is summed up in the reading of the Council’s consensus statement by João Pedro Stedile, of the National Coordination of the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and the Political Coordination of ALBA Movements, who summarized that “the formal participation of the People’s Council is historic because it consolidates a method. Everyone agrees that the problems facing the peoples will not be solved by government initiatives alone.” However, everyone seems to be clear that it will not be an easy process, given that the rotating presidencies of the group determine the approaches.

Next year, the presidency will go to India, which may have a different view of the role of popular organizations in BRICS, but the important thing is that it is already a decision of the popular organizations to accompany this geopolitical instance as an alternative to the crises already raised, this being another way in which popular movements and organizations are standing up to the monsters that have emerged at this stage, as they have also done with mass actions against the attacks on Iran, Israel’s extreme violence in Gaza and throughout Palestine, the kidnapping of migrants, in defense of the sovereignty of the Sahel countries, etc.

Carmen Navas Reyes is a Venezuelan political scientist with a master’s degree in Ecology for Human Development (UNESR). She is currently pursuing a doctorate in Latin American Studies at the Fundación Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos Rómulo Gallegos CELARG in Venezuela. She is a member of the International Advisory Council of the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research.

This article was produced by Globetrotter. 

Courtesy: Peoples Dispatch

Tennis star Venus Williams is the newest member of Barbie’s Inspiring Women club

Williams’ 2007 Wimbledon win and her role in securing equal prize money for women get the Barbie treatment.

Images Staff
16 Aug, 2025
DAWN

When Venus Williams fought for equal prize money in tennis, she didn’t just change the sport; she made history. And beginning this week, her legendary push is being sealed in plastic.

Barbie has unveiled a Venus Williams doll as part of its Inspiring Women collection, commemorating the seven-time Grand Slam champion for her forehands, titles, and her advocacy.

Williams is joining the ranks of Maya Angelou, Ida B Wells, Celia Cruz and Anna Sui, among others in the Barbie Inspiring Women Series.

On Instagram, Barbie announced the launch with a fitting tribute — “A masterful match. Venus Williams is a seven-time Grand Slam champ and an advocate for gender pay equity in sports, serving greatness on and off the court! Now, Barbie is proud to honour Venus as the newest Inspiring Women doll.”



The doll recreates Williams’ outfit she wore at Wimbledon in 2007, the year the grass-court major finally levelled the playing field by offering equal prize money to men and women. She beat Marion Bartoli to clinch her fourth Wimbledon singles crown. And she did it while making history off-court, too.

Speaking to USA Today ahead of the doll’s August 15 release, Williams called it a “huge moment” in her life, one that feels especially moving to see honoured this way. “To see that moment honoured with a Barbie doll is incredibly special,” she said. “I hope it inspires young girls to speak up, believe in themselves, and know they have the power to change the game too.”



Mattel said Williams was hands-on in the design process, making sure the doll was authentic right down to the accessories: a green gem necklace, drop earrings, wristbands, visor and Reebok sneakers.

For Williams, the reveal is what she calls a “full-circle moment.” For the rest of us, it’s a reminder that sometimes the most powerful wins happen beyond the scoreboard.

 

Pakistan: Thousands Rally Demanding Equal Rights for Religious Minorities

Abdul Rahman | 13 Aug 2025

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Religious minorities in Pakistan face various forms of discrimination and persecution because of social and institutional biases allegedly preserved and promoted by elements in society and the state.

Minority Rights March 2025. Photo: X

Hundreds of people marched from the YMCA grounds to the Sindh Assembly in Pakistan’s Karachi on Sunday, August 10, highlighting the continuous discrimination and persecution faced by millions of religious minorities in the country and demanding social and political equality for all citizens of Pakistan. 

The march, on the eve of National Minority Day, was organized by a collective of minority rights movements called Minority Rights March. The participants included representatives of women, sexual minorities, trade unions, and human rights activists.

They carried banners and posters and shouted slogans about various forms of discrimination and atrocities faced by the religious minorities in the country. Religious persecution was also highlighted by various cultural performances during the rally.

Several speakers called for social and political reforms in the country to address the persistence of systemic biases against minorities in Pakistan. They accused the state of promoting such discrimination by failing to remove provisions in article 40 and 91, which prevent non-Muslims from holding high constitutional posts. 

Speakers also called for revisions to the legal and education system in the country to end religious hatred and discrimination.

They highlighted how minorities in Pakistan face forced conversions and violence in the name of blasphemy. The hate spreading in the name of religious differences has led to a surge in mob lynchings targeting members of religious minority communities in recent months across various parts of the country. 

Around 4% of Pakistanis belong to various religious minorities. Most of the religious minorities in Pakistan belong to Hinduism, Christianity, Sikhism, and unorthodox sects of Islam, such as the Ahmadiyya faith.

Studies have established that apart from forced conversion and violence in the name of blasphemy, these religious minorities in Pakistan are also forced into particular professions through generations and pushed to live in ghetto-like situations. They face daily discrimination at public places and their religious symbols and practices are often suppressed.

Studies have also found that state and law enforcement agencies in Pakistan often act in a biased manner and fail to implement laws which have been passed after decades of struggle to protect minorities in the country.

Equality and harmony

Though the Pakistani state recognized August 11 as National Minority Day for the first time in 2009, this year’s Minority Rights March was only the third such march.

The central theme of the Minority Rights Marches have been to bring the religious discrimination and persecution faced by minorities of all shades, whether Hindus, Sikhs, or Ahmadis, to the mainstream and build a larger alliance of left, progressive forces in the country to promote religious harmony and values of constitutional equality in Pakistan.

The issue of discrimination and persecution faced by the religious and ethnic minorities in the country has long been a matter of concern for the left and progressive forces in Pakistan.

Taimur Rahman, academic and leader of the Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP) has described the treatment of the minorities by the state and society as medieval and “a grave threat to the social fabric of Pakistan.”

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, environmental and political activist who participated in last year’s march, noted that the rising violence against minorities in Pakistan and the perpetrators of such violence enjoying impunity is a betrayal of the founding principles of the country.

Pakistanis “must commit to upholding the dignity and safety of all minority communities,” Bhutto demanded in a post on X. 

This year’s organizers of the march presented an 11-point charter of demands for religious harmony and equality.

The demands included amendments to article 40 and 91 to end constitutional discrimination, the revision of school text books to remove all racially discriminatory references, affirmative action quotas for religious minorities in educational institutions, revisions to or the abolition of the blasphemy law in the country, and the active promotion of values of equality by the state.

Courtesy: Peoples Dispatch

PAKISTAN

Case dismissed against transgender persons held for organising ‘objectionable’ party in Lahore

Imran Gabol 

Published August 17, 2025

DAWN

A Lahore magistrate on Sunday dismissed the case against transgender persons allegedly organising an “objectionable” private party after police had arrested them earlier.

According to the court order, a copy of which is available with Dawn.com, the case was dismissed after “no incriminating material is available on record which connects the accused persons with the commission of alleged offences.

“Hence, the request of 10 days for physical remand of the accused persons is hereby turned down, and the accused persons present in the court are hereby discharged in this case.”

The order added that no private witness of the occurrence was associated during the raid, nor were any statements taken.

“Moreover, no permission for making a raid is attached with the file on a private place. Prima facie, it seems that the accused persons were included in the case on the basis of forged and concocted facts,” the order said.

Lawyer Haider Butt represented the accused in the case. He confirmed to Dawn.com that all the accused were released and the case was discharged against them.

According to the first information report (FIR) of the incident, a copy of which is available with Dawn.com, the Punjab government ordered the arrests after videos of the party, purportedly involving 50-60 individuals, including transgender persons, went viral on social media.

Fashion designer Maria B initially posted videos on her social media accounts, demanding action against “transgender activists” that she claimed featured in the clips, terming such gatherings “against the moral values of the country.”

Per the FIR, the footage, dated August 1, allegedly contained “explicit content, prompting public outcry and a swift response from law enforcement.”

The case was registered on behalf of the government at the Naseerabad police station against “a group of 50 to 60 transgender persons under sections 292 (sale of obscene material), 292-A (printing/advertising obscene matter), and 294 (obscene acts in public) of the Pakistan Penal Code, alongside Section 6 of the Sound System Act.”

Following the arrests, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Operations) Lahore, Faisal Kamran, had said, “Promoting obscenity under the guise of a party or photoshoot is a serious legal offence.”

He said that illegal and unethical acts will not be tolerated in any form. “All individuals involved in the incident will be brought to justice.”

Kamran added that the screening of the banned film Joyland, which features a transgender love affair, was also stopped in the city. “Strict action will be taken against any activity conflicting with Islam and the law.”

The movie was set to screen in Lahore today, nearly two years after it was barred from cinemas in Punjab. The long-awaited screening was said to take place at an alternative venue instead of a movie theatre.

Responding to the development, Islamabad-based transgender rights activist Nayyab Ali said in a post on X that individuals seen in the video were “not trans activists” and had “nothing to do with our movement.”

Ali also alleged that the video was shot at a private party and only went viral after Maria B posted it, saying, “If it’s fahashi (vulgarity), then who spread it to millions? Maria B did. That’s a crime itself.”

Meanwhile, human rights activists raised concerns over the potential misuse of morality laws on social media. “While obscenity laws exist, their vague wording often leads to arbitrary enforcement, disproportionately targeting marginalised communities,” said a legal expert, requesting anonymity.

The government authorities also vowed to expand the crackdown on “immoral activities” across the province.

RETHINKING THE TALIBAN DOCTRINE

Four years on from the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the optimism surrounding what was being hailed as a geopolitical victory for Pakistan has vanished.

Zia Ur Rehman 

Published August 17, 2025   

EOS/DAWN

Just one month before the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021, a closed-door discussion organised by an Islamabad-based security think-tank brought together regional experts, retired military officers and policymakers to assess the potential fallout of the Taliban’s rapid territorial gains in Afghanistan amid the US military withdrawal.

While many participants expressed concern over a looming security vacuum and its likely spillover into Pakistan, a few struck a markedly optimistic tone. Among them was a retired senior military official who declared confidently: “The good days are returning. The Delhi-leaning set-up in Kabul is on its way out. With the Taliban back in charge, all Islamabad needs to do is press for the closure of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan [TTP] and Baloch separatist sanctuaries in eastern Afghanistan, and the Taliban will comply. They owe us.”

He was not alone. Across Pakistan’s political and security establishment, the Taliban’s return in August 2021 was initially greeted with a cautious but clear sense of opportunity. A friendly regime in Kabul appeared to serve Islamabad’s long-standing strategic goals: rolling back Indian influence, reducing Western presence and restoring Pakistan’s central role in shaping regional outcomes.

Then-prime minister Imran Khan hailed the moment as the breaking of “the shackles of slavery.” Then-interior minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, speaking triumphantly at the Torkham border crossing, predicted the rise of “a new bloc” that would elevate the region’s global significance. Even Khawaja Muhammad Asif, then in opposition and now defence minister, posted a photograph of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar alongside US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, captioned: “You may have the power, but God is with us. Allah-o-Akbar.”

Four years on from the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the optimism surrounding what was being hailed as a geopolitical victory for Pakistan has vanished. Instead, Pakistan is contending with a rising wave of militant violence from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan, and which threatens to expand inland. What options does Islamabad have to rethink its Afghan strategy?

Four years later, that optimism has all but vanished. As Afghanistan slips from international headlines, Pakistan faces mounting costs from what was once hailed as a strategic win. Instead of securing its western frontier, Islamabad confronts a resurgence of militant violence, a worsening security climate and a strained relationship with a regime it once considered an ally.

Drawing on recent fieldwork in both countries, this article examines how the Taliban’s return has deepened Pakistan’s domestic security crises, exposing the limits of its longstanding strategic assumptions.

ACROSS THE BORDER, VIOLENCE RISES AGAIN

For the political and religious elders of Bajaur, the stakes could not have been higher. With the government poised to launch a new counterterrorism operation in the district bordering Afghanistan against the TTP and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) — the local affiliate of the transnational Islamic State network — they took it upon themselves to negotiate a peaceful resolution through a jirga.

Their appeal to local TTP commanders was straightforward: either retreat into Afghanistan or relocate to remote mountainous areas to engage security forces. Such a move, they argued, would spare civilian populations from the destruction, displacement and the fear that inevitably follow armed conflict in villages.

Yet the militants, sensing a shift in regional power dynamics, refused.

Emboldened by the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, the TTP leaders, according to a participant in the jirga, demanded terms that Pakistan could never accept. The talks collapsed, making renewed conflict all but inevitable. The renewed military operation was launched on August 11.

The Taliban’s triumph in Kabul has emboldened militant groups across Pakistan’s western belt. Alongside the TTP, groups such as the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Baloch ethno-separatist organisations such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have exploited the shifting regional balance to intensify their insurgencies against the Pakistani state.

ISKP — previously weakened by crackdowns by the US, the former Afghan government, and the Taliban — has also been reinvigorated since the Taliban’s takeover. After facing sustained pressure from the Taliban inside Afghanistan, some ISKP fighters crossed into Pakistan, particularly into Bajaur, where the group has since carried out several high-profile attacks.

The release of this year’s Global Terrorism Index (GTI) by the Institute for Economics and Peace think-tank coincided with an attempted hijacking of the Jaffer Express passenger train in Balochistan by BLA militants in March, an incident that drew international attention.

According to the GTI, Pakistan is now ranked as the world’s second most terrorism-affected country, after Burkina Faso, a name unfamiliar to many Pakistanis. The report also highlighted a troubling reality: three Pakistani militant groups, the TTP, the BLA and the ISKP, are among the world’s 10 deadliest terrorist organisations, posing a formidable challenge to Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy.

Findings from the GTI, corroborated by statistics from law enforcement agencies and other security research organisations, indicate that Pakistan has witnessed a sharp escalation in terrorism since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. In the years since, the country has faced a renewed wave of attacks, including suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, and complex assaults on military installations, political gatherings and mosques.

RESURGENCE OF MILITANT GROUPS

Until 2020, militant outfits such as the TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group were under sustained pressure from multiple fronts. Pakistan’s large-scale counterterrorism campaigns, including Operation Zarb-i-Azb launched in 2014, inflicted heavy losses on their ranks. Internal divisions further weakened these groups, while US drone strikes eliminated much of their senior leadership. By that period, many TTP factions had either gone dormant or dispersed into Afghanistan’s eastern provinces, including Khost, Kunar and Nangarhar.

In Balochistan, too, attacks by the BLA and other major separatist organisations had declined, due to a persistent security crackdown and internal splintering.

However, the US-Taliban peace talks in Doha and the subsequent American withdrawal from Afghanistan breathed new life into Pakistani militant groups, particularly the TTP. The anticipation of a Taliban victory triggered a wave of reunifications among previously fragmented TTP factions.

By mid-2020, several key splinters, including those aligned with al-Qaeda, had rejoined under the leadership of TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali. In internal communications, Wali praised the Afghan Taliban’s unity and urged Pakistani jihadist groups to follow suit, reportedly telling his commanders: “The jihad in Pakistan will not succeed until all mujahideen unite under one flag, as our Afghan brothers have done.”

The Taliban’s return to full power in August 2021 was a watershed moment for militant ideologues across the region. For the TTP, it was both an inspiration and a validation of their long-term strategy.

Since then, Pakistan has seen a sharp resurgence in insurgent violence. In 2024, terrorist attacks rose 70 percent from the previous year, reaching 521 incidents. These claimed 852 lives, a 23 percent increase in fatalities, according to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies. The surge marks the fourth consecutive year of escalating attacks on security forces and related casualties since 2021.

“PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT” IN AFGHANISTAN

The Pakistani military recently claimed it had killed 47 militants in two separate raids, as they attempted to infiltrate from Afghanistan into Balochistan’s Zhob district, one of the deadliest cross-border clashes in recent months. While the military provided few details, it identified the militants as belonging to Fitna al-Khwarij, a term coined by the military leadership for the TTP and other Islamist militant groups.

“While the US may have ended its presence, it left behind an unstable Afghanistan, making it a sanctuary for regional militant groups,” a senior security official in Islamabad tells me. “Whether it is ideological confidence, access to abandoned US weaponry, or physical sanctuaries, these groups are receiving active support or passive facilitation from the Taliban administration in Kabul.”

A recent report by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team echoed these concerns. It noted that the TTP, operating in a “permissive environment” in Afghanistan, now fields around 6,000 fighters and has acquired advanced weaponry, significantly enhancing its operational capabilities with substantial logistical and tactical support from the de facto Afghan authorities.

Muhammad Feyyaz, a Lahore-based academic specialising in terrorism studies, describes the Taliban’s return as “costly” for Pakistan. “Before the takeover, Pakistan faced no existential threat from Afghanistan. Now, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan poses exactly that,” he says. He said that the Taliban administration is actively backing the TTP’s efforts to regain Pakistan’s tribal belt as part of a larger vision for a transnational Islamic emirate.

While Pakistan’s military demonstrated during Operation Zarb-i-Azb that it could inflict severe damage on militant networks, the security environment of today is fundamentally different, more fragmented, more complex, and far less conducive to decisive action. The political, security, and economic realities of post-2021 Pakistan are inextricably linked to the dramatic shifts in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s return to power.

Pakistan has not been able to mount an effective counterterrorism response against TTP, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction and other groups due to the US exit from Afghanistan, fractured relations with the Taliban, divergent postures on the TTP and the growing state-society gap in the areas along with Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, according to Abdul Basit, an expert at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi meets with Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, in Rawalpindi on May 7, 2023: the resurgence of militant groups, such as the TTP and Baloch separatists, has emerged as Pakistan’s most pressing security challenge in years | AP

POLITICAL CHAOS, FRACTURED CONSENSUS

In recent weeks, KP Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur has been navigating turbulent political waters. Meeting with jirga leaders from the former tribal districts, he encountered a unified stance against any new military operation and the mass displacement it could trigger. Tribal elders instead proposed a broad-based, empowered jirga, including federal and provincial representatives, elders and key stakeholders, to open dialogue directly with the Taliban administration in Kabul.

Gandapur also faces resistance from within his own party. From jail, Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) chairman Imran Khan has warned against authorising military action in KP, particularly in the merged tribal districts. The party’s stance is explicit: no renewed operations on home soil.

This is a sharp contrast to 2014, when the Karachi airport attack and the Army Public School (APS) massacre forged an unprecedented national consensus behind Operation Zarb-i-Azb. Political parties, civil society and the media stood united.

Today, however, major political parties, including PTI, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F) and the Awami National Party (ANP), openly oppose a new offensive, warning of mass displacement and social disruption. Grassroots peace campaigns in KP are already rallying public resistance, underscoring that, without political consensus, the state’s ability to act decisively will remain limited. Since 2008, residents have endured multiple operations under different names, yet neither peace has returned nor terrorism has been eradicated, local activists complain.

CROSS-BORDER SANCTUARIES

A decade ago, the TTP was weakened by internal divisions, defections to the ISKP and the loss of senior leaders to US drone strikes. Today, the picture is starkly different. Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, the TTP has consolidated its splinter factions, absorbing smaller outfits linked to al-Qaeda and sectarian militancy.

“They’ve now dispersed across Pakistan, while securing hideouts in Afghanistan,” a senior Peshawar-based law enforcement official says. “The Taliban regime not only shelters them but also arms them with modern weapons and night-vision gear abandoned by US forces.” This level of support marks a significant shift from the previous Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani, which had at times cooperated with Islamabad to capture senior TTP leaders, such as Maulvi Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur.

The Taliban administration’s release of hundreds of imprisoned TTP fighters from Afghan jails has revitalised the insurgency, allowing the group to regroup, rearm and conduct operations with heightened sophistication, according to officials.

Adding to the complexity is the emergence of a new jihadist alliance, Ittehadul Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), comprised of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction, Lashkar-i-Islam, and Inqilab-i-Islami Pakistan. Since its formation, the IMP has conducted numerous attacks against Pakistani police and armed forces, primarily in southern KP. The alliance has also expressed its intention to expand operations into other provinces, including Punjab.

The overall conflict has also seen a growing use of drones by both militant groups and state security forces, tactics that have, tragically, increased civilian casualties, including children.

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, REDUCED US SUPPORT

Pakistan now confronts the challenge of counterterrorism in an environment devoid of the robust external support it enjoyed a decade ago. In 2014, political stability, relative economic health, and American assistance, including funding, intelligence sharing, and targeted drone strikes, played a decisive role in degrading TTP capabilities.

Today, the economic situation is far bleaker. Mounting debt and fiscal instability have left fewer resources for intelligence gathering, advanced technology procurement, and the deployment of specialised manpower, all crucial to effective counterterrorism operations.

According to Basit, “The US exit from Afghanistan, which had provided intelligence and financial assistance while also restricting TTP and other groups’ movements into Afghanistan, altered regional dynamics.”

There are signs of renewed, albeit limited, US cooperation. Washington recently acknowledged Pakistan’s role in capturing a regional ISKP leader linked to the 2021 Kabul airport attack that killed American troops. Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir’s two visits within just one and a half months to Washington underscore Islamabad’s efforts to re-engage with the US security establishment.

On August 11, the U.S. administration designated the BLA and its suicide bomber unit, the Majeed Brigade, as foreign terrorist organizations.

However, Basit warns that it will be nowhere near the coordination we witnessed during the war on terror or the pre-2021 era.

“During that time, it was a US-led, Pakistan-assisted counterterrorism template. Now it is a Pakistan-led, US-enabled counterterrorism equation, where Washington will provide technical support, training and intelligence assistance, and some specialised counterterrorism equipment,” he adds. “But, there will be no funding made available to Pakistan.”

He says that counterterrorism is no more a top priority for the US; it is a tactical concern, and the Munir-Trump bromance will unlock limited, tactical and transactional cooperation on counterterrorism.

BETWEEN BROTHERHOOD AND BLOWBACK

“It’s easy for Pakistan to demand the expulsion of muhajireen from Afghanistan,” says Qari Jamaluddin, a mid-ranking official in the Taliban administration, using the term to refer to Pakistani militants who sought refuge in Afghanistan after Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb in 2014. “But such demands do not align with the jihadist worldview, nor with the principles of Islamic or Pashtun brotherhood.”

We met in Kabul on a cold evening in late 2023. I had first known Jamaluddin during his Karachi days. A staunch loyalist of the Taliban’s first regime, his family fled to Pakistan following the 2001 US invasion. In exile, he attended a madressah [religious school] and ran a cloth shop, but his conviction in the Taliban’s eventual return never faltered. “It was only a matter of time,” he would often say.

Shortly after Kabul fell in August 2021, Islamabad pressed the Taliban leadership to stop the TTP from launching attacks inside Pakistan. The effort failed. Instead, the Taliban urged Islamabad to address the TTP’s so-called “grievances” and offered to mediate peace talks, a proposal that exposed the depth of their reluctance to act against former battlefield allies. Talks began but quickly collapsed, leading to renewed violence.

Officially, the Taliban administration denies harbouring foreign militants and frames Pakistani concerns as internal political matters. Yet their counterterrorism policy remains selective: while actively targeting the ISKP, they tolerate the TTP. The Taliban refrain from labelling the TTP as terrorists, viewing them instead as ideological kin and historical comrades-in-arms.

Jamaluddin characterises Islamabad’s support for the Taliban as strictly transactional. “Pakistan backed us to counter Indian influence but, at the same time, it handed over our leaders to the Americans. We endured it because every insurgency needs sanctuaries in a neighbouring country.”

In Pakistan, the Taliban once found an enabling ecosystem across segments of society that allowed them to reorganise and mount a lethal insurgency from around 2003 onward. Without that support, Jamaluddin acknowledges, the Taliban’s rise to power would have been far more difficult.

“It was not the Pakistani state, but the TTP, Pakistani religious activists and madressah teachers that stood unwaveringly with the Taliban,” he says. “They fought and died for us while being hunted by US drones in North Waziristan.”

Many Taliban leaders and experts argue that the reluctance to confront the TTP runs deeper than politics. “The relationship between the Taliban and the TTP is built upon shared ideological, historical, and cultural bonds,” says Jabbar Durrani, an Afghan researcher based in Britain. “This connection extends beyond the top leadership to include their rank-and-file members, who often maintain close personal and operational ties.”

Former-Afghan refugee minister Khalilur Rehman Haqqani, later assassinated in an ISKP attack in December 2024, recounted in a 2023 TV interview how TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud once captured dozens of Pakistani security personnel to secure the release of Taliban prisoners, including Haqqani himself. For many Taliban leaders, such episodes are enduring reminders of shared sacrifice.

This history reinforces the perception among the Taliban’s ranks in Afghanistan that cutting ties with the TTP would be both ungrateful and dangerous. “Any heavy-handed move against the TTP,” warns Durrani, “could trigger internal dissent and drive their fighters into the arms of ISKP, already locked in a bitter conflict with the Afghan Taliban.”

Police officials examine the site of a suicide bombing carried out by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) at a Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) rally in Bajaur district on July 31, 2023: frustrated by a surge in terrorist attacks, Pakistan has adopted a mix of hard and soft power tactics to pressure the Taliban administration in Kabul | AFP


PAKISTAN’S RESPONSE

Frustrated by a surge in terrorist attacks, Pakistan has adopted a mix of hard and soft power tactics to pressure the Taliban administration in Kabul into acting against the TTP.

Since 2022, the Pakistani military has carried out at least three airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan, the most significant occurring in December 2024, when jets targeted suspected Pakistani militant hideouts in Paktika province.

In parallel, Islamabad has sought to exert economic and demographic pressure. Since September 2023, it has expelled over one million undocumented Afghans, imposed a strict visa regime at the previously open Chaman border crossing, and tightened Afghan transit trade. These measures, which drew condemnation from UN agencies and human rights organisations, have disrupted bilateral trade and restricted Afghanistan’s access to essential imports.

While Pakistan’s Interior Ministry defended the expulsions as a “sovereign right to regulate illegal foreign nationals”, the timing suggested a calculated move to increase pressure on Kabul.

IS PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY A FAILURE?

“Whether it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 or the US-led intervention in 2001, Pakistan could not remain neutral,” a senior military official remarks when asked if the country’s Afghan policy has failed, as many critics contend. “Our geographic location has never afforded us the luxury of detachment. Proximity to conflict zones involving global powers has historically required us to take sides, always to safeguard national interests,” he adds.

Pakistan’s longstanding policy toward Afghanistan has been a subject of intense debate, often viewed by critics as a series of miscalculations. Yet, officials in Islamabad defend their approach as a necessary response to a complex geopolitical landscape, driven by the country’s unique geographic position. The Taliban’s refusal to act against anti-Pakistan militants now exposes the limits of Islamabad’s longstanding reliance on non-state actors.

From arming the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s to supporting the Taliban’s rise in 1996, and even after its ouster in 2001, Pakistan has often viewed Afghanistan less as a sovereign neighbour and more as “strategic depth.” Critics contend this policy has produced severe blowback, fuelling militancy, straining border relations and deepening Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation.

Today, after four years of the Taliban’s rule, Pakistan is attempting a delicate balancing act. While it extended swift recognition to the Taliban regime in 1996, its response to the Taliban’s return in August 2021 has been far more cautious. Islamabad has not formally recognised the new government but has granted it de facto recognition, allowing ambassadorial work to continue. This measured approach reflects lessons learned from the international censure that followed its early recognition in the 1990s.

Islamabad is now advocating for an “inclusive” political settlement in Afghanistan, a position it shares with other regional powers such as China, Russia and Iran. This stance, which emphasises incorporating diverse ethnic and political factions, marks a strategic shift away from an over-reliance on any single group, such as the Taliban, and highlights Pakistan’s effort to align its policy with international consensus.

The future of Pakistan’s Afghan policy hinges on whether this new approach can navigate the intricate dynamics of internal security, regional rivalries and the push for international legitimacy.

A TASTE OF RESOLVE

The resurgence of militant groups such as the TTP and Baloch separatists has emerged as Pakistan’s most pressing security challenge in years. The threat is no longer confined to the country’s peripheries, but is steadily encroaching inland.

In Punjab’s Bhakkar district, authorities have warned government employees to avoid neighbouring areas of KP, amid credible kidnapping threats. In Balochistan, the suspension of internet services until August 31 underscores the severity of the separatist threat and the daily disruption it inflicts on residents.

Four years of the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan have not led to regional stability but have instead fuelled a complex web of security, political and economic challenges for Pakistan. A stark and uncomfortable comparison arises: while the Taliban, with limited resources, has managed to maintain internal control and weaken ISKP, Pakistan, despite its vast and sophisticated security infrastructure, continues to struggle with resurgent militancy.

This disparity compels an honest and critical reassessment of Pakistan’s security doctrine. The question is whether the tools and strategies that served Pakistan for decades are still effective against a fundamentally changed, more fragmented and more complex threat.

With violence escalating in KP, Islamabad may soon be forced to abandon limited, intelligence-led crackdowns in favour of sustained, large-scale military campaigns. For many, ongoing peace talks between local jirgas and the TTP serve a dual purpose: proving that all peaceful avenues have been exhausted and building public support for stronger action.

Yet, success will not be measured by force alone. Rebuilding public trust, demonstrating decisive gains and avoiding the cycles of the past will be critical. The path Pakistan chooses in the coming months will not only determine the fate of this insurgent wave. It will shape the country’s security trajectory for years to come.

The writer is a journalist and researcher whose work has appeared in Dawn, The New York Times and other publications, and has worked for various policy institutes. He can be reached at zeea.rehman@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, EOS, August 17th, 2025

HISTORY: THE STORY OF SINDH’S AFRICAN SLAVES

Dr Muhammad Ali Shaikh 

Published August 17, 2025

DAWN

A 19th-century engraving depicting an Arab slave-trading caravan transporting enslaved Africans slaves: although the Indian Ocean slave trade had existed for a long time, it grew considerably in India and other Indian Ocean regions from the late 17th to the mid-19th century | Wikimedia Commons

Before British rule in Sindh, especially during the 18th and 19th centuries, Karachi was a hub of the slave trade in the region.

In his 1890 book Kurrachee: Past, Present and Future, the British politician Alexander F. Baillie wrote: “Slavery was an institution; as also was the slave trade. Not only were many slaves kept in the town, but Kurrachee was a great depot for supplying the up-country districts.”

During this period, Karachi’s slave market was part of a large Arab-led Indian Ocean slave trade, with Muscat in Oman serving as its centre. When Oman took control of the Swahili coast of East Africa and the nearby Zanzibar archipelago, the slave trade became even more intense. The practice involved raiding parties, mostly composed of local Africans, capturing villagers and handing them over to their Arab patrons, who sold them in the famous slave market on the island of Zanzibar.

Another source of slaves was the spoils of war between tribes, which brought not only gold, silver and other valuables taken from the enemy after the conflict, but also their men, women and children, who were sold in slave markets worldwide. Besides economic gain, this also served as a way to demonstrate power and control.

While the transatlantic slave trade dominates global memory, few know that Karachi was once a thriving hub for ‘black ivory.’ Under the Talpurs, slaves were taxed, categorised and sold — some for as little as sixty rupees. Even after the British abolished slavery, the trade persisted in the shadows…

In this network, slaves destined for Sindh from Zanzibar first arrived in Muscat and were then shipped to Karachi for sale. The local name for these African slaves was ‘Sheedi’.

The slave trade in Karachi reached its peak in the 1830s. This surge was due to the fact that, by then, the British had established control over a large part of the Indian Subcontinent, where they had banned or discouraged the trade. During this period, Sindh, still under the Talpurs, and its port of Karachi, became a hub of the slave trade.

According to Commander Thomas Greer Carless, a British naval officer known for his role in surveying and mapping the coast of Karachi in the 1830s, more than 1,500 slaves arrived in Karachi from Muscat in 1837. Although Sindh was annexed by the British in 1843, the trade in slaves, nicknamed ‘black ivory’, continued for several more decades, though secretly. Writing in his book in 1890, Baillie reported that, in that year, about 25 people were brought to Karachi by slave traders but found no market to sell them.An illustration from the book Slave-catching in the Indian Ocean by Philip Howard Colomb, published in 1873. The book details the British naval campaign to suppress the East African slave trade in the late 19th century

‘BLACK IVORY’ FOR SALE

There were many categories among the slaves. While in most parts of the world, including the transatlantic slave trade, there was higher demand for healthy men to work on agricultural fields under tough conditions, the demand in the Karachi market was primarily for girls and women, who made up about three-fourths of the turnover.

Among males, Sheedi boys were a favoured ‘commodity’ for Karachi’s fishermen, who regarded them as highly intelligent and quick learners, with the potential to become intrepid sailors. Older males were in demand in the upcountry districts for work in agriculture, as the advent of Talpur rule in Sindh in 1783 had led to the distribution of large tracts of land to Talpur notables and other Baloch tribes.

The price for such slaves ranged from sixty to one hundred rupees, depending on “their strength and appearance,” Baillie noted. The locals usually preferred younger slaves over older ones, as there was a higher chance of a mature person fleeing in a flat country such as Sindh.

Another category of slaves brought to Sindh was called ‘Hubshees’, who came from Abyssinia [Habsha] or modern-day Ethiopia. They were seen as a higher class and were imported in smaller numbers, mainly mature females. Their price ranged from Rs170 to Rs250 in Karachi’s market, depending on appearance.

Exceptionally attractive female Hubshee slaves could sell for up to Rs500. Understandably, this class of slaves was bought exclusively by the elites for their households. Sometimes, locals also sought Hubshee boys, but their import depended on a confirmed order and their price was about one hundred rupees.

Yet another group of slaves was brought in from the Makran coast, known as Makrani in local languages. A genetic study of the Makrani population in Karachi, conducted by Romuald Lasso-Jadart et al and published in 2017 in the American Journal of Human Genetics, states “the Makranis are the result of an admixture event between local Baluch tribes and Bantu-speaking populations from eastern or southeastern Africa; we dated this event to 300 years ago during the Omani Empire domination.”

The next class of slaves was not imported but produced locally. It consisted of children born from the union of local Sindhi men and slave women from any of the above categories, with the child considered an extension of their slave mother. These children were called “Gaado”, meaning mixed or combined in the Sindhi language (Baillie has misspelled it as ‘Guddo’, which can be attributed to his unfamiliarity with Sindhi phonetics).

The highest class consisted of the offspring of Sindhi men and Gaado women. These children, born in the palaces and houses of the ruling Talpurs, were given the title of “Qambrani” after Qambar, the most favoured, faithful and freed slave of Hazrat Ali (AS) from earlier Islamic history.

The slave trade in Karachi was a significant source of taxation and income for the Talpur dynasty, which charged five and a half rupees on each slave sold in the town. Members of Karachi's Sheedi community, descendants of Africans brought to India as slaves, during the festival at the Mangho Pir shrine in Karachi in April 2018 | AFP


SOCIAL STATUS AND ROLE IN SOCIETY

Most European travellers and authors visiting Sindh during the 18th and 19th centuries praised the treatment of slaves. In a world where slaves faced oppression and cruelty, Sindh was a relatively peaceful place for them. Because of this, many enslaved people in Karachi disliked manumission [being freed], as it could put them into the brutal hands of those outside Sindh.

For instance, Ballie remarked: “The great cruelty of tearing them [slaves] from their parents [by Arab traders] in early childhood was undoubtedly perpetrated on these unfortunate classes but, in their new homes, they do not appear to have suffered any ill-treatment… They were treated as inmates and lived so comfortably that manumission, which was rarely practised, except for religious motives, would have been to them an evil rather than a benefit.”

Another eyewitness, Edward Archer Langley, who served as a British political agent in Khairpur State, wrote in his 1860 book, Narrative of a Residence at the Court of Meer Ali Moorad: “These slaves were treated as inmates of the family and lived so comfortably that emancipation was to them rather an evil than a benefit. In some cases, they rose to distinction and, as confidential servants of the princes, exercised much authority over their inferiors.”

Another English traveller named T. Postans, who visited Sindh in the early 19th century, also discussed the topic in his 1843 book, Personal Observations on Sind. He wrote: “Slavery in a very mild form exists in Sindh: the natives of Zanzibar are brought to the country when very young and are sold to the wealthier classes; but in Sindh… the term slavery does not imply a state of cruel or degrading bondage. Slaves are treated with great consideration and often become the most influential members of a family.”

The primary roles of slaves included serving as soldiers in the army, palace guards, horse-keepers, grass-cutters, day labourers and helpers to various local craftsmen, such as carpenters and blacksmiths. Another major area where they played a significant role was as domestic servants for large landowners and wealthy merchants.

The British explorer and army officer Richard Burton, known for his travels and explorations, provided a vivid description of how slaves in Sindh lived in his 1851 book, Sindh and the Races that Inhabit the Valley of Indus. He wrote: “Their [African slaves] great delights are eating, drinking, music, and dancing… On several occasions, I have seen them dance so long and so violently that more than one performer has been carried off quite insensible.”

Describing the celebrations at Karachi’s Mangho Pir, he wrote: “At a well-known place of pilgrimage near Kurrachee, called Mager-Pir, their dances are more ceremonious and systematic: they are performed under a tamarind or other tree, and an offering of incense is made.”

In this environment, many slaves earned significant fame and recognition. One of the most notable examples is Hosh Muhammad, also known as Hoshu Sheedi, who came from a slave background. His role as part of the Sindhi army against British forces during the 1843 war is highly praised. His famous slogan, “Mar vesoon par Sindh na desoon” [I may die but I will not forsake Sindh], became a proverb.

Another notable example is writer Muhammad Siddiq Musafir, born in 1879, whose father, Gulab Khan, was brought as a slave from Zanzibar via Muscat. Musafir gained recognition as an educator and scholar, having authored over a hundred books and several articles. He died in 1961 and is still regarded as a laureate par excellence in Sindh.

POST-EMANCIPATION SCENARIO

It might be called an irony of fate that the British, against whom Hoshu Sheedi and other African-origin slave soldiers had fought so fiercely in 1843, abolished slavery in Sindh after their victory and freed all the slaves from bondage. In these circumstances, many slaves chose to stay with their former masters, albeit in new roles such as servants and labourers.

Others, in addition to those whose masters could no longer afford them due to their financial hardships under British rule, went ahead to establish their residential communities in villages and towns. In this venture, mutual help, unity and solidarity were their main tools for survival. They found employment as field labourers, domestic servants and craftsmen. In the 20th century, as the British cracked down harder on slavery, Sheedis chose to become tractor drivers and mechanics, unlike traditional poor Sindhis who served as haris or peasants in agricultural fields.

“The sheedis maintained many of their African customs and traditions, the chief among which was the beating of the call-drum (shaped like a kettle-drum) called mugarman or maseendo, and singing songs and hymns in a language peculiar to them, possibly an admixture of Arabic and Swahili,” observed Dr Feroz Ahmed of Howard University in his 1989 research article ‘Africa on the coast of Pakistan.’




In the case of Karachi, Lyari became the most preferred destination for many newly freed slaves because the settlement already had a significant number of former slaves of Sindhi merchants. This transformed Lyari into a large area of irregularly constructed houses, lacking civic amenities. Over time, due to upheavals in the coastal regions of Balochistan, more slaves and non-slaves moved eastward, with some settling in the eastern part of the Makran coast and others in Karachi’s Lyari. As a result, “the Baghdadi sector [neighbourhood] of Lyari, in particular, received a heavy concentration of Black people,” wrote Dr Ahmed.

“Those who had come from Makran were called Makranis, those who came from the state of Lasbela were called Lasis, and those who immigrated from Kutch as a result of famines were called Kutchis. However, for many outsiders, the word makrani became synonymous with the people of African origin,” Dr Ahmed explained.

They adapted to the new conditions of their lives and took up work as dock workers, porters, donkey cart drivers, as well as fishermen and boat crew in Karachi. Some of them, familiar with agricultural jobs, moved to Malir, where they began working on farms.

Today, centuries after their ancestors’ enslavement and forced removal from Africa, most of their descendants are poor and live in poverty-stricken conditions in Lyari. Despite this, they have kept vital aspects of African culture alive in Karachi and throughout Sindh. One of their proud cultural legacies kept alive is the Sheedi dance, with or without the Mugarman drum, which is performed not only at numerous shrines in Karachi and Makran, but also at wedding ceremonies.

While these are undoubtedly important cultural and social legacies of people of African descent in Karachi, I believe the most significant legacy is the socially and culturally liberated Black women of Lyari. As Dr Ahmed rightly noted, it was the women of Lyari alone who could sing and dance in the streets about the victory of their favoured political party in elections, when no one else could even imagine this kind of celebration.

The writer is the president of Citizens’ Education and Empowerment Society and a former university vice chancellor. He can be reached at drshaikhma@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, EOS, August 17th, 2025