Wednesday, January 07, 2026

 

Trump’s Venezuela Oil Dream Meets a $100 Billion Reality Check

  • The U.S.-led removal of Nicolás Maduro opens the door to a new, U.S.-aligned leadership in Caracas.

  • Restoring production to historic levels would require around $100 billion over a decade.

  • While Washington is urging U.S. firms to re-enter Venezuela and heavy crude is in strong demand, companies remain wary.

The shock-and-awe capture of Nicolas Maduro by the United States, which was the culmination of the U.S. pressure on Venezuela in recent months, ended a tumultuous chapter in the history of the South American nation sitting on 17% of the world’s proven oil reserves.

Maduro’s arrest and the installation of a U.S.-compliant leadership in Caracas open another chapter in Venezuela’s history, which could be equally tumultuous and, in these early days, face uncertainties and operational challenges.

U.S. President Donald Trump wants the big U.S. oil firms to return to Venezuela and invest in rebuilding the oil infrastructure in the country holding the world’s biggest proven oil reserves, estimated at about 303 billion barrels.

Venezuela, a founding member of OPEC, has more oil reserves than each of its fellow OPEC members and top exporters in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iran.

With Maduro out, U.S. oil giants are set to invest billions of U.S. dollars to fix the oil infrastructure and start making money for Venezuela, according to President Trump.

“We’re going to have our very large U.S. oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country,” President Trump said on Saturday, shortly after the Venezuelan leader was captured and flown to the U.S. to face drug cartel-related charges in New York.

Related: The Oil Ultimatum That Led to Maduro’s Capture

The U.S. President’s vision sounds like a great opportunity for the U.S. supermajors, of which only Chevron is currently authorized to operate in Venezuela and export the crude to the United States.

In reality, the mission to fix Venezuela’s dilapidated oil infrastructure after decades of mismanagement and corruption would be a real challenge, the political and security situation on the ground permitting.

Analysts have started to quantify how much money it would take to resurrect Venezuela’s industry. It’s quite a lot, and will take at least a decade, even if U.S. oil firms were to flock to the opportunity, they say.

Returning Venezuela’s oil production to the 1970s peak of 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd), more than triple the current output of about 1 million bpd, would need $10 billion in annual investment from U.S. oil majors over the next decade, Francisco Monaldi, director of Latin American energy policy at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, told Bloomberg.

That’s $100 billion in total over a decade.

Chevron, the other U.S. supermajor, ExxonMobil, and the largest independent, ConocoPhillips, are all being mentioned as the firms that could drive a U.S.-led recovery of Venezuela’s oil industry.

When late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez nationalized the country’s oil production in 2007, he forced Exxon and ConocoPhillips out. Exxon was entangled in an arbitration to recover its investments, while ConocoPhillips is still owed about $10 billion, which it seeks to recoup from the assets that Chavez ordered seized.

“ConocoPhillips is monitoring developments in Venezuela and their potential implications for global energy supply and stability. It would be premature to speculate on any future business activities or investments,” a company spokesperson told Reuters.

U.S. firms are in no rush to return to Venezuela. Two days after Maduro was captured, it’s not certain whether there would be a profound change in the way Venezuela and its oil industry are being run.

“I haven’t spoken to U.S. oil companies in the last few days, but we’re pretty certain that there will be dramatic interest from Western companies,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told ABC in an interview on Sunday.

“Non-Russian, non-Chinese companies will be very interested,” Rubio added.

“Our refineries in the Gulf Coast of the United States are the best in terms of refining this heavy crude, and there’s actually been a shortage of heavy crude around the world, so I think there would be tremendous demand and interest from private industry if given the space to do it, if given the opportunity to do it.”

By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com



Trump and Pump: Another Oil Quagmire


 January 7, 2026

Photo by Joe Mabel – CC BY-SA 4.0

Kleptocracy, crony capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, carbon politics or Kissinger-style politics. Call it what you wish. But the Trump semi coup in Venezuela is another example of the retro politics of the Trump administration, and it is destined to pull the US into yet another quagmire, reminiscent of Iraq, Afghanistan and perhaps even Vietnam.

There is an adage that states always prepared to fight the last war.  Trump’s incoherent views of the US were always backward looking, thus to make America great again has always been retro, looking at the US through Halcyon, rose colored glasses, seeing a time when the US dominated the world.

Yet as Karl Marx once observed in The Eighteenth Brumaire, the first time history repeats itself it is a tragedy, the second time it is a farce. What is unfolding in Venezuela fits neatly into that second category. It is not merely repetition, but repetition stripped of strategic seriousness. What remains is spectacle masquerading as statecraft.

From the beginning, it has been obvious that Venezuela was never about drugs. The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy made that clear. Rather than focusing on narcotics, governance, or humanitarian concerns, it resurrected an explicitly imperial vision of hemispheric dominance. Venezuela was framed as a problem of control, not law enforcement.

That document called for an update to the Monroe Doctrine, which some critics quickly dubbed the “Donroe Doctrine.” The premise was blunt: the United States should dominate the Western Hemisphere. Europe would be left to Europe, Asia to Asia, and Africa barely merited mention. This was not realism so much as nostalgia dressed up as strategy.

Yet the 2025 National Security Strategy was hardly a strategy at all. It read like a campaign speech extended into foreign policy form. It offered slogans, not plans, and branding rather than analysis. Venezuela appeared less as a case study than as a marketing opportunity.

The document foreshadowed what soon became clear: Venezuela was never about drugs, but about domination. That domination draws on an older historical memory, one rooted in the early twentieth century. During that period, the United States treated much of South America as an economic extension of its own industrial needs. Venezuela’s oil was extracted, exported, and monetized with little regard for Venezuelan sovereignty.

The semi-coup Trump orchestrated is an attempt to recapture that lost era. It is a bid to reclaim oil that the United States once took openly and unapologetically. The logic is strikingly familiar. As was once said during debates over the Panama Canal, what was stolen “fair and square” should be kept. That same logic now underwrites U.S. policy toward Venezuela.

Trump’s decision to charge Nicolás Maduro with drug crimes is similarly retro. It echoes the Bush administration’s justification for arresting Manuel Noriega decades earlier. In both cases, criminal charges substituted for political legitimacy. Law enforcement became a fig leaf for regime change.

This backward-looking politics is also about reviving carbon politics at a time when it is rapidly losing relevance. Daniel Yergin’s trilogy—The PrizeThe Quest, and The New Map—documents how the twentieth century revolved around oil and energy dominance. But the economic logic that once favored fossil fuels is eroding. Renewable energy is no longer speculative; it is increasingly cheaper, faster, and more scalable.

China understands this shift and is acting accordingly. It is investing heavily in solar, wind, batteries, and electric infrastructure. The United States, by contrast, under Trump sought to double down on oil and gas. Venezuela thus becomes a symbolic battleground between past and future energy regimes.

Even by the standards of regime change, this effort is oddly incomplete. Henry Kissinger, for all his moral failures, at least understood how to execute a coup decisively. Chile under Allende stands as grim evidence of that competence. What Trump has engineered instead is a semi-coup, lacking both legitimacy and control.

Trump has declared that the United States will run Venezuela, but not necessarily directly. Instead, it will rely on sanctions, embargoes, financial pressure, and the seizure of oil revenues. The opposition has not been empowered but marginalized. Maduro’s vice president remains in charge, and there is little evidence that the military has defected.

The result is a dangerous stalemate. It creates the conditions for civil conflict rather than political transition. As instability grows, U.S. involvement will deepen by necessity rather than design. Oil infrastructure will need protection, and protection will require troops.

When that moment comes, the justification will change. It will be framed as security, stability, or humanitarian necessity. But the underlying motive will remain the same. Control of resources will once again be dressed up as national interest.

The final stage of this episode will likely involve personal enrichment. Trump has consistently blurred the line between public power and private gain. Venezuela offers another opportunity for branding and profit. This would mirror how earlier American elites, including the Rockefellers, benefited from Venezuelan oil a century ago.

Welcome to Trump-and-Pump America. The more we pump, the more we are told we grow. It is an old story with a new logo. And like so many times before, it is likely to end badly.

David Schultz is a professor of political science at Hamline University. He is the author of Presidential Swing States:  Why Only Ten Matter.


Chevron Keeps Venezuelan Oil Flowing as Asia Shipments Stall

Venezuela’s beleaguered oil export system is narrowing rapidly around Chevron as shipments to its largest traditional customer in China remain stalled amid an intensified U.S. oil embargo and mounting geopolitical upheaval.

Shipping data as of January 6 shows crude loading for Chinese buyers at Venezuelan ports has been on hold for the fifth straight day—but Chevron’s vessels continue to load and export crude to the United States. PDVSA’s attempts to serve its Asia contracts have been disrupted by the U.S. naval blockade imposed late last year under President Donald Trump’s administration to choke off revenue that financed the Maduro government. Without outbound cargoes, inland and floating storage are nearing capacity, forcing PDVSA to consider deeper production cuts.

Chevron is the only U.S. oil major still operating in Venezuela under a Washington licence that exempts it from broad sanctions on the country’s energy sector. The company resumed exports to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries after a brief four-day pause and has recalled offshore workers after flights resumed. But crude oil bound for Asian refineries has sat idle since January 1, leaving tankers anchored and Venezuelan output under strain.

The backdrop to these trade flows is the high-profile US forces operation over the weekend that captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and transported him to New York on drug-related charges, a move President Trump has publicly tied to securing access to Venezuela’s vast oil reserves. Trump has said the United States will seek to boost Venezuelan oil output and could even subsidize U.S. companies to rebuild the country’s dilapidated energy infrastructure, projecting that expanded production will ultimately lower domestic fuel costs.

For now, at least, Chevron stands alone as Venezuela’s main oil export channel while the rest of the country’s crude trade buckles under political and logistical gridlock. The ability of the U.S. and private oil firms to upscale production amid the turmoil remains uncertain, and PDVSA’s operational capacity is under acute stress.

By Julianne Geiger for Oilprice.com


Only 10% of Canadian oil likely to be replaced by Venezuela in short term, says analyst



By Anam Khan
Published: January 07, 2026 


Canadian oil markets do not have to worry about Venezuelan oil substituting Canadian oil at U.S. refineries — at least for now, according to one economic analyst.

Only 10 per cent of Canadian oil could be replaced by Venezuela in the short term, Charles St-Arnaud, chief economist at Service Credit Union and former Bank of Canada economist, told BNN Bloomberg.

His analysis comes amid fears that Venezuelan crude could eventually compete with and displace Canadian barrels in key U.S. refining markets after U.S. President Donald Trump announced plans to operate and revitalize Venezuela’s oil industry following Maduro’s ouster.

St-Arnaud explained that while more than 90 per cent of Canadian oil goes to the U.S., the risk of being replaced by Venezuelan oil depends on which U.S. regions the oil goes to.

He said that 70 per cent of Canadian oil is exported to the refineries in the U.S. Midwest, 10 per cent is exported to the Gulf Coast and another 10 per cent goes to the West Coast.


“The only place where Canadian oil could be displaced is really at the Gulf Coast, where the U.S. could import oil directly from Venezuela to use in those refineries,” said St-Arnaud.Canadian oil stocks slip is a ‘massive overreaction’ to Venezuela: Eric Nuttall

He explains that oil arriving at the Gulf Coast cannot travel north toward the Midwest refineries because the pipeline system is designed to bring Canadian oil from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast.

On the other hand, the refineries on the West Coast have direct access to Canadian exports because they are fed through a branch in the Trans Mountain system.

“So it will be very hard for venues or Venezuelan oil to actually reach that region,” said St-Arnaud.
Venezuela would have to drastically ramp up production

Currently, Venezuela produces about one million barrels of oil per day, while Canada produces approximately five million.

To displace more Canadian oil, Venezuela would need to significantly ramp up production, according to St-Arnaud. He also questions whether there is an incentive to transport that oil to the Midwest.

“Is the pricing good? Is the investment in the pipeline infrastructure favourable enough to actually justify that investment?” he asks.

“That’s why, in the short term, it is very difficult for Venezuelan oil to displace Canadian oil. In the long term, if the economic incentives are there, it remains a possibility.”

A 10 per cent loss of oil exports would represent an approximate $13 billion loss for Canada. While manageable at a national level, it would result in a three per cent hit to Alberta’s GDP. Furthermore, competition between Canadian and Venezuelan oil would likely lead to price discounts on Canadian crude.


“That will have more impact on the economy, but also a lot of impact on the fiscal situation here in Alberta,” St-Arnaud added.
How much Venezuelan production can be expected in the short term?

Venezuelan oil output will begin increasing in the fourth quarter of this year, according to a forecast by Eric Lee, energy strategist at Citigroup.

He said if sanctions and blockades are lifted, he expects an additional production of half a million barrels per day.

“You might need on the order of US$100 billion of more sustained investment up to a decade before you could see Venezuela getting back to historic highs,” Lee told BNN Bloomberg.

“It was once at three to 3.5 million barrels…that would be a longer road, in our view.”
Oil as a leverage in Canada’s trade agreement

In the upcoming trade agreement, if the U.S. suggests it doesn’t need Canada’s oil because it has access to Venezuelan oil reserves, the Canadian government can call its bluff.

According to St-Arnaud, the Canadian government can challenge this claim because the U.S. would require immense investment to increase production enough to displace Canadian oil.

“So that’s not a guarantee yet,” said St-Arnaud, adding that increased production in Venezuela would also contribute to the current global oil oversupply.

“With those low oil prices, will the financial incentive of producing more and committing more long-term investment money actually make sense for the big American companies?”

Anam Khan

Journalist, BNNBloomberg.ca


Trump says U.S. to get 30 million to 50 million barrels of oil from Venezuela at market price


ByThe Associated Press
 January 06, 2026 



U.S. President Donald Trump said Tuesday that Venezuela would be providing 30 million to 50 million barrels of oil to the U.S., and he pledged to use proceeds from the sale of this oil “to benefit the people” of both countries.

The White House is organizing a meeting Friday with U.S. oil company executives to discuss Venezuela, which the Trump administration has been pressuring to open its vast-but-struggling oil industry more widely to American investment and know-how.

Representatives of Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips are expected to attend the White House meeting, according to a person familiar with the matter who requested anonymity to discuss the plans.

Earlier Tuesday, officials in Caracas announced that at least 24 Venezuelan security officers were killed in the dead-of-night U.S. military operation to capture Nicolas Maduro and spirit him to the United States to face drug charges. And the country’s acting president, Delcy Rodriguez, pushed back on Trump, who earlier this week warned she’d face an outcome worse than Maduro’s if she does not “do what’s right” and overhaul Venezuela into a country that aligns with U.S. interests, including by granting access to American energy companies.

Rodriguez, delivering an address Tuesday before government agricultural and industrial sector officials, said, “Personally, to those who threaten me: My destiny is not determined by them, but by God.

Venezuela’s Attorney General Tarek William Saab said overall “dozens” of officers and civilians were killed in the weekend strike in Caracas and said prosecutors would investigate the deaths in what he described as a “war crime.” He didn’t specify if the estimate was specifically referring to Venezuelans.


People protest outside Manhattan Federal Court before the arraignment of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Monday, Jan. 5, 2026, in New York. (AP Photo/Stefan Jeremiah) (Stefan Jeremiah)

In addition to the Venezuelan security officials, Cuba’s government had previously confirmed that 32 Cuban military and police officers working in Venezuela were killed in the raid. The Cuban government says the personnel killed belonged to the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior, the country’s two main security agencies.

Seven U.S. service members were also injured in the raid, according to the Pentagon. Five have already returned to duty, while two are still recovering from their injuries. The injuries included gunshot wounds and shrapnel injuries, according to a U.S. official who was not authorized to comment on the matter publicly and spoke on the condition of anonymity.

A video tribute to the slain Venezuelan security officials posted to the military’s Instagram account features faces of the fallen over black-and-white videos of soldiers, American aircraft flying over Caracas and armored vehicles destroyed by the blasts. Meanwhile, the streets of Caracas, deserted for days following Maduro’s capture, briefly filled with masses of people waving Venezuelan flags and bouncing to patriotic music at a state-organized display of support for the government.

“Their spilled blood does not cry out for vengeance, but for justice and strength,” the military wrote in an Instagram post. “It reaffirms our unwavering oath not to rest until we rescue our legitimate President, completely dismantle the terrorist groups operating from abroad, and ensure that events such as these never again sully our sovereign soil.”

A pedestrian walks past a mural of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026. (AP Photo/Matias Delacroix)


Questions about the future of Venezuelan oil



With oil trading at roughly $56 a barrel, the transaction Trump announced late Tuesday could be worth as much as $2.8 billion. The U.S. goes through an average of roughly 20 million barrels a day of oil and related products, so Venezuela’s transfer would be the equivalent of as much as two and a half days of supply, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Despite Venezuela having the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, it only produces on average about one million barrels day, significantly below the U.S. average daily production of 13.9 million barrels a day during October.

The press office for Venezuela’s government did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Trump’s announcement.

ExxonMobil is developing a mammoth offshore oil deposit in the waters off Guyana, Venezuela’s neighbor to the east. The company’s major oil discovery in 2015 prompted Venezuela to revive a century-old territorial dispute with Guyana and take steps to annex the remote region known as Essequibo, which comprises about two-thirds of Guyana’s land mass.

The development has also led to wide-ranging accusations from Venezuela’s government, including Rodriguez, against Guyana’s leaders and ExxonMobil. Two years ago, Venezuelan lawmakers even considered banning any future operation in Venezuela of oil companies working in Guyana.

Earlier Tuesday, Trump pushed back against Democratic criticism of this weekend’s military operation, noting that his Democratic predecessor Joe Biden had also called for the arrest of the Venezuelan leader on drug trafficking charges.

Trump in remarks before a House Republican retreat in Washington grumbled that Democrats were not giving him credit for a successful military operation, even though there was bipartisan agreement that Maduro was not the rightful president of Venezuela.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaks during a news conference at the State Department, Friday, Dec. 19, 2025, in Washington. (AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson) (Julia Demaree Nikhinson)

In 2020, Maduro was indicted in the United States, accused in a decades-long narco-terrorism and international cocaine trafficking conspiracy. White House officials have noted that Biden’s administration in his final days in office last year raised the award for information leading to Maduro’s arrest after he assumed a third term in office despite evidence suggesting that he lost Venezuela’s most recent election. The Trump administration doubled the award to $50 million in August.

“You know, at some point, they should say, `You know, you did a great job. Thank you. Congratulations.’ Wouldn’t it be good?” Trump said. “I would say that if they did a good job, their philosophies are so different. But if they did a good job, I’d be happy for the country. They’ve been after this guy for years and years and years.”


What U.S. opinion polls show



Americans are split about the capture of Maduro -- with many still forming opinions -- according to a poll conducted by The Washington Post and SSRS using text messages over the weekend. About 4 in 10 approved of the U.S. military being sent to capture Maduro, while roughly the same share were opposed. About 2 in 10 were unsure.

Nearly half of Americans, 45%, were opposed to the U.S. taking control of Venezuela and choosing a new government for the country. About 9 in 10 Americans said the Venezuelan people should be the ones to decide the future leadership of their country.

Maduro pleaded not guilty to federal drug trafficking charges in a U.S. courtroom on Monday. U.S. forces captured Maduro and his wife early Saturday in a raid on a compound where they were surrounded by Cuban guards. Maduro’s No. 2, Delcy Rodriguez, has been sworn in as Venezuela’s acting president.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, left, and his wife, Cilia Flores, second from right, appear in Manhattan federal court with their defense attorneys Mark Donnelly, second from left, and Andres Sanchez, Monday, Jan. 5, 2026, in New York. (Elizabeth Williams via AP)

In the days since Maduro’s ouster, Trump and top administration officials have raised anxiety around the globe that the operation could mark the beginning of a more expansionist U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. The president in recent days has renewed his calls for an American takeover of the Danish territory of Greenland for the sake of U.S. security interests and threatened military action on Colombia for facilitating the global sale of cocaine, while his top diplomat declared the communist government in Cuba is “in a lot of trouble.”

Colombia responds to Trump


Colombia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Rosa Villavicencio said Tuesday she’ll meet with the U.S. Embassy’s charge d’affaires in Bogota to present him with a formal complaint over the recent threats issued by the United States.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks with reporters while in flight on Air Force One, Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026, as they were returning to Joint Base Andrews, Md. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon) (Alex Brandon)

On Sunday, Trump said he wasn’t ruling out an attack on Colombia and described its president, who’s been an outspoken critic of the U.S. pressure campaign on Venezuela, as a “sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States.”

Villavicencio said she’s hoping to strengthen relations with the United States and improve cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking.

“It is necessary for the Trump administration to know in more detail about all that we are doing in the fight against drug trafficking,” she said.

Meanwhile, the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom on Tuesday joined Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen in defending Greenland’s sovereignty. The island is a self-governing territory of the kingdom of Denmark and thus part of the NATO military alliance.

“Greenland belongs to its people,” the statement said. “It is for Denmark and Greenland, and them only, to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland.”

Madhani reported from Washington and Janetsky from Mexico City. AP writer Linley Sanders and Manuel Rueda contributed reporting.

Regina Garcia Cano, Aamer Madhani And Megan Janetsky, The Associated Press


Op-Ed: From Allende to Maduro – the price of resources and defiance

Photo of Allende courtesy of Fundaciön GAP. Photo of Maduro courtesy of Eneas De Troya.

From Chile to Venezuela, battles over who controls strategic resources have repeatedly shaped regime change, foreign intervention and political fallout across the Americas.

When Chilean socialist President Salvador Allende nationalized the copper industry in 1971, he moved to bring foreign-owned copper mines —primarily controlled by US corporations such as Anaconda and Kennecott— under state control through the creation of Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile/ National Copper Corporation of Chile).

With this, Allende directly challenged corporate and US strategic interests tied to the country’s most valuable export. Washington responded with economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and covert destabilization by the CIA. Two years later, a US-backed military coup overthrew Allende, who died during the assault on the presidential palace, cementing his legacy as a cautionary example of the risks faced by leaders who seek to reclaim control over resource wealth.

Venezuela followed a similar trajectory, with resource nationalism reshaping its economy and foreign relations and culminating most recently in the capture and extradition of President Nicolás Maduro to New York to face criminal charges, another instance of a leader removed after defying foreign control over critical assets.

The roots of that confrontation stretch back decades. In the mid-2000s, then-president Hugo Chávez accelerated the nationalization of the oil sector, imposing tougher contract terms on foreign producers. Exxon Mobil and other major companies left the country. Chávez framed the move as a defence of economic sovereignty, but it carried lasting geopolitical consequences.

After his death, Maduro’s government struggled to offset collapsing oil output. In 2019, Maduro and Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president and now acting president, announced a five-year mining plan to expand mineral extraction as an alternative source of revenue.

Venezuela also moved last year to revive its coal industry, aiming to export more than 10 million tonnes in 2025, though it remains unclear whether that target was reached. The US Geological Survey estimated coal production at about 100,000 metric tons in 2019 from reserves totalling 731 million metric tons. Output of other minerals, including nickel, bauxite, iron ore and gold, has declined sharply over the past decade, mirroring the broader deterioration of the oil sector.

Absolute gain

On Saturday, the US launched “Operation Absolute Resolve”, a large-scale strike against Venezuela that resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, with US authorities accusing them of leading a narco-terrorism conspiracy. 

The operation marked the largest US military intervention in Latin America since the 1989 invasion of Panama and its most direct bid for regime change since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The Trump administration said Maduro would face corruption charges linked to major drug flows into the US. The strike followed months of escalating pressure, including the interception of oil tankers off Venezuela’s coast and actions against vessels Washington said were involved in narcotics trafficking. Trump openly linked the intervention to Venezuela’s energy wealth, saying the US would oversee a transition and suggesting US oil companies could return within about 18 months to rebuild production after years of collapse.

Few international observers expressed sympathy for Maduro or his inner circle. His government has been widely described as undemocratic and repressive, and as a source of regional instability. A recent United Nations report documented more than a decade of killings, torture, sexual violence and arbitrary detention by state-linked forces against political opponents. Maduro is also accused of stealing Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election and of fuelling economic and political disruption across the region by presiding over the exodus of nearly eight million migrants.

Broken system

Venezuela’s economic breakdown had already accelerated after oil prices fell below $30 a barrel in 2016, pushing the country into a deep political and financial crisis, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Chronic power failures further crippled oil and mining operations, eroding the state’s ability to monetize its resources.

While oil dominates headlines, analysts say Venezuela’s longer-term relevance to the US may lie in minerals critical to modern industry and defence. Chilean mining consultancy GEM says the country’s geology, particularly the Guiana Shield, is highly prospective for iron ore, bauxite, gold, nickel and other minerals aligned with US critical-mineral priorities.

Production data show how far the sector has fallen. Official gold output dropped from 5.95 tonnes in 1999 to about 30 kg in 2023, a decline of roughly 19% a year. Iron ore production fell from 14.1 million tonnes to about 2.5 million tonnes, while bauxite slid from more than 4 million tonnes to roughly 250,000 tonnes. According to GEM, the losses reflect failing power supply, infrastructure decay, security risks and regulatory instability, not depleted resources.

Juan Ignacio Guzmán, GEM’s CEO, said the opportunity lies in rehabilitation rather than new mine development. Restarting idle mines and processing plants could take one to three years if governance and market access are restored, while formalizing informal gold and coltan production would require a longer horizon. Any reintegration into global supply chains, he said, depends on sanctions clarity, restored rule of law and credible environmental and social safeguards.

The comparison with Chile remains instructive. Chile’s copper nationalization ultimately stabilized a core industry under stronger institutions. Venezuela’s experience, capped by direct US intervention, shows how resource wealth can instead become a lever for external power when infrastructure and governance collapse.

Across decades and ideologies, the pattern has been consistent. In the Americas, asserting control over strategic resources has carried heavy consequences, while the ability to seize them has rested with those willing and able to intervene.


Is Washington’s Move The Spark For A New Age Of Regional Power? – Analysis


January 7, 2026
By A. Jathindra

The recent U.S. military operation against Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro have sparked sharp criticism and condemnation. Maduro now awaits trial in New York City. Once again, it is evident that international politics is not guided by international law but by the interests of great powers and their alliances. Some critics, even within the United States, have described this as President Trump’s “Putinization of U.S. foreign policy.” Yet the deeper question is whether any individual president can override America’s institutional structures and act against national interests—or whether such actions reflect a broader continuity of U.S. hegemony in the region.

Historical Parallels: Panama and Venezuela


History offers striking parallels under the great-power rivalry. In 1989, President George H. W. Bush ordered the invasion of Panama, capturing dictator Manuel Noriega and indicted him under U.S. law. The Bush administration justified the intervention on grounds of Panama’s violations of the canal treaty, drug trafficking, and the killing of a U.S. Marine officer. During the election in 1989, Noriega had annulled election results and installed a classmate as president, prompting Washington to act decisively.

Thirty-six years later, President Trump has taken a similar course against Venezuela. The criticism has been just as widespread, with the United Nations condemning the move as a violation of sovereignty. True to form, Washington showed little concern for such objections. As Asanka Abeyagoonasekera points out, the situation appears to be managed on the basis of “act first, stabilize later.” Yet, as with Panama and Iraq, this episode may soon fade amid new waves of political turmoil.

The parallels are not exact. In Panama, Noriega’s national assembly declared war on the United States. In Venezuela, Maduro’s regime retained power through fraudulent elections, echoing Noriega’s tactics but without a formal declaration of war. In both cases, however, military action followed failed economic and diplomatic pressure. Reagan’s administration had tried to persuade Noriega to step down through diplomacy, but Bush—then vice president—opposed compromise. Similarly, Washington had long pressured Maduro through sanctions before resorting to force.

Venezuela’s Path to Confrontation

Venezuela’s troubled relationship with the United States dates back to Hugo Chávez’s rise in the 1990s. His socialist agenda and anti-American rhetoric enhance ties with China, Iran and Russia strained ties with Washington, and a U.S.-backed coup attempt in 2002 failed to remove him. After Chávez’s death in 2013, Nicolás Maduro carried forward his predecessor’s policies, deepening the crisis. Maduro retained power through fraudulent elections in 2018 and again in 2024, despite widespread opposition. By late 2025, Trump warned Maduro to step aside, but with sanctions failing to secure a smooth transition, Washington opted for regime change by force.

On the surface, Washington’s surprise move appears aimed at controlling the world’s largest proven oil reserves in Venezuela. But at a deeper level, it is about asserting control over the Western Hemisphere. The growing Chinese presence in Latin America is a serious concern in Washington. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio underscored this when he declared: “This is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live—and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.” Maduro’s capture came just hours after he met with Chinese diplomats to reaffirm their strategic partnership.

In 2017, Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) announced a U.S. focus on great-power competition, principally with China, marking a shift after decades of Middle Eastern preoccupation. The removal of Maduro aligns with the broader strategic shift outlined in the NSS released in December 2025. The document underscores the intervention as emblematic of a revived Monroe Doctrine, reframed as the “Trump Corollary”: “After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere… We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or control vital assets in our Hemisphere.”

The Monroe Doctrine and Its Legacy

The Monroe Doctrine, first articulated in 1823, warned European powers against interference in the Americas. Theodore Roosevelt expanded it in 1904, asserting U.S. “international police power” to quell unrest in the region. Franklin D. Roosevelt later attempted a “Good Neighbor” policy of non‑intervention, but Cold War realities prevented Washington from adhering strictly to this principle.

The CIA waged a shadow war, orchestrating coups and toppling several heads of state across Latin America to block Soviet influence. Against this backdrop, Venezuela is not the first country in the region to see its leader overthrown or seized with direct U.S. involvement—and it will not be the last.

The Trump Corollary represents a return to this older logic: the Western Hemisphere as America’s sphere of influence, where external powers—China and Russia today, rather than Europe—must be excluded. It signals a reassertion of regional dominance, justified in the name of security and access to strategic geographies.

Regional Hegemony: Old Patterns, New Context

The question now is whether Washington’s ambitions end with Venezuela—or whether this marks a broader return to Cold War-style regional dominance. History suggests that when smaller states fail to act as “good neighbors,” interventions by great powers become inevitable. India’s interventions under Indira Gandhi illustrate this dynamic in South Asia. As Henry Kissinger observed, “to create order, it is necessary to create it within regions first and then relate them to each other.”

Against this backdrop, Washington’s move in Venezuela may signal not just a tactical strike but the reassertion of regional hegemony. The door may once again be open for major powers to intervene militarily in their neighbors’ affairs when they are deemed “bad neighbors.”

This article was published by The Centre for Strategic Studies — Trincomalee

A. Jathindra is a Sri Lankan-based independent political analyst and head of a think tank, Centre for Strategic Studies -Trincomalee (CSST).


Tuesday, January 06, 2026

 

China’s Hengli Claims Industry First Floating Four VLCCs Simultaneously

tanker launch
Hengli floated out four 306,000 dwt tankers at the same time on Sunday (Hengli)

Published Jan 5, 2026 4:27 PM by The Maritime Executive


The rapid rise of China’s Hengli Heavy Industry into one of the leading global shipbuilders took a new step with an event on January 4, which the company claims as an industry first. The shipyard launched four 306,000 dwt very large crude carriers (VLCC) simultaneously.

Founded in 2022, Hengli Heavy Industry has emerged rapidly on the scene as the successor to the former STX Dalian Shipbuilding. Hengli Group, which in turn is a subsidiary of Guangdong Songfa, has quickly built its orderbook with the world’s leading shipping companies.

The company highlights the complexity of building four giant ships at once in the same dry dock, while the yard is producing a broad range of ships. Dry Dock No. 1 was used and measures 741 meters by 135 meters (2,430 x 443 feet), giving it the capability of building the four massive vessels simultaneously. They highlight the use of strict schedules and synchronized processes to keep the four ships progressing at the same pace.

The launch was an equally challenging feat. The flood valves for the massive dock were opened on January 3. The yard reports that it opened the dock was ready on January 4, and they removed the large gate to float out the vessels. First out was Front Resolute, a new tanker registered in the Marshall Islands. The yard highlights that the floating out process was expedited safely with a new cable system with trolleys.

The vessels were also moved to fitting out basins to be completed.  No details were announced on the planned deliveries.

The float out comes as the yard continues to build its orderbook as the world’s largest consolidated shipbuilding base. The yard more than doubled its backlog in 2025 with reports a total of 115 vessel orders in 2025, valued at more than $14 billion. The yard concluded 2025 with seven ship orders, including two additional VLCCs, four Capesize bulkers, and a Suezmax tanker.

The yard is reported to have over 200 ships on backlog. It is scheduling deliveries to 2029. Its growth helped China to reach nearly 54 percent of global orders in the first quarter of 2025 and then to grow rapidly to 67 percent in Q2 and 65 percent in Q3.
 

 

Bankrupt Retailer Bed, Bath & Beyond Files Sixth FMC Complaint on Carriers

HMM containership
Former retailers Bed, Bath & Beyond filed its latest complaint at the FMC against HMM for failing to meet service contracts (HMM file photo)

Published Jan 5, 2026 5:41 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The estate of former retailer Bed, Bath & Beyond continues its efforts to blame the shipping industry and the problems moving containers during and after the COVID pandemic as a contributing factor in its collapse. Last week, it filed a new complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission, its sixth action, and this time it is targeting HMM.

The company, today known as DK Butterfly-1, continues to seek reparations for injuries it says it suffered in the form of higher costs and the inability to get merchandise transported. The company went into a tailspin and ultimately filed for bankruptcy in April 2023. It has spent the past two and a half years complaining about the shipping industry and the large carriers, alleging there was a practice of “systematically failing to meet service commitments,” and taking advantage of the shortage of space and price inflation by “unfairly exploiting customers.”

The complaint filed against HMM on December 30, 2025, follows a similar pattern. The company filed its first complaints in 2023 against Orient Overseas Line and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company. Since then, it has expanded its efforts by filing complaints against Evergreen, BAL Container Line, and CMA CGM. It is the largest of the complainers, but the FMC has reported it was flooded with smaller complaints from many shippers who also alleged the carriers were failing to meet their contractual obligations.

Bed, Bath & Beyond highlights that it was a new customer to HMM and that it repeatedly advised the company of the problems it was having gaining space for its containers. In July 2020, it sent an email pleading with HMM, saying “We can’t afford any booking confirmation delays ever, but esp at this critical time. We desperately need space from all of our carriers right now….” 

The company reports it had a contract for 2020-2021 for 1,000 40-foot containers at an average of 100 per month. In 2021-2022, it increased the commitment to 2,000 FEUs or approximately 166 per month. The complaint alleges a shortfall of more than 62 containers in 2020-2021 and 531 containers in 2021-2022. 

The complaint alleges the shortfall and a practice of price coercing to pay extracontractual prices, and surcharges cost the company more than $440,000 under the 2020-2021 contract and more than $8.9 million for the 2021-2022 period.

They are also seeking relief for a substantial majority of the demurrage and detention charges assessed by HMM. They cite more than $4 million in demurrage charges and a further $680,000 in detention charges between September 2021 and January 2023.  They allege the costs were incurred, although circumstances outside its control made it impossible for the company to pick up containers or return empties promptly.

The carriers have spent years fighting the complaints of the shippers, saying the industry was overwhelmed by demand. They assert they were trying to work with all shippers to help manage the situation, and like the customers, they were left powerless as ports became backlogged and congestion built around the world. 

 

Turkish-Owned Freighter Runs Aground Near Kerch Strait

Happy Aras aground
Courtesy Turkish Ministry of Maritime Affairs

Published Jan 5, 2026 11:26 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

A Turkish-owned freighter has gone aground in the Black Sea just off Novorossiysk, according to Turkey's Directorate of Maritime Affairs. 

On Tuesday morning, the ministry said that the freighter Happy Aras had drifted south of he Kerch Strait and had gone aground. The vessel was taking on water, and all 14 crewmembers - including three Turkish nationals - were evacuated safely. Turkey's Maritime Rescue Center provided coordination for the response, the ministry said. 

No injuries have been reported, and the vessel's status is being monitored. 

Courtesy Ministry of Maritime Affairs

Happy Aras is a Vanuatu-flagged coastal freighter built in 1990. She has an extensive history of port state control deficiencies and detentions, with multiple issues identified in every PSC inspection since 2018. 

The vessel's AIS signal has appeared sporadically on commercial tracking since December 30, when the vessel departed Varna for Novorossisysk. The most recently-received transmission was picked up by MarineTraffic four days ago, and the vessel was moving at three knots and broadcasting "not under command." 

Along with its announcement, the ministry released the position for the Happy Aras' grounding site (45 06.65 N 036 44.73 E), just off a headland near the Taman oil export terminal. The terminal was hit by back-to-back Ukrainian strikes in December.