The Baltic Sea is becoming increasingly important to the security and economies of Poland and its northern European neighbours, but growing Russian hybrid activity is exposing energy infrastructure, ports, shipping and air navigation to new risks, Poland's Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) said.
The sea has become a critical corridor for energy, trade and military logistics for Nato and European Union members including Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden, while Denmark and Germany also have growing strategic interests in the region, the Warsaw-based think tank said in a report.
“[T]he task of securing energy and telecommunications infrastructure, safeguarding freedom of maritime and air navigation as well as building resilience to Russian hybrid activity is becoming one of the foremost challenges for the states of the Baltic Sea region," OSW said.
For Poland, the Baltic has become particularly important to energy security. The Baltic Pipe gas link and liquefied natural gas terminal at Swinoujscie together provide import capacity approaching Poland's annual gas consumption, while the Naftoport oil terminal in Gdansk handles all crude oil supplies to the country's refineries.
Offshore wind could eventually provide up to one-third of Poland's domestic electricity demand, further increasing the strategic importance of infrastructure in the Baltic, OSW said.
The Polish ports of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin-Swinoujscie also account for more than 40% of the value of Poland's foreign trade and are important military logistics hubs on Nato's northeastern flank, according to the report.
OSW said physical damage to undersea infrastructure was the biggest immediate risk, citing both deliberate attacks and accidents. Between 2023 and 2025, numerous incidents involved vessels dragging anchors across the seabed and damaging energy and telecommunications cables.
Cyber-attacks and interference with satellite navigation systems are additional threats, while disruptions to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are already imposing costs on offshore energy developers.
"The growing number of hybrid incidents, cyberattacks and GNSS disruptions is generating tangible costs for operators and developers of energy and telecommunications infrastructure," OSW said.
Nato has increased its presence in the Baltic under Baltic Sentry, while regional states agreed a 2025 memorandum on the security of critical undersea infrastructure providing for information-sharing and a network of contact points.
OSW called for wider use of unmanned systems by maritime police and border guards and faster repair capabilities for damaged infrastructure. It also said the Council of the Baltic Sea States could play a coordinating role.
Ports face a separate threat from espionage and cyber-attacks. OSW said traffic by Russian-linked vessels, including research, fishing and hydrographic ships, had increased, while photographing ports and unauthorised drone flights over ports and fuel terminals had also become more common since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Baltic ports face cyber-attacks "on a large scale, even daily", targeting operational systems, including those run by terminal operators, the report said.
The EU's Ports Strategy, published in March, envisages greater exchange of security practices and revised guidelines, as well as new rules on foreign investment in ports with civil and military significance.
OSW also warned about the growing risks associated with Russia's "shadow fleet", which transports sanctioned oil and other commodities using vessels operating at the margins of maritime rules.
Such ships use tactics including manipulation of automatic identification systems, ship-to-ship transfers and inexperienced crews, while some are suspected of conducting espionage or hybrid operations against critical infrastructure.
"Incidents in the Baltic’s narrow shipping corridors could paralyse navigation, cause collisions and inflict costly environmental damage," OSW said.
The think tank said Western sanctions had limited the ability of Russia's shadow fleet to access European services but warned that coastal states were reluctant to impose stronger controls without Nato military backing because of the risk of Russian retaliation.
It recommended greater pressure on flag states and jurisdictions hosting companies that charter shadow-fleet vessels, as well as discussions on a Baltic maritime convention that could permit vessels to be detained in exclusive economic zones for failing to meet environmental standards.
Air traffic is also increasingly affected. Russia's jamming of satellite navigation signals has become a persistent feature of the region's security environment, OSW said. Around 122,000 flights reported GNSS interference between January and April 2025 alone.
Russian military aircraft flying without transponders or flight plans add to the risks, while forcing Nato to scramble fighter aircraft to identify them.
The report said countries should build air-navigation systems capable of operating safely without satellite signals, pointing to Poland's "PNT Shield" as an example of an architecture combining satellite, terrestrial and inertial technologies.
"The priority is not only to detect the sources of interference, but also to create a resilient air traffic management system capable of operating safely even during prolonged degradation or loss of the satellite signal," OSW said.
The Baltic's security challenges are compounded by the large quantity of unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons left on its seabed from the two world wars. OSW said these materials represented risks to navigation and the marine environment and could potentially be exploited for sabotage.
The report called for deeper cooperation between maritime administrations, ports, rescue services and navies, with the Council of the Baltic Sea States potentially serving as a platform for coordinating efforts.
Overall, OSW said the region needed to combine national investment with stronger Nato and EU cooperation rather than treating individual incidents in isolation.
"The states of the region should give priority to full transposition of the EU CER and NIS2 Directives into their domestic legal orders," it said, referring to EU rules covering critical infrastructure resilience and cybersecurity.
It also stressed the need to develop regional systems for sharing information about threats and incidents.
"The use of ‘shadow fleet’ vessels to conduct activities that threaten the security of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea provides an important reason for coastal states to persist in efforts to limit the navigation of these vessels and increase maritime security," OSW said.
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