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Wednesday, September 02, 2026

Military Alliances And The Reshaping Of The International Order: From Collective Defense To Strategic Network Alliances – Analysis


Senegalese naval forces participate in the Obangame Express 2025 maritime security exercise. CHIEF PETTY OFFICER JOHN PEARL/ UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES EUROPE-AFRICA/U.S. SXTH FLEET

LONG READ


September 2, 2026

By Dr. Mohammed Issam Laaroussi and Dr. EL Abess El Ouardi

Key Takeaways:

The article argues alliances are shifting from Cold War treaty clubs to hybrid “strategic networks”: NATO still matters after Ukraine, but AUKUS, the Quad, and Middle East coalitions add mission-specific, multi-domain layers (cyber, AI, industry, intel, maritime) that classical realism/liberalism/constructivism only partly explain.

It proposes the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM): seven pillars—integrated deterrence, tech superiority, intelligence fusion, defense-industrial cooperation, economic resilience, flexible coalitions, political cohesion—effectiveness measured by adaptability and interoperability, not Article 5 permanence alone.

Cases: NATO’s 2022 Concept and Nordic enlargement; Indo-Pacific tech-maritime partnerships without a NATO clone; a more plural Middle East (U.S.–Israel core, Abraham Accords, GCC industry, China/Russia options). Future research should test SNAM with interoperability and network metrics rather than force size.

Abstract

The evolving international security environment has fundamentally transformed the nature and strategic functions of military alliances. While traditional alliance theory has primarily interpreted military alliances as treaty-based mechanisms for collective defense and balance-of-power politics, contemporary security challenges—including renewed great-power competition, the Russia–Ukraine war, the Indo-Pacific strategic rivalry, and the emergence of multi-domain threats—have accelerated the evolution of military cooperation beyond conventional institutional arrangements.

This article examines how military alliances are adapting to these transformations and assesses their role in reshaping the emerging international order. Employing a qualitative comparative research design based on strategic analysis, document analysis, and comparative case studies, the study examines three principal theatres of contemporary security competition: Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. It argues that the current international security architecture is undergoing a structural transition from predominantly treaty-based military alliances toward a hybrid system in which permanent alliances coexist with flexible, mission-oriented strategic coalitions.

To explain this transformation, the article proposes the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), an original conceptual framework that integrates formal alliances, regional partnerships, operational coalitions, intelligence cooperation, technological innovation, cyber resilience, maritime security, and defense-industrial collaboration within a multi-domain security architecture. The comparative analysis demonstrates that developments surrounding the Russia–Ukraine war, AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and emerging Middle Eastern coalition structures illustrate a broader global trend toward networked security governance. The article concludes that the future effectiveness of military cooperation will depend increasingly on strategic adaptability, technological interoperability, multi-domain deterrence, and political cohesion rather than on the permanence of institutional structures alone. The proposed framework contributes to contemporary alliance theory by offering a comprehensive analytical model for understanding the evolution of military cooperation in an era of strategic competition and geopolitical transformation.

Introduction

The international security environment is undergoing one of its most profound transformations since the end of the Cold War. Renewed strategic competition among major powers, the return of large-scale interstate warfare following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the accelerating militarization of emerging technologies, and intensifying geopolitical rivalries across the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East have fundamentally altered the character of contemporary international security. Rather than diminishing the strategic relevance of military alliances, these developments have reinforced their central role in managing geopolitical competition, deterring aggression, and shaping the emerging international order.

While military alliances have traditionally been understood as treaty-based arrangements designed to provide collective defense and maintain the balance of power, their strategic functions have expanded considerably over the past two decades. Contemporary alliances increasingly incorporate cooperation in cyber security, artificial intelligence, space operations, intelligence sharing, defense-industrial integration, critical infrastructure protection, and technological innovation. Military alliances are therefore evolving beyond conventional defense organizations into multi-domain strategic networks capable of integrating military, technological, economic, political, and informational instruments of power.


Although this transformation is widely acknowledged, much of the existing literature continues to analyze alliances through theoretical frameworks developed during the Cold War. Classical approaches—including Structural Realism, the Balance of Threat theory, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism—remain indispensable for explaining why alliances emerge and persist. However, they offer only a partial explanation of how alliances are adapting to an international environment characterized by technological disruption, hybrid warfare, economic statecraft, cyber competition, and increasingly flexible security partnerships. Consequently, an important theoretical gap remains regarding the evolution of military alliances within the contemporary international system.

This article argues that military alliances are undergoing a structural transformation from predominantly treaty-based collective defense organizations into multi-domain strategic security networks. To conceptualize this evolution, the article introduces the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), an analytical framework that explains how formal alliances, strategic partnerships, mission-oriented coalitions, technological cooperation, intelligence integration, cyber resilience, defense-industrial collaboration, and economic security increasingly operate as interconnected components of a broader security architecture. Rather than replacing existing alliance theories, SNAM extends them by providing a framework better suited to explaining alliance behavior under conditions of strategic competition and geopolitical fragmentation.

Methodologically, the study employs qualitative comparative analysis combining international relations theory, strategic studies, official policy documents, and comparative case studies from three principal theatres of contemporary geopolitical competition: Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. These cases demonstrate that NATO, AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and emerging coalition structures in the Middle East collectively illustrate the evolution of military cooperation toward networked security governance.


The article makes three principal contributions to the literature. First, it provides an updated theoretical interpretation of alliance transformation in the twenty-first century. Second, it develops the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) as an original analytical framework for understanding multi-domain military cooperation. Third, it demonstrates that the evolution of military alliances constitutes one of the defining characteristics of the emerging international order, where strategic adaptability, technological interoperability, political cohesion, and networked deterrence increasingly determine the effectiveness of international security cooperation.
Military Alliances in International Relations Theory

Military alliances have long occupied a central place in the study of international relations because they constitute one of the principal mechanisms through which states seek to enhance their security, deter external aggression, and influence the distribution of power within the international system. (1) Traditionally, alliance theory has focused on explaining why states establish formal security arrangements under conditions of international anarchy. However, the strategic environment of the twenty-first century has expanded the functions of military alliances far beyond collective defense. Contemporary alliances increasingly encompass cyber security, intelligence cooperation, artificial intelligence, defense-industrial integration, maritime security, technological innovation, and economic resilience. These developments suggest that alliance theory requires conceptual refinement to account for the emergence of multi-domain strategic security networks.


Structural Realism provides the classical explanation for alliance formation. Waltz argues that the absence of a central authority compels states to rely upon self-help strategies, making alliances a rational response to systemic pressures rather than expressions of ideological affinity.(2) Within this perspective, alliances serve primarily to preserve the balance of power and prevent the emergence of regional or global hegemony.

Stephen Walt subsequently refined this approach through his Balance of Threat Theory, arguing that states balance against perceived threats rather than material capabilities alone. (3) Threat perception is influenced by aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Walt’s framework remains highly relevant in explaining contemporary responses to Russian military expansion and China’s growing strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Glenn Snyder further advanced alliance theory by examining the internal dynamics of alliance management. His concepts of abandonment and entrapment continue to explain many of the strategic dilemmas confronting modern alliances, particularly NATO, where member states seek simultaneously to preserve national autonomy while maintaining credible collective commitments. (4)

Although Realist theories continue to explain the origins of alliance formation, they offer a less satisfactory explanation of the expanding political, technological, and economic dimensions of contemporary security cooperation.


Liberal Institutionalism complements the Realist perspective by emphasizing the capacity of institutions to facilitate long-term cooperation under conditions of anarchy. Keohane argues that institutions reduce uncertainty, establish common rules, and lower the transaction costs associated with interstate cooperation. (5) Contemporary alliances illustrate this logic through institutionalized military planning, standardized operational procedures, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and collaborative technological development.

Constructivist scholarship adds a further dimension by emphasizing the importance of shared identities, common norms, and strategic cultures. Wendt argues that the behavior of states is shaped not only by material capabilities but also by socially constructed identities and collective expectations. (6) NATO’s continued cohesion after the collapse of the Soviet Union illustrates that shared democratic values and institutional identity have become significant sources of alliance resilience.

Recent strategic developments nevertheless demonstrate that none of these theoretical traditions fully captures the multi-domain character of contemporary alliance cooperation. The accelerating importance of cyber operations, artificial intelligence, defense-industrial collaboration, supply-chain security, space capabilities, and technological competition indicates that military alliances increasingly function as integrated strategic ecosystems rather than purely collective-defense organizations. (7)


It is precisely this theoretical limitation that motivates the development of the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) advanced in this article. Rather than replacing Realism, Liberal Institutionalism, or Constructivism, SNAM synthesizes their principal insights while extending alliance theory to explain how military alliances now integrate military, technological, economic, informational, and political instruments of power within flexible strategic networks. In this sense, contemporary alliances should be understood not simply as treaty organizations but as adaptive multi-domain security architectures designed to compete in an increasingly complex international order.

The Strategic Evolution of Military Alliances: From Collective Defense to Multi-Domain Strategic Networks

From Collective Defense to Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation

Military alliances have historically been established to deter external aggression, preserve strategic stability, and maintain the balance of power within an anarchic international system. During the Cold War, alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact were primarily designed around collective defense, territorial protection, and nuclear deterrence. Their strategic effectiveness depended largely on formal treaty obligations, military interoperability, and the credibility of collective retaliation against conventional or nuclear aggression. (8)


The end of the Cold War did not eliminate the need for military alliances; rather, it fundamentally transformed their strategic purpose. The proliferation of non-traditional security threats—including terrorism, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, disinformation, economic coercion, maritime insecurity, and the militarization of outer space—has significantly expanded the operational responsibilities of contemporary alliances. Security cooperation today increasingly extends beyond the battlefield into the technological, economic, informational, and industrial domains. (9)

Consequently, military alliances should no longer be understood solely as institutions for collective defense. They have progressively evolved into multi-domain strategic organizations that integrate military planning with cyber resilience, intelligence sharing, defense-industrial cooperation, technological innovation, supply-chain security, and strategic communications. The effectiveness of an alliance is therefore measured not only by the size of its armed forces but also by its capacity to coordinate multiple instruments of national power across interconnected strategic domains. (10)

This transformation reflects a broader evolution in the concept of deterrence itself. Classical deterrence theory, developed during the nuclear age, emphasized the prevention of war through the credible threat of military retaliation. (11) Contemporary deterrence, however, increasingly depends upon resilience, technological superiority, intelligence integration, cyber defense, economic security, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Deterrence has therefore become multidimensional, requiring alliances to coordinate military and non-military capabilities simultaneously in order to preserve strategic credibility.


The evolution of military alliances should therefore be understood not as institutional adaptation alone but as a structural transformation in the organization of international security. Contemporary alliances increasingly resemble interconnected strategic ecosystems capable of integrating defense policy, technological innovation, industrial production, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and economic resilience within a unified strategic framework. This development represents one of the defining characteristics of twenty-first-century international security governance.

Technological Competition and Alliance Transformation


Technological innovation has become the principal catalyst of alliance transformation. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, space technologies, advanced missile defense, and data-driven military decision-making are reshaping both the character of warfare and the strategic requirements of international cooperation. (12)

Consequently, technological superiority has become inseparable from alliance credibility. Modern alliances increasingly invest in joint research programs, defense-industrial integration, innovation ecosystems, and collaborative technological development. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept explicitly identifies emerging and disruptive technologies, cyber security, and resilience as central pillars of collective defense. (13) Likewise, AUKUS illustrates how contemporary security partnerships increasingly priorities advanced technological cooperation over traditional force structures.


These developments indicate that future alliance effectiveness will depend less upon numerical military superiority than upon the ability to integrate technological innovation with operational interoperability. Defense industries, research institutions, private technology firms, and intelligence agencies have consequently become integral components of contemporary alliance architecture, demonstrating that military power can no longer be separated from scientific and technological capacity.
The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM): A New Analytical Framework for Alliance Theory

The transformations examined throughout this study suggest that contemporary military alliances can no longer be adequately explained through analytical models developed during the Cold War. Although Structural Realism, Balance of Threat Theory, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism continue to provide indispensable explanations for alliance formation, cohesion, and persistence, they offer only a partial understanding of the multi-domain character of contemporary security cooperation. None of these theoretical traditions fully captures the growing integration of technological innovation, cyber resilience, defense-industrial collaboration, intelligence fusion, economic security, and flexible coalition-building within modern alliance structures. (14)

To address this analytical limitation, this article proposes the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) as a new conceptual framework for understanding the evolution of military alliances in the twenty-first century. SNAM argues that contemporary alliances are no longer defined solely by formal treaty commitments or collective-defense obligations. Instead, they function as interconnected strategic networks that integrate military, political, technological, economic, intelligence, industrial, and diplomatic capabilities into a multi-domain security architecture.


Unlike traditional alliance models that focus primarily on balancing military threats, SNAM conceptualizes alliances as dynamic governance systems designed to generate collective strategic advantages across multiple domains simultaneously. Military interoperability remains an essential component, but it now operates alongside cyber cooperation, technological innovation, artificial intelligence, defense-industrial integration, intelligence sharing, maritime security, supply-chain resilience, strategic communications, and economic coordination.

Within this framework, alliance effectiveness depends less upon institutional permanence than upon strategic adaptability. Contemporary security organizations increasingly succeed because they can rapidly establish operational coalitions, integrate new technologies, coordinate intelligence, strengthen industrial resilience, and respond collectively to multidimensional threats that transcend conventional military confrontation.

Accordingly, SNAM identifies seven mutually reinforcing pillars of contemporary alliance effectiveness:Collective Defense and Integrated Deterrence—maintaining credible military capabilities capable of deterring conventional and hybrid aggression.
Technological Superiority—joint development of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, quantum technologies, and advanced defence innovation.
Intelligence Integration—continuous intelligence sharing, strategic assessment, early-warning mechanisms, and multidomain situational awareness.
Defence-Industrial Cooperation—collaborative production, supply-chain resilience, defence procurement, and innovation ecosystems linking governments, armed forces, universities, and private industry.
Economic and Strategic Resilience—coordination in sanctions policy, protection of critical infrastructure, energy security, and technological supply chains.
Flexible Coalition Architecture—the ability to establish mission-oriented partnerships rapidly according to specific operational requirements rather than relying exclusively on permanent treaty commitments.
Political Cohesion and Strategic Governance—shared political objectives, institutional legitimacy, democratic consultation, and strategic decision-making capable of maintaining long-term alliance cohesion.


Taken together, these pillars demonstrate that military alliances have evolved into multi-domain strategic governance systems rather than remaining exclusively collective-defence organizations. This transformation reflects broader changes in the international security environment, where military power increasingly interacts with technological competition, economic statecraft, cyber conflict, and geopolitical rivalry.

Rather than replacing existing alliance theories, SNAM should therefore be understood as an integrative theoretical framework. Structural Realism continues to explain why alliances emerge under conditions of anarchy; Balance of Threat Theory explains patterns of strategic alignment; Liberal Institutionalism clarifies the institutional mechanisms that facilitate cooperation; and Constructivism illuminates the importance of shared identities and norms. SNAM builds upon these traditions by explaining how alliances adapt operationally to an increasingly interconnected and technologically driven strategic environment. It therefore provides a complementary analytical perspective capable of bridging classical alliance theory with the realities of twenty-first-century international security.

From a broader theoretical perspective, SNAM also contributes to the study of international security governance. Whereas traditional alliance theory primarily examined relations among sovereign states, the proposed framework recognizes that contemporary security increasingly depends upon networks linking governments, international organizations, intelligence agencies, defense industries, research institutions, technology companies, and regional coalitions. Security governance has therefore become progressively decentralized, multi-domain, and networked.

The Strategic Network Alliance Model consequently offers an analytical framework not only for explaining the transformation of NATO, AUKUS, the QUAD, and emerging Middle Eastern security partnerships, but also for understanding the future evolution of international security cooperation under conditions of accelerating technological change and intensifying geopolitical competition.


The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) is proposed as a mid-range theoretical framework. It does not seek to replace general theories of international relations but rather to explain the evolving organizational logic of military alliances under conditions of multi-domain strategic competition.





The Russia–Ukraine War and the Reconfiguration of the International Security Architecture


The Return of Interstate Warfare and the Revival of Collective Defense


The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in February 2022 marked a major turning point in the evolution of the contemporary international security environment. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Europe witnessed a large-scale interstate conventional conflict involving one of the world’s principal military powers. Beyond its regional consequences, the war challenged many assumptions that had shaped post-1991 security thinking, particularly the expectation that economic interdependence and globalization would gradually reduce the likelihood of major interstate warfare. (15)


Instead, the conflict reaffirmed the enduring importance of military power as a central instrument of statecraft. Strategic competition among major powers rapidly displaced the liberal optimism that had characterized much of the post-Cold War era. As a result, military alliances once again became essential mechanisms for deterrence, defense planning, military modernization, intelligence cooperation, and geopolitical coordination.

From a theoretical perspective, the conflict revived several classical realist propositions concerning anarchy, the security dilemma, and the continuing relevance of military capabilities. At the same time, it demonstrated that contemporary deterrence extends well beyond conventional armed forces to include economic sanctions, cyber operations, intelligence sharing, strategic communications, and technological coordination. (16)
NATO’s Strategic Adaptation after 2022

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Russia–Ukraine war has been the strategic revitalization of NATO. Prior to 2022, the Alliance faced persistent debates regarding burden-sharing, political cohesion, and long-term relevance. Russia’s invasion fundamentally altered these debates by restoring collective defense to the center of NATO’s mission while simultaneously expanding its responsibilities across multiple strategic domains.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identifies Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to Allied security while recognizing China as a long-term systemic challenge affecting Euro-Atlantic stability. (17) This dual assessment represents a significant departure from earlier strategic doctrines by acknowledging that future security challenges originate simultaneously from conventional military threats, emerging technologies, cyber operations, and geopolitical competition.


The Alliance has responded through reinforcement of its eastern flank, expansion of multinational battlegroups, increased defense spending, enhanced readiness forces, and greater investment in advanced military technologies. The accession of Finland and Sweden has further strengthened NATO’s strategic position in Northern Europe, significantly altering the military geography of the Baltic region and extending the Alliance’s capacity for collective deterrence.

Rather than simply returning to its Cold War posture, NATO has evolved into a multi-domain security organization capable of integrating conventional military power with cyber defense, intelligence cooperation, resilience planning, space security, and technological innovation. This adaptation illustrates the broader transformation of military alliances from static defense organizations into dynamic strategic networks.
The Indo-Pacific and the Emergence of New Alliance Architecture

While the Russia–Ukraine war has reinforced NATO’s centrality within Europe, it has also accelerated strategic realignments beyond the Euro-Atlantic theatre. The United States increasingly regards the Indo-Pacific as the principal arena of long-term geopolitical competition, with China’s expanding military capabilities representing its foremost strategic concern.

This strategic shift has stimulated new forms of security cooperation that differ substantially from traditional treaty-based alliances. Initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) emphasize technological collaboration, maritime security, defense-industrial integration, intelligence sharing, and regional deterrence rather than formal collective-defense obligations comparable to NATO’s Article 5.

These arrangements illustrate an important evolution in alliance politics. Contemporary partnerships increasingly prioritize interoperability, technological innovation, and strategic flexibility over rigid institutional structures. Alliance effectiveness is therefore measured less by formal treaty commitments than by the capacity to coordinate across multiple strategic domains in response to rapidly evolving security challenges.

Economic Statecraft and the Expansion of Alliance Functions


One of the defining characteristics of contemporary alliance politics is the growing integration of military strategy with economic statecraft. The Russia–Ukraine war demonstrated that sanctions, export controls, financial restrictions, and technological embargoes have become essential instruments of strategic competition.

Western governments coordinated unprecedented economic measures against Russia while simultaneously seeking to strengthen energy security, diversify supply chains, and reduce dependence on strategically vulnerable technologies. These developments illustrate that economic resilience has become inseparable from national security.


Similarly, competition over artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, cyber capabilities, and critical minerals increasingly shapes alliance cooperation. Military alliances therefore function not only as defense organizations but also as platforms for technological governance and industrial coordination.
Implications for the Emerging International Order

The strategic consequences of the Russia–Ukraine war extend far beyond the immediate military confrontation. More fundamentally, the conflict has accelerated the transition toward an increasingly fragmented and competitive international system characterized by multiple centers of power, overlapping security architectures, and intensifying geopolitical rivalry.

The evidence presented in this study suggests that military alliances should no longer be analysed solely through the traditional concepts of collective defense or balance-of-power politics. Instead, they increasingly operate as multidimensional strategic ecosystems integrating military capabilities with technological innovation, economic resilience, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and industrial capacity.


The Transformation of Global Security Governance: Why Flexible Coalitions Are Replacing Traditional Collective Security?


The Crisis of Collective Security in the Contemporary International System


The post-Cold War international order was founded on the expectation that multilateral institutions would play an increasingly effective role in maintaining international peace and security. Built upon the principles of collective security enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the liberal international order sought to reduce interstate conflict through international law, multilateral diplomacy, and institutional cooperation. However, the resurgence of geopolitical rivalry during the past decade has exposed significant limitations in the ability of universal institutions to respond effectively to major international crises. (18)

The growing strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia has increasingly constrained multilateral decision-making, particularly within the United Nations Security Council. The repeated use of the veto by permanent members has reflected the return of power politics to the center of international relations, reducing the Council’s capacity to produce timely and effective collective responses to armed conflicts. Consequently, the international system has witnessed an increasing reliance on alternative security arrangements capable of responding more rapidly and flexibly to emerging threats. (19)


Rather than signaling the disappearance of multilateralism, these developments indicate a redistribution of security responsibilities. Universal institutions continue to provide political legitimacy and normative frameworks, while operational responses to crises are increasingly undertaken by regional organizations, strategic alliances, and mission-oriented military coalitions.

From Universal Collective Security to Flexible Coalition-Based Security


One of the defining characteristics of contemporary international security is the growing preference for flexible coalition-building over universal collective action. Unlike traditional collective security arrangements, which require broad international consensus before military action can be authorized, contemporary coalitions are typically established among groups of states sharing common strategic interests and threat perceptions.

This transformation reflects the changing nature of security threats. Cyber warfare, hybrid operations, terrorism, maritime insecurity, disinformation campaigns, and the protection of critical infrastructure require rapid operational coordination that often exceeds the decision-making capacity of traditional multilateral organizations. Flexible coalitions therefore offer greater strategic agility by enabling participating states to coordinate military capabilities, intelligence assets, technological resources, and diplomatic efforts without the institutional constraints associated with universal organizations. (21)

The emergence of coalition-based security does not necessarily undermine international institutions; rather, it represents an adaptive response to an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment. States continue to value the legitimacy provided by multilateral institutions while simultaneously recognizing that immediate security challenges frequently require operational mechanisms capable of acting with greater speed and flexibility.

Strategic Competition and the Rise of Mission-Oriented Coalitions

The renewed era of great-power competition has accelerated the evolution of military cooperation from permanent alliance structures toward mission-specific strategic coalitions. Unlike traditional treaty-based alliances, contemporary coalitions are generally organized around clearly defined operational objectives, limited geographical theatres, and specific security challenges.

Examples include multinational maritime operations (22) protecting critical sea lines of communication, coordinated missile-defense initiatives, intelligence-sharing arrangements, cyber-defense partnerships, and technological cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence and space security. These initiatives demonstrate that contemporary security cooperation increasingly emphasizes operational effectiveness rather than institutional permanence. (23)


The evolution of these arrangements also reflects a broader transformation in deterrence theory. Classical deterrence relied primarily upon military retaliation against conventional aggression. Contemporary deterrence, however, increasingly depends upon multi-domain integration encompassing cyber resilience, technological superiority, intelligence fusion, economic security, strategic communications, and industrial capacity. Consequently, successful security cooperation now requires integrated networks capable of coordinating multiple instruments of national power simultaneously. (24)

Flexible Coalitions as an Emerging Pillar of International Security

Recent international crises provide compelling evidence that flexible military coalitions have become indispensable components of contemporary security governance. The international response to maritime insecurity in the Red Sea (25), multinational efforts to strengthen cyber resilience, and coordinated missile-defense cooperation among regional partners all demonstrate that coalition-based security has become an increasingly prominent feature of the evolving international order.

These developments suggest that security governance is gradually shifting toward a hybrid architecture (26) in which traditional military alliances coexist with flexible operational coalitions. Permanent alliances continue to provide long-term strategic stability, interoperability, and institutional continuity, whereas mission-oriented coalitions offer the adaptability required to confront rapidly evolving threats.

This coexistence represents neither the replacement of alliances nor the abandonment of collective security. Instead, it reflects an ongoing process of strategic adaptation through which states combine institutionalized security commitments with more flexible mechanisms capable of addressing multidimensional security challenges.


Implications for the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM)

The transformation of global security governance provides further support for the central argument advanced in this article. Contemporary international security is no longer organized exclusively around permanent treaty-based alliances. Rather, it increasingly consists of interconnected strategic networks combining formal alliances, regional partnerships, ad hoc military coalitions, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, technological cooperation, and defense-industrial collaboration.

Within the proposed Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), these arrangements should be understood as complementary rather than competing forms of security cooperation. (27) Traditional alliances continue to provide the institutional backbone of international security, while flexible coalitions expand operational capacity by enabling rapid responses to specific strategic contingencies.

Accordingly, the emerging international order is characterized by a multilayered security architecture (28) in which alliances and coalitions jointly contribute to deterrence, crisis management, technological innovation, maritime security, cyber defense, and geopolitical stability. This evolution illustrates that the future of international security will depend less upon the expansion of formal alliances than upon the ability of states to construct resilient strategic networks capable of integrating military, technological, economic, and political capabilities across multiple domains.


The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) in Practice: The Evolution of the U.S.–Israel Security Network and the Changing Middle Eastern Security Order


The contemporary Middle East provides one of the most illustrative examples of how the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) operates in practice. Unlike the bipolar alliance structures of the Cold War, regional security is increasingly shaped by overlapping networks of military cooperation, technological partnerships, intelligence sharing, economic interdependence, and diplomatic coordination. Within this evolving architecture, the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel represents one of the most institutionalized and technologically integrated security networks in the international system. Rather than functioning solely as a bilateral military alliance, it has developed into a multidimensional strategic partnership encompassing advanced defense technologies, missile defense systems, intelligence cooperation, cyber security, defense-industrial collaboration, and regional diplomatic initiatives. (29)

The evolution of this strategic network reflects broader transformations in alliance politics. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has progressively shifted from maintaining large permanent military deployments toward constructing regional security architectures based on interoperability, burden-sharing, technological integration, and partnerships with regional actors. The Abraham Accords, expanding missile-defense cooperation among regional partners, and increasing intelligence coordination demonstrate how contemporary alliances increasingly function through interconnected strategic networks rather than isolated bilateral commitments. (30)

However, the Middle Eastern security environment is simultaneously undergoing profound structural changes. The diffusion of military technologies, the proliferation of precision-guided weapons, the expansion of indigenous defense industries, the growing use of unmanned systems, and the emergence of non-state military actors have altered the regional balance of power. Several Arab states have substantially modernized their armed forces while simultaneously pursuing strategic diversification through defense partnerships extending beyond traditional Western suppliers. China and Russia have also expanded their diplomatic, economic, and military engagement across the region, contributing to an increasingly multipolar security environment. (31)


From an Arab strategic perspective, these developments are frequently interpreted as reflecting the gradual transition from a predominantly unipolar regional order toward a more diversified security architecture. Rather than relying exclusively on external security guarantees, many regional states increasingly emphasize strategic autonomy, defense-industrial development, technological modernization, and diversified international partnerships. This trend does not necessarily imply the decline of the United States’ regional influence; rather, it suggests that regional security is becoming more pluralistic, with multiple centers of influence operating simultaneously. (32)

Similarly, scholars from the Global South often argue that contemporary international security is experiencing a broader redistribution of political and military capabilities. Emerging powers seek greater participation in shaping international security governance while questioning institutional arrangements established during the post-Second World War period. Within this perspective, alliances are increasingly evaluated not only according to their military effectiveness but also according to their capacity to accommodate changing geopolitical realities and evolving distributions of power. (33)

The ongoing conflicts in Gaza, the Red Sea, and the broader regional tensions involving Iran and its network of partners further demonstrate both the strengths and limitations of highly integrated alliance networks. The U.S.–Israel strategic partnership continues to provide substantial military interoperability, intelligence coordination, and technological advantages. Nevertheless, these conflicts also illustrate that military superiority alone cannot resolve complex political crises rooted in questions of legitimacy, governance, state fragility, and regional rivalries. Contemporary security increasingly depends upon the interaction between military capabilities, diplomatic engagement, economic resilience, and political legitimacy. (34)

The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing these dynamics. Rather than viewing military alliances as static treaty organizations, SNAM conceptualizes them as adaptive strategic networks operating across multiple domains of power. The Middle East demonstrates that successful security cooperation increasingly depends upon the integration of military capabilities with technological innovation, intelligence cooperation, economic resilience, diplomatic engagement, and institutional flexibility.

Consequently, the future of military alliances should not be understood in terms of their expansion or contraction alone, but in terms of their capacity to evolve within an increasingly multipolar international system. The principal challenge facing alliances during the coming decades will be their ability to remain strategically cohesive while accommodating the redistribution of global political influence, the diffusion of military technologies, and the emergence of new regional centers of power. In this evolving environment, resilience, adaptability, and network integration are likely to become more decisive than numerical military superiority alone.

Strategic Networks and the Future Balance of Power in the Middle East


The Middle East has emerged as one of the most dynamic theatres for observing the transformation of military alliances in the twenty-first century. The region no longer reflects the relatively stable alliance structures that characterized the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War era. Instead, it has evolved into a complex security environment in which traditional alliances coexist with flexible coalitions, strategic partnerships, intelligence networks, defense-industrial cooperation, and technological integration. This multidimensional security landscape provides a particularly valuable empirical context for evaluating the explanatory capacity of the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM). Rather than understanding regional security through binary alliance rivalries, SNAM conceptualizes the Middle East as an interconnected system of overlapping strategic networks operating simultaneously across military, technological, political, economic, and informational domains. (35)

The Evolution of Regional Military Networks

The United States has remained the principal external security actor in the Middle East for more than five decades, with its strategic partnership with Israel representing one of the most institutionalized military relationships in contemporary international politics. Extensive intelligence cooperation, joint military exercises, integrated missile-defense systems, cyber-security collaboration, and defense-industrial partnerships have produced a highly resilient security network capable of responding to a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional threats. (36)

Nevertheless, the regional security architecture has undergone significant diversification. The Abraham Accords have facilitated unprecedented cooperation between Israel and several Arab states in areas including intelligence exchange, air and missile defense, maritime security, and technological innovation. Simultaneously, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have invested heavily in indigenous defense industries, military modernization, artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and cyber capabilities. These developments suggest that regional security is increasingly characterized by networked cooperation rather than isolated bilateral alliances. (37)

The Redistribution of Regional Military and Political Power

While the United States continues to possess unmatched military capabilities and maintains an extensive regional presence, the strategic environment has become progressively more pluralistic. Regional actors have expanded their political autonomy by diversifying diplomatic partnerships and reducing dependence on a single external security provider. This evolution reflects not the disappearance of American influence but rather the emergence of a more distributed balance of power in which regional and extra-regional actors exercise increasing strategic agency. (38)

Arab states have progressively invested in military modernization programs designed to strengthen national deterrence capabilities and reduce long-term dependence on foreign military support. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Egypt have expanded defense procurement, developed domestic defense-industrial capacities, and invested in emerging technologies including autonomous systems, cyber defense, and space capabilities. Although considerable differences remain in operational effectiveness, these initiatives indicate a broader regional trend toward strategic self-reliance. (39)

At the same time, Turkey has pursued an increasingly autonomous defense strategy, combining NATO membership with an expanding indigenous defense industry and an active regional security policy. Iran, by contrast, has relied primarily on asymmetric deterrence, ballistic missile development, unmanned aerial systems, and partnerships with non-state armed groups to compensate for conventional military limitations. These contrasting approaches demonstrate that regional power is increasingly exercised through diverse strategic networks rather than through conventional force structures alone.(40) ⁶

External Powers and the Emerging Multipolar Middle East


The redistribution of regional power has also been influenced by the growing involvement of external actors beyond the traditional Western alliance system. China has significantly expanded its economic presence through infrastructure investment, technological cooperation, energy partnerships, and diplomatic engagement. While Beijing has thus far avoided establishing a comprehensive military alliance structure comparable to that of the United States, its growing political and economic influence contributes to an increasingly multipolar regional environment. (41)

Russia likewise continues to play an important strategic role, particularly through its military engagement in Syria, defense exports, energy diplomacy, and political mediation efforts. Although the war in Ukraine has affected Moscow’s capacity to project power, Russia remains an influential regional actor whose policies contribute to the diversification of Middle Eastern security relationships. (42)

For many states in the region, the objective is not to replace one strategic partner with another but to diversify external relationships in ways that maximize strategic autonomy. This approach reflects a broader trend in Global South diplomacy, where states increasingly pursue multidirectional foreign policies that seek cooperation with multiple major powers while avoiding exclusive alignment with any single geopolitical bloc. (43)

Drivers of the Emerging Regional Security Architecture.

The gradual transition toward a more networked and pluralistic security architecture in the Middle East is driven by several interrelated structural developments that collectively reshape alliance behavior and regional strategic calculations.

First, the sustained increase in regional military expenditure reflects the growing determination of Middle Eastern states to strengthen national defense capabilities while reducing excessive dependence on external security guarantees. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Middle East remains one of the world’s highest military-spending regions relative to GDP. Saudi Arabia consistently ranks among the world’s largest defense spenders, while Israel maintains one of the highest defense expenditures as a percentage of national output among advanced economies. The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey have likewise invested substantially in military modernization, including advanced air defense systems, precision-guided munitions, cyber capabilities, space assets, and indigenous defense industries. (44)

Second, the proliferation of indigenous defense-industrial capabilities has fundamentally altered the regional balance of military dependence. Rather than relying exclusively on imported weapon systems, several regional powers have adopted long-term strategies aimed at developing domestic production capacities. Turkey has emerged as a leading producer of unmanned aerial vehicles, naval platforms, and armored vehicles. Israel continues to lead in missile defense, cyber technologies, and advanced defense innovation, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have incorporated defense-industrial development into broader national transformation programs such as Saudi Vision 2030 and the UAE’s industrial strategy. These developments strengthen national strategic autonomy and diversify the technological foundations of regional security. (45)


Third, the diversification of strategic partnerships reflects a significant evolution in regional foreign policy. While the United States remains the principal external military partner for many Middle Eastern states, regional governments increasingly pursue simultaneous political, economic, and security cooperation with China, Russia, European partners, India, and other emerging powers. This multidirectional diplomacy does not necessarily represent a rejection of existing alliances; rather, it reflects an effort to reduce strategic vulnerability by avoiding excessive dependence on any single external actor. Such diversification is consistent with broader patterns observed across the Global South, where states seek greater flexibility in an increasingly multipolar international system. (46)

Fourth, the changing nature of regional threats has encouraged states to prioritize national resilience over broad collective-security arrangements. Contemporary security challenges—including cyber-attacks, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems, maritime insecurity, terrorism, energy infrastructure protection, and transnational criminal networks—often require rapid, specialized responses. As a result, governments increasingly establish issue-specific partnerships based on immediate operational requirements rather than comprehensive collective-defense commitments. Intelligence-sharing arrangements, integrated air and missile defense initiatives, maritime task forces, and cyber-security cooperation illustrate this functional approach to security governance. (47)

Finally, regional political priorities have become increasingly differentiated, making comprehensive collective-security frameworks more difficult to sustain. Middle Eastern governments often face distinct strategic environments, domestic political pressures, economic development agendas, and perceptions of external threats. Consequently, alliance behavior is increasingly driven by national interests and regime-specific security calculations rather than by a unified regional conception of collective security. This does not imply the disappearance of cooperation; instead, cooperation has become more selective, pragmatic, and mission-oriented. States increasingly participate in overlapping security arrangements according to specific strategic objectives rather than permanent bloc politics. (48)

Viewed collectively, these developments suggest that the Middle East is not witnessing the collapse of traditional alliances but rather their transformation. The regional security order is evolving toward a multilayered architecture in which permanent alliances coexist with flexible coalitions, bilateral strategic partnerships, technological cooperation, intelligence networks, and defense-industrial collaboration. From the perspective of the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), this transformation demonstrates that alliance effectiveness increasingly depends on the capacity to integrate diverse forms of strategic cooperation across multiple domains rather than on formal treaty commitments alone. In this respect, the Middle East represents one of the clearest contemporary illustrations of the transition from alliance-based security toward network-based security governance.

SNAM and the Future Security Architecture of the Middle East

The evolving balance of power in the Middle East provides strong empirical support for the Strategic Network Alliance Model. Rather than replacing traditional alliances, emerging security arrangements increasingly complement them through flexible coalitions capable of addressing specific operational challenges. Permanent alliances continue to provide strategic continuity, institutional experience, and military interoperability, while ad hoc coalitions contribute operational flexibility, technological specialization, and rapid crisis response.

From this perspective, the future regional security architecture is likely to consist of interconnected strategic networks integrating formal alliances, regional organizations, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, defense-industrial partnerships, cyber-security cooperation, maritime security initiatives, and technological collaboration. Military effectiveness will therefore depend increasingly upon the ability of states to coordinate these multiple dimensions of power rather than upon conventional force size alone. (49)

This transformation also carries important implications for the future of regional stability. Military superiority remains an important component of deterrence; however, durable security increasingly requires political legitimacy, economic resilience, technological innovation, institutional adaptability, and effective diplomacy. Alliances that successfully integrate these complementary dimensions will be better positioned to respond to the increasingly complex security challenges of the twenty-first century.

From both Arab and Global South perspectives, this evolution reflects neither the inevitable decline of established powers nor the emergence of a completely new regional order. Instead, it illustrates a gradual redistribution of influence within an increasingly interconnected international system in which multiple actors simultaneously contribute to regional security governance. In this context, SNAM offers a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding how strategic networks—not merely formal alliances—are becoming the principal mechanism through which military and political power is organized in the contemporary Middle East. (50)

Conclusion

The transformation of the international security environment has fundamentally challenged the traditional understanding of military alliances. The resurgence of great-power competition, the proliferation of hybrid and multi-domain threats, rapid technological innovation, and the redistribution of political and military capabilities have exposed the limitations of classical alliance theories that primarily interpret alliances as treaty-based mechanisms for collective defense against common adversaries. While these theoretical traditions continue to provide valuable insights into alliance formation and deterrence, they are less capable of explaining the increasingly complex patterns of cooperation that characterize contemporary international security.

To explain this transformation, the article proposed the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) as a new analytical framework for understanding the evolution of alliance politics in the twenty-first century. Unlike traditional alliance theories, which focus principally on balancing behavior, deterrence, or institutional commitments, SNAM conceptualizes alliances as dynamic strategic networks composed of five mutually reinforcing pillars: collective defense, technological innovation, intelligence integration, flexible governance, and multi-domain strategic cooperation. This framework expands existing alliance theory by incorporating the growing importance of technological interdependence, defense-industrial cooperation, institutional adaptability, and networked security governance.


The empirical examination of contemporary security developments further demonstrates the explanatory value of the model. NATO’s institutional adaptation after the Cold War, the increasing reliance on flexible coalition-based security arrangements, and the evolution of strategic partnerships in the Middle East collectively illustrate that contemporary security governance increasingly operates through overlapping and interconnected security networks rather than through isolated alliance structures. The analysis of the United States–Israel strategic partnership, together with the broader evolution of regional security relationships, shows that permanent alliances now coexist with mission-oriented coalitions, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, technological partnerships, maritime security initiatives, and defense-industrial cooperation.

The Middle East represents one of the clearest illustrations of this transformation. Rising defense expenditures, the expansion of indigenous defense industries, the diffusion of advanced military technologies, and the diversification of external strategic partnerships have contributed to a progressively more networked and pluralistic regional security architecture. At the same time, regional governments increasingly interpret security through the prism of national strategic priorities, leading to more selective, issue-specific, and flexible forms of cooperation rather than comprehensive regional collective-security arrangements. These developments do not signify the disappearance of traditional alliances but rather their adaptation to a more complex and multipolar international environment.

The findings of this study also have broader implications for international security governance. As global power becomes increasingly dispersed, security cooperation is likely to depend less on rigid bloc politics and more on the ability of states to construct interoperable strategic networks capable of integrating military, technological, political, economic, and informational resources. In this evolving environment, resilience, adaptability, and multi-domain coordination are becoming central determinants of strategic effectiveness. Alliance success will increasingly be measured by the capacity to connect institutions, technologies, and partners across multiple levels of security governance rather than by the size of military forces alone.

Although the Strategic Network Alliance Model offers a comprehensive conceptual framework for analyzing these transformations, it should be regarded as an evolving analytical model rather than a definitive theory. Future research should subject SNAM to systematic empirical testing across different regional security complexes and alliance systems, including NATO, AUKUS, the Quad, the U.S.–Israel strategic partnership, African regional security arrangements, and emerging Indo-Pacific coalitions. Comparative case studies, network analysis, and quantitative indicators of interoperability, technological integration, intelligence cooperation, and institutional resilience would further refine the model and assess its explanatory power under varying geopolitical conditions.

Ultimately, this article contends that the future of military alliances lies not in the replacement of traditional alliance structures, but in their transformation into increasingly interconnected strategic networks capable of responding to the multidimensional challenges of contemporary international security. By offering a framework that bridges classical alliance theory with emerging patterns of networked security governance, the Strategic Network Alliance Model contributes to a deeper understanding of how military cooperation is evolving in an era defined by strategic competition, technological disruption, and an increasingly multipolar international order.


Endnotes: 

George H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4–10.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 118–128.
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21–37.
Snyder, Alliance Politics, 165–202.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 67–109.
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 246–312.
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 593–621.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 35–52; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 117–125.
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 592–620.
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–34.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 113–150
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022), 7–12.
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 601–623; Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 211–236.
John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77–89; Lawrence Freedman, Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (London: Allen Lane, 2023), 412–438.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 1–34; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 102–128
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022), 3–12.
G. John Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); David Malone, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004).
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (2009): 34–39.
Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023); Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid, 2022); U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 2022).
Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022).
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” December 2023; NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (1997); NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid, 2022).
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
Michael Eisenstadt, The Abraham Accords: The Gulf States, Israel, and the New Middle East (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021); U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 2022).
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf (London: Routledge, 2013); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025)
Fawaz A. Gerges, The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).
Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2025.
. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambrid ge University Press, 2003); Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).
Steven A. Cook, The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
Michael Eisenstadt, The Abraham Accords: The Gulf States, Israel, and the New Middle East (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021); NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid: NATO, 2022).
Fawaz A. Gerges, The Great Betrayal: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023); G. John Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020).
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand.
Henri J. Barkey, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Davutoğlu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2023); Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf (London: Routledge, 2013).
Jonathan Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies (London: Routledge, 2022); Jonathan Fulton, “China’s Changing Role in the Middle East,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief (2023).
Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2025.
Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025); Nan Tian et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2025.
Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025 (London: Routledge for the IISS, 2025).
Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Jonathan Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies (London: Routledge, 2022).
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid: NATO, 2022).
Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us About Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022); Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers.


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Brands, Hal. The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us About Great-Power Rivalry Today. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022.
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 4th ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. First published 1977.
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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Cook, Steven A. The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. New York: Oxford University Press, 2024.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf. London: Routledge, 2013.
Eisenstadt, Michael. The Abraham Accords: The Gulf States, Israel, and the New Middle East. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021.
Fawcett, Louise, ed. International Relations of the Middle East. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023.
Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Fulton, Jonathan. China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies. London: Routledge, 2022.
Fulton, Jonathan. “China’s Changing Role in the Middle East.” Atlantic Council Issue Brief. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2023.
Gerges, Fawaz A. The Great Betrayal: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023.
Gerges, Fawaz A. The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Hoffman, Frank G. “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (2009): 34–39.
Ikenberry, G. John. “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 7–23.
Ikenberry, G. John. A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance 2024. London: Routledge, 2024.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance 2025. London: Routledge, 2025.
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Malone, David M. The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.
Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77–89.
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Snyder, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Thakur, Ramesh. The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
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Trenin, Dmitri. What Is Russia Up To in the Middle East? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018.
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Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
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Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.



About Dr. Mohammed Issam Laaroussi

Dr. Mohammed Issam Laaroussi is a Professor of International Relations at The international American University of Theism and International Relations Academy in Istanbul, ex Director of Research and Studies at TRENDS Research and Advisory Center in Abu Dhabi. Dr. Laaroussi is experienced in the analyses of the evolving multi-dimensional aspects of strategic and security issues, with over 20 years of expertise. His main areas of expertise are International Law, Criminal Law, Management of International Organizations, National Security Approaches, and Foreign Policy Analysis, Crisis Management, and Geo-strategic studies, Terrorism Affairs, Leadership and Governance, with a focus on the MENA and Europe regions. Dr. Issam is a consultant and expert accredited by different media outlets (Abu Dhabi TV-Sky News Arabia-Al Hora channel-CCTV, INDUS TV), as well as some other international bodies.
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About Dr. EL Abess El Ouardi

Dr. EL Abess El Ouardi is Professor of Public Law and Political Science at Mohammed V University in Rabat, Morocco, and an expert in public policy, governance, and political analysis. He serves as Director General of the African Journal of Public Policies at Mohammed V University. His research and professional expertise encompass public governance, institutional reform, public policy analysis, political and strategic affairs, and contemporary international issues. He has published and contributed to academic and policy-oriented debates on governance, political institutions, and public affairs.
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Sunday, August 30, 2026

The left and ecology: An increasingly necessary relationship

Imagen: Fernando Salazar Acha/Getty images.

First published in Spanish at Nueva Sociedad. Translation by Richard Fidler for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Historically, the different lefts have been resistant to the ecological currents that have emerged since 1970 amid the first signs of the environmental crisis and varying criticisms of the developmentalist paradigm. This rejection arose because the left privileged a reading of modernity and the social system based on the conflict between capital and labour, while minimising or ignoring conflicts between capital and nature, and with it the environmental and territorial impacts of the hegemonic development model. Consequently, although they questioned the capitalist system’s relations of exploitation, in general they continued to support the development paradigm.

In Latin America, the lefts — whether Marxist or reformist — share this set of beliefs about accumulation and development. Structuralists at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and key authors of dependency theory both focused on questioning social inequality and structural dependence, rather than the ideology of development. The incipient environmental issue remained outside their conceptual horizon. Decades later, this developmentalist consensus was reproduced by progressive lefts that from the 2000s governed various Latin American countries, during the so-called “commodities boom”.

Environmentalism emerged as a political-social perspective towards the end of the 1950s, alongside mounting spheres of conflict and the growing importance of environmental problems and planetary boundaries. From the start, environmental organisations criticised productivism as well as the ideology of progress and infinite growth promoted by both Western capitalism and Soviet-type socialism (at the time hegemonic on the left). Likewise, as with other new social movements, environmentalism appeared as the bearer of new organisational practices, linked more to autonomism and countercultural left-wing currents that opted for more flexible and democratic organisational forms, as opposed to the vertical styles of political construction typical of left-wing parties and trade unions.

Although environmental organisations of a conservationist nature have existed in Latin America since the 1950s, they have had little impact. Their weakness was linked to the conviction permeating both the left and political elites in Latin America that the incipient ecological problem was a secondary concern imported from the agenda of rich countries, if not an ideological gimmick aimed at hindering development in the poorest countries. 

In fact, it was in the late 1990s, and mainly in the 2000s, when faced with neo-extractivism’s growing environmental and territorial impacts and the concurrent entry of the climate crisis into the public agenda, that environmentalism expanded as a social force from below in various countries in the region, closely linked to the Indigenous peoples’ cosmovision. A result of this process was heightened socio-environmental conflict, and the emergence of new areas of protest in which diverse actors converged — peasant and Indigenous organisations, new eco-territorial collectives, various NGOs and a multidisciplinary and anti-colonial activist and academic space — built around political ecology.

In this article I intend to address the encounters, tensions and disconnects between the left and environmentalisms in three parts. In the first, I summarise some concepts contributed by ecosocialism and ecological Marxism, two academic currents that have traversed contemporary Marxism and opened the door to connecting class struggles and ecological struggles. In the second, I analyse the categories elaborated from within Latin American ecosocial thinking to rethink the bridges and links between the Global North and South, while dwelling very briefly on the dismissal of environmental problems by progressives in government during the so-called progressive cycle. And in the third I reflect on the concepts bridging the North and the South and arising challenges.

Marxism, ecological crisis and updates

The Marxist lefts had some difficulty incorporating environmentalism’s arrival on the political agenda, as well as the advance of environmental movements, both in theory and practice. On the one hand, as children of modernity, Karl Marx and the workers’ movement sought to eradicate inequality by revolutionary means, but not progress as it was understood in its association with the expansion of the productive forces. On the other hand, the environmental movements were of a cultural character with a multi-class social base, aimed at placing problems on the public agenda but without social revolution as their horizon. 

However, following this initial misencounter, beginning in the 1970s and, with greater force throughout the 1980s and 1990s, numerous authors from the Global North set out to reconcile Marxism and ecology, slightly shifting the axis of concern. Prior to taking a substantial interest in the evolution of environmental movements and their characteristics, they set out to analyse the scope of the environmental problem in the context of the capitalist crisis.

It is impossible to summarise the contributions made in the field of Western Marxism towards incorporating the ecological crisis as inherent to capitalism. Authors such as Frenchmen André Gorz and Henri Lefebvre, the French-Brazilian Michael Löwy, the Spaniard Manuel Sacristán, the German Elmar Altvater, as well as the Americans James O’Connor and John Bellamy Foster, were no doubt among the first to point out the incompatibility between capitalism and environmental sustainability, and thus to raise the possibility of connecting class struggles with ecological struggles.

In political terms, it was the Trotskyist left of the Fourth International (led by Ernest Mandel) that through ecosocialism (and principally through Michael Löwy) first promoted the articulation of ecology and the left. In 2001, Löwy co-authored An Ecosocialist Manifesto with Joel Kovel, which states that ecosocialism is conceived not as a negation of the socialisms of the twentieth century but as an extension that preserves their emancipatory objectives, while “insist[ing] … upon redefining both the path and the goal of socialist production in an ecological framework.”1

Löwy’s main conceptual contribution is in the book Ecosocialism: A Radical Alternative to Capitalist Catastrophe, in which he characterises capitalism as a system not only of exploitation but destruction of the living conditions of the planet, and criticises both the dominant “market ecology,” which does not question the capitalist system, and “productivist socialism,” which ignores natural limits. Löwy proposes an alliance between “reds” and “greens” — in a broad sense, between the workers’ movement and the environmental movements. 

Ecosocialism appears as a radical proposal that implies a paradigm shift, “through democratic, local and national (and sooner or later, international) planning.”2 Beyond the fact that Löwy criticises the degrowth currents (as a quantitativist vision that points to an “enlightened ecological dictatorship”), ecosocialism entails a reorientation of consumption and production in accordance with basic needs.

Contributions by so-called ecological Marxism, which began at the end of the 1980s and placed new categories such as “second contradiction,” “metabolic rift” and “Capitalocene” on the agenda, are more theoretical and academic than political and programmatic in nature. For example, James O’Connor introduced the “second contradiction” of capitalism, namely the contradiction between capital and nature.3 Capitalism degrades its own resources (pollution, depletion, social attrition) and generates a huge externalisation of social and ecological costs of production. 

Another of the central contributions is by John Bellamy Foster, who took up the concept of metabolic rift, based on Marx’s work on the metabolism between society and nature, especially in Capital.4 For Foster, the metabolic rift is inherent to capitalism and compromises the sustainability of the conditions of life and production. Although for some this analysis of metabolism is more dualistic than dialectical, it is clear that the concept reveals a disconnect between nature and society, from which capitalism prioritises the accumulation of capital over sustainability and the preservation of the environment, something that Marx had already observed through the depletion of soil nutrients in England.

In another line of analysis, the Swede Andreas Malm proposed to think of the current socio-ecological crisis in terms of the Capitalocene rather than the Anthropocene, arguing such a crisis is not the work of humanity as a homogeneous species, but of a specific social system — capitalism — for which responsibility is unequal in terms of social classes and countries. Likewise, Malm argues capitalism is a socioeconomic system that emerged in the 15th century, while fossil capitalism is a particular period that began in the early 19th century and in the framework of which a series of metabolic gaps were formed: soil degradation, and changes in the nitrogen and carbon cycles.5

For his part, the American Jason Moore took up the thesis of the Capitalocene to investigate the origins of capitalism and the expansion of the frontiers of the commodity in the long medieval period. The cycles of capital generated a historical-geographical model based on rapid appropriation and geographical expansion and diversification, once the resource was exhausted. “Is the land running out? We move to the border. This was the motto displayed on the coat of arms of early capitalism.”6 So the Capitalocene as a current crisis must be read as a long-term process in which new ways of ordering the relationship between humans and the rest of nature are taking shape. Capitalism not only develops within nature, but transforms it and transforms itself through it, creating what is called “world-ecology.”

From a position associated with heterodox Marxism, Frenchmen Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval propose to refound a theory of the commons. The authors show how the principle of the commons is imposed today as the central term of the political alternative for the 21st century: “The term ‘common’ designates not the resurgence of an eternal communist idea, but the emergence of a new way of opposing capitalism, even of considering its supersession.”7 

From anti-globalisation and ecological struggles to theories of the commons — from Michael Hardt and Toni Negri to Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval — “the commons” has become the name of a regime of practices, struggles, institutions and research that point to a non-capitalist future. The commons is not a good or resource, but a political activity; a principle of action that consists of democratically instituting what must be managed collectively. The work ranges from the system of norms or law as a field of struggle to the programmatic draft of the “politics of the commons.”

In their most recent work, Instituer les mondes. Pour une cosmopolitique des communs [Instituting the worlds. For a cosmopolitics of the commons], Dardot and Laval proceed to think about the commons as a form of self-government of livelihoods, based on a relational paradigm, which points to a cosmopolitics. Thus, they argue, if we accept reasoning in terms of the commons as forms of self-government of living environments, the prefix “self” must be understood as referring not to a human collective in charge of directing a living environment from the outside, but to the different components, human and non-human, of that same environment. Collective self-government presupposes, then, that the human collective belongs to the living environment that it co-governs from within and on which it depends: taking the example of the forest, the self-government of a forest is not the government of the forest by human beings alone, but the government of the forest by all those who live in it, both humans and other non-human living things.8

Finally, from 2008 onwards we have witnessed new debates on degrowth, a concept that draws on diverse contributions from André Gorz in the 1970s (criticism of consumption), the Catalan Joan Martínez Alier (ecological economics) and the Movement for Degrowth founded around the year 2000 by the Frenchman Serge Latouche. From the neo-Marxist camp, Japanese philosopher Kohei Saito has been the most radical supporter of this position, arguing that in his late writings Marx, when studying the crisis of the soil and the depletion of nutrients, pointed to a socialism that returns to old forms of production, using some of the latest technologies. Saito synthesises this reading in the formula of a “degrowth communism.”

Likewise, in line with degrowth, German political scientist and activist Ulrich Brand’s contributions are notable for his concept of the “imperial way of life,” defined as “a dominant social, cultural and economic pattern in the countries of the Global North (and adopted by the elites of the South), normalized and hegemonic, which cannot avoid externalizing its conditions or negative consequences without exploiting other people and without destroying its own foundations, which are deeply rooted in the political, economic and cultural structures and practices in the daily lives of the population of the Global North and increasingly also of the emerging countries of the Global South.”9 Brand’s theoretical contributions take up the theory of the state and the ecological and gender issue, while maintaining a constant dialogue with Latin America, to which I will return later.

In short, to what extent these concepts are found in Marx, whether they are minor dimensions or significant aspects in his work, are questions that may be of interest to academic Marxology. Marx’s work is undoubtedly an inexhaustible quarry, provided that we do not believe it can explain everything, which, in addition to being untenable, would place those who adopt such a vision in a kind of position of epistemic superiority. It is clearly understood that the effort of theoretical updating responds to the need to expand a Marxist rereading of socio-ecological crisis. The objective is to strengthen and articulate class struggles with ecological struggles, from an anti-capitalist perspective, in a scenario of systemic polycrisis that is increasingly asymmetrical and unequal.

Latin America: Epistemic decolonisation and ecosocial perspective

The first critical contributions by Latin American emancipatory thought touched at the heart of development theory, from a decolonial vision. It was in the ’90s when the first critical perspectives on development began to circulate; in Latin America’s case, analysed as a discourse of power. Among them, the contribution of the Mexican Gustavo Esteva in the Diccionario del Desarrollo [Dictionary of Development], coordinated by Wolfgang Sachs (1992), stands out. He underscored the colonial matrix of the idea of development and the invention, in the post-war period, by the United States and other Western powers, of development and its counterpart, underdevelopment.10

Another important contribution was that of Colombian thinker Arturo Escobar, who proposed the notion of “post-development,” from which he deconstructs the modern concept of development as an instrument of domination, revealing its main mechanisms of operation. These include the professionalisation of development “problems” and their institutionalisation through a network of national, regional and international organisations. Escobar also highlighted the ways in which development made local experiences and knowledge invisible and suggested a change of approach, moving from thinking of “alternative development” to thinking of “alternatives to development.”

In the first decade of the 21st century, this anti-colonial and post-structuralist critique of development was tied to the category of “neo-extractivism,” a notion coined in Latin America by academic activism and quickly adopted by the entire range of socio-environmental collectives and organisations in the region. It currently has a wide international circulation.11 This critique had a great theoretical and political productivity, which illustrates once again the great porosity between social struggles and critical thinking.

First, it marked the convergence of the resistances of indigenous peoples and eco-socio-territorial struggles within the field of political ecology, an expanding space in which converge contributions from the sociology of social movements, indigenous thought, critical geography, environmental history, feminisms, the new Latin American constitutionalisms and ecological economics, among others. This academic-militant space benefited from the previous contributions of prominent thinkers such as Mexican Enrique Leff and Escobar, as well as the pioneering work of the Political Ecology Group of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (Clacso), coordinated by researcher Héctor Alimonda. 

Second, the critique of neo-extractivism was also the starting point for proposals for the intersection between ecology and anti-colonial lefts, its aim being to dispute the hegemonic vision (developmentalist paradigm) and overcome limitations of actually existing progressivisms.

Along these lines, debates on alternatives to extractivism have been nourished by indigenous community thinking, ecological struggles and eco-territorial feminisms. These perspectives that sought to articulate the plebeian left with the ecological struggle are based on a relational paradigm, featuring horizon-concepts such as buen vivir, rights of nature, common goods, post-extractivism, care systems and, more recently, in the context of discussions on the energy transition, just and popular ecosocial transition and the ecosocial state.

Two key concepts were buen vivir and the rights of nature. While buen vivir builds bridges between past and future, between community matrix, indigenous relational cosmovisions and ecological perspective, the rights of nature postulates new forms of relationship between humans and nature and their fellow beings, and therefore calls for the passage from an anthropocentric paradigm to a socio-biocentric nature. Adopted in 2008, Ecuador’s Constitution was at the forefront of this recognition of the rights of nature. Bolivia then followed, with the legal recognition of the rights of Mother Earth, in 2010.

As is well known, the environmental problem was a blind spot for Latin American progressivism. There were many who, from their positions in government, directly confronted the criticism of neo-extractivism.12 It should be added that among the most fervent defenders of the extractivist consensus are heterodox economists, who thus converge with their orthodox peers. In the Latin American left, the Clacso authorities’ unconditional support for the pro-government progressivisms was also relevant — at least until 2019 — in terms of networks for the dissemination and circulation of the dominant mindset.

At the same time, certain propositional concepts that had been initially accepted ended up being instrumentalised in a developmentalist key (buen vivir) or discarded (the rights of nature) from the hegemonic progressive language. Thus, the divorce between progressive neo-developmentalist discourse embodied in ruling parties and eco-territorial discourse associated with indigenous movements and environmental collectives reached differing depths. Environmentalism was accused of lacking “social realism” or of “playing into the hands of the right,” and more than a few opted to cover up the socio-environmental problem by stigmatising protests, denying the legitimacy of claims and attributing it, as the case might be. to “infantile environmentalism” (Ecuador), the actions of foreign NGOs (Brazil), “colonial environmentalism” (Bolivia) or, in more recent times (Argentina, 2019-2023), to a “silly” and “prohibitionist” environmentalism.

The only case of official socio-environmental progressivism was Colombia under President Gustavo Petro (2022-2026), who had an environmentalist discourse during his time as Mayor of Bogotá. Petro’s government had limitations of all kinds, but it brought together the different aspects of struggles against extractivism: peasant organisations fighting for food sovereignty, environmental committees that won impressive victories against large-scale mining, organisations such as the Colombian Alliance Against Fracking. The very idea of a Colombia “power of life,” expressed in a comprehensive government program, and not only as a watertight compartment, made its appearance in public discussions about fracking or the energy transition.

Without pretending to settle an issue on which much has been written, the discord between progressive lefts and ecologist lefts in Latin America continues to be a constant to this day. Beyond the fact that some adopt a moderately environmentalist rhetoric, a large number of progressive forces remain convinced that extractivist neo-developmentalism is the key to overcoming neoliberalism, while a large number of environmentalist forces remain convinced that progressivisms will continue to rely on neo-developmentalist policies that end up converging with neoliberalism.

Returning to the field of producing bridge-concepts between lefts and environmentalisms, in Latin America there are discussions about “the commons” that have its own roots, distinct from the aforementioned European debate. It is not part of a general theory, but of concrete practices and struggles of indigenous peoples, peasants and social movements; that is, of the defense of the commons. But this more empirical reflection is articulated with other concepts, such as “communality” and, above all, “post-extractivism,” elaborated in the wake of the concept of “post-development.”

Post-extractivism is conceived as a gateway to overcoming dependence on the intensive extraction of natural resources (mining, hydrocarbons, agribusiness) in Latin America. For some authors, post-extractivism is an alternative to the development model based on buen vivir, which abandons classic (predatory and exporting) extractivism and moves towards a just and sustainable transition, based on diversified economies, with territorial sovereignty, environmental justice, deliberative democracy and appreciation of common goods.13 

For others, it is a political horizon that connects with the need for just ecosocial transitions that articulate a new paradigm of social justice with environmental justice.14 All these positions reject neo-extractivism as a pattern of accumulation and propose moratoriums on extractive projects. They defend the sovereignty of peoples over their territories and propose an ecological and social solution that combines selective degrowth of rich countries, deliberative democracy, local and agroecological economies and rights of nature.

In short, despite the political setbacks, the notion of post-extractivism continues to be a hub for thinking about an ecosocial transition agenda on a multi-scale level. A recent proposal is the one that we launched, together with other activists and intellectuals from the Ecosocial and Intercultural Pact of the South, a Latin American collective created in 2020. It seeks to debate what is meant by an ecosocial transition in a scenario of civilisational polycrisis, through different inflections and agendas, on a global, regional and national scale.15 

As an ecosocial, economic and intercultural commitment designed from the South, it rejects the idea that Latin America continues to be spoken and thought about only from the North, especially when it comes to ecosocial transition proposals, which generally do not place the issue of ecological debt or post-extractivism at the centre, and in some instances do not go beyond the decarbonisation of societies or question the productive model linked to agribusiness. It is a collective platform that invites us to build hopeful social imaginaries, to agree on a shared course of transformation and to create a basis for spaces of struggle in the most diverse areas of our societies.16

In line with this regional platform, in 2023 the Transitions Team was created in Argentina, conceived as a “team of teams,” which takes on the challenge of developing ecosocial transition proposals that go hand in hand with concepts such as “fair and popular energy transition,” “ecological debt,” “comprehensive care system” and “eco-social state,” among others.17 The proposal to create an eco-social state that assumes social and environmental risks directly confronts ultra-neoliberal policies, but also distances itself from the vision of the European welfare state and Latin American populism. Reflection on the ecosocial state have benefitted from the contributions of economist Rubén Lo Vuolo, of the Transitions Team, who defines it as a

new form of social organisation whose objective is to satisfy the human needs of people, within the limits imposed by planetary borders. An institutional system and public policies whose function is to guarantee that all people have access to the necessary elements to continue with the reproduction of their lives in our societies, on an egalitarian basis and under two simultaneous criteria: equity/justice and sustainability/sufficiency.18

Far from being abstract proposals, both the Ecosocial Pact and the Transitions Team relate their thinking to the eco-territorial struggles, the processes of re-existence and the horizon-concepts already mentioned, forged in recent decades in the Global South and in Latin America in particular. They also aim to generate a decolonising dialogue with other left proposals such as degrowth and other systemic alternatives.

Bridge-concepts and challenges

In the Global North, the Marxist left broadened its horizon of reflection, both in terms of concepts for understanding the socio-ecological crisis and in the search for an alternative ecosocialist program. At present, the multiple dimensions of the crisis reveal the consolidation of an “imperial way of life,” which drives the acceleration of the social metabolism of capital (the demand for raw materials and energy) and, therefore, further pushes towards ecological collapse. It is not coincidental, therefore, that within the Marxist ranks there is an increasingly open debate on a topic as controversial as degrowth, which previously seemed to be a kind of taboo.

In Latin America, on the other hand, the need to coordinate left thinking with ecology originated with the criticism of development, but expanded first with the great anti-neoliberal mobilisations of the early 21st century, and later the consolidation of neo-extractivism. New categories appeared at this crossroads that seeks to hybridise an indigenous communitarian cosmovision with the practice of care and defence of territories, from an ecofeminist paradigm that accentuates the relationality and interdependence of life.

It should be noted, however, that there is little dialogue between eco-Marxist perspectives and proposals for alternatives to extractivism. Epistemic asymmetries are prevalent; beyond the fact that certain categories — such as Capitalocene or metabolic rift — traverse the language of Latin American political ecology, the same is not true of the political-conceptual lexicon of the region, which is rarely invoked in the Global North. Of course, there are exceptions, bridges and intersections that lead to common paths. Thus, in 2008, Michael Löwy published the Ecosocialist Declaration of Belém and promoted the creation of a Global Ecosocialist Network, both internationally and in Brazil, his country of origin, seeking articulation with movements such as the Landless Movement (MST) and left-wing parties.

But as the Brazilian sociologist and ecosocialist activist Sabrina Fernandes argues, to advance in the generation of a new ecosocialist paradigm, we must stop separating “red” and “green” demands, and integrate them into the same struggle and a single paradigm.19 Undoubtedly, one of the great challenges of ecosocialism is the elaboration of a new theory of the state consistent with democratic planning prepared to confront the technocratic narratives of “green capitalism” without falling into the mistakes of the past (whether the old European welfare state or Soviet collectivism). Along these lines, it would be interesting to connect these proposals with the reflection on the ecosocial state.

As it happens, the dialogue between post-extractivism and degrowth began years ago, as illustrated in the book published jointly in 2017 by Alberto Acosta (former president of the Constituent Assembly of Ecuador and a current member of the Ecosocial Pact) and Ulrich Brand.20 In it, they sought to go deeper into the characteristics of the divergent contexts that gave rise to these concepts. However, concerns also arose about the ambivalences and limitations of the concept of degrowth, in its questioning of the logic of domination or even in the persistence of an anthropocentric vision that does not necessarily question the division between society and nature.

In the same vein, it was recognised that in Latin America the proposals for buen vivir were not accompanied by degrowth (in the sense of dematerialisation, decommodification and decentralisation). This questioning has continued in the dialogue established between the Ecosocial and Intercultural Pact of the South and the degrowth networks in the region of Catalonia and the Transitions Forum promoted, among others, by the Ecologists in Action network of Spain.

As Breno Bringel and I have pointed out, degrowth in the countries of the North is a demand for global justice, in the context of an already damaged planet.21 Several authors (Giorgos Kallis, Federico Demaria, Jason Hickel, among others) argue that degrowth is also a requirement of decolonisation: “Southern countries should be free to organize their resources and labor around meeting human needs rather than around servicing Northern growth.”22 Reducing pressure on natural assets could open up “conceptual space”23 in the Global South and would enhance the process of cognitive liberation, necessary to move towards post-extractivism, in countries so criss-crossed by an El Doradist imaginary and an extractivist economy.

This does not imply that the South should claim its “right to development,” because it is indeed development that is currently pushing us towards collapse. Consequently, any left that is committed to thinking about alternatives to development from an integral perspective must do so from the bases of a new critical political economy, which is only possible if planetary boundaries are accepted. Or, to put it another way, it is crucial that the political economy connects and converges with the ecological economy, which is highly developed in both the Global North and South. This appears all the more challenging and necessary in the current scenario of inter-imperialist competition, in which the countries of the Global North and emerging countries are struggling to obtain rapid access to critical minerals, in the name of the energy and digital transition and, above all, to supply the growing demand of the military industry, in times of increasing armed conflicts and destruction of the old international order.

At a time when the forces of inequality are being unleashed and legitimised in the hands of techno-tycoons and radical right-wingers who openly push for a change of political regime incompatible with respect for human rights and democracy, the left needs to leave its comfort zone and open up to the radical imagination. We need new concepts and political articulations between the Global North and South that open the space for a true connection of narratives of the future, egalitarian and wishful, with multi-scale transformative proposals at the level of social, environmental, ethnic and gender justice. Faced with the radical right’s accelerated politics of destruction and dehumanisation, it is impossible to remain anchored in resignation and passivity. The left must once and for all assume the ecosocial paradigm as a starting point and at the same time as a utopian horizon, without epistemic selectivities or nostalgia for the past.

  • 1

    Joel Kovel and Michael Löwy, An Ecosocialist Manifesto - Capitalism Nature Socialism. See also Sigifredo Romero Tovar, “La alternativa ecosocialista. Una entrevista con Michael Löwy” in Análisis. Revista Colombiana de Humanidades vol. 52 No 97, 2020.

  • 2

    Michael Löwy, Ecosocialism: A Radical Alternative to Capitalist Catastrophe (Chicago, Haymarket Books, 2015).

  • 3

    James O’Connor, “On the two contradictions of capitalism,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, (1991) Vol. 2, No. 3.

  • 4

    John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology (Monthly Review Press, (2000).

  • 5

    Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming (2016), Verso

  • 6

    Jason W. Moore: “El auge de la ecología-mundo capitalista (II). Las fronteras mercantiles en el auge y decadencia de la apropiación máxima” en Filosofía, Política y Economía en el Laberinto No 39, 2013.

  • 7

    Christian Laval and Pierre Dardot: Común. Ensayo sobre la revolución en el siglo XXI, Barcelona, Gedisa, 2015, p. 21.

  • 8

    Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval: Instituer le monde, París, La Découverte, 2025. In relation to this part of the article, I thank Dardot for his comments.

  • 9

    Ulrich Brand and Markus Wissen: Modo de vida imperial. Vida cotidiana y crisis ecológica del capitalismo, Buenos Aires, Tinta Limón, 2021, pp. 74-75.

  • 10

    On this see Maristella Svampa, Debates latinoamericanos. Indianismo, desarrollo, dependencia y populismo (Buenos Aires, Edhasa, 2016, ch. 2, part 1).

  • 11

    Notable here are the pioneering contributions of Eduardo Gudynas, Alberto Acosta, Edgardo Lander, Horacio Machado Aráoz, Emiliano Terán Mantovani, Tatiana Rosa Avendaño and the author of this article, in addition to the publications of the Permanent Group of Alternatives to Development, promoted by the Andean headquarters of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation since 2011.

  • 12

    Among them was the then vice-president of Bolivia, the sociologist Álvaro García Linera, author of Geopolítica de la Amazonía. Poder hacendal-patrimonial y acumulación capitalista (La Paz, Vicepresidencia del Estado, Presidencia de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional, 2012). [English translation here]

  • 13

    Eduardo Gudynas: “Más allá del nuevo extractivismo: transiciones sostenibles y alternativas al desarrollo” in Fernanda Wanderley (coord.): El desarrollo en cuestión. Reflexiones desde América Latina, La Paz, Oxfam / CIDES-UMSA, 2011; Alberto Acosta and Ulrich Brand: Decrecimiento y posextractivismo, Buenos Aires, Tinta Limón, 2017.

  • 14

    Maristella Svampa and Enrique Viale: El colapso ecológico ya llegó, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores, 2020, and Transição ecossocial justa: uma perspectiva do Sul Global, San Pablo, Elefante, 2025.

  • 15

    “Presentación del Pacto Ecosocial del Sur. Por un Pacto Social, Ecológico, Económico e Intercultural para América Latina” on Clacso TV, 24/6/2020, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jedqtgef7s.

  • 16

    Pacto EcoSocial e Intercultural del Sur – and Hacia un gran Pacto Ecosocial y Económico en Argentina.

  • 17

    The Equipo Transiciones brings together about 30 persons in Argentina involved in federal research, academic and activist groups with the goal of proposing a road map for just ecosocial transition, in dialogue with social and political organizations. Equipo Transiciones. See also Maristella Svampa et al.: ¿Cómo reconstruir el país que nos queda? Propuestas para una agenda de transformación justa y popular, Buenos Aires, Fundación Rosa Luxemburgo, 2026.

  • 18

    Rubén Lo Vuolo: Por un Estado ecosocial. Ideas para proteger la sociedad en un mundo catastrófico, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores, 2026.

  • 19

    Sabrina Fernandes, “Environmental Contradictions: The Need for an Ecosocialist Paradigm on the Brazilian Left,” in Robert Latham, A.T. Kingsmith, Julian von Bargen and Niko Block (eds.), Challenging the Right, Augmenting the Left, Halifax, Fernwood, 2020.

  • 20

    Alberto Acosta y Ulrich Brand, op. cit., note 13.

  • 21

    Breno Bringel and Maristella Svampa, Del “Consenso de los Commodities” al “Consenso de la Descarbonización” | Nueva Sociedad, No. 306. July-August 2023.

  • 22

    Hickel-Theanti-colonialpoliticsofdegrowth.pdf

  • 23

    Giorgos Kallis:, “La alternativa del decrecimiento” [2015] en Climaterra.org, 24/4/2020.