French actors slam 'systematic plundering' of voices and images by AI tools

Ahead of the 51st César Awards on Thursday, France's biggest film awards, 4,000 French actors and filmmakers have condemned "systematic plundering" of their work by artificial intelligence tools, which reproduce their voices or images.


Issued on: 25/02/2026 - RFI

French actors and filmmakers have condemned the use of their voices and images by AI tools. © Vertigo3d / iStock / Getty Images

"We are facing a profound change in our profession since the advent of artificial intelligence [AI]. This tool, which is extraordinarily valuable for certain professions, is also a devouring hydra for artists like us," wrote the signatories in a text published by Le Parisien newspaper on Sunday.

They include actors Swann Arlaud, Gérard Jugnot, Karine Viard, Franck Dubosc and José Garcia, Léa Drucker and Élodie Bouchez.

"The cloning of actors' voices without their permission is becoming commonplace," the open letter continues, adding that "not a week goes by without an artist warning about the brutal competition that AI is putting on their work".

"Sometimes hundreds of less established artists, who often cannot afford to turn down a contract, surrender their rights to AI, despite the risks to their image and their future."

"This systematic plundering is not a fantasy, it is happening here and now. It is unbearable and it is happening right before our eyes," they warn, calling for a "legal framework" so that "AI can coexist with the work of artists and respect for copyright and related rights".

Dubbing industry under threat

There has been a surge in initiatives within the profession over the last few months in response to the threat posed by AI to the industry, and the flood of content that reproduces artists and their voices almost perfectly.

At the end of January, eight French actors specialising in dubbing sent formal notices to two American companies that had cloned their voices without their consent.

Actors recently took to the streets in Paris and launched a collective called Touche pas ma VF ("hands off my VF" – for Version française).

It's calling for "dubbing created by humans for humans", and has launched a petition that has garnered nearly 250,000 signatures.

Europe's voice actors call for tougher regulation of AI technology

In early 2025, the dubbing world was shocked by an excerpt from the Sylvester Stallone film Armor in which the voice of Alain Dorval, the actor who had long dubbed Stallone, was modelled by AI.

Not only was the result deemed poor by the industry, but the actor had died in February 2024, raising ethical questions.

"AI is taking away artists' jobs. Can we do without artists in society? " actress Brigitte Lecordier told RFI at the time. "AI does not create. It reproduces a mediocre version of what has already been done."

The debate extends beyond France. Last week, Chinese software Seedance 2.0 was accused by major Hollywood studios of "massive" copyright infringements after releasing an AI-generated video showing a fight between Tom Cruise and Brad Pitt.

(with AFP)

What Is Shaping Artificial Intelligence Governance Policies In Southeast Asia? – Analysis

February 25, 2026 
 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Kristina Fong


The rapid proliferation of AI and the greater awareness of its capabilities and risks over the past few years have catalysed attempts to make AI development and deployment safer. In line with this, countries in Southeast Asia, as well as ASEAN as a whole, have made significant efforts to formulate guardrails around AI. For ASEAN, the release of the ASEAN Guide on AI Ethics and Governance[1] (ASEAN AI Guide) in February 2024, followed by a supplementary guide specifically for Generative AI[2] a year later, provided a set of holistic frameworks for the responsible design, deployment and usage of AI systems.

Besides ASEAN-wide guidance, individual ASEAN Member States (AMS) have also taken steps to strengthen their own safeguards to help ensure safe and ethical AI developments at a measured pace. Although the AMS may have taken different approaches to AI governance in their respective jurisdictions, there is an emerging utilisation of an umbrella soft law supported by hard law baseline regulations. Moreover, certain pertinent aspects of international governance benchmarks are also setting the foundation for their implementation, such as the EU’s risk-based approach leveraged in the EU AI Act.
Getting Your Ducks in a Row

Prior to the release of the ASEAN AI Guide, we conducted an assessment of AI policies in ASEAN Member States (AMS). In addition to that, we also explored if the regulatory building blocks required to better manage AI developments, such as Personal Data Protection (PDP) and Cybersecurity legislation, were in place.[3] Before the ASEAN AI Guide, six out of ten AMS had some form of AI strategy in place, while four had not crafted such policies as yet, the latter being Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. By the end of 2025, however, Brunei had released the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance and Ethics Guide for Brunei Darussalam (2025), under the Authority for Info-Communications Technology Industry, and gazetted its Personal Data Protection Order 2025. Notably, Brunei cited the ASEAN AI Guide as a key piece of guidance in the formation of its own AI governance strategy.[4]

Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, meanwhile, continue to develop their own national AI strategies, guided in the interim by their respective digital economy national strategies such as the Cambodia Digital Economy and Society Policy Framework (2021-2035) and the Laos Digital Economy Strategy (2021-2030). In these documents, AI-related initiatives such as studying and fostering the use of AI technologies are outlined, albeit without much detail. For Timor-Leste, ASEAN’s newest member state, Timor Digital 2032 (2023-2032) under TIC[5] Timor, is the main strategic document for the digital economy. However, it does not explicitly mention AI but rather, encompasses digital and ICT developments to facilitate economic, e-government, health, education and agriculture initiatives, which could include AI technologies. That said, prior to embarking on any AI-specific plans, Timor-Leste will need to bolster its overall digital development; it scores low on digital availability, access and adoption. As of 2023, it was estimated by UNCTAD that only 34 per cent of the population used the internet, with the next lowest in ASEAN being Myanmar at 58.5 per cent.


However, the more pressing issue is that Cambodia, Myanmar and Timor-Leste have yet to implement Personal Data Protection Laws. Moreover, cybersecurity enforcement also remains weak. Lao PDR employs the Law on Electronic Data Protection No. 25/NA[6] which pertains to data in digital form. The absence of an overarching national strategy on AI may put these countries in less competitive positions compared to their ASEAN peers. Without robust implementation of baseline regulations on AI, countries are posited more precariously amid the rapidity of technological developments.
The Evolving Role of Data-Protection Authorities (DPAs)

The role of DPAs has become more important in the context of the evolving model of AI development management and enforcement. In particular, the proposed use of DPAs as the best placed institution to act as a central body to coordinate AI policy compliance and enforcement, is gaining traction. Leading the way is the European Union (EU) with their EU AI Act. In the attempt to formulate the most optimal enforcement mechanism, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has encouraged the appointment of national DPAs as Market Surveillance Authorities (MSAs).[7] G7 Privacy officials support the idea, citing their familiarity gained in the development of guidelines and policy documents, the experience garnered in assessing AI technology impacts on its stakeholders, as well as the actions taken in this area following governance breaches at data source.[8]

In Asia, DPAs have been central to shaping key policy documents. In South Korea, the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) released generative AI (genAI) guidelines in August 2025. In Singapore, the Model AI Governance Framework, as well as the updated version that incorporates genAI, and subsequently the AI Verify tool – the world’s first AI governance testing framework and toolkit – were jointly produced by the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and the Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC).[9] These are prime examples of how DPAs have shaped public policy. However, the capabilities of DPAs across Southeast Asia are very diverse. As such, the use of DPAs as central market surveillance authorities may be viable for some, but not others. For the latter, existing DPA capacities will need to be bolstered to become effective regulatory bodies. This may need human capital enhancements and capital investments before it can be considered an ideal option as an MSA.

For countries with established DPA capabilities and who are keen to pursue this model of AI governance enforcement, capacity building will need to focus on the additional skills and knowledge to effectively monitor the entire AI system supply chain and not only the input level of data governance. Both the EU and the G7 have recognised this aspect to be integral for this model to work. The other integral aspect cited is the need to have a seamless coordination mechanism amongst the MSA and other regulatory bodies tasked with the supervision of the AI ecosystem. These bodies could include those involved in competition matters and consumer protection. In Southeast Asia, countries with more established AI ecosystems (Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand)[10] and regulatory coordination mechanisms in place would be better placed to implement this model.
Cherry Picking What’s Best for ASEAN

The AI governance risk frameworks around the region have largely been developed to be voluntary in nature – such as those in Brunei, Malaysia[11] and Singapore – but some countries are moving ahead with the establishment of more formal AI laws. In December 2025, Vietnam became the first country in Southeast Asia to make a concrete move on this with the promulgation of the AI Law which is to take effect in a phrased approach, from March 2026 over four years. The AI Law was passed along with updated laws on intellectual property (IP) and cybersecurity, which include revisions pertaining to AI-specific incidents.[12] Detailed enforcement mechanisms and other specifics will be more formally established during the implementation phases. The establishment of a regulatory infrastructure and the appointment of regulatory authorities are set for 2026.[13]


Whilst Vietnam has referenced the risk-based approach (emphasising safeguards in the risk-return trade-off) of the EU and the innovation-led approaches (emphasising technological development in the risk-return trade-off) taken by South Korea and Japan in the development of their own AI legislation,[14] it is important to also note that international guidance has not been merely taken ‘off the shelf’, but rather, customised to reflect domestic priorities and institutional capacities. Vietnam has adopted a risk-based approach in classifying risks, much like the EU AI Act; the number of risk categories has however been reduced. In particular, Vietnam’s AI risk classifications only apply to AI systems deemed lawful. In the EU AI Act, prohibited AI systems are included in the formal risk framework as Unacceptable Risks. Apart from that, the EU’s risk classification framework focuses on the use of the AI system and the risks therein,[15] whereas Vietnam’s approach looks at risks from the angle of impact.[16]Thailand is also targeting the creation of an AI Law. A drafting process initiated in 2023 experienced a quiet period of two years with limited traction. The Electronic Transactions Development Agency (ETDA) later explained that the reason for this was attributed to the need for the draft AI Law, which had originally used the EU AI Act as a template, to be refined to suit local circumstances,[17] much like in the case for Vietnam.

In this draft Law, the risk-based approach helps articulate what compliance requirements are needed for high-risk AI applications and systems. However, the draft Law proposes to leave it to sectoral bodies to determine which activities are high risk in their respective areas. This is based on the notion that sectoral bodies would have better understanding of these activities and could more accurately discern the level of risks they present to society. The cost of risk mis-classification could stifle economic activities as well as create undue compliance costs for affected business activities. To note, this sectoral approach has also been taken by Indonesia which is also proposing a soft AI Law or framework.[18] Some of the sectors identified include finance, education and healthcare. For Thailand, the timeline for passing the law is still unclear, although ETDA is revising the consolidated Draft Principles after a public consultation process in 2025.[19] For Indonesia, the AI framework is expected to be signed off as Presidential regulations in early 2026.

The EU’s risk-based approach to AI legislation seems to be the most adapted form of international guidance so far. The innovation-centric angle preferred by South Korea and Japan has also been cited as having some influence over the approaches taken by the AMS. International guidance is also important in limiting the risk of digital fragmentation. International alignment is important for digital integration, and to leverage upon the porous technology that AI is. Most of the principles underlying AI governance frameworks in the region take guidance from international AI governance frameworks such as the OECD AI Principles, EU’s Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF), UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, as well as ISO standards in this area. Thus, some form of regional alignment does occur when it comes to AI ethics and governance; regional documents are also quite consistent across the board. The proposed Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) which is expected to have a chapter on emerging issues including AI, will also help to streamline the operational standards[20] and best practices, and limit the risk of fragmentation.
Geopolitical Pressures Remain

Although China has its own set of AI governance principles in the form of the Interim Measures for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services,[21] as well as a strategy to socialise their vision for global AI governance in the form of the Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI),[22] these have not gained much traction compared to other international frameworks mentioned earlier. This could perhaps be due to the differences in their approach to governance and defining principles,[23] or the gravitation of countries in the region to multi-stakeholder models, wary as they are of being caught up in geopolitical wranglings. Quite notably, in America’s AI Action Plan[24] released in July 2025, there is a stated objective to ‘Counter Chinese Influence in International Governance Bodies’, which is as clear as it gets with respect to the US stance regarding this matter.


That said, China does noticeably take a more aggressive position in that of the AI stack[25] (or AI software and hardware infrastructure) in Southeast Asia.[26] Apart from physical foundations such as data centres, Chinese Large Language Models (LLMs) are open-source, as well as more competitively-priced compared to close market competitors, allowing more access and customisation for system deployers.[27] As at end-2025, Chinese models accounted for around 30 per cent of the global share in usage, marking a rapid rise from only 13 per cent at the start of 2025.[28] Thus, the influence of China in this space cannot be overlooked and the current trend may act as a catalyst for greater interest in China’s AI governance in the future. Although the economic benefits may be the prevalent concern, the potential acceleration in this trend is bound to accentuate geopolitical complexities. In May 2025, Malaysia announced that the country’s sovereign full-stack AI ecosystem utilised China’s DeepSeek LLM.[29]Most recently in October, Malaysia signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade[30] (ART) with the US. In the ART, specific terms discourage Malaysia from forging preferential economic cooperation with ‘a country that jeopardises essential US interests’, failing which would send US reciprocal tariffs on Malaysia back to 24 per cent (now negotiated down to 19 per cent). Thus, Southeast Asian countries with strong ties to both superpowers will once again be saddled with difficult choices.

Southeast Asian countries remain at different levels of AI policy implementation and enforcement. Though there may be various approaches across countries, by and large, there exists a similar basis and understanding of AI governance principles. As the governance ecosystem continues to evolve, international best practices aligned with ASEAN objectives will be adopted through customisation for local AMS conditions. However, the regulatory catch-up dynamic will be put to the test; technological developments will be largely operationalised before safeguarding frameworks can be institutionalised. There are also high risks of existing safeguarding regulations becoming outdated amid the rapid dynamism of this space.


For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

Kristina Fong is Lead Researcher (Economic Affairs) of the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), an autonomous organization established by an Act of Parliament in 1968, was renamed ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute in August 2015. Its aims are: To be a leading research centre and think tank dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. To stimulate research and debate within scholarly circles, enhance public awareness of the region, and facilitate the search for viable solutions to the varied problems confronting the region. To serve as a centre for international, regional and local scholars and other researchers to do research on the region and publish and publicize their findings. To achieve these aims, the Institute conducts a range of research programmes; holds conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars; publishes briefs, research journals and books; and generally provides a range of research support facilities, including a large library collection.