BALOCHISTAN IS A COUNTRY

Pakistan combing for perpetrators after deadly separatist attacks

Pakistan has been battling a Baloch separatist insurgency for decades. 

(AFP)

AFP
February 01, 2026

Around a dozen sites where the attacks took place — including the provincial capital Quetta — remained sealed off

The Baloch Liberation Army, the province’s most active militant separatist group, claimed responsibility for the attacks


QUETTA, Pakistan: Pakistan forces were hunting on Sunday for the separatists behind a string of coordinated attacks in restive Balochistan province, with the government vowing to retaliate after more than 120 people were killed.

Around a dozen sites where the attacks took place — including the provincial capital Quetta — remained sealed off, with troops combing the area a day after militants stormed banks, jails and military installations, killing at least 18 civilians and 15 security personnel, according to the military’s count.

At least 92 militants were also killed, the military added, while an official said that a deputy district commissioner had been abducted.

Mobile Internet service across the province has been jammed for more than 24 hours, while road traffic is disrupted and train services suspended.

After being rocked by explosions, typically bustling Quetta lay quiet on Sunday, with major roads and businesses deserted, and people staying indoors out of fear.

Shattered metal fragments and mangled vehicles litter some roads.

“Anyone who leaves home has no certainty of returning safe and sound. There is constant fear over whether they will come back unharmed,” Hamdullah, a 39-year-old shopkeeper who goes by one name, said in Quetta.

The Pakistan military said it was conducting “sanitization operations” in the areas that had been targeted in Saturday’s attacks.

“The instigators, perpetrators, facilitators and abettors of these heinous and cowardly act... will be brought to justice,” it said in a statement Saturday night.

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the province’s most active militant separatist group, claimed responsibility for the attacks in a statement sent to AFP.

The group said it had targeted military installations as well as police and civil administration officials in gun attacks and suicide bombings.

Saturday’s attacks came a day after the military said it killed 41 insurgents in two separate operations in the province.

Pakistan has been battling a Baloch separatist insurgency for decades, with frequent armed attacks on security forces, foreign nationals and non-local Pakistanis in the mineral-rich province bordering Afghanistan and Iran.

Pakistan’s poorest province despite an abundance of untapped natural resources, Balochistan lags behind the rest of the country in almost every index, including education, employment and economic development.

Baloch separatists have intensified attacks on Pakistanis from other provinces working in the region in recent years, as well as foreign energy firms that they believe are exploiting its riches.

The separatists attacked a train with 450 passengers on board last year, sparking a two-day siege during which dozens of people were killed.

‘We will fight this war’: CM Bugti says 145 terrorists killed in 40 hours across Balochistan

Published February 1, 2026

DAWN/AFP



Security personnel stand at the blast site in Quetta on Feb 1, 2026, a day after a terrorist attack. — AFP

Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti on Sunday expressed the firm resolve to eliminate terrorists after a spate of coordinated attacks across the province, adding that 145 militants were killed within a span of 40 hours.

The military’s media affairs wing said terrorists of Fitna-al-Hindustan carried out a spate of attacks across Balochistan on Saturday, responding to which the security forces killed 92 terrorists.

The state has designated Balochistan-based terrorist groups as Fitna-al-Hindustan to highlight India’s alleged role in terrorism and destabilisation across Pakistan.

Addressing a press conference in Quetta on Sunday, CM Bugti said 145 terrorists were killed in 40 hours, adding that their bodies were in the custody of the authorities.


“This is the highest number since Pakistan is facing this war on terror,” he highlighted.

“Our 17 law enforcement people, including police and FC and one Navy personnel, were martyred, and our civilian casualties are 31, including some injured,” CM Bugti said.

The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) had said on Saturday night that 15 personnel were martyred during the operations and 18 civilians, including women and children, were also killed during the attacks.

Stating that the state shared the grief of bereaved families, CM Bugti assured them that the welfare of the martyrs’ children was the government’s responsibility.

“We had intelligence reports that this kind of operation is being planned, and as a result of those, we had already started pre-operations a day before, in which around 40 terrorists were killed in Shaban and Panjgur,” he detailed.

The chief minister noted that the terrorists had planned to attack Quetta from Shaban, adding that the forces were “very vigilant”.

CM Bugti termed the Gwadar incident, where he said five women and three children were killed, as the “most painful”.

Noting that a narrative of independence had been created, he said, “When you could not even free a union council, a ward, why are you making Baloch fuel and on whose instructions? India’s.

“Whenever Pakistan begins to take off economically or on foreign fronts, you try to destabilise Pakistan by carrying out such attacks on India’s directives.”

The chief minister said the terrorists had planned to enter the Red Zone and occupy important assets, which were foiled.

However, he added, “Except for Nushki, where it took us some time to disengage them. Nushki is completely clear now.”

CM Bugti said tracing and combing operations were underway and vowed, “We will not let them go.”

The chief minister also assailed attempts to frame terrorism as a “political issue”.

“Is BLA a registered party with whom you have to hold a dialogue? […] They purely want to impose their ideology on us with the force of guns and push the Baloch into a futile war. […] You are linking this war with deprivation and rationalising this violence too.”

He asserted that “rationalising this violence in the name of ethno-nationalism was a direct support to BLA”.

Bugti then asked what some people wished for to be the outcome of such a dialogue. “As a result of dialogue, they want us to surrender? We will not. We will fight this war for a thousand years,” he affirmed.

“We are not ready to surrender even for a second. They can carry out a thousand such attacks. They can destabilise us, but they cannot take an inch from us. This Pakistan is not for breaking away. These people cannot do it. And neither can their masters.”

CM Bugti said “tools such as certain Sardars and social media” were being used to “disintegrate” the youth from the state. He expressed the resolve to further boost engagement with the population and the youth.

Responding to a question, he asserted that terrorists were only terrorists and that it upset him when they were called “Baloch terrorists”.

Noting that terrorists blend themselves within the civilian population, the chief minister asked, “Should we become brutal like them?

“We could kill 10 [terrorists] by throwing one mortar, but what about the 20 civilians with them? This is the only reason why we do not want to become brutal like them.”

CM Bugti also took exception to those arguing that the Balochistan “issue cannot be solved with force”. “When has force ever been used in Balochistan?” he asked rhetorically, adding that no military operation was conducted in any city.

“It is a purely intelligence-driven war,” the chief minister stressed, noting that only intelligence-based operations (IBOs) were conducted in the province.

He also accused India’s Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) of backing the terrorist activities, asserting that the authorities had “solid and circumstantial evidence”.

Responding to a question, CM Bugti expressed the state’s firm resolve to continue the war against terrorism.

“Why will we get tired? We are the state of Pakistan. We will not get tired,” he said, adding that military operations were not needed currently as IBOs were being carried out.

The chief minister noted that while “all kinds” of arms were employed in the recent attacks, those left behind after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan had “spread into the market and were provided to them by their masters”.

‘Mopping-up’ operation underway: defence minister

Separately, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said peace has been established in Balochistan after yesterday’s attacks and security forces were now “engaged in a mopping-up operation”.

“At this moment in time, peace has been established, and the coordinated attack has been repulsed completely, and they (terrorists) have retreated,” Asif said while addressing the media in Sialkot.

The defence minister further said that attempts were made to target the FC headquarters in Nushki and Dalbadin, adding that all attacks were foiled.

“They attempted to carry out a suicide attack in Dalbadin,” he said, adding that “all targets have been neutralised”.

Echoing Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi’s statements, Asif blamed the incidents on neighbouring India, adding that the attacks aimed to “destabilise the country at a time when it is on the path to progress”.

“Our intelligence and the confessional statements by terrorists all prove linkages to India,” the defence minister said.

Pointing out that the BLA was now making use of female bombers, Asif said two of Saturday’s attacks involved women perpetrators.

“The minds of young women are being polluted,” he said, adding that the BLA was now targeting “labourers and poor people struggling to survive”.
US remains Pakistan’s ‘steadfast partner’ in efforts to ensure peace

Earlier in the day, US Charge de’ Affaires Natalie Baker strongly condemned the Balochistan terrorist attacks and affirmed that the United States remained a “steadfast partner” of Pakistan in efforts to ensure peace.

“The United States strongly condemns January 31 attacks and acts of terrorist violence against security personnel and civilians in Balochistan, claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army, a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation,” Baker said on X.

On behalf of the US, she extended condolences to the victims of terrorism, their families and all those affected. “The Pakistani people deserve to live free from violence and fear,” she said.

Baker added: “The United States remains a steadfast partner of Pakistan in its efforts to ensure peace and stability. We stand in solidarity with Pakistan during this difficult time.”


In August 2025, the US also designated the BLA and its Majeed Brigade squad as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs).

Besides the US, the British High Commission, Qatar and Saudi Arabia had also condemned the latest terrorist activities.

The interior minister held India responsible for the series of attacks, asserting that the authorities would go after every single one of those involved and the “masters behind them”.

In 2024, the BLA emerged as a key perpetrator of terrorist violence in Pakistan.

Consent on trial: How Pakistan’s courts are failing rape survivors

As 2026 dawns, women in Pakistan are left grappling with a stark reality: rape and marital rape continue to be misinterpreted by judges in the country’s highest courts.

Zofeen T. Ebrahim 

Published January 10, 2026 

DAWN


Earlier this month, Pakistan’s Supreme Court (SC) set aside a rape conviction, changing it to fornication (consensual sex out of marriage), reducing a 20-year sentence to five years and slashing the fine from Rs500,000 to Rs10,000, sparking fresh calls for better protections for Pakistani women.

“Such judgments do not give confidence to women to come out and report sexual violence perpetrated on them,” said Ayesha Farooq, chairperson of the government-notified Committee of the Anti-Rape Investigation and Trial Act, formed in 2021.

Despite protective legislation, 70 per cent of gender-based violence (GBV) incidents go unreported. Of those reported, the national conviction rate stands at just 5pc, with some categories as low as 0.5pc and domestic violence convictions at 1.3pc.

Senator Sherry Rehman highlighted the stark figures: in 2024, Islamabad recorded just seven convictions out of 176 reported rape cases. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reported one conviction from 258 cases, Sindh reported no convictions despite 243 cases, and Balochistan recorded 21 rape cases with no convictions.
Legal precedent or social regression?

Nida Aly, Executive Director AGHS Legal Aid Cell, said, “I have never felt so disappointed in our judiciary. Judges have failed as a gender-competent forum and lost credibility.”

The SC case involved a survivor who, in 2015, was raped at gunpoint while relieving herself in the woods. She reported the incident seven months later; DNA tests confirmed the accused as the father of her child. The trial court convicted him, and the Lahore High Court (LHC) upheld the verdict. Yet at the SC, two of three judges reclassified the act as fornication, citing the complainant’s silence, lack of resistance, and absence of physical marks. Section 496-B of the Penal Code prescribes five years of imprisonment and a Rs10,000 fine for fornication.

This reasoning drew sharp criticism from the National Commission on the Status of Women, which said consent cannot be inferred from silence, delayed reporting, or lack of resistance, and urged courts to recognise the realities of trauma, fear, coercion, and power imbalances in sexual violence cases.

Ironically, after the recasting of the case, the woman was exempted from punishment.

She was reminded of another case of rape in 2024, where a woman accused her brother’s friend of rape.

“The same judge converted the conviction of rape into fornication along with arguments like “the woman showed no resistance; there were no marks of violence” and there was a two-day delay in reporting to the police.

Justice Ayesha Malik’s dissenting note arguing there was no “standardised” rulebook response by the victim emphasised consent.

Jamshed M. Kazi, UN women country representative, said such cases resonate far beyond the courtroom. “The language used and the conclusions reached shape not only legal precedent but also social attitudes, survivor confidence, and public trust in justice.”

He added, “For survivors of sexual violence, judgements can leave lasting marks on the lives of women and girls, affecting how their experiences are believed and remembered, and may discourage reporting, reinforcing silence, fear, or self-doubt among survivors.”

Another case saw the LHC dismiss rape complaints against a husband because he was still legally married, even though he raped the woman at gunpoint. The judge, while maintaining the conduct of the man to be “immoral” and “inappropriate under religious or social norms”, said it was not a crime since the marriage continued to exist legally at the time of the incident.

“The judge focused on the validity of the marriage and completely disregarded the woman’s claim of non-consent and being subjected to forced sex at gunpoint,” pointed out Aly.
Marriage, consent and the law — A dangerous grey area

While there is no explicit provision criminalising marital rape, the Protection of Women (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 2006 removed marriage as a defence to rape. When the definition of rape was substantially revised under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2021, no marital exemption was reintroduced.

Between 1979 and 2006, Maliha Zia, Director, Gender, Inclusion & Development at the Karachi-based Legal Aid Society, explained, marriage operated as a defence to rape because the law defined rape as sexual intercourse by a man with a woman “who is not his wife” under specified circumstances. The deliberate removal of the words “not his wife” in 2006 therefore eliminated marriage as a defence, a position that has remained unchanged since.

“The 2006 Protection of Women Act was an important step; it corrected major injustices by separating rape from zina (unlawful sexual intercourse – including adultery and fornication),” said Dr Sharmila Faruqui, a member of the National Assembly. “But it stopped short of clearly saying that lack of consent within marriage is also rape and that silence has allowed old assumptions to survive.”

Faruqui stressed the need for judicial sensitisation, particularly at senior levels, but noted that judges are ultimately bound by the law. “When the law is unclear, even well-intentioned interpretations can go wrong,” she said. She called for legislative clarity — through a penal code amendment or another carefully considered route — emphasising that consent, grounded in dignity and equality, must remain central regardless of marital status. “Marriage was never meant to be a license for violence.”

This was endorsed by Zia, who has been among the trainers of judges who hear GBV cases. “Much work needs to be done to constantly sensitise the justice sector on women’s experiences and the trauma they go through due to sexual violence. “Many work on the assumption that the woman is most likely lying, especially if she didn’t fight or run or report straight away,” she added.

To its credit, Pakistan, under the anti-rape act of 2021 special courts were notified to look into GBV cases. To date there are 174 such courts. Unfortunately, these courts are not exclusively handling GBV cases, said Zia.

But even with this limitation, rape case convictions in Sindh rose to 17pc in 2025, from 5pc in 2020, when such courts did not exist. “Imagine how much better it could be!” According to her, in districts where there is a high caseload of GBV, courts should be exclusive, not necessarily more.

Header image: A woman carries a sign and chants slogans during a rally to mark International Women’s Day in Lahore, Pakistan March 8, 2019. Reuters/Mohsin Raza/File Photo

Note: This article was originally published in Inter Press Service and has been reproduced here with permission.


Zofeen T. Ebrahim is an independent journalist based in Karachi.
She tweets at @zofeen28.

Work at home

Parvez Rahim 

December 12, 2025 

IN Pakistan, we have two categories of individuals working within households — domestic workers and home-based workers. There is a difference in the work each does. Domestic workers, commonly refer­red to as ‘maasi’ are employed for regular household chores like cooking, cleaning and laundry. They can work either part-time or full-time, usually on the basis of informal verbal contracts. They may also be engaged to care for children, the elderly or the sick.

The number of domestic workers ranges from around 4.5 million to 8.5m. The ILO reports 8.5m, while another source estimates 4.5m. However, these figures cannot be authenticated as it is difficult to collect statistics for individuals working in homes, as they are widely scattered. There is also a strong likelihood that these numbers overlap with those of home-based workers.

The latter category is more formal and closer to the jobs performed by their counterparts in industrial and commercial est­ablishments. They perform a wide variety of tasks, primarily in manufacturing, ie, garments, carpets, footwear, jewellery, etc, and services including virtual assistance, customer service data entry, writing, etc. The work is often categorised as traditional, manual labour, intensive work, or modern skill-based professional activity.

Official estimates place the number of home-based workers in Pakistan at around 4.4m to 4.8m, while unofficial sources suggest the total could be as high as 20m. Out of the 20m, 12m are women, which comes to 60pc. Their output may not be less than that of men but they are still paid less than them.


Karachi’s women have played a notable role in forming the HBWWF.

A report in this paper says that “Globally, women make up about two-thirds of the health workforce but earn, on average, 20pc less than men and remain underrepresented in leadership positions”.

Karachi’s women have played a remarkable role in forming the Home-Based Women Workers Federation in December 2009. The HBWWF has been advocating for the rights of women with more vigour and enthusiasm than its male-dominated counterparts. It was officially registered with a membership of about 1,000 but now has over 4,500 members in Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab. There is also a broader union called the Federation of Sindh Home-Based Workers, which is a federation of various unions in Sindh.

HBWWF had persuaded the Sindh government to legislate the Sindh Home-Based Workers Act, 2018. This law relates to the protection of rights of persons who work in the informal or unorganised sector carrying out remunerative work within their homes or surroundings. The act stipulates that the wages of home-based workers will not be less than the minimum wages under the Sindh Minimum Wages Act, 2015. They are also eligible for “all those social, medical and maternity benefits, compensations and marriages and death grants” available under the labour laws.

Thereafter, the Punjab Domestic Workers Act, 2019, was enacted followed by the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) Domestic Workers Act, 2022. They provide for issuance of appointment letters to domestic workers, regulation of daily working hours, grant of sick leaves and festival holidays, maternity leave for female workers and minimum wages as per the law. Termination of employment is subject to a month’s prior notice in writing either by the domestic worker or employer and a month’s wages is to be paid in lieu of notice.

A dispute resolution committee will be formed to resolve disagreements between employers and workers. No one under 15 years will be allowed to work in households in any capacity.

These provisions, derived from various labour laws, have never been fully co­­mplied with by ent­repreneurs of industrial and comme­­r­-

cial establishments. How can we expect millions of households in Pakistan, with limited inco­mes and no knowledge of laws, to ad­­h­ere to them? In fact, these provisions sho­­uld be included in the act for home-based workers, whose nature of work and discipline are closer to that of factory workers. Consequently, neither the Punjab nor the ICT law has been implemented, nor have the respective governments tried to enforce them.

Recently, Saudi Arabia issued guidelines for the conduct of domestic workers and their employers. As domestic workers there belong to different nationalities, it is important for the government to regulate their conduct through these guidelines. Unlike Pakistan, where most laws go unhe­eded, the Saudi government will ensure their compliance in letter and in spirit from the beginning.

The Punjab government and ICT are advised to abrogate their respective acts and issue realistic guidelines to be followed by employers and domestic workers. It will also be convenient for the labour department to check compliance.

The writer is a consultant in human resources at the Aga Khan University Hospital.

Published in Dawn, December 12th, 2025

 

Pakistan’s Packed Prisons

by Syed Salman Mehdi / December 8th, 2025

Prisons in Pakistan are overcrowded and jam-packed with thousands of inmates living under conditions that take away their health, dignity, and hope. Behind the bars lies a human rights crisis that goes well beyond the mandate of official reports or the business of courtroom debate.

Pakistan’s prisons now confine around 102,026 inmates despite being built to hold only about 65,811. This means the system operates at 152 percent of its capacity. Punjab alone houses more than 61,000 prisoners in space designed for just 37,000. Sindh prisons run at 161 percent, while Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan exceed safe limits by 20 to 30 percent. The Justice Project Pakistan calls this overcrowding “one of the country’s most urgent and ignored humanitarian failures.” More than 74 percent of those behind bars are under-trial detainees still waiting for their first hearing. They are the forgotten faces of a justice system that moves too slow and punishes before proving guilt.

Deeply entrenched within the foundations of the very system lies the root cause of this crisis. The slow pace of the courts makes a glacier’s movements look fast, with delays for months or years on hearing dates. The police rush to effect arrests; bail is nonexistent or is set so high that it becomes unaffordable for many. The National Commission for Human Rights has called it a “silent crisis of neglect.” Old laws inherited from colonial times still favor detention over release. Governance failures and limited budgets only worsen the pressure. Political promises of reform appear and vanish, leaving cells more crowded than ever. Pakistan’s rate of pre-trial detention is among the highest in South Asia, even surpassing India and Bangladesh, according to UNODC data.

Inside the walls, conditions are grim. Inmates often share one toilet for fifty people. Meals are meager and medical care is rare. Human Rights Watch has described prisons as “nightmare zones for health and dignity.” Tuberculosis, skin infections, and HIV spread unchecked in cramped cells. Outbreaks at the Adiala Jail have become national concerns, but normal health care is rarely allowed. The harsh realities are even more so for female inmates. Two hundred inmates are cramped into one women’s jail in Lahore, which was originally built for half that number. Reports of harassment by staff are common. Pregnant women receive no special care, and survivors of abuse rarely get counseling. Juvenile offenders share space with hardened criminals, turning confinement into a school of crime rather than a chance for reform.

Overcrowding also destroys any hope of rehabilitation. Workshops, education, and counseling programs rarely function. Guards are overworked and untrained, and violence among inmates is frequent. Drugs circulate freely, and fights break out daily. According to Penal Reform International, more than sixty percent of prisoners reoffend within a year of release. Jails that should reform instead produce more hardened criminals. Society pays the price through rising crime, mistrust, and fear. In Karachi, a prison designed for 2,400 people now confines about 8,500. Three inmates died in violent clashes last year alone.

Courts have occasionally intervened. During the pandemic, the Supreme Court of Pakistan ordered the release of 25,000 under-trial prisoners to ease congestion. Yet numbers climbed back quickly. However, the prison reform panel remains unactive, which the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Federal Ombudsman) had formed in 2015. None of the bail reforms or alternative sentencing have been implemented yet as part of the National Jail Reform Policy 2024. Such a debate was stalled in Parliament in 2023 over the plea bargains and parole under the distracting political environment. Provincial budgets are shrinking with prison funds cut by 10 percent this year. Without consistent political will, even sound policies turn into paperwork.

There are practical ways forward. Bail reform must take priority. Judges should grant bail for minor, non-violent offenses unless a real flight risk exists. Introducing plea bargains and fast-track trials could cut delays significantly. Parole boards could free low-risk prisoners after serving part of their sentences.

Community service and fines should be imposed instead of imprisonment for petty crimes. With such non-custodial measures and justice reforms in India have had limited success. This burden could be eased through rehabilitation interventions for drug users instead of imprisonment. Norwegian practice may provide an appropriate example for local adaptation, emphasizing rehabilitation instead of punishment. UNODC continues to promote these alternatives in South Asia with an emphasis on human rights and economic benefits.

The civil society is the lifeline of prison reforms. Amnesty International, Justice Project Pakistan, and independent lawyers have filed petitions and written detailed reports about many grave violations and conditions of inhumanity. There is also the media, which is beginning to make a difference; a Dawn investigation in 2024 led to a review of Punjab’s overcrowded prisons. Such successes, however, have been few and far between; for instance, part of the creation of secure bail for 500 women was the result of concerted efforts from human rights groups in 2022. So far, limited change has come from sustained activism, the involvement of the religious sector in seeking rehabilitation funding, and pressure from the public.

The overcrowding in prisons in Pakistan reveals deeper moral and administrative failure. It’s not just about poor infrastructure, in fact it lies deep inside justice and humanity. To neglect those who are in jail threatens both prisoners and society.

Disease, violence, and radicalization fester in these broken spaces. Building more prisons will not solve anything unless the present system learns to dispense justice speedier and fairer.

Conclusion

Pakistan is at a juncture, and prison overcrowding is no longer a bureaucratic issue at this point: it has now become a matter of national conscience. In order to restore the balance of justice, state action must be immediate and urgent: speedier trials, changes in the laws governing bail, and humane forms of punishment to replace imprisonment. No longer time for promises. Every day of delay adds to the mute suffering of thousands. True justice cannot exist while its foundations remain trapped behind bars.

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Syed Salman Mehdi is a freelance writer and researcher with a keen interest in social, political, and human rights issues. He has written extensively on topics related to sectarian violence, governance, and minority rights, with a particular focus on South Asia. His work has been published in various media outlets, and he is passionate about raising awareness on critical human rights concerns. Read other articles by Syed.

Frankenstein at the border: Pakistan, the Taliban, and the wounds of a region

By Farooq Sulehria & Alternative Viewpoint

Published 27 November, 2025

First published at Alternative Viewpoint.

As border clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan erupt once more, the fault lines of South Asia’s post–9/11 order have been starkly exposed. What initially resembled a relationship of patronage — Islamabad’s enduring quest for “strategic depth” through its Taliban protégés — has devolved into overt hostility. Pakistan’s economic decline, the diminishing legitimacy of its military, and the Taliban’s newfound diplomatic assertiveness have created a precarious situation that threatens to reshape regional dynamics.

In this extensive conversation, Farooq Sulehria — writer, scholar, and long-time observer of South Asian politics — engages with Alternative Viewpoint regarding the crisis along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the misconceptions within Pakistan’s military establishment, and the shifting global and regional power landscape.

Sulehria outlines the historical trajectory from the CIA-sponsored “Afghan Jihad” of the 1980s to the current standoff between a weakened Pakistani state and the empowered Taliban regime in Kabul. He contends that Pakistan’s longstanding strategy of nurturing militant proxies has ultimately backfired, resulting in a “Frankenstein’s monster” that is now aligning with India and challenging its former patron.

The conversation covers a range of topics, from the domestic repercussions of Pakistan’s militarism to the evolving geopolitics of the U.S.–China rivalry, India’s growing role in Afghanistan, and the dire situation of Afghan refugees caught amid failing states. Sulehria asserts that the only viable alternative lies in fostering socialist, secular, and internationalist solidarity across South Asia — transcending militarised borders and imperial configurations.

You describe the Taliban as Pakistan’s “Frankenstein’s monster.” Could you please explain what you mean by this metaphor in today’s context — especially after the recent border clashes?

Since the 1980s, the Pakistani state has nurtured and supported armed fundamentalist groups. This initial collaboration involved the USA, Saudi Arabia, and others within the framework of the so-called Afghan Jihad. However, even after the Soviet troops withdrew in 1988-89 and the left-wing government in Kabul fell in 1993, the policy of backing fundamentalist militias continued. The focus shifted away from Afghanistan and toward Indian-administered Jammu-Kashmir. The establishment deployed these groups against civilian governments. 

After 9/11, some factions became dissatisfied with Islamabad’s apparent alignment with Washington against the Taliban in Kabul. Consequently, Pakistan experienced a wave of terrorism for the next fifteen years. Simultaneously, the Afghan Taliban received safe havens in Pakistan for two decades. 

Pakistan has functioned as a client state, consistently reliant on US support. Such an approach has proven to be a risky strategy. Islamabad prioritized US patronage to bolster the Taliban, aiming to restore their control over Kabul and transform Afghanistan into a “strategic backyard,” devoid of Indian influence. Ironically, the Taliban, nurtured and armed at great cost to the state and society, have now aligned with Pakistan’s primary rival, India. This is where the Frankenstein’s monster analogy comes into play.

Are we witnessing a genuine breakdown between Pakistan and the Taliban regime, or just a renegotiation within a long, uneasy alliance?

It’s difficult to determine whether we are witnessing a true breakdown between Pakistan and the Taliban regime or merely a renegotiation within their longstanding, uneasy alliance. Both parties lack principles, and opportunism defines the behavior of both the Taliban and the Pakistani elite. This opportunistic behavior is not unique to them; ruling elites worldwide often act in similar ways. However, I believe the current breakdown is genuine. Amir Khan Mutaqi’s trip to New Delhi represents a significant crossing of what Islamabad considers a diplomatic redline.

How do Pakistan’s current internal crises — economic collapse, IMF dependence, and political disarray — shape its new aggressiveness toward Afghanistan?

In fact, aggressiveness towards Afghanistan shows newfound confidence. Since the “winning of war” against India used to legitimise the hybrid regime, Donald Trump’s nonstop pat on the back and silencing of all sorts of opposition and dissent, the ruling elite has become drunk with power. However, Islamabad continues to face challenges from militancy in Balochistan and the Pakistani Taliban, also known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP attacks from their safe havens in Afghanistan are annoying the establishment. Perhaps there is an illusion in Islamabad that they can coerce Kabul into submission. In short, I do not see the aggression against Kabul as an expression of crisis. Quite the opposite is true.

To what extent are the recent military actions an attempt by Pakistan’s army to reassert legitimacy at home?

There exists a prevalent Afghanphobia, propagated through various means of media and propaganda. This sentiment has been developing since the events of 9/11. In addition to India, Afghanistan has emerged as the new ‘other’ for Pakistan. As a result, there is either support for military actions against Afghanistan or widespread indifference among significant segments of society.

In an earlier article, you had mentioned that “ running with the hare and hunting with the hound” has been Pakistan’s state policy for decades. Why has this duplicity persisted across regimes — both civilian and military?

In the realm of international politics involving India, Afghanistan, and major powers such as China and the USA, military influence predominates. The so-called civilian leaders have very little authority in these matters.

You note that the Taliban have adopted patriotic rather than religious rhetoric in their recent clashes with Pakistan. Does this mark a shift in their ideological project, or is it purely tactical?

It is akin to the situation in Iran, where the Ayatollahs blended their interpretation of fundamentalism with a form of nationalism during the war against Iraq. The Taliban remain steadfast in their fundamentalist ideology; without it, they would cease to be the Taliban. Nonetheless, they strategically incorporate elements of jingoistic-nationalistic rhetoric.

How do ordinary Afghans perceive Pakistan today, and does this popular sentiment limit Islamabad’s leverage over Kabul?

Long before the current stand-off, Pakistan had already lost any sympathy among the Afghan population. Many Afghans hold them accountable, largely justifiably, for the numerous miseries they have endured.

What role does internal factionalism within the Taliban — particularly the Haqqani vs. Kandahar groups — play in this escalating tension?

There are numerous rumours circulating, yet no concrete information is available. It is difficult to make definitive statements. However, those who are monitoring the situation in Afghanistan, including Afghan citizens and the diaspora, continue to emphasise internal differences, as do various commentators in the media.

You hint at the US–China rivalry shaping the regional situation. How plausible is the idea that Washington sanctioned Pakistan’s attacks on Afghan territory, possibly to reclaim influence through Bagram or challenge China?

Once again, the matter is largely speculation, and no documented evidence supports these claims. Donald Trump’s comments provide context regarding the attack on Kabul, as he stated that the USA aimed to regain control of Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan to encircle China. However, it is crucial to note that Pakistan cannot afford to irritate China either.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s economy is deeply dependent on Beijing. How is the Pakistani ruling class managing this contradiction between U.S. appeasement and Chinese dependency?

They have been managing this relationship since the 1960s. The issue is not merely how they will appease both Beijing and Washington; rather, it is that Islamabad has two patrons, and this dual patronage poses a threat to democracy in Pakistan. Notably, the two patrons often have overlapping interests that Pakistan attempts to satisfy simultaneously.

Does this triangular tension (Pakistan–US–China) suggest a broader crisis in the “post-war on terror” regional order?

Yes, it is a complicating factor. However, this triangular relationship is merely one aspect of the broader situation. India is another significant element. Anwar ul Haq, a former caretaker prime minister, once candidly remarked, ‘Pakistan is China’s Israel.’ Such a Freudian slip is rather unusual in Pakistan. Nevertheless, an India-China rapprochement may be crucial for keeping the USA at bay in this region. Currently, especially with the BJP’s ideological grip on India, such a rapprochement seems increasingly like a mirage.

Afghanistan’s foreign minister’s visit to New Delhi, as you note, embarrassed Islamabad. How should we read this growing India–Afghanistan proximity?

I believe that any government in Kabul will strive to maintain strong relations with New Delhi. The Taliban regime may seek to reconcile with Islamabad in the near future; however, they are unlikely to sacrifice their newly formed friendship with India. They may be ruthless, but they are not foolish. They will refrain from placing all their trust in Pakistan.

Is New Delhi seeking to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal — or is it more about projecting regional hegemony under the Modi government’s nationalist agenda?

I am not well-placed to analyse this issue for an Indian audience. Nevertheless, I do not believe that India can effectively fill the gap left by the United States.

How do you view Indian media and policy narratives around Pakistan’s “instability”? Do they serve a strategic function domestically, beyond foreign policy?

In the past, Indian media, particularly during the dominance of print, commanded significant respect in Pakistan and beyond. However, in the present, Indian media, except for a few alternative outlets, often lacks credibility. I also follow a few bloggers, such as Shekhar Gupta from The Print and Praveen Swami, to gauge what the Indian establishment is thinking. Ravish Kumar is a notable exception, though he tends to focus on domestic politics. Overall, even on platforms like YouTube, there is a noticeable lack of quality journalism, particularly regarding Pakistan.

Pakistan’s deportation of nearly a million Afghan refugees has shocked many observers. What does this reveal about the militarised and xenophobic direction of Pakistan’s state?

In addition to reflecting xenophobia, it also highlights opportunism. During the 1980s, media outlets celebrated Afghan refugees, portraying them as ‘Muslim brothers’ resisting ‘infidel Soviets’. The narrative framed the Afghan Jihad as, in reality, a Pakistan Jihad aimed at thwarting Soviet aspirations to access the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. I believe their expulsion was also manipulated as a means to exert pressure on the Taliban. However, it is worth noting that the Taliban treat Afghans in a manner reminiscent of how Pakistan treated Afghan refugees. This situation should also be viewed as part of a broader global trend in the era of Trumpism. When so-called liberal democracies violate refugee and human rights, they normalise poor practices. Iran, too, has expelled Afghan refugees with comparable brutality. Ironically, both Pakistan and Iran profess to champion the rights of the Ummah.

How is this militarism affecting the working class, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan? Is there any visible resistance, solidarity, or dissent emerging from below?

In Afghanistan, perhaps nobody wants any more trouble. They are already enduring a life-threatening situation. Likewise, the civil society has been utterly destroyed. In Pakistan, the left and certain progressive nationalists in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) have opposed this escalation. But they are marginalised.

You end a recent article by saying, “ Frankensteins cannot live in peace when terror-monsters rule the roost.” Is there any political force—inside or outside these states — capable of breaking this vicious cycle?

Presently, the situation is very pessimistic. However, the source of hope always struggles. We in the Af-Pak region have no other option but to organise ourselves against all these forces of darkness on both sides of the border. We need international solidarity on the level of South Asia, in particular.

What would a progressive, anti-imperialist regional framework look like today — one that can counter both Taliban reaction and militarist nationalism in Pakistan and India?

I think it has to be unapologetically socialist, secular, internationalist, and anti-imperial. It is important to highlight that sections of the left in India-Pakistan have huge illusions about China. The left needs to understand that China represents a new form of imperialism. Furthermore, the so-called multipolarity is being projected as an opportunity. It is an opportunity for the ruling classes, not the working classes.

Unfortunately, a section of the left in Pakistan is even giving up on secularism, let alone internationalism and an anti-imperialism anchored in Marxist principles rather than campism. As Marxists, what we privilege over everything else is the interest of the working class.

Finally, what can the Indian left learn from Pakistan’s experience with “strategic depth” and its disastrous consequences?

I think the primary lesson is: do not support imperial-style elite adventures outside of the country. The working classes and subaltern sections bear the consequences.

ADB okays additional $48m financing for water project in Balochistan

News Desk 

Published November 26, 2025

DAWN




The Asian Development Bank.— AFP/File

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has approved an additional $48 million loan for the Balochistan Water Resources Development Sector Project (BWRDSP), according to a press release issued on Wednesday.

In September, the Central Development Working Party had cleared the Rs49.9bn project for the Zhob and Mula river basins. At the time, participants were told the project would be financed through an ADB loan of $148m (78.99pc), an ADB grant of $5m (2.67pc), and a government contribution of $34.37m (18.34pc).

On Tuesday, the Exe­cutive Committee of the Nat­­i­onal Economic Cou­ncil had approved the project.

In the press release issued today, the ADB said the additional funds would support the completion of critical components of the project, including the Churi Infiltration Gallery subproject, the development of Siri Toi Dam command area, and watershed management activities, adding that work on the components had been “previously delayed due to budgetary constraints”.

“These components are vital for enhancing irrigation efficiency, promoting sustainable water use, and mitigating soil erosion caused by floods,” it said.

The press release further said: “An innovative piped water distribution network will also be introduced in the Siri Toi command area.

“This system promises higher efficiency, reduced conveyance losses, and improved service delivery compared to traditional open-channel systems.”

The ADB projected that once completed, Siri Toi Dam in the Zhob River basin would provide a storage capacity of 36 million cubic metres of water, significantly improving reliable water availability.

“This will ensure efficient and equitable water delivery for domestic and agricultural use across 16,592 hectares of the command area, including 1,839 hectares under khushkaba (rainwater harvesting) farming systems,” the press release said.

It further detailed that “to enhance long-term sustainability, the project incorporates watershed management measures such as afforestation, soil conservation, and the construction of check dams, to reduce land degradation and improve flood management within the dam’s catchment area”.

It further stated that additional financing for BWRDSP was aimed at building on the “project’s earlier successes in strengthening irrigation infrastructure and improving water resource management in Balochistan”.

The press release highlighted that the province faced “severe water scarcity, exacerbated by economic challenges and climate impacts”.

“Agriculture, which forms the backbone of Balochistan’s economy, contributes nearly two-thirds of the province’s economic output and employs 60 per cent of its 13 million residents. However, frequent droughts, water management capacity issues, and climate vulnerabilities have put livelihoods at significant risk, with regional poverty rates nearly twice the national average.”

The press release quoted ADB Country Director for Pakistan Emma Fan as saying: “The ongoing project, for which additional financing has been approved, focuses on the Zhob and Mula river basins. This project supports livelihoods and creates improved economic opportunities, particularly for women engaged in agriculture.”

The project is cofinanced by the Japan Fund for Prosperous and Resilient Asia and the Pacific — funded by the Government of Japan through ADB — and the High Level Technology Fund, the press release said.

It added that the project “aims to establish a climate-resilient and sustainable water resource management system in Balochistan, ensuring long-term benefits for the province”

CU

Barrick committed to Reko Diq copper project, says interim CEO

Reuters | November 25, 2025 |

Barrick’s Reko Diq copper-gold project in Pakistan. (Image courtesy of Barrick Mining.)

Barrick Mining Corp remains committed to its Reko Diq copper mine in Pakistan, one of the world’s largest undeveloped deposits of the metal, its interim CEO said on Tuesday after reports of a possible withdrawal.

The $7 billion project in the remote, insurgency-hit western province of Balochistan is held in an equal partnership between the company and the Pakistani authorities and is expected to start production by the end of 2028.

Barrick’s board had raised the possibility of splitting the company’s assets, which could include an outright sale of the Reko Diq mine and the company’s African assets, Reuters reported this month, citing sources familiar with the company’s thinking.

“Barrick remains committed to the Reko Diq project and to Pakistan,” Mark Hill told Reuters.

Security, scale, stake

Balochistan suffers frequent attacks by separatists and jihadists, making security a major concern for the mine. The project also requires a railway line upgrade to transport copper concentrate to Karachi for processing abroad.

Lenders including the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank among others are assembling a financing package exceeding $2.6 billion.

The Reko Diq project added 13 million ounces to Barrick’s gold reserves in 2024 and is expected to produce 200,000 metric tons of copper a year in its first phase, doubling after expansion, with projected free cash flow of more than $70 billion over 37 years.

Barrick’s Reko Diq project to generate $74 billion over 37 years

Pakistan’s mineral play

The remarks from Barrick underscore Reko Diq’s importance to both Pakistan and the company, with Islamabad counting on the mine to anchor its minerals strategy while the Canadian miner advances one of its largest long-term projects.

Sources familiar with the company’s thinking told Reuters this month that board members and some shareholders worry that exposure to riskier assets in Pakistan and Africa may be weighing on Barrick’s valuation compared with its safer North American operations, particularly in the context of any potential takeover interest.

Barrick returned to Pakistan in 2022 after a years-long legal dispute was settled, and the mine has since become a flagship investment for the country as it seeks to draw more capital into its minerals sector.

(By Ariba Shahid and Sakshi Dayal; Editing by Kirsten Donovan and David Goodman)

US EXIM to invest $100B in critical minerals and energy, says chair

Staff Writer | November 24, 2025 | 

The Reko Diq deposit is located in the Balochistan province. (Image courtesy of Barrick Gold.)

The US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) will invest $100 billion in support of the Trump administration’s strategy of achieving global energy dominance, the export credit agency said.

In an interview with the Financial Times, newly appointed chair John Jovanovic said the move aims to address the West’s over-reliance on supplies from China and Russia.

“We can’t do anything else that we’re trying to do without these underlying critical raw material supply chains being secure, stable and functioning,” he said.

The first tranche of investments, according to Jovanovic, will be in Egypt, Pakistan and Europe. These include $4 billion worth of natural gas being delivered to Egypt by New York-based commodities group Hartree Partners, and a $1.25 billion loan for the giant Reko Diq copper mine being developed by Barrick Mining (TSX: ABX, NYSE: B) in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province.

However, the EXIM chair told FT that the bank is finalizing several other critical minerals deals that are  “orders of magnitude larger” than the Reko Diq loan. While he did not provide further details, Jovanovic said EXIM is “ready” to be part of various critical minerals pacts that the US has with its allies such as Australia.

To date, it has deployed $35 billion of the $135 billion authorized by the US Congress, he noted.

On top of critical minerals, the bank is also placing a heavier investment emphasis on energy security. Jovanovic told FT that it was “actively in discussions” about several nuclear projects in southeast Europe, where US companies such as Westinghouse were looking to invest. Last year it supported $1.6 billion in green energy projects, an increase of 74% compared with 2023, he noted.

Also of significance is LNG, for which EXIM has received requests for US support from Europe, Africa and Asia, and “a series of multibillion-dollar LNG supply deals” could be announced soon, according to Jovanovic.

(With files from Reuters)