Cheap weapons, growing fears: Inside the Taliban’s drone campaign against Pakistan

Pakistan says it intercepted 23 suicide drones launched from Afghanistan into Pakistani airspace in September alone. Since the conflict began in February 2026, the Taliban have increasingly used drones to attack Pakistan, raising concerns in Islamabad.


Issued on: 14/10/2026 - 
By: Ershad ALIJANI / The FRANCE 24 Observers

Images of several drones that Pakistani forces said had been launched from Afghanistan and shot down in different parts of Pakistan, including the suburbs of the capital, Islamabad, on February 27, 2026. © Observers

The Pakistani army on September 23 said it had shot down at least eight fixed-wing drones in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, less than 1,000 metres from the Afghan border. It was the latest reported attempt by the Taliban to target Pakistani forces using this type of drone.

One of the drones that Pakistani forces said had been launched from Afghanistan was shot down on September 23 near the Torkham border crossing.

Since the conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban began in February of this year, the Taliban have deployed armed first-person-view (FPV) drones – small quadcopters carrying munitions such as mortar shells – to attack Pakistani positions near the border. They have also used larger, fixed-wing suicide drones equipped with more powerful engines, potentially capable of flying hundreds of kilometres.

Propaganda footage published by the Taliban showing FPV drone attacks on Pakistani positions near the Afghan border in October 2025.

On September 28, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said it had delivered a diplomatic protest note to the Taliban over what it described as "provocative incursions", citing 23 drones launched from Afghanistan into Pakistani airspace since the beginning of the month.

On March 13, 2026, Pakistan claimed to have shot down two Taliban drones near the capital, Islamabad.

From friends to foes

Once close allies, Pakistan and the Taliban entered into open conflict about eight months ago when Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif publicly declared that “relations with the Taliban had deteriorated into an ‘open war’.”

The conflict escalated after Pakistan began targeting positions of the Pakistani militant group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inside Afghanistan. Also known as the Pakistani Taliban, the TTP is officially recognised as a terrorist organisation by multiple countries and international bodies, including the United Nations, Pakistan and the European Union.

The TTP has carried out attacks in Pakistan for nearly two decades and has long-standing ties with the Afghan Taliban, which Pakistan accuses of sheltering and supporting the group.

When Pakistan, which has aerial military superiority over Afghanistan, has struck suspected TTP positions deep inside Afghanistan, the Taliban has retaliated with ground attacks and drones.

On February 27, 2026, Afghanistan’s Taliban government claimed to have carried out drone attacks on the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. The same day, Pakistani sources published images of what they said were Taliban drones shot down in a suburb of the capital.

'Making a fixed wing drone is not that complicated anymore'

UAV expert Mark Grozel explains:

These drones are roughly two metres in size and could carry between half a kilogram and one kilogram of explosives. They have a very limited military effectiveness and are easy to intercept. They are slow and fly at low altitude. The difficulty is detecting them: they are hard to spot, but once detected, they are easy to shoot down.

There are multiple scenarios. One is that a foreign government supplies them. Or they could be, to some extent, homemade. Today, making a fixed-wing drone is not that complicated anymore.

Autopilot software that controls a drone’s trajectory is widely available.

On [the e-commerce site] Alibaba, you can easily buy components such as the engine and battery. The body could be made with a 3D printer, or from polystyrene or even balsa wood…

After examining photos and videos of drones that Pakistan’s army said it had intercepted, FRANCE 24 identified what appear to be DLE55 engines fitted to each of the suicide drones shown. These 55cc single piston engines and are commercially available online.

The DLE55 engine is available for purchase on the Chinese e-commerce platform Alibaba. © Observers

Despite their basic engines, small explosive payloads and simple radio navigation systems, these drones have a heavy psychological impact.

'Their main power is their psychological impact'

According to Grozel:
The strength of this kind of fixed-wing drones is that they are cheap to make. Any group with the resources, including the Taliban, can now produce them.

They allow you to tell your adversary: ‘I can threaten your infrastructure at any moment.’ If one hits a school or a fuel facility, the consequences could be catastrophic. Their main power is their psychological impact.

The Taliban’s drone attacks come amid a broader conflict between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, fueled by the activities of the TTP.

Direct engagements between the TTP and Pakistani security forces have increased significantly since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, rising from 98 incidents in 2021 to 470 in 2024. Throughout 2025, regular clashes along the border reportedly resulted in approximately 4,000 deaths.

On September 18, 2026 a TTP suicide car bomb attack on a mosque killed 21 people in the Pakistani border city Kohat .

The roots of the Taliban–TTP alliance

Mukhtar Wafaei, an expert on the Taliban who specialises in Afghan affairs, explains how relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban deteriorated into military conflict.

To understand the current situation, we have to go back to the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s.

During those years, Afghan and Pakistani fighters were sent from religious schools in Pakistan to participate in the “jihad” against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

These relationships were forged during that period and remained largely unquestioned until the September 11 attacks and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan.

After the collapse of the Taliban’s first government in 2001, Taliban leaders and members dispersed, with many seeking refuge in Pakistan’s border regions, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Waziristan and Balochistan.

The debris of a house destroyed by a Pakistani air strike in Afghanistan on September 21, 2026. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), at least three civilians were killed in the attacks that day.

They maintained these long-standing cross-border relationships. In 2008, the Afghan Taliban expanded their presence across various parts of Afghanistan. Around the same time, several jihadist organisations operating in Pakistan, originating from the same tribal regions and carrying out violent attacks, came together under the TTP.

Another turning point came in 2021, when the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. Taliban leaders who had been sheltered in safe houses in Pakistan belonging to the TTP, left for Afghanistan. Their Pakistani friends, allies and associates accompanied them to Kabul and also took refuge there.

Between late 2021 and mid-2022, Pakistan attempted to negotiate with the TTP. But after the group refused to disarm or accept Pakistan’s constitutional framework, it ordered its fighters to launch nationwide attacks on November 28, 2022. The Taliban claim the TTP is a Pakistani internal issue and deny any responsibility.

When diplomatic ultimatums failed to halt cross-border militant operations, Pakistan resorted to air strikes inside Afghanistan, prompting the Afghan Taliban to retaliate with attacks on Pakistani territory.

Made with Flourish • Create a scatter plot

Number of Afghan civilians killed in Pakistani air strikes between October 2025 and October 2026. Sources: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Amnesty International.

Pakistan also launched a mass expulsion campaign, with 2.39 million Afghans returning from Pakistan to Afghanistan over a period of more than two years.

Made with Flourish • Create a chart

The number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan (blue) and the number of civilians killed in these attacks (red) between 2008 and 2025. The TTP was responsible for most of the attacks during this period. Source: westpoint.edu

There is a very deep ideological relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP rooted in the extremist Islamist religious schools in Pakistan. They share the same ideology, come from the same religious tradition and follow the same teachings. They can no longer be separated. They are effectively one group.

A few months after the Afghan Taliban returned to power, the TTP leader stated very clearly in Pashto that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, meaning the Afghan Taliban, were one group. He said: “We are not two groups. We are one group, following one programme, one ideology and one method.”

This is particularly revealing because the TTP leader himself explicitly described the two movements as one.

 

Iran Faces Rising Threat From Within as Baluch Insurgency Escalates

By RFE/RL staff - Oct 18, 2026

• Armed Baluch groups have intensified deadly attacks on Iranian security forces in Sistan-Baluchistan.
• 
  
• Militant factions are increasingly coordinating their operations as Tehran faces mounting military pressure.
• 
  
• Longstanding ethnic and religious grievances threaten to deepen Iran’s internal security crisis.

Iran's vast and restive southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan, located along the border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, has witnessed a deadly flare-up of violence in recent weeks.

Armed groups and Iranian security forces have clashed almost daily across the impoverished province, the site of a decades-long, low-level insurgency.

Separatist groups and Islamist militants in Sistan-Baluchistan, home to Iran's marginalized ethnic Baluch minority, are increasingly coordinating their efforts to challenge the Iranian state, experts say.

The intensifying insurgency has compounded the security threats facing Iran, which remains at war with the United States and Israel and braces for a possible resumption of major US combat operations.

"The renewed attacks in Sistan-Baluchistan come at a time when the Islamic Republic is facing unprecedented military and economic pressure," said Hamidreza Azizi, senior Iran analyst at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group.

"What makes the situation more concerning for Tehran is the possibility that localized insurgent activity could become part of a broader security challenge," he added.

Spate Of Attacks

Baluch armed groups have claimed responsibility for a series of hit-and-run attacks, deadly roadside bombs, and shootings targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the elite branch of Iran's armed forces, the Basij paramilitary force, and local police across the province in recent weeks.

On October 14, a police officer and local Basij commander were killed in separate attacks in the town of Mehrestan, Iranian media reported.

A day earlier, the IRGC said one of its members was killed after a hostage-taking attempt triggered clashes in Zahedan, the provincial capital of Sistan-Baluchistan. Also on October 13, gun battles between gunmen and the IRGC broke out in the town of Taftan.

In response, the authorities have stepped up security operations in the province, including preemptive raids on suspected insurgent cells, underscoring the growing threat.

Iran also executed a prominent Baluch militant on October 12. Omar Dorostaran had been convicted of armed rebellion, membership in a terrorist group, and complicity in an armed uprising.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on October 12 claimed that "terrorist groups" operating in the area were acting on "plans devised by Israel and the United States to destabilize the country's borders."

Azizi of the International Crisis Group said Iranian officials increasingly fear that their adversaries may try to exploit existing ethnic and political grievances to open new fronts inside the country.

"Tehran appears determined to prevent a longstanding security problem from developing into a more serious vulnerability during a potential new war," he said.

Sistan-Baluchistan, Iran's second largest province and roughly the same size as Syria, is particularly strategic and sensitive.

It borders Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and Pakistan's Balochistan Province, which has also been the scene of a decades-long insurgency.

Sistan-Baluchistan is also home to Chabahar, Iran's only port with direct access to the open ocean. It allows Iran to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, a major flashpoint in the war with the United States and Israel.

Militants Merge

In December 2025, four separate armed Baluch groups joined forces under the Mobarizoun Popular Front, signaling closer coordination among militant factions.

The umbrella group includes Jaish al-Adl, a Baluch separatist militant group that is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran and the United States.

Believed to be operating out of Pakistan, Jaish al-Adl is the most potent Baluch armed group fighting Tehran. Iran has accused the United States and Israel of arming the group.

"The Iranian government is currently facing multiple pressures at home and abroad, and naturally, armed groups may have come to the conclusion that they have found a good opportunity to expand their operations," said Fatemeh Aman, a US-based Iran analyst.

"If these attacks become coordinated, sustained, and continuous, they could pose a more serious security challenge for the government," Aman told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.

Experts say armed groups are exploiting the longstanding grievances of the Baluch minority, many of whom are Sunni Muslims in Shi'a-majority Iran. The group has long faced disproportionate discrimination and violence at the hands of the authorities.

Baluch make up around 5 percent of Iran's population of some 90 million. But they account for around 20 percent of all executions in the country.

During the nationwide anti-establishment protests that rocked Iran in 2022, Sistan-Baluchistan was the scene of the deadliest government crackdown. On September 30 that year, referred to as "Bloody Friday," nearly 100 protesters were gunned down.

Poverty, religious and ethnic discrimination, and lack of political representation have "created a basis for deep dissatisfaction in the province," said Aman.

"The government's largely security-based approach to the demands of the Baloch people has also contributed to the spread of this distrust," she added.

By RFE/RL

Balochistan: The Female Face Of Insurgency – Analysis




Baluchistan, Pakistan. Credit: VOA


October 3, 2026
SATP

By Ruchika Kakkar

Key Takeaways:

SATP reports that the banned Balochistan Liberation Front claimed its new all-female Karima Armed Assault Division’s first operation on Sept. 22, 2026, an ambush on an Action Task Force convoy near Jusak on the CPEC highway in Kech; no independent casualty figures were released, and the group also posted training footage.

The piece reads KAAD, named for activist Karima Baloch, as a 2025–26 shift after the BLF’s first claimed female suicide attack at Nokundi on Nov. 30, 2025, catching up with the BLA’s Majeed Brigade, which has publicized female attackers since the April 26, 2022 Karachi Confucius Institute bombing.

Claims about a mixed-gender Saddo battalion, a May 22, 2026 BLA women’s wing, and named attackers in Herof operations are group statements, not verified battlefield facts; the author treats the trend as recruitment and branding under pressure, not proof of a wider social mandate.

On 22 September 2026, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) – a banned Baloch ethno-nationalist separatist group in Pakistan, waging an insurgency in Balochistan, allegedly from bases in Afghanistan – claimed that its newly formed all-female unit, the Karima Armed Assault Division (KAAD), carried out its first armed operation near Jusak in the Turbat tehsil (revenue unit) of Kech District in Balochistan. According to BLF spokesperson ‘major’ Gwahram Baloch, KAAD fighters ambushed a Pakistani military Action Task Force (ATF) convoy on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Highway. The group stated that the attack damaged military vehicles and left several ATF personnel dead or injured, though it did not release specific casualty figures. At the same time, the BLF’s media wing Aashob released training footage showing more than 20 uniformed women handling heavy weapons in mountainous terrain.

In a subsequent statement demarcating KAAD’s objectives, the BLF declared that its female fighters would operate on dual fronts: militarily against the Pakistani Army, intelligence agencies and military infrastructure, and socially against patriarchy, class exploitation and what the organisation terms regressive traditions within Baloch society. The statement positions KAAD as both an operational combat formation and a deliberate ideological project. BLF portrays its female members as predominantly highly educated and politically conscious, leveraging their involvement to frame insurgency as an intellectual and political movement rather than a purely armed or tribal uprising. It further contends that women’s participation bolsters the movement’s legitimacy and helps transcend regional, tribal and sectarian divides. KAAD, named after the prominent Baloch activist Karima Baloch, a former chairperson of the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO-Azad), whose death in suspicious circumstances in Toronto, Canada, in December 2020 became a significant rallying point, is presented by the BLF as an organised unit that combines armed, political, ideological and organisational roles.


The formation of KAAD forms part of a wider strategic and political shift within the BLF in 2025-2026. For years, the group had largely avoided both suicide operations and the systematic recruitment of female fighters. This stood in contrast to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), another Baloch ethnonationalist militant organisation, whose Majeed Brigade had first popularised high-visibility suicide attacks from 2022 onward, as well as the use of female operatives in those missions. The BLF only began employing female suicide operatives later, with its first confirmed case on November 30, 2025, and subsequently formalised this change by creating KAAD as a competitive response to BLA’s tactics. BLA’s methods had generated significant media attention, prompting the BLF leadership under Allah Nazar Baloch to adjust its approach, while also seeking to expand the group’s operational scope.

In 2025, on November 30, Zareena Rafiq, aka Tarang Maho/Trang Mahoo, associated with the BLF-formed Saddo Operational Battalion (SOB), carried out a suicide attack on the Frontier Corps (FC) headquarters in Nokundi, Chagai District of Balochistan. BLF presented this as its first use of a female suicide bomber. The attack resulted in the death of at least one FC trooper and injuries to several others, though casualty figures remain contested. The involvement of a relatively small number of Baloch women in armed and suicide operations has drawn significant attention. SOB is named after Commander Waja Sado aka Saadat Marri / Sado Marri, a veteran Baloch fighter born in 1927 who participated in earlier phases of Baloch resistance during the 1960s, 1970s and later years. He was killed on December 3, 2007, during an attack on an FC post in Kech. BLF messaging describes SOB recruits as highly motivated volunteers selected for discipline and a willingness to undertake high-risk operations. It is labelled as an evolutionary step that moves the BLF beyond traditional guerrilla tactics toward more professional, high-intensity special operations.


Although KAAD and SOB are operational units within BLF, they feature distinctly different structural frameworks and roles. Unlike KAAD, which is an exclusively female unit, SOB is not restricted to women. It includes male members and functions as an elite mixed-gender formation designed for complex, high-intensity missions.

As the South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) noted earlier, the participation of Baloch women in insurgent groups, including as female fidayeen (suicide) attackers, has become increasingly prominent in recent years. Women in Balochistan have been prominent in non-violent political activism over the past decade. Much of this activism has centred on issues of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, reflecting a parallel but distinct form of mobilisation within Baloch society. The first confirmed use of a female suicide bomber by a Baloch insurgent group occurred on April 26, 2022, when BLA attacked the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi. The bombing killed five people, including three Chinese nationals, their Pakistani driver, and a security guard. In claiming responsibility, the BLA released the image and identity of the attacker, Shaari Hayat Baloch aka Bramsh, a member of the group’s Majeed Brigade suicide squad. She had joined the Majeed Brigade two years earlier.

Significantly, BLA is also actively expanding its women’s wing. On May 22, 2026, BLA publicly announced the creation of its women’s wing and released a video via its media wing, Hakkal, featuring Shaynaz Baloch as its ‘commander’. In the approximately 11-minute video, Shaynaz Baloch appears in combat gear alongside other armed women, states that she joined the organisation about seven years earlier as an ordinary member, and appeals to Baloch women and youth to join the struggle. She frames women’s participation as equal and rooted in historical Baloch tradition.

During Operation Herof 2.0, a large-scale, multi-district offensive launched by BLA across Balochistan in January-February 2026, the group heavily publicised the front-line involvement of its female cadres. In February 2026, Asifa Mengal, a 24-year-old Majeed Brigade operative, carried out a vehicle-borne suicide attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters in the Nushki District of Balochistan.


Similarly, in February 2026, Hawa Baloch, a fighter on the Gwadar front in Gwadar District, recorded a final propaganda video against the Pakistani state hours before dying in combat; and Dur Jan Baloch, a militant within BLA’s specialised Fateh squad, featured in BLA media carrying weapons alongside male fighters during attacks in Nushki.

In recent years, BLA has strategically deployed highly educated women for high-impact suicide missions, exemplified by the actions of Summiya Qalandarani and Mahal Baloch. On June 24, 2023, Qalandarani, a 25-year-old Computer Science student and BLA media propagandist, executed a suicide bombing targeting a Pakistani military convoy near Chakar Azam Chowk in Turbat, killing a police constable and prompting the BLA to officially declare the “era of women’s active participation in the armed struggle.”

Building on this tactical shift, law student Mahal Baloch aka Zilan Kurd, participated in BLA’s coordinated “Operation Herof” on August 26, 2024, driving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) directly into the gates of the FC Headquarters at Bela in Lasbela district to breach the military infrastructure.

The emergence of female suicide bombers marks a departure from traditional patterns in the Baloch insurgency. Using women enhances operational effectiveness by exploiting gendered assumptions in security protocols while expanding the recruitment base available to insurgent organisations. Sustained military operations, arrests, and targeted killings often shrink the pool of available male recruits, prompting groups to seek alternative sources of manpower. The present shift combines tactical innovation, ideological rebranding, and gendered symbolism in an effort to reposition the organisation within the increasingly competitive landscape of Baloch militancy.

KAAD is significant primarily because it may signal a tactical shift from the occasional participation of women in Baloch militancy toward a more institutionalised female combat structure. It reflects an organisational strategy shaped by the pressures of prolonged conflict. The growing presence of women in militant violence highlights the capacity of these groups to adapt, innovate, and reshape social norms to ensure their own survival.

Ruchika Kakkar, Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Source: This article was published by SATP

About SATP
SATP, or the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) publishes the South Asia Intelligence Review, and is a product of The Institute for Conflict Management, a non-Profit Society set up in 1997 in New Delhi, and which is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. The Institute was set up on the initiative of, and is presently headed by, its President, Mr. K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd).
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Afghanistan Reduced Opium Production: What Was The Impact On Drug Trafficking? – Analysis

Cultivating poppies in Afghanistan for opium. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency.


September 28, 2026

By Geopolitical Monitor
By Damián Jacubovich

Key Takeaways:

UNODC figures show Afghan opium poppy area falling from ~232,000 ha (2022) after the Taliban ban to 10,200 ha in 2025 (~296 tonnes potential output; Alcis/EUDA ~414 tonnes). Farm sales income is estimated at $134 million in 2025, down 48% from 2024; drought also played a role.

The author says that does not prove the world heroin market shrank: EUDA cites ~12,000 tonnes of estimated Afghan stocks, Myanmar area up 17% (output ~flat), and ~9,116 ha of poppy reported in Balochistan—hectares are not proven replacement tonnes.

Criminal profits cannot be read off farm losses: revenue, cost, and margins differ by stage; groups may tap stocks, new sources, or other drugs. Relocation is a hypothesis to test, not a finding.

Afghanistan reduced the area devoted to opium poppy cultivation from approximately 232,000 hectares in 2022 to 10,200 in 2025. The scale of this decline raises three related questions that require different answers.

First, can state intervention drastically reduce a major source of drug production? In Afghanistan, the answer is yes. Second, has that reduction produced an effective contraction in the international opium and heroin market? Large accumulated stockpiles and the possible emergence of alternative suppliers make the answer less certain. And third, what consequences has the ban had for criminal organizations’ revenues and profitability, and what can we infer about drug trafficking globally?

Did the ban reduce opium production in Afghanistan?

In April 2022, the Taliban authorities banned opium poppy cultivation. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan cultivated approximately 232,000 hectares in 2022 and produced an estimated 6,200 tonnes of opium. Cultivated area fell to 10,800 hectares in 2023, rose to 12,800 in 2024 and declined again to 10,200 in 2025. UNODC estimated potential production at 296 tonnes in 2025. Drought and crop failures also contributed to the latest decline, so not every change can be attributed exclusively to the ban.

The contraction is unmistakable, although estimates differ. The European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) cites an Alcis estimate of 414 tonnes of Afghan opium production in 2025, compared with UNODC’s 296 tonnes. Comparisons over time should therefore use a consistent statistical series.

The economic consequences are also clear at farm level. UNODC estimates that farmers’ income from opium sales to traders fell from $260 million in 2024 to $134 million in 2025, a decline of 48 percent.


The answer to our first question is clear: following the ban, opium cultivation in Afghanistan fell dramatically. Afghan farmers also suffered a substantial loss of income. Yet their losses do not establish that international intermediaries and distributors experienced an equivalent decline. A smaller harvest does not necessarily mean that less opium is available on the market.
Did the fall in Afghan production contract the international opium and heroin market?

Cultivation is only the first link in a longer commercial chain involving traders, processors, transporters, intermediaries, and distributors. The market impact of lower harvests also depends on accumulated stocks, alternative suppliers, prices, and demand.

Stockpiles create a time lag between production and supply. The European Drug Report 2026 cites an Alcis estimate of approximately 12,000 tonnes of opium stored in Afghanistan in 2025. This is an estimate, not a physical inventory. EUDA reports that stockpiles, processing and adulteration practices, and supply management by trafficking networks have helped sustain heroin availability in Europe despite the decline in Afghan cultivation.

Stocks can sustain sales without equivalent new production, but they may eventually be depleted, become more expensive, or cease to be accessible to particular networks. The evolution of supply as these stocks diminish will be essential to evaluating the ban’s lasting market effects.

Alternative producers present a different question. UNODC reports that Myanmar’s cultivated area increased by 17 percent, from 45,200 hectares in 2024 to 53,100 in 2025. Its estimated opium output, however, rose by only 1 percent because yields fell. Internal conflict, displacement, and economic difficulties also affect cultivation there. These figures establish expansion in another country, not that the Afghan ban caused it or that Myanmar has replaced Afghan supply.


Pakistan offers a different kind of evidence. EUDA cites satellite analysis suggesting approximately 9,116 hectares of poppy cultivation in Balochistan in 2025, potentially rivaling Afghanistan’s 2025 output. This suggests a possible alternative source of supply, but hectares are not tonnes: neither the volume produced nor effective replacement of Afghan supply has been established.

We must distinguish three propositions: simultaneous expansion elsewhere, displacement causally linked to the Afghan ban, and actual replacement of supply. Each requires different evidence. The answer to the second question remains open: the production decline is established, but the extent and duration of its effects on the international opium and heroin market are not. Even if that market contracts, we still need to establish who bears the economic losses—and which activities, if any, take their place.
What happened to criminal organizations’ revenues and profitability—and what does this tell us about global drug trafficking?

This question brings me back to a hypothesis I began developing in 2014 while examining changes in Latin American drug trafficking and its expansion into Argentina. I borrowed a concept from the economics of globalization: relocation.

My hypothesis involved two mechanisms. State pressure—stronger controls, enforcement, and higher operating costs—could encourage certain activities to move to territories with lower risks. Expanding demand could also attract organizations, alter routes and draw previously peripheral territories into new consumer markets. Relocation could therefore reflect both a response to state intervention and the search for new commercial opportunities.

Afghanistan provides a case in which to investigate this hypothesis, but the available evidence does not yet confirm it. The central question is what happens to economic opportunities when a major source of production shrinks. Some may disappear permanently; others may be taken up by new suppliers, organizations, or activities. Relocation is one possible mechanism of that transformation, and its existence and scale must be demonstrated case by case.

Criminal organizations are not interchangeable with the markets in which they operate. An intervention may dismantle a network without eliminating consumer demand or the opportunities that attracted other actors. Some organizations may lose their business; others may draw on stockpiles, find suppliers, or diversify. There is no single global drug-trafficking organization making coordinated decisions.

The economic terms also matter. Revenue is the money received from sales; profit is what remains after costs; profitability relates profit to the resources required. Supply contraction can affect prices, costs, and margins differently at each stage. Prices and traded volumes may help estimate revenue, but profit also requires information on costs, and profitability requires relating profit to the resources employed. Higher heroin prices could increase an intermediary’s revenue without raising profit if procurement and operating costs also rise.

The documented fall in Afghan farmers’ income cannot simply be transferred to international traffickers’ accounts. Nor would a contraction in the heroin market and falling profits among organizations involved in it establish an equivalent decline in global drug-trafficking profits. Different organizations, substances, and markets may experience opposite outcomes; there is no single profitability figure for the entire illicit drug economy.


Testing the broader impact would require establishing which organizations lost income and profit, whether those losses persisted, whether other actors took their place, and whether activities shifted to other markets. Illicit markets do not provide conventional financial statements, but wholesale and retail prices, traded volumes, seizures interpreted alongside other indicators, estimated margins, financial flows, and changes in distribution may offer partial evidence.

Consumer behavior matters too. Reduced heroin availability could lead some people to consume less and others to turn to different substances. EUDA warns that synthetic opioids and stimulants warrant monitoring as possible market shifts; it does not establish that widespread substitution has already occurred because of the Afghan ban. A smaller heroin market could coexist with growth elsewhere, but that possibility remains to be tested.

The ban’s impact on the revenues and profitability of organizations involved in opium and heroin remains uncertain. Establishing its consequences for drug trafficking globally requires an even broader investigation.
Three Questions, Three Different Answers

The first question has a clear answer: state intervention can drastically reduce a major source of drug production. Afghanistan’s cultivation figures demonstrate this.

The second remains open. Stockpiles have cushioned the impact of smaller harvests, while alternative suppliers, prices, and consumption will help determine whether the international opium and heroin market undergoes a lasting contraction.

The third demands a wider inquiry. Even if that market contracts, we must establish which organizations lose revenue and profit, which adapt and whether those losses translate into a reduction in the illicit drug economy as a whole. The outcome could be lasting contraction, partial adaptation, or a transformation of criminal activities. Relocation is one mechanism to investigate, not a conclusion to assume.

Afghanistan has demonstrated that opium production can be drastically reduced. What remains to be demonstrated is whether that reduction also shrinks the market and, beyond it, the economic opportunities and profits of criminal organizations.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com


About Geopolitical Monitor
Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.
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Attacks on mining operations on the rise in Pakistan: report

Marina Meireles | September 20, 2026 | 

(Reference US Army photo by Pfc. Joshua Kruger | Flickr Commons.)

More than 30 mining operations have been attacked in Pakistan’s resource-rich Balochistan province in 2026, raising security risks as the country seeks investment to develop some of the world’s largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits. 

Balochistan recorded 38 attacks connected with extractive operations between January and September, bringing the total over the past three years to more than 130, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) report.  

“This risks undermining Pakistan’s drive to attract international investment and develop its mineral sector amid the global scramble for critical minerals,” ACLED South Asia assistant research manager Pooja George said in a news release. 

Balochistan is a region swarmed by conflict between separatists and the government especially around extraction of copper, gold, chromite, coal and natural gas. For separatists, extraction equals exploitation of the country’s wealth, causing them to target operations for what they signify. 

The attacks make it more difficult for Pakistan to leverage its untapped mineral and fossil fuel wealth, as well as find safety solutions for all parties involved in the conflicts.   

Transport targeted 

Balochistan has reported over 130 attacks in the last three years directly connected with extractive operations, with 38 being just between January and September 2026.  

Attacks on mineral projects occur predominantly during transportation, where militants can bypass the heavier security surrounding mine sites, according to ACLED. 

Flagship projects such as the Reko Diq copper mine and Saindak copper-gold mine involve foreign partners and receive protection from private and state security forces. 

Publicly-owned oil and gas operations face a different pattern. More than half of the attacks against those operations take place on extraction sites, a result of less security when compared to mineral projects. Coal operations have experienced most of its attacks during transportation and about a third on site. 

Nature of conflicts 

With less than 17% of attacks involving roadside bombs or landmines, ACLED suggests that the purpose of attacks is to disrupt operations by creating an insatiable atmosphere, rather than harming workers and civilians.  

Nearly 90% of separatist attacks against mineral projects happen on roads.  Gunmen typically fire at vehicle tires to disable trucks and sometimes set the vehicles ablaze after allowing drivers to leave, according to ACLED.  

“Most attacks impacting mining involve property destruction rather than fatalities. The aim appears to be disruption: creating and amplifying a sense of instability around mining operations and making the environment increasingly difficult for companies to operate in,” George said.  

Militants have also increased roadblocks and checkpoints in the region to facilitate attacks, aiming to show how the state’s authority has decreased and that fear is spreading especially along remote areas. ACLED data show that the number of such events in 2026 is on track to surpass 2025 levels.   

Attacks on extractions sites can carry greater human costs because militants are more likely to encounter security forces,  increasing the potential for lethal clashes. 

Source: ACLED.

Operations workers and companies have felt this increase in instability, with privately-owned mining operations warning about shutdowns or slower operations and workers going on strike. 

Impact on Pakistan’s mining future 

The stakes are rising as Pakistan courts international investment to develop Balochistan’s largely untapped mineral wealth.  

Lack of well-developed and secured transportation infrastructure and the need for state security bring more risks to foreign investors, as separatists are more likely to attack their operations as the government is their biggest adversary.   

ACLED also adds that another risk that comes with increased security, is the abuse of those forces, that can carry reputational costs for companies and impact local community engagement, which is key to safe operations. 

Continued attacks could also draw more international attention to the separatist insurgence, giving militants a larger platform while potentially exposing them to a stronger state crackdown.  

Pakistan has deployed additional security forces to Balochistan, but ACLED argues security measures alone are unlikely to resolve a conflict rooted partly in political disputes over resources, autonomy and the distribution of economic benefits. 

“Opposition to resource extraction lies at the heart of the Baloch separatist insurgency, meaning attacks may escalate further as Pakistan seeks to leverage its untapped mineral wealth,” George said. 

Pakistan: Tormenting Baloch Women – Analysis



September 8, 2026
SATP
By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty

Key Takeaways:

On 27 August 2026 Balochistan put 1–1.5 million-rupee bounties on nine named women from Gwadar, Jiwani, and Turbat, alleged to be linked to Baloch insurgents (“Fitna al Hindustan”). The SATP piece treats the posters as a distraction from a rise in alleged enforced disappearances of women.

Cited cases: 

Safia Baloch, 20, taken in Quetta on 23 August; Aqsa, 17, taken with her father in Khuzdar on 5 August; Rafia Bibi, Tania, and Javeria held at Lak Pass on 30 July and then unaccounted for.

 HRCB: 23 women disappeared January–July 2026; BYC listed at least 12 in 2025. Groups say women are held without charge, then sometimes shown in “confession” videos (Mahal Baloch, 2023, is the template cited). Wider tallies: BYC 1,223 disappearances/killings in 2025; PAANK 556 disappeared and 227 killings in H1 2026; VBMP 6,207 days of protest and 7,000+ missing since the insurgency began.
The state points to women in BLA Majeed Brigade suicide attacks (Karachi Confucius Institute 2022; Turbat 2023; Mastung 2024; Kalat and Nokundi 2025).

 Rights groups say most women are in non-violent protest—Mahrang Baloch’s BYC, the Turbat-to-Islamabad march—and that treating that as a security problem widens repression instead of answering the grievance.

On August 27, 2026, the Balochistan Government announced bounties, ranging from 1 million to 1.5 million rupees, on nine Baloch women, for their alleged linkages to Fitna al Hindustan (A state term for Baloch insurgents. These women hail from Gwadar, Jiwani and Turbat. The announcement was made by Babar Yousafzai, Adviser on Media Affairs to the Balochistan Interior Minister, who said the Government considered the women highly wanted and urged members of the public to provide information to the authorities. Officials added that the identities of informants would be kept confidential. A poster published by the Government identified the suspects as Hanifa Bibi, daughter of Sher Muhammad; Ayesha, daughter of Abdul Rasheed; Iqra, daughter of Ali; Ruqayya, daughter of Waleed; Hafsa, daughter of Iqbal; Zahra, daughter of Malik Muhammad; Amina, daughter of Abdul Rashid; Zareena, daughter of Wahid Baksh; and Aziza, daughter of Ibrahim.

This announcement came at the heels of recent cases of “enforced disappearances” of Baloch women, and appeared to be intended to distract attention from these state atrocities.


On August 23, 2026, a 20-year-old woman, Safia Baloch, the daughter of Abdul Khaliq, a student and resident of the Killi Zayak area of Basima in the Washuk District of Balochistan, was “forcibly disappeared” by personnel of the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from provincial capital Quetta at approximately 1:00 a.m.

On August 5, 2026, a 17-year-old woman, Aqsa, was “forcibly disappeared” along with her father, Abdul Qudoos Zarakzai, by Security Forces (SFs) during a raid on a residential quarter in the Civil Colony of Khuzdar District in Balochistan. At approximately 10 p.m. in the night, personnel from CTD and plainclothes officials carried out a joint raid and took away Abdul Qudoos Zarakzai and Aqsa.

On July 30, 2026, three Baloch women, identified as Rafia Bibi, Tania and Javeria, who belong to the Nechari tribe, were reportedly detained at the Lak Pass FC checkpoint near Quetta and later “forcibly disappeared”. Their family said no information had been provided about their whereabouts and that they had not been informed of the reasons for their detention.

In a statement citing the “enforced disappearance” of Safia Baloch, Dr. Shalee Baloch, an organizer of the Baloch Women’s Forum (BWF), stated on August 26, 2026, that the continued abduction and enforced disappearance of Baloch women had reached an “alarming and intolerable” level. In her statement, Dr. Shalee named several women, Habiba, Mahjabeen, Nasreena, Humaira, Najma and now Safia Baloch, who represented a growing pattern of Baloch women being forcibly disappeared. Dr Shalee added that the targeting of Baloch women reflected a “colonial logic of domination”, alleging that militarisation, arbitrary detention, surveillance, collective punishment and intimidation have historically been used to subjugate colonized peoples.


Organisations including the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) and the Human Rights Council of Balochistan (HRCB) have repeatedly raised concerns over women who they say were detained by SFs and intelligence agencies and subsequently remained unaccounted for, with some later being presented before the media as suicide bombers after months of detention. In recent years, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and other Baloch human-rights groups have documented what they described as an increase in enforced disappearances involving women, and have repeatedly called for detainees to be produced before courts if there are criminal charges against them.

According to an HRCB report released on August 27, 2026, 23 women have been “forcibly disappeared” by SFs between January and July 2026. According to rights organizations, these incidents mark a critical and dangerous escalation in the region, where enforced disappearances historically targeted men, but have increasingly targeted women directly. HRCB and other human rights organizations have raised an alarm over these abductions, which targeted women from diverse backgrounds, including human rights activists, healthcare workers, students, and housewives.

Earlier, on January 13, 2026, BYC released a report highlighting the pattern of enforced disappearances of Baloch women and girls across Balochistan during 2025, emphasising the use of collective punishment and gender-based human rights violations. Titled Enforced Disappearances of Baloch Women in 2025: Collective Punishment and Gender-Based Human Rights Violations in Balochistan, the report noted that at least 12 women and girls were forcibly disappeared across different Districts of Balochistan over the course of the year. BYC underlined that these cases did not represent isolated incidents but pointed to a systematic practice in which enforced disappearance is used as a tool of repression. The report states that the victims included female students, woman health workers, minor girls, and an eight-month pregnant woman. In several instances, multiple members of the same family were targeted during single operations, causing long-term psychological, social, and economic harm to entire families and communities.


Over the years, enforced disappearances in Balochistan have predominantly targeted men, leaving women to bear the social, economic, and psychological consequences within their families and communities. Since 2025, however, the pattern appears to have shifted, with women increasingly emerging as direct targets of state action. This development marks a significant expansion in the nature and scope of alleged State repression in Balochistan.

Forced confessions have become a recurring practice used by the state in Pakistan to shape public narratives around dissent in Balochistan. Women are first subjected to enforced disappearance, held in custody for prolonged periods without due process, and exposed to coercion and abuse. After weeks or months in detention, they are suddenly brought before the public, often through staged appearances or recorded videos, to “confess” to acts they have consistently denied. The case of Mahal Baloch was one of the earliest examples of this pattern. In February 2023, Mahal Baloch was taken into custody by CTD during a late-night raid on her home in the Satellite Town of Quetta, without a warrant. Authorities later claimed she had been arrested with explosives and accused her of links to militant activity, including involvement in a suicide attack, allegations her family strongly denied. Despite being kept on physical remand for fifty-five days, authorities failed to present any substantial evidence against her. Instead, a video later surfaced in which she appeared to “confess” to militant involvement. This statement was made while she remained in police custody, not before a court of law.


The participation of some Baloch women in insurgent groups, including female fidayeen (suicide) attacks on SFs and state establishments, has forced to government to resort to its ‘regular’ method of disappearances targeting women, which it has been following with Baloch men since decades. The first use of female suicide bombers by the Baloch insurgent groups was reported in April 26, 2022, when the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) carried out a suicide attack at the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi, which resulted in the deaths of five persons, including three Chinese nationals, their Pakistani driver and a security guard. While claiming responsibility for the attack, BLA released the image and name of the attacker, female suicide bomber Shaari Baloch aka Bramsh, who was a member of BLA’s Majeed Brigade, a suicide squad. She had joined Majeed Brigade two earlier ago.

The second woman suicide attack came on June 24, 2023, when a BLA-Majeed Brigade bomber, Sumaiya Qalandrani Baloch, attacked a VIP Army convoy that was going from Turbat Airport to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters in the Turbat city of Kech District. The attack resulted in the death of one FC trooper and injuries to another five.

On August 26, 2024, a third female suicide attack was reported when BLA-Majeed Brigade suicide bomber Mahal Baloch carried out a car-bomb attack at the gate of an FC camp in the Bela area of Mastung District.

The fourth female suicide attack was reported on March 3, 2025, when Majeed Brigade suicide bomber Mihikan Baloch attacked a military convoy on the national highway near the Mughalzai area of Kalat District, resulting in the death of FC trooper Attaullah, and injuries to four others.


The last female suicide attack in this series was on November 30, 2025, when Majeed Brigade suicide bomber Zareena Rafiq aka Tarang Maho attacked the FC Headquarters in the Nokundi area of Panjgur District, resulting in the death of one FC trooper and injuries to another seven.

While the participation of a small number of Baloch women in insurgent attacks has drawn attention, women in Balochistan have also become increasingly visible in non-violent political activism over the past decade, particularly around the issue of enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killing. They have led prolonged protests over “missing family members,” relatives they accuse security agencies of forcibly disappearing. Hundreds of women and family members undertook a massive march covering roughly 1,000 miles from Turbat town (Kech District) in Balochistan to Islamabad, and staged sit-ins outside the Islamabad Press Club, demanding the recovery of missing persons, drawing national attention. BYC, a civil rights movement founded by Dr. Mahrang Baloch, was led the effort. Protesters faced Police blockades, tear gas, water cannons, and temporary detentions upon reaching the capital. Despite of state atrocities, Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sammi Deen Baloch organized and spearheaded these non-violent demonstrations.

Mahrang Baloch founded BYC in July 2018, as a grassroots movement advocating the rights of the Baloch community, with a particular emphasis on mobilising women and the families of individuals allegedly subjected to forcible disappearances. In its annual report released on February 3, 2026, BYC documented 1,223 cases of forcible disappearances and extrajudicial killings across Balochistan and adjoining regions during 2025, including affected areas in Sindh and Punjab. On August 26, 2026, the Baloch National Movement’s (BNM) human rights wing, PAANK (Tr: Shield or Protection), reported at least 556 people were forcibly disappeared and 227 others were subjected to extrajudicial or custodial killings across Balochistan between January and June 2026. A PAANK statement added that a further 171 individuals were released during the same six-month period, describing the figures as amounting to an average of roughly 93 enforced disappearances and 38 killings every month. The Human Rights Council of Balochistan (HRCB) recorded 1,455 disappearances, with 1,052 persons remaining missing. The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) estimates that more than 7,000 persons have disappeared since the insurgency began, even as its continuous protest against enforced disappearances in Quetta had reached 6,207 consecutive days by June 26, 2026.

While describing the growing involvement of Baloch women in the Baloch resistance movement, BYC leader Sammi Deen Baloch told Arab News in an interview on February 25, 2025: “We see that our men, our brothers and sons, were systematically taken from their homes, from educational institutions, dragged away while they slept at night. In such circumstances, the only option left for Baloch women was to take this fight into their own hands, to step forward and lead the battle for justice themselves.”

This shift among Baloch women, from the quiet grief to active resistance, has significantly altered the nature of the state’s response. Rather than addressing the underlying drivers of Baloch resentment, the SFs have increasingly sought to suppress dissenting voices among women, treating their growing mobilisation as a security challenge rather than a manifestation of longstanding political and social grievances.

About the author: Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Source: This article was published by SATP


About SATP
SATP, or the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) publishes the South Asia Intelligence Review, and is a product of The Institute for Conflict Management, a non-Profit Society set up in 1997 in New Delhi, and which is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. The Institute was set up on the initiative of, and is presently headed by, its President, Mr. K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd).
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