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Barrick warns of “significant increases” to budget, timeline for Pakistan copper project

Staff Writer | April 2, 2026 | 

Barrick’s 50% Reko Diq copper-gold project in Pakistan. (Image: Barrick’s presentation.)

Barrick Mining (NYSE:B)(TSX:ABX) said on Thursday that it anticipates that there could be “significant increases” to the previously disclosed total estimated capital budget and timeline for its Reko Diq copper project in Pakistan.  

On March 26, Barrick said it will slow its development of the Reko Diq deposit and extend the project’s review period, citing security concerns in the Middle East. 

Reko Diq, one of the world’s largest undeveloped deposits of the metal, is in the remote, insurgency-hit western province of Balochistan and held in an equal partnership between the company and the Pakistani authorities. 

The previously disclosed total estimated capital cost of Phase 1 was between $5.6 billion and $6.0 billion (100% basis, exclusive of capitalization of financing costs) and of Phase 2 was between $3.3 billion and $3.6 billion (100% basis, exclusive of capitalization of financing costs), with first production targeted by the end of 2028. 

“Barrick continues to believe in the long-term value of Reko Diq. Following the preliminary findings of the review and the further escalation of security issues in Pakistan and the region, the company considers it necessary to slow the development activity and continue the project review until mid-2027,” the Canadian miner said in a statement released just after market close in Toronto.  

Barrick has viewed Reko Diq — with an estimated 15 million tonnes of copper reserves — as a key pillar of its strategy to become a Tier 1 producer of the metal. 

The continued review will allow the company to assess in a comprehensive manner the evolving security situation, capital requirements, project financing, project scope and timeline, it said.  

“While development activity will be slowed, the project will remain under active management with a reduced capital spend,” Barrick said.  “Development of Phase 1 of the Reko Diq project was approved on this basis. Barrick recognizes its important role in the local community and intends to continue to invest in and honor its existing in-country community and social programs.” 

Barrick, which has been developing the project in partnership with the governments of Pakistan and Balochistan for years, initially planned for the project to come online in 2028, subject to financing.   

Once operational, the mine is forecast to generate over $70 billion in free cash flow and $90 billion in operating cash flow over a 37-year lifespan. 

No sign yet of China’s plan to cut copper output in major smelters’ results

Reuters | April 2, 2026 | 

Stock image.

Major Chinese copper smelters are planning to raise or maintain output in 2026, their earnings outlooks show, despite a public commitment by the state-linked industry association last year to cut production by over 10%.

The China Smelter Purchase Team (CSPT), a group of 16 of the top copper smelters, agreed last year to cut production to counter overcapacity amid falling processing fees for copper concentrates.

But there’s no sign of output cuts in guidance issued by three major smelters, all CSPT members, as part of annual earnings over the past few weeks.

Jiangxi Copper, China’s top copper smelter, raised 2026 production guidance for copper cathodes to 2.39 million metric tons, up from 2.38 million tons produced in 2025.

Similarly, Yunnan Copper increased its 2026 guidance to 1.71 million tons, up from 1.64 million tons produced last year.

Daye Nonferrous, which published its 2025 results on Wednesday, flagged a slight drop in 2026 to 713,000 tons, from output of 716,000 tons for last year.

The three smelters produced a third of the country’s 14.72 million tons of refined copper last year.

The production cut announcement last year was made as treatment and refining charges (TC/RCs), which are traditionally paid by miners to smelters to process copper concentrates, collapsed in 2025 due to tight supply of the feedstock, leaving smelters having to pay miners.

The CSPT did not set quarterly TC/RC guidance for the fifth time in a row this week. The figure traditionally served as a benchmark for spot copper concentrate deals in China.

Negative fees have left Chinese smelters relying on by-product profits, especially sulphuric acid. Sales of sulphuric acid, for example, accounted for 14.65% of total gross profit of Jiangxi Copper, more than the gross profit from copper rod and wire and finished copper products combined in 2025.

(By Lewis Jackson and Dylan Duan; Editing by Sonali Paul)

Chinese copper miners join $1.2 billion African rail revamp

Bloomberg News | April 2, 2026 | 

Tanzania Zambia Railway. Stock image.

Chinese mining, shipping and logistics companies are joining a $1.24 billion project to revamp a railway linking Zambia’s copper region to a port on the Indian ocean.

Copper producers CMOC Group Ltd. and Zijin Mining Group Co. are teaming up with state-owned China Civil Engineering Construction Corp., or CCECC, to upgrade the 1,860-kilometer (1,156-mile) rail line that runs to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

CCECC – which signed a deal with Zambia and Tanzania in September to rehabilitate the so-called Tazara railway – will retain an 80% interest in the joint venture undertaking the project, according to a statement on Wednesday from Jiayou International Logistics Co., one of four firms taking 5% stakes. The other three are units of Zijin, CMOC and COSCO Shipping Holdings Co., Jiayou said.

The backing for the Chinese project comes as Washington tries to loosen Beijing’s grip on supply chains for critical minerals in Africa. The US concluded a bilateral minerals partnership with the Democratic Republic of Congo in December that grants American companies preferential access to some of the country’s abundant reserves of metals.

The Tazara link — originally built with Beijing’s assistance under Mao Zedong in the 1970s — will compete with the Lobito Corridor, a rail project backed by the US and European Union. That railway connects the same copper-rich region of central Africa to an Angolan port on the west coast of the continent.

CMOC and Zijin are among the Chinese miners that dominate metal exports from Congo, the world’s No. 2 copper producer and the biggest source of battery material cobalt. By contrast, Western firms – particularly Canada-headquartered First Quantum Minerals Ltd. and Barrick Mining Corp. – account for most output in neighboring Zambia.

Tanzania and Zambia granted CCECC a 30-year concession to operate the line. Once completed, the rehabilitated infrastructure will ease congestion on roads in Zambia and Congo, from where most mineral cargoes are currently trucked over long distances to African ports.

The Chinese companies will invest in the Tazara project according to the size of their interests in the Dubai-registered joint venture entity, according to Jiayou, which will contribute $62.2 million. The partners will operate freight services on the line after renovating the railway and purchasing equipment including locomotives and containers, it said, adding that the project still needs to complete the approval and filing process with China’s government.

The investments reflect a shift in China’s Belt and Road Initiative to increasingly partner with private companies to operate projects on commercial terms.

State-owned COSCO is China’s largest container line, while Jiayou is the majority owner of one of Zambia’s biggest trucking firms and is developing road concessions in the country. Zijin is also Jiayou’s second-biggest shareholder, with a 17.5% stake in the group.

Washington’s pact with Congo recognizes the “strategic nature” of the Lobito Corridor and aims to increase the volume of minerals exported to the US and its allies using the railway.

(By William Clowes, Annie Lee and Matthew Hill)

Ivanhoe stuns market with deep Kamoa-Kakula output cut

Cecilia Jamasmie | April 1, 2026 | 

Installation of the Stage Two submersible pumps at Kamoa-Kakula. (Image courtesy of Ivanhoe Mines.)

Ivanhoe Mines (TSX: IVN) has slashed near-term production guidance for its flagship Kamoa-Kakula copper complex in the Democratic Republic of Congo, surprising analysts and resetting investor expectations.

The company now expects 2026 copper anode output of 290,000 to 330,000 tonnes, down from 380,000 to 420,000 tonnes, while 2027 production will reach 380,000 to 420,000 tonnes versus a prior projected 500,000 to 540,000 tonnes.

Ivanhoe released the update after markets closed Tuesday, citing a shift toward underground development, rehabilitation and access work that will constrain ore delivery over the next 18 to 24 months. The company also raised expected cash costs, compounding the weaker outlook.

“The headline takeaway was a material reset to near-term expectations,” Jefferies analyst Fahad Tariq said in a note, adding that investors were not anticipating the downgrade. “We view the update as a clear acknowledgment that operational challenges at Kakula are taking longer to resolve than initially envisaged, pushing volume recovery further out.”

At the core of the revision is a new reserve model that cut contained copper by 24.7% and reduced reserve grade by 28%, reflecting more conservative assumptions, lower cutoff grades and revised mine sequencing. Ivanhoe now caps underground extraction rates at about 60%, down from 70% to 80% or higher, as it widens pillars and excludes inaccessible areas to improve long-term stability.

The reset underscores a broader trade-off facing large mining projects: sacrificing short-term output to secure more reliable, efficient production over time, forcing investors to recalibrate expectations.

Key ramifications

BMO analysts said the reserve update appears conservative but carries more significant implications for near-term production and valuation, largely due to the lower grade profile.

“The reserve update for Kakula/Kamoa came in below both the market’s and our expectations,” analyst Andrew Mikitchook wrote. “The largest impact on valuations comes from a 28% decrease in reserve grade.”

BMO cut its price target on Ivanhoe shares to $16 from $23, citing weaker near-term output and revised long-term assumptions. Year-to-date, the stock is down almost 35%, trading at $10.51 on Wednesday for a market capitalization of $11.8 billion (C$15B).

The bank also highlighted a planned redevelopment of the complex in 2026 and 2027, aimed at enabling broader and more efficient mining with faster backfill sequencing, though at the cost of reduced extraction rates in the interim.

Despite the downgrade, BMO said there is potential upside as Ivanhoe continues to refine its mine plan. Ongoing optimization work, including geotechnical drilling and further analysis of Kakula East, could lead to improved efficiency, with an updated prefeasibility and feasibility plan expected in the first quarter of 2027.

Jefferies similarly noted that mine plans for 2026 and 2027 now focus explicitly on development and rehabilitation rather than production, with slower advance rates and more conservative sequencing reducing ore delivery and raising costs in the near term.

Long-term outlook safe

Ivanhoe continues to target annual copper production exceeding 500,000 tonnes from 2028, positioning Kamoa-Kakula among the world’s largest copper operations.

The current redevelopment phase aims to unlock that scale by improving underground access, expanding mining areas and enabling more consistent extraction, even as it delays the ramp-up profile that had supported prior market expectations. Analysts said the company’s more cautious approach reflects a focus on long-term performance and stability after persistent operational challenges at Kakula.

Near-term sentiment will hinge on execution, including improved operating performance, timely redevelopment progress and clearer visibility on the next iteration of the mine plan, with signs of progress later this year likely key to rebuilding investor confidence.

 

20 U.S. Warplanes Shot Down — Indian Media Roasts Trump Over Iran Losses While Delhi Balances Tehran & Tel Aviv

By

 Sumit Ahlawat

 -

March 31, 2026

On February 28, the Iran War opened with a precision strike that eliminated Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On the same day, a Tomahawk missile struck a primary school in Tehran, leaving 160 girls dead.

The Iran War left India in an uncomfortable situation, as New Delhi had strong ties with the US, Israel, and Iran.

Prime Minister Narendera Modi visited Israel on February 25-26. The two countries are strategic partners, and according to SIPRI, Israel is India’s third largest source of arms imports, behind France and Russia.

Similarly, the US is India’s largest trade partner, an important source of cutting-edge weapons, and a big source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

On the other hand, India shares deep cultural, historical, and linguistic relations with Iran.

The Strait of Hormuz is critical for India’s energy needs. Nearly 50% of India’s crude oil and up to 60% of its Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Furthermore, with Pakistan blocking India’s access to Afghanistan, Iran also serves as India’s gateway to Kabul and further to Central Asia.

India has deep strategic interests in the Chabahar port, which New Delhi was building before the war broke out. The Chabahar port is not only India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, but also a competitor to the China-funded Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province.

India is also home to the world’s third-largest Shia population, behind Iran and Pakistan (some sources suggest Iraq’s Shia population is also larger than India’s).

Understandably, and in line with India’s multi-alignment foreign policy, India tried to walk a tightrope, striking a delicate balance by upholding neutrality while urging all the sides to exercise “restraint, dialogue, and de-escalation.”

Still, even while adhering to neutrality, New Delhi could have issued a diplomatic note mildly condemning the assassination of a head of state and regretting the deadly strike on a girl’s primary school in Tehran.

A statement like “both sides should take utmost precaution to avoid targeting political leadership, children, schools, and hospitals,” would not have read as overtly critical of the US or Israel.

Given India’s legacy of the non-aligned movement and its aspirations to lead the Global South, the world watched for New Delhi’s reaction. Instead, what it got was… radio silence. No fiery condemnation. No official mourning. No strong or even mild-worded statement defending Iranian sovereignty.

It was only after a few days had passed that India’s foreign secretary, Vikram Misri, visited the Iranian embassy to sign the condolence book. The exercise was largely seen as a face-saver since a foreign secretary is not competent enough to fulfil that protocol.

India’s stoic silence was even more conspicuous given that India is the chair for BRICS in 2026, and Iran, a fellow BRICS-member state, has been attacked. In fact, India is perhaps the only founding BRICS member that has not condemned the attack on the girls’ primary school in Tehran.

Clearly, India is taking utmost care not to be seen as critical of the US and Israel’s war in Iran, so much so that many commentators are reading this silence as tactical support for the US and Israel.

For instance, writing for The Diplomat, Sandeep Bhardwaj said, “Although India has officially declared neutrality in the current Middle East conflict, its actions indicate tacit support for the United States and Israel.”

Similarly, in The Wire’s article “Silence Is Not Strategy: How India Blinked on Iran,” Gurdeep Sappal argued that “India’s ‘silence’ on the US–Israel war on Iran is being sold as responsible statecraft, but it is actually deference, not prudence… It is a reflexive tilt, calibrated to please Washington and Tel Aviv.”

The Indian Express’s Diplomatic Editor, Shubhajit Roy, opined that “India is picking a side” through its combination of silence, the timing of its statements, and its diplomatic choices.

However, despite this apparent tilt of the Indian government towards Israel and the US in this war, the Indian broadcast media is “going hammer and tongs” in its support for Tehran and criticism of the US.

In the Indian broadcast media, while Iran is framed as a lone warrior, courageously standing up for its sovereignty and self-respect, the US is framed as an arrogant imperial power, aloof to ground realities, and refusing to see how its war in Iran is pushing the whole world into a recession, barely four years after the Corona crisis.

Indian broadcast media commentators are repeatedly warning that Iran could turn into the next Afghanistan or Vietnam for the US.

Even for the forced closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a lifeline for India’s energy supplies, by the IRGC, Indian media commentators blamed Washington.

The contrarion stand taken by the Indian media is surprising, for it is known for its compliant attitude towards the Modi government, often blatantly supporting every foreign policy move of the government.

So, what explains the divergent stand taken by the Indian media?

There are two theories that could explain this peculiar situation.

First, it is the Indian government itself that has implicitly communicated to the media to be vocal in their support for Iran to balance out its own silence on the West’s aggression.

According to this theory, the Indian government is preserving its growing ties with both Jerusalem and Washington.

On the other hand, it is allowing, or at least not restraining, a domestic media narrative that keeps Iran engaged and public opinion satisfied.

It is a tightrope walk: tactical support for Israel in practice, but enough pro-Iran noise in the media to prevent any perception of outright betrayal of old friends in Tehran.

Notably, while the Indian media is supporting Iran, there has been no harsh criticism of the Indian government’s silence on the issue.

However, the second, and more plausible, theory is that the feverish pitch of US criticism in the Indian media reflects a deep churn in the Indian psyche towards Washington.

The Indian public mood, which was overtly pro-US and pro-Trump till last year, has turned deeply hostile after repeated indignations by Trump over the last year.

He insisted that he forced New Delhi into a ceasefire with Islamabad in May 2025, despite New Delhi’s forceful denials. He made fun of alleged Indian aircraft combat losses, slapped 50% tariffs on Indian exports to the US (one of the highest on any country), pressurised India to stop buying discounted Russian oil, and elevated Pakistan’s stature in international politics through multiple steps that seemed to favor Islamabad over New Delhi.

Indian media repeatedly reminds Trump of American aircraft losses in the Iran war (20 so far, including F-35, Super Hornets, E-3 AWACS, and scores of Reaper Drones) to avenge Trump’s repeated snide remarks about seven, eight, or even 12 aircraft having been shot down in the India-Pakistan War.

The Trump administration’s arm-twisting of India to stop buying Russian oil, going so far as to slap 50% tariffs on Indian exports, was deeply resented by New Delhi, as Indians highly value their strategic autonomy.

Notably, India, which gained independence after nearly two centuries of anti-imperialist struggle, has a long tradition of anti-Americanism that subsided after years of confidence-building measures by both sides.

After the end of the Cold War, India gradually eased its strategic suspicion of the US, signed a civilian nuclear deal with Washington, entered into intelligence and logistics-sharing pacts with the US, strengthened defense ties, and even joined the QUAD.

When the Trump administration was burning bridges built with India over many decades, many foreign policy experts had warned that while Trump might roll back the punitive tariffs on India at some point, the episode might leave a deep impression on the Indian psyche that Washington is not a reliable partner, and the damage to the bilateral relationship will be irreversible.

Writing for the Washington Post, noted US media anchor Fareed Zakaria had warned, “President Donald Trump’s sudden, inexplicable hostility toward India reverses policies pursued under five administrations, including his own previous one. If this new attitude holds, it might be the biggest strategic mistake of his presidency so far.”

“India has been a U.S. foreign policy bright spot. Yet Trump’s transactional approach, which prioritizes short-term gains for the U.S. even at the expense of long-term returns, could be reinforcing Indian skepticism about American reliability,” prominent foreign-policy strategist Brahma Chellaney had warned.

Similarly, Richard M. Rossow, Senior Adviser & former Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies at CSIS, wrote, “In an effort to push India to cross unreasonable thresholds… the Trump administration is depleting the reservoir of trust that both nations have painstakingly built over a generation… The bizarre engagements with Pakistan… have stoked India’s age-old concerns about the reliability of the United States as a partner.”

The over-the-top criticism of the US in the Iran war, the repeated referring to Washington as an arrogant, haughty, imperial power, despite the Indian government’s total silence, demonstrates how deep the rot has been in the US-India relationship.

Curiously, the criticism of the Iran War in the Indian media is reserved only for Washington, as Israel is hardly blamed for this war.

The Indian media condemned Washington’s “warmongering” while conveniently glossing over Israel’s central role.

This selective targeting of the US clearly shows that the Trump administration has done irreparable harm to the Indo-US relationship.

The spontaneous anti-US discourse in the Indian media should serve as a warning sign for the Trump administration and should convince Washington to reverse course soon.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

PAKISTAN

Barrick delays Reko Diq project amid Middle East concerns

Staff Writer | March 26, 2026 |

The Reko Diq deposit is located in the Balochistan province. (Image courtesy of Barrick Gold.)

Barrick Mining (TSX: ABX, NYSE: B) says it will slow its development of the Reko Diq deposit in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and extend the project’s review period, citing security concerns in the Middle East.

The decision, first reported by the Financial Times on Thursday, adds further uncertainty to the buildout of what is considered to be one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper-gold projects.

Shares of Barrick edged lower on the news, trading within a narrow range between $37.70 and $38.97 in New York. It has a market capitalization of nearly $67 billion.

The delay follows preliminary findings from a review announced by Barrick last month to examine all aspects of the project, including capital allocation. The review, according to the company, will now be extended for 12 months from July amid recent escalation in security issues caused by the Iran conflict.

Barrick, which has been developing the project in partnership with the governments of Pakistan and Balochistan for years, initially planned for the project to come online in 2028, subject to financing. The cost for Phase 1 of the project alone would be upwards of $5.6 billion.

Once operational, the mine is forecast to generate over $70 billion in free cash flow and $90 billion in operating cash flow over a 37-year lifespan.

The extended timeline will allow Barrick to further assess potential risks and refine its delivery strategy for the project, the Toronto-headquartered miner said in a statement.

Barrick has viewed Reko Diq — with an estimated 15 million tonnes of copper reserves — as a key pillar of its strategy to become a Tier 1 producer of the metal.

The Third Gulf War And The World It Is Already Remaking – Analysis

March 26, 2026 
By Dr. Mohamed Chtatou

A war that began with an assassination is reshaping energy markets, security architectures, and global geopolitics in ways that will not simply reverse when the shooting stops.

On the morning of February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes against Iran in operations codenamed “Epic Fury” and “The Roaring Lion.” The war got bombastic names: “Operation Epic Fury” (United States) and “Operation The Roaring Lion” (Israel). The Times of Israel The opening salvo was spectacular and deliberate: the most dramatic aspect was the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, an event which elicited celebrations among some Iranians but dark and angry responses among regime loyalists. University of Oxford Within hours, Iran retaliated, launching missiles at American bases in Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain. Additional missiles landed in Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait City, and Riyadh. Iran also fired missiles at Israel, though these were largely intercepted by US naval forces and local air defense systems. University of Oxford

Four weeks later, the war has not ended. A ceasefire remains elusive. But even before the guns fall silent, the Third Gulf War — the name has already stuck among analysts, distinct from both the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and the 2003 invasion of Iraq — has produced effects so vast and so structural that they are already irreversible in their outlines. Energy systems have been shattered. A regional security architecture built over decades has collapsed. A food crisis is threatening to tip into famine. And the geopolitical map of the Greater Middle East is being redrawn not in diplomatic chambers but in the rubble of refineries and the wreckage of missile interceptor magazines. What follows is an attempt to reckon, domain by domain, with what this war is already doing to the world.

The Energy Shock That Broke All the Models

The most immediate, quantifiable, and globally consequential aftereffect of the Third Gulf War is energy. The US-Israeli war on Iran has already sent the price of benchmark Brent crude soaring to nearly $120 per barrel, close to its highest point of $147 recorded in July 2008. Al Jazeera But price alone understates the severity of what has happened. The 2026 US–Iran war has resulted in a physical chokepoint, taking offline part of the supply of oil and gas due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Tanker traffic disruptions have forced Gulf producers to curtail output as they have run out of storage capacity. Al Jazeera

The Strait of Hormuz — that narrow seam of water between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, barely 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest — carries roughly 20 percent of global oil and gas daily. The war has effectively erased the 20 million barrels of petroleum that used to traverse the waterway each day, according to a report released by the International Energy Agency. Now, only “a trickle” is passing through, the IEA said, and the implications for global oil markets are historic. Fortune

The human geography of this disruption is staggering. The oil production of Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates collectively dropped by a reported 6.7 million barrels per day by March 10, and by at least 10 million barrels per day as of March 12. It is the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Wikipedia The IEA’s executive director Fatih Birol put it in historical context at the National Press Club in Canberra: the fallout from the Iran war is equivalent to the two major oil crises of the 1970s and the 2022 gas crisis combined. CNBC That is not hyperbole from a bureaucrat seeking attention. It is a sober accounting of what physics and geography have conspired to produce.

The damage to infrastructure compounds the chokepoint problem in ways that will outlast any ceasefire. On March 18, Israeli drone strikes targeted facilities at Iran’s Asaluyeh complex, damaging four plants that treat gas from the offshore South Pars field. Tehran vowed to retaliate by hitting five key energy targets in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Hours later, Iranian missiles caused “extensive damage” to Ras Laffan, the heart of Qatar’s energy sector. Separate suspected Iranian aerial attacks caused damage to oil refineries in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and led to the closure of gas facilities in the UAE. The Conversation

Ras Laffan is not just Qatar’s gas hub; it is responsible for approximately one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas supply. Its damage is not merely a Gulf problem. Europe, which had turned to LNG imports instead of Russian pipeline gas after the invasion of Ukraine, has been left needing to replenish low gas stockpiles while major exporter Qatar is offline. World Economic Forum At the 2026 Nuclear Energy Summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the crisis as a reminder of the vulnerabilities created by relying on other regions for oil and gas, calling for more investment in nuclear energy alongside renewables.

Even beyond the physical destruction of facilities, the operational consequences of shut-ins will persist. “Shut-ins don’t just happen and then you turn a switch and everything’s back together. You have to get production back online, and that can be pretty time-consuming,” Richard Nephew of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy noted. Fortune Corrosion, structural wear, and the logistics of restart mean that even a prompt ceasefire and reopening of Hormuz would not immediately normalize supply. Unlike sanctions-driven disruptions, a sustained blocking of the Strait of Hormuz obstructs not only trade routes but the very ability of producers to export, pushing markets beyond adjustment mechanisms into forced demand destruction and structural reconfiguration. Al Jazeera

The tools that managed the 2022 Russia-Ukraine energy shock — rerouting, sanctions workarounds, diversification — simply do not apply here. There is no alternate route when the strait is mined and contested. The shock is physical, not financial.

Food, Water, and the Anatomy of a Humanitarian Crisis

Oil prices are legible to markets. Food and water shortages are legible to human bodies. The Third Gulf War has generated both in parallel.

The maritime blockade triggered a concurrent “grocery supply emergency” across GCC states, which rely on the Strait for over 80% of their caloric intake. By mid-March, 70% of the region’s food imports were disrupted, forcing retailers to airlift staples, resulting in a 40–120% spike in consumer prices. Wikipedia Gulf states have quietly built up strategic food reserves over recent years, but none were dimensioned for a siege of indefinite duration.

The water crisis is even more acute, because it has no easy international substitute. The crisis shifted toward fears about a humanitarian catastrophe following Iranian strikes on desalination plants — the source of 99% of drinking water in Kuwait and Qatar. Wikipedia These are not marginal utilities. In Kuwait and Qatar, there is no groundwater to fall back on, no river to tap. The desalination plant is the faucet. When it goes dark, people go thirsty within days, not weeks.

The global food system is implicated far beyond the Gulf’s borders. The Strait of Hormuz is not just a shipping lane for oil tankers; it is a critical artery of the global food system. Key food staples — including wheat, corn, rice, soybeans, sugar, and animal feed — travel through the Strait on their way to Gulf countries, and farmers around the world depend on the fertilizers and fuel that flow out of it. Project Syndicate The Fertilizer Institute stated that nearly 50% of global urea and sulfur exports, as well as 20% of global LNG — a key feedstock for nitrogen fertilizers — transit through the strait. Wikipedia When fertilizers stop flowing, the damage to next year’s harvests is not speculative. It is arithmetic.

A prolonged closure could disrupt agriculture worldwide and place more than 100 million people at risk of a humanitarian catastrophe, analysts warned. Project Syndicate Afghanistan is already bearing these costs disproportionately: much of Afghanistan’s limited trade with the world goes through Iran’s Chabahar port, and Iran is also a major conduit for humanitarian aid into Afghanistan. Crisis Group With the conflict disrupting Iranian transit infrastructure, one of the world’s most aid-dependent populations faces additional strangulation.

The Collapse of the Gulf Security Architecture

The Third Gulf War has not simply damaged the Gulf states. It has shattered the political logic on which their security rested for half a century.

For several decades, the region’s security architecture has rested essentially upon the guarantee provided by the United States to protect the monarchies of the Arab Peninsula. Today this strategy has largely failed and seems already called into question by these countries’ ruling elites. The Gulf rulers, who had linked their security to the promise of Western protection by welcoming on their soil many military bases, discover today that those installations mainly served to support Israel’s military operations. Orient XXI

The resentment is concrete and documented. In the UAE, an open letter to President Trump from businessman Khalaf Ahmad Al Habtoor questioned Washington about the reasons that led it to transforming the whole region into a battlefield when the Gulf States had warned of the chaotic consequences of such a war. Orient XXI The Gulf rulers see the stocks of munitions required for their own anti-missile defense gradually diminishing, while Israel’s needs seem to be given priority. Orient XXI In effect, the Gulf states’ own air defense systems are being depleted in a war they did not choose, against an adversary who now targets them precisely because of the American bases they host.

The security guarantee, it turns out, was a trap. The bases that were supposed to deter aggression became the targeting coordinates for Iranian missiles. The weapons that were supposed to protect Gulf populations were being quietly redirected to protect Israeli military operations. The monarchies are reckoning with this reality in real time, and the calculations they are making — about future basing arrangements, about the reliability of American security umbrellas, about the wisdom of strategic autonomy — will define Gulf foreign policy for a generation.

The logic of an “Arab NATO” — a formalized GCC collective defense structure — has gained currency in several Gulf capitals as a hedge against American unpredictability. The Gulf Kingdoms, with the possible exception of the UAE, might consolidate their military forces under the GCC, placing their regional integration group on the path to becoming an “Arab NATO” over time. South24 Center This is not merely a theoretical exercise. The war has created the political conditions for a structural reform that peacetime diplomacy never could.

Iran’s Internal Crisis and the Regime Question

No analysis of the Third Gulf War’s lasting consequences can avoid the question of what happens to Iran itself. The Islamic Republic entered the conflict already structurally weakened. Thousands of Iranians poured onto the streets in protest against collapsing public services, corruption, and years of oppression University of Oxford in the period following earlier 2025 strikes. Now, with the Supreme Leader killed and the regime’s military architecture systematically dismantled, the internal dynamics are volatile and unpredictable.

The 2026 Iran War has effected the effective dismantling of Iran’s Axis of Resistance — the network of non-state armed actors that Tehran had cultivated across the Levant, the Persian Gulf littoral, and South Asia to project power and raise the costs of any strike on Iranian territory. Eurasia Review By late 2024, Hezbollah’s leadership had been decapitated. Hamas was functionally dismantled militarily. Syria’s Assad had fallen in December 2024, severing the land corridor through which Iran supplied arms to Lebanon. The Houthis remained operational but supply-constrained. Iran entered this war with its strategic depth already excavated.

Three broad scenarios for Iran’s post-conflict trajectory circulate among analysts. In the first, the Islamic Republic survives in attenuated form: militarily degraded, territorially intact, economically ruined, but politically still in the hands of regime loyalists. In the second, a US-facilitated transition — a “Venezuelan scenario” — yields a compliant successor government. In the third, the country fractures along ethnic and regional lines: Kurdish, Azeri, Arab, and Baloch pressures, exploited by neighboring powers, produce something closer to a Balkanization. Any significant Kurdish uprising could prompt a Turkish military intervention, while a significant Azeri uprising in the north could prompt the same by Azerbaijan. Pakistan could intervene in Sistan and Balochistan on the pretext of fighting cross-border Baloch separatists. South24 Center

The nuclear question remains unresolved and constitutes perhaps the most dangerous long-term legacy of the conflict. The IAEA said that it did not have the access it needed to ensure that the Iranian nuclear program was exclusively peaceful, but that there was no evidence of a structured nuclear weapons program at the time of the strikes. Wikipedia The US and Israel launched a war, in part, to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation. Whether they have succeeded, stalled, or paradoxically accelerated the proliferation logic — by demonstrating to every regional power the strategic value of a nuclear deterrent — is a question history will answer, but perhaps not soon.
Geopolitical Realignment: The Multipolar Moment

The Third Gulf War did not create the multipolar world, but it has dramatically accelerated its crystallization. The United States has demonstrated overwhelming kinetic superiority — its ability to destroy Iranian military infrastructure is not in question. What the war has simultaneously revealed is the cost of that superiority: in munitions, in alliance credibility, in the economic damage inflicted on partners and adversaries alike.

The economic architecture of the conflict exposes a fundamental contradiction. The US has imposed enormous costs on many of the same economies it relies on as trading and strategic partners. The damage to allied economies will complicate the coalition politics that will likely be needed for post-conflict stabilization, not to mention addressing future crises elsewhere. World Economic Forum

China’s position is particularly instructive. Beijing finds itself simultaneously threatened and potentially advantaged by the conflict. Beijing was unable to shield Tehran from either the 2025 or 2026 US-Israel attacks, exposing the limits of its cautious approach to regional security. While avoiding direct intervention, Beijing mobilized to protect its nationals by arranging the evacuation of more than 3,000 Chinese citizens from Iran. Middle East Council on Global Affairs The disruption of Gulf energy supplies, on which China depends for roughly half its crude imports, is economically painful. Yet the relocation of US military assets from East Asia to frontline service in West Asia temporarily alters the balance of power in China’s geopolitical perimeter Geopolitical Monitor — a strategic windfall that Beijing has noted without acknowledgment.

Russia’s calculus is similarly double-edged. In partial compliance with an emerging bilateral defense partnership, the Russians have apparently assisted the Iranians with intelligence on US targets, but Moscow does not support bellicosity toward Israel or the GCC states. Geopolitical Monitor Higher oil prices benefit Russia’s battered energy revenues. The diversion of US military attention from Europe and the Pacific relieves pressure on multiple fronts. Russia did not ignite this war, but it is not unhappy it burns.

Europe, meanwhile, has been reduced to something approaching irrelevance. Whatever posture they take, Washington’s European allies are consigned to a largely reactive role, with limited clout they can use to help bring the war to an end. Former French ambassador Pierre Vimont put it bluntly: “Brussels has slipped into a starkly paralyzed role as a mere commentator on the geopolitical upheaval on its southern flank.” Crisis Group

The Legal and Normative Rupture

Beyond the material consequences, the Third Gulf War carries a normative legacy that may prove equally durable. Critics of the war, including legal and international relations experts, have described the attacks as illegal under US law, an act of imperialism, and a violation of Iran’s sovereignty under international law. Wikipedia The assassination of a sitting head of state — Khamenei — raises questions under international humanitarian law about the lawful targeting of political leadership. Iran’s strikes on Gulf desalination plants and civilian airports raised equivalent questions from the other direction.

The UN Security Council’s response was revealing in its selectivity: the Council passed a resolution condemning Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf states, a formulation that implicitly accepted the US-Israeli campaign as the legal baseline — a normative determination with significant long-term consequences for the permissibility of preemptive strikes against nuclear programs. Eurasia Review In other words, the Security Council, under American pressure, has effectively blessed the principle that a state may strike another’s nuclear facilities preemptively, without Security Council authorization. This precedent will not remain in the Gulf. It will travel.

The Structural Acceleration

Wars of this scale do not merely destroy; they accelerate. The 1973 oil embargo accelerated France’s nuclear energy program. The 1979 Iranian Revolution drove Japan’s push for energy efficiency. The current crisis, which simultaneously exposes Asia’s dependence on oil and LNG imports and the fragility of fertilizer supply chains, may prove to be a powerful accelerant for diversification, redundancy, and stockpiling. But structural adjustment takes years. In the interim, the damage is accruing. World Economic Forum

Asia’s energy-importing economies — Japan, South Korea, India, the countries of Southeast Asia — have received the starkest possible reminder that their industrial civilizations rest on a narrow maritime corridor that can be closed by a single belligerent. Japan relies on the region for about 95% of its crude oil and 11% of its LNG imports, roughly 70% and 6% respectively shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. World Economic Forum The political will to accelerate domestic energy transition, nuclear expansion, and strategic stockpiling that has been intermittently present in these capitals for decades will now be sharply concentrated.

The Gulf states themselves face a forced reckoning with the fragility of their economic models. Their sovereign wealth funds, their diversification programs, their tourism industries, the aviation hubs that connected the world through Dubai and Doha — all have been interrupted or degraded by a war they were told, by the ally hosting his forces on their soil, was not their concern. The reconstruction of credibility, not just infrastructure, will take years.

Conclusion: An Unfinished Reckoning

The Third Gulf War is not over. As of today, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. Energy infrastructure across nine countries is damaged. Desalination plants have been struck. A regional security architecture built over fifty years has been discredited in four weeks. The Islamic Republic of Iran, its Supreme Leader dead and its military materiel systematically destroyed, faces an uncertain political future whose contours no one can reliably predict. And the global economy — already stressed by tariffs, inflation, and the lingering derangements of the pandemic years — has absorbed an oil shock that the IEA’s own director calls the worst in history.

As the aftermath of the First Gulf War brought about an international peace conference in Madrid in October 1991, which put in motion the peace processes of the 1990s, the aftermath of the Third Gulf War should bring about the convening of another international peace conference — this time, perhaps, in Riyadh. The Times of Israel Whether the political will for such a gathering exists, whether Washington is interested in the architecture of peace rather than merely the achievement of military objectives, remains to be seen.

What is already certain is that the world of February 27, 2026 — the world before “Epic Fury” — will not return. The energy systems are cracked. The security guarantees are discredited. The normative architecture governing when states may attack other states has been rewritten by force. The Gulf’s decades-long transformation from petrostate backwater to global hub has been interrupted, perhaps permanently redirected. And a Middle East in which Iran’s Axis of Resistance structured conflict across the Levant, the Gulf, and South Asia for forty years has been dismantled — not replaced by stability, but replaced by a vacancy whose filling will be bloody and contested.

Wars have aftereffects. This one is still making them.

You can follow Professor Mohamed Chtatouon X : @Ayurinu

Dr. Mohamed Chtatou

Dr. Mohamed Chtatou is a Professor of education science at the university in Rabat. He is currently a political analyst with Moroccan, Gulf, French, Italian and British media on politics and culture in the Middle East, Islam and Islamism as well as terrorism. He is, also, a specialist on political Islam in the MENA region with interest in the roots of terrorism and religious extremism.

The Accession Debate: History As A Weapon – OpEd

History, in Balochistan, is not the background to the conflict. It is the argument sustaining it.

Pakistan's Muhammad Ali Jinnah with Ahmad Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat. 

Photo Credit: Author unknown, Wikipedia Commons (image cropped and remastered with Grok)


March 26, 2026

By Ashu Mann


On March 27, 1948, in Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat, signed an instrument of accession bringing the Khanate of Kalat into Pakistan. Pakistani authorities have held that signing as the constitutionally final resolution of Balochistan’s incorporation into the state ever since. The Khan wrote in his own memoirs that Pakistani troops were already positioned near Kalat when he put pen to paper. His brother, Prince Abdul Karim, launched an armed rebellion within weeks and was arrested and imprisoned. Seventy-seven years later, both sides still cite the events of those months as proof that their reading of them is the correct one.

Pakistan’s legal argument is straightforward. The Khan signed the instrument. The document is valid. The accession is constitutionally settled. The Baloch nationalist argument draws from the same period and reaches the opposite conclusion: the signature was extracted under military pressure, and an agreement made under those conditions carries no legitimate authority.

The pre-accession record does not resolve the dispute cleanly. In August 1947, Pakistan and Kalat concluded a Standstill Agreement that acknowledged Kalat as an independent state. A separate document from the same period described both entities as sovereign and equal. Baloch nationalists cite both as evidence of a prior commitment to independence that the 1948 accession reversed. Pakistani officials argue that the March 1948 instrument supersedes those earlier agreements and constitutes the legally operative fact.

British archival records from the negotiating period, publicly accessible, show the Khan resisted accession through most of the preceding months. They also show Pakistani forces deployed near Kalat before the accession document was signed. They do not establish whether the signature was given freely or under compulsion. No independent body has ever been constituted to make that determination.

That absence has a measurable political cost. Armed Baloch nationalist movements have used the accession’s contested origins as their central mobilizing argument across five insurgency cycles. The argument retains force precisely because its documentary basis has never been subjected to authoritative, neutral examination. Pakistan’s official position classifies any public challenge to the 1948 accession as separatism rather than historical inquiry, foreclosing the kind of examination that might produce a shared factual baseline.


Contested accession disputes elsewhere have followed two trajectories, and which one they took depended largely on whether any party engaged the legitimacy question directly.

Tibet’s political status has been disputed between China and the Tibetan government-in-exile since 1959. Both sides cite documents from the early 1950s. No independent adjudication has been conducted. No political settlement has been reached across seven decades.

Kashmir presents the same pattern. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession to India in October 1947 under disputed circumstances, with armed incursion already underway. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the territory. The accession’s legitimacy has never been reviewed by an independent authority, and the dispute is now in its eighth decade.

Northern Ireland followed a different course. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement did not require the British government to concede that its historical conduct in Ireland was wrong in every particular. It required acknowledging that Irish nationalist political grievances had legitimate historical roots. That acknowledgment opened political negotiations that had no prior foundation. The agreement has held for more than 25 years.

The distinction is not about which side’s historical account is accurate. It is about whether a state is willing to acknowledge that a grievance exists and that its origins are genuinely contestable. Pakistan has not made that acknowledgment on Balochistan. The legal position, maintained without variance since 1948, is that the accession was valid and the matter is closed.

Armed groups in Balochistan recruit from a population that has heard, across three and four generations, that the foundational act establishing Pakistan’s presence in their province was illegitimate. The documentary basis for that argument has never been examined by a neutral party.

A political settlement negotiated on that foundation carries a liability no subsequent agreement can fully address. The party claiming the settlement lacks legitimacy will have the same documents to point to that it has always had. History, in Balochistan, is not the background to the conflict. It is the argument sustaining it.


Ashu Mann

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.

The War Nobody’s Watching: Pakistan’s Three-Front Conflict

by Pieter J. Friedrich | Mar 16, 2026 | 

On Feb. 22, 2026, a Pakistani airstrike hit the village of Girdi Kas in eastern Afghanistan. As one family lost 18 of its 23 members, Pakistan termed it a targeted counterterrorism operation against militant hideouts. Afghanistan, in contrast, said the strikes hit civilian homes and a religious school. The United Nations confirmed credible reports of civilian casualties, including women and children.

Five days later, Pakistan’s defense minister declared “open war” as Pakistani warplanes struck Kabul, Kandahar, and targets at the former American air base at Bagram, though the Taliban denied significant damage. Afghanistan retaliated with drone strikes and cross-border offensives. Both sides claimed to have killed hundreds.

“They have a great prime minister, a great general,” Trump declared, that same day. “Pakistan is doing terrifically well.”

The State Department backed Pakistan’s “right to defend itself against attacks from the Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group.” Three days later, the U.S. and Israel launched strikes on Iran, and the Pakistan-Afghanistan war vanished from the news.

Yet Pakistan is now fighting on three fronts.

To the northwest, an open war with Afghanistan. To the southwest, an escalating insurgency across the province of Balochistan, where separatist militants launched coordinated attacks across a dozen cities in January, killing nearly 200 people. To the east, an unresolved military standoff with India following their brief war last May – the heaviest engagement between the two nuclear powers since 1971.

Meanwhile, the United States is entangled on every side: backing Pakistan’s military against the Taliban while partnered strategically with the India that hosts the Taliban, that Pakistan accuses of fueling the Baloch insurgency, and that just went to war with Pakistan last year. Yet the U.S. is too busy bombing Iran to notice.

Pakistan shares a 1,600-mile border with Afghanistan to the northwest – a contested colonial-era line that splits the Pashtun population and that no Afghan government has ever recognized. Its southwestern province of Balochistan, the country’s largest and poorest, borders both Afghanistan and Iran and sits atop vast reserves of coal, gold, copper, and gas. To the east lies India, with the disputed territory of Kashmir the eternal sore point between them.

Three borders. Three conflicts.

The Afghan Front

The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) is a militant group distinct from the Afghan Taliban that governs Afghanistan. Operating from bases along the Afghan border, the TTP has waged an escalating campaign of bombings and armed attacks inside Pakistan.

In 2025, Pakistan suffered its most violent year in nearly a decade, with a 34 percent increase in terrorist attacks. In January 2026, a suicide bomber hit a Shia mosque in Islamabad, killing 36 worshippers. In February, TTP fighters attacked a military checkpoint in the border district of Bajaur, killing 11 soldiers and a child.

Pakistan demanded the Taliban government shut down the TTP. The Taliban denied harboring them.

The Feb. 22 airstrikes targeted seven alleged militant camps along the Afghan border, which Pakistan called “intelligence-based, selective operations.” Afghan officials reported 18 civilian dead in the first wave alone. On Feb. 26, Afghanistan launched retaliatory strikes against Pakistani military positions along the border. Pakistan responded by bombing Kabul.

“Our patience has now run out,” said Defense Minister Khawaja Asif. “Now it is open war between us.” As of early March, heavy shelling continued along the border and tens of thousands of civilians had been displaced.

Pakistan helped create the Taliban in the early 1990s – with fighters hardened by the CIA-funded war against the Soviets in the 1980s – supported them through their rise to power, and welcomed the American withdrawal that put them back in charge in 2021. What Pakistan did not anticipate was that the Taliban, once in power, would stop taking orders.

The Balochistan Front

Turning to the southwest, Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province and its poorest, home to 15 million Baloch – an ethnic group distinct from Pakistan’s Punjabi majority, with their own language and a history of resistance to central rule stretching back to the country’s founding. They live on land rich in coal, gold, copper, and gas – revenue that flows to the federal government, not to them. China’s $62 billion investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor runs directly through the province, centered on the deep-water port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. Armed resistance to Pakistani rule has flared in cycles since 1948. The current phase, accelerating since 2019, is the most organized and most lethal to date.

On Jan. 30, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched coordinated attacks across more than a dozen districts. Militants hit schools, hospitals, banks, markets, military installations, police stations, and a high-security prison, freeing more than 30 inmates. The BLA says it killed 280 security personnel. Pakistan says it killed 216 militants and lost 22 soldiers and 36 civilians. The BLA views the Chinese projects running through its homeland as extraction without benefit – wealth siphoned off from Baloch land to enrich Islamabad and Beijing. It regularly targets Chinese workers and infrastructure as symbols of that arrangement.

The BLA has deployed female suicide bombers, hijacked passenger trains, stormed army and navy bases, and carried out attacks reaching Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi. Pakistan’s military response has been overwhelming force – airstrikes, mass arrests, enforced disappearances. After the January attacks, a military spokesman announced the army had “sent 216 terrorists to hell.”

Pakistan, meanwhile, claims that the BLA – and the Afghan Taliban – are operating as Indian proxies.

In 2025, the military renamed the organization “Fitna al-Hindustan” – literally, the chaos of India. Pakistan’s defense minister has accused India of “penetrating” the Taliban leadership. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav, a former Indian naval officer detained in Balochistan in 2016, is a prime case cited as evidence of Indian intelligence operations in the province. In 2013, U.S. Special Representative James Dobbins acknowledged that Pakistan’s concerns about Indian involvement were “not groundless,” even as he called them “somewhat exaggerated.”

India flatly denies it all. The Baloch are caught in the middle regardless – between a Pakistani military that kills them and calls it counterterrorism, Indian intelligence that may be using them as pawns, and a Chinese mega-project that treats their land as a throughway. Nobody is fighting for the Baloch. Everyone is fighting over Balochistan.

The India Front

The third front is quieter but no less dangerous.

In May 2025, after militants killed 26 Hindu tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir – the disputed territory at the heart of the India-Pakistan conflict since 1948 – India launched missile strikes on Pakistan. Pakistan retaliated. After four days, a ceasefire brokered by Washington finally held.

Nothing was resolved. Kashmir remains the trigger while both sides are rearming. Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia in September 2025. Aggression against one will now be considered aggression against both. India, meanwhile, has been building a relationship with the Taliban that would have been unthinkable a decade ago – opening an embassy in Kabul and hosting Afghanistan’s foreign minister in New Delhi.

The Taliban was once Pakistan’s strategic asset – created, funded, and armed by Islamabad to secure a friendly government in Kabul and block Indian influence in Afghanistan. Now Pakistan accuses the Taliban of being India’s proxy against Pakistan. The defense minister has said the people “pulling the strings” in Kabul are “controlled by Delhi.” The alliance that Pakistan built for three decades now takes meetings in New Delhi.

Washington on Every Side

The U.S. is not watching this war. It is on every side of it.

Washington backs Pakistan against the Taliban. The State Department explicitly endorsed Pakistan’s “right to defend itself.” Trump praised General Asim Munir – the architect of the Afghan campaign – as one of “two of the people that I really respect a lot.” Before launching the June 2025 strikes on Iran, Trump invited Munir to the White House and secured Pakistan’s cooperation before opening his own front in the Middle East.

Washington partners with India. The strategic relationship has deepened through two Trump administrations. India is the cornerstone of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy against China. When India and Pakistan went to war in May 2025, Washington brokered the ceasefire, then walked away without resolving anything.

Washington designated the BLA, the Taliban, and the TTP as terrorists, giving Pakistan legal cover for military operations against all three while maintaining alliances with the governments accused of supporting them. The same State Department that endorsed Pakistan’s airstrikes on Afghan cities once stationed American troops in those same cities for twenty years.

Then, on Feb. 28, the U.S. and Israel struck Iran. The Pakistan-Afghanistan war was just one week old and disappeared from the front pages overnight. Trump called Pakistan’s strikes on Afghanistan “outstanding.” Then the Iran war started and he forgot about Pakistan and Afghanistan entirely.

The People in the Middle

In Girdi Kas, a family of 23 became a family of 5 in a single night. Pakistan says the strike hit a militant camp. Afghanistan says it hit a home. The United Nations confirmed civilians were killed.

In Balochistan, 15 million people live on land that everyone wants and nobody asks them about. In Kashmir, the same. And now, as Pakistan’s military announces body counts, and India is accused of funding chaos, China continues building ports there.

And the family in Girdi Kas is still dead.

Pakistan’s military says it has “sent 216 terrorists to hell.” Trump says Pakistan is “doing terrifically well.” And Balochistan – along with the other two fronts Pakistan is fighting on – remains the war nobody is watching.

Pieter Friedrich is an investigative journalist covering ethnonationalism, transnational repression, and South Asian geopolitics. His work has appeared in The Caravan, Middle East Eye, and the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, and has been cited by Harper’s Magazine, the Washington Post, and The Intercept. More at pieterfriedrich.com.