Monday, April 17, 2023

Is the Army All That You Can Be?

Originally posted at TomDispatch.

In some ways, it’s still hard to take in. In 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush and crew invaded Afghanistan, the very country in which the Soviet Union’s military had failed so catastrophically in the previous century. Since then, in one fashion or another, our country has been at war – openly in Afghanistan and Iraq, far less so across other parts of the Greater Middle East as well as Africa. And that global war, which used to be known here as “the war on terror,” has simply never ended. Of course, there could be worse to come, given the way the two great military powers on the planet, the U.S. and Russia, are facing off in Ukraine right now, while the Biden administration and the U.S. military ratchet up the pressure for a future conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific region.

And mind you, unlike in so many of America’s past wars, all of this has been done without a draft (which was ended in the wake of the disastrous conflict in Vietnam) by what’s known as the all-volunteer military. The question TomDispatch regular Nan Levinson, author of War Is Not a Game: The New Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built, explores today is: How can a military that hasn’t actually managed to win a war of consequence since 1945 and can’t seem to stop fighting them continue to restock its ranks?

My hint to the Chinese (if they are indeed the rising power on planet Earth), given the Soviet experience, the present Russian one in Ukraine, and the American one in this century: figure out how to do it without going to war. In our world, it should be obvious by now that war is poison for the planet’s great powers. As Levinson suggests today, at some level those the U.S. military is so eager to incorporate into its ranks increasingly seem to sense this. ~ Tom Engelhardt


Losing Wars and Losing Recruits

By Nan Levinson

After more than 20 years of losing wars, recruiting for the U.S. Army is now officially a mess. Last year, that service fell short of its goal by 15,000 recruits, or a quarter of its target. Despite reports of better numbers in the first months of this year, Army officials doubt they will achieve their objective this time around either. The commanding general at Fort Jackson, the South Carolina facility that provides basic training to 50% of all new members of the Army, called the recruiting command’s task the hardest since the all-volunteer military was launched in 1973. The Army’s leaders were alarmed enough to make available up to $1.2 billion for recruitment incentives and related initiatives.

Those incentives include enlistment bonuses of up to $50,000 and promotions for young enlistees who successfully bring in new candidates. Women recruits can now wear their hair in ponytails, and regulations have been updated to permit small, inconspicuous tattoos in places like the back of your ear.

The other branches of the military aren’t exactly doing well either. The Marines, for example, met their numbers largely through retention, not recruitment, and the Navy was forced to accept recruits who scored in the lowest-qualifying range on an entrance exam.

The tempo of recruitment has always swung back and forth, depending in part on whether the economy is bad or booming. Today, that economy may be a mess, but hiring is still remarkably robust, leaving high school graduates with more choices than just the Army or stocking shelves at Walmart (which, by the way, also offers college tuition assistance).

The labor market isn’t the only obstacle to filling the ranks. Covid not only kept recruiters largely out of schools – a traditional hunting ground – for a couple of years, but they also lowered the scores on military entrance exams. The Army has seen a 9% decrease in scores (already low when this round of measurement began) on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), the all-important test that determines which branches of the military and which jobs you qualify for. An oft-cited statistic – and it’s alarming, no matter how you feel about the military – is that only about 23% of the Americans the Army aims to recruit qualify as physically, educationally, and mentally fit to enlist.

Then there’s what could be called the patriotic duty gap. The U.S. is no longer officially fighting any wars (though the global war on terror, even if no longer known by that name, never really ends). The lack of a rally-round-the-flag event like 9/11, along with the calamitous military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and 20th-anniversary reexaminations of the disastrous invasion of Iraq, have left Washington wary of starting a new conflict. Sure, tens of billions of dollars of weaponry are going to Ukraine and there are more than 900 U.S. troops still in fighting mode in Syria, where a drone strike recently killed an American contractor and injured U.S. troops, but we seldom hear much about such deployments, or similar ones in IraqNigerSomalia, and other countries across much of Africa, until something goes wrong, so they’re hardly top-notch recruitment material.

Summing up the mood of the military’s present target generation, Major General Alex Fink, chief of Army enterprise marketing, observed, “They see us as revered, but not relevant in their lives.”

What’s a Recruiter To Do?

A year ago, an Army Career Center (aka a recruiting station) opened in my fairly affluent neighborhood. This was curious. After all, it’s an area surrounded by elite universities and not the most welcoming high schools when it comes to the military. I had walked by the station often, noting the posters in its windows advertising career training and the benefits of the Army Reserve. There was even one in Tagalog about an expedited path to U.S. citizenship. (And mind you, there isn’t a large Filipino population in this neighborhood either.)

Finally, as someone who’s worked for years with antiwar GIs and wrote the book War Is Not a Game: The New Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built, I decided to drop in for a chat, only to hesitate, anticipating suspicion, if not outright hostility.

Boy, was I wrong! The four noncommissioned officers stationed there, only one of whom had spent extended time in a war zone, couldn’t have been more eager to talk about the benefits of Army life. Their spiel was good, too: career training, college tuition, some control over the first duty station you’re likely to get, housing, health care, family benefits, competitive pay, even bonuses, not to speak of 30 days off each year and substantial responsibility at a young age. Admittedly, the tuition reimbursement offered wouldn’t faintly cover any of the universities near where I live and it takes a while for your salary to amount to much… still, it was an impressive pitch.

And they don’t take just anyone, either. Enlistment requirements are similar across the six branches of the military, except when it comes to age limits. (For the Army, you have to be between 17 and 35.) You must be a high school graduate or the equivalent, a citizen or Green Card holder, medically and physically fit, in good moral standing, and score high enough on the ASVAB entrance exam, which only about one-third of test-takers now pass. (Full disclosure: I couldn’t do the sample math questions.)

So, how’s recruiting going? The Army has about 9,000 recruiters at 1,508 locations nationwide whose pay and benefits are tied to their success. Each recruiter is responsible for signing up a minimum of one recruit for each of the 11 months they’re at work. If this had actually happened, the Army would have coasted to last year’s goal. (I can do that math.) My neighborhood recruiters, however, seem to be typical in coming in well under that quota.

A Necessary Revamp

Somewhere in our friendly chat, I pointed out that armies exist to go to war. They countered that, for every infantryman in the U.S. military, there are about 100 support personnel and pointed to wall posters advertising 130 Army career options. No one seemed inclined to delve any deeper into the subject of future battlefields.

Surely, anyone qualified to enlist in the Army should know that such forces exist for only one significant purpose: to fight wars. And the U.S. military – with its 750 bases around the world and its unending war on terror, while the pressures between China and this country only continue to escalate – might well find itself at war again any time. The Army’s website is clear enough on its mission: “To deploy, fight, and win our nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.” But curiously enough, on its recruiting website, the topic of fighting a war doesn’t show up under “reasons to join.” The system is clearly focused instead on all the remarkably peaceful opportunities the Army offers its soldiers.

That emphasis shines forth in the resurrection this spring of the oldie (but apparently goodie) ad campaign “Be All You Can Be,” which last appeared in 2001. It has now replaced the “What’s Your Warrior” ads, with their video-game visuals and bass-heavy soundtrack. The new campaign includes short YouTube videos, where likeably plain-spoken soldiers explain just what they appreciate about the Army. One features an Army rapper; in another, a woman talks about finding balance in her Army life, as images of soldiers with weapons and soldiers with families flash by.

Admittedly, there have been a few hiccups along the way to this gentler, hipper vision of that service. Take the two high-profile ads in the new recruitment campaign that featured actor Jonathan Majors (AntmanCreed III) and were pulled shortly after their debut when he was arrested on charges of assault, harassment, and strangulation.

Get ‘Em Early, Get ‘Em Young

Army recruits tend to come from military families (83% of enlistees by one reckoning) and hometowns near military bases, where kids grow up around people in uniform and time in the military becomes part of their worldview. Elsewhere, the military works remarkably hard to introduce that worldview. High schools receiving certain kinds of federal funding, for instance, are required to give recruiters the same access as they do colleges or employers and provide the military with contact information for all students (unless their parents opt out).

While Covid-19 limited recruiters’ access to schools, there were always ways around that. Take Army J.R.O.T.C., which currently has programs in more than 1,700 high schools, a sizeable portion of them in low-income communities with large minority populations. (J.R.O.T.C. boasts about this, although a New York Times exposé on the subject revealed it to be more predatory than laudatory.) The literature emphasizes that it’s a citizenship and leadership program, not a recruitment one, and it’s true that only about 21% of Army enlistees attended a school with such a program. Still, it’s clearly another way that the service recruits the young. After all, its “cadets” wear their uniforms in school and are taught military history and marksmanship, among other things. “Co-curricular activities” include military drills and competitions.

And there have been problems there, too: among them, a report citing 58 documented instances of sexual abuse or harassment of students by instructors in all branches of J.R.O.T.C. between 2018 and 2022. (As with all statistics on sexual abuse, this is undoubtedly an undercount.)

J.R.O.T.C. is hardly the only program exposing young students to the military. Young Marines is a nonprofit education, service, and leadership program dating back to 1959, which promotes “a healthy, drug-free lifestyle” for kids eight years old through high school. Its website emphasizes that it isn’t a military recruitment tool and doesn’t teach combat skills. Nonetheless, “events that Young Marines may participate in may involve close connection with public relations aspects of the armed forces.”

Then there’s Starbase, a Defense Department educational program where students learn STEM subjects like science and math by interacting with military personnel. Its primary focus is socio-economically disadvantaged fifth graders. And yes, that would be 10- and 11-year-olds!

It’s good when extra resources are available to students and schools. In the end, though, programs like these conflate good citizenship with militarism.

Too Little – Or Too Much?

A recent student of mine, who joined Navy R.O.T.C. to help pay for the college education she wanted, told me her age group, Gen Z, a key military target, doesn’t view such future service as beneficial. Her classmates, typically enough, felt less than positive about her wearing a uniform. Only older people congratulated her for it.

Three senior Army leaders reached a similar conclusion when they visited high schools nationwide recently to learn why enlistment was so dismal. They came away repeating the usual litany of problems: tight job market, pandemic barriers, unfitness of America’s youth, resistance from schools, and especially a lack of public information about the benefits of an Army career.

But what if the problem isn’t too little information, but too much? Despite ever-decreasing reportage on military and veterans’ issues, young civilians seem all too aware of the downsides of enlisting. Gen Zers, who until recently never lived in a country not openly at war, have gobs of information at their fingertips: videos, memoirs, movies, novels, along with alarming statistics on sexual assault and racism in the military and the ongoing health problems of soldiers, including exposure to toxic waste, rising cancer rates, and post-traumatic stress disorder. And that’s not even to mention the disproportionate rates of suicide and homelessness among veterans, not to speak of the direct contact many young people have had with those who returned home ready to attest to the grim consequences of more than 20 years of remarkably pointless warfare in Afghanistan, Iraq, and across all too much of the rest of the planet.

All of this probably helps explain what the Army found in surveys of 16- to 28-year-olds it conducted last spring and summer. That service described (but didn’t release) its report on those surveys. According to the Associated Press, the top three reasons cited for refusing to enlist were “fear of death, worries about post-traumatic stress disorder, and leaving friends and family.” Young Americans also made it clear that they didn’t want to put their lives on hold in the military, while 13% anticipated discrimination against women and minorities, 10% didn’t trust the military leadership, 57% anticipated emotional or psychological problems, and nearly half expected physical problems from a stint in the Army. Despite recent accusations from conservative members of Congress, only 5% listed the Army being too “woke” as a deterrent, which should put that issue to bed, but undoubtedly won’t.

Let me offer a little confession here: I find all of this heartening – not just that potential recruits don’t want to be killed in war, but that they’re aware of how dangerous joining the military can be to body and mind. And apparently the survey didn’t even explore feelings about the possibility that you could be called on to kill, too. In an op-doc for the New York Times that followed a group of American soldiers from their swaggering entry into the Iraqi capital of Baghdad in 2003 to their present-day lives, an off-screen voice asks, “So what does it do to a generation of young people during these deployments?” The answer: “They become old. They are old young men.”

If there’s one thing the Gen Zers I know don’t want, it’s to get old before their time. (Probably not at their time either, but that’s another story.) So, add that to the reasons not to enlist.

Early in the U.S. occupation of Iraq, I met Elaine Johnson, a Gold Star Mother from South Carolina, so outspoken in her opposition to the Iraq War after her son, Darius Jennings, was killed in Fallujah in 2003 that she reportedly came to be known in the George W. Bush White House as “the Elaine Johnson problem.” Antiwar as she was, she also proudly told me, “My baby was a mama’s boy, but the military turned him into a productive young man.”

So, yes, the Army can be a place to mature, master a trade, take on responsibility, and learn lasting lessons about yourself, while often forging lifelong friendships. All good. But that, of course, can also happen in other types of organizations that don’t feature weapons and killing, that don’t take you to hell and back. Just imagine, for a moment, that our government left the business of losing the wars from hell to history and instead spent, say, half of the $842 billion being requested for next year’s military budget on [fill in the blank here with your preferred institutions].

Count on one thing: we would be in a different world. Maybe this generation of potential soldiers has already figured that out and will someday make it happen.

Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel, Songlands (the final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s novel Every Body Has a Story, and Tom Engelhardt’s A Nation Unmade by War, as well as Alfred McCoy’s In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power, John Dower’s The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War IIand Ann Jones’s They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from America’s Wars: The Untold Story.

Nan Levinson’s most recent book is War Is Not a Game: The New Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built. A TomDispatch regular, she taught journalism and fiction writing at Tufts University.

Copyright 2023 Nan Levinson

Arab Americans fought hard to be recognised

A recent proclamation from Joe Biden follows years of struggle to overcome exclusion and discrimination


JAMES ZOGBY

Arab Americans have continued to organise, mobilise their vote and coalesce with allies. 


On March 31, US President Joe Biden issued the first-ever formal proclamation designating April as Arab American Heritage Month. This is the second year in a row it has been celebrated. That Mr Biden took this step is significant, marking a turning point in our decades-long effort to secure recognition and respect for our community.

I’ve written before about the exclusion and outright discrimination we’ve faced in past decades. These have been due to external threats either coming from those who feared our becoming organised and empowered, or those who saw us through the lens of racist stereotypes.

There are unfortunately too many examples of this: candidates returning “Arab money” or rejecting our endorsements; Arab Americans denied positions or advancement in government, academia or media because their ethnicity was viewed as suspect or threatening; political coalitions and parties denying membership to Arab-American organisations because some objected to our involvement; and law enforcement, at national and local levels, launching surveillance programmes or indiscriminate round-ups of persons with Arab names for questioning or harassment.

All of these external challenges to our community were painful to endure, but tested our mettle and made us stronger. Because we continued to organise, mobilise our vote, coalesce with allies and fight back, we have earned recognition across the country and now from the president of the United States.

To be clear, however, the external threats to the Arab-American community's organisation and recognition are only one part of the story. We have also faced internal challenges. These have mainly been due to the importation of ideologies and identities that have divided the Arab world or the ways that others have used these divisions to their advantage and not our own.

On March 31, US President Joe Biden issued the first-ever formal proclamation designating April as Arab American Heritage Month. EPA

It’s worth noting that the birth of the modern Arab-American identity occurred simultaneously with various nationalist upheavals across the Arab world. There were the competing movements led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Baath parties in Syria and Iraq, the heyday of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, and the deeply divisive Lebanese Civil War.

In this context, many politicised Arab immigrants took sides, identifying with one or another group or ideology. At the same time, those in the generation who came of age in the US saw their Arab identity as a unifying factor and began to build organisations based on shared heritage and concerns, including advocacy for Palestinian human rights.

They contested negative stereotypes in the media and popular culture. They registered and organised Arab-American voters and supported Arab-American candidates for public office – and did so without attention to country of origin or religion, something that many in the Arab world or those who, as we say, “have their feet planted here but their heads in the Middle East” just couldn’t understand. Three stories come to mind.

Challenges to our community were painful to endure, but tested our mettle and made us stronger

In 1983, amid the civil war in Lebanon and after the Israeli devastation of Beirut and the south of the country, a group of Arab Americans launched a project called Save Lebanon to bring wounded Lebanese and Palestinian children to the US for medical care that was unavailable to them in Lebanon. The outpouring of support from the community was overwhelming. Hospitals run by the Shriner fraternal society donated services and families took in the wounded kids. Jordanian airlines provided flights and the Saudi ambassador’s wife underwrote an event at the Kennedy Centre that featured two famous Arab-American entertainers – Danny Thomas and Casey Kasem.

Over a two-year period, a group of Arab-Americans brought 63 children and found homes for them and their families in more than a dozen communities. There were, however, some who complained when a Palestinian child was sent to a largely Lebanese community (or vice versa) or a Christian child was sent to a largely Muslim community (or vice versa). But the complaints were short-lived because those who initially objected would melt upon meeting the kids and their families. What we said in response was, “We brought the children here to heal them. In the end, they healed us.”

In the early 1990s an Arab ambassador visited my office and began the conversation by asking me, “How do you organise your staff?” I responded by telling him that there were organising, policy, communications and administrative teams. He asked again, “How are they organised?” I replied, “By function.” He then said, “No, I mean that guy at the front desk, he’s Lebanese Shia, isn’t he? What are the countries and religions of the rest?” Now understanding his question, I replied, “In all honesty sir, we don’t ask their religion or country of origin so I have no idea. That’s not who we are.”

At the Arab American Institute's annual Kahlil Gibran Spirit of Humanity gala, we honour groups and individuals for their public service. One award we give is for public service, named after Najeeb Halaby, the father of Jordan’s Queen Noor. Mr Halaby, a Syrian American, was the first Arab American to serve in high office as a presidential appointee. The award in 2012 was given to ambassador Ted Kattouf, a Palestinian American and was presented by former Secretary of Transportation, Ray Lahood.

At the dinner’s end, I addressed the audience noting that, “Tonight we gave an award named after a Syrian American to a Palestinian American and it was given by a Lebanese American. That is who we are and it’s something that couldn’t happen in the Arab world.”

In recent years, we have seen this same unity manifesting itself time and again. Still, problems remain. Some originate with government policies that attempt to define us or cherry-pick portions of our community in an effort, unconscious or deliberate, to divide us, often by erasing our ethnic identity by prioritising religion.

The Bush administration, for example, courted several Christian groups, while the Obama administration conflated the Arab and Muslim communities. In other cases, it was by prioritising countries of origin. During the Arab uprisings, some focused special attention on the communities of exiles from the affected countries while ignoring the broader Arab-American community. These efforts were exploited by those who used these divisive tactics to their advantage – serving only to disrupt efforts to build a unified community.

With this background, it should be clear why the Biden administration’s formal proclamation of Arab American Heritage Month is so important. It acknowledges our hard-fought efforts to overcome the external and internal forces that have sought to exclude or discriminate against us or deny us the right to define ourselves. And by recognising our history of overcoming obstacles and paying homage to our contributions to America, this proclamation empowers us on our path forward.

Published: April 13, 2023, 
James Zogby

James Zogby

Dr James Zogby is the president of the Arab American Institute and a columnist for The National


Myanmar’s resistance needs a Zelensky-like charismatic leader

Detained democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi’s day is likely done and no new generation fighting figure has risen to the fore
APRIL 13, 2023
ASIA TIMES
In this file photo taken on March 12, 2021, protesters with placards showing the image of the detained civilian leader sit along a street before holding a candlelight vigil. 
Photo: Stringer / AFP


The international community has dutifully condemned the latest barbarism perpetrated by Myanmar’s military junta after a military airstrike killed more than 50 people and injured at least 30 people, including children, on April 11 in Sagaing Region.

The previous day, another airstrike killed at least nine people in Chin state.

“These violent attacks further underscore the regime’s disregard for human life and its responsibility for the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Burma (Myanmar) following the February 2021 coup,” a US State Department spokesman said in a statement.

But the latest in a growing number of murderous attacks on civilians by Myanmar junta forces is unlikely to result in more than tough rhetoric from the West.

More than two years on from a military coup that ousted a popularly-elected government, there is little enthusiasm from the rest of the world – including among Myanmar’s neighbors in Southeast Asia that are supposed to be steering a response to the civil strife – for anything other than stern words.

Tom Andrews, the United Nations’ special rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, tweeted: “The Myanmar military’s attacks against innocent people, including today’s airstrike in Sagaing, [are] enabled by world indifference and those supplying them with weapons. How many Myanmar children need to die before world leaders take strong, coordinated action to stop this carnage?”

According to Andrew, Myanmar is the world’s “forgotten war.”

Indeed, there is an obvious double standard as Myanmar’s disparate rebel forces have been repeatedly rebuffed in their appeals for military and financial aid while, at the same time, Western democracies are propping Ukraine with the latest munitions in its defense against Russia’s invasion.

A member of the Karenni People Defense Force (KPDF) holds up their wooden weapon as they take part in military training at a camp near Demoso in Kayah state, July 6, 2021. Photo: AFP / Stringer

“While the two conflicts are not completely analogous, it is nonetheless striking how much Ukraine has galvanized the international community, while Myanmar has almost completely been ignored,” Nicholas Farrelly, of the University of Tasmania, argued recently in an essay.

One reason, he suggested, has to do with the lack of a visible, iconic leader leading the resistance in the name of democracy. “With ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other public figures locked up, Myanmar’s resistance forces have no recognizable public face,” he wrote.

Likewise, The Economist, in an article published on January 31, noted “This new resistance lacks a charismatic leader.” According to Frontier Myanmar, a newspaper, “the lack of an easily recognizable figure equivalent to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky has arguably made it harder to rally international support.”

The anti-junta National Unity Government (NUG)’s acting president is Duwa Lashi La, who is almost unknown outside of Myanmar.

Several resistance leaders have risen and fallen in popularity. In the months after the coup, Dr Sasa, a Chin medical doctor and a National League for Democracy (NLD) campaigner, became one of the main spokespeople for the anti-junta movement, but his pedigree has fallen since last year.

“Dr Sasa’s role in the NUG has visibly diminished. Although still its minister of international cooperation, he is no longer featured so heavily in the administration’s press conferences and events, and he attends fewer meetings with foreign governments,” Frontier Myanmar reported in November.

The newspaper noted another pro-democracy figure, Min Ko Naing, a longtime activist, also rose to prominence in the immediate months after the coup but he deliberately retreated from frontline activity soon afterward.

Analysts reckon that potential leaders are wary of making themselves too well known, as this makes them more of a target for the junta’s forces. There are also claims that many in the civilian PDFs and ethnic militias, those doing the fighting, are quick to mock “armchair activists” and attention seekers.

Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s long-time pro-democracy icon since the 1990s and whose National League for Democracy-led government was toppled in the February 1, 2021 coup, could have played a Zelensky-like unifying role if she were free to operate.

Protesters hold posters with the image of detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi during a demonstration against the military coup in Naypyidaw on February 28, 2021. Photo: AFP / Stringer

On the day of her arrest, she called on Myanmar’s people “not to accept a coup” and warned the international community that a military coup would return the country “back under a dictatorship.”

However, she is only rarely able to convey public messages from detention, which are relayed by her proxies and often cryptic in nature. Last April, she apparently called on her compatriots to “stay united and hold discussions on different views.”

Scot Marciel, an author, analyst and former US ambassador to Myanmar, told Asia Times that “a unifying, charismatic figure would certainly help a great deal, as would a highly professional public communications campaign.”

One can only speculate what would have happened had Suu Kyi managed to escape capture and fled abroad before the coup.

Perhaps, like Zelensky, she would have been invited to deliver speeches to the US Congress and parliaments across the Western and wider world. She would have also been a regular on rolling news.

Newspaper and television editors tend to prefer stories with a human touch, and Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and whose name is immediately recognizable in the West, could have been that spark to keep Myanmar in the news.

Of course, there’s a problem with this wishful narrative.

Suu Kyi was a darling of Western liberals during her 15 years of detention between 1989 and 2010 for her non-violent stand to achieve democracy, and she was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for “an outstanding example of the power of the powerless.”

Awards and accolades followed. French director Luc Besson’s feature biopic “The Lady” made her a recognizable icon in the West, spoken about in the same breath as Nelson Mandela.

But Suu Kyi’s reputation was badly damaged (one French newspaper called her a “pariah” on the day of her arrest) after her NLD was elected to government in 2016 and she became state counselor, the nation’s de-facto leader, in a quasi-civilian arrangement where the military maintained control of top ministries including defense, home and border affairs.

In office, she was often accused of not pressing the liberal policies she long said she held sacrosanct. Worse, her image was irrevocably tarnished after she failed to condemn the military-led “genocide” of Muslim Rohingyas in a spasm of internationally-condemned violence in 2017.

Rohingya refugees reflected in rain water along an embankment next to paddy fields after fleeing from Myanmar into Palang Khali, near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh November 2, 2017. Photo: Agencies

More than 730,000 Rohingyas fled to precarious, flood-prone camps in Bangladesh, while about 600,000 remain under oppressive rule in Myanmar, Human Rights Watch estimates.

“Aung San Suu Kyi completely lost all international credibility and sympathy after defending the military against charges of genocide,” Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington DC, said.


“She is part of the problem and she should have no role if there can be a negotiated settlement; she is simply too polarizing,” Abuza added. “But her absence now, as an iconic figure who has the ear of political elites and a pedestal does hurt the NUG in terms of garnering international support.”

Yet it is doubtful whether a unifying charismatic figure, if one existed, would prompt a more coordinated response from the international community.

“I don’t think that it’s an issue of personality, it’s rather about leadership,” a senior foreign diplomat told Asia Times.

The main problem is that the vast resistance movement is disorganized, analysts and observers say. Although the NUG claims to speak on its behalf, the movement is divided between numerous new People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), most of which act independently or are aligned with ethnic armed organizations.

“There is no single charismatic leader that can represent the opposition because there is no unified opposition,” Gregory Poling, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said.

“The National Unity Government claims to speak for all opposition forces, but it doesn’t,” he added. “The ethnic armed organizations or the more important fighting forces, without which the NUG has no hope of victory, are not interested in following the NUG’s political lead.”

This lack of an organized movement, some analysts reckon, is the primary reason why foreign governments have shied from wading any further into the conflict.

It isn’t clear to them that greater support for the NUG would amount to anything if the shadow government doesn’t command the will of the movement it claims to speak for.

Protesters wearing signs in support of the People’s Defence Force (PDF) during a demonstration against the military coup in Dawei, May 10, 2021. 
Photo: Handout / Dawei Watch / AFP

“Sympathetic governments are looking to the National Unity Government to create a clear alternative to the military election agenda, which means making the concessions on federalism necessary to bring ethnic armed organizations and ethnic political parties and civil society on board to create a unified front,” Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, a lobbying group, said.

“This hasn’t happened yet.”


While Suu Kyi, 77, remains popular at home, her time in the political limelight has likely ended. Many in the younger generation reckon that Suu Kyi’s domineering control of the NLD was a hindrance to democratic development.

Others reckon that the anti-junta movement needed to shed the NLD’s baggage in order to agree on more revolutionary solutions to the problems that have plagued Myanmar for decades, not least the question of minority groups in ethnic areas.

The NUG, for instance, now proposes a federal solution to the country’s historic divisions, providing more autonomy to the ethnic periphery regions as well as greater representation of minority groups.

The anti-coup revolution has also significantly altered thinking about how to achieve peace and liberty.

Whereas Suu Kyi and several other NUG senior figures are from an older generation who saw non-violent means as the way to achieve political goals, many young PDF members clearly reckon that liberty will come more readily through violent means that result in the military junta’s overthrow.

There is little chance they will accept the return of the status quo antebellum: the system of militarized politics and centralized control over the peripheries must be overturned by revolution. Suu Kyi, despite her charisma and clout, now represents the old failed ways to many in a, for now, leaderless movement.

Follow David Hutt on Twitter at @davidhuttjourno

Arakan Army sets the rebel standard in Myanmar

Successful insurgent group stands in stark contrast to NUG shadow government’s weak, feckless and divided resistance

By DAVID SCOTT MATHIESON
APRIL 12, 2023
ASIA TIMES
Arakan Army insurgent fighters take aim in their conflict against Myanmar state forces in Rakhine state.
 Photo: YouTube / Arakan Army promotional video


The Arakan Army (AA), one of Myanmar’s most audacious and effective insurgencies turned 14 years old this week, underscoring what can be achieved by anti-military resistance as civil war rages on multiple fronts.

“Felicitation” notices were duly made to the rebel group and its leaders on the day, standard communications among resistance groups to each other on key anniversaries.

The anti-military National Unity Government (NUG), formed after the 2021 coup, also sent its best regards, as did the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), the Chin Defense Force-Mindat, the Yaw Defense Force (YDF) and the Anti-Dictatorship Revolution People’s Army (DRPA), among others.

Well-wishers had to be careful about posting on Facebook: the platform still bans the AA and three of its ethnic armed organization (EAO) allies and posting anything related risks a suspension of any account. But this censorship threat has not diminished the AA’s popularity and reach.

The NUG’s acting president, Duwa Lashi La, sent a handwritten letter which was in many ways more touching for the occasion, congratulating the AA on uniting the people of Rakhine. His note received a positive reply from the AA’s charismatic founder and leader, Major General Twan Mrat Naing.

This reflected a respectful acknowledgment of the AA’s near-top position on Myanmar’s revolutionary ziggurat, and the struggles of the NUG to unite hundreds of disparate People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to better coordinate armed struggle against the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.

In many respects, the AA is the preferred model for many emerging armed groups, who admire the AA’s determination, fighting spirit and elan, and its successful model for mobilization against military repression.

Myanmar has become an incubator for insurgent innovation, but this had spread well before the February 2021 democracy-suspending coup.

Formed in northern Kachin state on April 10, 2009, the AA cut its teeth in battling the Myanmar military after its 17-year-long ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) – the AA’s and other Rakhine insurgent groups’ initial benefactor and trainer – broke down in 2011.

Starting in 2009, the KIO nurtured three “startup insurgencies”; the AA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the reformed ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), now collectively known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.

Arakan Army fighters in a promotional video in 2018. 
Photo: YouTube screengrab

With methodical logistics, the AA has built up its base area in Paletwa in Chin state, the isolated northern back door to Rakhine state, and slowly pushed into the plains of central Rakhine.

A furious two-year heavy fighting period ensued from 2018 to late 2020, with the Myanmar military losing, by some estimates, 2,000 soldiers in furious battles across multiple Rakhine state townships that also displaced some 200,000 Rakhine civilians. Those fights are a microcosm of what is happening all over Myanmar now.

A surprise bilateral ceasefire agreed in the aftermath of the November 2020 nationwide elections restored some calm, but tensions and open fighting resumed before a November 2022 “humanitarian ceasefire” was brokered by controversial Japanese envoy Yohei Sasakawa of the Nippon Foundation.

The AA has prioritized consolidating administration in the areas it controls in Rakhine, but further hostilities with the SAC are inevitable.

The widespread popularity of the AA and its United League of Arakan (ULA) political arm stands in stark contrast to widespread public criticism of the longer-established Arakan Liberation Party-Arakan Liberation Army (ALP/ALA), which spent decades headquartered on the Thai-Myanmar border and since 2012 has engaged in bilateral and multilateral peace talks with previous quasi-civilian governments.

But the ALP has not been a serious rival to the AA for many years, and has fallen into deeper disarray as the AA has superseded it for several years.

In early January, following Myanmar Independence Day Celebrations in the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe, ALA chief of staff General Khaing Soe Mya and two subordinates were assassinated in town. Although the AA is strongly suspected, no one has claimed responsibility for the lethal attack.

The ALP’s leadership split in February, with the public face of the party, Saw Mra Razar Lin, expelled before bizarrely establishing her own parallel ALP on March 19.

A day after, the mainstream ALP banned her “new” party and prohibited her from attending Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) peace talks with the SAC in late March: she went anyway, injecting even greater absurdity to the wan proceedings of seven micro armed groups still discussing constitutional issues while Myanmar burns far and wide.

Myanmar’s military likes to flex its hardware muscle. Photo: Facebook

For the AA, it is pursuing a measured path to consolidating its rule and using the humanitarian pause to expand its administration, including over judicial issues tax collection, and expanding its armed forces, which some estimate may now number somewhere between 25,000-30,000 soldiers.

Despite some Rakhine political parties re-registering in recent weeks for the SAC’s planned elections at an indeterminate date, their potential participation in the widely criticized polls will likely be decided by the AA/ULA’s leadership.

The AA’s once prolific media strategy has also gone into a hiatus of sorts – at least the English language version – since its “state-building” phase began in late 2020. This shouldn’t be surprising.

The AA/ULA realizes its relationships with neighboring China, India and Bangladesh (and to a certain extent Thailand) are more important than with the West.

In fact, having to deal with Sasakawa is another symptom of how the Western-funded and misdirected peace process excluded the new, and arguably more representative, insurgents ever since it was signed in 2015.

It is no surprise that the AA and its northern allies have established close relationships with the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF): they pride themselves on having an eye for talent.

AA/ULA deputy leader Dr Nyo Twan Aung told an online session on resistance “liberated areas” in early April, “Our Brotherhood recognizes the KNDF as a partner organization, and we are fighting this revolution together. We will continue to either operate separately or work together in the future, depending on the situation of the country.”

This also tracks with several other emerging groups receiving recognition for performance on the battlefield and political strategy over elite entitlement from the coup-toppled former ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has hobbled the NUG since its formation.

The Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), led by the charismatic activist poet Maung Saungkha, has established close ties with renowned Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) leader Lieutenant General Baw Kyaw Heh, whose group is operating in northern Kayin state, and in early 2023 established the multi-ethnic Brigade 611 in the Kokang area near the China border.

Observers say the AA is likely providing clandestine aid to PDFs in the neighboring Magwe region, while the wider Brotherhood is likely supporting anti-SAC PDFs and EAOs with weapons in the southeast of the country.

But this support, if confirmed as some assess, is likely based on inter-group relations and not the efforts of the increasingly maligned NUG and its two widely perceived as feckless armed resistance leaders: Minister of Defense U Ye Mon and Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration Lwin Ko Latt.

Perhaps, then, Lashi La’s handwritten note to Twan Mrat Naing was a gesture toward establishing better relations with an armed group many believe it needs to model its comparatively torpid resistance.

Twan Mrat Naing, commander-in-chief of the Arakan Army, attends a meeting of leaders of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups at the United Wa State Army headquarters in Myanmar’s northern Shan state. Photo: Twitter

To be sure, the AA has not jumped into the NUG’s embrace. This is for a number of reasons. The first is that the ULA’s political project of “Arakan Dream 2020” and “The Way of Rakhita” predated the February 2021 coup and was clearly defined as seeking more autonomy from the central ethnic Bamar state, which has maligned and marginalized Rakhine people for decades.

The AA, like other armed groups, will not easily forget or forgive the NLD’s years of withering dismissal of their political, economic and social claims.

It should also cast doubt on NUG Ministry of Defense claims it has the clout to effectively coordinate between well-established EAOs. Two years into the anti-SAC resistance and the NUG has failed to attract the AA and other EAOs into an effective anti-military coalition.

Twan Mratt Naing and his AA have a clear-eyed vision for the Rakhine revolution, a resolve that stands in contrast to the lukewarm lethargy of so many NUG leaders.

On the occasion of the Myanmar air force bombing a KIO celebration in Hpakant in October 2022, killing over 50, he posted on social media that it was a “clarion call for concerted action to exterminate the military fascism.”

As news comes in around the latest mass murder of civilians by a military air strike against a civilian food distribution center in Kantbalu in Sagaing Region, it’s precisely the professional yet ruthless leadership model of the AA that the wider resistance needs to adopt before its too late.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar.

Junta making plans for a meaningless Myanmar election

Regime deregisters coup-toppled National League for Democracy ahead of elections designed to launder military atrocities, not reset democracy


By DAVID SCOTT MATHIESON
MARCH 29, 2023
ASIA TIMES
A trishaw driver wears a face mask promoting the National League for Democracy (NLD) party during an election campaign rally in Yangon, Myanmar, September 8, 2020. 
Photo: Agencies


Myanmar’s military regime on Tuesday (March 28) took the major step of deregistering the National League for Democracy (NLD), the clear winner of the November 2020 nationwide elections.

The State Administration Council-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC) announced that following the release of the amended Political Party Registration Law in late January, existing political parties had 60 days to re-register.

Forty parties, including the NLD, refused to do so. Fifty other existing parties, including the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), have registered for future polls. A further 13 new political parties have applied for registration.

The SAC has still not announced a date for its planned polls, after renewing the State of Emergency on February 1. The announcement may make it clearer who will and won’t contest, but everything else about the regime’s election plans is subject to speculation.

It is likely that the military leadership still hasn’t decided on when and how it can hold polls. A new system of proportional representation has been announced, but it is unlikely the military-captured electoral commission has the bureaucratic capacity to conduct anything resembling a credible election.

But SAC elections are not designed for credibility. They are being constructed to dupe the already deluded into some semblance of legitimacy for the military takeover.

Dissolving the NLD and 39 other parties, some of whom such as the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), won significant numbers of seats in 2020, turns already discredited poll planning into violent pantomime.

The coup sparked widespread armed resistance to the military, has rendered large parts of Myanmar into conflict and humanitarian disaster zones, and shows no sign of abating; if anything, armed conflict and civilian suffering have been on the rise as the coup enters its third year.

These are not conditions conducive to election preparation, a point SAC leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing made in a speech to the annual Armed Force Day parade on March 27.

Myanmar’s coup maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attends the 9th Moscow Conference on International Security in Moscow, Russia on June 23, 2021.
 Photo: AFP via Anadolu Agency / Sefa Karacan

The NLD has been subjected to extreme violence since the coup, with hundreds of party members arrested and imprisoned under politically motivated charges of corruption. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been imprisoned for 33 years on a number of spurious offenses.

Property of NLD party members has been seized and destroyed, and security forces have targeted party members for assassination. Several hundred USDP members have also been killed in targeted assassinations by resistance forces.

Of the 50 parties who had applied for new registration, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDP) is the one most closely aligned with the military. Many of them are smaller parties that will contest only in state and regions, not nationally.

The National Unity Party (NUP), which rose from the ashes of the vanquished Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) to contest the 1990 election, which it lost to the NLD, is running once again after a losing streak that included few votes and fewer parliamentary seats in 2010, 2015 and 2020.

Significant ethnic parties such as the Pa-O National Organization Party (PNO), the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP) and the Mon Unity Party (MUP) have registered, but their involvement in future elections will likely suffer from diminished community support, as divisions widen between the subservience of geriatric leaders and angry youth resisting military rule.

One surprise re-registration was the Arakan National Party (ANP), the most popular political party in Rakhine state, likely still smarting from having many of its constituencies canceled by the NLD and military in 2020 due to widespread armed conflict.

However, registration does not automatically infer contesting. The ultimate decision for that will likely be decided by the Arakan Army (AA) leadership, who have extended their Arakan People’s Authority (APA) administration to large parts of Rakhine, and has the capacity to thwart any poll preparation.

Less surprising was the decision by the Arakan Front Party (AFP) of Aye Maung, a quixotic Rakhine ultra-nationalist who appears to have chosen to appease the SAC after being released from prison following the coup.

As if to presage the assembly of Quisling’s who will contest the elections, Ko Ko Gyi of the People’s Party (PP) attended Monday’s Armed Forces Day event in Naypyidaw: his party registered early in the 60-day period.

He failed to win a seat in 2020 and his PP attracted little support. He was one of several high-profile losers in that election who succumbed to the dark side of anti-Suu Kyi sentiment and entered the military’s orbit. Thet Thet Khaing’s People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) also registered, but she seems committed to serving the SAC as Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement.

Also present on Monday’s unconvincing demonstration of military might, and instrumental in rigging the future elections, were the gaggle of thugs who hoodwinked so many diplomats, journalists and military apologists over the years: Khin Yi, former national police chief and the head of the USDP, former admiral Soe Thane, and reportedly some of the leaders of smaller Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) who were in the capital this week for another round of farcical “peace talks.”

A banner featuring Aung San Suu Kyi is displayed on February 15 as protesters demonstrating against the military coup surround police, who had blocked off the street leading to the headquarters of the National League for Democracy (NLD), in Yangon that day.
 Photo: AFP / Ye Aung Thu

There is no doubt that the NLD made its share of enemies. Its political culture was deemed to be rigidly hierarchical, with blind fealty to the wintry monarch of Suu Kyi.

The National Unity Government (NUG), which rose partly from NLD members and anchors its legitimacy in the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH, or national assembly) is still grappling with the vestiges of this culture that frustrates the forging of consensus politics, coalition building, inclusivity and the urgent necessity of collective leadership with anti-SAC armed groups throughout the country.

But the deregistration of the NLD, SNLD and others is not the final step in the grotesque illegitimacy of the SAC’s elections plans. There is no possibility that any polls will provide a breakthrough for political reform. Only the most studiously gullible diplomat would fall for these elections designed to launder the atrocities of military rule, not reset democracy.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues.
Middle East’s dilemma: authoritarianism vs Western hypocrisy
Arab rulers won’t organically evolve toward democracy

By MOHAMMED NOSSEIR
APRIL 10, 2023
ASIA TIMES
Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat (center), in Beijing on March 10, 2023, with counterparts Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban of Saudi Arabia and Ali Shamkhani of Iran. Image: China Daily

The news that China has reconciled the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a clear gesture that China will be playing a leading role in shaping the future of the Middle East, a role that was previously driven exclusively by the United States, backed by other Western nations.

For many years, Arab governments have been accustomed to the Western model combining rhetoric on human rights while looking the other way for economic gain, while the regional crisis intensifies.

On the other hand, authoritarian rulers have a single clear mission: Remain in power endlessly. Being unaccountable for their failures is empowering the world’s autocrats to take bolder initiatives than Western politicians who always have to consider the effect of economic ramifications on citizens’ votes.

For these Western politicians, maintaining certain domestic economic outcomes has proven to be more important than a sound foreign decision based on values.

“Strategic ambiguity” is an acknowledged policy of the United States in which it offers two equally opposing messages, which is best exhibited in the present China-Taiwan conflict. This approach means that the US could either stand with Taiwan if it engaged in a war with mainland China or apply realpolitik and let Taiwan confront the Chinese on its own.


This ambiguity dilemma has resulted in growing distrust in the rest of the world toward the United States, whose present leader often talks about the significance of spreading democracy in the world.

One of the largest misperceptions of Western nations is believing that Arab rulers are aligned with their policies. In fact, Arabs, who largely admire Western lifestyles and technology, are not necessarily happy with their equivocality approach.

This is best exhibited in the recent manipulation of the Gulf states’ security vis-à-vis the Iranian regime, a move that was sufficient to drive the Arab leaders to explore a new approach to national security, followed by a search for a more reliable strategic partner.

In fact, Western nations have been heavily engaged in almost every single political dialogue in the region, beginning with the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict and ending with the present crises and conflicts in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. They have no significant achievement to show for their efforts with the exception of the Egypt-Israel Camp David Accord that is now close to half a century old.

All of these intense struggles have been addressed by rhetorical conferences that enable participants to address their concerns without having tangible outputs. The US Summit for Democracy, the second version of which has recently concluded, is a clear example.

It sometimes appears that Western politicians advance their careers by engaging in these unaccountable meetings. Moreover, sanctioning Iran will never transform it to democracy; on the contrary, it expands support for extremism, increases the economic burden on Iranian citizens, who will naturally escalate their dislike toward the West.

Meanwhile, China’s influence is more constructive than the United States’. It is achieved by offering competitive products to the world and investing in developing nations’ infrastructure, which is complemented by the Belt and Road Initiative.

Egypt, my country and a major recipient of funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), often has a “gloomy” relationship with the US that is driven by shortsighted American political interests of either the Democrats or Republicans.

While the US has always been generous in its economic aid to Egypt – opening special doors for Egyptian products to the United States – these policies have never helped advance the relationship between the two nations either at the state or citizens’ level.

“Which side is of more value to Egypt, Russia or Ukraine?” a famous Egyptian scholar asked me. Well, if we put the immoral aspects of the war aside, along with the fact that Russia has invaded a sovereign nation, certainly siding with Russia could work in reducing the United States’ hegemony in the Middle East.

Arab conspiracy theorists tend to accuse the United States of triggering all regional conflicts. But even the “Great Satan” itself, as the US is referred to by the government of Iran, wouldn’t be able to design all the evil afflictions affecting the Arab world.

However, it seems clear that Western nations, deliberately or carelessly, don’t expend the right efforts to address the Middle East’s conflicts. This is compounded by the lack of democracy in the Arab world.

Moreover, Arab citizens have been confronting a number of economic, political and religious struggles; poverty is rising, violence is spreading widely, rule of law is declining, and voicing an opinion that may differ with the ruler may lead to prison. These complications naturally produce extremely frustrated Arab citizens who could be easily manipulated by terrorists.

Middle Eastern citizens need genuine assistance in developing democracy, peace and prosperity; the three values are linked. The Western approach in promoting prosperity, such as the Abraham Accords, at the expense of genuine peace and democracy is simply wasted effort.

Western nations’ proud unification that is shaped in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or Group of Seven, for example, is meaningless for the rest of the world as long as it results in inefficient policies. Economic aid is relevant, but must have an impact on ordinary citizens rather than enriching elites who further empower the regional dictators.

Arab rulers won’t organically evolve toward democracy, and are anticipated increasingly to stand shoulder to shoulder with their authoritarian bigger brothers, China and Russia.

Western nations will need to decide whether they want to serve their interests by cozying up to Arab autocrats for economic or domestic political gain or genuinely promote democracy, a long-term approach that has an economic cost, but will have a better impact on the citizens of the world than a double-face policy.


Mohammed Nosseir is an Egyptian liberal politician who advocates political participation and economic freedom. Nosseir was member of the higher committee at the Democratic Front Party from 2007 to 2012, followed by being a member of the political bureau of the Free Egyptian Party until 2013. More by Mohammed Nosseir
US still a giant leap ahead of China in space

Notion of a heated US-China space race makes for clickable headlines but the more complex reality is US still has a decisive lead

Both the US and China have plans to establish bases on the Moon in the near future. Photo: Caspar Benson / fStop via Getty Images / The Conversation


Svetla Ben-Itzhak
THE CONVERSATION
ASIA TIMES
APRIL 13,2023


Headlines proclaiming the rise of a new “space race” between the US and China have become common in news coverage following many of the exciting launches in recent years. Experts have pointed to China’s rapid advancements in space as evidence of an emerging landscape where China is directly competing with the US for supremacy.

This idea of a space race between China and the US sounds convincing given the broader narrative of China’s rise, but how accurate is it?

As a professor who studies space and international relations, my research aims to quantify the power and capabilities of different nations in space. Viewed from various capacities, the data paints a much more complex picture than a tight space race between the US and China.

At least for now, the reality looks more like a complex hegemony – one state, the US, is still dominating in key space capabilities and this lead is further amplified by a strong network of partners.
SpaceX rockets carry hundreds of private satellites into orbit each year from the seven active U.S. spaceports. Photo: SOPA Images / LightRocket via Getty Images / The Conversation


A clear leader makes for a boring race


Calling the current situation a race implies that the US and China have roughly equal capabilities in space. But in several key areas, the US is far ahead not only of China, but of all other spacefaring nations combined.

Starting with spending: In 2021, the US space budget was roughly US$59.8 billion. China has been investing heavily in space and rocket technology over the last decade and has doubled its spending in the last five years. But with an estimated budget of $16.18 billion in 2021, it is still spending less than a third of the US budget.

The US also leads significantly in the number of active satellites. Currently, there are 5,465 total operational satellites in orbit around Earth. The US operates 3,433, or 63% of those. In contrast, China has 541.

Similarly, the US has more active spaceports than China. With seven operational launch sites at home and abroad and at least 13 additional spaceports in development, the US has more options to launch payloads into various orbits. In contrast, China has only four operational spaceports with two more planned, all located within its own territory.
Parity with nuance

While the US may have a clear advantage over China in many areas of space, in some measures, the differences between the two countries are more nuanced.

In 2021, for instance, China attempted 55 orbital launches, four more than the US’s 51. The total numbers may be similar, but the rockets carried very different payloads to orbit.

The vast majority – 84% – of Chinese launches had government or military payloads intended mostly for electronic intelligence and optical imaging. Meanwhile, in the US, 61% of launches were for nonmilitary, academic or commercial use, predominantly for Earth observation or telecommunications.

Space stations are another area where there are important differences hiding beneath the surface. Since the 1990s, the US has worked with 14 other nations, including Russia, to operate the International Space Station.

The ISS is quite large, with 16 modules, and has driven technological and scientific breakthroughs. But the ISS is now 24 years old and participating nations are planning to retire it in 2030.
Construction of China’s Tiangong space station began in 2021, and the small, three-module station opened for research in December 2022.
Shujianyang/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

The Chinese Tiangong space station is the new kid on the block. Construction was only completed in late 2022, and it is much smaller – with only three modules. China has built and launched all of the different parts and remains the sole operator of the station, despite having invited others to join.

China is undoubtedly expanding its space capabilities, and in a report published in August 2022, the Pentagon predicted that China would surpass US capabilities in space as early as 2045. However, it is unlikely that the US will remain stagnant, as it continues to increase funding for space.

Allies as force multipliers


A major point of difference between the US and China is the nature and number of international collaborations.

For decades, NASA has been fruitfully cultivating international and commercial partnerships in everything from developing specific space technologies to flying humans into space. The US government has also signed 169 space data-sharing agreements with 33 states and intergovernmental organizations, 129 with commercial partners and seven with academic institutions.

China also has allies that help with space – most notably Russia and members of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, including Iran, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey. However, China’s collaborators are fewer and have far less developed space capabilities.

In just two years, 24 nations, including Brazil, have joined the US-led Artemis Accords. This international agreement outlines the goals of space exploration in the near future. Photo: Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

Efforts to return to the surface of the Moon excellently highlight this difference in ally support and synergy. Both the US and China have plans to send people to the surface of the Moon and to establish lunar bases in the near future. These competing lunar aims are often cited as evidence of the space race, but they are very different in terms of partnerships and scope.

In 2019, Russia and China agreed to jointly go to the Moon by 2028. Russia is contributing its Luna landers and Oryol crewed orbiters, while China is improving its Chang’e robotic spacecraft. Their future International Lunar Research Station is “open to all interested parties and international partners,” but, to date, no additional countries have committed to the Chinese and Russian effort.

In contrast, since 2020, 24 nations have joined the US-led Artemis Accords. This international agreement outlines shared principles of cooperation for future space activity and, through the Artemis Program, specifically aims to return people to the Moon by 2025 and establish a Moon base and lunar space station soon after.

In addition to the broad international participation, the Artemis Program has contracted with a staggering number of private companies to develop a range of technologies, from lunar landers to lunar construction methods and more.
China is not the only game in town

While China may seem like the main competitor of the US in space, other countries have space capabilities and aspirations that rival those of China.

India spends billions on space and plans to return to the Moon, possibly with Japan, in the near future. South Korea, Israel, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Germany and the European Union are also planning independent lunar missions.

Japan has developed impressive technological space capabilities, including rendezvous proximity technology to send a spacecraft to an asteroid and bring samples back to Earth, that rival and even surpass those of China.

In the past, the space race was about who could reach the stars first and return home. Today, the goal has shifted to surviving and even thriving in the harsh environment of space. It is not surprising that, despite its decisive lead, the US has partnered with others to go to the Moon and beyond.

China is doing the same, but on a smaller scale. The picture that emerges is not of a “race” but of complex system with the US as a leader working closely with extensive networks of partners.

Svetla Ben-Itzhak is Assistant Professor of Space and International Relations, Air University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
How many Iraqis did the US really kill?

A respectful and humane account of all the Iraq war’s dead remains an unfinished task due to incomplete documentation

By LILY HAMOURTZIADOU
THE CONVERSATION
MARCH 20, 2023
ASIA TIMES
Iraq has been devastated by the unending war that started with America's invasion 20 years ago. 

The mass killings of Iraqis started on the night of March 19 2003 with the US-led coalition’s “shock and awe” bombing of Baghdad. They called it “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

Millions around the world sat transfixed in front of their TV screens, watching as bombs and missiles exploded. The reports came with the warning that they “contained flashing images”. True enough, the sky over Baghdad flashed orange and golden – but those were bombs, not flash photography.

The narrative of terror which began that day was to last for years. Terror from the sky, terror on the ground, terror from the foreign soldier, terror from one’s neighbor. By the time the invasion was completed, some 7,500 Iraqi civilians had been killed in the airstrikes.

Each death was recorded by the Iraq Body Count (IBC) database, with which I have been involved for some years. Among them were 15 adults and children who lost their lives in Baghdad’s Zafaraniya area on March 30, 2003:

Iraq Body Count, Author provided

As the war began, the US president George W Bush vowed to “disarm Iraq and to free its people” in a live television address, shortly after explosions had rocked the Iraqi capital. US military sources told the BBC that five key members of the Iraqi regime, including its president Saddam Hussein, were targeted in these first attacks – but that it was not known whether the targets had been hit and what damage might have been caused.


When it came to civilian deaths, an IBC dossier revealed the extent of the killings between 2003 and 2005. During the invasion and in the two years that followed, 24,865 civilians were reported killed – almost half in the capital Baghdad.

Nearly one-third of these civilian deaths occurred during the invasion phase before May 1, 2003, when Bush made his “mission accomplished” speech from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, at the safe distance of the coast of San Diego.

US-led forces killed 37% of all civilian victims in the first two years. Anti-occupation forces and insurgents killed 9%, post-invasion criminal violence accounted for 36% of all deaths, and the remainder were killed by “unknown agents.” At least a further 42,500 civilians were reported wounded
.
Iraq war: who did the killings? (2003-05). Iraq Body Count, Author provided

While mortuary officials and medics were the most frequently cited witnesses of these deaths, three press agencies (Associated Press, Agence France Presse and Reuters) between them provided more than one-third of all media reports.
The aftermath

Thousands of civilians have been killed each year since that first night of shock and awe. At its peak, in 2006, the conflict claimed 29,027 people. At its calmest, in 2022, there were 740 deaths.




Two decades on, the killings continue. IBC’s 2022 security report, Iraq’s Residual War, revealed that the country is still effectively at war.

In 2022, in addition to civilian killings, 521 Islamic State fighters were killed by the Iraqi military in joint operations with the US, and 506 members of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) were killed by the Turkish military. Other conflict-related deaths included 97 Turkish and 80 Iraqi soldiers, 30 members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (paramilitaries with links to Iran), and 23 federal police.

Pro-Iran parties dominate Iraq’s parliament, and more than 150,000 fighters of the former Iran-backed Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitary forces have been integrated into the state military.

In 2021, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights published a study that highlighted the severe and enduring injustices of the Iraqi justice system – based on 235 interviews with current or former detainees, as well as discussions with prison staff, judges, lawyers, families of the detainees and other relevant parties. As reported in the Washington Post, the study detailed:

… a labyrinth of unfairness, with detainees often denied due process at every turn … Confessions frequently come through torture … [such that] detainees frequently end up signing documents admitting crimes they did not commit. Few detainees see a lawyer until they appear in court. Methods of abuse include severe beatings, some on the soles of the feet, as well as electric shocks, stress positions and suffocation. Sexual violence was also reported.

There were also 1,352 arrests in Iraq in 2022 under the Terrorism Act. All these men face the death penalty.

Traumatized country

Members of Shiite militias loyal to Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr leaving Baghdad’s Green Zone in August 2022.

Since the 2003 invasion, Iraqis have been subjected to genocide, terrorism, the killing of protesters, poverty and the displacement of millions of people. When the war in Iraq officially ended in 2011 with then-US president Barack Obama declaring the withdrawal of troops, a deeply traumatized country was left behind, with a bankrupt economy.

Economists say that, due to falling oil prices and the effects of Covid on the country’s economy, Iraq’s poverty rate may have shot up from 20% in 2018 to more than 30% in 2020, meaning that 12 million Iraqis were living below the poverty line. In 2019, the estimated youth unemployment rate in Iraq was 25% – in a country where almost 60% of the population is under 25.

The future


In July 2016, in his report to the UK’s parliamentary inquiry into the Iraq war, Sir John Chilcot underlined the need for documenting the effects of military action on civilians. It was the government’s responsibility, he stated, to identify and understand the likely and actual effects of its military action. Referring to the war, he wrote:

Greater efforts should have been made in the post-conflict period to determine the number of civilian casualties and the broader effects of military operations on civilians. More time was devoted to the question of which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than it was to efforts to determine the actual number.

One of Chilcot’s recommendations was that the UK government should be ready to work with others, in particular NGOs and academic institutions, to develop such assessments and estimates over time.

The vast majority of civilian deaths in Iraq remain only partially documented. A respectful and humane account of all the Iraq war’s dead remains an unfinished task.

Lily Hamourtziadou is Senior Lecturer in Security Studies, Birmingham City University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.