Rosa Luxemburg’s article “Social-patriotism in Poland’’ was written in 1895 and published in the German Social-Democratic magazine “Neue Zeit”, 1895/96, no. 41. In a way, this detailed work presents as a precursor to her doctoral thesis at the University of Zürich.
The Acheron In Motion
Mar 20, 2021
Introduction
In this comprehensive work, originally titled “Socjalpatriotyzm w Polsce” published in the German Social-Democratic magazine “Neue Zeit”, 1895/96, no. 41, Rosa Luxemburg tried to show the economic reasons for the integration of Poland into Russia, which rendered any programmatic point about the restoration of independent Poland unviable and contradictory for Social-Democracy at that time. “From the viewpoint of national aspirations it is an unfortunate fact, but it would be even sadder if we wanted to shut our eyes and not recognize it,” she judged. But here we also see her materialist approach, which refuses to project any concrete affairs onto the broader situation and avoids generalizations:
“Applying the measure of Western European relations to Poland, one could say: if the ruling classes have lowered the banner of national independence, all the more should the proletariat raise it. Such a view, however, in our opinion, would be based on a purely external comparison”
This is followed by a Marxist exposition of economic development and how it affects daily struggles, through which the author makes clear the differences between West European and the Polish proletariat, who have objectively similar aims, but vastly dissimilar conditions.
Luxemburg not only utilizes many sources — technical and statistical — but also analyses every aspect of Polish class situation and its standpoint with respect to nationalism. She doesn’t resort to a mechanistic advocation or a principled rejection of any slogan, but rather gauges at the core source of these slogans and juxtaposes it to everyday realities. In a sense, this work is a nascent version of Luxemburg’s PhD thesis — “The Industrial Development of Poland,” which she would write three years later.
The Polish original comes from “Rosa Luxemburg — Selected Works,” Volume 1 (in Polish), Warsaw 1959.
The Acheron In Motion thanks Jan Michalik and Benjamin Ashton, who made translating and publishing this piece possible.
Rosa Luxemburg — Social-Patriotism in Poland
Since the unification of Poland was declared a postulate of the proletarian foreign policy, many things have changed in the world. The political situation of Europe looks different now: The center of attention has shifted from the East, from the Polish question, to the German-French border. Now, the tactic of the struggling proletariat looks differently. In 1848, its political fight was a fight on the barricades and its main enemy was the bayonet. It would then be advisable to separate yourself from the reaction’s reserve — the Russian bayonets — with the help of a physical wall, and independent Poland was to become this wall. Today the proletariat wages a daily political struggle and in no way wants to be provoked into the streets. In this situation, it is not the Russian bayonets that are dangerous for it, but the reactionary influence of Russia on Europe. This influence however, cannot be destroyed with a physical wall, but with the obliterating of Tsarism in its own country.
Fortunately, many things have changed in Russia as well: it isn’t in absolute social apathy that it found itself in just thirty years ago, its foundation being undermined by a young mole — capitalism, which guarantees the annihilation of absolutism from within. Russia not only has bayonets, but also the struggling proletariat, the latter being precisely the most natural guarantee of Europe’s liberation from the suffocating nightmare of Petersburg’s autocracy, with the Polish proletarians being the most natural ally of the Russian proletarians in the daily struggle for political freedom in their common prison.
Western European socialists’ judgements of Polish national aspirations usually bear the characteristic trait that they infer the domestic social nature of these aspirations in Poland from the role ascribed to them in the context of European international relations. On the contrary, we should evaluate the significance of Polish national aspirations for Europe through the traits that these trends must have in Poland alone, as a result of the existing social conditions there. Here, we briefly outline these relations, limiting ourselves to one part of Poland — in this case the most important one — Poland under the Russian Partition.
The peasant reform of 1864 put an end to noble-national [szlachecko-narodowym] uprisings in Poland. Without the peasants, the nobility [“nobility” is the English word we’ve chosen for the szlachta, which shall be translated as such from this point forward — ed.] could not overthrow Russian rule. On the other hand, a victory with the help of the peasants was conditioned on the abolition of serfdom as the only means of winning over the peasantry to the noble movement, and thus on the most terrible economic disaster for the nobility, a disaster that would deprive their political victory of its essence and would render all their struggle senseless. Noble uprisings had to clash against this contradiction, and it was precisely this opposition between the nobility and the peasantry that ensured the Russian government the role of tertius gaudens [Latin for “a rejoicing third,” signifying a third party, which benefits from a given dispute — ed.] and the possibility of keeping the nobility in check and paralyzing their movements. The epilogue of the national struggle — the peasant reform, completely reshaped the economic landscape of the country, fundamentally overturned the noble economy, and thus abolished the material terrain in which the roots of the national movements were planted.
From the 1860s onward Poland — which at that time was still a predominantly agricultural country with a natural economy, separated from Russia by a customs border until 1851, living an economic life closed in on itself so to speak — has been carried away by the current of proper capitalist development: big industry entering the country. The abolition of the Russian-Polish customs border, the liberation of the serfs in Russia in 1861 [the Emancipation Edict — ed.], the related development of the monetary economy, and the large-scale construction of railroads commenced in the 1860s and 1870s — all of this resulting in Poland becoming connected with all regions of Russia. Finally, since the 70s, a system of custom duties has been introduced, which gave the Russian markets the exclusive right to exploit domestic manufacturers and receive 40–60% of their profits — all of this making the Polish industry into a paradise of primitive accumulation, where it grew like mushrooms after rain. The period of hectic factory establishment began, and production grew to such an extent during the two decades of 1870–1890 that it surpassed everything in the industrial field threefold in comparison to the previous 50 years. Łódź and Sosnowiec turned from settlements into large industrial cities within 25 or 15 years. Little Kongresówka [The Congress Kingdom of Poland, the de jure title of the Polish region under Russian control- ed.], with a population of 8.5 million, produces an equivalent of 300 million rubles a year. [1]
We have briefly listed the factors behind the development of Polish capitalism, but the prerequisite for this development was and is access to the Russian sales markets. As the network of railroads expands, the Polish surplus production goes further and further into Russia, and this progress can be followed by leaps in production development. Two-thirds of the entire production of Polish factories is consumed by Russia, the remaining industries depending directly on these main production branches for Russia. The latter, which should be given special attention, are precisely those branches of industry which, for each capitalist country, constitute the basic pillars of big industry: spinning-weaving [i.e. textiles — ed.] and iron. [2]
In this way, the Russian markets have become a vital node for Polish capitalism, and therefore for the entire development of modern Poland.
The dependence of Polish industry on Russian markets has been established long ago and many times. It must be admitted, however, that the Russian government knew how to assess this phenomenon much more deeply and accurately than some Polish socialists. Their only conclusion from this was that the Polish bourgeoisie had no national tendencies. To see nothing else, however — this is to overlook the entire objective and dialectical side of the phenomenon, namely the impact of the Polish-Russian economic relationship on the entire social system of Poland and, consequently, the far-reaching impact of these relations and their development on the issue of Polish independence. However, little attention has been paid to this side of the issue; perhaps that is where the decisive moment in assessing the Polish issue lies.
The general tendency of capitalism to encourage the mingling and interdependence of all elements within a state found no obstacle in relation to Poland and Russia, as the customs border between them had already been abolished. On the one hand, thanks to this tendency, agriculture, craftsmanship and trade in Poland found themselves dependent on large industry, which became the axis of the general social economy, whilst on the other, this axis was directly connected to the entire mechanism of the Russian capitalist economy. Production, exchange, transportation — all of these got tangled up into one big knot between Poland and Russia. It is no longer possible to take on any of these factors in Poland without severely infringing certain interests in Russia, and vice versa. Each economic situation on the Russian farm has a corresponding effect on the Polish farm, and vice versa. Poland and Russia are transforming into one economic mechanism. This fusion follows the development of capitalism. As the surviving forms of production in both countries give way to the modern ones, this relationship becomes stronger and stronger, Polish integration into Russia becoming more and more a vital condition for the former’s existence. [3]
Thus, the tendencies of capitalist development in Poland entail its economic incorporation into the Russian state. It is an objective historical process which depends neither on the will of individuals nor on the will of any party; it is primarily the result of the conditions of production and exchange in Poland. From the viewpoint of national aspirations it is an unfortunate fact, but it would be even sadder if we wanted to shut our eyes and not recognize it. [4]
The course of social development described above has led to the fact that there is no social class in Poland today that would have an interest in rebuilding Poland and, at the same time, the strength to support this interest in practice.
The position of the top class, the bourgeoisie, is clear from what has been said above. While the bourgeoisie of other countries strives to rule over other nations through class interests, in Poland, the bourgeoisie is forced, in the name of the same interests, to submit to someone else’s rule!
The nobility, once the head of Polish society, is now trailing behind the bourgeoisie. The transition to wage labor and the general decline in grain and land prices brought the entire mass of the middle nobility, already burdened with debts, to the brink of economic ruin. A third of noble estates have already slipped from the hands of landowners: 15% have passed into the hands of Jews and Germans, and 15% have been parceled out and given to small producers. The remaining landowners are encumbered with mortgage debt, which amounts to an average of 80%, and in ⅖ of cases 100% and up to 250% of the property value. The entire ⅓ of the property is therefore doomed to subhastation [expropriation due to a court verdict- ed.]. In general, agriculture in Poland can only survive in two completely opposite forms today: either as a large property with an intensive farming applied to the factory processing of products, thus making it indirectly dependent on Russian markets, or as a small property with an antiquated three-field farm, which is able to yield crops only because such a holder forgoes that part of the income in the capitalist enterprise which goes towards rent and profit, or even a part of the wages. Today, the middle-estate landowners — and this Estate was once a proper fighter for national independence — is completely absorbed in a desperate struggle for existence. Their “social agenda” is — to use the words of their present-day spokesmen, Bloch and Górski — a parceling bank and debt relief. [5] It cannot wait for these means of salvation until the future Polish government comes into existence. The bailiff knocking on the door is an argument that forces the ruined Polish agrarian to seek help from the Tsarist government as its only savior; so she crawls on her knees in front of him.
The Polish petty bourgeoisie does not represent a homogeneous mass politically. Some industries (such as clothing manufacture, etc.) benefit directly from the Russian markets; their social program is the craft companies that make it possible to sell “to the East.” These and many other industries profit from the accumulation of capital in the country and thus the increasing internal consumption. They are therefore on the side of the great bourgeoisie. Some crafts, however, feel the competition of big industry directly. The petty bourgeoisie, who are deprived of capital and go bankrupt as a result of antiquated methods of production, have every reason to be dissatisfied with the existing relations. The form in which this dissatisfaction manifests itself naturally arose from the given relations, because large industry is a child of the Russian partition, so the petty bourgeoisie crushed by this industry became the adoptive father of orphaned national aspirations.
The peasantry has no political physiognomy at all. However, just in case, the Russian government, through the “liberation of the serfs,” stuck a wedge between them and the nobility in the form of “servitudes” — an inexhaustible source of quarrels and disputes which make it impossible for these two social classes to reach an agreement thus far. While the Polish peasant could have a political expression, his characteristic trait to this day is the traditional hatred of the nobility and skepticism towards any national movement, from which the peasant suspects swindle from the nobility, as well as the peasant’s crude, servile devotion to the Tsarist government as the supposed liberator of the peasant from the hell of serfdom.
What remains is the so-called bourgeois “intelligentsia.” This small social class, which causes a lot of uproar in countries deprived of political freedom, is recruited in Poland mainly from the fallen nobility and the petty bourgeoisie. At school, as a result of the bestial system of Russification, young people become agitated and patriotic. Later, he views scientific careers, offices and higher military ranks as something inaccessible. As a result, part of the bourgeois intelligentsia at a certain age dream of a homeland and violently clench their fists in their pockets against Moscow’s invasion. All the more, however, they see themselves forced to indulge in the so-called civil professions, and since the industry is still developing, they can easily find the desired subsistence here. Since the “intelligent” youth has thus gained ground underfoot in bourgeois society, he as a mature husband adopts the physiognomy of this society and becomes “sober” and “sane.”
This is more or less the state of today’s Polish society. Connected by capitalist arteries to Russia, it presents only two elements with a nationalist tinge: the already fallen and doomed part of the petty bourgeoisie, and the “intelligentsia,” if it has not yet reached its position. Both suspended in the air, both depicting only a transitional phase, and thus powerless and unable to enflesh their ideals. Therefore, in our opinion, those who think that several hundred thousand proclamations thrown into the country — the pre-capitalist Poland, the Poland of national uprisings — would be able to ignite a national uprising like a thunderbolt, are wrong. For in today’s Poland, as we have seen, the strata that have an interest in rebuilding Poland do not have the strength, and those that do have no interest in this endeavor. That’s not all. While the former Poland with its natural economy, presenting an aggregate of independent serfdom and feudal estates could be freely divided into parts without undermining the contemporary economic system, and therefore without affecting the relevant conditions of existence of the ruling class, today, in order to unite capitalist Poland, it would be necessary to force a complete upheaval in the life interests of the only classes falling into political consideration — the urban population and a large section of the rural.
That leaves the proletariat. Applying the measure of Western European relations to Poland, one could say: if the ruling classes have lowered the banner of national independence, all the more should the proletariat raise it. Such a view, however, in our opinion, would be based on a purely external comparison. If the proletariat in the West raises and adopts as its own the democratic slogans betrayed by the bourgeoisie, it has good reasons for doing so. The proletariat and the bourgeoisie, although they may be two hostile brothers, are nevertheless children of the same social formation — the capitalist one. The latter is itself pregnant with a number of democratic tendencies to which it tries to give life. At first the bourgeoisie becomes the mouthpiece of these tendencies, and to a certain extent then acts as the representative of the whole “people.” As soon as class differences are sharpened to the point that the proletariat enters the political arena, the bourgeoisie gradually betrays its democratic ideals. If, therefore, the proletariat takes up these ideals, it becomes merely the heir of the bourgeoisie and the spokesman of the tendencies of the same capitalist period, and thus remains in harmony with its historical role. In Poland, as we have seen, both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie belong to the social system which arose from the ruins of the national struggle. The banner of Polish independence was not properly betrayed by the bourgeoisie, because independence was never its ideal. It was the ideal of the pre-capitalist, aristocratic, natural-economic period. If, therefore, one demands that the proletariat in Poland accept this program as its own the heritage, it amounts to demanding from the proletariat in Western Europe — to use a truly analogous example — that it accept as its own, for example, the freedom aspirations of feudal, pre-capitalist times — aspirations of which only ideological forms have survived in the capitalist period, but whose material basis, and therefore the means of realization, have long since been irretrievably consigned to the past.
This, of course, cannot be the task of the proletariat. On the contrary, he must, in his endeavors, stand with both feet on the basis of capitalist development. In Poland, however, the same capitalist development which produces the proletariat is pinning Poland more and more firmly to Russia. Both of these results are but two sides of the same process. If the Polish proletariat were to take as its program the independence of Poland, then it would stand against economic development itself. The latter would then not work towards the realization of this task as it works towards the realization of all the other class tasks of the proletariat, but, on the contrary, would create more and more of a chasm between it and its aim. By turning towards the restoration of Poland as a capitalist state, it would turn away from its ultimate goal, from socialism, which is the result of social development; thus, in order to realize this goal, the proletariat must turn its back on the program of the restoration of Poland. The supporters of national aspirations have nothing to gain from economic development; only stagnation, or rather retreat, could give them some ground under their feet. From this it follows that such a program cannot be the program of the proletariat, that as far as its social character is concerned, it is a typical program of the reactionary petty-bourgeoisie. If, therefore, the proletariat adopts this program, it will not, as some believe, attract various elements of the petty bourgeoisie to its side, but on the contrary, despite the fact that these elements are very weak, the proletariat would actually move into their camp.
The lack of space does not allow us to draw all conclusions from the above considerations.
The most important of them are as follows:
1. National aspirations in Poland, aside from their hopelessness, cannot create a serious movement in the country itself, and therefore they cannot be assigned any serious role in the politics of the international proletariat.
2. The positive tasks of the Polish proletariat are exactly analogous to the tasks of the Social Democrats in all other countries. These tasks consist in the democratization of given state conditions. By the fact that Russia and Poland become one capitalist mechanism, the Polish and Russian proletariat become one working class, and their common immediate goal is the overthrow of tsarism.
The fight for political freedom in Russia gives the Polish proletariat the full opportunity to fight not only for its workers’ interests, but at the same time gives it the only opportunity to effectively win autonomous freedom in Poland and thus to guard the endangered Polish nationality.
On the basis of the principles expressed above, there has been Social Democracy in the Kingdom of Poland since its first appearance in 1889. [6]
Footnotes
[1] Due to the lack of space, we can only cite a few articles of data from the rich material provided by official and other sources to demonstrate our point:
The number of spindles in the cotton industry increased from 216,640 to 505,622 (+ 134%) over ten years (1877–1886). At the same time, the increase in the number of spindles in the Russian industry is 32%, in North America (1881–1891) — 29%, in England — 8%. According to the survey conducted in 1886, 25% of large Polish factories were built before 1860, and 75% from 1860 to 1886. The production of Łódź, the main center of the textile industry, in 1860 amounted to 2.6 million rubles, in 1888–40 million rubles. The production of Sosnowiec in 1879 was 0.5 million rubles, in 1885–13.0 million rubles. In the last ten years, Sosnowiec has become the center of the iron and mining industry in Poland.
The industry is in fact much bigger than official statistics show. For example, the total value of production for the year 1890 is not 210 million rubles, but, as can be seen in figures, 300 million. Thus, at present, Poland’s industrial production — in terms of annual value — exceeds agricultural production three times. Data on imports (from Russia) and exports of grain in Poland show that there is already a certain deficit, which must be covered with grain imports. Poland, once a granary of Europe, has thus become a purely industrial country. We derive the above data from the following sources: J. G. Bloch, “Przemysł Królestwa Polskiego od roku 1871 do 1880” [Industry of the Kingdom of Poland from 1871 to 1880], Warsaw 1884, pp. 17 and 151; “Historyczno-statystyczny przegląd przemysłu w Rosji” [Historical-statistical survey of industry in Russia], St. Petersburg 1883, Vol. I, tables XI and XV; “Sprawozdanie urzędowe na wystawę w Chicago” [Official Report for the Chicago Exhibition], Vol. “O przemyśle kopalnianym w Rosji” [On the Manufacturing Industry in Russia], pp. 32, 33 and 113; “Materiały do statystyki handlu i przemysłu w Rosji za rok 1891” [Materials for the Statistics of Trade and Industry in Russia for 1891], St. Petersburg 1894, pp. 124–147; “Sprawozdanie na wystawę w Chicago” [Report for the Chicago Exhibition], volume “O przemyśle fabrycznym w Rosji” [On the Mine Industry in Russia], pp. 59–60 and 91; I. Janżuł, “Zarys historii przemysłu polskiego” [An outline of the history of Polish industry], Moscow 1887, pp. 6 and 39; A.S. “Moskwa i Łódź” [Moscow and Łódź], St. Petersburg 1889, page 17. — Luxemburg’s note.
[2] Here we rely on “Sprawozdaniu komisji dla zbadania polskiego przemysłu fabrycznego” [The Report of the commission for the study of Polish factory industry], St. Petersburg 1888, and other official sources. The reader may also find some data in “Diplomatic and Consular reports on trade and finance,” no. 128, p. 6 and no. 321, p. 7. In the years 1886–1887, ¾ of the industrial products in Łódź were consumed in Russia, and only ¼ in Poland alone. — Luxemburg’s note.
[3] The social-patriots understand this as Poland being “the master of the situation.” “Russia,” they say, “has lagged so far behind in economic development that it is completely dependent on the production of the Kingdom of Poland.” Perhaps the following numbers will teach them reason. According to the quoted “Sprawozdania na wystawę w Chicago” [Report on the Chicago Exhibition], the total value of industrial production in 1890 was:
In all of Russia — 597 million rubles = 13.5 rubles per capita
In the St. Petersburg district — 242 million rubles = 40.0 rubles per capita
In the Moscow district — 460 million rubles = 38.0 rubles per capita
In the Kingdom of Poland — 210 million rubles = 25.0 rubles per capita
[4] It can be judged from this just how “deeply” social-patriotism understands things, as it claims that this objective historical process is our “program demand.” Namely, they claim that the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland [SDKP] “demands” the organic incorporation of Poland into Russia. It is an assertion which makes as much sense as the statements of the bourgeoisie, which claim that the Social Democrats “demand” the destruction of the petty bourgeoisie, the abolition of the family, etc. — Luxemburg’s Note.
[5] We derive the above given data from, among others, the works of: J. G. Bloch, “Ziemia i jej oddłużenie” [The Earth and its debt relief], Warsaw 1890, and “Kredyt melioracyjny i stan rolnictwa” [Melioration credit and the condition of agriculture], Warsaw 1892; then from the work of L. Górski, “Nasze błędy w gospodarstwie folwarcznym” [Our errors in the farm], Warsaw 1874, and from “Encyklopedii Rolniczej” [The Agricultural Encyclopedia], volume I, Warsaw 1890. Some data can also be found in “Foreign Office, Miscallen Series” №347: “Report on the Position of Landed Proprietors in Poland” and №355: “Report on the peasantry and peasant holdings in Poland.” — Luxemburg’s note.
[6] Rosa Luxemburg has in mind “The Union of Polish Workers” — Ed.
In this comprehensive work, originally titled “Socjalpatriotyzm w Polsce” published in the German Social-Democratic magazine “Neue Zeit”, 1895/96, no. 41, Rosa Luxemburg tried to show the economic reasons for the integration of Poland into Russia, which rendered any programmatic point about the restoration of independent Poland unviable and contradictory for Social-Democracy at that time. “From the viewpoint of national aspirations it is an unfortunate fact, but it would be even sadder if we wanted to shut our eyes and not recognize it,” she judged. But here we also see her materialist approach, which refuses to project any concrete affairs onto the broader situation and avoids generalizations:
“Applying the measure of Western European relations to Poland, one could say: if the ruling classes have lowered the banner of national independence, all the more should the proletariat raise it. Such a view, however, in our opinion, would be based on a purely external comparison”
This is followed by a Marxist exposition of economic development and how it affects daily struggles, through which the author makes clear the differences between West European and the Polish proletariat, who have objectively similar aims, but vastly dissimilar conditions.
Luxemburg not only utilizes many sources — technical and statistical — but also analyses every aspect of Polish class situation and its standpoint with respect to nationalism. She doesn’t resort to a mechanistic advocation or a principled rejection of any slogan, but rather gauges at the core source of these slogans and juxtaposes it to everyday realities. In a sense, this work is a nascent version of Luxemburg’s PhD thesis — “The Industrial Development of Poland,” which she would write three years later.
The Polish original comes from “Rosa Luxemburg — Selected Works,” Volume 1 (in Polish), Warsaw 1959.
The Acheron In Motion thanks Jan Michalik and Benjamin Ashton, who made translating and publishing this piece possible.
Rosa Luxemburg — Social-Patriotism in Poland
Since the unification of Poland was declared a postulate of the proletarian foreign policy, many things have changed in the world. The political situation of Europe looks different now: The center of attention has shifted from the East, from the Polish question, to the German-French border. Now, the tactic of the struggling proletariat looks differently. In 1848, its political fight was a fight on the barricades and its main enemy was the bayonet. It would then be advisable to separate yourself from the reaction’s reserve — the Russian bayonets — with the help of a physical wall, and independent Poland was to become this wall. Today the proletariat wages a daily political struggle and in no way wants to be provoked into the streets. In this situation, it is not the Russian bayonets that are dangerous for it, but the reactionary influence of Russia on Europe. This influence however, cannot be destroyed with a physical wall, but with the obliterating of Tsarism in its own country.
Fortunately, many things have changed in Russia as well: it isn’t in absolute social apathy that it found itself in just thirty years ago, its foundation being undermined by a young mole — capitalism, which guarantees the annihilation of absolutism from within. Russia not only has bayonets, but also the struggling proletariat, the latter being precisely the most natural guarantee of Europe’s liberation from the suffocating nightmare of Petersburg’s autocracy, with the Polish proletarians being the most natural ally of the Russian proletarians in the daily struggle for political freedom in their common prison.
Western European socialists’ judgements of Polish national aspirations usually bear the characteristic trait that they infer the domestic social nature of these aspirations in Poland from the role ascribed to them in the context of European international relations. On the contrary, we should evaluate the significance of Polish national aspirations for Europe through the traits that these trends must have in Poland alone, as a result of the existing social conditions there. Here, we briefly outline these relations, limiting ourselves to one part of Poland — in this case the most important one — Poland under the Russian Partition.
The peasant reform of 1864 put an end to noble-national [szlachecko-narodowym] uprisings in Poland. Without the peasants, the nobility [“nobility” is the English word we’ve chosen for the szlachta, which shall be translated as such from this point forward — ed.] could not overthrow Russian rule. On the other hand, a victory with the help of the peasants was conditioned on the abolition of serfdom as the only means of winning over the peasantry to the noble movement, and thus on the most terrible economic disaster for the nobility, a disaster that would deprive their political victory of its essence and would render all their struggle senseless. Noble uprisings had to clash against this contradiction, and it was precisely this opposition between the nobility and the peasantry that ensured the Russian government the role of tertius gaudens [Latin for “a rejoicing third,” signifying a third party, which benefits from a given dispute — ed.] and the possibility of keeping the nobility in check and paralyzing their movements. The epilogue of the national struggle — the peasant reform, completely reshaped the economic landscape of the country, fundamentally overturned the noble economy, and thus abolished the material terrain in which the roots of the national movements were planted.
From the 1860s onward Poland — which at that time was still a predominantly agricultural country with a natural economy, separated from Russia by a customs border until 1851, living an economic life closed in on itself so to speak — has been carried away by the current of proper capitalist development: big industry entering the country. The abolition of the Russian-Polish customs border, the liberation of the serfs in Russia in 1861 [the Emancipation Edict — ed.], the related development of the monetary economy, and the large-scale construction of railroads commenced in the 1860s and 1870s — all of this resulting in Poland becoming connected with all regions of Russia. Finally, since the 70s, a system of custom duties has been introduced, which gave the Russian markets the exclusive right to exploit domestic manufacturers and receive 40–60% of their profits — all of this making the Polish industry into a paradise of primitive accumulation, where it grew like mushrooms after rain. The period of hectic factory establishment began, and production grew to such an extent during the two decades of 1870–1890 that it surpassed everything in the industrial field threefold in comparison to the previous 50 years. Łódź and Sosnowiec turned from settlements into large industrial cities within 25 or 15 years. Little Kongresówka [The Congress Kingdom of Poland, the de jure title of the Polish region under Russian control- ed.], with a population of 8.5 million, produces an equivalent of 300 million rubles a year. [1]
We have briefly listed the factors behind the development of Polish capitalism, but the prerequisite for this development was and is access to the Russian sales markets. As the network of railroads expands, the Polish surplus production goes further and further into Russia, and this progress can be followed by leaps in production development. Two-thirds of the entire production of Polish factories is consumed by Russia, the remaining industries depending directly on these main production branches for Russia. The latter, which should be given special attention, are precisely those branches of industry which, for each capitalist country, constitute the basic pillars of big industry: spinning-weaving [i.e. textiles — ed.] and iron. [2]
In this way, the Russian markets have become a vital node for Polish capitalism, and therefore for the entire development of modern Poland.
The dependence of Polish industry on Russian markets has been established long ago and many times. It must be admitted, however, that the Russian government knew how to assess this phenomenon much more deeply and accurately than some Polish socialists. Their only conclusion from this was that the Polish bourgeoisie had no national tendencies. To see nothing else, however — this is to overlook the entire objective and dialectical side of the phenomenon, namely the impact of the Polish-Russian economic relationship on the entire social system of Poland and, consequently, the far-reaching impact of these relations and their development on the issue of Polish independence. However, little attention has been paid to this side of the issue; perhaps that is where the decisive moment in assessing the Polish issue lies.
The general tendency of capitalism to encourage the mingling and interdependence of all elements within a state found no obstacle in relation to Poland and Russia, as the customs border between them had already been abolished. On the one hand, thanks to this tendency, agriculture, craftsmanship and trade in Poland found themselves dependent on large industry, which became the axis of the general social economy, whilst on the other, this axis was directly connected to the entire mechanism of the Russian capitalist economy. Production, exchange, transportation — all of these got tangled up into one big knot between Poland and Russia. It is no longer possible to take on any of these factors in Poland without severely infringing certain interests in Russia, and vice versa. Each economic situation on the Russian farm has a corresponding effect on the Polish farm, and vice versa. Poland and Russia are transforming into one economic mechanism. This fusion follows the development of capitalism. As the surviving forms of production in both countries give way to the modern ones, this relationship becomes stronger and stronger, Polish integration into Russia becoming more and more a vital condition for the former’s existence. [3]
Thus, the tendencies of capitalist development in Poland entail its economic incorporation into the Russian state. It is an objective historical process which depends neither on the will of individuals nor on the will of any party; it is primarily the result of the conditions of production and exchange in Poland. From the viewpoint of national aspirations it is an unfortunate fact, but it would be even sadder if we wanted to shut our eyes and not recognize it. [4]
The course of social development described above has led to the fact that there is no social class in Poland today that would have an interest in rebuilding Poland and, at the same time, the strength to support this interest in practice.
The position of the top class, the bourgeoisie, is clear from what has been said above. While the bourgeoisie of other countries strives to rule over other nations through class interests, in Poland, the bourgeoisie is forced, in the name of the same interests, to submit to someone else’s rule!
The nobility, once the head of Polish society, is now trailing behind the bourgeoisie. The transition to wage labor and the general decline in grain and land prices brought the entire mass of the middle nobility, already burdened with debts, to the brink of economic ruin. A third of noble estates have already slipped from the hands of landowners: 15% have passed into the hands of Jews and Germans, and 15% have been parceled out and given to small producers. The remaining landowners are encumbered with mortgage debt, which amounts to an average of 80%, and in ⅖ of cases 100% and up to 250% of the property value. The entire ⅓ of the property is therefore doomed to subhastation [expropriation due to a court verdict- ed.]. In general, agriculture in Poland can only survive in two completely opposite forms today: either as a large property with an intensive farming applied to the factory processing of products, thus making it indirectly dependent on Russian markets, or as a small property with an antiquated three-field farm, which is able to yield crops only because such a holder forgoes that part of the income in the capitalist enterprise which goes towards rent and profit, or even a part of the wages. Today, the middle-estate landowners — and this Estate was once a proper fighter for national independence — is completely absorbed in a desperate struggle for existence. Their “social agenda” is — to use the words of their present-day spokesmen, Bloch and Górski — a parceling bank and debt relief. [5] It cannot wait for these means of salvation until the future Polish government comes into existence. The bailiff knocking on the door is an argument that forces the ruined Polish agrarian to seek help from the Tsarist government as its only savior; so she crawls on her knees in front of him.
The Polish petty bourgeoisie does not represent a homogeneous mass politically. Some industries (such as clothing manufacture, etc.) benefit directly from the Russian markets; their social program is the craft companies that make it possible to sell “to the East.” These and many other industries profit from the accumulation of capital in the country and thus the increasing internal consumption. They are therefore on the side of the great bourgeoisie. Some crafts, however, feel the competition of big industry directly. The petty bourgeoisie, who are deprived of capital and go bankrupt as a result of antiquated methods of production, have every reason to be dissatisfied with the existing relations. The form in which this dissatisfaction manifests itself naturally arose from the given relations, because large industry is a child of the Russian partition, so the petty bourgeoisie crushed by this industry became the adoptive father of orphaned national aspirations.
The peasantry has no political physiognomy at all. However, just in case, the Russian government, through the “liberation of the serfs,” stuck a wedge between them and the nobility in the form of “servitudes” — an inexhaustible source of quarrels and disputes which make it impossible for these two social classes to reach an agreement thus far. While the Polish peasant could have a political expression, his characteristic trait to this day is the traditional hatred of the nobility and skepticism towards any national movement, from which the peasant suspects swindle from the nobility, as well as the peasant’s crude, servile devotion to the Tsarist government as the supposed liberator of the peasant from the hell of serfdom.
What remains is the so-called bourgeois “intelligentsia.” This small social class, which causes a lot of uproar in countries deprived of political freedom, is recruited in Poland mainly from the fallen nobility and the petty bourgeoisie. At school, as a result of the bestial system of Russification, young people become agitated and patriotic. Later, he views scientific careers, offices and higher military ranks as something inaccessible. As a result, part of the bourgeois intelligentsia at a certain age dream of a homeland and violently clench their fists in their pockets against Moscow’s invasion. All the more, however, they see themselves forced to indulge in the so-called civil professions, and since the industry is still developing, they can easily find the desired subsistence here. Since the “intelligent” youth has thus gained ground underfoot in bourgeois society, he as a mature husband adopts the physiognomy of this society and becomes “sober” and “sane.”
This is more or less the state of today’s Polish society. Connected by capitalist arteries to Russia, it presents only two elements with a nationalist tinge: the already fallen and doomed part of the petty bourgeoisie, and the “intelligentsia,” if it has not yet reached its position. Both suspended in the air, both depicting only a transitional phase, and thus powerless and unable to enflesh their ideals. Therefore, in our opinion, those who think that several hundred thousand proclamations thrown into the country — the pre-capitalist Poland, the Poland of national uprisings — would be able to ignite a national uprising like a thunderbolt, are wrong. For in today’s Poland, as we have seen, the strata that have an interest in rebuilding Poland do not have the strength, and those that do have no interest in this endeavor. That’s not all. While the former Poland with its natural economy, presenting an aggregate of independent serfdom and feudal estates could be freely divided into parts without undermining the contemporary economic system, and therefore without affecting the relevant conditions of existence of the ruling class, today, in order to unite capitalist Poland, it would be necessary to force a complete upheaval in the life interests of the only classes falling into political consideration — the urban population and a large section of the rural.
That leaves the proletariat. Applying the measure of Western European relations to Poland, one could say: if the ruling classes have lowered the banner of national independence, all the more should the proletariat raise it. Such a view, however, in our opinion, would be based on a purely external comparison. If the proletariat in the West raises and adopts as its own the democratic slogans betrayed by the bourgeoisie, it has good reasons for doing so. The proletariat and the bourgeoisie, although they may be two hostile brothers, are nevertheless children of the same social formation — the capitalist one. The latter is itself pregnant with a number of democratic tendencies to which it tries to give life. At first the bourgeoisie becomes the mouthpiece of these tendencies, and to a certain extent then acts as the representative of the whole “people.” As soon as class differences are sharpened to the point that the proletariat enters the political arena, the bourgeoisie gradually betrays its democratic ideals. If, therefore, the proletariat takes up these ideals, it becomes merely the heir of the bourgeoisie and the spokesman of the tendencies of the same capitalist period, and thus remains in harmony with its historical role. In Poland, as we have seen, both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie belong to the social system which arose from the ruins of the national struggle. The banner of Polish independence was not properly betrayed by the bourgeoisie, because independence was never its ideal. It was the ideal of the pre-capitalist, aristocratic, natural-economic period. If, therefore, one demands that the proletariat in Poland accept this program as its own the heritage, it amounts to demanding from the proletariat in Western Europe — to use a truly analogous example — that it accept as its own, for example, the freedom aspirations of feudal, pre-capitalist times — aspirations of which only ideological forms have survived in the capitalist period, but whose material basis, and therefore the means of realization, have long since been irretrievably consigned to the past.
This, of course, cannot be the task of the proletariat. On the contrary, he must, in his endeavors, stand with both feet on the basis of capitalist development. In Poland, however, the same capitalist development which produces the proletariat is pinning Poland more and more firmly to Russia. Both of these results are but two sides of the same process. If the Polish proletariat were to take as its program the independence of Poland, then it would stand against economic development itself. The latter would then not work towards the realization of this task as it works towards the realization of all the other class tasks of the proletariat, but, on the contrary, would create more and more of a chasm between it and its aim. By turning towards the restoration of Poland as a capitalist state, it would turn away from its ultimate goal, from socialism, which is the result of social development; thus, in order to realize this goal, the proletariat must turn its back on the program of the restoration of Poland. The supporters of national aspirations have nothing to gain from economic development; only stagnation, or rather retreat, could give them some ground under their feet. From this it follows that such a program cannot be the program of the proletariat, that as far as its social character is concerned, it is a typical program of the reactionary petty-bourgeoisie. If, therefore, the proletariat adopts this program, it will not, as some believe, attract various elements of the petty bourgeoisie to its side, but on the contrary, despite the fact that these elements are very weak, the proletariat would actually move into their camp.
The lack of space does not allow us to draw all conclusions from the above considerations.
The most important of them are as follows:
1. National aspirations in Poland, aside from their hopelessness, cannot create a serious movement in the country itself, and therefore they cannot be assigned any serious role in the politics of the international proletariat.
2. The positive tasks of the Polish proletariat are exactly analogous to the tasks of the Social Democrats in all other countries. These tasks consist in the democratization of given state conditions. By the fact that Russia and Poland become one capitalist mechanism, the Polish and Russian proletariat become one working class, and their common immediate goal is the overthrow of tsarism.
The fight for political freedom in Russia gives the Polish proletariat the full opportunity to fight not only for its workers’ interests, but at the same time gives it the only opportunity to effectively win autonomous freedom in Poland and thus to guard the endangered Polish nationality.
On the basis of the principles expressed above, there has been Social Democracy in the Kingdom of Poland since its first appearance in 1889. [6]
Footnotes
[1] Due to the lack of space, we can only cite a few articles of data from the rich material provided by official and other sources to demonstrate our point:
The number of spindles in the cotton industry increased from 216,640 to 505,622 (+ 134%) over ten years (1877–1886). At the same time, the increase in the number of spindles in the Russian industry is 32%, in North America (1881–1891) — 29%, in England — 8%. According to the survey conducted in 1886, 25% of large Polish factories were built before 1860, and 75% from 1860 to 1886. The production of Łódź, the main center of the textile industry, in 1860 amounted to 2.6 million rubles, in 1888–40 million rubles. The production of Sosnowiec in 1879 was 0.5 million rubles, in 1885–13.0 million rubles. In the last ten years, Sosnowiec has become the center of the iron and mining industry in Poland.
The industry is in fact much bigger than official statistics show. For example, the total value of production for the year 1890 is not 210 million rubles, but, as can be seen in figures, 300 million. Thus, at present, Poland’s industrial production — in terms of annual value — exceeds agricultural production three times. Data on imports (from Russia) and exports of grain in Poland show that there is already a certain deficit, which must be covered with grain imports. Poland, once a granary of Europe, has thus become a purely industrial country. We derive the above data from the following sources: J. G. Bloch, “Przemysł Królestwa Polskiego od roku 1871 do 1880” [Industry of the Kingdom of Poland from 1871 to 1880], Warsaw 1884, pp. 17 and 151; “Historyczno-statystyczny przegląd przemysłu w Rosji” [Historical-statistical survey of industry in Russia], St. Petersburg 1883, Vol. I, tables XI and XV; “Sprawozdanie urzędowe na wystawę w Chicago” [Official Report for the Chicago Exhibition], Vol. “O przemyśle kopalnianym w Rosji” [On the Manufacturing Industry in Russia], pp. 32, 33 and 113; “Materiały do statystyki handlu i przemysłu w Rosji za rok 1891” [Materials for the Statistics of Trade and Industry in Russia for 1891], St. Petersburg 1894, pp. 124–147; “Sprawozdanie na wystawę w Chicago” [Report for the Chicago Exhibition], volume “O przemyśle fabrycznym w Rosji” [On the Mine Industry in Russia], pp. 59–60 and 91; I. Janżuł, “Zarys historii przemysłu polskiego” [An outline of the history of Polish industry], Moscow 1887, pp. 6 and 39; A.S. “Moskwa i Łódź” [Moscow and Łódź], St. Petersburg 1889, page 17. — Luxemburg’s note.
[2] Here we rely on “Sprawozdaniu komisji dla zbadania polskiego przemysłu fabrycznego” [The Report of the commission for the study of Polish factory industry], St. Petersburg 1888, and other official sources. The reader may also find some data in “Diplomatic and Consular reports on trade and finance,” no. 128, p. 6 and no. 321, p. 7. In the years 1886–1887, ¾ of the industrial products in Łódź were consumed in Russia, and only ¼ in Poland alone. — Luxemburg’s note.
[3] The social-patriots understand this as Poland being “the master of the situation.” “Russia,” they say, “has lagged so far behind in economic development that it is completely dependent on the production of the Kingdom of Poland.” Perhaps the following numbers will teach them reason. According to the quoted “Sprawozdania na wystawę w Chicago” [Report on the Chicago Exhibition], the total value of industrial production in 1890 was:
In all of Russia — 597 million rubles = 13.5 rubles per capita
In the St. Petersburg district — 242 million rubles = 40.0 rubles per capita
In the Moscow district — 460 million rubles = 38.0 rubles per capita
In the Kingdom of Poland — 210 million rubles = 25.0 rubles per capita
[4] It can be judged from this just how “deeply” social-patriotism understands things, as it claims that this objective historical process is our “program demand.” Namely, they claim that the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland [SDKP] “demands” the organic incorporation of Poland into Russia. It is an assertion which makes as much sense as the statements of the bourgeoisie, which claim that the Social Democrats “demand” the destruction of the petty bourgeoisie, the abolition of the family, etc. — Luxemburg’s Note.
[5] We derive the above given data from, among others, the works of: J. G. Bloch, “Ziemia i jej oddłużenie” [The Earth and its debt relief], Warsaw 1890, and “Kredyt melioracyjny i stan rolnictwa” [Melioration credit and the condition of agriculture], Warsaw 1892; then from the work of L. Górski, “Nasze błędy w gospodarstwie folwarcznym” [Our errors in the farm], Warsaw 1874, and from “Encyklopedii Rolniczej” [The Agricultural Encyclopedia], volume I, Warsaw 1890. Some data can also be found in “Foreign Office, Miscallen Series” №347: “Report on the Position of Landed Proprietors in Poland” and №355: “Report on the peasantry and peasant holdings in Poland.” — Luxemburg’s note.
[6] Rosa Luxemburg has in mind “The Union of Polish Workers” — Ed.
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