March 10, 2026
ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Sherry Tao Kong and Maria Monica Wihardja
The expansion of the middle-class has long been viewed as an indicator of successful development.[1] In China, large-scale poverty reduction under an industrialisation-led growth model beginning in the late 1970s was accompanied by sustained wage growth and the gradual expansion of social insurance. This allowed income gains to translate into greater economic security and the emergence of a large middle-class that has since consolidated.[2] Indonesia’s experience, however, presents a more fragile trajectory. Despite significant progress in lifting people out of poverty, middle-class expansion has slowed and even reversed in recent times.
Indonesia’s secure middle-class share has declined since 2018, while nearly half of the population remains economically insecure despite being no longer poor or near poor. Many households that have moved beyond poverty and near poverty remain exposed to income volatility, informal employment, and limited social protection. Stagnant real wages, weak manufacturing and high-end service sector growth, and rising informality have constrained upward mobility, while recent episodes of social unrest point to growing anxiety among those who are not poor or near poor but who remain economically insecure.
This Perspective argues that the central challenge facing Indonesia—and many middle-income economies in Southeast Asia—is not only how to expand the middle-class, but how to ensure that its expansion is resilient and durable. It advances a conceptual framework for middle-class resilience, defined as the capacity of households to sustain their economic position over time, absorb shocks, and convert income gains into lasting welfare and political stability. By comparing Indonesia with the case of China, the analysis shows how labour market conditions, social protection systems, structural transformation, and the fiscal capacity–governance nexus shape middle-class outcomes.
DEFINING THE MIDDLE-CLASS
Globally, there is no consensus when it comes to identifying the middle-class. Commonly adopted approaches include absolute (fixed) income (or expenditure) cutoffs, relative positions within the income distribution, and subjective self-identification. In Indonesia, the National Statistics Agency uses an absolute measure to define the middle-class where the cutoff values are based on economic vulnerability, following the approach used in the World Bank’s middle-class report for Latin America.[3]
It groups individuals into five economic classes:[4]
Poor: Those who live below the poverty line.
Vulnerable (near poor): Those who live above the poverty line but face more than a ten-percent probability of becoming poor in the following year.
Aspiring middle-class: Those who are neither poor nor vulnerable but face more than a ten-percent probability of becoming vulnerable in the following year.
Middle-class: Those who face less than a ten-percent probability of falling into poverty or vulnerability but face greater than a ten-percent probability of falling into the aspiring middle-class during the following year.
Upper-class: Those who face less than a ten-percent probability of falling into aspiring middle class or below in the following year.
With this definition, the middle-class are those who are relatively free from economic insecurity. Using the calculation described in Appendix 1 to set the expenditure threshold for each class category, the middle-class threshold is set at 3.5 to 17 times the poverty line. In 2024, this translates into those who consume IDR2.04 million-IDR9.91 million per capita expenditure per month (approximately USD136-USD661 per capita expenditure per month or USD6.5K-32K per household per year).
Figure 1: Indonesia’s household expenditure distribution (2010-2024)
Source: Susenas, 2010-2024; authors’ calculations. Note: Horizontal lines are indicated in the graph as higher and lower bounds for identifying middle class in Indonesia: 3.5-17 x national poverty line per capita expenditure per month.
Figure 1 shows that Indonesia’s middle-class consolidation has proven fragile. Although the middle-class was the fastest-growing expenditure group during the 2010s, its share has declined since 2018, with many households slipping back into the aspiring middle-class and the vulnerable class. This reversal reflects income volatility and limited access to social protection, particularly among wage earners without stable contracts or adequate employment protections. More fundamentally, the types and quality of jobs created over the past two decades have not generated sufficient upward mobility to absorb a substantial share of the aspiring middle-class into secure middle-class status.
Using Indonesia’s national definition of the middle-class, in 2024, Indonesia’s middle-class was estimated to have reached 47.9 million or only 17.1 percent of total population. It peaked at 22.5 percent in 2018 before declining to a share similar to that of a decade ago (2014). The middle-class lies between the 82nd and 99th percentiles of the consumption distribution.[5] Note that when an absolute measure is used, the middle-class does not necessarily comprise those in the ‘middle’ of the income or expenditure distribution as seen in the case of Indonesia.
Figure 2: China’s household income distribution (2010-2024)
Source: CFPS data and authors’ calculation. Note: Horizontal lines are indicated in the graph as higher and lower bounds for identifying the middle class in China: 80K-400K in 2010, 2012; 90K-450K in 2014, 2016; 100K-500K in 2018 and after, per household per year. The 2024 data is still preliminary.
China’s middle-class consolidation contrasts sharply with that of Indonesia. Like Indonesia, China adopts the absolute measure approach for its national definition of the middle-class albeit using income instead of expenditure. China’s National Bureau of Statistics categorises households into three income groups: low-income, middle-income and high-income. It defines the middle-income-group, a loosely comparable notion to the middle-class, using an absolute measure, namely those who earn RMB100K-500K (approximately USD14K-71K) per household per year in 2018 and after.
Figure 2 shows that over the past decade, China’s income distribution has shifted from a steep pyramid toward a more ‘elongated vase’, reflecting a broad-based expansion of middle-income households.[6] While income dispersion remains and mobility across income groups is substantial, the middle of the distribution has thickened over time, reflecting a net expansion of middle-income households. This structural shift has been supported in part by sustained wage growth and rising formal employment; these have helped reduce the risk of large-scale backsliding even as income mobility remains high. In 2022, China’s middle-class is estimated to have reached 591 million people or close to 40 percent of total households, up from 14.4 percent in 2012, to lie neatly between the 53rd and 97th percentiles of the income distribution.
WHY THE MIDDLE-CLASS MATTERS
In Indonesia, the middle-class contributes significantly to national consumption. Indonesia’s middle-class accounted for 38 percent of total household consumption in 2024, which was disproportionately larger than the 17 percent share of the middle-class in the population.[7] Indonesia’s economy is largely driven by household consumption, which contributes a robust 53 percent of GDP. Robust domestic consumption, fueled by the middle-class, is therefore not just desirable; it is a strategic necessity for economic resilience and sustained growth. Moreover, a 2024 study in Indonesia shows that the middle-class contributed 51 percent of total tax revenues despite only receiving 9 percent of total government subsidies.[8]
Aside from its economic significance, a resilient middle-class is often correlated with greater political stability. Global experiences including Thailand,[9] Brazil,[10] and Indonesia[11] show that a fragile middle-class easily generates political instability. A recent study by Basri (2026) shows a strong correlation between social unrest intensity and middle-class shrinkage among emerging markets between 2019 and 2024.[12] This segment of the population is distinctly more educated than those in poorer sections of the population and typically make demands for better governance, transparency, and public services.[13] In Indonesia, more than one in four individuals aged 15 or older in the middle-class have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree, compared to only 9 percent or lower of those in the less economically secure class groups (Figure 3). Their political participation – whether through formal politics, civil society, or consumer activism – shapes national agendas and fosters more responsive institutions.
The middle-class is also distinct from other class groups in their consumption patterns and in quality of jobs. The middle-class spends more on non-food items than food items, unlike the more vulnerable class groups (Figure 4). They drive demand in key sectors such as automobiles, education, healthcare, entertainment, travel, and e-commerce, and they invest more in their children’s education and help break intergenerational poverty.[14] Moreover, Indonesia’s middle-class mostly work as wage employees in formal employment unlike those in lower-class groups who mostly work in the informal employment (Figure 5).
Figure 3: Highest Educational Attainment for Population Aged 15 and Above in 2024
(Indonesia)
Figure 4: Average Share of Food and Non-Food Items by Income Class in 2022 (Indonesia)
Figure 5: Employment Status in 2024 (Indonesia)
Like Indonesia, China’s middle-class carries significant economic weight and exhibits stronger educational and occupational advantages compared to the low-income group. In 2022, it accounted for nearly half of total household consumption, exceeding its share of the population. Middle-income households in China have substantially higher educational attainment and spend more on non-food items compared to low-income households (Appendix Figure 1-2). They are more closely linked to formal employment in public and private enterprises compared to low-income households (Appendix Figure 3).
THE PILLARS OF MIDDLE-CLASS RESILIENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALAYSIS
This section develops a framework organised around four pillars—quality jobs, structural transformation, social protection, and the fiscal capacity-governance nexus—to explain why poverty reduction has been more likely to translate into middle-class consolidation in China, while that class has remained more fragile in Indonesia. These pillars are inter-related. Structural transformation shapes the availability of productive jobs, which in turn determines labour market formality and wage dynamics, while social protection, fiscal capacity and governance provide the conditions in which income risks are managed over the life cycle. By using China as a benchmark for middle-class consolidation, the analysis of Indonesia’s case yields lessons for other middle-income economies across Southeast Asia.
Structural Transformation and Productivity
Structural transformation forms the foundation of middle-class resilience and shapes the economy’s capacity to generate productive, well-paying jobs. Middle-class expansion is more likely to be durable when labour moves into higher-productivity sectors and occupations that support sustained wage growth, rather than into low-productivity activities that limit earnings and job upgrading, and reinforce informality.
Indonesia’s structural transformation has been limited. Investment has increasingly been oriented towards resource-based activities and capital-intensive sectors, while labour-intensive manufacturing has failed to expand.[15] The high-end services sector has also been constrained by a limited supply of high-skill workers. While labour has transitioned away from the low-productivity agricultural sector, it has primarily been absorbed by the low-end services sector.[16] As a result, job creation has been concentrated in low-productivity services and informal activities, limiting wage growth and reinforcing employment precarity. This pattern helps explain why employment expansion has not translated into more substantial middle-class consolidation, despite rising consumption.
In contrast to Indonesia’s limited structural transformation, partly attributed to ‘premature deindustrialisation’ starting in the early 2000s, China’s middle-class expansion was underpinned by a sustained shift of labour into manufacturing and, more recently, to technology- and knowledge-intensive activities.[17] This transformation raised productivity and created large numbers of wage-paying jobs in the formal sector capable of supporting income growth over time. While not all employment has been high-quality, and regional disparities persist, the overall structure of growth has generated the productive jobs needed to sustain a broad middle-income group.
The contrast highlights a core vulnerability. In Indonesia, household consumption accounts for a large share of GDP—around 53 per cent—yet this consumption-led growth has not been matched by a productivity-driven employment base. Without deeper structural transformation into sectors that generate ‘good jobs’, middle-class expansion is likely to remain fragile.
Quality Jobs
Labour market conditions are central to middle-class resilience in Indonesia, since wages (labour incomes) are the primary income source for its middle-income households. Stable real-wage growth and access to formal employment reduce income volatility and help households sustain middle-class living standards, while stagnant wages and informality increase the risk of backsliding.
Indonesia’s trajectory is concerning in this regard. Real wages have stagnated since around 2017, a reversal of the pre-2017 trend when real wages grew by 4.2 percent annually between 2010 and 2017.[18] Job creation has increasingly occurred in the informal sector rather than in the formal sector, reversing the long-term trend of formalisation.[19] It is notable that the issue here is not in job creation but in job quality. Recent shifts have weakened earnings stability and reduced access to employment-linked protections; this contributes directly to the decline since 2018 of the secure middle-class. The pattern reflects a structural change in labour market dynamics rather than a temporary cyclical slowdown.
In contrast to Indonesia’s recent labour-market trajectory, middle-income households in China have a mix of relatively secure formal employment in the public sector and private enterprises, alongside owning private businesses and self-employment. Wages in China account for around 70 per cent of middle-class income. While income mobility remains high and some downward movement persists, sustained wage growth has ensured that upward mobility has, on balance, exceeded downward mobility.
Social Protection
While labour market conditions and structural transformation establish the foundation for middle-class incomes, access to essential services and social protection determines whether those gains can be sustained in the face of economic shocks. Social protection is however not a substitute for decent jobs.[20] The extent and effectiveness of the safety nets thus constitute a third pillar of middle-class resilience.
Due to lack of access to social protection programmes, Indonesia’s middle-class has been described by some as ‘consuming like the middle-class but living with the anxiety of the poor’, reflecting limited insurance coverage and high exposure to health and economic shocks. Indonesia’s situation is characterised by a heavy reliance on private services (for those who can afford them) that have emerged in lieu of public alternatives that remain underdeveloped. For example, while 49 percent of government employees have a pension fund, this is true only for 12 percent of private-sector employees.[21] The share of workers in household enterprises with a pension fund is only 0.18 per cent. Moreover, while 75 percent of government employees have health insurance, only 69 percent of private-sector employees and less than 3 percent of workers in household enterprises do.[22] This qualitative dimension of fragility is evident in expenditure patterns, where middle-class households allocate a significant share of their spending to private health and education—a defensive strategy that drains resources which could otherwise be saved or invested for upward mobility.[23] The under-provision of public social protection also shifts risk management onto households, leaving them financially exposed. Without a functional safety net, the economic security of the middle-class remains provisional.
In contrast, the expansion of social insurance in China has proceeded in tandem with middle-class growth, providing a measurable degree of security. Coverage for medical insurance and old-age pensions exceeds 57 per cent of the relevant population, reflecting a systematic effort to build a broad-based safety net.[24] Although the social protection system, while extensive, remains incomplete, institutional backing has helped to cushion middle-income households against health emergencies and retirement insecurity, reducing the risk that a single shock could push them back into poverty.
The contrast between China’s institutionalised, albeit incomplete, system, and Indonesia’s fragmented, individually financed model, underscores the fact that the durability of the middle- class depends not only on the ability to earn a stable income but also on the collective capacity to pool risks and ensure general access to essential services.
Fiscal Capacity and Governance
The state’s capacity to mobilise resources, deliver services, and maintain public trust plays an important role in determining whether the economic foundations of middle-class resilience can be fully realised. Labour markets, structural transformation, and social protection do not operate in an institutional vacuum; their effectiveness is mediated by fiscal capacity and the governance pact between the state and its citizens.
Revenue mobilisation is the bedrock of state capacity, enabling investments in public goods that support middle-class stability. However, Indonesia struggles with low tax revenues relative to its economy, constraining the government’s ability to fund essential services.[25] This fiscal gap undermines the very public investments needed to consolidate the gains made from poverty reduction, leaving the middle-class exposed to underfunded systems.
State capacity and service delivery determine whether revenue translates into tangible benefits for households. When the state provides quality education, healthcare and infrastructure efficiently, it reinforces middle-class trust and reduces the need for costly private alternatives. In Indonesia, however, perceived inefficiency or corruption in public service delivery erodes confidence; this prompts households to opt for private services as a rational choice that, in turn, weakens the tax base and perpetuates underinvestment in public services. This vicious cycle highlights the fact that effective governance is not merely about collecting taxes but about demonstrating credible delivery to secure citizen buy-in.
In contrast, in China, rapid economic growth has expanded the tax base, allowing for substantial public spending on infrastructure, education and healthcare. These are key drivers of productivity and household security. Access to quality education, healthcare and infrastructure has also reduced the need for costly private services.
The dynamics of the above four pillars produce a critical political economy feedback loop. A resilient middle-class tends to support long-term investment and fiscal capacity, and thus becomes a stabilising force, while a large, fragile ‘aspirational’ class—no longer poor or near poor but lacking economic security—can fuel grievances and populism, undermining the very policies that can foster long-term resilience.[26] While a state that delivers on its promises nurtures a resilient, tax-compliant middle-class, a mismatch between rising expectations for public services and limited fiscal capacity fuels political anxiety. Thus, in Indonesia, rebuilding the governance pact—where credible service delivery meets tax morale—is essential to prevent middle-class fragility from undermining long-term resilience.
Furthermore, the large share of Indonesian households clustered near the threshold of middle-class status (the aspiring middle-class) has translated into rising expectations for public services and protection, without a commensurate expansion of the stable tax base or fiscal space. By contrast, where income growth and employment are closely anchored in productivity gains, as in the case of China, governments have been better able to mobilise resources and expand social protection alongside middle-class growth. More broadly, the experience of Indonesia suggests that middle-class fragility can generate political pressures that, if not managed, risk reinforcing economic vulnerability and making reforms more difficult to implement.[27] This is an issue that holds growing relevance for middle-income countries across Southeast Asia.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
For Indonesia, the transition from poverty reduction to a resilient middle-class is not an automatic process. By using China as a benchmark case, the analysis in this paper shows that middle-class consolidation requires a deliberate and integrated policy approach that addresses the interconnected pillars of labour markets, social protection, and structural transformation, which are at the same time underpinned by sound fiscal capacity and governance and adapted to the country’s developmental context.[28] For Indonesia, there is an urgent need for middle-class consolidation in order to prevent backsliding.
Indonesia’s policy agenda needs to aim at stabilising its vast aspirational class and halting the erosion of its secure middle-class. This requires a coordinated strategy across the following three areas. First, policies must reverse the trend of de-formalisation. This involves labour market deregulation to incentivise formal hiring, coupled with targeted skills training aligned with the needs of higher-value sectors.
Second, to address the profound vulnerability highlighted by the social protection pillar, the government must prioritise expanding the social safety net. Enhancing the coverage and adequacy of health insurance and pension fund, and introducing a credible unemployment benefits system, are critical to reducing households’ exposure to shocks and building trust in state institutions.
Third, these efforts will be futile without a shift in structural transformation. Policy must consciously steer away from capital-intensive, resource-extractive FDI towards job-creating, competitive manufacturing and knowledge-intensive modern services, supported by improved regulatory certainty. Ultimately, these economic measures must be framed within a broader new social contract that demonstrates tangible improvements in public service delivery through the broadening of the tax base; this will break the vicious cycle of low tax morale and underfunded public goods.
REFERENCES
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Kong, Sherry Tao, and Shaobo Chen. 2025. Expanding the Middle-Income Group: Measurements, Characteristics and Policy implications (扩大ä¸ç‰æ”¶å…¥ç¾¤ä½“ç ”ç©¶). Social Sciences Academic Press (社会科å¦æ–‡çŒ®å‡ºç‰ˆç¤¾). (In Chinese)
Li, S. 2023. ‘Understanding China’s road to common prosperity: background, definition and path’. China Economic Journal, 16(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/17538963.2023.2164950
LPEM FEB UI. 2025. ‘Indonesia Economic Outlook Q3 2024’.
Nagara, Khaerul Budhy, & Rusma Rizal. 2025. ‘The Burden of Education Costs for the Middle Class in Indonesia: An Analysis of Challenges and Implications’. Jurnal Serambi Ilmu, 26(2), 153–164. https://doi.org/10.32672/jsi.v26i2.3766
Qin G. 2021. ‘Liberal or Conservative? The Differentiated Political Values of the Middle Class in Contemporary China’. The China Quarterly. Vol. 245:1-22. https://doi:10.1017/S0305741020000296
Yang, Xiuna, Terry Sicular, Björn Gustafsson. 2024. ‘China’s Prosperous Middle Class and Consumption-led Economic Growth: Lessons from Household Survey Data’. The China Quarterly. 258:479-494.
Wihardja, Maria Monica and Putu Sanjiwacika Wibisana. 2024.
Fulcrum. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
About the authors:
Sherry Tao Kong is Head of Research at the Institute of Social Science Survey, and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Digital Finance, Peking University. She also teaches at the Institute of Area Studies, Peking University.
Maria Monica Wihardja is Visiting Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Media, Technology and Society Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and also Adjunct Assistant Professor at the National University of Singapore.
Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute
ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), an autonomous organization established by an Act of Parliament in 1968, was renamed ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute in August 2015. Its aims are: To be a leading research centre and think tank dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. To stimulate research and debate within scholarly circles, enhance public awareness of the region, and facilitate the search for viable solutions to the varied problems confronting the region. To serve as a centre for international, regional and local scholars and other researchers to do research on the region and publish and publicize their findings. To achieve these aims, the Institute conducts a range of research programmes; holds conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars; publishes briefs, research journals and books; and generally provides a range of research support facilities, including a large library collection.
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