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Monday, January 12, 2026

PAKISTAN’S WINDING ROAD TO THE BOMB
Published January 11, 2026
EOS/DAWN

LONG READ

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto (left) pictured alongside Munir Ahmad Khan (centre) and Dr Abdus Salam (right) during the inauguration ceremony of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (Kanupp) on November 28, 1972 | PAEC



BHUTTO’S SUMMIT WITH SCIENTISTS

I had not yet joined the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and was working as an information officer in the Press Information Department (PID), where each information officer is responsible for servicing the media needs of one or more ministries.

On a cold January day in 1972, a colleague in the PID responsible for media projection of scientific organisations talked about a planned meeting of the country’s scientists. President [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto had called the meeting to frankly discuss what role they could play in national defence and security, he said. Where and when it was to be held, he was not sure. It would be at some undisclosed secret venue, he said.

He also said that prominent scientists and engineers had started arriving in Islamabad, waiting to be taken to the conference venue, which was known only to a few. There was confusion about the venue. When the word spread that it would be held in Quetta, some scientists actually travelled there, making their own private arrangements. In the morning, a military aircraft airlifted a precious human cargo of scientists and engineers from Islamabad. But instead of Quetta, it landed at Multan. Those who had already arrived in Quetta were herded to Multan in a special Pakistan Air Force aircraft.

No one was sure of the conference’s purpose. Some excited scientists, before leaving their homes, only told their families that they would be out of station for a few days without disclosing where they were going. Having been personally invited by the head of state, everyone felt elated.

Even though the purpose had not been officially declared, there was a sense among the scientists that Bhutto wanted to salvage the country in the wake of the loss of East Pakistan. He wanted to seek the support of the scientific community and raise the morale of the people, they conjectured.

In January 1972, at a secret meeting, Pakistan’s top scientists were tasked by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with one objective: build an atomic bomb, no matter the cost. At the heart of this endeavour was Bhutto’s handpicked nuclear expert, Munir Ahmad Khan. For two decades, Munir Ahmed Khan worked behind a thick veil of secrecy, building key nuclear structures in a race against time, sanctions and even smear campaigns. In Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey, Farhatullah Babar details the story of the unsung architect of Pakistan's atomic programme. Eos presents, with permission, excerpts from the book recently published by Lightstone Publishers…

In private conversations, they recalled that Bhutto outlined his views on foreign and security policies in his 1969 book The Myth of Independence. As a minister in [Gen] Ayub [Khan]’s cabinet, he had failed in his mission to make Pakistan nuclear. But now he was the president himself, and a great opportunity was knocking at his door.

Pakistan had not only suffered defeat at the hands of the Indian army, but it had also lost half of the country and more than half of the population. China also had not applied pressure on India’s border, and Pakistan had suffered a permanent strategic loss by the cessation of East Pakistan.




The Multan Conference was aimed at inspiring the scientists and engineers to commit themselves to delivering. The Chief Scientific Adviser to the president, Dr Abdus Salam (later Nobel Laureate), was also on board the special flight from Islamabad. A younger colleague later recalled Dr Salam saying, “I think they are going to make us bite the dust.”

Excitement grew as they neared Multan. An army bus was waiting to collect the cream of scientists as they disembarked in Multan. Shamiaanas covered the spacious lawns of Nawab Sadiq Qureshi’s — a PPP [Pakistan Peoples Party] leader and Governor of Punjab — residence in Multan, to host the first-ever face-to-face meeting between scientists and the country’s president.

The conference brought together science luminaries from all over the country, including the chairman of the PAEC, the versatile and outspoken Dr I.H. Usmani. Professor Abdus Salam had also flown in from abroad. The attendees also included Munir Ahmad Khan, a nuclear engineer with international credentials. He had flown in from Vienna, where he was in charge of the nuclear power and reactor division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

It was a historic moment in Pakistan’s journey toward nuclear development. Scientists and engineers took turns addressing pressing issues in science and technology, with particular focus on how quickly Pakistan could achieve atomic capability. Criticism voiced at the conference ranged from lamenting the misallocation of funds for building physical infrastructure to issues with trained manpower and a lack of planning and motivation. Some voiced concerns about bureaucratic red tape, while others passionately demanded respect and recognition.

After several scientists had spoken, Bhutto rose to speak. The chatter in the pandal stopped. There was a pin-drop silence as eager eyes turned towards him.

Bhutto began his address by recalling with anguish the surrender and national humiliation in December 1971 and vowed to restore the lost national honour. He then told the audience that he had invited them to seek their help. He addressed them directly, face-to-face, and excited them. Only a month earlier, Pakistan had witnessed its darkest hour: the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, following a humiliating defeat in the Indo-Pakistani war. The nation’s wounds were fresh, its pride shattered. Amidst the ruin, Bhutto’s speech kindled in the gathering the spark of resolve that would forever alter the trajectory of Pakistan’s history.

Bhutto’s words resonated with the scientists. In Multan, he was not merely outlining a policy; he was igniting a movement. Masterfully blending pragmatism with patriotism, he quoted from history. He spoke about the transformative power of nuclear technology, instilling enthusiasm in the audience. He cited India’s steady march toward atomic capability as both a challenge and a provocation. Pakistan’s survival in the regional power matrix required a matching response.


Dr Mujaddid Ahmed Ijaz (extreme left), Munir Ahmad Khan (centre) and Dr Abdus Salam (extreme right) at the International Nathiagali Summer College on Physics and Contemporary Needs (INSC) in 1976 | Ijaz Family Archives



When the crowd of scientists was sufficiently charged, Bhutto directly asked how they could help meet the threat to the nation’s security. India possessed not only superiority in conventional weapons, it was also building nuclear weapons.

“Can you meet India’s nuclear challenge?” He asked them, promising “all the resources you may need.” He had challenged the scientific community at a time of the lowest national morale, and the scientists were ecstatic.

Curiosity was replaced by enthusiasm. The enthusiastic ones believed they could do it even if some of their colleagues disagreed. The atmosphere was electric, tinged with the weight of what lay ahead.

As the discussions unfolded, the pandal crackled with ideas, projections, and debates about feasibility, resources and time frames. The scientists understood that achieving nuclear capability was no small feat — it was a herculean task and a willingness to defy all odds — but they were ready. There were a few who were sceptics, also mindful of the technical roadblocks, but a shared sense of purpose united all.

MORE THAN A CONFERENCE

Scientists fell over one another to convince the president they could deliver on the promise. The president was amused as he watched them engage in a shouting match. “Yes, yes, sure, we can deliver,” the scientists shouted back in unison, almost like children on a playground, a scientist later recalled.

When a scientist claimed that Pakistan had already reached a “take-off stage” in the nuclear field, Bhutto said, “There is no such thing as the take-off stage. Either we take off or we are left behind.”

President Bhutto deplored that we had been left behind in almost every aspect of national life, especially in science, technology and education.

How long will you take to deliver, he asked them. The scientists did not expect such a pointed question from the head of state. Already charged with enthusiasm, the meeting turned into near pandemonium. Scientists made claims and counterclaims about how soon it would be done.

Some said it would take five years; others thought it would take longer. The overenthusiastic claimed to do it in less than a year, while the realistic ones said at least five years were needed. Everyone was eager to catch Bhutto’s attention.

When a young engineer jumped and almost shouted, “Five years, Your Excellency, five years!” Bhutto asked him to sit down.

On the dais, the chairman of PAEC, Dr I.H. Usmani and Dr Salam looked at each other. As a young scientist claimed that they could make the bomb in three years, Usmani nudged Professor Salam, sitting next to him, with his elbow.

Usmani, the pioneer of nuclear energy in the country, believed that Pakistan was a long way away from acquiring nuclear capability. “We will never be able to make it, we do not have the infrastructure,” he whispered in his ear, Salam later recalled to me.

When Salam asked him whether he disapproved of the quest to go nuclear, Usmani told him, “How can I refuse the president anything? I am only trying to be realistic.”

Usmani then said, “Listen, morally I can disagree with a nuclear weapon, but I will not. I know what Bhutto wants and I want to help him.”

Usmani then rose on his seat.

“With all respect, Mr President,” he said, “but I think that we should look into the eye of truth.”

At present, Pakistan does not possess a thing that justifies the optimism in this pandal, he said. “We do not have any metallurgists or a steel industry.” Usmani had the courage to speak his mind in front of the president and a charged crowd of enthusiastic scientists.

Perhaps Dr Usmani was not wrong. As head of the organisation for a decade, he knew better. There was no infrastructure in place needed to go nuclear. It took more than a decade after the Multan Conference for Pakistan to conduct its first cold nuclear tests, in March 1983, and complete its nuclear fuel cycle projects.


(Left to right) Professor Ishfaq Ahmad, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Gen K.M. Arif and Munir Ahmad Khan at the cold test site | Beyond the Bomb


A young engineer was keen to speak but was ignored each time he raised his hand to ask for the floor. Just as the next speaker was about to take the floor, Bhutto, pointing towards the young engineer, said, “No, no, that man over there.”

“Mr President, all I want to say is that we have a research institute in PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology] at Nilore. Local people call the nearby bus stop ‘Nilore Bum Factory.’ They believe that the atom bomb is the saviour. They also hope that the bomb will be produced in this building. But what are we doing here? We can make it if tasked,” he said.

Bhutto listened intently.

The young man was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, later the first project director of the uranium enrichment project at Kahuta and much more.

As the scientists differed over how soon the bomb could be made, Bhutto raised his hand and stretched out three fingers. Everyone was silent. He wanted the bomb made in three years. All eyes had turned to him.

“Can I have this from you in three years?” he then asked. “Yes, yes,” the scientists responded in chorus, vowing not to disappoint him.

The Multan conclave of scientists marked the starting point of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear programme. The dye was cast that day.

The Multan Conference marked the genesis of a long and arduous journey. Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear capability was as much a battle against external pressures as it was a test of internal resolve. In the years that followed, the country faced a barrage of international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and economic challenges. Yet, the vision set in motion that January day in Multan endured.

The Multan Conference remains a pivotal chapter in Pakistan’s history, its significance extending beyond the realm of nuclear technology. It set Pakistan on a path that continues to shape its identity and policies.

More than a chatter of enthusiastic scientists, it was a solemn promise to deliver. More than a conference, it was a defining moment.

BHUTTO SELECTS MUNIR AHMAD KHAN

Amidst fervent exchanges at the Multan Conference, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once again raised his hand to signal that he had an announcement to make. The chatter in the pandal fell silent, all eyes fixed on him.

Turning towards Munir Ahmad Khan, seated on the podium, Bhutto declared, “From today, Munir Ahmad Khan will be the new chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.” Munir Ahmad Khan was thus entrusted with the responsibility of advancing the nuclear programme, aligning it with Bhutto’s bold vision.

Bhutto’s faith in Munir Ahmad Khan seems to have been rooted in their past association, which began when Munir Ahmad Khan worked at the IAEA in Vienna. He had established himself as a distinguished nuclear engineer and shared a common vision with Bhutto about the role of nuclear technology for the country’s development and survival.

In December 1965, Bhutto, then Pakistan’s foreign minister, accompanied President Ayub Khan during an official visit to London. Bhutto orchestrated a meeting of Munir Ahmad Khan with President Ayub, aiming to persuade the latter to invest in nuclear reprocessing technology. Despite Munir Ahmad Khan’s compelling arguments, Ayub remained unconvinced, placing reliance on China’s “nuclear umbrella” in case Pakistan needed it. After the meeting, a disappointed Munir Ahmad Khan was reassured by Bhutto: “Do not worry—our turn will come.”

That turn came in 1972. Bhutto, now the president of Pakistan, positioned Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of PAEC, signalling a new chapter in the pursuit of his ambition of making Pakistan a nuclear power.

Following Munir Ahmad Khan’s appointment, Dr I.H. Usmani, who had served PAEC with great distinction for over a decade, resigned from his position. While Dr Usmani laid the groundwork for scientific development, Munir Ahmad Khan was tasked with a transformative mission: to translate Bhutto’s vision of a nuclear Pakistan into reality.

In his address, Bhutto noted what he called a “process of erosion” which he said had set in the country as a result of the events of December 1971. He wanted it addressed urgently. In the realm of science and technology, he wanted to launch a “crash programme” to nurture indigenous talent. He wanted to create a pool of at least a hundred scientists, bringing home expatriate Pakistani talent, and instituting prestigious awards for the talented. He wanted to ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were powered by its own people.

THE UNSUNG HERO

Munir Ahmad Khan’s emphasis on secrecy and a low profile was one of the reasons for his remaining unsung. But this was not the only reason. He remained unsung also because his criticism of the tendency to seek personal projection at the expense of the nuclear programme displeased a powerful lobby that cherished personal publicity.

He was uncomfortable when some contemporaries liked to advertise their achievements and flaunted nuclear capabilities, terming it irresponsible. He said that scientists, bureaucrats and generals in other countries do not publicly make tall claims about their capabilities. No scientist in India, Israel or any other country had publicly made such claims.

A former army chief publicly made some claims in the mid-nineties that appeared to him unwise. With carefully chosen words, he strongly criticised him in a newspaper article. He said that what the ex-army chief had said amounted to Pakistan making a fool of the US president for continuing to certify, on the advice of the US Embassy in Islamabad for three years from 1987 to 1990, that Pakistan did not have nuclear capability or a device. He predicted that such irresponsible rhetoric would cost Pakistan dearly.

Naturally, those in high places seeking personal publicity did not like it and turned against him.

When, in May 1988, Pakistan demonstrated nuclear capability, individual scientists in another organisation scrambled to claim credit for bomb-making, cherishing the spotlight. In doing so, some scientists excelled over others. The PAEC scientists were trained in his [Munir Ahmed Khan’s] nursery with a rigid code of restraint for two decades. They remained tight-lipped even at that time of national celebrations.

While there was no one to speak for him, his detractors had a field day. When he retired, he launched a vigorous campaign advocating to curb nuclear rhetoric. He and his associates in the PAEC paid a heavy price for this restraint. He endured all this with grace.

Despite his remarkable achievements in bringing Pakistan to the world nuclear map, he was not lauded. His achievements were not recognised during his lifetime. For 20 years, the cold nuclear tests that were carried out under his watch had remained a guarded secret.

He denied himself and the team limelight through self-projection, adhering to the strict secrecy codes. He did not advertise his achievements to safeguard the safety and security of the nuclear programme. He believed that advertising personal achievements would damage the programme by attracting adverse international response.

In his memoirs, Professor Riazuddin, the quiet theoretician behind the bomb, has said: “All the strategic nuclear infrastructure was completed during the tenure of Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of the PAEC. Thus, all the key elements, except uranium enrichment, were already in place, including conducting cold tests and building tunnels in the Chagai mountain for carrying out underground nuclear tests when needed. In spite of all this, he didn’t get the credit he deserved and remains an ‘unsung hero.’”

He had raised the bar of secrecy so high that it deprived his team of due recognition. When in office, he never mentioned in public the word “cold nuclear tests”, let alone reveal that it had indeed been successfully carried out way back in the early 1980s.

His detractors ensured that Munir was not honoured in his lifetime. While others were decorated with the highest civil award twice, Munir Ahmad Khan was denied it. [Asif] Zardari had long been aware of Munir Ahmad Khan’s work, since his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was prime minister. During his first term as president, he posthumously awarded the unsung hero in 2012 with the highest civil award, the Nishan-i-Pakistan. His family received the award.

In a world often seduced by the allure of spectacle, the power of restraint is the most profound virtue, but it does not come without a cost. Munir Ahmad Khan’s life and the price he paid demonstrated this truth. He exemplified it throughout his career in his disdain for self-promotion and his advocacy for nuclear discretion. His steadfast belief that nuclear capabilities must never be flaunted distinguished him as a leader of extraordinary foresight. He was willing to pay a price for it.

His ethical philosophy was that nuclear capability is not a status symbol but a grave responsibility. It needed strategic silence and avoiding rhetoric that could provoke adversaries or attract unnecessary global attention. He clearly understood that self-promotion in this sensitive domain was counterproductive and dangerous. The success of Pakistan’s nuclear programme lay in the collective effort of a well-knit team in complete secrecy, not in individual accolades.

He never sought cheap popularity, denied himself newspaper headlines, and declined to advertise the Commission’s achievements. He kept a low profile and disliked anyone making provocative, inflammatory statements to grab headlines.

The brandishing of nuclear capability was anathema to him. He believed that bravado, brandishing nuclear capability or advertising achievements did not serve the national interest. A natural consequence of this worldview was that he and his team were not acknowledged for their work.

His commitment to restraint placed him at odds with those in positions of power. But he was not deterred and continued to be vocal in condemning nuclear rhetoric. Later, when talking about the former army chief’s public statement, he said, “Farhatullah, it was more than a lapse in judgment; it was a breach of trust.”

He viewed such declarations as reckless and an invitation to international sanctions. He foresaw adverse diplomatic fallout and the damage it could inflict. His frustration stemmed not only from the immediate consequences but also from the long-term implications of eroding the trust of global powers.

Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to see the day when his warnings against the dangers of irresponsible nuclear behaviour proved true.

The world was shocked when, in 2006, Gen Pervez Musharraf disclosed in his memoirs, In the Line of Fire, how a clandestine proliferation network had been in existence in Pakistan for a long time, and blamed one lone individual for it. The network had actually been busted by the CIA in 2003, and Musharraf was forced to acknowledge it in his 2006 memoirs. Ignoring Munir’s warnings cost the nation dearly.

The legacy of restraint was both his formidable strength and a great burden. While it was meant to shield Pakistan’s nuclear programme from external threats, it also allowed his detractors to dominate the narrative. His posthumous recognition, with the highest civil award, was a bittersweet moment for his family and colleagues. It was a long-overdue acknowledgement of his role in placing Pakistan on the global nuclear map while also underscoring the quiet pain of a life spent in service without recognition.

His life is a powerful reminder of humility and restraint in leadership. When egos clash and ambitions run high, quiet dedication to the collective good is his enduring legacy. Prioritising responsibility over recognition and wisdom over bravado while remaining personally self-effacing shall resonate as his legacy.

Excerpted with permission from Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey by Farhatullah Babar, published by Lightstone Publishers

The writer is a former senator and served as the director of information at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) under Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan

Published in Dawn, EOS, January 11th, 2026

Monday, December 29, 2025

Bangladesh's first female prime minister Khaleda Zia dies aged 80

Bangladesh’s former prime minister and opposition leader Khaleda Zia has died at the age of 80, her party said Tuesday, just months before elections many expected would return her to power. Her death ends a turbulent political career marked by imprisonment, ill health and a dramatic comeback attempt following the fall of her longtime rival Sheikh Hasina.


Issued on: 30/12/2025 
By: FRANCE 24

Khaleda Zia speaks during a press conference in Dhaka in March 2015. © Munir Uz Zaman, AFP

Bangladesh's former prime minister Khaleda Zia, who many believed would sweep elections next year to lead her country once again, died on Tuesday aged 80, her Bangladesh Nationalist Party said.

"The BNP Chairperson and former prime minister, the national leader Begum Khaleda Zia, passed away today at 6:00 am (0000 GMT), just after the Fajr (dawn) prayer," the party said in a statement.

"We pray for the forgiveness of her soul and request everyone to offer prayers for her departed soul," it added.

Despite years of ill health and imprisonment, Zia vowed in November to campaign in elections set for February 2026 -- the first vote since a mass uprising toppled her arch-rival Sheikh Hasina last year.

The BNP is widely seen as a frontrunner.

But in late November she was rushed to hospital, where, despite the best efforts of medics, her condition declined from a raft of health issues.

Nevertheless, hours before her death, party workers had on Monday submitted nomination papers on her behalf for three constituencies for the polls.

During her final days, interim leader Muhammad Yunus called for the nation to pray for Zia, calling her a "source of utmost inspiration for the nation".

BNP's media chief Moudud Alamgir Pavel also confirmed Zia's death to AFP.

Zia was jailed for corruption in 2018 under Hasina's government, which also blocked her from travelling abroad for medical treatment.

She was released last year, shortly after Hasina was forced from power.

There had been plans earlier this month to fly her on a special air ambulance to London, but her condition was not stable enough.

Her son, political heavyweight Tarique Rahman, only returned to Bangladesh after 17 years in self-imposed exile on Thursday, where he was welcomed back by huge crowds of joyous supporters.

READ MORE'Symbol of hope': Exiled Bangladesh opposition leader and PM hopeful Rahman returns ahead of polls

Rahman will lead the party through the February 12 general election, and is expected to be put forward as prime minister if his party wins a majority.

Bangladesh's Prothom Alo newspaper, who said that Zia had "earned the epithet of the 'uncompromising leader'", reported that Rahman and other family members were by her side at the time of her death.

"The lives of politicians are marked by rises and falls," the newspaper wrote on Tuesday.

"Lawsuits, arrests, imprisonment, persecution, and attacks by adversaries are far from uncommon. Khaleda Zia endured such ordeals at their most extreme."

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)


The rise and fall of Bangladesh's first woman PM Khaleda Zia

DW
30/12/2025

Bangladesh's first female prime minister, Khaleda Zia, who was once praised for restoring democracy and empowering millions of women, has died at the age of 80.



Khaleda Zia first came to power in 1991 (File photo: 2018)Image: Munir Uz Zaman/AFP/Getty Images

Khaleda Zia, who served as prime minister of Bangladesh for three terms, died on Tuesday morning at the age of 80.

Zia and her Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) were once hailed for playing a crucial role in transitioning the South Asian nation from military rule to democracy.

She served as prime minister of Bangladesh between 1991 and 1996, and between 2001 and 2006. She was the first woman to serve as prime minister of Bangladesh.

Zia had been sentenced to several years behind bars prior her death for alleged involvement in corruption charges that her party said were politically motivated.
Rise to politics

Zia entered politics after her husband, former president Ziaur Rahman, was assassinated in May 1981 during a military coup. Rahman had fought for Bangladesh's independence war from Pakistan in 1971, and formed the BNP party a few years prior his assassination.

Zia, who was a housewife at the time with no experience in politics, soon became one of the country's top leaders for her civilian political resistance against the then military regime.

Zia established a solid political alliance by including political parties from both the left and the right with her center-right party. She successfully forced the military regime to give up power by leading nationwide movements for democracy.

On February 27,1991, Zia's party won 140 of the 300 directly-elected seats during the national election and became the country's first female prime minister.
Empowering women

Zia helped increase literacy rates among girls and boosted job opportunities for women by providing free education and scholarships. She introduced daily free meals for students at schools across the country with help from foreign donors. During her tenures, those efforts have seen millions of girls enrolled in primary and secondary schools.

Zia also contributed to expanding the country's export-oriented garment industry.

"Now as Prime Minister, Mrs. Zia, in contrast with Benazir Bhutto when she first became Prime Minister of Pakistan, is aggressively promoting education and vocational training, especially of girls, and expanding small-scale, no-collateral lending to increase the self-sufficiency of women," journalist Barbara Crossette wrote in the New York Times in November 1993.

US Forbes magazine, which included Zia as one of the 100 world's most powerful women for several years during her leadership between 2001 and 2006, wrote, "Once a shy and withdrawn housewife, Zia has revitalized the education sector, particularly for young girls."

Laila Noor Islam, a professor at Dhaka University, told DW Zia will be remembered for changing the social and political landscape of Bangladesh.

"People will remember her for introducing the parliamentary system of democracy in her country, for creating export-oriented readymade garment factories where hundreds of thousands of women got jobs, for introducing free primary education for all, and developing the caretaker government system for conducting free and fair national elections," she said.

Archrival Sheikh Hasina


Soon upon entering politics, Zia became the archrival of Sheikh Hasina, the top leader of the center-left Awami League (AL) party and in power since 2008.

They are often called "the Battling Begums" – "begum" refers to a Muslim woman of high rank – for their longs-standing rivalry, which split the country's political arena into two, one led by Hasina's AL, the other by Zia's BNP.

"When I hear the name Khaleda Zia, what comes to mind is "Hasina's rival." Zia and Hasina have had such a long and bitter rivalry, and it's been amplified by the fact that they've dominated Bangladeshi politics for so long," Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, told DW.

"And given that their respective families comprise the country's two political dynasties, the rivalry also is embedded in the core political history of Bangladesh," he added.

Corruption allegations

Zia was convicted in a graft case in February 2018 and later in a separate corruption case. The politician was accused of misusing her power by embezzling some $250,000 (€240,000) in donations meant for an orphanage trust.

The BNP maintains the cases were fabricated to keep Zia out of politics, allegations denied by Hasina's government.

Over the past decade, more than 180,000 legal cases have also been filed against nearly four million BNP members, according to the party's count. The data shows that more than 600 party members have been abducted, and around 3,000 were victims of extrajudicial killings at the hands of authorities during the same period.

In 2020, her prison sentence was converted to house arrest before she was released again in 2024 after the fall of her rival Sheikh Hasina's government.

Political downfall

Zia, an advocate of democracy, slowly lost her ground by failing to form solid political resistance against the Hasina government.

"Khaleda Zia has made a lot of mistakes in the last decade. Boycotting elections led to missed opportunities. More importantly, she opted to play the role of a disruptive and confrontational opposition without seeking a middle ground, and this led to a lot of burned bridges," Kugelman said.

"It also led to her party resorting to violence at times, which didn't help its cause. Additionally, her decision to align herself with Islamist political parties [at times], especially those with hardline elements cost her and her party support from those that uphold the idea of a secular and moderate Bangladesh," he added.

Asif Nazrul, a professor at Dhaka University, believes Zia's downfall should also be attributed to her unwillingness to gain the confidence of India and foreign diplomats who could have pushed Hasina to conduct a fair and inclusive national election.

"Zia's decision not to meet Indian President Pranab Mukherjee in Dhaka in 2013, and refusing the offer of Sheikh Hasina regarding election-time government in the same year, have heavily cost her political career," Nazrul told DW.

"She has failed to win the heart of Dhaka-based elite intellectuals and western diplomats," he added. "Her failure to stop the people in BNP and its allies in harboring separatists fighting the Indian government in the past also made her weaker over time."

But Zia's fight for democracy will be remembered for years to come, said Nazrul.

"Zia could have flown to other countries during political uncertainties in 2006 and 2007, and during her trial in the last years,” Nazrul said. "She was aged and very ill, and despite knowing the likelihood of her suffering, she did not bow to the Hasina government and took any chance of leaving the country."



Arafatul Islam Multimedia journalist focusing on Bangladeshi politics, human rights and migration.

Monday, December 22, 2025

PAKISTAN

THE ASSASSINATION OF LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

 First prime minister of Pakistan


Farooq Babrakzai 
Published December 21, 2025 
EOS/DAWN


(Figures: from left to right) Former prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan, his killer Said Akbar, and Maj Gen Akbar Khan — who plotted a coup against Liaquat Ali Khan. (Background) The public rally at Rawalpindi’s Company Bagh on October 16, 1951, during which Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated

In a mystery, the sleuth must be believably involved and emotionally invested in solving the crime. — Diane Mott Davidson

On Tuesday, 16 October, 1951, around 4 pm, the first prime minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, was going to address a public meeting in Company Garden in Rawalpindi. As he walked to the microphone and uttered the words“Baraadaraan-i-Millat” [Brothers of the Nation], a man named Said Akbar, sitting on the ground near the dais, fired two bullets at him in rapid succession with a 9mm semi-automatic pistol.

Chaos and mayhem suddenly erupted in the meeting. Khan Najaf Khan, the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had personally supervised the security arrangements, yelled in Pashto, “Who fired the shots? Shoot [him]!”. Within seconds, a police inspector, Mohammad Shah, came running with his service revolver drawn and shot Said Akbar five times at close range, in such a haphazard manner that he missed one shot altogether.

As Said Akbar was lying on the ground dying, he was also stabbed more than 26 times with spears by Muslim League volunteers. The recording equipment of Radio Pakistan was on and captured the sounds of the firing and the chaos for one minute and 13 seconds, and then fell silent. The entire shooting episode ended within 48 seconds. The recording is available online. Liaquat Ali Khan was taken to the Combined Military Hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.


The assassin, Said Akbar, was my father, who had come to Rawalpindi from Abbottabad on 14 October.


One of Pakistan’s founding fathers and the country’s first prime minister was assassinated at a public gathering 74 years ago. Despite the formation of an Inquiry Commission and two other police investigations — one by Scotland Yard — until today, there has been no satisfactory closure regarding those tragic events. Now, the son of the assassin has penned his own investigation into the events in the shape of a book, which provides, for the first time ever, his family’s perspective as well as delves into the weaknesses of the official accounts and spans Pakistan’s tumultuous history — from the first war over Kashmir, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and internal friction within the new state’s functionaries. 

Eos presents, with permission, excerpts from The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952 by Farooq Babrakzai, published by Vanguard Books…




INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

Neither the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) nor the police personnel had any prior knowledge of Said Akbar’s presence in Rawalpindi, let alone at the public meeting. All police and CID claims about keeping Said Akbar under surveillance in Rawalpindi for three days prior to the murder, upon close examination, turned out to be false; stories that were fabricated after the tragedy. No CID or police official was able to establish Said Akbar’s identity in the public meeting.

Soon after the incident, Inspector Abrar Ahmad went around checking hotels in Rawalpindi Saddar to see if Said Akbar had stayed in any of them, when, after two hours, he got lucky at Grand Hotel, where Said Akbar was staying. The hotel clerk immediately identified and confirmed that the body was that of Said Akbar, who was staying at the hotel. That led police to Abbottabad and, by nightfall, with the help of a few men from the neighbourhood, they arrived at Said Akbar’s home.

Said Akbar’s eldest son, 11-year-old Dilawar Khan, was with the father in Rawalpindi, and was sitting in front of him in the public meeting. He heard the shots and saw the prime minister fall. He turned around to ask father why the prime minister had fallen and what was happening and saw the chaos erupting and people attacking his father. He got scared and ran away, leaving his shoes behind.

The assassination of the prime minister was a sudden, unexpected and shocking event for Pakistan. In the days following the incident, when the police and the CID officials started to examine the circumstances of the crime, they had no prior information about the incident, no relevant intelligence reports, and no leads to follow.


A copy of the only photo of Said Akbar that survived the searches conducted by the police. The picture shows him dressed like a Khaksar | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952



COMMISSION OF INQUIRY


On 25 October 1951, the government appointed a ‘Commission of Inquiry’, consisting of Mr Justice Mohammad Munir, judge of the Federal Court, as the president, and Mr Akhtar Hussein, Financial Commissioner, Punjab, as his associate. The Commission examined 66 witnesses in 38 sessions, 23 in Lahore and 15 in Rawalpindi. Four months later, on 28 February 1952, the Commission submitted its report to the chief secretary, Government of Punjab. From the final version of the report, 73 names, clauses and sentences were omitted, mostly for security reasons. This obfuscated the report and made it look quite weak.

The Commission looked at five major factors to see if they had any bearing on the assassination. It examined at length various documents about Said Akbar, from January 1947, when he and his older brother, Mazrak Zadran, surrendered to the British authorities in North Waziristan, till October 1951.

These pertained to their detention under the Bengal Regulation III of 1818, which determined their official status, starting in British India and then in Pakistan, and records of all the places they visited in Pakistan. Nearly all of this was irrelevant to the tragedy in Rawalpindi as the Commission did not find any valuable clues in Said Akbar’s travels, his contacts with people, and his lifestyle.

Next, the Commission examined the security arrangements at the public meeting, the circumstances under which the prime minister was killed, and recorded statements by witnesses. In some cases, after much rambling discussions, the Commission concluded that certain CID and police personnel made false statements. High-ranking officials, such as Khan Najaf Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Rawalpindi, gave evasive answers to questions of the Commission. It was Najaf Khan who suggested, supervised and approved the security arrangements at the public meeting.

Other officials either lied or gave exaggerated accounts to the Commission to protect themselves. Inspector Mohammad Shah, who had shot and killed Said Akbar, was not questioned by the Commission.



The weapon Said Akbar used for the assassination was a semi-automatic pistol of this model, German-made 9mm Walther P38, which he had bought from a tribesman in 1948, who was returning from the war in Kashmir | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952



POSSIBLE MOTIVES


The Commission also examined possible motives for the crime. It considered three: first, that Said Akbar killed the prime minister in a fit of insanity, but could not find any evidence to support it.

Second, he did so out of resentment over the prime minister’s policy regarding Kashmir. In fact, some time in the summer of 1951, Said Akbar had volunteered to raise a lashkar [band of fighters], pay for their food and other expenses, and lead them in the jihad to liberate Kashmir, but the Commission considered Said Akbar’s offer a “hoax” and rejected it.

Third, that he did not like the un-Islamic lifestyle of the prime minister and because his wife, Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, did not observe purdah [veil] in public. But this also turned out to be a baseless story.

It then examined various theories of conspiracy to see if Said Akbar was part of any of them but did not provide details of any conspiracy and discarded each of them and, in fact, stated its inability to uncover any conspiracy.

Police searched Said Akbar’s home three times and took away all items they considered important, including books, documents, air gun, money, mother’s gold, photos etc. A summary of the items was given in the Inquiry Report.

The public was not satisfied with the findings of the Commission because it failed to fulfil its own mandate and provide transparent answers to the very questions it was tasked to investigate. The two important questions for which the Commission could not find answers were: what was Said Akbar’s motive? And if the murder was the result of conspiracy, then who were his accomplices?

POLICE INVESTIGATIONS


The task of the Commission was to examine the circumstances of the crime, and not to identify any individuals who might be implicated, because that was the task of criminal investigation by police.

There was only one police investigation conducted in 1951-2, in Lahore, when our family was taken there. We were kept there for about five months, during which time mother was questioned through an interpreter. It was this investigation that the Inquiry Commission alluded to but gave no details, as it was on-going at that time.

Scotland Yard’s official Cecil Edwin U’ren referred to the same investigation as “headed by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein, Superintendent of Police, CID, Lahore, and his team.” He quoted extensively from the Munir-Hussein Inquiry Report, but did not include any information from Chaudhry Hussein’s report and, what is more, did not even discuss his own conclusion with him.

The public and the media raised further questions about the U’ren report. The prime minister’s widow, Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, strongly reacted to the U’ren Report and raised several questions, but no one in Pakistan, whether the police, politicians or journalists, provided satisfactory answers.

The report by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein and his team allegedly got destroyed when the plane carrying the police Inspector General Etezazuddin, crashed in August 1952. But curiously, Scotland Yard’s official Cecil Edwin U’ren was given access to it in 1954-5. That is because the documents pertaining to the investigation were safe and available. All the statements about the documents being destroyed were deliberate attempts by the government to protect unnamed army officers and government officials, and divert public attention from the case.

Said Akbar's eldest son, Dilawar Khan (pictured above in 2019 at the age of 79 in the suburbs of Abbottabad), was sitting in front of Said Akbar when he killed Liaquat Ali Khan | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952


MY INVESTIGATIONS


The Inquiry Report at best described the circumstances under which the prime minister was killed. It provided sufficient background information for me to see the gaps and discrepancies in the description of events and flow of information. The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan was the result of a well-planned conspiracy by the plotters. Said Akbar indeed had accomplices in Abbottabad, in Rawalpindi, and right at the public meeting on 16 October, 1951.

This work is driven by numerous questions that are explored in the chapters of the book. These are questions that have been asked multiple times since 1951, but not answered truthfully. For example, why would Khan Najaf Khan yell an order in Pashto at the public meeting in Rawalpindi, to shoot the person who fired the shots?

How did Dilawar Khan, Said Akbar’s son, come up with the story that his father had seen Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi in a dream on 13 October, 1951, who told Said Akbar to kill Liaquat Ali Khan? In fact, it was the police who repeatedly instructed Dilawar what to say and how to answer investigators’ questions.

Because the police had to find a motive for the crime, they invented the story of Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi and put it in Dilawar’s head. The police created that story from a document taken from Said Akbar’s home during one of the searches, which had names of Muslim warriors, including Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi, written on it.

Over the decades, the Liaquat Ali Khan murder turned into a mystery, the result of some deep-rooted conspiracy, which no one seriously attempted to solve. The major reason was the investigation report by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein that was deliberately never made public, and no other truthful statements came from the government. The Munir-Hussein inquiry and that by U’ren of the Scotland Yard went in two different directions, while exploring the same incident.

The former did not answer the questions it formulated to explore. The latter concluded that Said Akbar committed the crime because he was socially isolated, void of any reasoning, and had inherited some kind of criminal genes.

For me, it has been like solving a dozen separate but related puzzles, in which each one the actors played different roles. But when connected, the small puzzles make a giant puzzle, one that sheds light on the dark corners of the tragedy and attempts to provide transparent answers.

KASHMIR AND SAID AKBAR

The goal of the book is to find the hard and transparent answers of the case in plain and easy language. It attempts to inform and educate the readers and let them rethink and have a fresh look at history.

It neither glorifies Liaquat Ali Khan as a martyr nor condemns Said Akbar as the assassin. Here Liaquat Ali Khan is presented as a politician who had both his loyal followers and rivals in the government, but he also committed blunders, particularly his decision to accept the ceasefire agreement in Kashmir, which also sealed his fate.

The prime minister was a refugee from India, and Said Akbar was a refugee from Afghanistan, who had no personal grudge against the prime minister and no motive to kill him. He had no cultural roots in Pakistan and was not savvy in Pakistani politics. But he became interested in the Kashmir war solely because the social and political atmosphere in Pakistan was awash with pro-Islamic and anti-Hindu speeches, media stories and Friday’s sermons in mosques.

The constant clamour of jihad to liberate Kashmir from Hindu-domination naturally influenced young Said Akbar, who had seen Kashmiri refugees in Abbottabad and the Pashtun tribesmen who went to fight in Kashmir.

Religion played a nominal role in Said Akbar’s life in Afghanistan as, over the centuries, Islam had been adapted and blended with Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of social and moral conduct. Being a good Pashtun naturally meant being a good Muslim. In Pakistan, he became interested in religion starting in mid-1949 and began to learn about Islam, but his goal was personal and pragmatic, not scholarly.

He sought meaning in his life, to make sense of the social and political turmoil in Pakistan, and to understand the fervour of jihad in Kashmir through religion and Iqbal’s poetry. These provided the justification for jihad in a simple and pragmatic sense.

It is important to note that the ceasefire agreement in Kashmir came into effect on 1 January, 1949, and hostilities stopped. However, Said Akbar’s interest in jihad started in mid-1949. Curiously, this is also the period when Maj Gen Akbar Khan, ringleader of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, first spoke openly about overthrowing Liaquat Ali Khan’s government.

Said Akbar knew many tribal fighters from his Zadran tribe, some of whom visited him. It was during this period that Said Akbar became acquainted with men who were active in the war in Kashmir, and those who hated the ceasefire agreement that the prime minister had accepted, and therefore lost the chance to march on to Srinagar.

Some of these people eventually persuaded Said Akbar, in the summer of 1951, to assassinate the prime minister and, in the process, became his accomplices and facilitators.

I have taken it upon myself as my moral and ethical duty to uncover the truth to the best of my ability. It is something that I owe to the people of Pakistan, to my family, and to myself, while living thousands of miles away in the United States.

THE RAWALPINDI CONSPIRACY

Political assassinations are well-planned, meticulous operations by the plotters, their accomplices, facilitators, and those who carry out the deeds. Secrecy is the key to the success of such operations. Whether the crime is successfully committed or it fails, the news, stories and conspiracies later become part of public discussions. The plotters and accomplices remain hidden from the public eye. That is what happened in October 1951.

The Rawalpindi Conspiracy was the first coup attempt to topple the government of Liaquat Ali Khan and eliminate him. But it failed. On 9 March, 1951, the ringleader, Maj Gen Akbar Khan, and his collaborators were arrested. That was because, earlier in February, an insider of Akbar Khan’s group, Inspector Askar Ali, CID Peshawar, informed I.I. Chundrigar, governor of North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), who informed the prime minister.

The documents of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy presented in the court showed that “late Hon’ble Liaquat Ali Khan, along with his personal attendants… would be called and cleared.” That is, arrested and executed. The list also included the name of the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gen Ayub Khan, who “was shocked that he was to be shot.” When the first attempt failed, many officers thought of taking a bold action.

In the second week of May (1951), Maj Hassan met some other officers in Rawalpindi who were also apprehending arrest, and there was some talk of confronting the authorities and taking some desperate step. But the idea was given up. There was no leadership, and the suspected officers were far too demoralised and isolated from the top command to undertake the dangerous course of mutiny.

The trial of those accused in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy started on 15 June, 1951 and, four months later, on 16 October, 1951, the prime minister was assassinated in the same city.

I came across the Munir-Hussein Inquiry Report (1952) in the Asia Collection of Hamilton Library at University of Hawai’i at Manoa, in 1998. Since 2007, I have read the Report many times and re-read parts of it more than 30 to 35 times, taking copious notes on small individual events. In the process, it started to dawn on me that there were discrepancies in the recording of many events.

In 2010, I bought a copy of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. Many events described in the book coincided with changes in Said Akbar’s life, and some of the people mentioned in the book were also known to Said Akbar.Liaquat 


Ali Khan stands to the left of Maj Gen Akbar Khan, who points with his stick towards the Pandu area in Kashmir in January 1949: Maj Gen Akbar Khan would eventually become the ringleader of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, a coup attempt to topple the government of Liaquat Ali Khan and eliminate him | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952


THE U’REN REPORT

In November 2016, I went to London to visit the British Library and Scotland Yard, looking for a copy of Cecil Edwin U’ren’s Report (1955). After a few days of searching, I was told that the report was in the National Archive. About a month later, the National Archive put the photocopy of the report on a website and allowed me access to it for a fee.

I finally downloaded a photocopy of the report as it was published in Dawn on 25 June, 1955, along with other related documents, and the response by Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, the widow of the prime minister to the U’ren Report. The report is a photocopy of the columns in Dawn and does not have chapters and page numbers.

U’ren concluded that Said Akbar alone plotted to assassinate Liaquat Ali Khan, and that no one else was involved in any conspiracy. His report exonerated the police officials, satisfied the politicians, but very cleverly avoided getting involved in the controversies of the case. He expressed sympathy with police personnel for the undue duty-related stress they had to suffer during the investigation. He spuriously questioned Inspector Mohammad Shah, who had shot and killed Said Akbar, and did not even meet Khan Najaf Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police.

The only valuable piece of information in the U’ren Report was that the police investigation conducted in 1951-2 was not destroyed in the plane crash in August 1952, because U’ren was given access to it in 1954-5.

U’ren considered Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein a highly competent police officer, whose team had conducted the only criminal investigation of the case. However, he did not quote any information from Chaudhry Hussein’s report. In other words, the U’ren report did not uncover a single piece of fresh and relevant evidence. His own conclusion was based on evidence that was skewed and faulty and had no bearing on the assassination of the prime minister. In short, his conclusion amounted to another cover-up.

Epilogue

There are also other sides to the story. Journalists and writers continue to write on Liaquat Ali’s murder and narrate at length his life and achievements as prime minister, and how his widow, Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, was later sent abroad as ambassador. But there has never been a shred of objective information about Said Akbar before October 1951, and about his family after that.

Hasan Zaheer, author of The Time and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, stated:

In March 1995, I wrote to the former prime minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, requesting permission to consult the official records of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and related background materials for this study. I thank her for graciously acceding to my request.

I personally would like to examine the investigation report by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein and his team and other related documents of the assassination of the prime minister, which have been collecting dust in some government archives. However, in the current political atmosphere of Pakistan and the fact that I am an American citizen, it would require authorisation by high government officials and sincere cooperation of others. Something I cannot count on.

I realise that certain events are described more than once in different chapters of the book because each chapter analyses one or more related questions of the case and describes the characters and the different roles they played in the tragedy. All events eventually culminated in the killing of Liaquat Ali Khan and Said Akbar in less than a minute.

The author is the third son of Said Akbar, the assassin of Liaquat Ali Khan, and was born in North Waziristan. He lived and studied in Abbottabad, Kabul, Beirut and Honolulu, where he completed his doctorate in linguistics. He has taught in Hawai’i, Muscat and Beijing and at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. He currently lives in California in the US

Excerpted with permission from The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952 by Farooq Babrakzai and published by Vanguard Books

Published in Dawn, EOS, December 21st, 2025


Wednesday, November 19, 2025

Making martyrs

November 19, 2025 
DAWN

AS far as the anointed go, saints in the Sufi tradition have it easy. You could be declared one in life and then continue to dispense generosity and blessings from the afterlife. Martyrdom, on the other hand, has a significant drawback: it must be earned with one’s life, as the ‘immortal’ status can only be awarded posthumously, in all traditions. It’s strange, then, that martyrdom, a status considered far higher than any other, can be granted to anyone these days.

The right-wing, MAGA influencer Cha­r­lie Kirk, who was shot dead at a rally on the University of Utah campus in September this year, is being fashioned as a martyr. The NYT recently ran a piece on the req­uired ingredients for a good martyr, especially for conscription into an immediate political purpose. It listed public, dramatic, and innocent deaths, a cause attached to them, and a movement to glorify and capitalise on them, as a must for this recipe.

The word ‘shaheed’(martyr) inspires awe, passion, admiration, and absolute respect. Before any competing words, tropes, and honorifics are introduced, consider the context of this piece: the transcendence of this Arabic word into not just the vocabulary of non-Arabic speakers but also into their body politic, narratives, identities and collective conscience. As long as it was attached to an Abu this and a Bin that, it could be hung on the obsession of ‘Islamist fundamentalists’ with the promised afterlife, as opposed to the ‘rationalist fascists’’ rejection of anything beyond the material world. The lines seem to be blurring now.

Street-corner banners could be seen in Surrey, British Columbia, proclaiming ‘Shaheed Jathedar Hardeep Singh Nijjar’. Singh was a Sikh separatist shot dead in Canada in front of the Guru Nanak Gurdwara in June 2023. The Indian government claimed that lax policing and appeasement of domestic votes had made Canada a safe space for ‘jihadists’. Some may see it as cultural appropriation, and others as their handlers’ stamp on Sikh separatist movements for invoking shahadat. It’s important to remember, however, that in Sikh history, the fifth Guru, Arjun, is considered the first shaheed. He was tortured to death during the Mughal emperor Jehangir’s reign for refusing to renounce his faith.

The origin of the word ‘shaheed’ comes from ‘shahadat’, which means to bear witness. In the context of martyrdom, it is closely tied to monotheistic faith and, by extension, the concept of the afterlife. Sacrificing one’s life to fulfil duties stemming from the verbal shahadat grants the individual the status of Shaheed — the highest a believer can aim for — promising eternal life and companionship of the holiest on the Day of Judgement. While this idea has inspired some who believe they are fighting for a just cause to face unimaginable challenges, its misuse has also led to the rise of suicide bombers.

It’s strange that martyrdom can be granted to anyone these days.

Invoking martyrdom turns victims into heroes whose reward is hoped to be in the afterlife, making current calls for justice seem petty. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s execution in 1979, although widely regarded as a judicial murder, has not been overturned by a court of law. In the court of public opinion, at least among his supporters, he has long been considered a shaheed. A university established to honour his legacy includes the suffix ‘Shaheed’ in its name, as does a political party founded by his son after he broke ties with his sister, Benazir. Yet, his most notable creation, the Pakistan Peoples Party, recently sought to have a resolution passed by the National Ass­e­mbly declaring ZAB a ‘national martyr’. Strangely, his nemesis and tormentor, Ziaul Haq, the military dictator under whom Bhutto was executed, is also portrayed as a shaheed. The MQM has designated a graveyard in Karachi as Shuhuda Qabristan (martyrs’ cemetery), where party workers and leaders, particularly those who suffered violence, are buried.

As we consider the idea of supreme sacrifice and eternal redemption in the afterlife, it’s natural to think about the exemption from prosecution in this life that beneficiaries of immunity might enjoy. While our parliament has currently limited such exemptions to a few individuals, the Israeli Knesset, in March 2023, debated a bill from far-right factions calling for immunity from prosecution for all soldiers. The reason behind this proposed exemption is that all soldiers risk their lives, and the fear of legal action and consequences might prevent them from performing their duties without fear. The bill was put on hold. Opponents of the proposal, including the attorney general, pointed out that such legislation could leave exempted individuals vulnerable to international prosecution, including at the International Court of Justice.

The writer is a poet. His latest publication is a collection of satire essays titled Rindana.

shahzadsharjeel1@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, November 19th, 2025

Monday, October 06, 2025

 

Pakistan As A Consequence Of The Partition Of British India In 1947 – Analysis

India Pakistan Map South Asia Bangladesh

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Pakistan as a country

Pakistan is a country located in the northwest of the Indian sub-continent. It borders Iran on the west, Afghanistan on the north-west, China on the north-east, and India on the east, with the direct exit to the Arabian Sea. 


Physically, from the rest of Asia, Pakistan is separated in the north by the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and the Himalaya high ring of mountain chains. Other mountain ranges are going down on the Pakistani western side to the Arabian Sea. Below them is the long and broad valley of the Indus River. The Province of the North-West Frontier contains the strategically very important Khyber Pass, which is very high. Toward the south is the Punjab plateau. It is watered by the tributaries of the Indus River, where wheat is grown. However, to the east is the Thar Desert. It is important to stress that between the Sind Desert, which covers part of the Indus delta, and Baluchistan in the western hills, there are large reserves of natural gas and, to a certain extent, oil, which is also found in Punjab.  

Pakistan has a predominantly agricultural economy. The focal export goods are raw and processed cotton, cotton fabrics, and rice. Other agricultural products include sugar cane, wheat, and maize. Livestock-raising is important too. Textiles are an important part of the Pakistani industry and are substantially contributing to Pakistani exports. Other industries include chemicals, cement production, fertilizer, and food processing. 

Population

The inhabitants of Pakistan are about 88% Pakistani Muslims, while there are about 11% Indians (Hindi). Of all the other ethnic groups, Baluchistanis are the most numerous. Baluchistan, as a province, is the least populated. With the partition of British India in 1947 into Pakistan and India, Pakistan received a predominantly Muslim population as well as a larger number of Indians, and vice versa. In the period from 1947 to 1950, population exchange between Pakistan and India, including ethnic cleansing, reached the scale of several million inhabitants in both directions. In Pakistan, the official language is Urdu (the Muslim variant of the Hindi language), which in 1972 replaced English as the official language. However, several other local/regional languages ​​are in use. In 1970, 80% of Pakistan’s inhabitants were illiterate, which caused a lack of professional and educated staff, and this was especially felt in the administration and economy. 

For the sake of more comprehensive education and the reduction of illiteracy, in September 1972, 176 private colleges were nationalized. There were three universities in Pakistan then. About 15% of the population lived in cities, while there were 10 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. The capital of Pakistan was Rawalpindi from 1959, while today it is Islamabad. Until 1959, the largest city in Pakistan was Karachi. Today, Pakistan has a population of 251 million in an area of ​​881,913 sq. km. The GDP is 373 billion dollars, while the GDP per capita is almost 1500 dollars.

State organization

With the division of the British colony of (British) India into two states, India and Pakistan, on August 15th, 1947, Pakistan received the status of dominion, and according to the constitution of February 29th, 1956, it became a republic – the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, composed of two federal units: West and East Pakistan.


By the military coup of October 1958, the constitution was abolished, and a new one was adopted in March 1962. This new constitution provided for a federal system of government, a presidential system of government (the president must be a Muslim and is elected for 5 years), a National Assembly of 156 deputies (78 deputies from each of the two federal units) and two capital cities: Islamabad in West Pakistan (seat of the central government) and Dhaka in East Pakistan (seat of the National Assembly). However, the constitution from 1962 was repealed on March 25th, 1969, and only partially reinstated on April 4th, 1969. 

A turning point in Pakistan’s history was the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in December 1971, when East Pakistan declared itself an independent state under the name Bangladesh. Thus, the new state of Pakistan included only the territory of the former West Pakistan. In January 1972, Pakistan left the British Commonwealth.

A modern history of Pakistan up to the Partition in 1947

Pakistan is a country that came under British colonial control in the first half of the 19th century, when it became part of (a Greater) British India. Interestingly, its name is derived from the word “pak” (ritually pure) in the Urdu language. In other words, it means “Land of the Pure”. However, it is as well as an acronym for its most important component peoples: Punjabis, Afghans, Kashmirs, Sindhis, and the peoples of Baluchistan.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were only a several moves towards independence. One of the reasons was that those people living in the north in Punjab and Kashmir have been great beneficiaries of the British Raj, and occupied important posts in the administration and army of British India. It was among the more disadvantaged Muslim minority in north-central India that a Muslim cultural and political identity began to form, mainly due to several reformers and organizations like the Muslim League, a party founded on December 30th, 1906, in Dacca. Originally, the party fought for separate Muslim representation at all levels of government. The party claimed to represent the grievances and demands of the entire Muslim community within British India. 

Under its leader, Jinnah, the Muslim League issued several requirements for greater rights of Indian Muslims in a vast country of British India in which Muslims at that time accounted for some ¼ of the total population. Nevertheless, this political demand became all the more urgent with the increasing momentum of the Indian National Congress (the INC) under M. Gandhi, which made self-government or even independence under a Hindu-dominated government all but inevitable during the 1930s. In the first decades of its existence, the Muslim League pursued the dual aim of winning greater rights of self-government from the British colonial power and of winning greater rights for Muslims within such a British system. In order to achieve the first aim, the Muslim League cooperated with the INC, with which it allied itself in the Lucknow Pact of December 1916. However, the League was largely ineffective in the 1920s, when it claimed to have some 1.000 members in the whole of British India. This led to a decade in the 1930s of a major revision of the political goals of the Muslim League and the organization itself for the sake of appealing to the disparate Muslim community. 

The League, in 1930, addressed its annual conference to demand, for the first time, a separate Muslim state in the western portion of British India. This demand became gradually accepted, particularly after the Muslim League’s catastrophic showing in the 1937 elections, when it gained only 104 out of 489 Muslim seats. Therefore, its leader, Jinnah, now sought to broaden its popular base. On March 23rd, 1940, the requirement for a separate Muslim state became accepted as the official party’s policy in the coming years. It was known as the Pakistan Resolution or the Lahore Resolution, which, in fact, warned that if conditions for Muslims, especially in areas with a Muslim minority, did not improve, Muslims would lay claim to separate states as their homelands. The very idea of separate Muslim states referred to the western provinces of British India and East Bengal. The Muslim League in 1944 claimed over 2.000.000 members. The League got in the 1945−1946 elections 75% of the Muslim vote. Therefore, the Muslim League got a popular mandate for the creation of a separate Muslim state in the western regions of British India. This task was finally achieved by the creation of an independent Pakistan on August 15th, 1947. However, initially dominant in Pakistani politics, after the death of its party’s leader, Jinnah, the Muslim League lacked an integrative force and soon dissolved into various groups in the coming decade.  

All the countries of South Asia have been troubled by the special position of minorities and of regional groups. The Indian government’s attempt to foster Hindi was soon faced by demands for a new structure of states on linguistic lines, and from the 1950s onward, state boundaries have been rearranged. However, the linguistic feeling remained strong, especially in South India in Madras State, which was renamed Tamil Nadu. Before 1947, Pakistan formed part of British India, but following the British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent in 1947, Pakistan was created as a separate state, comprising the territory to the north-east and north-west of ex-British India in which the population was predominantly Muslim. In Pakistan, linguistic and regional demands were initially resisted, and the separate provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated as One Unit. However, regional loyalties forced a return to the old provinces, representing linguistic regions, in 1970. In East Pakistan, the strength of Bengal culture and grievances against the dominant West Pakistan elite fostered a demand for autonomy and later for independence.  

The Partition in 1947

For the reason that no agreement could be reached on a unified form of independence, a decision was required about the partition of the Indian sub-continent. The areas in the northwest with a Muslim majority were allowed to choose separation and the formation of a new state of Pakistan. The provinces of British India, which were affected, voted either through their elected representatives or by plebiscite. The rulers of the princely states within British India chose whether to join the independent state of India or where their boundaries marched with the new partition line, Pakistan. Punjab and Bengal were separately partitioned. Independence came to India and Pakistan in August 1947, to Burma in January 1948, and to Ceylon in February 1948. 

In India, it was fraught with problems from the beginning. The major part of the Indian sub-continent wished to remain united under the leadership of Nehru and the Indian National Congress. However, the explosive situation and the impossibility of securing agreement between Congress and the Muslim League led by Jinnah forced the hand of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, and on August 14th, 1947, the sub-continent became partitioned and the new state of Pakistan (physically composed of two parts) came into existence. The princely states (500+) have been left to the individual decisions of their rulers, who could, in effect, join either India or Pakistan if their boundaries marched with the new partition lines.

For both India and Pakistan, the first question was the delimitation of frontiers between the new states. However, this question particularly affected the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, where the populations were so mixed that partition seemed the only feasible solution (like in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s). But the boundary award cut through areas which in Punjab were occupied by rich farmlands populated by Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus as neighbors.   

Nevertheless, the partition of British India soon led to the high rank of violence between Hindus and Muslims as communal riots followed, and a two-way exodus started, with Muslims moving west and Sikhs and Hindus moving east, with more than 1 million people killed. Around 7.5 million Muslim refugees fled to both parts of Pakistan from India, and around 10 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India. The partition of Bengal produced similar results. Overall, some 500.000 people lost their lives. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League, became Pakistan’s first governor-general (President). The new state was composed of the western provinces of Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, and North-West Frontier (or known as West Pakistan). Separated by Indian territory was the eastern half of Bengal, which also belonged to the newly proclaimed independent Pakistan (or known as East Pakistan).

In addition to the resettlement of the refugees, the governments had to integrate the 500+ princely states. Most princes were persuaded to accede, promptly, to either India or Pakistan. Hyderabad resisted and became absorbed only after the action by the security forces (police). The ruler of Kashmir as well as hesitated, and an invasion of tribesmen from the Pakistani North West Frontier Province followed. The Maharaja then acceded to India, subject to a plebiscite of the Kashmir people, but Pakistan supported the tribal invaders. The situation was only stabilized by the mediation of the UN in 1949. 

The new state of Pakistan was, from the very beginning, confronted by plenty of problems. The most immediate of these was extensive migration (around 17.5 million people), as a consequence of the partition of British India into a Hindu and Muslim state. In addition, Pakistan contested its borders, as it competed with India over control of Kashmir. This confrontation has led to hostile relations with India up to today and the conduct of three Indo-Pakistani Wars. Moreover, Pakistan suffered as well from the tension between the majority of the population living in East Pakistan and the important posts in government, administration, and the military being occupied by officials from the wealthier and better-educated West Pakistan. These problems have been compounded by the total lack of any tradition or history as a single, unitary state. On one hand, East Pakistan (or East Bengal) was relatively homogeneous, but on the other hand, West Pakistan was composed of regions with widely different economies and ethnicities and with different degrees of religious observance. Some tribes of the North-West Frontier had devout observance of Islam and a history of autonomy within the former British colonial system. They have been contrasted with the more secular elite of Punjab, which had been well integrated into the British colonial administration.   

A contemporary history of Pakistan since the Partition in 1947 up to 9/11

The problem of finding a compromise that would create a viable, integrated, and constitutional entity bedeviled Pakistan during its existence. Pakistan continued to be formally ruled by the 1935 Government of India Act until 1956. The country’s liberal constitution became opposed by the fundamentalist Muslims, and in 1951, the Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated by an Afghan fundamentalist. In 1954, a state of emergency was declared, and a new constitution was adopted in 1956. However, the new political settlement failed to stabilize the country sufficiently to prevent the 1958 army coup, led by Ayub Khan. It was an attempt to adopt a multiparty system, but it failed, and consequently, Ayub Khan imposed martial law in 1958. He, in fact, abolished the recently established democracy but without much resistance, and devised a second constitution in 1962. 

On the other hand, Ayub Khan’s decade of power produced economic growth, followed, however, by political resentment as the two parts of the Pakistani state have been physically separated by a thousand kilometers of the territory of the independent and hostile Republic of India. Allegations by the Bengalis in East Pakistan against West Pakistan’s disproportionate share of the state’s assets led to demands by the Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, for regional autonomy. Nonetheless, in the following civil war in 1971, the Bengali dissidents defeated the Pakistani army, with help from India. It resulted in the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh in the same year. 

In 1965, Pakistan attempted to infiltrate troops into Kashmir. In the fighting which ensued, India made some gains, but in the agreement afterward reached in Tashkent under Soviet auspices, both countries agreed to return to the status quo. His precipitation of a costly and unsuccessful war with India over Kashmir in 1965, and increasing economic difficulties in Pakistan, finally led to his resignation in 1969. Relations between Pakistan and India continued to be tense, however, and rapidly worsened in 1971 when Pakistani military President, Yahya Khan, cruelly repressed the demands for autonomy in East Pakistan (East Bengal, later Bangladesh), which led to 10 million refugees crossing over into India. 

In 1970, the first-ever general democratic election has been organized, which brought to power in Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party. However, these elections were won by the Awami League in East Pakistan. Therefore, the West Pakistani political establishment, led by Yahya Khan, refused to hand over power and sent military troops to secure control in East Pakistan. This action caused a short but extremely violent civil war, and led, after Indian military intervention in December 1971, which supported the Bangladesh guerrilla with powerful military forces, which defeated the Pakistani army within two weeks, to the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. Zulfikar Bhutto, as the new President since 1971, created a populist and socialist regime. His program of nationalization, public works, and independence from US financial help failed to overcome the negative effects of the oil price shock of 1973, leading Pakistan into an economic crisis. He introduced constitutional, social, and economic reforms, but in 1977 was deposed in an army coup led by Zia-ul-Haq and later executed.   

Zia-ul-Haq improved Pakistani relations with the USA after the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan in 1979, when Pakistan came to host up to three million Afghan refugees, followed by bases for Afghan guerrillas. US military and civilian assistance led to high economic growth in the 1980s. However, Zia-ul-Haq died in a 1988 plane crash. His successor, Ishaq Khan, supervised the transition back to democracy, with the 1988 elections won by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto. She failed to establish control over the country and was dismissed by Khan in 1990 on charges of corruption. However, she became re-elected in 1993, but once again struggled to maintain control in a country plagued by crime, the international drugs trade, and the growing assertiveness of some of the Pakistani provinces (Baluchistan and Sind) and tribes (North West Frontier Province). 

Benazir Bhutto became dismissed by President Leghari once again on formal charges of corruption and mismanagement in 1996 and was finally succeeded by Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Islamic Democratic Alliance) in 1997, who proceeded to strengthen his position by changing the constitution, which limited the power of the Prime Minister (the PM). Nevertheless, he as well as confronted the judiciary, which he sought to conciliate towards his policies. Ultimately, in 1999, he sought to introduce Islamic law in Pakistan, but this attempt led to widespread demonstrations, while at the same time, the deteriorating economic situation had already eroded Sharif’s popular support, and for the reason of his pro-Western position during the First Gulf War/Desert Storm, 1990‒1991. His order to the army to withdraw forces from Kashmir and his dismissal of Musharraf led to a successful army coup, headed by Musharraf himself, who suspended the constitution, moved to put Pakistani political and judicial institutions under military control, and tried to stabilize the economy to placate international creditors. After establishing control, Musharraf’s regime became more liberal. However, it happened only after 9/11 (in 2001) that his regime became welcomed in the Western international arena. His decisive support of the US War on Terrorism brought great foreign policy benefits and enabled him to gain very much-needed Western international loans. Nevertheless, his pro-US stance was criticized by many Islamic fundamentalists and radicals in Pakistan, so that needed to temper by a moderate stance towards radical Islamist groups in Kashmir. In 1998, Pakistan carried out a series of underground nuclear tests in response to a similar program by the focal regional enemy – India. 

The political situation in Pakistan remained turbulent, including intra-ethnic violence in Karachi, followed by national economic problems. Pakistani industrial expansion emphasized the private sector and consumer goods. Nonetheless, unemployment rose more rapidly than new production, and up to 70% of the population is still dependent on agriculture. Both governments of India and Pakistan have been putting greater emphasis on better yields from the soil. Though the rate of growth remains slow, both India and Pakistan have succeeded in attaining self-sufficiency in food. Yet some 40% of the rural population remains undernourished because their income is very low.  

Finally, from 1947 up to 1971, there were three Pakistani-Indian Wars: the First (1947‒1948); the Second (September 1st‒23rd, 1965); and the Third (December 3rd‒16th, 1971). These Pakistani-Indian wars were the result of unresolved issues, but especially border-territorial ones, between Pakistan and India that appeared after the British division of the Indian subcontinent, i.e., of British India, in August 1947 between these two states. As a consequence of the Third War, Pakistan lost its eastern territories, on which the new state of Bangladesh was formed. After the war, the general balance of power on the Indian subcontinent changed in India’s favour. India, also improved its strategic and geopolitical position. Nevertheless, the region of Kashmir has been left to be he apple of discord between Pakistan and India to our da

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.