The U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran and the Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict threaten Central Asia’s plans to establish southbound trade routes to markets in Asia and Africa.
Military escalation between Afghanistan’s Taliban-led government and Pakistan threatens several emerging trade, transport, and energy corridors linking Central Asia to South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and global markets. Risks are both direct (insecurity along routes) and indirect (border closures, investor withdrawal, and partner-state reluctance).
Pakistan previously moved goods through Afghanistan to Central Asian markets, accounting for significant export volumes (bilateral trade was USD2.4 billion in 2025). That corridor is effectively closed, with border crossings, supply chains, and customs operations stalled. The loss of reliable land access undermines Afghanistan’s (food, fuel, industrial inputs) and Central Asian access southward toward Pakistan’s seaports.
Several high-profile connectivity initiatives depend on peace and stable transit through Afghanistan; heightened conflict raises the risk of delay or failure.
The 760-kilometer Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway is intended to link Central Asia directly to the Arabian Sea via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The USD6 billion project will cut transit time by five days and reduce transport costs by 40%, but the current conflict makes construction and future operations insecure. International financiers, including the Asian Development Bank and Persian Gulf investors, are likely to hesitate if Pakistan–Afghan relations remain adversarial. Uzbekistan cannot guarantee safe transit if Pakistan views Taliban-linked militant groups as a threat.
CASA-1000, a $1.2 billion cross-border electricity transmission project exporting surplus hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, also becomes vulnerable if conflict escalates.
Construction of the long-delayed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline is underway, but has made limited progress. TAPI is a 1,814-km pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, with a capacity of 33 billion cubic meters (bcm)/year. Construction started in 2015, and the Turkmenistan portion was completed by the end of 2024; the Afghanistan section to Herat is projected for completion by the end of 2026.
Taliban–Pakistan hostility undermines Taliban security guarantees, Pakistan may freeze cooperation on construction segments, and India will not commit to off-take agreements in a conflict zone.
Existing road corridors within Pakistan and Afghanistan are at risk. In Pakistan, the Khyber Pass Road corridor, the Peshawar–Torkham Expressway, and trucking routes carrying Central Asian exports to Karachi and Gwadar are high-risk, raising insurance and transport costs, making Pakistani ports less competitive for Central Asian exporters.
In Afghanistan, the Kabul–Jalalabad highway, the Kabul–Kandahar highway, and routes linking Mazar-i-Sharif to Pakistan are vulnerable, and traffic will slow during security operations.
Pakistan may suspend provisions of the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) to pressure the Taliban, leading to retaliation by the Afghan side. Goods from Central Asia transiting Afghanistan will be vulnerable to sudden policy reversals that may strand the cargo, vehicles, and drivers.
The Central Asia–South Asia Economic Corridor (CASAEC) is a regional framework that includes road, rail, and energy integration between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The fighting could stall corridor planning as Afghanistan–Pakistan coordination collapses, Persian Gulf and Chinese investors pause financing, and Central Asian states may shift focus to westward or eastward routes.
The conflict will increase instability along transit corridors, border closures and freight disruption, higher shipping and insurance costs, reduced investor confidence, and a shift away from Pakistan routes toward Iran or the Caspian Sea. The Trans-Afghan Railway, the TAPI natural gas pipeline and the CASA-1000 electricity project can only succeed if there is peace between Kabul and Islamabad.
Politically, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan lose strategic depth as southward access to the Arabian Sea becomes blocked. Iran becomes more critical as Central Asian states may reroute trade through Iran, but this is risky amid the U.S./Israel–Iran conflict. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) planning is disrupted, and China’s efforts to develop north–south corridors through Afghanistan and Pakistan face setbacks if neither side can guarantee stability. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan border Afghanistan and will be concerned about spillover violence and refugee flows from adjacent areas of Afghanistan.
In summary, Central Asia loses a key Southward trade gateway through which goods and transit benefits were expected to expand.
U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran are disrupting regional routes and supply chains. The conflict - particularly around the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf airspace - has significant implications for Central Asia.
The crisis has disrupted tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, an energy corridor that hosts the movement of more than 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports. Oil price volatility and rerouting add cost and uncertainty for Central Asian energy imports and transit.
Air and freight logistics have also been affected. Thousands of flights have been canceled or rerouted due to airspace closures, making Asia–Europe routes longer and more expensive. The spill-over includes concerns about airspace over South and Central Asia if instability spreads.
Projects that rely on stable Iran, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor, a 7,200-km multimodal network of sea, rail, and road routes for moving freight between India, Iran, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Europe, and Russia., will face elevated risk if Iran’s logistics infrastructure (the seaports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas) is targeted or trade sanctions tighten.
Central Asia depends on Iran for access to sea links and alternative routes outside of Russia and China; the current conflict weakens that option. Although partly complete in sections such as the Azerbaijan–Iran Western Route, Russia–Azerbaijan links, and the Mumbai–Bandar Abbas maritime leg, full efficiency depends on stable operations through Iranian territory.
The Five Nations Railway Corridor is a rail link to connect China, through Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, to Iran and ultimately to Persian Gulf ports. The corridor is meant to deepen Central Asia’s link to global markets via Iran and help the participants avoid maritime chokepoints. A major escalation in or around Iran threatens construction, cross-border coordination, and raises security costs and deters financing and investment, particularly in sections involving Iranian infrastructure. The corridor is making slow progress with limited freight operations between Iran and Afghanistan.
The Southern Corridor through Iran is a broader set of Iranian rail expansions intended to bolster East-West connectivity between Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Iran has been upgrading tracks and electrifying main corridors that link Central Asian freight to the Persian Gulf and European markets. Projects include the Marand–Cheshmeh-Soraya railway and expansion of the Turkmenistan–Iran rail link toward Turkey and beyond.
Nargiza Umarova of the Institute for Advanced International Studies in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, notes the Southern Corridor is “critical for Central Asia,” but active conflict could cause delays, rerouting of freight, and suspension of services as neighboring countries close borders or airspace. Shuttle services that rely on Iranian rail infrastructure may find it difficult to operate safely under US and Israeli attacks.
The Central Asia–Persian Gulf Multimodal Corridor, under the Ashgabat Agreement, links Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Oman, and is designed for combined rail, road, and maritime transport. Iran represents a critical section of this corridor, enabling overland freight to reach the Persian Gulf, and conflict-related disruption could curtail services that depend on Iranian logistics capacity, customs cooperation, and security guarantees. The corridor is not yet fully operational, and attacks on Iran will slow work.
The Dauletabad–Sarakhs–Khangiran natural gas pipeline links Central Asian energy exports to Iranian networks. Its continued operation supports regional energy trade and complements transport infrastructure by enhancing the incentives for broader integration. Escalation around Iran could threaten energy infrastructure, encourage sanctions, or lower regional investment in pipeline expansions. The pipeline is operational and moves 12 bcm of gas annually.
South-North land corridors through Afghanistan and Pakistan were emerging as strategic links for Central Asia to South Asia and Indian Ocean transits. These include Trans-Afghan rail and road routes and the partly operational Lapis Lazuli Corridor linking Afghanistan with Turkmenistan and beyond, and Central Asian plans to diversify away from Russia–China routes toward Pakistan and Iran. These land routes are now under severe strain as conflict blocks key junctions and raises security costs, discourages investment, and delays infrastructure completion.
Iran or neighboring states (e.g., Pakistan, Turkey) may close borders or airspace, effectively severing key overland corridors that run through or around Iran. This has already happened in parts of the region during heightened conflict.
Possible alternatives are the Middle Corridor that links Central Asia through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and onward to Europe — seen as a safer alternative; and the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway, another BRI overland route that increases Central Asian connectivity to China and Europe without relying on Iran links.
With Iran unstable and Pakistan embroiled in conflict, Central Asia’s access to ports becomes more constrained. Alternative maritime access—especially via Iranian ports—becomes riskier and more expensive. Central Asian exporters may increasingly rely on northern or east–west corridors (Russia, China) instead of struggling North-South options. And Iran may move to assert more control over Chabahar Port in light of India’s USD 10 billion in defense deals with Israel.
Rail corridors tied to Iran are optimized to complement maritime freight through Persian Gulf ports. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and shipping routes can cascade back into overland connectivity planning and usage.
Displaced trade flows risk increasing transport costs, delivery times, and logistical uncertainty for Central Asian exporters and importers. Some countries could see trade patterns shift further east toward Chinese markets or Caspian routes. Investment flows into connectivity infrastructure are likely to slow unless security stabilizes, as investors avoid conflict zones.
Heightened geopolitical risk reduces or slows foreign investment and financing for infrastructure projects, and may prompt Central Asian states to pivot toward alternatives such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) bypassing Iran.
Despite the disruptions, Central Asian states may pursue diversification by pushing more trade via rail and the Trans-Caspian corridor (bypassing conflict zones), deepening ties with China’s BRI and the Middle Corridor through the Caucasus, and strengthening overland routes to Europe that bypass Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.
The U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran do not just threaten Iranian territory and infrastructure - they endanger key pieces of the regional connectivity architecture that Central Asia seeks to build for diversifying trade routes, reducing dependence on Russia or maritime chokepoints, and integrating into global markets. Despite Trump’s friendly approach toward Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, he is likely to prioritize cooperation with Israel in the conflict with Iran, leaving regional economic repercussions to be addressed later. Among the effects may be reduced interest by Persian Gulf investors if they turn their attentions to repairing infrastructure damaged by Iranian attacks or increasing military spending.
These combined geopolitical crises are undermining Central Asia’s planned integration into South Asian and Middle Eastern trade networks, prompting nations to pivot toward more secure connectivity options to sustain economic growth and avoid being cut off from global value chains.
By James Durso
