Imaginary Peace Treaties and the Ceasefire Illusion

Daniel Warner

June 12, 2026

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Bill Clinton mediates the handshake between Yitzak Rabin and Yassir Arafat outside the White House on September 13, 1993. Photo: White House Historical Association.

“A truce [between Lebanon and Israel] that has been in effect since April 17 has never been respected,” AFP reported. So what exactly is a cease-fire worth if the fighting continues? From Lebanon to Ukraine, cease-fires are announced with great fanfare and violated with remarkable speed. Yet politicians and commentators still speak as if a truce were the same thing as peace.
Donald Trump is one of the worst violators of this confusion. Trump’s claims to have ‘ended’ eight wars follow a familiar pattern. A cease-fire becomes peace, a negotiation becomes a deal, and a temporary pause in fighting becomes the end of a war. Trump’s declarations belie the underlying reality that the conflicts he refers to remain unsettled—much like a schoolyard fight is declared “over” the moment the children are pulled apart.

Did Trump really “end” eight wars? Are the underlying conflicts actually over? Lebanon remains unstable. Iran and Israel continue to exchange threats and attacks. Russia and Ukraine are still at war. The Houthis still fire missiles. Gaza remains unresolved. Kashmir remains disputed. The Democratic Republic of Congo remains violent. These claims often amount to relabelling partial stabilization, normalization, or temporary pause as a final resolution. If these wars were truly “ended” by Trump, nobody seems to have informed the combatants, civilians killed in the fighting, or the millions suffering and displaced.

Cease-fires are among the most celebrated and least understood achievements in modern diplomacy. They generate headlines, press conferences, handshakes, and declarations of success. (See the famous September 13, 1993, photo of Bill Clinton, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat White House handshake from the Oslo peace process.) Many cease-fires are violated almost immediately. Some collapse within days. Others survive on paper long after they have ceased to exist in reality.
What is the value of the cease-fire? The New York Times headlined recently: “Israeli Strike Kills 3 Lebanese Soldiers, Days After Truce Was Signed.” While there may be benefits to agreements intended to halt fighting, the cease-fire glass appears not merely half-empty, but nearly drained. Too often, the promises are celebrated while the fighting continues.

Three recent examples of the cease-fire illusion:

1) A new U.S.-brokered cease-fire framework was announced June 3, 2026, under which Israel and Lebanon agreed to enforce a cessation of hostilities and expand Lebanese Army control in southern Lebanon. Within days, renewed exchanges of fire spread across multiple border sectors. Repeated evacuations followed in southern Lebanon. Tens of thousands were displaced. Reports of casualties continued from ongoing clashes. The cease-fire exists in declaration, not in control of events on the ground.

2) The United States and Iran maintain a cease-fire framework. Both sides accuse each other of violations. Military pressure continues across multiple fronts. On June 8, Iran and Israel exchanged missile and drone strikes again, breaking through a fragile truce and triggering renewed escalation. Israeli strikes hit targets inside Iran. Iranian missiles reached Israeli territory. Additional attacks extended across the wider regional network of aligned forces. The cease-fire holds in language, not in conduct.

3) The Russia–Ukraine war. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, repeated cease-fire attempts, humanitarian pauses, and localized truces have failed to hold. Fighting continues across eastern and southern Ukraine. Missile and drone strikes continue on Ukrainian cities. Temporary pauses collapse quickly, often within days. Prisoner exchanges and localized cessations of fire occur, but do not translate into sustained reductions in combat or movement toward settlement. The cease-fires exist in interruption, not in resolution.

There is nothing new about cease-fires. Armies have been pausing wars for thousands of years. Sometimes to negotiate. Sometimes to regroup. Sometimes simply because both sides were exhausted. In the ancient world, Greek city-states occasionally suspended hostilities during religious festivals, while medieval rulers often arranged truces that paused wars for months or even years without resolving the underlying conflict. Sometimes the warriors stopped fighting to return home to harvest the crops.

What cease-fires have rarely done is resolve the conflict they interrupt.

There are exceptions. In modern times some cease-fires have become major turning points to end conflicts rather than merely time-outs. The 1953 Korean War cease-fire froze the battlefield and stopped large-scale combat. Although the conflict was never formally ended by a peace treaty, the cease-fire has largely held for over seventy years.

Other cease-fires have opened the door to lasting political settlements. In Northern Ireland, repeated cease-fires by paramilitary groups in the 1990s helped create the conditions for negotiations that culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. In the Middle East, the cease-fire agreements that ended the 1973 Arab–Israeli War paved the way for diplomacy between Egypt and Israel, eventually leading to the 1979 peace treaty. Cease-fires can create the breathing room needed for diplomacy to succeed where armed conflict could not.

Despite the limited cease-fire successes, they were never intended to be peace treaties. They are instruments for stopping violence, not for resolving the political disputes that caused the violence in the first place. Their success should therefore be measured by whether they create the conditions under which diplomacy becomes possible. The problem in many of today’s conflicts is not that cease-fires exist; it is that they are increasingly treated as substitutes for political settlement rather than as a first step toward one.

In that sense, a cease-fire is a comma, not a period. “I have no illusions about the difficulty of peace,” George Mitchell said while working on the Northern Ireland peace process. “It is hard, painstaking work that requires patience and persistence.” Yet politicians like Trump, and real estate brokers like Witkoff and Kushner keep presenting it as the end of the sentence, all show and closure with little chance of sustainability. It is like the passing of the eye of a hurricane before the high winds pick up again. Confusing cease-fires and peace may make for a good political talking point and publicity about “ending” wars, but it makes for poor history.

The tendency of politicians like Trump, journalists, and the public to confuse a cessation of hostilities with a resolution of conflict obscures deeper diplomatic efforts to find lasting resolutions. Obama’s team spent about two years, from 2013 to 2015, negotiating the Iran nuclear deal, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, Under Secretary Wendy Sherman, and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, with close involvement from National Security Council officials including Jake Sullivan and Ben Rhodes. Real estate salesmen should not be confused with diplomats. A Trumpian announcement on CNN Breaking News should not be confused with “hard, painstaking work.”

A cease-fire can pause a war. It cannot resolve the conflict that produced it. What is often claimed as having “ended” a war is merely political branding. Only sustained diplomacy can turn a pause into a settlement.

Daniel Warner is the author of An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations. (Lynne Rienner). He lives in Geneva.

How Western Media Normalizes Israel’s Ethnic Cleansing in Lebanon

Like in Gaza, where genocide proceeds apace in spite of a declared ceasefire, the media tend to report “ceasefires” in Lebanon without caring to highlight the fact that it’s not a ceasefire when Israel is still pummeling the country and massacring people.


A child suffering serious injuries is brought to hospital after an Israeli airstrike on a building on April 08, 2026 in Nabatieh, Lebanon.
(Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images)

Belen Fernandez
Jun 12, 2026

FAIR

In October 2024, one year into Israel’s genocidal war on the Gaza Strip and attendant assault on Lebanon, the Israeli army did a thing. It invited journalists from major Western corporate media outlets on an incursion into Lebanon’s ravaged south, accompanied by Israeli military personnel who would interpret the wreckage in Israel’s favor—not that the Western media have ever required much assistance in this regard.

Reporters from the New York Times, Washington Post, Associated Press, Reuters, BBC, Fox News and a handful of other special guests signed up for the cross-border sortie. It was, as Habib Battah and Christina Cavalcanti note in an investigation for the Public Source (8/27/25), an “awkward hybrid between a traditional embed and the kind of all-expense-paid publicity trip that journalists refer to as junkets, freebies and dog-and-pony shows.”

Never mind that it is entirely illegal for journalists or anyone else to enter Lebanon from Israel—what’s one more illegal invasion from a country that has been invading Lebanon pretty much since its founding? As Battah and Cavalcanti emphasize, these media professionals were also embedding themselves “within a national project of extraordinary transnational violence,” hosted by an “extrajudicial occupying military power—a critical point that all of them would fail to mention in their coverage.”

The Israelis certainly hit the jackpot with the coverage, as reporters excitedly discovered boots and helmets allegedly belonging to Hezbollah—clear proof that the group had been plotting a nefarious attack on Israel. New York Times Jerusalem correspondent Isabel Kershner, an old pro at conducting preemptive journalistic strikes on Lebanon, did not disappoint with her dispatch (10/13/24), “Just Over the Border From Israel, a Hezbollah Cache of Explosives and Mines.”

And in report after embedded report, Israel’s chosen journalists faithfully transmitted the tiresome and counter-logical notion that Hezbollah was somehow the aggressor in the arrangement—as opposed to the army that was busily slaughtering thousands of people in Lebanon while implementing a scorched-earth strategy.
‘Urgent evacuation warnings’While the October 2024 embed was one of the more preposterous embodiments of Western corporate media’s special relationship with Israel, outlets continue to do a fine job of sanitizing Israeli brutality even when their reporters are not physically viewing the region from inside an Israeli armored vehicle. Since March of this year, Israel has killed at least 3,613 people in Lebanon and displaced 1.2 million, obliterating entire villages and otherwise expanding the ecocidal policy honed in the Gaza Strip.

There has been no remotely comparable destruction on the Israeli side, and a recent Reuters article (5/31/26) that had attempted to suggest some symmetry now comes with the preface: “This May 31 story has been corrected to remove a reference to tens of thousands of Israelis being displaced by Hezbollah fire, in paragraph 3.”

Like in Gaza, where genocide proceeds apace in spite of a declared ceasefire (FAIR.org, 10/21/25), the media tend to report “ceasefires” in Lebanon without caring to highlight the fact that it’s not a ceasefire when Israel is still pummeling the country and massacring people, all the while setting the stage for a massive land grab with its creeping so-called “evacuation orders.” These “evacuations” have been focused on the Shiite demographic, with Israel warning Christian and Druze communities not to allow Shiite neighbors to take refuge in their towns (New York Times, 4/1/26).

Lebanese journalist Habib Battah, co-author of the aforementioned Public Source investigation, suggested to me that such orders might be more accurately termed “ethnic cleansing directives.” But that, of course, would be way too much for corporate media outlets to handle—and so it is that we learn about Israel’s “urgent evacuation warnings” and “large-scale evacuation orders,” as though it’s some sort of public service announcement, fire drill or other fundamentally legitimate Israeli undertaking, rather than entirely illegal in addition to downright psychopathic. From a legal and moral perspective, after all, you can’t just go around ordering people in other countries out of their homes, oftentimes only to bomb them when they comply.

Then there’s the matter of the “Yellow Line” or “security zone”—more terminology borrowed from Gaza (FAIR.org, 5/19/26)—which denotes the portion of south Lebanon that Israel is currently illegally occupying. But Israel has never been very good at staying within the lines, and its latest “evacuation orders” spanned no less than one-fifth of the entire country, far beyond its own unilaterally appointed Yellow Line.

As Battah remarked to me, the media’s acceptance and deployment of such arbitrary vocabulary creates “artificial structures” and a sense of orderliness, when in reality “there’s no yellow lines, there’s no yellow, there’s no colors—these are just illegal invasions.” And because media are committed to sanitizing Israel’s behavior rather than questioning it, “colonization becomes normalized.”
‘A warning to residents’

The eagerness of journalists to do Israel’s bidding is all the more confounding given that Israel is currently the No. 1 killer of journalists in the world. A recent Associated Press article (5/29/26), for example, reduced the pulverization of Lebanon to simply “ongoing fighting in southern Lebanon between Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters.”

A June 4 Reuters writeup blamed Hezbollah for having “rejected” the latest US-mediated “ceasefire” plan—which, mind you, would basically have given Israel the green light to seize south Lebanon outright. Reuters refrained from referencing the thousands of Lebanese casualties since March, but did allow Israel the usual space to defend its depredations: “The Israeli military, in a warning to residents of the south, said it was continuing to target Hezbollah facilities.”

This is not to say that corporate media do not report on the destruction, displacement and killing in Lebanon; they do—and sometimes even sympathetically. But the refusal to paint a consistent and properly contextualized picture of what is actually going on in the country means that they mostly just end up legitimizing Israel’s war crimes.

Imagine for a moment that Hezbollah had just killed thousands of Israelis in three months and occupied northern Israel. In doing so, it laid waste to 5,000-year-old cities, and bombed the fuck out of everything from homes to ambulances to World Heritage sites to university students to environmental activists who protect sea turtles. Suffice it to say we’d be hearing a lot more about the utter barbarity of it all—and that Hezbollah wouldn’t be allowed to claim ad nauseam that it was targeting “military facilities.”

Almost three years into a genocide that has officially killed nearly 73,000 Palestinians and given Israel every opportunity to blind the world with its true colors, it is no short of an abomination that Israeli officials are still permitted to insist—with little to no media pushback—that they only target “terrorists” and “terrorist infrastructure.” If Israeli officials were to claim that two plus two equals eight, or that Elvis Presley was living in a cave in Madagascar, would the corporate media also report such information with a straight face?

By taking Israel’s word for it, journalists wind up essentially validating mass killing and occupation—as in the corrected May 31 Reuters piece that straight up makes the case for Israel’s seizure of a 900-year-old castle that lies nowhere near the imaginary colored line:
The advance into Beaufort Castle has granted Israeli troops a vantage point over much of southern Lebanon and northern Israel, from which attacks have been launched ⁠towards Israeli residential areas.

‘Iranian proxy on its borders’

Of course, willful media decontextualization and omission of relevant history facilitates the conversion of Israeli propaganda into “news.” One handy trick is to always, always, always remind audiences that Hezbollah is a “powerful Shia group supported by Iran,” as the BBC (5/28/26) puts it.

On March 13, CNN ran an analysis datelined Tel Aviv that bore the headline: “The War That Never Ended: Israel Seizes Moment to Finish Fight Against Hezbollah, Iran’s Proxy in Lebanon.” The analyst proceeded to justify Israel’s belief that “it needs to establish a strong military defense to protect civilians from the Iranian proxy on its borders.”

But while invoking Hezbollah’s support by Iran is practically a requirement for Western media reports, it is never deemed necessary to qualify Israel’s own orientation in any way—like, I dunno, “The war that never ended: Genocidal psychostate backed to the hilt by global superpower seizes moment to finish fight against Hezbollah.”

As for why this fight started in the first place, the media can somehow never summon the energy to explain that Hezbollah owes its very existence to Israel’s apocalyptic 1982 invasion of Lebanon that killed tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians, prompting the group’s formation. Indeed, Israel’s lengthy history of invading Lebanon—not to mention its 22-year occupation of the south of the country, which ended in its ignominious eviction by the Hezbollah-led Lebanese resistance—would seem to be pretty crucial context in terms of understanding the current war. But those journalists who do bother to provide a bit of background do so in as ambiguous and cursory a fashion as possible, as in the New York Times’ explanation (6/3/26) that “Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite militia group, has been in conflict with Israel, on and off, for decades.”

A May 13 NBC News intervention headlined “Amid Ceasefire, Israeli Forces Ramp Up Destruction of Homes in Southern Lebanon” offers a roundabout summary of Hezbollah’s origins: “The group, formed in the early 1980s as a civil war consumed Lebanon, was created with support from Iran and sought to expel Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.” The piece went on to discuss some details of the present destruction in south Lebanon, including footage from a video posted to X on April 24 in which
two excavators can be seen destroying solar panels in the Christian border town of Debel, where a photo last month showed a soldier taking what appeared to be an axe to a statue of Jesus.


In a statement to NBC News that can be safely filed under the can’t-make-this-shit-up category, the Israeli army “said…that the damage to the solar panels was not in line with its values, and that disciplinary measures had been taken.” Here’s praying that corporate journalists might someday have the balls to take Israel to task on more existential matters.



© 2023 Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR)

Belen Fernandez
Belén Fernández is the author of The Darién Gap: A Reporter’s Journey through the Deadly Crossroads of the Americas and Inside Siglo XXI: Locked Up in Mexico’s Largest Immigration Center, among other titles. She is an opinion columnist at Al Jazeera.
Full Bio >

Iran War Poses Middle East’s Biggest Economic Shock In Five Decades – Analysis

 June 12, 2026  

By Arab News

By Alaa shahine Salha

The Iran war has delivered the broadest economic shock to the Middle East and North Africa in at least half a century of regional upheaval, according to an analysis produced by Asharq Business with Bloomberg.

Its report, based on analyzing International Monetary Fund data dating back to 1980, compared the conflict with the onset of major geopolitical crises, including the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the 2011 Arab protests and the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks.

The current crisis is hitting a much larger economic bloc than previous shocks in the sample. 

The combined nominal gross domestic product of the 10 directly affected economies — including Iran, the Gulf states, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel — is about $4 trillion, equal to roughly 70 percent of the Middle East and North Africa economy and around 3 percent of global output, according to the analysis.

It underscores how the conflict may prove to be the region’s biggest turning point since the 1973 Arab oil embargo, a crisis that disrupted the global economy and led to what economists later called “stagflation.”

The difference is that the 1970s oil shock helped launch a Gulf boom, while the Iran war threatens to leave the region facing higher costs from disrupted trade and damaged investor confidence.

The conflict also came at a time when the Middle East was gearing up for a massive multi-year reconstruction effort in several postwar countries, including Syria, Lebanon, and Sudan, where Gulf states had been expected to play a major role alongside international institutions.

Here are the report’s key findings.

For the first time since the 1940s, a military conflict in the Middle East directly affected 10 countries: Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel.

The war disrupted oil and gas production and exports across most Gulf countries, as well as Iraq and Iran. It also pushed OPEC production in May to its lowest level since 1985, according to Bloomberg estimates.

Combined GDP of the countries directly affected by the war is close to $4 trillion, equal to about 3 percent of the global economy and roughly 70 percent of the Middle East and North Africa’s nominal GDP — a share unmatched by any other crisis in the historical sample.

In growth terms, the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution and the start of the Iran-Iraq war caused the region’s economy to contract by more than 1 percent in 1980, driven by a 21.6 percent collapse in Iran’s economy.

This year, the IMF’s baseline scenario expects Iran’s economy to shrink by about 6 percent.

By contrast, higher oil prices helped the region’s GDP grow by about 7 percent in 1990 and 1991, despite Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war to liberate the country.

Oil prices also helped the region grow by about 5.8 percent in 2003 despite the US-led invasion of Iraq, while Iraq’s own economy contracted by more than 36 percent.

In 2011, the data show the region’s GDP grew by about 4 percent despite the impact of the anti-government protests on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, as Gulf economies — led by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait — posted strong growth supported by oil prices.

In 2024, reflecting the impact of the Gaza war, the region grew by 1.8 percent, according to the data.

Saudi Arabia’s economy has shown resilience through most major geopolitical crises to hit the region over the past five decades, according to historical data and current IMF forecasts — a situation that largely reflects the Kingdom’s ability to keep producing and exporting oil during periods of conflict.

In the current Iran war, Saudi Aramco diverted most crude exports through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, reducing exposure to the Strait of Hormuz.

The crisis has also highlighted the strength of Saudi Arabia’s economy beyond oil, supported by domestic demand and a more diversified government revenue base after years of reforms.

Saudi GDP growth remained positive in the crises reviewed: 5.8 percent in 1980, 9.4 percent in 1990, 8.2 percent in 1991, 8.8 percent in 2003, 11 percent in 2011, 2.6 percent in 2024, and a forecast 3.1 percent in 2026.

The report said the path of recovery will depend on how quickly the war ends, whether the Strait of Hormuz fully reopens, and how fast energy exports return to normal.

A rebound in oil and gas output could lead to a sharp, V-shaped growth because of the weight of the energy sector in Gulf and Iraqi GDP.

But the harder challenge will be ensuring there is no repeat conflict anytime soon. That is essential for tourism, foreign direct investment, shipping, and non-oil activity — sectors that have become increasingly important for employment and diversification plans, according to the report.

PAGF 13


Trump’s meeting with Orthodox Christian patriarch sows confusion

(RNS) — The Greek Orthodox leader expects to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin later this month.

Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem, left, meets with President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington, June 4, 2026. (Photo courtesy Jerusalem Patriarchate)

David I. Klein
June 10, 2026 

RNS

(RNS) — The Greek Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophilos III, met with President Donald Trump last week in the White House and awarded him one of the highest honors in the church, the Grand Cross of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre.

In return, Theophilos came out of the meeting with an honor of his own, the suggestion of becoming a peacemaker in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, apparently backed by Trump, Israeli media reported.

The news left many observers scratching their heads. In the constellation of Orthodox Church leaders, Theophilos is seen as solidly in Russia’s camp. The patriarch is set to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow later this month.

The Ukraine-Russia war is the largest conflict affecting the world’s Orthodox Christians today, with majorities of both Russia and Ukraine’s population identifying with Orthodox churches.

The conflict has divided the wider Orthodox world too, after the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephaly to a Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent of the Moscow Patriarchate, prompting Moscow to break communion with Constantinople and forcing many of the Eastern Orthodox churches to pick sides. The result has been the largest schism in the church since the break with Rome in 1054.

Though the Jerusalem Patriarchate does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the independent Ukrainian church, Theophilos is one of the leaders who — in some respects — straddles the divide. As a native Greek, he maintains ties with those in Constantinople’s orbit, but the long history of Russian pilgrimage to the Holy Land and number of Russian Orthodox Christians in Israel have kept him close to Moscow, explained Samuel Noble, a scholar of Orthodox Christianity at Belgium’s University of Liège.

People light flares during the funeral ceremony of fallen Ukrainian servicemen in Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, June 8, 2026. (AP Photo/Danylo Antoniuk)

“Having goodwill with both the Hellenic world and with Russia is an interesting diplomatic thing,” Noble told RNS, “but I don’t think that it all translates into diplomatic cachet with the Ukrainian state.”

Cyril Hovorun, a Ukrainian Orthodox theologian and scholar, told RNS he viewed the news as an attempt to replace the White House’s previous efforts to tap the Vatican as such a mediator. “The patriarch of Jerusalem is known for being quite closely attached to Putin,” he noted.

“I think it fits the policy of Donald Trump’s administration to distance itself from Ukraine as a mediator and to bestow this mission of mediation upon someone else,” Hovorun said. “Once upon a time, the Holy See, the Vatican, was considered as such a mediator. … Now that the relations between the White House and the Apostolic Palace — the Holy See — have deteriorated significantly and dramatically, I think this idea to ask someone else, some other religious figure, to do mediation emerged in the White House.”

Ukrainian officials quickly shut down the idea of Theophilos as a mediator, noting his opposition to the Ukrainian church’s independence.

“Patriarch Theophilos’ participation in negotiations with Ukraine is unrealistic,” a high-ranking diplomat of the Ukrainian Embassy in Israel told Ukrainian media. “Ukraine will never do such a thing.”

Greek Orthodox Patriarch Theophilos III speaks during a joint press conference with Latin Patriarch Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, not pictured, after their visit to the Gaza Strip in Jerusalem, July 22, 2025. (AP Photo/Mahmoud Illean)

The embassy also said Theophilos had not responded to any of the embassy’s initiatives previously but participated in Russian diplomatic events.

The ancient Jerusalem patriarchate, one of nine independent churches governing Eastern Orthodoxy, has long seen its role as protecting Christian communities and sites in the Holy Land. The meeting came at a time when the Christian population of the Holy Land, including many Orthodox Christians, are facing heightened tensions against their communities and while the Trump administration has shown signs of willingness with Israel to topple the fragile status quo governing sacred sites in the region.

“The Patriarch presented the President with a range of concerns and challenges confronting the churches of the Holy Land. Foremost among these were sustaining the authentic Christian presence, safeguarding holy sites, promoting human dignity, and reinforcing the Church’s mission of pastoral care, mercy, and peace building,” the patriarchate said in a statement.

After his meeting with Trump, Theophilos met with the Greek prime minister with the same agenda to protect Christians and the church’s holy sites.

Over the past several years, Jerusalem and the wider region have seen a rash of harassment, violence and legal pressures against Christian communities in the Holy Land. According to a recent report by the Jerusalem-based Rossing Center for Education and Dialogue, 2025 saw more than 150 attacks on Christians in Israel, up from 111 in 2024 and 89 in 2023. Only about 1.9% of Israel’s population is Christian, and 80% of Israeli Christians are Arab.

Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem, left, meets with President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington, June 4, 2026. (Photo courtesy of Jerusalem Patriarchate)

Jonathan Kuttab, a Palestinian Christian and human rights lawyer, noted that despite the influence of Christian Zionism, anti-Christian sentiment — as something separate from anti-Palestinian or anti-Arab sentiment — is a growing problem in several sectors of Israeli society.

“There’s a very strong, almost gut level anti-Christian sentiment that is never acknowledged, but in some places and in some cases — like these days — it’s coming up to the surface,” Kuttab said, citing examples of ultra-Orthodox Jews spitting at nuns and priests and religiously motivated attacks against Christian villages, cemeteries and churches in the region.

“There is a very clear sentiment there, which is almost never addressed or expressed openly, unless, you know, you’re somebody crazy, like (Bezalel) Smotrich or (Itamar) Ben-Gvir who say it up front,” he said, referring to Israel’s finance and national security ministers, who both helm far right parties in the Knesset and have a history of defending sectarian attacks.

RELATED: Israeli attacks on Christians and Christianity demand answers

In April, an Israeli soldier smashed a statue of Jesus with a sledgehammer in southern Lebanon while another soldier photographed the act, resulting in their removal from combat service and prompting the Jewish state to appoint a special envoy to the Christian world. In May, a man chased, pushed down and kicked a French Catholic nun in Jerusalem.

An undated photo of an Israeli soldier smashing a statue of Jesus Christ with a sledgehammer in southern Lebanon. (Image via social media)

“We have witnessed incidents of harassment, acts of disrespect toward clergy and religious symbols, and growing concerns surrounding the preservation of Christian life and heritage in the city,” said Levon Kalaydjian, a Jerusalem Armenian Christian activist. “These are not abstract concerns; they affect the daily sense of dignity, belonging and safety of communities that have been rooted in Jerusalem for centuries.”

Rabbi Eugene Korn, the former academic director of the Center for Jewish-Christian Understanding and Cooperation, said the mentality has been growing in certain sectors, such as the ultra-Orthodox and religious Zionist communities.

“Problems that have gotten a lot of attention — and rightfully so — in Jerusalem, are kind of localized to Jerusalem, because you have these radicals and many of them are represented in the government and the government doesn’t take action against them,” Korn said.

Jerusalem’s many church bodies have faced legal pressures as well. The Jerusalem municipality froze the Greek Orthodox Church’s accounts last summer in a tax dispute that critics allege was an attempt to force the church to sell its prized land holdings. The Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem has similarly been embroiled in a long court battle to defend a portion of the Armenian quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City from being taken over by developers. The two patriarchates, and particularly the Greek Orthodox Church, are among the largest landholders in Israel, controlling large swaths of land far beyond historic churches and religious institutions. But the Jerusalem Patriarchate has also recently sold off properties — to the chagrin of its local Palestinian flock.

While the church’s flock is overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking Palestinian and Jordanian Christians, its leadership has for centuries been — almost invariably — transplants from Greece or Greek-speaking communities.

“The Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem has never reflected the sentiment of the Palestinian, the people in the pew,” Kuttab said.

Claudio Katz: ‘The Argentine left must aim to govern with a strategy for power’

By Claudio Katz & Argentina Indymedia

Published 11 June, 2026

First published in Spanish at Argentina Indymedia. Translation by Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

In this interview, Claudio Katz assesses the newfound prominence in Argentine politics of Workers’ Left Front – Unity (FIT-U) MP Myriam Bregman, and outlines some of the debates on the left. Katz also examines Argentina’s political situation, its economic crisis and President Javier Milei’s declining support, within a regional framework marked by events in Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia.

Is Argentina’s political landscape changing?

Yes. Milei’s discrediting is very obvious, even among sectors that propelled him to power. His low approval rating, various expressions of disapproval with his administration, and the early election campaigning all indicate this.

The causes are obvious: two years of a dramatic fall in consumption and a brutal transfer of income to the wealthiest has caused widespread discontent. Daily life has been dramatically disrupted. A simple trip to work is now a nightmare, with reduced services and fares rising 12 times faster than wages. The healthcare system’s collapse is even more severe. Price hikes of 400% have pushed 740,000 people out of private health care and into already overcrowded public hospitals. Many pensioners are going without medicines to pay for food.

Inequality is shameful. As fuel exports rise, so do domestic energy costs. Each new record harvest comes with more empty tables in homes, cartoneros [a person who collects waste, such as cardboard, to resell]. rummaging through bins and school canteens run short on food supplies.

Milei took his chainsaw to the country, paralysing public works. He also abandoned his last remaining campaign pledge to cut inflation. It is again hovering at about 3% a month, according to a fictitious measurement based on obsolete household costs. The government itself is fuelling inflation by imposing tariff hikes and violating its monetarist ideology, which attributes price rises to money supply. By manipulating the exchange rate, it is artificially containing a further surge.

But this has not caused his economic model to collapse…

In reality, it is creaking and the shock absorbers are wearing out. 140,000 jobs losses were offset by 100,000 new informal gig economy jobs. No economy can function with 930 businesses closing each month and disposable income collapsing, with families asked to compensate for unpayable debts.

As so many times before, the huge trade surplus has evaporated due to capital flight, and another Trump rescue package is unlikely should last year’s critical exchange rate scenario be repeated. Milei's only solution to the crisis he has created is yet more austerity cuts. With tax revenue plummeting in a stagnating economy, Milei has imposed further cuts to sustain the fiction of a fiscal surplus and avoid a debt default. He has created a vicious circle of economic contraction and poverty, with no way out in sight.

Against this critical backdrop, outrage over corruption has resurfaced…

Absolutely. There is enormous anger over embezzlement by Milei’s gang. Their thievery is so brazen that even the tax collection agency head is hiding assets from tax authorities. The Libra cryptocurrency scandal, [general secretary of the presidency] Karina Milei’s 3% kickback revelations, bribery in more than 600 contracts between the national disability agency and a Kovalivker family-owned business, Milei-backed candidate José Luis Espert’s resignation over campaign funds from a high-profile drug trafficker, all expose how a gang of thugs have taken over the state to line their pockets. The scandals around Milei’s former cabinet chief, Manuel Adorni, go beyond anything imaginable and reveal a scandalous network of salary kickbacks and private plunder. They protect each other with codes and complicity like the mafia.

Milei, however, is more furious that no one cheers his outbursts and antics anymore. He does not know how to handle defeat in the culture war. His inner circle are cynically blaming people for their misfortunes, claiming they “got themselves into too much debt”. Others reinforce the ideology of cruelty, mocking destitute pensioners.

But the huge turnout at the March 24 commemorations [of the 1976 military coup] put those stories to rest. Official denialism [of the military junta's crimes] has as little resonance as attempts to revive theories of “the two demons” [morally equating the military junta’s state violence with leftist political subversion] or dictatorship “excesses”. Milei had to shelve plans to pardon the genocide perpetrators, amid widespread demands for “Memory, Truth and Justice”. These causes are a source of pride for a society that views the trials of the junta leaders as a victory embedded in the country’s DNA.

This same pattern was repeated with the mass march for education. Milei was left isolated after provocatively calling for further cuts to the lowest education budget in 35 years. He has failed to comply four times with the law requiring him to transfer owed funds to universities, attacking institutions that embody the ideal of upward mobility in the popular imagination. Attempting to destroy the symbol of qualification, knowledge and culture that public education embodies, he is losing his audience at breakneck speed.

He is not losing the support of everyone though, because the ruling class still backs him…

That is true, but the establishment is waiting for his term to finish in a respectable manner before continuing with “Mileism” without Milei. They are already sounding out potential replacements, such as the chameleon-like [right-wing Peronist1 MP Miguel Ángel] Pichetto, the reborn [former new right president Mauricio] Macri, the enigmatic [talk show host and pastor Dante] Gebel or the ever-changing [right-wing senator Patricia] Bullrich. Some are even considering a de facto replacement, should the president fall before then. In that scenario, they would keep the government afloat with the support of state governors and the Peronist right.

But Milei is uncontrollable and refuses to give up. He seeks to survive with Trump’s blessing. He has spent more time in the United States than in any Argentine town. New concessions to his patron include contentious laboratory patents and help with business disputes with China in several provinces. Milei has assembled a group of like-minded capitalists, who are vying with [multinational conglomerate Techint CEO Paolo] Rocca, [media mogul and Clarín group CEO Héctor] Magnetto and other local capitalists to reap the benefits of privatisations. They are also competing for control over the judiciary, where disputes between them are settled.

But, as always happens in Argentina, the streets will have the final say on the political course…

Exactly. The March 24 demonstrations exceeded all expectations. An estimated more than 1 million people attended, including a broad mix of generations, refuting claims that young people are shifting right. The education marches reaffirmed this resurgence. Trade union protests in various provinces show that the negative situation created by the recently approved labour reform has been reversed, after several months of retreating from street actions. These are significant mobilisations, but they lack the scale and militancy needed to defeat Milei. There is not yet the prospect of a repeat of the 2001 rebellion [that toppled several presidents] or the 2017 electoral victory against Macri.

Another significant shift is the sudden rise of Myriam Bregman…

Yes. Her rise in the polls is significant, as she has a very high net positive image, which is boosting her voting intentions. Many analysts say Myriam’s appeal has expanded beyond the traditional left-wing or progressive electorate. They believe that the angry anti-establishment voters that supported Milei might soon channel their discontent via the left. The atmosphere, to a certain extent, resembles that around [left-wing MP Luis] Zamora in the years before and after 2001. There are plenty of reasons to launch a major campaign in support of Myriam’s presidential candidacy. All the left agrees we need to shore up this prominence in the coming months.

There have been debates, expressed through various open letters and documents, on the strategic significance of this campaign. What is your view?

There is discussion on the need for Bregman to shift her discourse to show a genuine intent to become president. Such a positive tone requires an affirmative message, highlighting how the left can govern. This approach distinguishes between government and power, and calls on the people to take hold of both. The challenge lies in working out a strategy to achieve this objective.

Some participants in the debate have taken a negative view. They believe the Workers’ Left Front – Unity (FIT-U) should not seek to govern, as it has no viable policy to achieve that goal. Such pessimism simply repeats the right’s tired arguments against the left and fails to recognise potential shifts in the battle for power.

Is this pessimism being reconsidered?

We will have to see. The traditional Trotskyist view sees the struggle for government and power as two simultaneous processes, occurring in close succession. This is the 1917 Bolshevik model: revolution, soviets, the storming of the Winter Palace and the immediate launch of a socialist process. Calls to deepen the struggle, with hopes that popular power will emerge from below, are premised on repeating this.

Some documents reformulate this possibility, presenting Myriam’s candidacy as a link in the chain. They propose a positive campaign, presenting her winning the presidency as closely tied to a revolutionary upsurge. This is the reason for proposing “Committees to fight for a workers’ government, with Bregman as president”.

The obvious objection is this view is unrealistic. There are no signs, as yet, this could occur. But this sensible criticism can lead to the wrong conclusion of abandoning any effective campaign for the presidency. Some documents reject running such a campaign, instead arguing that the focus should be simply on recruitment while reaffirming the idea that elections are merely a platform to spread socialist ideas.

More moderate versions of this position argue that now is not the time to win government, because the social support needed to implement a revolutionary program does not exist in the current climate. They say the left should instead prioritise the immediate building of a party to address this weakness. I disagree with these positions, which I think help perpetuate the left’s political marginalisation.

What is your position?

Basically, fight to win the elections and form government as a means to initiate a struggle for power. A victory at the ballot box that is grounded in popular mobilisation and grassroots organisations would allow us to start the struggle to seize economic, judicial, military and media power. This is a clear, forceful strategy and, above all, one understood by the majority of the population. It avoids abstract debates about whether the conditions exist to advance the socialist project, because it situates that objective within an unpredictable course of events.

We do not know whether conditions for the classic revolutionary model to unfold will materialise. It is just as misguided to dismiss that possibility as it is to stake everything on it. Reaching government and contesting power views that path as a stage in the socialist project. The left may soon be in a position where it can and must govern with a strategy for power. But the most realistic approach is to assess contexts, taking into account the recent history of our country and region.

Which is?

In Argentina, the 2001 uprising. This was a revolt involving assemblies, picket lines and widespread grassroots organisations. This in turn led to an electoral process and the subsequent Kirchnerist cycle [of centre-left administrations headed by Nestor Kirchner (2003-07) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-15)]. It seems to me the left had no strategy then to intervene in elections. We should not repeat that mistake.

In contrast, Evo Morales became president in Bolivia and [Hugo] Chávez was elected in Venezuela. Their paths were similar to Salvador Allende in Chile. This path was greatly debated throughout the 20th century in terms of assessing the concrete meaning of a workers’ government. In my view, this path aligns, converges or complements — but is in no way counterposed to — the revolutionary dynamics in Russia, China, Vietnam or Cuba.

But the obvious objection would be that those attempts failed to combine the electoral path with revolutionary development…

That is not a valid objection, in my opinion. With that abstract yardstick, every left political process failed. All of them faced limits, setbacks and frustrations at some point. Was Leon Trotsky’s path a success? It seems to me there is a bad habit in polemics to attack an opponent’s failures, without considering one’s own shortcomings. It is not enough to say, for example, that Peronism has failed, without providing an example, national or international, that one considers successful.

If Myriam can consolidate her prominence on the political stage, these shortcomings will be overcome, especially if the left sets more ambitious goals in line with the position it could potentially occupy. This is not just a question of electing more MPs, but winning elections at the district, municipality or provincial level in 2027, and from there launching a campaign to win government at the national level and contest for power. Achieving these goals requires alliances and coalitions that go beyond just the left.

If the FIT-U significantly expanded its electoral base, it would have to clarify its positions on a potential run-off between a progressive centre-left and right-wing presidential candidate. This is not an immediate issue, as Myriam’s positive presidential campaign supposes that she will make it into that second round. But it is essential to develop a position for what typically happens in second round run-offs in Latin America. In that scenario, we cannot hesitate in calling for a vote against the right. Refining strategies is unavoidable in a regional context marked by dramatic events.

Are you referring to the threat of an imperialist attack on Cuba?

Yes. Trump has already stated his intention to take the island and do with it as he pleases. His naval fleet has surrounded Cuba and the US has fabricated a charge against Raúl Castro to pave the way for kidnappings, targeted assassinations or even an invasion. The tycoon needs to make up for his defeat in Iran. This means he could intensify the embargo and oil blockade through military action. The island is preparing for resistance. We must step up our solidarity initiatives here.

Marches are planned, supplies are being sent, and solidarity gestures are multiplying. But the FIT–U should demonstrate a more explicit and visible commitment by, for example, having Bregman visit Cuba, just like [Peronist left-wing leader Juan] Grabois did. This would have a major impact and constitute an important gesture regionally, following Nicolás Maduro's kidnapping.

What is your view on the situation in Venezuela?

To call it “worrying” would be an understatement. We all know that the government has a gun to its head after Maduro’s abduction. We assumed that [Acting President] Delcy [Rodríguez] was buying time, gathering strength and preparing to launch a counter-offensive. We interpreted the concessions to Trump as the heavy and unavoidable cost of such a strategy.

But several months on, the evidence is rapidly mounting that a different path has been taken. This includes a suspicious reorganising of the military command, the foreign ministry’s whitewashed statements on the war against Iran, the release of right-wing conspirators from prison, and the much-celebrated meetings with the empire’s emissaries.

While the head of the [US military] Southern Command talks with Delcy, there is total silence about the humiliating image Trump posted of Venezuela as the “51st state”. The final straw was the mock evacuation of the US Embassy, with Pentagon aircraft flying in the skies over Caracas. It is forgotten that the guest carrying out these operations holds Venezuela’s president hostage.

Furthermore, laws have been passed benefiting US companies in terms of appropriating oil profits. Oil profits are funnelled on a large-scale to the US Treasury, while the IMF resumes inspections.

Criticisms of all this mainly come from within Chavismo’s heart. Luis Britto García has called for transparency over Maduro’s abduction and demands explanations for the government’s appeasement of Trump. Former Vice-President Elías Jaua has insisted Venezuela is under occupation, with Washington planning a protectorate. Lastly, the handover of financier Alex Saab to US courts is completely unjustified. He kept foreign trade circuits open amid the empire’s sanctions. If he committed a crime, he should be tried in Caracas, not held in a prison cell near Maduro.

There are too many signs of a regressive shift to ignore. This should be discussed openly. Continuing to discuss whether there was a betrayal leads us nowhere. What matters is how we characterise this in political terms. Perhaps we could look at what happened after Sandinismo’s first electoral defeat as a precedent for Venezuela today.

Fortunately, we have encouraging developments in Bolivia…

Yes. The popular uprising is truly remarkable. Six months into the right-wing government’s term, there is a huge uprising against austerity, which again demonstrates the strong tradition of militancy in the Altiplano [Bolivia’s western highlands].

This rebellion has laid siege to La Paz, through radical methods of struggle such as roadblocks and mass demonstrations. Protesters demand the president resign for failing to fulfil his mandate and are acting with the force needed to bring the oppressors to their knees. The confrontation is ongoing; the government is using the military to crack down on the streets, issuing arrest warrants for leaders and deploying equipment supplied by Milei.

Remember that in recent decades, Bolivia has paved the way for regional cycles of struggle. At the turn of the century, Bolivia kicked off the wave of rebellions that then swept through Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina. A few years ago it spearheaded a second wave, which then saw rebellions in Ecuador, Chile, Colombia and Peru.

Today, Bolivians are once again taking the lead, against a backdrop of important resistance in Chile, just a few months before [far-right incoming president José Antonio] Kast takes office. The rebellion in Bolivia transcends borders, challenges Trump’s agenda and strikes a blow against his far-right henchmen. It is charting a path that the Argentine left has already adopted as its own.

• 1

  Peronism has been the dominant political force in Argentine politics since the rise to power of President Juan Domingo Perón in 1946. Currently in opposition, it has also been the main ruling party since the end of the military dictatorship in 1983. As a broad political movement, it encompasses a wide spectrum of politicians (from right-wing to centre-left and progressive), including the previous centre-left administrations of Nestor Kirchner (2003-07) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-15).

The anti-capitalist left surge in Argentina and the letter that sparked a crucial debate

Tuesday 9 June 2026, by Eduardo Lucita, Israel Dutra

Against the backdrop of a Javier Milei government in crisis and Peronism’s [1] decline, polls are showing a surge in support for Myriam Bregman, a Workers’ Left Front – Unity (FIT-U) MP. With between 9–14% support and a strong social media presence, the FIT-U is emerging as an alternative for millions. However, historic difficulties that have plagued Argentina’s radical left have also re-emerged. Despite its combativeness, the radical left remains fragmented and, in some cases, very sectarian.

Israel Dutra interviewed veteran Argentine revolutionary Eduardo Lucita about Argentina’s emerging political landscape. Lucita is a Fourth International member and co-coordinator of Argentina’s Left-Wing Economists (EDI) collective. Lucita, along with other comrades, initiated a debate with an open letter addressed to the parties in the FIT-U, “The Left Faces a Major Challenge”. The letter has been circulating in Argentina for over a month and was recently followed by a second letter, also signed by well-known left-wing activists. [2]

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As we believe it is important to raise awareness internationally about what is happening in Argentina, we interviewed Lucita, a signatory to both letters, on May 27. He discussed this process, provided an overview of the international situation and argued the case for building on the successful anti-fascist conference recently held in Porto Alegre in Brazil.

Your open letter addressed to the parties in the FIT-U has had a big impact within left-wing circles and beyond. Its impacts have even been felt here in Brazil. Could you give us an overview of the letter’s purpose and why it was published now?

I will focus on the letters’main points. To start, there is a broader context to bear in mind: the deepening social crisis and young people’s sense of a lack of future; the president’s declining popularity and strong rejection of his government’s actions; the serious difficulties Peronism has resolving its internal crisis; and the rise of the anti-capitalist left, embodied in the figure of Myriam Bregman. This general context seemed to us a turning point in the political situation, as well as both an opportunity and a challenge for the left.

So, the first objective was initiating a debate about this juncture, which I view as exceptional. Judging by the comments, criticisms and suggestions we have received, and that the Socialist Workers’ Party (PTS), Workers’ Socialist Movement (MST) and Socialist Left (IS) [all parties within the FIT-U] published the first letter on their websites, I think this first objective was achieved.

Beyond the analyses and characterisations, the letter also puts forward concrete proposals, such as creating “Committees of Struggle and Support for Myriam Bregman,” and establishing technical working groups to develop the left’s program with greater precision. We believe this would help consolidate its rise.

As for why now, the idea flowing through the text is that, for the first time in more than 40 years, the chance exists to mobilise sections of the masses to support a workers’ government and, within a broader perspective, raise the idea of contesting for real power. As we say, the committees could play an important role in this. It strikes me as an unprecedented situation that we must capitalise on.

Polls show surging support for Bregman, in terms of her image, approval and voting intentions. Did this surprise you?

Well, Bregman’s profile has been rising for several years. She is a left-wing activist with a long track record around human rights, and supporting trade union and social struggles. She is also a very powerful voice in the National Congress.

But I would be lying if I said that the surge in support for her over the past two months did not take me by surprise. She is the only political figure in the country with a positive approval rating and has an average voting intention of 10%. I am pleasantly surprised by all this.

What do you think explains this explosive rise in the polls? Is it her personal qualities, the policies she proposes, or rather the political and social situation being ripe for a figure as disruptive as Milei was in his day?

It is a combination of several factors. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the socio-economic situation carries significant weight. This is reflected in Milei’s falling approval ratings — now at their lowest point since he came to office [in 2023]— and, above all, by the 60% disapproval of his government’s performance.

The shift to the right within Peronism is also important. The party’s leaders have drifted a fair way from its historic base, which is fragmented, leaderless and disoriented. In a recent conversation with colleagues from some outer Buenos Aires suburbs, they said they had observed a shift in voting intentions within Peronism away from traditional figures towards Juan Grabois [who leads a progressive wing of Peronism closely linked to sectors of the Catholic Church], but now, for reasons unknown, Grabois’s rise had stalled and people were looking to vote for Bregman. I do not know if that is exactly the case, but such anecdotes are worth bearing in mind.

I believe her role as an uncompromising opposition figure who has never made deals with any government (just like the other FIT-U MPs) has been decisive. Her personality and charisma also carry weight. She is pleasant to deal with, always smiling, cultured and intelligent. She is also not afraid to speak out in parliamentary debates, to put her body on the line on the streets and to speak with the media, becoming the most sought-after figure these days.

I would also add that she has been a member of a Trotskyist party [the PTS] for 20 long years. You, as a full-time party activist, and I know full well the demands such parties entail. Bregman’s personality stems from her DNA, but I also believe it comes from being shaped and raised within that party.

The first open letter disagreed with statements by Bregman and Christian Castillo [another PTS leader and FIT-U MP] that the conditions do not exist for a left-wing government, nor for contesting power, as there is no powerful social movement or organs of dual power.

In my opinion, those statements were rather unfortunate. It is not that they are entirely wrong, but they failed to account for the context and came across as defensive, whereas we believe — and the letter makes this clear — that the conditions exist for a more active stance, putting forward proposals and seeking to overcome resistance.

Fortunately, our comrades have not repeated those statements. I think there was a process of reflection, and Bregman recently said in an interview: “Of course we want to be in government, of course we want to have the power to transform this situation at its roots.”

You also controversially characterised the current moment, saying that “an electoral breakthrough is more likely than an insurrectionary one”, before proposing “Committees of Struggle and Support for Myriam Bregman”. Is this not a sign of electoralism? How does this fit with the PTS’s proposal for a new workers’ party? And is the open letter not overly optimistic?

Well, in the face of so much resignation and despair that others want to impose on us, we have opted for the optimism of the will. But not in the abstract; rather, an optimism based on the shifting situation.

As for a workers’ party, I cannot answer definitively, as I am not clear what they are proposing. Speaking at the Ferro stadium on May 1, Bregman referred to a workers’ party, then to an instrument of the workers, then a party of the new working class, and finally a new historic movement. I suppose this proposal will be more defined in time and be discussed within the FIT-U, whose coordinating committee I understand is due to meet in the coming days.

As for electoralism, no one doubts that capital, led by Milei, is waging an offensive against working people’s living conditions, environmental protections and women’s rights, the LGBTQ+ community and various minorities in the country involved in multiple resistance movements.

But a common feature of these struggles — which all indications suggest will intensify — is that they are dispersed, fragmented and often influenced by identity politics, which hinders attempts to unify and centralise them. To make matters worse, leaders such as those of the CGT [General Confederation of Labour] favour negotiation over confrontation, or simply look the other way.

No one believes a social uprising is imminent, although the class struggle is obviously unpredictable. Otherwise, we would have all predicted the 2001 uprising [against neoliberal policies that forced the resignation of several presidents]. As I am older, I remember the 1959 conflict at the Lisandro de La Torre meat-processing plant, which culminated in a general strike organised via word of mouth. But it is a fact that the polls show electoral progress is far more likely to occur today than an uprising.

In the second letter, “Some reflections on the tasks ahead”, you place great emphasis on the committees, presented under the slogan “For a workers’ government: Myriam Bregman for president”.

Yes. The proposal for committees — which, it must be acknowledged, Bregman took up in her May 1 speech when she spoke of “organising support” — seeks not only to unite activists from parties in the FIT-U or other organisations and movements, but also intellectuals, artists and, above all, those leading the currently scattered and fragmented struggles. It aims to call for the broadest possible unity so that we can discuss together a minimum program to address the emergency we face and opens possibilities for profound transformations.

In recent days, the PTS launched its public call of “We need you.” We support this as a step forward, which invites people to organise around the idea of a workers’ government. It also raises the idea of a workers’ party and/or a new historic movement, but as I said, this requires more in-depth discussions.

Logically, these committees, convened by and rallying behind Bregman, should also be involved in election campaigning. The reality is that we will most likely enter a lull period now, due to the World Cup. But elections will be happen soon after it finishes. And they will be important, not only because many think things cannot go on as they are, but because within the ruling classes there is a sector already doubting that Milei will be re-elected, or if it is even in their interests if he is. So, there is no shortage of people wanting to drop him to save their project, and are already looking for a replacement.

So, for me, this is not electoralism. It is about seizing an unprecedented opportunity. But looking at the two open letters, you will see that they insist on not abandoning the struggles or the streets. The electoral arena is just another battlefield. As they used to say in the past, we must not ignore the battles on the terrain that the rulers dominate.

You also talk about shifting from defence to offence. I find this interesting, and not just for the Argentine left. Can you explain what this might look like?

It is clear that Bregman’s support and the shift in public sentiment that I have described — and it is not just me talking about this — will not automatically translate into organised support or votes. Achieving this political objective requires a sort of cultural shift on the left, here and around the world. It involves leaving behind a simply self-serving or self-referential politics and prioritising the general interests of the workers’ and popular movement. That is to say, less vanguardism and more mass politics to reach broad sectors hit hard by the crisis, including those who do not identify with anti-capitalism or socialism.

In our case, we need to reach out to the many groups and sectors within Peronism that are now directionless — without a project, program,or clear leadership — and who have repeatedly expressed their intention to vote for Bregman, to ask them to join the committees.

This leads us to the need for left unity, not simply because together we are more, but because it allows us to jointly think and act. This unity cannot simply be declared, it has to put aside fruitless arguments and create independent, democratic and autonomous committees as a common space for uniting the activist energy currently dispersed across multiple, often ineffective, spaces.

Making progress on this front requires a change in attitude among the members of the various parties in the FIT-U. If we manage this, we can leave behind the defensive position we have been stuck in for a long time, and go on the offensive. This would allow us to go beyond just resisting to envisioning ways to transform this intolerable reality, deal with the problem of power and forge the alliances needed to make this possible.

We have an unprecedented window of opportunity that also poses a major challenge for the left. This opportunity is not open-ended. We know politics abhors a vacuum. If the left does not occupy that space, others will. There is no time to lose.

I also have the international situation in mind. In that sense, how do you see what is happening in Argentina, but also in Bolivia, fitting into a world marked by geopolitical tensions, the rise of the right, and a figure like Donald Trump?

Well, Argentina is, to some extent, an exceptional case. We have a president who defines himself as an anarcho-capitalist and is at the ideological vanguard of the right’s global rise. As if that was not enough, he has also subordinated the country’s foreign policy to Trump’s US and Netanyahu’s Israel.

On the other hand, we have an anti-capitalist left, I believe, unlike any other in the world at the moment. It is spearheaded by an electoral alliance (the FIT-U) of four Trotskyist parties, which has existed for 15 years now, something equally unprecedented.

Bolivia is undergoing a severe political crisis fuelled by a workers’, indigenous and peasant uprising that has blocked the country’s main roads and cities. They demand the Rodrigo Paz government, elected just over six months ago, resign. If this happens — and we should not rule out that something similar could happen in my country, given the critical social situation — it would have a tremendous impact internationally.

Even defeating Milei in the 2027 presidential elections would be significant. It would concretely demonstrate that, whether through insurrection or the ballot box, the far right can be defeated. And if the anti-capitalist left plays a decisive role in these movements, it would serve as an example for the left internationally.

As for Trump, it is clear that he heads a decaying empire seeking to take refuge in the “Western bloc” and that, as it declines, has become more aggressive and predatory. This was demonstrated by the military invasion of Venezuela and kidnapping of its president, the threats and strangulation of Cuba, and his remarks about annexing Canada and Greenland.

Trump allowed Israel to drag him into the Middle East war, while letting Israel run rampant in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. Trump became involved in the war without a clear entry or exit strategy. It is now clear that he will emerge weakened from this self-inflicted chaos. This could have consequences for the US November mid-term elections.

The flip side is the rise of China, now the main reference point on the global chessboard, as a Spanish political scientist put it. In just under a week, China’s president Xi Jinping received Trump and Vladimir Putin on state visits to Beijing and signed various trade and political agreements with both, granting neither anything of significance. He forced Trump to back down on arms sales to Taiwan and made clear to Putin that China is more important to Russia than Russia is to China.

We face a changing world order, and everything indicates that we are heading towards a division of spheres of influence. This may stabilise the situation for a while, but tensions will return, especially considering that global capitalism’s unresolved crisis underlies all this.

Finally, here in Porto Alegre, we held the 1st Anti-Fascist Conference for the Sovereignty of Peoples in March, with a significant delegation from Argentina. What were your thoughts on this event and how do you see it developing in the future?

I do not know if you are aware, but I collaborated with Eric Toussaint in organising the conference. I no longer travel, but from the reports I received and comments from various comrades, the conference was a success in terms of participation and the diversity of topics debated in the various panels and self-organised activities.

There is no doubt that this success stemmed from focusing on the common objective of an international convergence to confront far-right forces across the world, an objective shared by various parties and social movements in Brazil and internationally by organisations such as CADTM [Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt], the Fourth International, Jubilee South and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.

A large delegation from my country took part, comprising members of anti-capitalist organisations and centre-left and/or progressive movements, as well as some prominent intellectuals.

I believe the conference must be followed up. This was also the view of the International Committee, which decided to organise two events, one in Mexico and another in Argentina. We will see when these can take place. The decision has been made and it is our duty to carry them out.

2 June 2026

Source: A version of this interview was first published in Spanish at Revista Movimento. Translation by Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Attached documents

• the-anti-capitalist-left-surge-in-argentina-and-the-letter_a9594-2.pdf (PDF - 977.6 KiB)
  Extraction PDF [->article9594]

Footnotes

[1] Peronism has been the dominant political force in Argentine politics since the rise to power of President Juan Domingo Perón in 1946. Currently in opposition, it has also been the main ruling party since the end of the military dictatorship in 1983. As a broad political movement, it encompasses a wide spectrum of politicians (from right-wing to centre-left and progressive), including the previous centre-left administrations of Nestor Kirchner (2003-07) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-15).

[2] Among the signatories of these open letters are also Ariel Petruccelli, a renown intellectual; Juan Pablo Casiello, a well-known teachers’ union leader from Rosario, and Aldo Casas, a lifelong revolutionary socialist.

Argentina

• Notes on the Political Situation in South America
• From Michigan to Argentina: Nurses’ Struggles and International Solidarity
• Will Trump’s bail-out be enough for Milei?
• China and the IMF, supported by BRICS+, provided a lifeline to Javier Milei’s far-right government in Argentina
• Mobilisations in Argentina: Brief considerations on the current political turmoil

• Eduardo Lucita

  Eduardo Lucita is a Director of the Marxist review Cuadernos del Sur, and member of the Argentinian group Economists of the Left (EDI) and of the Fourth International. He has been active on the revolutionary left since the 1960s.

• Israel Dutra

  Israel Dutra is a sociologist. He is secretary of international relations of the National Directorate of the PSOL and an activist of the Movement of the Socialist Left (MES, member of the Fourth International in Brazil).