Citizens and Government Actions in Economics, Trade, and Financial

by Jan Oberg / February 13th, 2026

Read Part 1 and 2.

A. Trade Measures & Market Signaling

Economic pressure can be applied instantly and scaled without violence.

Immediate Measures (within a week)

Government boycott US goods and services
A very powerful signal which over time will be felt.

Targeted tariffs on selected U.S. goods
Symbolic but high-visibility sectors send a clear message.

Suspend trade facilitation talks
A peaceful pause that signals deep concern.

Freeze U.S. participation in public procurement – military procurement in particular
A nonviolent way to reduce influence.

Competition law review of U.S. corporations
A legal tool to scrutinise market dominance.

Longer-Term Measures

EU–Asia–Africa trade corridors
Reducing reliance on U.S. markets.

European supply chains for critical minerals
Strategic autonomy in resource access.

European Strategic Trade Authority
Monitoring coercive practices globally.

Euro-denominated commodity markets
Weakening the dollar’s pricing monopoly.

The EU must resume contacts and negotiations with Russia, focusing on energy cooperation
To stop the US economic warfare on Europe, not least since the destruction of Nord Stream.

Stop accepting the US secondary sanctions
Trade with countries that are in your interest. Accepting US control of whom you deal with is a loss of sovereignty.

Join the Belt & Road Initiative, BRI
No less than 140+ countries participate, just not the West as a bloc.

B. Financial Countermeasures & De-Dollarisation

The most powerful nonviolent tools are financial; diversification is the long-term path to stability.

Immediate Measures (within a week)

Freeze new purchases of U.S. Treasuries
A peaceful and powerful signal.

Review dollar exposure in reserves
Central banks announce diversification.

Task force on alternative payment systems
A first step toward non-SWIFT infrastructure and an opportunity to work with those who are already developing it.

Suspend new U.S. listings on European exchanges
A symbolic but impactful pause.

Longer-Term Measures

Non-SWIFT payment systems
Euro-SWIFT, CIPS interoperability, regional clearing houses, seek cooperation directly with China too.

CBDC settlement networks
Digital currencies enabling non-U.S. cross-border payments.

Nonaligned Payments Corridor
A global alternative to U.S. financial dominance.

Global bond benchmark independent of U.S. Treasuries
A structural shift in global finance.

C. Corporate, Institutional & Citizen-Driven Actions

Citizens hold enormous nonviolent power; when millions change their consumption patterns, markets shift.

Immediate Measures (within a week)

Global boycott of U.S. products and services
A voluntary, moral, nonviolent act of resistance.

Consumer campaigns (“Don’t Buy From the Bully”)
Guides and challenges encouraging non-U.S. alternatives.

Pension fund reviews of U.S. political risk
Savings should not finance destabilising behaviour.

Shareholder activism
Resolutions demanding diversification away from U.S. markets.

NGO scorecards
Ranking banks and corporations by U.S. entanglement.

Avoid investment or company establishment in the US
Instead, turn to the rest of the world.

Longer-Term Measures

Ethical consumption networks
Sustained alternatives to U.S. brands.

Long-term divestment campaigns
Reducing exposure to U.S. equities.

Consumer Sovereignty Index
Tracking corporate dependence on U.S. markets.

Financial literacy movements
Teaching how everyday purchases reinforce global power structures.

Part 3 Summary

Economic and financial measures can be deployed within hours and scaled over years. Immediate actions send shockwaves; long-term strategies build a resilient, multipolar financial order where no single state dominates global trade or value creation. And this is an area where citizens and government have similar interests and can act in unison.

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Jan Oberg is a peace researcher, art photographer, and Director of The Transnational (TFF) where this article first appeared. Reach him at: oberg@transnational.org. Read other articles by Jan.

Russia Raises Pipeline Gas Supply to Europe via TurkStream

By Tsvetana Paraskova - Feb 02, 2026

Russia’s natural gas exports via the TurkStream pipeline to Europe jumped by 10.3% in January from a year earlier, Reuters calculations showed on Monday, as Gazprom boosted supply via the only gas route left from Russia to the EU.

Last month, Russian gas supply via TurkStream totaled 1.73 billion cubic meters (bcm), up from 1.57 bcm in January 2025, according to the calculations made by Reuters.

On January 1, 2025, Russian pipeline gas supply to Europe crumbled again, after Ukraine refused to extend the pipeline transit deal with Russia.

Russian gas supply via pipelines to Europe has slumped since 2022, after Russia cut off many EU customers from its gas deliveries, and Nord Stream stopped supplying gas to Germany, after Russia reduced flows and after a sabotage in September 2022.

Russian pipeline gas supply via Ukraine stopped on January 1, 2025, after Ukraine refused to negotiate an extension to the transit deal.

That left only TurkStream as the conduit of Russian natural gas via pipeline to Europe.

Some European countries, including Hungary and Slovakia, continue to receive Russian gas through the TurkStream pipeline via Turkey and the Balkans.

Supplies via TurkStream have increased over the past year. 

Daily flows in January 2026 averaged 55.8 million cubic meters (mcm), up from 50.6 mcm in January 2025, per the Reuters calculations based on data from European gas transmission group Entsog. December 2025 flows averaged 56 mcm per day, so the past two months have seen consistent flows via TurkStream.

Despite higher gas flows on TurkStream, Russia’s gas sales to Europe last year plunged to a 50-year low, after crashing by 44% from 2024 in the absence of transit via Ukraine.

Moreover, the 27 EU member states last month formally adopted the regulation on phasing out Russian imports of both pipeline gas and LNG into the EU. A full ban will take effect for LNG imports from the beginning of 2027 and for pipeline gas imports from the autumn of 2027.

By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com

Berlin’s Wake-Up Call: When ‘America First’ Means Europe Last

Hosein Pabarja

December 22, 2025

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Image by Getty and Unsplash+.

The era of polite transatlantic nodding is over. Chancellor Merz is signaling that if the U.S. wants to go it alone, Germany will stop waiting by the phone.

Germany’s frustration with the United States is no longer confined to closed‑door briefings or diplomatic understatement. It is now spilling into public view — and striking at the core assumptions of the transatlantic alliance.

The trigger was Washington’s newly released U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), a document that reads less like a partnership agreement and more like an indictment. It criticizes Europe for democratic backsliding, uncontrolled migration and over‑reliance on American military protection, while demanding that Europeans carry a far greater share of the defense burden. In Berlin, the document landed not as strategy, but as provocation.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz made that clear in remarks that went well beyond routine alliance fatigue. Parts of the NSS, he said, were simply “unacceptable to us from a European perspective.” He rejected the notion that the United States should act as Europe’s democratic overseer, adding: “I see no need for the Americans to now want to save democracy in Europe. If it would need to be saved, we would manage on our own.”

Behind the rhetoric is a deeper reckoning: Germany is starting to question how much strategic dependence on the United States it can afford — economically, financially and militarily.

The Burden-Shift: From Ally to Liability

For decades, Germany accepted asymmetric relations with Washington as the price of security. U.S. power underwrote Europe’s defense, global trade routes and financial architecture. In return, Germany kept military spending low and focused on export‑led growth.

That bargain now looks increasingly one‑sided.

The NSS explicitly frames Europe as a liability: insufficiently armed, politically fragile, and unwilling to pay for its own defense. German officials privately describe the shift as moving from “burden‑sharing” to “burden‑shifting” — transferring responsibility without ceding control.

Merz articulated this concern bluntly, warning against an alliance that drifts toward unilateralism: “‘America first’ is fine, but ‘America alone’ cannot be in your interest. You need partners in the world, and one of those partners can be Europe. And if you cannot make use of Europe, then at least make Germany your partner.”

King Dollar’s Stranglehold

Germany’s vulnerability does not begin with tanks or troops. It starts with currency.

The U.S. dollar remains the backbone of the global financial system. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) COFER data, the dollar accounted for roughly 56–58 percent of global foreign‑exchange reserves in late 2024, compared with about 20 percent for the euro. While the dollar’s share has gradually declined, its political utility has not.

Access to dollar clearing — and the threat of losing it — gives Washington leverage that no ally can easily resist. German economists increasingly describe this system as a form of structural pressure: sanctions applied extraterritorially, enforced through U.S. jurisdictional reach rather than multilateral agreement.

For Berlin, this is not theory. It is lived experience.

The Sanctions Straightjacket

Germany’s export‑driven economy is deeply exposed to U.S. markets. In 2024, German exports to the United States totaled roughly $170 billion, making the U.S. Germany’s single most important export destination — accounting for nearly 10 percent of total German exports.

That dependency sharply limits Berlin’s room for maneuver when U.S. policy collides with German economic interests.

The most cited example remains Iran. After Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, German firms — including Volkswagen, Siemens, and BASF — rapidly exited the Iranian market to avoid U.S. secondary sanctions. German‑Iranian trade collapsed from €3.4 billion in 2017 to roughly €1.5 billion by 2024.

European counter‑measures failed. The EU’s “blocking statute” offered legal cover, but not financial protection. Companies chose access to U.S. markets over European political symbolism — a decision Berlin officials quietly acknowledge was unavoidable.

The Billion-Dollar Handcuffs

The financial sector tells a similar story. Deutsche Bank alone has paid more than $20 billion in fines and settlements since 2008, largely to U.S. authorities.

These include a massive $7.2 billion settlement in 2017 over mortgage-backed securities, as well as a $186 million Federal Reserve fine in July 2023 related to sanctions violations and anti–money-laundering failures. German officials rarely dispute the technical merits of individual cases. What unsettles them is the asymmetry: U.S. regulators policing European institutions extraterritorially, often with limited reciprocal oversight from Frankfurt or Brussels.

The €100 Billion Paradox

If Germany hoped that throwing money at the military would ease tensions with Washington, the data suggest otherwise.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Germany spent approximately $88.5 billion on defense in 2024, solidifying its position as one of the world’s top military spenders. Defense outlays reached 1.9 percent of GDP, effectively meeting NATO’s 2‑percent benchmark for the first time — largely financed through the €100 billion special fund (Sondervermögen) adopted after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Germany also remains the second‑largest financial military aid donor to Ukraine, trailing only the United States.

Yet even this dramatic increase has not insulated Berlin from U.S. criticism. SIPRI data and German budget analyses warn that without further structural budget hikes, Germany’s current spending levels are not fiscally sustainable beyond 2026 once the special fund is exhausted. The political message from Washington remains unchanged: spend more, do more, rely less — but follow American strategic priorities.

Plan B: A Post-American Defense?

The contradiction sits at the heart of Germany’s dilemma. Washington urges Europe to become stronger, yet resists any European military or industrial autonomy that might dilute U.S. influence. Since Brexit, Germany has emerged as the EU’s central power. From Nord Stream 2 to China policy to defense procurement, U.S. pressure has repeatedly constrained Berlin’s choices. Many German officials now see this not as temporary friction, but as structural tension — intensified by America’s growing rivalry with China and declining tolerance for independent allies.

The result is not estrangement, but recalibration.

Germany is not preparing to leave the alliance. But it is preparing for a world in which American guarantees are conditional, transactional and increasingly political. In that world, dependency is no longer just a risk — it is a liability.

Hosein Pabarja, a graduate in European Studies from the University of Tehran.

WSJ Bombshell: Trump Chiefs Met With Putin Honcho On Peace Plan To Access Billions Frozen In Europe

Tommy Christopher
Sat, November 29, 2025 

Mediaite

Trump Chiefs Met With Putin Honcho On Peace Plan To Access Billions Frozen In EU

President Donald Trump’s top envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner met with Putin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev to hammer out a peace deal that would unlock hundreds of billions in funds frozen in Europe, according to a bombshell Wall Street Journal report.

Recently, Trump took flak over a 28-point peace plan that was rejected by many Republicans and others as a “Russian wish list.”

The president lashed out after the leaked plan was widely criticized, but Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s did confirm that “The peace proposal was authored by the U.S. It is offered as a strong framework for ongoing negotiations. It is based on input from the Russian side. But it is also based on previous and ongoing input from Ukraine.”

In remarks to reporters, Trump later distanced himself from the plan, saying “Well, that was just a map, all that was is a map. That was not a plan, it was a concept.”

But according to the Wall Street Journal’s five-member reporting team — Drew Hinshaw, Benoit Faucon, Rebecca Ballhaus, Thomas Grove, and Joe Parkinson — another plan was being worked out in Miami by Trump’s business cronies/officials:


At his waterfront estate, billionaire developer-turned-special envoy Steve Witkoff was hosting Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russia’s sovereign-wealth fund and Vladimir Putin’s handpicked negotiator, who had largely shaped the document they were revising on the screen. Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law, had arrived from his nearby home on an island known as the “Billionaire Bunker.”

Dmitriev was pushing a plan for U.S. companies to tap the roughly $300 billion of Russian central bank assets, frozen in Europe, for U.S.-Russian investment projects and a U.S.-led reconstruction of Ukraine. U.S. and Russian companies could join to exploit the vast mineral wealth in the Arctic. There were no limits to what two longtime adversaries could achieve, Dmitriev had argued for months: Their rival space industries, which raced one another during the Cold War, could even pursue a joint mission to Mars with Elon Musk’s SpaceX.

For the Kremlin, the Miami talks were the culmination of a strategy, hatched before Trump’s inauguration, to bypass the traditional U.S. national security apparatus and convince the administration to view Russia not as a military threat but as a land of bountiful opportunity, according to Western security officials. By dangling multibillion-dollar rare-earth and energy deals, Moscow could reshape the economic map of Europe—while driving a wedge between America and its traditional allies.

The report goes into great depth about the secret meetings and machinations that would result in windfalls for U.S. businesses in Russia and Ukraine. 

Read the full report here.

Trump’s $2 Trillion Plan to Cash in on Ukraine ‘Peace’; Leaks

Adam Downer
Sat, November 29, 2025 
DAILY BEAST

John McDonnell / Stringer, Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images

At the center of President Trump’s contentious plan to end the Russia-Ukraine war isn’t peace: it’s profit.

Trump envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are negotiating with Russian officials to ensure U.S. businesses—and Trump’s friends—are in position to make a killing once the war ends, according to an exhaustive Wall Street Journal report published Friday.

“Russia has so many vast resources, vast expanses of land,” Witkoff, who last week was busted coaching Russians on how to best suck up to the president, told The Wall Street Journal.

Steve Witkoff (left) has been a central figure in the Russia-Ukraine peace talks and has been busted pushing Russian interests in the negotiations. / Gavriil Grigorov / via REUTERS

Witkoff spoke to the paper about a future where Russia, the U.S., and Ukraine are all business partners.

“If we do all that, and everybody’s prospering and they’re all a part of it, and there’s upside for everybody, that’s going to naturally be a bulwark against future conflicts there. Because everybody’s thriving,” Witkoff said.

For Witkoff, Kushner, and the Russians, the goal is reportedly to revitalize Russia’s $2 trillion economy through joint Russia-U.S. ventures. At the center of the talks is $300 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets that Russia wants to give to U.S. businesses for investment projects and U.S.-led reconstruction of Ukraine.

Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, has been dangling lucrative Russia-U.S. ventures, such as exploiting Arctic mineral resources and teaming up with SpaceX on a joint mission to Mars.

Kirill Dmitriev has been proposing lucrative joint U.S.-Russia business ventures so that the U.S. will get kickback once the war ends. / Getty

Money from such projects would flow to Trump’s friends and megadonors. Gentry Beach, founder of investment firm America First Global , a college friend of Donald Trump Jr. and Donald Trump campaign donor, is in talks to acquire a stake in a Russian Arctic gas project if it is released from sanctions, according to The Journal.

Trump megadonor Stephen P. Lynch has been working with Trump Jr. to purchase the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which provides vital gas to Europe from Russia.

By coordinating with the U.S. on profitable business ventures, Russia believes it could become an economic powerhouse in Europe while driving a wedge between the United States and its traditional European allies.

Europe balked at President Trump’s 28-point peace plan—which Witkoff drafted based on a Russian plan— arguing it was overly generous to Russia. The deal had Ukraine concede territory and cut its military capacity, effectively neutering the nation’s sovereignty. The plan wasn’t popular in America either, as it received significant pushback from the GOP.

Europe responded with its own peace plan that amended Trump’s. The new plan makes territorial concessions a point of post-ceasefire talks and raises the cap on Ukraine’s military so the country can still defend itself effectively. Negotiations are ongoing.

The White House did not immediately respond to the Daily Beast’s request for comment.

Spokesperson Anna Kelly told the Wall Street Journal, “The Trump administration has gathered input from both the Ukrainians and Russians to formulate a peace deal that can stop the killing and bring this war to a close. As the President said, his national security team has made great progress over the past week, and the agreement will continue to be fine-tuned following conversations with officials from both sides.”

Trump's peace plan has been criticized for being overly friendly to the Russians.

 / Contributor / Getty Images

Though the Journal’s report details the many ways in which Americans and Russians could profit from an eventual peace deal, it’s unclear how Ukraine would benefit.

Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, former Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, said he was leaving the government after he was “frozen” out of peace talks. In October, President Trump refused Ukraine’s request for Tomahawk missiles that they felt could help Ukraine negotiate with Russia more effectively.

Witkoff suggested Ukraine instead ask Trump for a ten-year tariff exemption to “supercharge” its economy.