NORDSTREAM BOMBING

Opinion - A German court may have just shattered one of the Biden era’s biggest lies

Jonathan Turley,

FOX NEWS  opinion contributor

Sat, November 29, 2025






It is often said that “the first casualty when war comes is truth.” A criminal warrant just issued in Germany shows that war continues to claim its victims. However, this warrant could prove to be as great an indictment not just of the government of Volodymyr Zelensky, but also of former President Joe Biden.

This week, a German court issued an arrest warrant for Ukrainian Serhii Kuznietsov, which may finally confirm what was long suspected: that Ukraine was responsible for the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the waters near Denmark and Sweden.

The Biden administration may have been given prior warning. It was allegedly told years ago by a Ukrainian whistleblower that a six-person team of Ukrainian special forces was planning to rent a boat, dive to the sea floor and blow up the Nord Stream project. The operation was reportedly led by Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces.

Nevertheless, after the attack, the Biden administration and many in the media fueled speculation that Russia had destroyed its own pipeline, despite evidence and logic to the contrary. It was another convenient claim of a Russian false-flag operation that allowed the Biden administration to ignore the possibility that Ukraine had not only engaged in environmental crimes but had also knowingly lied to its allies.

For years, some of us have questioned the official account from the Biden administration about the available evidence of those responsible.

The suggestion of a Russian attack on a Russian pipeline never seemed logical. However, the administration was funneling billions in support for Ukraine, funding that has now exceeds an estimated $180 billion. Having Ukraine sabotage pipelines to our allies would hardly be opportune when many were questioning the costs to U.S. citizens.

The Biden administration was not alone in running interference for Ukraine, as Zelensky denied responsibility despite mounting evidence to the contrary. When another alleged Ukrainian saboteur was found in Poland, a Polish court blocked the extradition to Germany and ordered his release. The reason? The judge did base the decision on Ukrainian denials. Instead, he declared that the act had been committed in the name of a just war. (Poland remains the frontline against Russian aggression in Europe).

An Italian court did not engage in such rationalization. It ordered the extradition of Kuznietsov, believed to be a key figure in the conspiracy. The attack involved leasing a yacht in the German port of Rostock, using forged IDs and a screen of intermediaries. Kuznietsov insists that he was an army captain serving in Ukraine at the time.

If the investigators are correct, it was not just the Ukrainian government that was lying to us. Biden was also presumably informed by the intelligence agencies of this evidence. Yet Biden kept suggesting anyway that the Russians were covering up the truth. He told the public, “The Russians are pumping out disinformation and lies. We will work with our allies to get to the bottom [of) precisely what happened] Just don’t listen to what Putin’s saying. What he’s saying we know is not true.”

Ironically, even if we were told about this evidence, the public might still have supported the commitment to Ukraine. After all, Ukraine is the victim of a horrendous invasion that has involved repeated charges of war crimes against the Russian forces. However, the public has a legitimate expectation that a country that is receiving billions in support will not engage in environmental attacks on our allies. These pipelines were in the economic zone of two NATO countries.

As the Germans work to find the truth, the question is whether the American public will ever be given transparency on our own government’s complicity or knowledge. The public was asked to pump billions into a war while the administration allegedly covered up an attack by Ukraine on a Western pipeline — and then may have misled the public.

The public also has a right to know if the CIA was told in advance that this attack was coming and either gave tacit approval or said nothing to our allies.

While Johnson is often quoted on his 1929 line about truth in war, the line following was equally poignant: “this mode of propaganda whereby … people become war hungry in their patriotism and are lied into a desire to fight. We have seen it in the past; it will happen again in the future.”

It may have happened in the U.S., and truth was not the only casualty. The American people were treated as chumps who could not handle the truth.

Jonathan Turley is the Shapiro professor of public interest law at George Washington University and the author of the best-selling book “The Indispensable Right: Free Speech in an Age of Rage.”

The EU’s Ukraine Strategy: The Worst Foreign Policy Blunder In European History Since WWII?

By Thomas E. Henökl 

November 25, 2025

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Image by European Commission (Dati Bendo), Creative Commons 4.0

For more than three and a half years now, Ukraine – and with it the so-called ‘West’ – have been paralyzed by a dreadful, protracted war of attrition against Russia, and Europe is collectively heading into a hurtful military, political and economic defeat. This article reveals a series of pitfalls of European diplomacy allowing the EU to be held hostage by U.S. great power politics. 

In a rather shortsighted move, Europe (with the sole exception of Switzerland) has aligned on a strategic path, designed by the U.S. to serve American interests and has jeopardized, if not completely relinquished, any residue of autonomous reasoning and decision-making. Of course, by building and stocking up their own arsenals, EU member states will achieve some degree of tactical leverage. However, what remains is the strategic alignment with (what used to be) US policy. In some form of collective cognitive dissonance, Europe, again, has permitted letting itself be dragged into yet another unnecessary and devastating war, causing tremendous human suffering and security risks as well as global political and economic havoc. By blindly falling in line with the Biden-administration’s provocation of this conflict, Europeans yielded their independent actorness and any remaining diplomatic clout. In conclusion, this chapter will try and point towards a potential exit strategy for the present quagmire.

Also in academic debates, we are witnessing a revival of wartime narratives, characterized by antagonistic, mutually exclusive and even hostile discussion, leaving no middle ground, no room for compromise; and that much rather displays a partisan logic, zero-sum game, and entrenched antagonism. Therefore, an underlying problem exposed by this article is the lack of debate about the scope and direction of EU foreign policy. Re-arming or militarizing Europe has become central to EU policy, with alternatives being almost instantly discounted. Accepted points of debate within the EU focus only on the most effective ways to “ReArm EU” rather than the meaning and consequences of such a strategy.

Literature on policy-making in times of crisis, connected to decision-making in EU foreign policy and “presidentialization” as a concentration of power at the top of the hierarchical level, explains the foreign policy choices by EU-leaders. The perception of crisis creates momentum for centralization of decision-making at the top of government hierarchies (Dahlström et al., 2011; Furness et al., 2019; Sperling, J., and M. Webber, 2019). The prospect of war has the effect of focussing policy debates on a narrow range of issues perceived to be at the heart of the crisis. A perceived security threat would clearly represent such a crisis, which favours the centralization of decision-making at the political helm, endowing leaders with exceptional powers – a classical feature of politics in the time of war. Leaders, on the other hand, know about and consciously use such narratives of crisis and emergencies to bestow special powers on themselves. Hence, there is a two-way centralization bias resulting from and framing political phenomena as a crisis, or a so-called “unprovoked war of aggression”.

The EU’s very own Stalingrad?

According to prominent voices, although marginalized in the dominant IR-discourse, such as John J. Mearsheimer (2014, 2022), Stephen M. Walt (2022), Jeffrey Sachs (2022, 2025), Glenn Diesen (2022, 2024), Jacques Baud, Daniele Ganser or Johannes Varwick (2023), the course of events was foreseeable, and the West has to assume its share of responsibility for Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In this perspective, the present situation is the logical consequence of path-dependent behaviour, resulting in a perfect lock-in of the actors involved. Already 2008, when NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance at their summit in Bucharest, Putin made it crystal clear that Russia was never going to accept this expansion of the Western military bloc right at its doorstep (Mearsheimer 2022). This unambiguous warning by Russia was simply – and shamelessly – ignored, with the catastrophic consequences the Ukrainian and the Russian people have to bear and are paying the price for with their blood. The EU got dragged into this cataclysm by US imperialist self-interest, with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) becoming a fig-leave for transatlantic great-power ambitions. If not already sufficiently demonstrated in 2008 and 2011, today the ENP turns out to be a total and utter failure, leading to a series of distressed states and societies in the Southern neighbourhood producing terror and mass-migration and a devastating war in the Eastern neighbourhood, causing immense human suffering and a black hole for billions of Euros in military and monetary aid.

For the Biden administration and for the United Kingdom, Ukraine was merely a pawn in a much bigger geostrategic plot, along the tune of Lord Rothschild’s message to the UK government from 02 March 2012:

“The world order will not survive without Ukraine. We must bring Russia to its knees by any means necessary to send a clear and unambiguous signal to our enemies.”
“Ukraine is a necessary thing that we cannot afford to lose on the geopolitical chessboard. In essence, our current path of no hostilities means that our global project is dead.”
“I demand from you to send more forces against Russia and its satellites, step up the “information war” to correct public opinion and send weapons to our friends in Ukraine.”

Now that the US under President Donald Trump is oscillating between pulling out from and a somehow limited engagement in the war effort in Ukraine, the EU risks to stand alone with its support to Kiev. Trump, while struggling with US hawks, deep state and neocon war profiteers, wants to look like a “deal maker” while avoiding the impression of appearing as a weak leader, giving in to Vladimir Putin.

To explain why and how Europe (read: the EU and Norway) has got trapped in a proxy-war against Russia, one needs to adopt a realist’s perspective and soberly look at the historic context of the EU’s external policy and its relations with its wider neighbourhood over the last two decades. This lens will help understanding how dramatically the EU has changed as an actor in response to the Ukraine war. Without questioning the US premises and logics behind the war against Russia, Germany (echoed by the rest of the EU) announced “Zeitenwende”, and Europe went straight into fueling this catastrophic conflict – yielding parts of its sovereignty and acting contrary to its own best interest.

Siding with the US and UK doctrine of dealing a decisive blow to Russia can hardly be qualified “strategic autonomy”. What the EU has achieved is a subaltern autonomy, as main funder (and thereby fueller) of the war. It can now send more weapons from US manufacturers to Ukraine. What “Zeitenwende” actually meant for Europe, was some sort of silent merger between EU and NATO and acting against its own political and economic interest. The UK had been on board from the beginning, but one may merely second-guess, why Germany was so wilfully promoting war; possibly, because Germany has no room for independent foreign policy-making, at least not where it matters.

Since then, life in Europe itself is no longer as self-evident as it seemed decades ago. European values and way of life, and especially democracy as a political system, with its checks and balances, have come under attack. Shamefully, the better part of this attack on European values comes from within and from the top of the political leadership. Prosperity and a decent standard of living is becoming a fairy from the past for more and more EU citizens. In part this may be due to a decade of austerity, but this loss in standard of living has been drastically accelerated by the unconditional (financial) support of Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. According to the “Ukraine Aid Tracker” by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy of June 1st 2025, Ukraine received a flabbergasting 156.1 bn Euro from the EU and its member states (compared to 114.6 bn from the US), as of 1 June 2025. (Another 335 bn Euro, left over from the Covid-recovery fund, are yet to be channeled into the conflict by the Von-der-Leyen Commission.) And the (so far) 19 packages of economic sanctions-imposed on Russia hit, first and foremost, the Europeans themselves, with energy prices soaring and entire sectors of industries tanking.

Whatever happened to the EU as a peace project?

Worst of all, the nightmare of war, which seemed unthinkable for 21^st century Europe, turned into a real possibility with all the rhetoric and even preparation in a number of EU member states. It is unforgivable that the EU did not take the security concerns repeatedly raised by Vladimir Putin serious enough – nor did it honor its own commitment vis-à-vis Russia, the Minsk agreements. Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, caused in part by the economic interests of big heavily industrialized countries such as Germany, but also based on the assumption that trade with Russia could foster the development of peaceful relations in the long term, was suddenly radically aborted. At the same time, also the weakness of the EU’s own defence capacities, its vulnerability and security dependence on the US are on display. There has been presidentializaton (to put it mildly) of, amongst other, foreign policy, with Ursula von der Leyen (even though facing her second no-confidence vote by the European Parliament) exercising nearly unchecked power from the upper-most level of the executive. One might speak of anti-democratic tendencies or even an autocratic turn in the EU under Von der Leyen, that at the latest began or took a clear shape in the COVID pandemic. From this onwards, we witness an authoritarian slide of the EU.

Other actors, like the European External Action Service and its unfortunate former High Representative Josep Borrell had been largely marginalized. This changed under the leadership of Kaja Kallas, excelling in Russophobia and escalation. Among the most arduous war mongers, beside the EU Commission figure the UK, France and Germany, Poland (depending who is governing)  and the Baltic states. And they completely cancelled any record of the origins of the conflict, dating back at least to 2014. Over time, the European Union turned into a branch of NATO, and foreign policy-wise put under direct control by the United States. Democracy and accountability in the EU have been set on stand-by. Nowadays, the EU stands for limiting freedom of expression, and oppression of dissenting opinions. Today’s EU is a clear threat to democracy, and peace and prosperity. Politically, the state of the Union transpires the total absence of strategic thinking – and moral standards.

There is a gloomy scenario on the horizon, where democracy and civil liberties could succumb to the pressures of an increasingly authoritarian EU. And citizens would in large numbers begin to accept repressive structures and a clamp-down on democracy and free speech justified on the grounds of wartime priorities and prerogatives. The use of the Digital Service Act and the European Democracy Shield by the EU-Commission for the purpose of surveillance and silencing citizens is a case in point. But also, the space for academic debate has been considerably narrowed. As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling elites, so-called experts and commentators as part of struggle between democracy and autocracy (good vs. evil), the quality of discourse in the West has taken a hit. Respected academics throughout the West have been smeared and ignored. If we look at the reality, democracy is not doing so well in Ukraine either – not to mention the colossal problem of corruption in the country – as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and defamation.

Gone are the days of the EU being a credible broker in international conflicts. Instead, the EU has gotten itself involved in a devastating war, explicitly siding with and materially supporting Ukraine, more precisely its extreme right leadership. While enormous costs are inflicted on civilian populations by western-financed hostilities (at the expense of the European taxpayers), and to the benefit of the military-industrial complex, EU leaders fail to make an effort to push for immediate peace talks in both Ukraine and Israel. Is it not the first task of diplomacy to work for the non-violent resolution of conflicts? In contrast, European statesmen are piling up arsenals of deadly weapons, ultimately prolonging and intensifying the dreadful bloodshed. For those who seem to have forgotten that the EU is not NATO, and should not be instrumentalized to adopt, implement and finance US and NATO policies, they need to be reminded of the ruins of WWII from which the European idea emerged. War is not the spirit of the EU treaties, but peace, even though the EU today seems to be transitioning from being a “normative power” (Manners 2002) to a military power. In the case of Ukraine, the EU could (and should) make it a condition for any kind of further support to Kiev to engage in negotiations to end the war.

There is no doubt that the process of European integration made an important contribution to the long-lasting period of peace in Europe. To many, it seemed that the process of enlargement would take place gradually and orderly and that the sphere of peace and prosperity would continue to expand. However, the situation has changed significantly in this millennium with several crucial internal and external challenges. For the EU it has been a decade of crisis, and the war as well is taking its toll. The consequences of the sanctions packages are having a high price for Europe.  At the same time a new cluster of power centers emerges, in the shape of ascending geopolitical players (BRICS+, notably Russia, China, India, Turkey) – as well as the erratic behaviour of the EU’s transatlantic ally, the USA, e.g. President Trump’s erratic tariff policy. Even before the Russia’s arguably retaliative special military operation against Ukraine, Russia has made a systematic effort to champion a multipolar world order, which disrupts the agency of the EU and its allies. While Russia does not have the capabilities to directly oppose NATO expansion nor any interest in preventing EU expansion, it has been suspected of undermining the democratic ideals of the EU through hybrid warfare, promotion of post-truth narratives and support for reform-oriented political forces, most of which has turned out as being Western (US and EU/NATO) deception. There is no “realism à la carte”, not even for Europe.

European delusion

Russia’s leadership cannot afford losing the war it was forced into – and Russia will not lose, and literally cannot lose it, not least since it is a nuclear power. Time is on its side, and the contestation of the international liberal order by the BRICS+ countries plays in Russia’s favour. US military and financial support to Ukraine may come at a high price or even to a full stop under the presidency of Donald Trump, and the EU/NATO-alliance is facing a crushing defeat in its proxy-war. The EU and (European) NATO have virtually merged, and both of them seem to have tied their destiny entirely to Ukraine. This is a zero-sum game that is not only very harmful – but also extremely dangerous. There is the risk of a wider war with devastating consequences, and also institutionally for the EU (and NATO), since if they fail in helping Ukraine prevail, they will face an existential threat and maybe their decomposition. This connects to realist thinking in that the prime objective of states – and entities like the EU – is self-preservation, securing their own survival. EU, more so than NATO seem to have put their carriage before the horses. It clearly turns out to be rather backfiring premise to say: Putin attacks our European values in Ukraine (which he does not), and if Ukraine loses, we will be berobbed of our values.

And Russia is by no means isolated, it is actively engaging with the BRICS+ group countries, notably with powerful players such as China, India or Brazil. China, in turn, has long sought to reshape the primary and secondary institutions of the current international system via the promotion of a new narrative about the ideal future of a multipolar global international society. Most recently the Eastern giant became more assertive in contesting the status-quo of international relations and in proposing an alternative world order, openly challenging the ILO dominated by the Western (NATO-)powers, namely the US and its allies, most notably the UK, Norway, and the EU. It may rather be, that the US needs the Russia-threat to keep its alliance together, because an economic or political cooperation between Russia and European countries, especially Germany is not in the American interest. The destruction of the NordStream pipelines by the US (and/or its proxies) is a clear example for this neocon calculus. Russia, in close coordination with China, is also pushing for a multipolar international order and works actively towards a de-dollarization of the global economy, trading with China and others in local currencies. This could have far reaching consequences weakening the standing of the US in external trade and finance, as it would no longer be in a position to offset its fiscal deficit by limitless emission of treasury bonds, hitherto bought by economies all over the world. China alone has been selling off its dollar holdings at a value of 400 bn US$ over the last couple of months.   

However, the US are still the word’s superpower and able to impose its will economically, e.g through sanctions, tariffs and militarily, potentially projecting protection and deterrence. Europe, on the other hand, has for decades presumably benefitted from (some even say, it has been free-riding on) US military capacity and capitalized an economic peace dividend. Now, at this perceived or pretended point of “Zeitenwende” this passive approach to security and defence is said to backfire, and Europe has to move out of its comfort-zone, taking responsibility for protecting and guaranteeing the viability of its model of liberal democratic governance and economic prosperity. And in this reasoning, Europe forever vows its allegiance to the US, come hell or high water. Even if this means to wreck its own industrial base and national economies.

Concomitantly, we observe the rise of some sort of imperial attitude among EU-elites, pretending to fight what Brussels perceives as ideological extremism or anti-liberal populism that questions some elements of “European values”. This phenomenon is even more problematic since Eastern European countries frequently are still unconsolidated or ‘unsettled’ democracies as well as economically vulnerable countries, unable to defend themselves against EU feudalism and arrogance. The EU’s autocratic turn under von der Leyen disqualifies it to act as model for democracy and the rule of law. Brussels has been unmasked as a hotbed of anti-democratic rule, corruption and mismanagement, as well as meddling in national elections and circumcising national sovereignty (e.g. the Romanian presidential election of 2024/25). The feeling of institutional ineffectiveness is particularly strong in the candidate countries, where the bureaucratic burden of EU “criteria” is experienced as particularly pressing. The so-called ‘enlargement momentum’ has abated considerably, and the EU is no longer perceived as a credible crisis manager or even moderator. While measures relevant to consolidating the functioning of democratic institutions is crucial for the enlargement process, interference with democratic processes is of little help in this endeavor. The genuine political efforts to silence critical voices have fueled the resentment of Brussels and its agenda. This is why we are witnessing the decreasing power of attraction of the European model of democracy over the last decade or so. And this erosion of democracy is manifest not just within candidate countries but also in the Union itself, especially with von der Leyen’s second term. The consequence of these problematic developments is the weakening of the European Union as a global promoter of freedom and democracy, which opens room of maneuver for geopolitical actors, such as the BRICS+, to expand their influence and implement their agenda more easily.

Realism à la carte

For the past three years EU/NATO countries sent hundreds of billions’ worth of arms to Ukraine, a quantity of weapons so enormous it depleted their own reserves, and a vast undisclosed number of mercenary soldiers was deployed; and they applied the whole arsenal in terms of sanctions to cripple Russia economically. The result? It simply didn’t work. Without the US, NATO countries will now have to work on a peace deal, and Ukraine will probably end up having lost at least a fifth of its territory, half the size of the UK. All this after having been told during almost the entire duration of the war that Ukraine was winning. Of course, people will be told that it’s not a defeat, merely a “stalemate”, that NATO comes out of it reinforced with additional members, that it’s Ukraine or Zelensky’s fault anyhow. But the crux of the matter is NATO defined an extremely clear objective – which was to “drive Russians back to pre-invasion lines” to directly quote Anthony Blinken – and that failed miserably despite their unprecedented efforts. Which means that the West is much weaker than they thought they were, they just couldn’t collectively defeat Russia. This has immense implications. First of which being: if they can’t defeat Russia, what hope do they have against China which is likely – just looking at metrics (number of people, production capacity, military budget, etc.) – at least 5 times more powerful than Russia? The answer is obvious. Another one is that all those places around the world who thought they were protected by the US will start (in fact, they are already starting) to ask themselves difficult and serious questions: “Can we rely on that promise of military protection?” We will witness very significant shifts of alliances and defence arrangements. Lastly, people in Western countries will at some point wake up from their propaganda haze and ask very simple questions like: why did we ruin ourselves for Ukraine with virtually nothing to show for? Wouldn’t we and the Ukrainians have been better off if we had respected Minsk 2 and if we hadn’t tried to convert Ukraine into a Western bulwark against Russia? And so, this will likely serve as a hard lesson domestically that we should rather be much humbler about our geopolitical ambitions (assuming the West still is capable of learning lessons, which is far from certain). All in all, this will undoubtedly be seen by history as the defining event that signified that we moved from Western hegemony into a multipolar world. A very long chapter of our collective world history book has just been closed, 500 years of Western hegemony is about to end.

Mainstream ideas that influence EU foreign policy have always sidelined the importance of realism. With the von der Leyen Commission, the EU, at least declaratively, emphasized the importance of geopolitics. However, this implied a certain understanding of geopolitics which is somewhat patronizing and ignores the way power is distributed in the world order, as well as the claims and perspectives of other important actors, such as Russia or China. One could say the EU pretended to accept that geopolitics and realism play a key role but has not yet come to terms with the way realism shapes international relations. Rather, it ignores parts of reality that are uncomfortable and brands alternative ideas as evil, wrong, or as “misinformation”. This refers to both more intellectual voices as well as the views of other international actors. Even though the Von der Leyen Commission conceives itself as a “geopolitical Commission” and presumably adopted a realist approach to external policies, the way the EU-leadership is applying the notion of realism to its version of geopolitics, very much looks like “realism à la carte”, a menu to pick and choose from to one’s own liking, as is the case in the ENP or in the EU’s approach to the BRICS+. The consequence is a behavioural pattern that EU policy is not based on realist assessments of the distribution of power in the world but on misguided hope, arrogance, and virtue signaling. In practice, this results in a chaotic strategy, where any alternative view, both from inside the EU and more importantly outside, is seen as a threat. Hasty militarization or re-arming is a key example of this chaotic response.

Instead, the EU should accept Ukraine’s imminent defeat and demand general elections in the country. A new and legitimate leadership in Kiev could be trustworthy to enter serious peace-negotiations with Russia. Otherwise, Europe should stay out of this conflict; no more arms shipments, no more threateningRussia, no more meddling with Ukrainian politics, and no more arms race.Email

Thomas E. Henökl

Thomas E. Henökl is an Associate Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Agder (Norway) and a Senior Research Associate at the German Development Institute (Bonn). He works in research and teaching in the fields of European politics, public administration, EU foreign and security policy, international cooperation and development, and more widely on comparative politics and organization theory. Previously, Thomas Henökl worked as Security Policy Officer for the European Commission, External Relations DG (from 2011 the European External Action Service) and at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA). He holds PhD in Political Science from the University of Agder (Norway).

 BACKGROUND

A draft of the 28-point plan reviewed by AFP:

1. Ukraine's sovereignty will be confirmed.

2. A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.

3. It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further.


4. A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation.

5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.

6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.

8. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

10. The US will receive compensation for the security guarantees it provides. If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated and recognition of its new territories and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will also be deemed invalid.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.

12. A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine will be established, including the creation of a Ukraine Development Fund, the rebuilding of Ukraine's gas infrastructure, the rehabilitation of war-affected areas, the development of new infrastructure and a resumption of the extraction of minerals and natural resources, all with a special finance package developed by the World Bank.

13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy, with discussions on lifting sanctions, rejoining the G8 group and entering a long-term economic cooperation agreement with the United States.

14. Some $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine, with the US receiving 50 percent of the profits from the venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine's reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen, and the remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle.

15. A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.

16. Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine.

20. Both countries undertake to implement educational programmes in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance.

21. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de-facto recognition along the line of contact. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, which will then be used to create a buffer zone.

22. After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.

23. Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve prisoner exchanges and the return of remains, hostages and civilian detainees, and a family reunification programme will be implemented.

25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by US President Donald Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.

28. Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to the agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

SEE

Inside the Chaos of Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plan

Ukraine Solidarity Network (US): Oppose Trump’s surrender plan for Ukraine

'For a very long time, Ukrainians have suspected that Steve Witkoff was working for the Russians'

Trump admin crafted Russia-friendly peace plan with help from Kremlin in 'secret meetings'

Trump’s ‘Munich’ agreement is nothing but Russian demands. The world must reject it.

UKRAINE CAPITULATION PLAN

The Nestor Makhno Archive - index

 

Trump to offer Russia access to minerals for peace in Ukraine

Staff Writer | August 14, 2025 | 

US President Donald Trump and Russia President Vladimir Putin. Credit: Trump White House Archived, under public domain license

The US may offer Russia access to its critical minerals alongside other economic incentives in an effort to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, according to The Telegraph.

The British paper reported on Wednesday evening that US President Donald Trump is prepared to let Moscow tap into its natural resources in Alaska and lift some sanctions on Russia’s aerospace industry. Another key element of the proposal is granting Kremlin access to rare earth deposits in Ukrainian territories currently under Russian occupation.

The deal will likely be presented to Russian President Vladimir Putin during an upcoming meeting in Anchorage, says The Telegraph. The meeting, scheduled for Aug. 15, represents the first between the nations’ leaders since Trump’s re-election in 2024.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is said to be coordinating the economic package, which could involve joint mining ventures to speed up the development of mineral deposits in Ukraine. The Eastern European nation is said to host significant deposits of critical minerals, most of which are unexplored.

The Ukrainian Geological Survey estimates that its critical minerals account for 5% of the world’s total. Amongst the most prominent are graphite, with 19 million tonnes in reserves, and lithium, for which it holds about a third of Europe’s endowment. Other key minerals featured in the state agency database are copper, lead, zinc, silver, nickel, cobalt, manganese and rare earth elements.

In addition to minerals on the ground, the US deal could also involve giving Russia development rights in the oil and gas-rich Bering Strait, a region estimated to hold 13% of the world’s oil reserves.

UK officials told The Telegraph that the proposed measures may be acceptable to European leaders — many of whom had expressed concerns over Ukraine’s exclusion from the summit.

Ahead of the summit, Trump told Fox News Radio that no comprehensive peace deal will happen without Ukraine’s participation. Meanwhile, European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy have strongly opposed any agreement that sidelines Ukraine or requires it to cede territory.

Earlier this week, Trump held a video call with Zelenskiy and other European leaders, emphasizing that securing a ceasefire is the top priority of his meeting with Putin.

Trump’s ‘Deadly Serious’ Russia Squeeze Shown in Big Tariffs on Ally India

By Simon Watkins - Aug 11, 2025

• Trump has doubled tariffs on Indian imports to 50% over New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian oil.
• 
  
• The move risks nearly 1% of India’s GDP this year but underscores U.S. determination to coordinate with the EU on sanctions to weaken Russia’s economy and deter its geopolitical ambitions.
• 
  
• India, alongside China and Turkey, remains a top buyer of Russian oil, and Washington is preparing similar tariff threats.
• 
  

“India is not only buying massive amounts of Russian Oil, they are then, for much of the Oil purchased, selling it on the Open Market for big profits,” U.S. President Donald Trump posted last week on Truth Social. “They don’t care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian War Machine. Because of this, I will be substantially raising the Tariff paid by India to the USA.” These words directly implicate buyers of Russian oil as accomplices in the murder of tens of thousands of Ukrainian people in the war started by the Kremlin on 24 February 2022, as indeed they have been. Had these words been said in 2008 when Europe continued to buy Russian oil after it attacked Georgia, or in 201,4 when the continent continued to buy Russian oil after it annexed Ukraine’s Crimea region, then the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine might never have happened. They were not said, it did happen, but this time around, the U.S. President is looking to the future in his actions today. His seriousness is further underlined by the fact that India – long seen as a key ally to Washington in the Asia-Pacific region – now faces big tariffs. So what does this all mean, and what will happen next?

Slightly in advance of the 8 August deadline imposed by Trump on Russia to make a peace deal with Ukraine, the U.S. doubled its tariffs on India to 50% -- a rate that will come into effect on 27 August. The U.S. is India’s top export market, constituting 18% of its exports and 2.2% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Many of the country’s major exporting firms had already stated that they could not deal with the 25% tariffs, as they are too high to absorb, and passing them on to customers makes their products uncompetitive. Initial analysts’ estimates are that 50% tariffs could reduce India’s GDP by nearly 1% this year. But the U.S. knows all this, which is one of the reasons why it has chosen to do it, according to a very senior European Union (E.U.) energy security source who spoke exclusively to OilPrice.com on the day of the new Indian tariffs announcement. “India is known as a key ally of the U.S. globally, and especially in Asia Pacific, and the thinking is that if he [Trump] is willing to do that to India, then he would be willing to do that to anyone else, and this is absolutely the case – he [Trump] is deadly serious on squeezing Russia’s economy from here,” he said. “The message should not be lost on European countries who might be thinking of easing up on the sanctions being rolled out on Russia from now to December 2027 [when the intention is to end all imports of Russian oil and gas],” he added. Indeed, a closely co-ordinated ramping up of sanctions against Moscow by the U.S. and E.U. is seen by both sides as key to preventing Russian President Vladimir Putin from realising his dream of reconstituting the full scope of the U.S.S.R.’s previous European empire, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. “Trump believes that the continuation of European purchases of Russian oil and gas after the annexation of Crimea, especially in 2014, was key to the Russian action in Ukraine in 2022, as underlined in his comments on the Nordstream gas pipelines [from Russia to the heart of Europe],” he highlighted.

In this context, India has a multi-layered strategic importance to the U.S. The most notable of these is the objective of positioning it as the regional counterweight to China’s economic, political, and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Washington’s efforts in this regard intensified following the 15 June 2020 clash between Chinese and Indian troops in the disputed territory of the Galwan Valley in the Himalayas, as the U.S. believed this marked a new push back strategy from India against China’s policy of seeking to increase its economic and military alliances through its multi-generational power-grab project, the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI). The U.S. further believed that this push back might also be echoed in India’s economic desire to finally make substantive progress on its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy as an alternative to China’s BRI programme. However, for this to work, India would need access to secure energy sources over the long term, as – like China – it has few oil and gas sources of its own. Indeed, given the potential economic growth projections for India, the International Energy Agency forecast that the Asian sub-continental power would constitute the biggest share of global energy demand growth at 25% in the coming two decades. In fact, the IEA predicted India would overtake the European Union as the world’s third-biggest energy consumer by 2030. It was at this point – in Trump’s first term as president – that the plan was hatched to link this plan to use India to challenge China as Asia’s major power in parallel with a corollary objective to use the UAE to promote further relationship normalisation deals (‘Abraham Accords’) between Israel and key Arab states in the Middle East. This remains a second key reason why India is so important to Washington.

Nevertheless, India – along with China and Turkey – is still one of the biggest buyers of Russia's energy exports three years into Moscow’s war in Ukraine. According to industry figures, last month saw it receive 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil from Russia, while China imported around 1 million bpd and Turkey about 500,000 bpd. Over the entirety of 2024, China was the largest buyer of Russian oil, at about 2.2 million bpd, followed by India on 1.76 million bpd, and Turkey on 0.3 million bpd. The U.S. has already warned China that ongoing imports of Russian oil could lead to huge tariffs being imposed on the country, according to the E.U. source. “During the talks [end-July U.S.-China trade talks in Stockholm], [U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott] Bessent told his opposite number [Vice Premier He Lifeng] that legislation [‘Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025’] is being drawn up in Congress authorising the imposition of up to 500% tariffs on countries that buy sanctioned Russian oil,” he exclusively told OilPrice.com last week. In reality, the Act goes wider to encompass any country that “knowingly sells, supplies, transfers, or purchases oil, uranium, petroleum products, or petrochemical products that originated in the Russian Federation”. It currently has 84 listed co-sponsors in the U.S. Senate alone, according to the U.S. Congress website, and the Speaker of the House has also indicated his chamber’s support to pass the bill.

The U.S. has also suggested to China that it may treat Beijing’s assistance to Russia in much the same manner as it has started to treat the same for Iran. This was seen in the very recent U.S. State Department announcement on Iran-related sanctions that it would impose sanctions on 20 entities it believes are engaged in trading Iranian oil and petrochemical products, including China’s Zhoushan Jinrun Petroleum Transfer Co., an oil terminal in the greater Zhoushan port area. Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson said of these China sanctions that: “The Iranian regime continues to fuel conflict in the Middle East to fund its destabilizing activities, [and] Today, the United States is taking action to stem the flow of revenue that the regime uses to support terrorism abroad, as well as to oppress its own people.” Zhoushan Jinrun was highlighted by the State Department for: “…knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran”. The port is the fourth of China’s to be sanctioned by Washington in recent weeks, following similar actions against Huaying Huizhou Daya Bay Petrochemical Terminal Storage in March, Guangsha Zhoushan in April, and Dongying Port in May. “More is to come,” the very senior U.S. legal source told OilPrice.com at the time of the sanctions announcement and could include a dramatically increased list of blacklisted Chinese officials, businesses, banks, financial houses, ports, ships, and supportive infrastructure to the facilitation of Russian oil imports.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

AU CONTRAIRE

Western Pundits Should Stop Writing Idiotic Nonsense About Russia’s Economy – OpEd

 March 17, 2025 

By Ian Proud

From an extremely small list, Owen Matthews has been one of the more balanced mainstream commentators on the war in Ukraine. Not seeking to take one side over the other, but to step back and look at the bigger picture.

I was shocked, therefore, by his article in the Independent this week.

‘The Russian economy is on the brink of collapse, and Putin knows it,’ ran the headline.

I’ve read a different version of the same headline over a hundred times since 2014, including while serving as the Economic Counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow.

I am still waiting for it to be proved correct.

Firstly, some of the data in Matthews’ article were objectively not correct.

The ‘ruble has lost over half its value since Putin invaded Crimea in 2014.’

Wrong. It is around one third of its spring 2014 value. And as I’ve pointed out many times, a weak ruble has been an explicit article of Russian monetary policy since late 2016, to offset the effect of major energy price swings. That helped Russia pull in record tax receipts in 2022 because of the potent combination of sky high energy prices and rock bottom ruble rate. That’s basic economics.

‘Over $600bn of the Kremlin’s foreign currency reserves have been frozen in Western banks,’

Wrong again. The figure is less than $300bn, and Russia still retains the same value of available reserves, that would cover over a year’s worth of imports.

I could go on but won’t. Matthews is known as an historian, not an economist. I don’t claim to be an economist either, but I can count.

In broad terms, I don’t dispute the economic headwinds that Matthews points to, albeit clumsily. Domestic labour constraints driven by the war and Russia’s secular population decline are a problem. Massive fiscal stimulus is overheating the economy with inflation high. Although I’d argue that 9% isn’t ‘rampant’; one million percent in Venezuela is rampant.

However, Russia has been here before. Inflation breached the 9% mark in November 2014 following the oil price collapse, and didn’t fall below that level until early 2016. It peaked again at the start of the war in Ukraine hitting 18%. Interest rates in Russia now are extremely high at 21% but, again, they were hiked to 17% in December 2014.

It isn’t incorrect for Matthews to point out these legitimate economic challenges. The point is that neither inflation nor interest rates will ever be a strong enough reason for President Putin to change course in Ukraine.

Not now, not in 2014, not at any point since the Ukraine crisis started. He has always chosen to accept economic pain and manage the political consequences of that, to avoid backing down in the face of western economic pressure.

Like so many mainstream pundit, Matthews briefly sketches the economic fix Ukraine is in before hurrying along as if there’s ‘nothing to see here’.

Conveniently, he doesn’t explore the mathematics of how Europe will pay to keep the lights on in Kyiv while also funding Von der Leyen’s $800bn rearmament programme.

Nor has he considered what this would mean for ordinary European citizens who increasingly question the wisdom of funding a forever war that Ukraine cannot win.

Or considered the link between self-defeating war policy of identikit globalist European leaders and the rise in the popularity of anti-war nationalist parties all across Europe.

Owen Matthews doesn’t touch on Ukraine’s looming sovereign default and the collapse of its currency that would follow. Or the concern that, with a structural current account deficit, Ukraine has no way to exist as an independent, sovereign nation, other than, you guessed it, through western state handouts. Nor how the immense cost of bailing Ukraine out would fall on Europe on top of the contingent liabilities already enumerated above.

Rather, Matthews suggests that Europe needs to do more of what is has been doing for the past eleven years without success. More sanctions, even though over 90% of individual sanctions have absolutely no effect.

He doesn’t reflect on the fact that Russia has been under sanctions for eleven straight years, is the most sanctioned country on the planet, and yet is still growing faster than Europe, even though that growth is undoubtedly built on fiscal sand.

Yet still, finally and irrevocably, he suggests Europe could cut itself off completely from Russian gas. No need to dwell on the obvious economic truth that higher-cost energy in Europe is driven by a huge imbalance between supply and demand that neither the U.S. nor Russia experiences. No thought given to the notion that Europe’s deindustrialisation has been accelerated by the political choice to cut off 90% of piped Russian gas supplies.

As every other mainstream British pundit has called for more sanctions and less gas, Owen Matthews has plumped for the easy option too.

Presumably to show some value-added in his low-calorie commentary, Owen Matthews supports Ukrainian drone attacks on any energy infrastructure that facilitates the delivery of Russian gas to Europe. Clearly impressed by the destruction of the NordStream pipeline, like a spotty-faced teenager watching a Seventies Bond movie, he considers industrial terrorism to be a legitimate policy choice for western leaders.

I would like to say that his article was terrible. But in truth, it was no different from practically every other mainstream British Glavlit article on Russia’s economy that I’ve seen over the past eleven years.

And, the thing is, it isn’t that it was littered with data that was objectively untrue.

It was not the not the lack of economic analysis, or the failure to explore the greater economic challenge facing Ukraine.

It was not, even, the crass and frankly dangerous policy prescriptions.

It was that, like so many other journalists I had thought weaker, Owen Matthews was missing the point. Badly, irresponsibly, and idiotically, missing the point.

Despite the very clear economic challenges that Russia does face because of the war in Ukraine, its economy will always be better placed to manage the shock of war than Ukraine’s.

Every argument to punish Russia more will only embolden Putin to keep fighting.

In this war of attrition, Ukraine, and Europe, will run out of money first. And with Trump shutting off the taps of American money, that crunch point will come much sooner.

• This article was published at Strategic Culture

Ian Proud was a member of HM Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. From July 2014 to February 2019 Ian was posted to the British Embassy in Moscow. He was also Director of the Diplomatic Academy for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Vice-Chairman of the Board of the Anglo-American School of Moscow.