THE LAND ETHIC: key philosophical and scientific challenges
by J. Baird Callicott
The holism of the land ethic and its antecedents
Of all the environmental ethics so far devised, the land ethic, first sketched by Aldo
Leopold, is most popular among professional conservationists and least popular
among professional philosophers. Conservationists are concerned about such things as
the anthropogenic pollution of air and water by industrial and municipal wastes, the
anthropogenic reduction in numbers of species populations, the outright
anthropogenic extinction of species, and the invasive anthropogenic introduction of
other species into places not their places of evolutionary origin. Conservationists as
such are not concerned about the injury, pain, or death of nonhuman specimens-that
is, of individual animals and plants-except in those rare cases in which a species's
populations are so reduced in number that the conservation of every specimen is vital
to the conservation of the species. On the other hand, professional philosophers, most
of them schooled in and intellectually committed to the Modern classical theories of
ethics, are ill-prepared to comprehend morally such "holistic" concerns. Professional
philosophers are inclined to dismiss holistic concerns as non-moral or to reduce them
to concerns about either human welfare or the welfare of non-human organisms
severally. And they are mystified by the land ethic, unable to grasp its philosophical
foundations and pedigree.
Tailoring it to accommodate the holistic concerns of conservationists like himself,
Leopold (1949, p. 204, emphasis added) writes, "a land ethic implies respect for . . .
fellow-members and also for the community as such." Though the idea of respect for a
community as such is completely foreign to the mainstream Modern moral theories
going back to Hobbes, such holism is, however, not in the least foreign to the
Darwinian and Humean theories of ethics upon which the land ethic is built. Darwin
(1871, p. 96-97) could hardly be more specific or emphatic on this point: "Actions are
regarded by savages and were probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad,
solely as they obviously affect the welfare of the tribe, -not that of the species, nor that
of an individual member of the tribe. This conclusion agrees well with the belief that
the so-called moral sense is aboriginally derived from the social instincts, for both
relate at first exclusively to the community." Gary Varner (1991, p. 179) states flatly
that "concern for communities as such has no historical antecedent in David Hume."
But it does. Demonstrably. Hume (1957 [1751], p. 47) insists, evidently against
Hobbes and other social contract theorists, that "we must renounce the theory which
accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We must adopt a
more publick affection, and allow that the interests of society are not, even on their
own account, entirely indifferent to us." Nor is this an isolated remark. Over and over
we read in Hume's ethical works such statements as this: "It appears that a tendency to
public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in society, does
always by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame engage us on the side of
the social virtues" (1957 [1751], p. 56). And this: "Everything that promotes the
interests of society must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious, give
uneasiness" (1957 [1751], p. 58).
That is not to say that in Hume, certainly, and even in Darwin there is no theoretical
provision for a lively concern for the individual members of society, as well as for
society per se. According to Darwin (1871, p. 81) the sentiment of sympathy is "all important." Sympathy means "with-feeling." It is the basis of our moral concern for
the welfare of other human beings and indeed all beings capable of having feelings-all
sentient beings, in other words. By the same token, however, sympathy can hardly
extend to a transorganismic entity, such as society per se, which has no feelings per
se. Hume and Darwin, however, recognized the existence and moral importance of
sentiments other than sympathy, some of which-patriotism, for example-relate as
exclusively and specifically to society as sympathy does to sentient individuals. In the
Leopold land ethic, in any event, the holistic aspect eventually eclipses the
individualistic aspect. Toward the beginning of "The Land Ethic," Leopold, as just
noted, declares that a land ethic "implies respect for fellow-members" of the biotic
community, as well as "for the community as such." Toward the middle of "The Land
Ethic," Leopold (1949, p. 210) speaks of a "biotic right" to "continue" but such a right
accrues, as the context indicates, to species, not to specimens. Toward the end of the
essay, Leopold (1949, pp. 224-225) writes the famous and oft-quoted summary moral
maxim, the golden rule, of the land ethic: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends
otherwise." In it there is no reference at all to "fellow-members." They have gradually
dropped out of account as the "The Land Ethic" proceeds to its climax.
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A first encounter: French environmental philosophy from an anglo-american perspective
The “French exception” could be many things—language purity, cultural assimilation of immigrants, federalism counterbalanced by labor unionism, popular intellectualism. The French exception in environmental philosophy is constituted by humanism and the replacement of ethics by politics. Anglo-American environmental ethics makes of local nature a moral patient. In the French humanistic politics of global nature, global nature is indeterminate. Science incompletely represents global nature in both senses of the word “represents.” As an object global, nature is under-determined by a science incapable of so wide a grasp. And as subject in law, science speaks on behalf of a mute and indifferent nature, while policies regarding nature as an agent of powerful effect are decided in the political arena.
Key words: French exception, ecology, environmentalism, French environmental philosophy, humanism, M. Serres, C. Larrere, nature, nature as political
Michael Zimmerman is author of Environmental Philosophy, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, and Contesting Earth's Future. He is a member of the Integral Institute's Ecology group, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, Clinical Professor of Psychology at the Tulane Medical School, Director of the Environmental Studies Program and Co-Director of the Asian Studies Program, and can be contacted at 
