US Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program: Background And Issues For Congress – Analysis

A tomahawk cruise missile launches from the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class William Collins III) 


January 19, 2026 
Congressional Research Service (CRS).
By Ronald O’Rourke

Introduction

The Navy’s DDG(X) program has envisaged procuring a class of next-generation guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) to replace the Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers and older Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Navy plans have called for procuring the first DDG(X) in the early 2030s. The Navy’s proposed FY2026 budget requested $133.5 million in research and development funding for the program.

On December 22, 2025, the Trump Administration announced a proposed program to build a new class of guided missile battleships (BBG[X]s) for the Navy. (For more on the BBG(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF13142, Navy Guided Missile Battleship (BBG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.) Somepress reports have stated that the Navy intends to suspend work on the DDG(X) program as a consequence of starting the BBG(X) program.

Navy Large Surface Combatants (LSCs)

Force-Level Goal

The Navy refers to its cruisers and destroyers collectively as large surface combatants (LSCs). The Navy’s preferred 381-ship force-level goal, released in June 2023, calls for achieving and maintaining a force of 87 LSCs.

Existing LSCs

The Navy’s CG-47s and DDG-51s are commonly called Aegis cruisers and Aegis destroyers, respectively, because they are equipped with the Aegis combat system, an integrated collection of sensors and weapons named for the mythical shield that defended Zeus. The Navy procured 27 CG-47s between FY1978 and FY1988. The ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005. The Navy began retiring the remaining 22 ships in FY2022 and wants to retire all 22 by the end of FY2027.

The first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985 and entered service in 1991. The version of the DDG-51 that the Navy is currently procuring is called the Flight III version. The Navy also has three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers that were procured in FY2007-FY2009 and are equipped with a combat system that is different than the Aegis system. (For more on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.)

LSC Industrial Base

All LSCs procured for the Navy since FY1985 have been built at General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are major contractors for Navy surface ship combat system equipment. The surface combatant industrial base also includes hundreds of additional component and material supplier firms.
DDG(X) Program: Program Designation and Lead Ship Procurement

In the program designation DDG(X), the X means the precise design for the ship has not yet been determined. As mentioned earlier, Navy plans have called for procuring the first DDG(X) in the early 2030s. Procurement of DDG-51s—the type of LSC currently being procured by the Navy—would end sometime after the start of procurement of DDG(X)s.

Navy’s General Concept for the Ship

Figure 1 shows a Navy rendering of a notional DDG(X) design. The Navy approved the DDG(X)’s top-level requirements (i.e., its major required features) in December 2020. A January 2025 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan states, “The Navy has indicated that the initial [DDG(X)] design now prescribes a displacement of 14,500 tons—1,000 tons more than the design under the [FY]2024 [30-year shipbuilding] plan and 4,800 tons [about 49.5%] more than a DDG-51.”

Figure 1. Navy Rendering of Notional DDG(X) Design. Source: Navy rendering of notional DDG(X) design accompanying Sam LaGrone, “Navy Wants 3-Year Overlap Between Arleigh Burkes and DDG(X), Considering Propulsion System,” USNI News, January 10, 2024.

The Navy has envisaged the DDG(X) as a ship with (1) DDG-51 Flight III Aegis combat system elements; (2) more growth margin than the DDG-51 Flight III design, meaning more space, weight-carrying capacity, electrical power, and cooling capacity (aka SWAP-C) for accepting additional or higher-power equipment and weapons (including directed-energy weapons) over the ship’s service life; (3) an integrated power system (IPS); (4) reduced vulnerability due to reduced infrared, acoustic, and underwater electromagnetic signatures; (5) increased cruising range and time on station; and (6) increased weapon capacity.

The Navy stated that the baseline DDG(X) design, like the DDG-51 Flight III design, was envisaged as including 96 standard Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, with an ability to incorporate 12 large missile launch cells in place of 32 of the 96 standard VLS cells, as well as two 21-cell Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launchers, and possibly also an ability to be built with an additional mid-body hull section, called the Destroyer Payload Module, that would provide additional payload capacity. The Navy states that


The Future Naval Force Study (FNFS) and the Future Surface Combatant Force Analysis of Alternatives (FSCF AoA) identified the requirement for future large surface combatants (LSCs) to be capable of hosting directed energy (DE) weapons, larger missiles for increased range and speed, increased magazine depth, growth in organic sensors, and an efficient integrated power system to manage the dynamic loads. DDG 51 is highly capable, but after over 40 years in production and 30 years of upgrades the hull form does not provide sufficient space and center of gravity margin to host future capabilities. To reset these design allowances for the future, requirements tradeoff and design studies were performed from FY 2018 to FY 2020 that considered modification of existing surface combatant and amphibious ships in addition to new concepts. These studies concluded that DDG(X) is required to deliver the necessary margins and flexibility to succeed the DDG 51 Class as the next enduring LSC combining the DDG 51 FLT III combat system elements with new hull form, an efficient Integrated Power System (IPS) and greater endurance, reducing the Fleet logistics burden…. (Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book, Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, June 2025, p. 467.)

Procurement Quantities and Procurement Cost

The Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan projected LSCs being procured in FY2032 and subsequent years in annual quantities of generally one to two ships per year. The January 2025 CBO report estimates the DDG(X)’s average procurement cost in constant FY2024 dollars at $4.4 billion—about 33% more than the Navy’s estimate (shown in the CBO report) of $3.3 billion. The CBO report states that “the Navy’s estimates for its destroyers imply that the DDG(X) would cost about 22 percent more than the DDG-51 Flight III but would have a full-load displacement that was 50 percent greater than that ship. Such an outcome, however, seems unlikely given the history of surface combatants.”

Technical Risk

A June 2025 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on selected Department of Defense acquisition programs stated


The Navy approved changes to the operational requirements for the [DDG(X)] program in August 2024. The program is assessing how the changes affect its schedule and cost estimates and officials did not provide a time frame for when they will update these estimates. The changes were based on additional input from the fleet and Navy leadership to increase speed and [electrical] power…. The Navy plans to model the IPS at a land-based test site, but the results may not be available to fully inform the ship’s design prior to detailed design. The second critical technology is the ship’s hull form. The program continues to conduct risk reduction activities for both critical technologies.

Issues for Congress

Issues for Congress regarding the DDG(X) program include the following: (1) Does the Navy intend to suspend work on the DDG(X) program as a consequence of starting the BBG(X) program? What would be the net impact on future Navy capabilities and funding requirements of developing and acquiring BBG(X)s instead of DDG(X)s? (2) Would the DDG(X) be more cost-effective than a lengthened version of the DDG-51 design? (3) Did the Navy accurately identify the DDG(X)’s required operational capabilities? (4) Would future Navy budgets permit the procurement of DDG(X)s in desired numbers while adequately funding other Navy priorities? (5) Has the Navy taken adequate steps to mitigate technical, schedule, and cost risk in the program? (6) Has the Navy planned adequately for a transition from DDG-51 procurement to DDG(X) procurement?

FY2026 Funding Request

The Navy’s proposed FY2026 budget requests $51.6 million for Project 0411 (DDG[X] Concept Development) within Program Element (PE) 0603564N (Ship Preliminary Design & Feasibility Studies), which is line 46 in the Navy’s FY2026 research and development (R&D) account, and $81.9 million for “DDG(X) Power & Propulsion Risk Mitigation & Demonstration,” which forms part of Project 2471 (Integrated Power Systems [IPS]) within PE 0603573N (Advanced Surface Machinery Systems), which is line 48.

About the author: Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

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What Does Venezuela Have to Do With Taiwan?

By Biljana Vankovska

January 14, 2026

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

The New Year did not begin with hope or joy, except for the arms dealers. More precisely, for the military-industrial-media-academic-NGO complex that feeds on permanent war. Orders are flowing, profits are booming, and blood has once again become a growth sector. For any normal society, pirates belong in adventure films, not in the civilian power corridor. Yet Venezuela, more precisely, its legally elected president Nicolás Maduro, became the first trophy of the New Year.

A week after the grotesque “spectacle” of assault and kidnapping, analysts remain confused. It is not because the facts are unclear, but because they are often imprisoned by prefabricated narratives, many of which they themselves manufacture. Such is the “Taiwan issue” for quite some time. About Venezuela, much has already been said in a brilliant and insightful way. But let’s focus on the rest of the story. Much of it was delivered by Trump personally, with no shame and no restraint. In a grotesque parody of Kant, he openly declared himself “above international law,” constrained only by the ‘moral law’ within. To invoke morality and Trump in the same sentence—under the shadow of Epstein and ICE death squads—is not irony but obscenity.

Yet even as Venezuela is under tremendous pressure, this modern Nero is already drafting the next targets in what increasingly resembles an imperial suicide note. Names roll out like betting odds: Cuba. Greenland (dragging NATO and the EU into the madness). Iran. Gaza, conveniently erased once more, allowing Israel to continue its “peaceful” extermination without distraction. In this grotesque sequence, one territory stands out—not even a state, but a pawn. Taiwan.

In times of general deception, one has to repeat well-known facts tirelessly: Taiwan is the island province of the People’s Republic of China. It is according to UN resolutions, international law, and even Washington’s own foreign policy. The “One China” principle is not contested in law or diplomacy; it is challenged only by hawks, profiteers, and useful idiots. And yet, Taiwan has been deliberately inserted into the imperial narrative as the next “victim.” We saw it clearly when a New York Times journalist asked Trump whether the assault on Venezuela sets a precedent. Taiwan was invoked immediately: What if China attacks Taiwan because it lies in its ‘hemisphere’? (By the way, China immediately responded to this idea about a world of hemispheres.) The danger lies not in Trump’s answer, but in the question itself. It equates Venezuela with Taiwan, international crime against a sovereign state with the internal affairs of another state, thus sustaining the fiction of a ‘small, democratic Taiwan’ threatened by a monstrous China.

What Western discourse avoids saying plainly is that Taiwan is historically and legally part of China. The same people live on both sides of the Strait, separated by unresolved history, the residue of an unfinished civil war. This is not a matter of international security. It is China’s internal question.

What turns Taiwan into a ‘global crisis’ is not Beijing, but Washington.

For decades, and with escalating intensity in recent years, the United States has weaponized Taiwan: politically, ideologically, and militarily. Just before the New Year, Washington concluded the largest arms deal in Taiwan’s history, funneling billions to U.S. defense corporations. China responded as it always has: calmly, legally, and firmly. Military exercises on its own territory (a fact Western media systematically suppresses) sent a clear message: China will not allow the dismemberment of its sovereignty.

Predictably, Western experts scream that China is preparing for a military solution. In truth, it is certain Taiwanese politicians who are playing Russian roulette, feeding the U.S. war machine while endangering their own people. They arm the island against its own country, against a nuclear superpower, while pretending this is “ self-defense.” It is political theater bordering on insanity.

Some compare Taiwan to Ukraine, and they are right, though not in the way they intend. Ukraine was militarized, instrumentalized, and sacrificed. Taiwan’s situation is worse. Ukraine was at least a state. Taiwan is not. It cannot join the UN. It cannot join NATO. And despite illusions carefully cultivated in Taipei, no U.S. soldier will die for Taiwan. Nor is Taiwan able to deter China’s military advancement, if a decision of that sort is made in Beijing.

So why is Washington draining the island’s resources? Why force military spending of 5 percent of GDP on a territory outside NATO? Why manufacture hysteria where no war was inevitable? The answer is obvious: profit, containment, and geopolitical sabotage.

The result is political backlash. The leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, the Taiwanese “Zelensky”, now faces impeachment. Public dissatisfaction is growing. Ordinary people understand the arithmetic of war: fewer hospitals, fewer schools, fewer pensions—more weapons, more fear, more dependency.

The so-called Taiwan question is China’s internal affair, and Beijing has approached it with patience unmatched in modern geopolitics. A Chinese proverb says: “A Chinese does not raise a hand against a Chinese.” War has never been the plan. Reunification has been pursued through time, development, and restraint. 

The real recklessness lies elsewhere. Some Taiwanese elites believe U.S. promises—despite the long cemetery of abandoned allies. They waste resources chasing an impossible independence. And they sabotage their own future, which clearly lies in reconciliation with a rising China—one that builds power through economy, infrastructure, education, and technology, not through occupation and destruction.

Taiwanese society itself does not want war. Despite political divisions, there is internal coexistence and the skills to reach a compromise over sensitive issues peacefully. Who benefits from destroying this balance? This is just a rhetorical question, of course.

Venezuela and Taiwan have nothing in common. Except for one thing: both have been placed on Washington’s chopping block. The only real danger comes from the hyper-imperial center that, like a drug addict nearing overdose, risks dragging the entire world down with it.

This article was produced by Globetrotter and No Cold War. 

Biljana Vankovska is a professor of political science and international relations at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, a member of the Transnational Foundation of Peace and Future Research (TFF) in Lund, Sweden, and the most influential public intellectual in Macedonia. She is a member of the No Cold War collective.

 

The Dream of Korean Independence

Sovereignty survives in the shadow of imperial hegemony.

By Simone Chun

January 14, 2026

Source: Counterpunch

Light sticks from K-pop idol concerts have become a symbol of mass demonstrations. (Telegram/Bisang Action)

“People of this nation, please come to the National Assembly now. Protect the final bastion of our democracy!”
—Lee Jae Myung, December 2024

This urgent plea was livestreamed at 10:40 p.m. on 3 December 2024 by National Assemblyman Lee Jae Myung, barely ten minutes after martial law had been declared by the now-impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol. Hundreds of citizens heeded the call, converging on the National Assembly building to block troops from entering parliament and prevent the country from sliding into authoritarian rule.

One year later, Lee, now President of Korea, commemorated one of the most dramatic nights in the nation’s history. He described it as a moment when the Korean people peacefully overcame an “unprecedented democratic crisis in world history,” in what is now remembered as the Revolution of Light. Lee went on to designate December 3 as National Sovereignty Day, pledging to build a Korea in which no one could even contemplate extinguishing the light of popular sovereignty. Lee’s renewed focus on sovereignty underscores the urgent need to examine not only the causal factors behind Yoon’s failed insurrection, but also to confront deeper factors that continue to undermine the foundations of Korea’s sovereignty, namely, Washington’s encroachment on Korean independence. 

Despite the great strides made by South Korean democracy, the country remains the world’s only state to have ceded wartime operational control to a foreign power, an arrangement that violates international law and contradicts the principles of the UN Charter by effectively positioning Korea not as a fully sovereign state but as a U.S. forward military base. For 74 years, Washington has maintained wartime Operational Control (OPCON) over Korea’s military, commanding 600,000 frontline troops, 3.5 million reservists, and the entirety of Korea’s military infrastructure. Under the 1953 U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. forces have unrestricted freedom of operation on Korean soil. 

As a result, Korea remains bound to a security framework that prioritizes Washington’s strategic objectives over its own sovereign decision-making. This unprecedented system has long constrained Korea’s military and political sovereignty and continues to shape every major security decision the country faces. It is within this broader structure of dependency–and the ongoing limitations on Korea’s sovereignty–that the events of December 2024 must be understood.

Exposing the U.S. Role in Yoon’s Insurrection 

A six-month investigation into Yoon’s declaration of martial law resulted in his indictment, along with 18 co-conspirators, of attempting to create justification for declaring martial law provoking North Korea to “mount an armed aggression”; a gambit that failed only because Pyongyang “did not respond militarily.” The Special Prosecutor investigation revealed that the Yoon administration carried out a series of calculated provocations, including repeatedly launching droves of massive balloons and military drones into North Korean airspace just two months before the December 3 insurrection. South Korean military sources confirmed that these were not defensive measures but deliberate provocations. A memo from the Defense Counterintelligence Command warned of potential North Korean reprisal scenarios ranging “from a minimum security crisis to a maximum Noah’s flood,” reflecting the high stakes of Yoon’s planning.

While Yoon stands trial for deliberately heightening inter-Korean tensions and risking a devastating war in furtherance of his own ambitions, the U.S. role in his brinkmanship has remained largely unexamined. In fact, Yoon’s declaration of martial law, far from being an isolated act of authoritarian overreach, was the culmination of years of U.S. pressure under the Biden administration, which strategically positioned Korea as a frontline military hub in Washington’s global strategy. Washington’s geopolitical ambitions were directly manifested through Yoon’s pursuit of regime change in the North, his advocacy for the deployment of U.S. nuclear assets in South Korea, and his full embrace of a U.S.-brokered trilateral military alliance that inducts Korea and Japan into Washington’s aggressively anti-China regional strategy.

It strains credibility to suggest that given the extensive intelligence sharing between the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces and the advanced reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), which monitors the Korean Peninsula 24/7 with advanced equipment like satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, Washington somehow failed to notice Yoon’s sustained provocations against Pyongyang. Noh Sang-won, a Yoon associate and former intelligence operative, was found in possession of notes pointing to a plan to notify the US in advance before martial law declaration, including several references to “US advance notice,” “cooperation from the U.S.,” and “prior notice to the U.S.” While Noh Sang‑won’s notes contain references to “U.S. advance notice” and “cooperation from the U.S.,” suggesting that elements of Yoon’s plan may have considered informing Washington, U.S. officials have publicly denied any prior knowledge or involvement in the attempted martial law declaration.

The special prosecutor’s most striking claim is that Yoon sought to justify martial law by repeatedly trying to “provoke” North Korea into responding militarily and coordinating covert moves to spark a security crisis. Yet the most serious provocations toward the North remain in place even after Yoon’s impeachment, namely, the decades-long campaign of military brinkmanship led by Washington. 

Under the Yoon administration, U.S.–ROK combined military exercises surged to nearly 340 per year, nearly triple the number conducted in 2017, locking the Korean peninsula in a cycle of militarization and provocation that perpetually thwarts any prospect for peace. These maneuvers mobilize tens of thousands of troops and U.S. strategic assets for live-fire field maneuvers simulating preemptive strikes, decapitation of leadership, territorial occupation, and post-war stabilization. ROK–U.S. and ROK–U.S.–Japan military exercises expanded exponentially, signaling near-continuous training and a sharp escalation from 2023. This trajectory reflects the consolidation of a trilateral nuclear war alliance, formalized in 2022–2023 and now actively operationalized. The exercises have also undergone a qualitative shift, encompassing nuclear war simulations against North Korea, China-focused drills, U.S. homeland defense training, and Conventional–Nuclear Integration (CNI). Through CNI—evident in bomber escort missions and carrier-based operations—South Korea’s conventional forces are increasingly embedded in U.S. nuclear war planning.

At the same time, the U.S. has been rapidly expanding its airborne footprint in South Korea, signaling a significant strategic shift. Gunsan Air Base, located on Korea’s southwest coast in North Jeolla Province, provides the U.S. with rapid access to key theaters such as the Chinese mainland, the Taiwan Strait, and the West Sea maritime zone, making it a critical platform for US power projection into Northeast Asia. It now hosts the first U.S. F-16 “super squadrons,” with 31 aircraft deployed last year and additional squadrons joining this year. Infrastructure upgrades, including 20 reinforced hangars built in 2020 and another 18 more nearing completion, have prepared the base to accommodate F-35A strategic bombers as well.

While portrayed as “defensive”, the U.S. military posture in the Korean peninsula is unmistakably offensive, integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities, and rehearsing multi-domain operations spanning land, sea, air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains and extending across the Indo-Pacific to explicitly target China. The increased cadence of Multinational drills such as Talisman Sabre, Pacific Vanguard, and Freedom Edge deepen South Korea’s entanglement in U.S. strategic priorities at the expense of its own national interest. Properly understood, the offensive character of these U.S.-led military exercises is not incidental but foundational, providing a structural context that enabled and emboldened Yoon’s insurrection. Although the exercises are justified as “reinforced deterrence,” in practice they implement a permanent near‑war posture. The battlefield is being structured not around risk reduction and normalization of relations, but around the maintenance and even increase of heightened tensions.

Gravest Threat to South Korea: Servility Toward Washington

In contrast to Yoon, the Lee administration has taken modest but meaningful steps to de-escalate tensions, including suspending anti–North Korea leaflet launches and halting loudspeaker broadcasts along the heavily militarized border. Yet even these small gestures merely serve to expose the limits of South Korea’s sovereignty under the alliance structure. Washington has taken no parallel steps, as U.S.-led joint military exercises continue unabated, hamstringing any measures independently taken by Seoul and effectively constraining South Korea’s capacity to pursue an independent de-escalatory policy.

In fact, the precedent of provocation set under the Yoon administration has not only persisted but expanded, undermining South Korea’s efforts toward genuine de-escalation. Just two weeks after Lee’s inauguration, on June 18, 2025, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea conducted their first-ever joint military exercise near Jeju Island, while South Korean artillery drills near Hwacheon, situated only a few miles from the North Korean border, violated the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement, underscoring the persistence of provocative military posturing.

Moreover, General Xavier Brunson, Commander of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), has explicitly described South Korea as a forward platform for U.S. power projection and offensive operations against China and Russia, thus abandoning any pretense of pursuing deterrence or regional stability. Brunson has prioritized “cost imposition” against China and Russia by operationalizing the Korea–Japan–Philippines strategic triad, placing Seoul in the front line of potential conflict and highlighting the enduring challenge to South Korea’s sovereignty. In doing so, he has openly positioned South Korea as the central hub of U.S. forward military operations in Northeast Asia aimed at China and Russia. By enabling the USFK to impose military costs not only on North Korea but also on Russia’s Northern Fleet and China’s Northern Theater Command, South Korea itself becomes a primary target. 

Korea’s National Sovereignty Crisis Under the Trump Administration

Since Yoon’s removal from power, the Trump administration has imposed even harsher and more coercive encroachments on Korea’s national sovereignty, deepening the subordination of Korean decision-making to U.S. strategic imperatives. Trump’s newly released National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025 explicitly states that “allies” must bear the costs of the Indo-Pacific strategy “with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain”,  a U.S.-led strategic concept describing the line of western Pacific islands stretching from Japan and Okinawa through Taiwan and the northern Philippines. These nations are intended to serve as the U.S. front line of military containment against China.

This represents Washington’s renewed emphasis on systematically shifting the financial costs, operational burdens, and strategic risks of its Indo-Pacific and global defense commitments onto subordinate allies who are incapable of rejecting this structure. South Korea, deeply bound to the United States economically, militarily, and ideologically, has become a prime example of this subordination. Not only does the country shoulder the major financial responsibility for the U.S. forces it “hosts”—troops whose unrestricted operations on Korean soil have been guaranteed since the 1953 U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty–it is increasingly being entangled in a program of intensified regional militarization driven by Washington. 

Coupled with military pressure, economic coercion has also been systematically applied to undermine Seoul’s sovereignty. Through the imposition of a new trade arrangement that replaced the zero-tariff framework of the original KORUS FTA with a 15% tariff rate, Washington has compelled Seoul to commit to an estimated $350 billion investment (which amounts to nearly 19% of the country’s total GDP in 2024), including roughly $200 billion in cash commitments and $150 billion tied to U.S.-controlled assets, including shipbuilding and other strategic sectors. According to Trump’s Social post, South Korea has agreed to pay the U.S. $350 billion and additionally purchase large quantities of oil and gas, with investments by South Korean companies exceeding $600 billion. Trump’s tariff-driven trade deal has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on South Korea’s economy, exemplified by the current won‑weakening crisis.  By pressuring South Korea to put U.S. investment first—at the expense of its own economic stability—the deal shifted real financial risk onto Seoul. The result is not merely economic realignment but effective dispossession: Korea has ceded control over critical segments of its own economy and entrenched itself in a structurally subordinate position within a U.S.-led economic order.

Furthermore, South Korea’s 2026 defense budget has risen by 8.2 percent, representing the largest year-on-year increase since 2019 and driven largely by expanded procurement of U.S.-made arms. Seoul now finds itself compelled to purchase an estimated $25 billion in additional U.S. weapons systems, underscoring how Seoul’s defense policy is being reshaped under coercion and locking Korea into a U.S.-dominated military-industrial framework. Moreover, South Korea has committed an additional $33 billion to support USFK, on top of the expenses it already bears for hosting roughly 28,500 U.S. troops on its soil. Notably, South Korea covered 90% of the $10.8 billion cost of constructing Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. overseas base in the world.

Under the Trump administration, Seoul, as a key “burden-bearing” state within a U.S.-centered framework spanning defense, energy, and infrastructure, is being compelled to finance the construction of U.S. military installations, absorb strategic and frontline costs, fund U.S. security operations, increase defense spending to support U.S. forces, and purchase billions in American weapons. Recognizing these exactions, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby praised South Korea as the first non-NATO treaty ally to make such commitments, calling it a “model ally” for “stepping up” its defense spending.

Taken together, these measures reveal not a commitment to peace or regional stability but the deep entrenchment of a war-making posture: Korea’s sovereignty has been subordinated to Washington’s strategic agenda, forcing the country to finance the occupation of its own territory while bearing the material, political, and front-line risks of U.S. militarism in the Indo-Pacific.

Inter-Korean Reconciliation Blocked by Washington

Amid mounting economic and military pressure, Washington not only continues to veto even modest Korean efforts to foster inter-Korean rapprochement but also preempts any attempt to formulate independent policies based on the principle of self-determination.

On December 3, for the first time since his inauguration, President Lee publicly mentioned the possibility of suspending or reducing U.S.-ROK joint military exercises. To bolster his argument, Lee recalled President Trump’s 2018 statement: “I think it’s very provocative…  We will be stopping the war games… which will save us a tremendous amount of money.” Indeed, a U.S. Army budget analysis later confirmed that canceling certain exercises in 2018 had saved the U.S. an estimated $14 million. Lee then argued for dialogue and rapprochement as a means of reducing or postponing the exercises once “a peace regime between the North and the South is firmly established”

However, USFK Command promptly rejected the prospect of suspending or reducing the exercises, asserting de facto control over Korea’s military decisions. General Brunson retorted: “Whenever someone talks about—I don’t care who it is—talks about exercising less or exercising differently, they need to understand that there are two times in a year where we absolutely need some support.” Brunson also made clear Washington’s rejection of another central pillar of President Lee’s agenda: the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea within Lee’s presidential term.

Veteran American journalist Tim Shorrock, who has covered Korea for more than two decades, summed up the implications succinctly: “Sovereignty much? … South Korea’s de facto leader is a U.S. four-star general, Xavier Brunson, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.”

In spite of an approval rating above 60 percent, based largely on public pledges to safeguard Korea’s national sovereignty, Lee remains unable to fully exercise Korea’s sovereignty on the most important national security matters. War, peace, and sovereignty on the Korean Peninsula is being decided by Washington, while the Korean ambition for sovereignty has been pushed aside and Korea itself reduced to a sidekick in the U.S. Indo Pacific strategy, forced to pay for the U.S. military assets stationed on its soil.

Asserting Sovereignty in a World Shaped by Washington’s Militarism

While the broader pitfalls of the U.S.–ROK alliance remain largely unchallenged, grassroots movements within Korea, together with the Korean diaspora in the U.S., continue to assert the right to self-determination and demand an end to Korea’s structural dependence on U.S. forces. In the U.S., Korean American activists, scholars, and peace advocates, along with independent research and educational organizations such as the Korea Policy Institute have been at the forefront of the struggle for Korea to reclaim its sovereignty. At the same time, domestic pro-democracy organizations within Korea such as the weekly Korean Citizens’ Candlelight Rally and Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), whose protests were instrumental to removing Yoon from power, have remained active, renewing their focus on social reform, national sovereignty, and liberation.

Viewed through the lens of U.S. militarism and Korea’s eroded sovereignty, the following takeaways highlight both the significance of the Revolution of Light and the paradox of Korea’s sovereignty crisis under Washington’s persistent pressure.

First, Korea’s revolution of light exposed the enduring imperial dynamics shaping Korean politics and the geopolitical constraints imposed by Washington’s revived Cold War posture. In this context, the movement underscored the profound moral contradictions at the heart of a U.S. foreign policy that claims to defend democracy while simultaneously enabling authoritarianism in its client states. It also illuminated the deep contradictions at the core of Washington’s hegemonic ambitions that continue to erode Korea’s sovereignty.

Second, the revolution of light effectively united millions of Koreans around a shared demand to reclaim democracy not only from domestic authoritarians but also from imperial domination. It revealed a truth rarely acknowledged by mainstream analysts: the fragility of U.S. unipolar power when confronted with a morally grounded and highly organized popular resistance. Standing as a testament to the resilience of Korea’s grassroots democracy, it demonstrated that any U.S. policy in Korea that dismisses or sidelines the democratic will of the Korean people is ultimately unsustainable.

A year ago, Koreans rose not only against illegal martial law and an attempted insurrection but also implicitly against a hegemonic U.S. framework that empowered an autocratic president whose ambitions nearly sparked war. To challenge Yoon and martial law was to resist U.S. hegemonic power within a deeply militarized client state under occupation, a reality that most mainstream analysts and media either ignore or deliberately obscure. Korea has already proven it can resist authoritarianism peacefully. The question now is whether it can assert genuine sovereignty in a world order dominated by U.S. militarism.

How South Korea’s Billions Will Upgrade Trump’s War Machine

By Dae-Han Song

January 14, 2026

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Money to Weapons by Cam Cotrill

In a flagrant disregard for international law and national sovereignty, the Trump administration invaded and kidnapped Venezuela’s President Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. Rather than being an isolated event, the increasing bravado of and remarks from President Donald Trump open the terrifying possibility that, if not opposed, Trump’s war machine will proliferate its aggressions, with next possible targets being Cuba, Mexico, and Colombia or Greenland. US hyperimperialism is dividing and unraveling the world at a time when we should be coming together to address our most existential crises. 

Key in this strategy for military domination are ‘AI, quantum computing, and autonomous systems, plus the energy necessary to fuel’ them. South Korea’s pledge of $350 billion dollars in factories, manufacturing know-how, and technology in these sectors will strengthen Trump’s war machine. Opposing this memorandum of understanding is one front in resisting the Trump administration’s hyper-imperialism. 

Robbing the Mouse

Since his ““Liberation Day””, Trump’s tariff war has extorted pledges for trillions of dollars from the rest of the world, accusing it of taking advantage of the US and creating the US trade deficit. This narrative conveniently ignores the ultra-rich in the US whose trillion dollar companies were built on these global supply chains. More specifically, over 70 percent of the US S&P 500 companies rely on global supply chains (as noted by COVID 19’s impact on them). Most spectacularly, Apple grew into a $3.8 trillion company by selling products manufactured by the rest of the world. If it were a country, Apple would be the 7th largest. Amazon grew into a $2.6 trillion company (greater than Italy’s GDP, the 8th globally) by trading mostly (71 percent) goods manufactured in China. If countries, nonetheless, developed and industrialized by producing US goods, they did so despite earning pennies on the dollar. For instance, China earned 2 pennies for every dollar from the sale of an iPhone; Apple earned over 50 cents. The bulk of the US trade balance went not into the coffers of countries around the world but into those of the ultra-rich in the US, who took the lion’s share of the wealth. Now, Trump is gunning for the mouse’s share.

Much has been made of the fact that the EU’s $600 billion investment pledge lacks enforceability, with most investment happening on its own through the markets. Yet, the enforcement mechanism for Japan and South Korea’s investment pledges of $550 billion (42 percent of Japan’s foreign reserves) and $350 billion (83 percent of South Korea’s foreign reserves) is far more direct and brutal. Both countries must invest in Trump’s projects or risk reciprocal tariffs. More specifically, the Trump administration will propose investments in strategic sectors. If they refuse, Trump can simply impose the reciprocal tariffs and, despite South Korea’s bragging that it has gotten a better deal than Japan (through assurances that the US would consider the destabilizing effects of investments and would limit investments to $20 billion a year), it still has the same unequal profit sharing scheme: South Korean and Japanese investors would bring all their capital and manufacturing know-how into a project, but contrary to the principles of the market, they would still hand over 50 percent and, once the investment is recovered, 90 percent of the project’s profits to the US. In effect, the US gets 50 percent and then 90 percent of profits without putting a penny of its own money. Furthermore, it’s not yet clear what impact the funneling out of such massive investments from South Korea and Japan will have on their people. By building factories for and training future competitors, it’s hard not to rule out a hollowing out of each country’s industrial base and a dulling of their competitive advantages. 

Upgrading the War Machine

Worst of all, these investments do not build a world centered on the needs and interests of people in the United States or of the world nor make the world safer or more sustainable. On the contrary, they help Trump preserve and advance ‘cutting-edge military use technology and dual-use technology’ to intimidate, bully, and invade other countries. More specifically, South Korea will be investing $150 billion to expand the US capacity (which is suffering from backlogged orders) to build warships and potentially nuclear powered submarines. Additionally, South Korea will invest up to $20 billion a year for 10 years on sectors Trump’s National Security Strategy has identified as deciding ‘the future of military power.’ Semiconductor factories would create the chips for the data centers that will allow the US to dominate AI, which is becoming central to waging war. To power these electricity-hungry data centers, South Korea will provide the nuclear power plants. Finally, South Korea will be providing smelting technology and know-how for refining critical minerals for defense.

Not Set in Stone

While Trump has managed to extract many concessions through his tariff war, the memorandum of understandings (MOUs) that are reached are not set in stone. Not only are the legality of Trump’s tariffs (the extortion mechanism) being deliberated upon by the Supreme Court, the MOUs are not legally binding. In other words, their enforceability will be determined by a struggle between Trump’s tariff pressure and a government—and more importantly, its people’s—willingness to resist Trump’s extortion and war machine. 

South Korean progressive political parties and civil society created the Organizing Committee of the International People’s Action Against Trump’s 1st Year Anniversary to resist Trump’s aggressions. Jeong-eun Hwang of the Organizing Committee explains, ‘The US doesn’t need more submarines, warships, and AI to get better at intimidating, bullying, and destroying the world. Opposing South Korea’s $350 billion investment offers one specific way to resist Trump.’ 

This article was produced by Globetrotter. Dae-Han Song is a part of the International Strategy Center and the No Cold War collective and is an associate at the Korea Policy Institute.Email