Rebranding French Imperialism

Although the Africa Forward Summit in Kenya was framed as a partnership, it was actually France desperately looking for a new door into a continent that wants to throw it out.

By Okakah Onyango

June 21, 2026

Source: Africa As A Country

State Dinner hosted by President William Ruto of Kenya and First Lady Rachel Ruto during the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi, 11 May 2026. Source: Paul Kagame/Flickr.

More than seven decades after the Fifth Pan-African Congress demanded the complete liberation of Africa from colonial domination, the continent still finds itself trapped in the structures of dependency. The resolutions of the historic 1945 Congress in Manchester were clear: African nations deserved full political and economic independence, the removal of foreign domination, and the right of the African people to determine their own future. Yet in 2026, many African leaders continue opening the gates of the continent to the same imperial powers that colonized, exploited, and brutalized our people.

The recently concluded Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi, co-hosted by Kenyan President William Ruto and French President Emmanuel Macron, became a symbol of this contradiction. Presented as a partnership of equals, the summit sought to rebrand France’s relationship with Africa at a time when Paris is rapidly losing influence across the continent.

The summit brought together over 30 African leaders and resulted in announcements of approximately €23 billion in investment pledges, targeting sectors such as energy, agriculture, and artificial intelligence. But beneath the language of co-investment, mutual respect, and win-win lies the enduring reality of imperialism.

France did not arrive in Nairobi merely out of friendship for Africa. The summit came at a moment when French influence has sharply declined in West Africa. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have expelled French troops and challenged decades of French military and economic control. And France has been forced to withdraw military forces from several former colonies amid growing anti-French sentiment and popular uprisings.

This explains why the Nairobi summit was politically significant for France: it was the first major France-Africa summit hosted in an Anglophone African country. Kenya became the bridge through which France hopes to regain strategic influence in East and Central Africa, after facing resistance in the Sahel.

The question remains: why was President Ruto willing to host such a summit at this particular moment? The answer lies in the class character of the Kenyan state. The current administration has consistently aligned itself with Western powers, presenting Kenya as a reliable regional partner for foreign capital, military cooperation, and geopolitical interests. By hosting Macron, Ruto positioned Kenya as a strategic gateway for France’s renewed engagement with Africa while simultaneously strengthening his government’s standing among Western allies. Far from representing an independent African development agenda, the summit reflected the tendency of comprador elites to seek legitimacy and support from imperial centers of power, rather than from the citizens of their own countries.

Kenyan authorities framed the summit as an opportunity for economic growth and foreign investment. Yet the deeper question is: growth for whom, and under whose control?

Macron described the initiative as a partnership of equals. But equality cannot exist between economies structured in fundamentally unequal ways. The relationship between France and Africa has historically been shaped not by equality but by extraction. According to France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, over 1,000 French subsidiaries operate in Africa and over 140 in Kenya alone. Major corporations such as TotalEnergies, Orange, Carrefour, CMA CGM, and Bolloré maintain extensive commercial interests in energy, telecommunications, logistics, retail, and infrastructure. While this is presented as development and partnership, the profits extracted from African labor and resources overwhelmingly benefit foreign capital.

French influence in Africa has never been exercised solely through military and economic means. Cultural diplomacy has long formed part of France’s strategy for maintaining influence abroad. Through language institutions, educational exchanges, media partnerships, cultural centers, and development programs, France projects what is often described as “soft power.” Critics argue that such initiatives also serve broader political and economic objectives by cultivating favorable elites, shaping public discourse, and reinforcing France’s long-term strategic interests. The Africa Forward concert, Macron’s cooking with influencers, and other PR activities during his visit to Kenya all evidence this.

This is why Macron’s attempt to present himself as a “Pan-Africanist” during the summit was met with skepticism among activists and progressive forces. Pan-Africanism is not a branding exercise. It is a revolutionary struggle for African unity, sovereignty, and liberation from imperial domination.

Even the summit declaration itself reflected the language of dependency politics. Discussions focused heavily on debt restructuring, private investment, credit reform, and security cooperation—issues that often operate within financial systems dominated by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.

The security dimension of the summit also raised concern among activists. Kenya and France have strengthened military cooperation in recent years, with critics arguing that the recently signed military pact increasingly compromises national sovereignty. Social movements have drawn parallels between new defense arrangements and earlier military agreements involving British troops at the British Army Training Unit in Kenya (BATUK). Particularly controversial are the defense cooperation arrangements that grant significant legal protections to foreign military personnel operating in Kenya—limiting the ability of Kenyan institutions to hold foreign troops fully accountable under local law.

At the same time, France continues presenting itself as a “stabilizing force” in Africa, despite widespread criticism of its military role in the Sahel. Many people across West Africa increasingly associate foreign military interventions with instability rather than liberation.

These contradictions became more visible during protests organized by activists and members of social justice movements in Nairobi during the summit. Protesters denounced French imperialism, foreign domination, debt dependency, and military expansion. Reports from activists indicated that demonstrators were met with police violence, including tear gas, arrests, and arbitrary detention.

The summit therefore exposed two Africas existing side by side. One Africa sits inside conference halls discussing investment frameworks with multinational corporations and foreign powers. The other Africa exists in the streets, among unemployed youth, struggling workers, peasants, students, and communities facing rising costs of living.

Only a week after the summit, Kenya witnessed protests linked to the high cost of living and fuel prices. Across major towns and cities, sections of the population expressed frustration with worsening economic conditions. These demonstrations reflected deeper class contradictions inside Kenya’s capitalist economy.

Recent developments in the Alliance of Sahel States demonstrate that sections of Africa are once again questioning foreign military domination and asserting greater sovereignty. While contradictions and challenges remain within those states, their rejection of permanent foreign military influence has inspired anti-imperialist discussions across the continent.

Ultimately, the task before progressive African forces is not simply to criticize summits such as Africa Forward. The deeper challenge is building organized political alternatives rooted in workers, youth, peasants, women, and oppressed communities. Africa’s liberation will not emerge from elite conferences hosted in luxury halls or from dependency disguised as partnership. It will come through revolutionary political organization, Pan-African solidarity, and the collective struggle of African people against imperialism, capitalism, and comprador elites who profit from foreign domination.

The future of the continent cannot be determined in Paris, Washington, London, or the boardrooms of multinational corporations. It must be determined by the organized masses of Africa themselves. The task of this generation is clear: to learn from the failures of false independence, reject dependency, and continue the unfinished struggle for a united and sovereign continent.

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This article was originally published by Africa As A Country; please consider supporting the original publication, and read the original version at the link above.

Major Nigeria police reform edges forward with senate approval

Abuja (AFP) – The Nigerian Senate on Wednesday approved a bill to allow states to create their own police forces, following lower chamber passage earlier this month of what could be a potentially sweeping security reform.


Issued on: 24/06/2026 - RFI

President Bola Tinubu (R) has supported efforts to create state-led police forces in Nigeria © Light Oriye Tamunotonye / AFP

Critics of the highly centralised federal police force say it has been unable to tackle the country's myriad conflicts -- concerns brought back into the spotlight recently after a mass school abduction in the typically safer southwest.

But experts warn that putting Nigeria's 36 states in control of their own police could embolden the country's powerful governors in a nation where politics is already often violent.

The version of the reform passed by the Senate will likely need to be harmonised with that passed by the House of Representatives two weeks ago. As a constitutional amendment, it will also require approval by two-thirds of Nigeria's state-level houses of assembly.

President Bola Tinubu has backed the reform as insecurity roils Nigeria ahead of January elections in which he is seeking a second term.

Nigeria's police and military have long been overstretched: across its north, Africa's most populous country is fighting a long-running jihadist insurgency, complicated by inroads made by militants from the Sahel, and non-ideological "bandit" gangs.

The centre of the country is the scene of farmer-herder violence, while the southeast is home to a low-level separatist conflict.
Police to 'fill gaps'

Supporters of the reform say it would create nimble police forces that are more easily held accountable and staffed by locals who know the terrain.

For years already, states have backed locally recruited militias to plug gaps left by the military and police.

State police "would help fill the yawning gaps in extant policing framework," Femi Mimiko, a political science professor at Obafemi Awolowo University, told AFP.

But Usman Ibrahim, director of security programmes at SARI Global, a risk consultancy, warned that complex economic and political factors beyond a simple lack of security have sustained armed groups in Nigeria.

"Is it something that state police can solve?" he asked.

There are also fears governors will deploy state police to intimidate opposition parties, interfere with elections and harass critics, said Dengiyefa Angalapu, a research analyst at the non-profit Centre for Democracy and Development.

Already, the federal police are routinely accused of interfering in politics on behalf of the national government, he noted.

As the reform gathers steam, it remains unclear how state and federal police would settle disputes over jurisdiction -- and whether the creation of yet another security organ would actually make a difference.

Despite Tinubu's inauguration of Nigeria's Forest Guards service, for example, kidnappings have continued unabated across the country -- with some 900 incidents recorded this year, according to conflict tracker ACLED.

© 2026 AFP

Over a billion children exposed to three or more climate hazards UN report shows

More than one billion children face at least three overlapping climate hazards, the UN childrens' agency Unicef has warned, while highlighting the disproportionate impact in some regions of the world.


Issued on: 16/06/2026 - RFI

Children displaced by floods play in a relief camp, in Jaffarabad, a district in the southwestern Baluchistan province, Pakistan, 2022. © Zahid Hussain / AP



For the report, the UN agency cross-referenced data showing where the roughly 2.4 billion children on the planet live with the geographic distribution of the eight most common climate impacts. They are coastal flooding, river flooding, drought, tropical storms, heat waves – at least three days above a high temperature threshold, which varies by country – extreme heat, wildfires and sandstorms.

The report primarily focuses on the 1.1 billion children who are exposed to at least three risks, with the most common combination being drought, extreme heat (above 35 degrees Celsius) and heat waves.

That combination affects some 296 million children, including 74 million in Nigeria, 34 million in Pakistan and 32 million in India.

The number of children in this three-or-more category has increased sharply over the past 20 years.

Children are 'first victims' of climate change, French rights watchdog warns

Almost all children – some 2.3 billion – are exposed to at least one risk. Two billion are exposed to at least two, while 364 million face at least four.

Of the 123,000 children exposed to seven or more climate hazards, some 46,000 are in Myanmar.

"Children are at the forefront of the impact of climate change," said Unicef chief Catherine Russell.

As for the worst place for a child, "there isn't a super short answer," one of the report authors, Tom Slaymaker, told AFP.

"But they're not all equal," Slaymaker said. "We do see some hot spots... it's really concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia."
Chad's children at risk

Countries with large populations of children – including Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Pakistan – are at the top of the list for the number of children exposed to at least three hazards.

But in sheer percentage terms, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa – particularly the Sahel – have the largest proportion of children affected by hazards. The impacts are often exacerbated by governments' inability to cope with climate hazards.

Chad, for example, faces a humanitarian crisis with limited access to water, electricity and food. According to the report, more than 95 percent of kids in the country are exposed to at least three hazards – one of the highest proportions in the world.

'A vicious cycle that exhausts bodies and minds': the human cost of climate change

Other particularly vulnerable countries include 39 island states that face challenges such as limited freshwater, import dependence, and inability to easily shelter elsewhere after a disaster such as a hurricane.

No country is truly spared, the report shows.

"In many countries, there will be small pockets of the population which are not exposed to these hazards," Slaymaker said. "They tend to be in the northern hemisphere, particularly so, parts of Scandinavia."

But that is because the report looks only at the eight most common risks worldwide, he stressed, noting that children in those countries may face other threats not covered in the report, such as melting glaciers or thawing permafrost.

(with AFP)

Illicit gold networks fuelling conflict, organised crime across Africa and global south, GI-TOC warns

The GI-TOC’s global risk assessment of illicit gold influence / GI-TOCFacebook

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By Brian Kenety June 11, 2026

Gold is increasingly being weaponised by states, criminal networks and sanctioned regimes as a strategic financial tool, while regulatory systems are failing to keep pace with rapidly evolving illicit supply chains, according to a new report from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC).

The report, Commodity, Currency, Crime: How Illicit Gold Markets are Outpacing Global Responses, argues that illicit gold has become one of the world's most consequential criminal markets, acting as a financial backbone for organised crime, sanctions evasion, conflict financing and corruption. The authors contend that criminal actors increasingly control entire gold supply chains, from extraction and processing to logistics and trade, making illicit flows harder to detect and disrupt.

Released in Geneva on June 9, the 72-page report comes amid record central bank gold purchases and a sharp rally in bullion prices. According to data cited by GI-TOC, gold prices have risen nearly 587% over the past two decades, reaching record highs as investors and governments seek protection from geopolitical uncertainty and currency volatility.

Africa accounts for a significant share of global gold production, with major producers including Ghana, South Africa, Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Tanzania and the DRC. The report argues that the continent's combination of extensive mineral resources, weak governance in some jurisdictions and expanding informal mining sectors has made it particularly vulnerable to illicit gold flows.

The organisation warns that gold is increasingly being used as an instrument of "geocriminality" — the deployment of illicit financial networks by states to achieve geopolitical objectives. Russia, Iran, Venezuela and Sudan are identified as examples of countries that have used gold to circumvent sanctions, access hard currency and sustain governments that might otherwise face financial isolation.

“However, in practice, it can be difficult to differentiate between policy, selective enforcement of regulations and laws, and geocriminality. For example, although Chinese private sector entities have been implicated in the expansion of illicit gold mining in Ghana, Beijing has repeatedly denied involvement or support for illicit operations. In June 2025, the Chinese ambassador to Ghana asserted that it was a ‘significant injustice’ to blame Beijing for the spread of illegal gold mining,” the report says.

Ghana, Africa's leading gold producer in recent years, has struggled with illegal small-scale mining, known locally as galamsey. The issue has become a major political and environmental concern because of its impact on rivers, forests and agricultural land, while authorities have repeatedly linked parts of the sector to foreign-backed illicit mining operations.

GI-TOC said Russia has systematically expanded its use of gold following its invasion of Ukraine, including through military-linked networks operating across Africa. The report notes that Russian-linked entities, including Wagner Group and Russian military-linked structures including Africa Corps, have secured access to gold resources in countries such as Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic.

Criminal networks industrialise illicit mining

The study argues that conventional approaches to tackling illicit gold remain too narrowly focused on artisanal and small-scale mining. Instead, the report identifies systemic vulnerabilities throughout the entire gold ecosystem, including industrial-scale illegal mining operations, opaque refining networks, under-regulated commodity markets, recycled gold channels and emerging cryptocurrency-linked gold transactions.

“Illicit gold operations also drive demand for other illicit markets. In South Africa, for example, the same syndicates that control illegal mining operations are linked to human trafficking, with miners recruited under false pretences or coerced into working in lethal conditions, as the 2024 Stilfontein mine standoff revealed,” the report states.

“The syndicates are also connected to arms trafficking and Lesotho organized crime groups with political links. A secondary informal economy has emerged around the mines, with syndicates supplying food, liquor, drugs and sex workers to underground operations, compounding the human exploitation. Consequently, illegal gold mining in South Africa anchors an entire criminal ecosystem.”

The organisation also highlighted the growing industrialisation of illegal mining operations across Africa, Latin America and Asia. Foreign financing, weak governance and regulatory capture have transformed many illicit mining activities into large-scale enterprises that bear little resemblance to traditional artisanal mining. Criminal groups are increasingly controlling processing facilities, logistics networks and other strategic bottlenecks across supply chains.

A major concern identified by the report is the lack of transparency across global bullion markets. GI-TOC described international bullion centres such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China and the United States as significant blind spots because they handle large volumes of global gold trade while maintaining limited transparency over bullion activities and gold provenance.

The report further argues that central banks are among the least scrutinised participants in the gold market despite record levels of purchasing. Domestic buying programmes in some producing countries risk absorbing illegally mined gold, while gold swaps and reserve accumulation programmes can introduce additional provenance concerns.

GI-TOC warned that illicit gold should not be viewed as a niche commodity crime but rather as an accelerant economy that amplifies broader criminal activity. The proceeds from illicit gold mining and trading are linked to environmental destruction, deforestation, mercury pollution, wildlife trafficking, illicit cattle ranching, arms purchases, conflict financing and human rights abuses.

“Links between gold and conflict have been well documented and are the focus of a multitude of regulatory instruments. While gold can be an important source of revenue for armed groups, a focus on conflict financing and restrictive application of terms such as ‘conflict mineral’ often produces a narrow view centred on non-state armed group revenues,” the report says.

“This obscures understanding of the broader political economy of gold and the state and other actors embedded within it, while overlooking the root causes of conflict and the more nuanced roles gold plays in conflict. For example, efforts to cut off conflict financing can have the effect of building the legitimacy of non-state armed groups among local populations. Securing livelihoods and other forms of service delivery has long been a tactic of organized crime groups to undermine state legitimacy while building their own.

“Such is the case in West Africa, where ASGM is a major economic driver and a critical source of livelihoods. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the most powerful violent extremist organization in the Sahel, primarily profits from gold through taxation of mining sites and transport routes, and has engaged in gold-for-weapons barter exchanges. By defending miners’ access to sites against state crackdowns, JNIM also builds legitimacy with local populations. Heavy-handed state security responses, including the targeting of mine sites, have compounded the security challenge.”

GI-TOC is calling for a fundamental overhaul of the international response, including mandatory supply-chain due diligence, stronger anti-money laundering oversight, enhanced scrutiny of international bullion centres, improved customs and trade data collection, and legally binding global standards governing gold supply chains. Existing voluntary frameworks, it argued, have proven insufficient to address increasingly sophisticated criminal activity.

"The gold market can become more resilient to crime, but only if the actors with the greatest systemic influence accept that their economic interests are better served by a more transparent, rules-based market than by the opacity that currently prevails," GI-TOC senior expert Sophia Pickles said.

Africa emerges as a frontline of illicit gold flows

Zimbabwe is emerging as an increasingly important node in Africa’s illicit gold economy, where organised crime, arms trafficking, insurgent financing and cross-border smuggling are becoming deeply interconnected, according to GI-TOC.

The report argues that illicit gold has evolved into a strategic source of financing for organised crime, armed groups and corrupt political networks. It warns that gold is no longer merely a commodity but increasingly functions as "a weapon of war and geopolitics", financing conflict, sanctions evasion and transnational criminal activity across multiple continents.

The study places several other African countries among the world's highest-risk jurisdictions for illicit gold influence, including Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, South Africa and the DRC. According to GI-TOC's new risk framework, these countries combine substantial gold production with elevated levels of organised criminal activity linked to natural resources.

The report finds that criminal convergence around gold is accelerating across Africa. Gold trafficking increasingly intersects with arms smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, financial crime and corruption, involving not only criminal syndicates but also politically connected actors and private-sector facilitators.

"Criminal convergence is increasingly a central feature of organized crime operations in gold-rich regions," the report states.

For southern Africa, the findings are particularly relevant to Zimbabwe. The report identifies the country as part of a regional network of illicit gold flows that stretches from South Africa through Zimbabwe and onward to international trading hubs. Zimbabwe is identified by the report's risk-assessment framework as a jurisdiction facing elevated exposure to illicit gold-market influence despite comparatively modest officially recorded gold trade volumes, reflecting concerns that significant illicit flows may be escaping official statistics.

The report argues that African conflicts are increasingly shaped by competition over gold resources. In the Sahel, militant organisations such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province have expanded their influence over mining regions, taxing production, controlling transport corridors and using gold revenues to finance military operations.

"Gold plays a critical role in armed groups' efforts to build legitimacy, exemplified in West Africa," the report notes, adding that foreign actors are increasingly influencing African conflicts through financing arrangements and gold sourcing networks.

The report also links African gold markets to broader geopolitical competition, arguing that states are increasingly using illicit commercial networks to pursue strategic objectives. Russia's activities in Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic receive particular attention. The report notes that Russian-linked entities have secured privileged access to gold resources in exchange for security support and military assistance.

Sudan is cited as one of the clearest examples of gold's strategic role in modern conflicts. According to the report, both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have benefited from external backing linked to gold revenues, while international actors have sought access to Sudanese gold through refining, trading and investment arrangements.

Dubai and regional hubs under scrutiny

The study also identifies Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Cameroon and Egypt as important transit or laundering hubs where gold originating in conflict zones can enter formal international supply chains with limited scrutiny. Rwanda receives particular attention because official export volumes have significantly exceeded estimated domestic production in recent years, raising questions about the origin of some exports.

Dubai remains the dominant destination for much of Africa's artisanal and small-scale gold output. The report notes that the UAE continues to receive substantial volumes of African gold, including material linked to conflict zones and illicit supply chains. Despite regulatory reforms introduced in 2023, GI-TOC argues that implementation gaps remain significant.

Global oversight struggles to keep pace

One of the report's central conclusions is that current international responses remain inadequate because they focus too narrowly on artisanal mining and conflict minerals. Instead, the organisation argues that illicit gold now permeates the entire ecosystem, from extraction and processing to international bullion trading, financial markets and even central-bank purchasing programmes.

"The systemic vulnerabilities that enable its circulation span physical and financial supply chains," the authors write.

The report warns that foreign financing is driving the industrialisation of illicit mining operations across Africa, allowing criminal groups to control processing plants, logistics networks and export channels.

"Criminal mining operations are increasingly industrialized and growing in scale," GI-TOC states, adding that foreign investment is a key driver of this trend across Africa, Latin America and Asia.

The GI-TOC identifies four distinct clusters of risk:

■ High-production, high-criminality producer countries. Russia, China, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, Mexico, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa, Venezuela and the DRC produce substantial volumes of gold under conditions of significant criminal influence. Several other countries are closely clustered in this group, reflecting the visibility and reach of non-renewable criminal influence in gold-producing states.

■ High-import, high-criminality hubs. The UAE, Switzerland, China, Hong Kong SAR, Turkey and India sit at the top centre of the chart, where large refining and trading volumes meet high resource crime exposure.

■ High-impact destination markets with moderate criminal influence. The UK, the US and Singapore sit further to the right of the chart, lower on the criminal influence axis but with import volumes large enough that any illicit gold entering these markets has outsized downstream consequences. Countries on the fringe can also play a key role as transit or laundering hubs. For example, Armenia was reported to be key to Russian sanctions evasion, importing billions of dollars’ worth of Russian gold in 2023 and 2024.

■ High-criminality jurisdictions with low recorded flows. The scoring also accounts for countries where highly organised crime scores coincide with low recorded gold production and import volumes. The absence of recorded volumes is not evidence of low risk but its opposite: criminality is extensive enough for substantial illicit flows to escape official statistics; for example, known gold producers and transit hubs Myanmar, South Sudan, Rwanda, Chad and Cameroon.

GI-TOC concludes that Africa sits at the centre of a rapidly evolving global gold economy in which criminal organisations, insurgent groups, foreign governments and international traders increasingly intersect. Without stronger transparency requirements, more rigorous due diligence and tighter oversight of global bullion centres, the organisation warns that illicit gold markets will continue to outpace enforcement efforts and undermine efforts to improve transparency across global commodity supply chains.

Is US Influence In Africa At A Crossroads? – Analysis

June 10, 2026 
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Charles A. Ray

(FPRI) — The United States enters the second half of the 2020s facing a fundamental question in Africa: Is Washington still seen as a strategic partner of choice, or is it becoming a transactional power whose engagement is seen as narrow, punitive, and unpredictable? This is no longer a theoretical question. It is now being tested in southern Africa, West Africa, the Sahel, and in the mineral-rich heart of the African continent.

Strained US-South African relations, friction with Nigeria over claims of religious persecution, renewed efforts to regain some counterterrorism footing in the Sahel, and the controversies around third-country deportation deals and minerals diplomacy all point to a larger issue. While the United States is not pulling away from Africa altogether, it is redefining its presence in ways that could either sharpen its influence or erode it.

For decades, American influence in Africa has been based on a mix of security cooperation, development assistance, diplomatic engagement, and support for good governance and public health. Such support was never without contradictions, but it did give Washington a broader identity than that of a purely extractive or coercive actor. Currently, the pattern of US engagement looks different. It is more selective, more openly associated with immediate political priorities, and much more willing to link diplomatic engagement to issues such as migration control, ideological signaling, or commercial access to strategic minerals. On a continent where governments already have alternatives to China or Russia, such as the Gulf states, Turkey, India, and the European Union, this shift matters. African leaders are increasingly able to hedge, diversify, and resist external pressure. If the United States appears to them to be mainly interested in punitive actions, one-off deals, or symbolic confrontations, it risks losing not just goodwill but also long-term leverage.

South Africa: From Strategic Disagreement to Diplomatic Rupture

The most visible and significant deterioration has been in US relations with South Africa. President Donald Trump’s move to disinvite South Africa from the 2026 G20 Summit in Miami followed an already dramatic breakdown, in which US officials boycotted the South African-hosted Johannesburg summit. In addition, the Trump administration escalated claims that white Afrikaners were being persecuted or subjected to “genocide,” allegations that South African officials, and even groups representing Afrikaners, have strongly rejected. Despite no substantiation of the claims, the US administration prioritized refugee admissions for white South Africans even as refugee access was curtailed for many other groups. Whether these steps are viewed as moral positioning or domestic political theater, the effect is the same in Africa: The United States looks willing to rupture ties with one of the continent’s most important powers on the basis of a narrative that many Africans see as ideologically loaded and factually questionable.


Feelings like this matter because South Africa is not just another bilateral partner. It is a leading voice in the African Union, Africa’s largest economy, a member of numerous multilateral organizations, and a country whose positions often shape broader African perceptions. A rupture with Pretoria, therefore, has an impact beyond trade or bilateral diplomatic relations. It signals to other African governments that Washington might be prepared to downgrade relations with an influential African nation not over conventional disputes such as sanctions, military alignment, or treaty obligations, but over a polarizing culture war issue. Many are likely to read this less as principled diplomacy than as evidence that domestic American policies can redefine foreign policy priorities toward the continent.

This could have significant consequences. In the first place, the dispute with South Africa weakens US credibility as a defender of multilateralism at a time when African governments are skeptical of Western selectivity. Secondly, it risks pushing South Africa to deepen cooperation with other powers, including China and Russia, not necessarily out of ideological agreement but as a hedge against US hostility and unreliability. Thirdly, it might reinforce a broader continental impression that the United States is comfortable engaging African countries only when they align with US domestic priorities. Even those governments that disagree with South Africa on some issues might still resent what they see as public humiliation of an African power at the first African-hosted G20 Summit.


In diplomacy, symbolism is important, and it can be costly for the United States.
Nigeria: An Ideological Cloud Over Security Cooperation

While South Africa is an example of an increasing diplomatic rupture, Nigeria is a more complicated situation. It is an illustration of deep strategic importance combined with rising political distrust. Nigeria is central to any serious American engagement in West Africa. With over 240 million people, it is the most populous country in Africa; it is one of its largest economies; it is a major security player in the Lake Chad Basin; and it is a critical player in regional diplomacy. But US-Nigerian relations are strained because the Trump administration has redesignated it as a Country of Particular Concern, based on what the US government describes as mass-scale persecution of Christians, and the increasingly heated rhetoric from Washington that frames violence in Nigeria primarily through the lens of Christian persecution. While this framing resonates strongly with segments of the American right’s political base, in Nigeria it is viewed by many as incomplete, politicized, and dangerously provocative.


Violence in Nigeria is real and serious, and Christian communities have suffered grievously in parts of the country. But Nigerian officials credibly argue that the violence also involves jihadist insurgency, banditry, communal conflict, weak policing, and governance failures rather than a single, state-directed campaign of religious persecution. In a country whose population is almost evenly split between Christians, who live in the south, and Muslims, mostly in the north, where attacks have been concentrated, and where the religion of victims is not often reported—or relevant—it is impossible to conclusively attribute religious persecution as a motive. When Washington ignores these distinctions, it risks alienating Abuja and oversimplifying a crisis that requires careful analysis and cooperation rather than mere denunciation. Washington’s calls for aid conditionality, sanctions, visa restrictions, and pressure against sharia and blasphemy laws might appeal to some audiences in the United States, but they risk making Nigerian leaders more defensive and less willing to coordinate closely with the United States on security matters.

Neither side, though, can afford a complete breakdown of the relationship. The United States needs Nigeria’s cooperation on intelligence, regional stabilization, energy, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, and counterterrorism activities in the Lake Chad corridor. Nigeria, on the other hand, benefits greatly from US training, intelligence, diplomatic support, and economic ties. For this reason, outright rupture of the relationship is not the main risk. What is more probable is a more corrosive relationship, one that remains functionally intact, but that is less trusting, less open, and more transactional. If the United States is seen as lecturing Nigeria from a narrow ideological frame while simultaneously asking for deeper security cooperation, its leverage will be weaker. Abuja might continue to work with the United States where interests overlap, but it might also diversify its partnership and resist American pressure more openly and directly.

The Sahel: Counterterrorism Cooperation Returns, But With Tighter Constraints

The Sahel is another stress test of US influence in Africa. After the loss of key access points, particularly in Niger, where Washington had a drone base, the United States has been looking for ways to reestablish a viable counterterrorism posture, not just in West Africa, but in the broader Sahel.

The current Trump administration appears to be renewing its focus on the Sahel, as it seeks to renew ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, with delegations to the capitals of the three countries discussing US military support in exchange for access to their natural resources. Washington would consider providing weapons, equipment, and potentially personnel to aid local forces fighting extremists. In return, the United States would get priority access to uranium, gold, and other critical minerals. This approach emphasizes intelligence sharing, training, and advisory missions, rather than large-scale deployments of US military forces. While this is, on the surface, a pragmatic-sounding adjustment to current political realities, the AES, which was formed in 2023, already has strong ties to Russia, including the presence of military advisors, training support, and supply of arms, and since 2025 AES foreign ministers have concluded agreements with Russia on security, energy, and higher education. This limits America’s freedom of action in the region.


Some progress has been made on moving this new agenda forward, with an intelligence cooperation agreement with Mali near completion and the removal of sanctions on some senior Malian defense personnel, but despite the potential of getting Washington back in the good graces of Sahelian countries, these changes in US policy are unlikely to offset Russian or Chinese influence in the region. Unfettered US access to the Sahel will be difficult because the environment has changed in three significant ways. First, access to the region is now contested. Governments that have survived coups or insurgencies are more suspicious of Western intentions and more willing to use anti-Western rhetoric to bolster regime legitimacy. Second, the external competition is greater. Russia offers assistance with fewer political conditions attached, while China and the Gulf states expand their economic influence through infrastructure construction, mining, and commercial deals. Even Turkey and Europe are ahead of the United States in terms of trade with the Sahel. Third, the populations of the Sahel are disillusioned with security agreements that promised stability but failed to deliver, and US competitors, Russia in particular, have used this in their propaganda campaigns. In this context, even a small US footprint can be portrayed as neo-imperialism rather than a mutually beneficial partnership.

This presents the United States with a serious strategic dilemma. If Washington’s focus is narrowly on counterterrorism, it might regain some operational advantage but lose credibility with countries on the continent on governance and democratic norms. If, on the other hand, it insists too heavily on constitutional order and political reform, it might find itself excluded from the security spaces it considers vital.

A logical hybrid strategy, which the current administration shows no sign of pursuing, would be to intensify work with cooperative countries like Nigeria, other coastal West African partners, and perhaps even northern anchor states outside the coup belt, while monitoring Sahelian threats from the periphery. While this is the most practical and realistic option, it’s not the same as influence. It’s damage limitation, which African leaders will recognize. On the Sahel, the United States seems to be in a damned if you do, damned if you don’t situation. The question then becomes, does it focus on short-term gains, or swallow the pain and focus on long-term credibility in the rest of the continent? We can only wait and see.

Assistance, Minerals, and Deportation Deals: The Cost of Transactionalism

A recent issue that highlights the current administration’s approach to Africa is the growing overlap among strategic minerals diplomacy, aid leverage, and domestic immigration enforcement.

The DRC has drawn a lot of attention because of US efforts to secure access to the critical minerals in its conflict-ridden eastern region, and because it has become part of a network of African countries accepting third-country deportees from the United States. There are reports of similar agreements with countries such as Rwanda, Eswatini, and Sierra Leone. Critics of the deportation agreements, such as Human Rights Watch(HRW), argue that these opaque deals violate human rights law and are “part of a policy that is designed to instrumentalize human suffering as a deterrent to migration.” The governments implementing such deals risk violating international law. Human Rights Watch claims to have seen a copy of the agreement with Rwanda that includes an inducement of approximately $7.5 million in US financial support in exchange for Rwanda’s acceptance of third-country deportees. The agreement with Eswatini, according to HRW. Offers $5.1 million to build Eswatini’s border and migration management capacity in exchange for the country accepting up to 160 deportees from the United States. These agreements effectively turn African governments into subcontractors for US immigration control operations, and, even where they are accepted willingly, the public optics can be damaging in the long term.


Though not as serious in human rights terms as the deportation deals, the reported use by Washington of assistance funding as leverage to secure access to critical minerals is just as controversial.

In November 2025, according to a report in Al Jazeera, the United States approached Zimbabwe with an offer of $300 million in funding in exchange for sensitive health data, which Harare rejected, and around the same time, Washington announced $1 billion in health funding for Zambia, which Lusaka said was problematic because the United States sought access to the country’s minerals. In the minerals deal with the DRC, as mentioned above, the situation is even shakier due to the DRC’s security situation and the weakness of the DRC government. The deal could possibly entail the commitment of US security resources, including ‘boots on the ground’ in one of the least stable countries in the world.

Diversifying and securing US mineral supply chains is essential for economic and national security. It is also important to support African nations’ efforts to exploit mineral wealth for sustainable growth and to reduce extremist violence. But African audiences are unlikely to appreciate the nuances of these policy issues. If a country appears to be receiving security support or mineral investments at the same time it agrees to accept deportees who are not nationals of the country, or there is a sudden influx of American mining companies where there were none before, many will conclude that Washington is monetizing vulnerability. That impression is intensified by Washington’s perceived shift away from traditional development assistance and toward dealmaking framed explicitly around US gain. From the American perspective, this might be candid realism. But, from African perspectives, it looks like coercive diplomacy dressed up as partnership. The difference is not semantic. It goes directly to whether the United States is seen as a trusted and reliable actor or a neo-colonial exploiter to be used when unavoidable.

That doesn’t mean that the United States should not be interested in African critical minerals. Quite the contrary. Competition over cobalt, lithium, copper, tantalum, and rare earth supply chains will be central to global industrial policy and security for a long time to come, and the United States has compelling reasons to avoid overdependence on Chinese-dominated systems. But there is a difference between building mutually beneficial mineral partnerships and appearing to tie security guarantees, diplomatic mediation, or migration deals to access to extract these minerals. If Africans believe that every American initiative ultimately serves a narrow resource agenda, Washington’s strategic reach might become shallower even in areas where its commercial footprint is large. Influence is not measured by contracts signed; it’s measured by whether partners believe the relationship has mutual value.

What Does All This Mean for US Influence in Africa in the Future?

In the coming years, US influence in Africa is likely to fluctuate rather than simply grow stronger or weaker. The United States will remain consequential because it offers many African states access to finance, technology, military training, intelligence, higher education, health partnerships, and diplomatic clout. In times of crisis, the United States can still make an enormous difference. But influence will increasingly depend on whether African governments see US engagement as broad-based and dependable, or as selective and punitive. The current trend points toward selective influence: stronger in nations or sectors where American interests are immediate, weaker in the broader contest for legitimacy and long-term political trust.


This loss of legitimacy and trust matters because the United States no longer operates in an arena where African governments have few alternatives, and where it provided a clear alternative to extractive countries like China and Russia. China is still deeply entrenched in infrastructure, trade, and mining. Russia continues to exploit security vacuums and elite insecurity, particularly in fragile states. The countries of the Persian Gulf are expanding investment, logistics, and political influence, and Turkey and India are also broadening their footprints. In such a competitive environment, an American strategy centered on coercive pressure, punishment, or one-sided dealmaking is unlikely to generate durable alignments. Some African governments might still accept American offers, but they will do so for short-term tactical reasons rather than long-term loyalty. They are likely to shop around, compare offers, and push back when US demands seem politically costly at home.

There is, therefore, considerable reputational risk for Washington. If the United States is seen as championing refugee protection for white Afrikaners while restricting other refugee channels, invoking religious freedom in Nigeria in ways that are viewed as partisan, seeking renewed counterterrorism access without broader political vision, and using aid to achieve mineral access or support for America’s deportation problems, a coherent image begins to emerge. It is an image of a powerful country that is interested in Africa less as a community of sovereign partners than as a set of problems to manage and assets to acquire. That image might be inaccurate and unfair in some respects, but perceptions often matter more than official intent. And in international affairs, reputational damage accumulates quietly before it becomes strategically obvious.

The decline in US influence is not inevitable, at least not permanent. The United States could still preserve, and in some areas even rebuild or increase its influence if it recalibrates its approach to Africa in three ways. First, it would need to treat major African states such as South Africa and Nigeria as strategic interlocutors, even when there are sharp disagreements, instead of turning disputes into public tests of ideological loyalty. Second, it needs to embed security cooperation within a broader framework that includes trade, governance support, education, and health, so that military engagement doesn’t become the only face of US official policy. Third, it would need to ensure that mineral partnerships and migration agreements are transparent, legally defensible, clearly reciprocal, and they are not linked to humanitarian programs. In short, Washington must show that it is not merely transacting with Africa but is investing in relationships.

The disputes now unfolding in Africa are not isolated controversies. Taken together, they reveal a broader transition in US policy from a relatively broad, if at times imperfect, model of engagement to a narrower, more transactional one. The clash with South Africa shows just how quickly political symbolism can wreak havoc with strategic relationships. The strain with Nigeria shows the danger of reducing complex insecurity to a single ideological narrative. The push to regain a foothold in the Sahel for counterterrorism operations shows that military relevance can survive even as political influence fades. And the convergence of minerals diplomacy, aid pressure, and deportation deals shows how easily hard-nosed realism can become reputational self-harm.

The United States is unlikely to pull back completely from Africa in the coming years, if for no other reason than the need to address the counterterrorism issue. But it risks becoming less admired, less trusted, and less able to shape outcomes beyond narrow areas of immediate interest. For some in Washington, that might be acceptable if concrete short-term gains in security, mineral access, and migration control are achieved. But great power influence is not sustained by transactions alone. It depends on credibility, predictability, and partners’ belief that the relationship serves more than one side’s short-term aims. If the United States wants lasting influence in Africa, it will have to prove that it still sees African states not just as instruments of policy or powerless pawns in great-power competition, but as consequential partners in shaping and preserving the international order.

About the author: 

Charles A. Ray, a member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, served as US Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe.

Source: This article was published by FPRI

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The Long History of Controlling Water—and Why It No Longer Works

By Jeremy Rifkin

June 5, 2026

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Image by Gregg M. Erickson/Wikimediacommons, licensed via CC BY 3.0

The defining signature of the past 6,000 years of human civilization is the domestication of the hydrosphere—capturing, damming, canalizing, reorienting, propertizing, privatizing, consuming, profiting from, depleting, and poisoning it. From ancient hydraulic civilizations to the hydro-powered superdams, reservoirs, canals, and ports of the 21st century, water has been repurposed for humanity, often at the expense of millions of other species that depend on it.

Harnessing the hydrosphere has shaped societies and the distinctiveness of cultures across history. The design of hydraulic infrastructure has partially fated societies to the entropic costs that led to their demise—and sometimes collapse. Unlike in the past, the entropic consequences of water use during the fossil-fuel-based Industrial Revolution—the water-energy nexus—have eclipsed localities, regions, and continents, propelling Earth into the sixth extinction of life.

Now, the hydrosphere is freeing itself, spasming in ways unimaginable half a century ago. Waters are breaking loose as Earth warms, altering water cycles and producing effects humans can scarcely manage. A conversation is beginning about mobilizing collective efforts to free the waters and allow the hydrosphere to self-evolve. These responses are admirable and imperative, reflecting our learning to let go of infrastructural restraints imposed over centuries.

Roughly 70 percent of Earth’s surface is water, but only 2.5 to 3 percent is fresh water, and only a fraction is readily accessible. A 2021 study found that less than 19 percent of land remains wilderness, as human development has diminished or eliminated ecosystems worldwide. Increasingly, the hydrological cycle is reshaping the planet—deconstructing infrastructure and rewilding landscapes—leaving humanity to adapt to a new nature.

During the industrial era, urban and suburban communities were built over once-vibrant floodplains, which were drained, dammed, and diverted. In Great Britain, 90 percent of wetlands have disappeared, along with much native wildlife, as urban-industrial landscapes expanded. Efforts across the U.K. and elsewhere aim to free rivers, restore floodplains and habitats, and decommission dams, teaching us to adapt to water rather than force water to fit development. These efforts are urgent, as intensifying hydrological cycles threaten rural and urban infrastructure. Citizen scientists and volunteers, working with marine biologists and local governments, are rewilding fish nurseries and salt marshes and supporting projects that absorb carbon, reduce flooding, and restore native species.

While oceans were reduced to property and remain under severe strain, scarce freshwater has also been commodified and controlled in the global marketplace by a handful of corporations. Until the late 20th century, fresh water was largely administered publicly as a common resource. Over the past half-century, it has increasingly been seized by private companies and transformed into a tradable commodity. In practice, private companies often have little incentive to upgrade infrastructure or lower costs. Unlike public systems, market-based utilities must maintain revenue and profit margins even if populations remain stable, leading to the continuous extraction of value, especially in water and sanitation services, where communities have few choices.

Despite evidence of privatization’s shortcomings, ten global companies dominate the water utility market. They profit from government incentives, charge high water prices, and sometimes compromise service quality. In the United States, industry-owned utilities typically charge 59 percent more for water and 63 percent more for sewer service than local government utilities. Privatization can also increase financing costs for water projects by 50–150 percent, while municipalities that resumed public operations achieved average savings of 21 percent across water and sewer services.

A lingering misconception is that a warming climate means we are running out of water. While heavier rainstorms and floods are widely acknowledged, they are often treated separately from droughts. In reality, the planet is not running out of freshwater; a rewilding hydrosphere driven by climate change is altering the seasonal timing, intensity, and duration of precipitation. Global hydraulic civilization remains locked into a water cycle suited to a temperate climate that no longer exists, leaving humanity unable to reliably access water for consumption, industry, or agriculture when and where it is needed.

The long-term solution is to reset humanity’s relationship with the hydrosphere—adapting to the waters rather than attempting to control them. A growing suite of initiatives, including “Slow Waters,” “Sponge Cities,” “Nature-Based Systems,” and “Green Infrastructure,” reflects this shift. These approaches move away from centralized, hyperefficient hydraulic systems designed for Holocene-era predictability and toward adaptive systems responsive to the rewilding hydrosphere of the Anthropocene. Philosophically, they shift the focus from managing water to stewarding it—going with the flow rather than attempting to direct it.

This distributed approach emphasizes hands-on engagement by local populations in their ecosystems, echoing commons governance while leveraging technologies. Movements like “slow water,” inspired by the “slow food” and “slow cities” movements, encourage communities to abandon hyperefficient extraction, commodification, and overconsumption, and instead adapt locally to natural rhythms and cycles.

Erica Gies, a journalist who writes on water issues and climate change and coined the term “slow water,” emphasizes that water in its natural state does not always rush across the land surface but also has “slow stages,” seeping into soil, settling in wetlands, or nestling into groundwater caverns. This, she says, is “where the magic happens,” providing habitat and food for many forms of life above and below ground. “[T]he key to greater resilience… is to find ways to let water be water, to reclaim space for it to interact with the land.”

The problem is that global hydraulic civilization is designed to sequester water quickly: storing it in artificial reservoirs, pumping it through pipes to irrigate crops, generate electricity, and supply homes and businesses, then rapidly recycling wastewater back into the system. Little room is left for natural absorption or ecosystem renewal.

Urban growth has compounded this dynamic. Dense urban and suburban communities are often built atop former wetlands, rivers, and streams, leaving rain with nowhere to go. Water instead floods impermeable asphalt and concrete, preventing infiltration and depriving soils and ecosystems of moisture. In China’s urban sprawl, for example, less than 20 percent of precipitation running off buildings and pavement soaks into the soil, with most diverted into drains and pipes. In Beijing, where pumped groundwater long supplied the population, the water table has been dropping by roughly a meter per year, with largely ignored consequences. Allowing waters to follow their natural flow is essential to humanity’s realignment with the planet.

Across the globe, experiments are underway to reintroduce ecosystem-friendly water management practices, though most remain pilot projects. Engineers, urban planners, and landscape architects are implementing bioswales, rain gardens, and permeable pavements to restore hydrological balance. Bioswales are shallow channels planted with native grasses, shrubs, and flowers, and layered with soil, mulch, and stones to slow rainwater and filter pollutants such as fertilizers, motor oil, and litter. Rain gardens perform a similar function in a bowl-shaped design that “captures, stores, and infiltrates rainwater.” Permeable pavements—made from porous concrete, asphalt, interlocking pavers, or plastic grids—allow rain and melted snow to penetrate underlying soil rather than run off hardened surfaces.

Green rooftop gardens also slow runoff while moderating urban heat. As the Environmental Protection Agency notes, these elevated gardens “provide shade, remove heat from the air, and reduce temperatures of the roof surface.” If widely adopted, green roofs can reduce city-wide ambient temperatures by up to 5 degrees Fahrenheit, allow more water to sink into the soil, and reduce electricity demand.

More integrated strategies, such as “sponge cities,” reintroduce natural water flows into urban areas. Developed by the late Chinese urbanist Kongjian Yu, sponge cities reduce flooding by slowing rainwater through natural landscapes, allowing it to seep into the ground or be stored underground for later use. Rapidly growing cities like Izmir, Turkey, are implementing site-specific models to capture water for dry seasons and reduce flood risk. Urban planners often cite targets such as 30 percent green or permeable surface coverage, as recommended in frameworks like the C40 Urban Nature Accelerator, as a baseline for stormwater absorption and flood mitigation.

As climate change intensifies the water cycle—bringing heavier snowfall, torrential floods, prolonged droughts, heatwaves, and hurricanes—harvesting rainwater has become a priority even in high-tech cities. Traditional cistern systems, from Jordan to Las Vegas, are being adapted and scaled, sometimes integrated with sensors and digital networks, to store and distribute water locally and capture winter rains for dry seasons.

Between 2018 and 2020, the United States Agency for International Development Small Projects Assistance program supported Peace Corps volunteers and local communities across nine municipalities in four Mexican states in installing rainwater harvesting systems in 68 homes, 23 schools, and 23 community centers, capturing 1,633,330 liters of water. Local engineers, working with volunteers and neighborhood crews, installed 12,000-liter cisterns in homes and 50,000-liter cisterns in schools. Similar efforts are now being replicated worldwide, as communities increasingly collect seasonal rains to endure drought-prone periods.

Among the more ambitious efforts is the One Million Cisterns for the Sahel, sponsored by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Water harvesting and storage systems are being installed across seven Sahelian countries—Senegal, Gambia, Cabo Verde, the Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. The initiative targets the most vulnerable rural communities in these arid and semi-arid regions, all of which experience massive floods followed by repeated droughts. These increasingly wild gyrations in the water cycle, the FAO notes, “are devastating for the poorest rural households, who struggle with these shocks and see their vulnerability worsen.” The program emphasizes training communities to construct, manage, and maintain cisterns, with particular attention to engaging women through “cash-for-work” activities to ensure equitable stewardship of water resources.

Even highly industrialized nations are adopting water harvesting. States such as Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia offer tax credits for rainwater harvesting equipment, though restrictions remain on the amounts and uses eligible. Beyond climate adaptation, decentralized water systems also provide resilience against cyberattacks or sabotage of centralized infrastructure. Neighborhood water microgrids can maintain water flow even when main pipelines fail.

A “water internet,” embedded with IoT sensors, is increasingly deployed in reservoirs and pipelines to monitor pressure, equipment wear, leaks, and water quality, enabling predictive maintenance and more efficient management. In the United States alone, nearly 6 billion gallons of treated water are wasted daily due to leaking pipes, metering inaccuracies, and other system failures, according to the American Society of Civil Engineers. Other countries face similar losses. Studies increasingly recommend distributed water microgrids—analogous to decentralized energy systems—that enable local treatment, storage, and reuse.

The Omega Center for Sustainable Living pioneered on-site water purification systems that mimic natural processes. Water is drawn from an aquifer, pumped to cisterns, used in buildings, then treated through eco-machines and aerated lagoons before returning to the aquifer in a closed loop. Modern systems are scaling up in homes, hotels, and factories, using membrane filtration, ultraviolet light, and chlorine to treat gray and blackwater for reuse. Combined with local harvesting of sunlight and wind, decentralized water systems democratize access to a vital resource and could reduce water demand by up to 75 percent.

These distributed initiatives give cities resilience against floods, droughts, and heatwaves, but they also raise questions about whether megacities—built atop vast centralized hydraulic infrastructure—are suited to a rapidly warming planet. Dense urban hydraulic civilizations over the past 6,000 years have shaped the Earth for humans; the challenge now is adapting humans to the planet. These water initiatives are waystations on the path to rethinking our relationship with nature.

At a moment when the human family is despairing about the future, the Age of Resilience offers a new and powerful narrative, which, if widely embraced, could lay the foundation for a radically different future—bringing humanity back into nature’s fold and giving life a second chance to flourish on Earth.

This adapted excerpt is from Jeremy Rifkin’s Planet Aqua: Rethinking Our Home in the Universe  (2024, Polity Books). It is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) with permission from Polity Books. It was adapted and produced for the Observatory by Earth | Food | Life, a project of the Independent Media Institute.Email

Jeremy Rifkin

Jeremy Rifkin is the bestselling author of 24 books translated into 35 languages. He is a principal architect of the European Union’s and China’s economic plans for transitioning to a Third Industrial Revolution to address climate change, and he served as an advisor to U.S. Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer on America’s infrastructure plan. The Huffington Post named him among the world’s ten most influential economic thinkers in its global survey of “The World’s Most Influential Voices.”