It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
First Commercial Bunkering of Ammonia Completed on Exmar Ship in Ulsan
Exmarr's gas tanker Antwerpen completed the world's first ammonia bunkering for a commercial, ocean-going vessel docked at the Port of Ulsan, South Korea (Ulsan Port Authority)
The emerging market for ammonia-fueled commercial shipping achieved its next milestone with the first-ever port-to-ship bunkering on an ocean-going vessel. Previously, the only bunkering had been done as demonstrations, while extensive work has been underway by port authorities, classification societies, and others to develop the processes for safely handling highly toxic ammonia as a marine fuel.
The Ulsan Port Authority (UPA) in South Korea announced that the first ammonia bunkering operation had been carried out on April 23. The gas tanker Antwerpen, built by HD Hyundai as the first in a series of vessels for Exmar, achieved the milestone.
The bunkering operation took place at Pier 2 of Ulsan Main Port, where Lotte Fine Chemical, designated as the sustainable marine fuel supply demonstration operator, supplied approximately 600 tons of clean ammonia via the port-to-ship method.
“This world-first ammonia bunkering operation was made possible by Ulsan Port’s advanced energy infrastructure and accumulated bunkering expertise,” said Byun Jae-young, President of UPA. “It is a meaningful milestone that demonstrates the port’s readiness to support a range of major sustainable marine fuels.
To enable this milestone, the Ulsan Port Authority reports it signed a Memorandum of Understanding in January 2024 to promote the ammonia bunkering industry. Since then, it has worked closely with key stakeholders across the ammonia value chain, including Korean Register (KR), Lotte Fine Chemical, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, and HMM, covering policy and regulation, port infrastructure, vessel readiness, and fuel supply.
The 46,000 cubic meter gas carrier continues to mark milestones in the development of this new segment. The ship was ordered in 2023 and named during a ceremony earlier in April at the HD Hyundai shipyard. It measures 190 meters (623 feet) in length and was specifically designed for the transport of liquefied gas cargoes, including ammonia and LPG. It can also use its cargo, including the ammonia, as its fuel.
The Antwerpen remains on the dock in Ulsan while her sister ship, Arlon,is completing sea trials. The second ship is scheduled to be delivered to Exmar in June.
To prepare for the bunkering, Lotte Fine Chemical announced in March that it had completed the world’s first commercial import of green ammonia. It was the first cross-border trade of green ammonia. The imported green ammonia was entirely produced using 100 percent renewable energy (wind and solar power) at the world’s largest green hydrogen and ammonia production complex developed by Envision and located in Inner Mongolia, China.
Lotte developed storage capabilities for the green ammonia at the Port of Ulsan. It said that it planned to use it to meet the growing demand for carbon-free energy applications, including ammonia marine bunkering, co-firing power generation, and as a hydrogen carrier.
The first ammonia bunkering for a vessel took place in Singapore in early 2024 and involved three tonnes of liquid ammonia loaded from Vopak’s Banyan Terminal on Jurong Island in Singapore. It was placed aboard Fortescue’s converted offshore supply vessel, which was rechristened Fortescue Green Pioneer and began ammonia demonstration in 2024. The only other vessels currently able to operate on ammonia are two tugboats, with Japan also reporting ammonia bunkering from tank trucks to NYK’s Sakigake, a tug that was converted from LNG to ammonia as part of an ongoing demonstration of the future marine fuel.
Thursday, March 05, 2026
RAGOZIN: The unholy alliance between Ukraine’s far right and the Western defence industry
Battle-hardened commander Mykola “Makar” Zynkevich appears at a large event organised on the sides of the Munich Security Conference. / Snake Island Institute via Facebook
A look at Ukrainian units dealing with cutting-edge unmanned technology reveals an unholy alliance between far-right extremism and the Western defence industry. It came into the limelight during the latest Munich Security Conference, the world’s most prestigious gathering of global security practitioners and military industry bosses.
Here is the backstory. At the end of May 2017, a group of far-right activists stormed Lviv region’s legislature and briefly detained its deputies inside the occupied building. They demanded amnesty for the veterans of the Russo-Ukrainian war who had been jailed for violent crimes inside and outside the war zone.
Only one of the attackers was charged at the end of the day — Mykola “Makar” Zynkevich of the National Corps, the political wing of the Azov Movement, as its members themselves call their vast network of large military units and paramilitary groups.
Fast-forward seven years and the battle-hardened commander Zynkevich appears at a large event organised on the sides of the Munich Security Conference. Zynkevich's unit deals with cutting edge war technology, namely terrestrial robotic systems which aid — and may one day replace — soldiers on the battlefield.
The unit is called NC13, in which NC likely stands for Zynkevich’s political alma mater, National Corps. Number 13 is defined by the Anti-Defamation League as a white supremacist symbol Aryan Circle (A being the first and C being the third letter in the alphabet).
NC13 is part of the 3rd Detached Assault Brigade which currently makes up the core of Ukrainian army’s 3rd Corps. The brigade was founded by the political leadership of Azov Movement, which grew out of Patriot of Ukraine, a white supremacist group at the core of Azov battalion formed in 2014. Its leader, Andriy Biletsky, is now 3rd Corps commander and gets regularly listed among presidential hopefuls in the polls.
The event on the sides of the Munich conference was organised by Snake Island Institute, a Ukrainian think-tank set up by Vladyslav Sobolevsky, formerly the chief of staff at Azov Regiment and deputy chief of staff at the National Corps, the political party.
War beneficiaries
Back in his days as National Corps official, Sobolevsky helped to organise various protests aimed at disrupting the Paris agreements between presidents Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Vladimir Putin that led to a near-full ceasefire throughout 2020 and 2021. These protests were a part of the “No to Capitulation” campaign, announced by Azov Movement leader Andriy Biletsky in October 2019 in response to Ukraine and Russia agreeing upon the Steinmeier formula — an algorithm for the implementation of Minsk agreements proposed by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
On March 12, 2020 Sobolevsky led National Corps activists who violently attacked Zelenskiy’s ally and Security Council deputy head, Serhiy Syvokho, when he attempted to present a pro-peace political platform. Two days later, Sobolevsky led a march of Azov veterans to the Russian embassy. The participants tore up a Russian flag and shot at the embassy from flare pistols in a show which helped to convince the Kremlin that Zelenskiy is helpless against far-right thugs and hence of little value as a negotiator.
The campaign against “capitulation” has succeeded in swaying Zelenskiy who effectively rejected peace on conditions that look infinitely better than what Ukraine can hope for now, after four years of Russia’s brutal all-out invasion. Under the Minsk agreements, Ukraine would have retained full sovereignty over most of its Donbas region as well as formal sovereignty over the smaller part, then de-facto controlled by Russia.
Zelenskiy made a U-turn on relations with Putin at the beginning of 2021 (it coincided with Joe Biden moving into the White House). He embarked on crossing Putin’s key red lines, clamping down on his previously untouchable Ukrainian ally Viktor Medvedchuk and launching a loud campaign to join Nato. Putin responded by starting to deploy troops on the Ukrainian border in March that year.
Despite the president succumbing to the pressure, relations between the Azov Movement and Zelensky’s administration remained tense during the buildup to the all-out invasion in 2021. That year, Sobolevsky led protests against Ukraine’s Security Service arresting a large group of Azov Movement activists in Kharkiv on charges of racketeering and extortion — a pointed attack at the movement’s fledgling business empire. The arrested activists were released at the start of the all-out invasion and went on to form the Kraken special unit under the auspices of Ukraine’s military intelligence (the HUR).
When the 3rd Detached Assault Brigade was reorganised into 3rd Corps in 2025, Kraken joined the corps. Its commanders — one of whom, Serhiy Velychko previously languished in prison in the SBU crackdown — were put in charge of the corps’ drone unit. Another Kraken commander set a drone pilot school called Killhouse Academy which ran a live FPV drone simulator show at the Munich conference event, with no one voicing objections to the propaganda of murder in its very name.
The war in Ukraine allowed people from the far-right fringe jump on a social lift they could have never dreamed about, which makes them key beneficiaries of this conflict — along with Putin’s regime in Russia — and explains their interest in this war running for as long as possible, at best forever.
With Gopniks on board
Times have changed in a big way since 2011, when the BBC Panorama exposed neo-nazi ultras from Metallist Kharkiv accused of violence against people of colour at football matches. At the end of the programme, famous British player Rio Ferdinand called for the boycott of Euro-2012 held in Ukraine. These days, people from this very milieu are warmly welcome at major international events platforms, like the Munich conference.
Coopting far-right extremists and football ultras as a potent street force that could either protect a political regime or help overthrow it is an old political technology. One may recall Arkan’s Tigers, a Serbian paramilitary group that threatened ethnic cleansing in Kosovo back in the 1990s. It was at least partly comprised of the Grobari (Gravediggers), the fans of Partisan Belgrade.
Putin’s regime has been eager to engage both football fans and neo-nazi thugs since the early 2000s — just look at his administration’s dealings with BORN, a neo-nazi group responsible for assassinations of migrants and antifa activists. However many of these former Kremlin allies and FSB volunteer helpers, including people related to BORN, ended up in Ukraine in the heady days of the Maidan revolution. They deemed Ukraine to be closer to their far-right political ideals, while Putin launched a purge of the far right in Russia exactly because of their role in the Maidan revolution.
In social terms, secret services and presidential office operatives engaging with the far right are tapping into the social strata typically described in post-Soviet space as “gopniki”, the nearest English-language equivalent being chavs — low-class young men prone to gang-like behaviour and criminal culture.
A predominantly Russian-speaking city, Kharkiv has its own word for gopniki — syavy. Two opposite paramilitary camps emerged in that city from this social strata — Patriot of Ukraine which grew into Azov movement and Oplot, a pro-Russian group that was instrumental in staging coup attempts in various Ukrainian regions in the spring of 2014. In a pattern characteristic of both Ukraine and Russia, both groups emerged at the conjunction of secret services, organised crime and far right activism.
People like Kraken founder Velychko (he coined the famous ‘Putin khuylo’ or ‘Putin is a dick’ chant when he was a leader of Metallist Kharkiv ultras), couldn’t possibly imagine that he would command a large, Nato-equipped military unit and the Western military-industrial complex would be keen to tap into his unit’s experience.
At the Munich conference, the Snake Island Institute event was opened by former CIA chief David Petraeus. Among the event’s partners, the institute listed Alta Ares which describes itself as “a leading Nato-backed project to reshape the defence of Europe’s eastern flank”, deals with AI-powered drones and takes part in Nato drills. Danish anti-drone equipment manufacturer MyDefence and Rasmussen Global, the PR agency run by former Nato secretary-general Andres Fogh Rasmussen, were on the same list.
The war in Ukraine saw many former far-right activists turn into operators of unmanned fighting systems, primarily drones. Some of these are absolutely open about their political leanings — a fact which the Ukrainian government and its Western funders seem to be entirely okay with. For example, the 422nd drone regiment of the Ukrainian armed forces is called Luftwaffe and displays the Prussian/Nazi Iron Cross symbol on its logo.
Snake Island Institute people are also not the only ones who get hosted by major Western expert platforms like Munich conference. Take Yevhen Karas, the founder of C14 group which has “Fourteen Words” (a neo-nazi slogan) in its name and whose members were accused of conducting political assassinations after the Maidan revolution, including that of the journalist Oles Buzyna. Now a drone regiment commander, Karas was hosted by Chatham House, a leading British think-tank, last November.
Members of the pro-Ukrainian commentariat tend to dismiss the very existence of a nazi problem in Ukraine, even as Kyiv landmark WWII Museum is currently hosting an exhibition dedicated to Russian Volunteer Corps, a far-right unit fighting on Ukraine’s side which draws inspiration from Hitler’s Russian allies of Gen. Vlasov’s Russian Liberation Army and uses the fascist Spayka symbol as its logo. The curator of the exhibition, Aleksey Lyovkin, is a frontman of M8L8TH (Hitler’s Hammer), in which 88 is a neo-nazi slogan which stands for Heil Hitler.
But none of that seems to bother the members of Western security establishment when people from this milieu appear at their prestigious event in Munich, a century after the Beer Hall Putch.
From €4 million in 2022, the year the war began, revenues have soared to €87.3 million in 2025. Portuguese exports to Ukraine, five to ten times lower before the conflict, now represent double the sales to Russia.
Portugal's drone exports to Ukraine have risen sharply since the start of the full-scale invasion of the country by Russia. Portugal is now selling more drones to Ukraine than it ever sold to Russia — and the gap is widening fast.
According to Jornal Económico, revenues from drone sales to Ukraine totalled €4 million in 2022, the year the conflict broke out, rising to €23 million in 2023 and €33 million in 2024.
Growth accelerated sharply in 2025, with revenues reaching €87.3 million. The largest Portuguese drone exporter to Ukraine is Tekever, a company based in Caldas da Rainha.
Relate
The surge has reshaped Portugal's broader trade relationships.
Ukraine climbed from 75th to 36th in the ranking of Portugal's export destinations between 2019 and 2025, while Russia fell from 34th to 50th over the same period — a decline surpassed among the top 100 destinations only by Cuba, which dropped 20 places, and Syria, which fell 19.
Before the war, Portuguese exports to Ukraine were five to ten times lower than sales to Russia.
By 2023 and 2024 that gap had narrowed to around 10%, and by 2025 Ukrainian purchases had pulled ahead to double those to Russia.
Overall, Ukrainian purchases from Portugal have jumped 110%, making Ukraine one of very few countries in the top 100 export destinations to record double- or triple-digit growth.
The trend may be further boosted by a deal signed in December between Portugal and Ukraine for the joint production of underwater drones.
A new book provides a bridge between global theory and Indian practices.
For any modern economy, there exist two crucial elements: firstly, money at the core and secondly, a monetary or financial system that lets money show its full potentialities. The issues of financial inclusion and financial stability are outcomes of the financial system that have been debated without any final outcome. India has been through an evolution of money and financial system since the Gupta Period (3rd to 6th century). After intermittent debacles, a uniform system during the Mughal era was taken over by the British empire to drain India's wealth. More organised monetary management started with the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on April 1, 1935.
Money and banking in India are complex phenomenon evolved over a long period and requires impeccable understanding of its foundations. It is in this context that the book "Foundation of Money and Banking in India" by Prof. Ankur Bhatnagar and Prof. C. Saratchand (Primus Book, Delhi; January 2026; 646 pages) serves the purpose of building a sound and organised understanding. It blends theoretical rigor with historical analysis, focusing on India's experience since independence in 1947. The authors describe it as a "synthetic outcome of a persistent academic dialogue", negotiating between mathematical models and non-mathematical expositions to make complex ideas accessible. The foreword, by eminent economist Prof. Prabhat Patnaik, sets a critical tone, arguing that in developing economies like India, fiscal policies have been ignored as effective pro-cyclical economic interventions and monetary policy intervention has been considered as a key lever for stability in the era of dominance of global finance. According to Prof. Patnaik, the book makes readers aware about the functioning of financial and monetary models which will be useful to understand the possible implications of financial and monetary policies practiced during this era.
The book is organised into five sections, each building on the last to provide a layered understanding. This reflects a logical progression from foundational concepts to applied Indian scenarios, enriched by numerous boxes, figures, and tables.
Money in Today’s World
Section I, Money: Concept, Theory and Measurement, lays the groundwork. This section clarifies how economic activities in an economy are determined by the presence of money and what are its basic characteristics that make money so significant for an individual and the country. We have witnessed emergence of crypto currencies as the recent development in the monetary and financial system across the world that are being used as digital medium of exchange for online and peer to peer transactions bypassing the role of national/fiat currency as also the role of central banking. According to the Cryptocurrency Market Report-2026, the projected growth rate of the size of cryptocurrency market was 17 percent during 2025-26 and is estimated to reach up to USD 3.35 billion in 2026. The book does have discussion on such latest development in the monetary world and its possible fallout. It also discusses Fintech in which India has been a leader as far as the extent of transactions is concerned triggered by demonetization in 2016. However, the share of cash circulation as percentage of GDP has gone up from 11.6 percent in 2015 to 13.7 percent in 2022 as per the book, defying one of the purposes of demonetization. This section stands out for its balance of economic theories and Indian specificity, incorporating discussions on fintech, crypto, and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).
Financial Systems
The global economy that has been through one crisis after another triggered by the exponential growth of the financial instruments and their size in the name of financial innovation with an objective of risk reduction. The sub-prime crisis of 2008 has been the latest event that shook the global economic world and brought misery in India too, leading to stagnation and inflation in the later part of the UPA-II and finally causing its ouster from the central government. UPA-II also relied on monetary and financial tools mainly to overcome the stagnation in the economy leading to unsustainable build-up of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) of the banking sector in India. But post-UPA-II, during the current political dispensation, NPAs might have come down but that has been possible only with slower GDP growth rate even though India is the fastest growing major economy in world as per the latest data.
The second section of the book is all about the prototypes of the financial system to the current structure of the financial system that world and India are characterised by, with evidence of financial crisis and bringing into the discussion one of the leading economists Hyman P. Minsky and his work on genesis of financial crisis. Such interweaving of theory and empirics is rare in textbooks from India's perspective.
Demystifying Interest Rates
Global domination of finance and its repercussions for developing economies is reflected in the interest policies of these countries. It has been continuously seen that developing countries adjust their interest rate as per the adjustment in federal rate of the USA to adjust the capital flight as per their needs. This trend raises the question on true sovereignty of a country and independence of its central banking. The recent rise of outflow of foreign capital to the magnitude of approximately USD 19 billion in 2025 is an indication of what happens when a developing country does not adjust its interest rate to the US federal bank rate as desired by global rentiers. Section III of the book deals with such issues with special reference to the whole notion of interest rate and its determination in the setting of Indian context. This Section excels in demystifying interest rates through graphics and Indian examples, though the mathematical models might intimidate non-economics majors.
Banking Sector and Monetary Policy
The final two sections of the book are about banking sector in India and monetary policy formulation by the central bank. It gives detailed functioning of role of banks and the central bank in an economy. The book goes beyond discussion of commercial and cooperative banking and brings into discussion new trends that have emerged on the financial horizon of India with greater possibility of instability, uncertainty and non-transparent financing of business expansion. Some of the important topics which any student of economics must understand such as functioning and objectives of Monetary Policy Committee in India makes this very useful.
Global Theory to Local Practice
Overall, the book's strengths are manifold. Its integration of theory with Indian empirics, supported by over 100 graphics, fosters critical thinking. The focus on financial development since 1947, including demonetization and fintech, fills a gap in India-centric textbooks. Another important aspect is introducing basic concepts of Islamic banking, present in 60 countries, which brings in an aspect of banking not guided by profit maximisation. The breadth of the book, covering cryptos to crises, could overwhelm beginners, and the mathematical elements assume prior knowledge. Data in places only include figures up to 2022, which might limit its utility amid fast-changing events. While it includes comparative discourse related to USA and China, it could have also discussed emerging markets like Brazil or South Africa. The index is a good addition, and each chapter ends with quizzes, review questions, and references.
In conclusion, "Foundations of Money and Banking in India" is a robust, insightful textbook that demystifies a complex field for not only Indian readers but anyone who holds interest in the world of money and finance in Indian context. It acts as a bridge between global theory and local practice, ideal for undergraduate and postgraduate students, policymakers, and economists.
The writer is Associate Professor at Shri Ram College of Commerce, University of Delhi. The views are personal.
Wednesday, February 04, 2026
Inside Strum: How a Subscription Platform Funds Ukraine’s Neo-Nazi Azov Brigade
One of the most persistent myths in Western political thought is the idea that the United States and its European allies are principled opponents of fascism and totalitarianism. This doctrine, which many Washington elites believe at an almost religious level, has served as the basis for the ongoing proxy war in Ukraine. Numerous politicians from both sides of the proverbial aisle have accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of being a Nazi or a fascist. However, when the United States allows Neo-Nazi-linked Ukrainian organizations like the Azov Brigade to receive support, this undermines their narrative.
Now, after American and European taxpayers have already paid billions for Ukraine’s war, the Azov Brigade is attempting to extract more money from Westerners via a subscription service called “Strum.” But before discussing Strum, it is important to examine what the Azov Brigade is and why it requires additional funding in the first place.
The Azov Brigade (formerly known as the Azov Battalion and Azov Regiment) has been mired in controversy since its founding. The organization was founded in 2014 by Andrey Biletskyi, a political activist with ties to Neo-Nazi movements. The Azov Brigade began as an amalgamation of radical movements including the Patriot of Ukraine gang which “espoused xenophobic and neo-Nazi ideas, and was engaged in violent attacks against migrants, foreign students in Kharkiv and those opposing its views.” Following the Maidan Revolution, oligarchs and elements of the Ukrainian government backed the organization which was then incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine. In 2016, the UN alleged that the Azov regiment violated international law due to its documented mass looting of civilian homes, its targeting of civilian areas, and its treatment of prisoners. During the Siege of Mariupol, the group was heavily involved in the fighting on the Ukrainian side though it eventually surrendered to Russia. In 2023, the Azov Regiment was reorganized into the Azov Brigade.
With resources dwindling and rampant foreign military aid corruption, Azov has increasingly relied on donations from individuals and companies. According to reporting from Svidomi, which included interviews with founders and project managers, a new project, Strum, has become the “driving force” behind the Brigade. The platform operates as a subscription service like Netflix or Spotify, but with some substantial differences and additional features.
Donors choose how much they give per month giving the Azov Brigade a consistent “electric current” of funding for vehicles, drones, fuel, and whatever else the Brigade might need. In return, donors get access to a members-only Telegram channel. Additionally, its referral program incentivises donors to spread the word.
Strum has a rewards program where you can get access to different merchandise and raffles depending on how much you give.
Launched on October 14, 2024, the timing of its founding is not merely an interesting factoid. Indeed, major changes in how the American government views the Azov Brigade occurred mere months prior to its establishment. On June 11, 2024, the US lifted its ban on providing weapons and training to the Azov Brigade. Commentators described this as part of a Western effort to “release the reins” on Ukraine to allow them to attack Russia at maximum capacity.
Strum emerged in the midst of this newly permissible environment, which reduced barriers to Western support. According to Strum’s creator and project manager, Dmytro Horshkov, “The Ukrainian “donation market” is significant but not unlimited. Strum… aims to attract foreign support.” This is why they make use of the Stripe payment platform as it is “very trusted in the West.” Additionally, the company also records some promotional videos in English. However, the project also has significant domestic backers including numerous corporate benefactors.
Strum lists numerous Ukrainian companies of varying sizes and industries as backers. Some companies are more related to the defense industry like Balistika, which is a manufacturer of body armor and military equipment, and Dronarium Academy, which has trained over 16,000 Ukrainian drone pilots and develops drone technology for the Ukrainian government. Other companies like Underwood Brewery or Dodo Socks appear to have little to do with technology or defense. DOU, Djinni, GoIT, Prjctr, and CS Osvita are all related to IT while Obmify is a cryptocurrency exchange platform. A number of supporters are involved in digital or print media including Yakaboo (book publishing), Toronto Television (satirical news), and Taxflix (Ukrainian movie streaming). Together, these companies form part of the larger Strum donor network which helps the Azov Brigade fund its operations while also normalizing itself amongst the business community and the public at large.
The Azov Brigade’s social media strategy to promote Strum is notably savvy, making use of both military and civilian influencers. As Strum’s lead designer Mykyta Malyshev put it, “On social media, it’s a competition for just three seconds of someone’s attention… The subscription also needed a well-communicated message. Many foundations have similar services, and the Brigade itself had something like a subscription, but it didn’t attract many signups. We need to grab attention and then convey importance.”
Most of their military influencers are from the standard Azov Brigade but some are part of the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian National Guard “Azov,” a special forces battalion within the broader Azov organization. Most of the military influencers have small platforms of five thousand or less followers; however, Mykola Kush and Maksym Yemelyanenko both have noteworthy followings at around 66,000 and 24,000 followers respectively.
Some of Kush’s following can be attributed to his release in a prisoner swap facilitated by Turkey. The swap saw 215 Ukrainian soldiers (108 from the Azov Brigade) exchanged for 55 Russian soldiers and Viktor Medvedchuk. Regardless of follower counts, the purpose of each of the military influencers is clear: to make the Azov Brigade seem “cool.” Posts frequently feature the influencers in their military gear brandishing weapons. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, civilians also make up a significant portion of their influencers.
Much like the Israel Defense Forces who use attractive women as part of their social media propaganda campaigns, the Azov Brigade employs a similar strategy. Out of the six civilian influencers, five are women, all of whom are conventionally attractive, which helps the Brigade garner more attention. Unlike the military influencers, all of the civilian influencers boast follower counts between 10,000 and 55,000. Four out of six of the influencers are artists with the remaining two being journalists.
Unlike his fellow civilian influencers, Corrie Nieto is a male from America. As stated in his bio, he works for Euromaidan Press, which is funded by the George Soros-backed International Renaissance Foundation. Nieto has covered some globally significant topics including Ryan Wesley Routh’s failed assassination of President Donald Trump. Interestingly, Nieto was able to get an interview with an unnamed source who claims to have known Routh during his time in Ukraine, illustrating the reach and access of some Azov-associated media figures. Nieto is not the only American who has developed an affinity for the Azov Battalion. As previously mentioned, the US government itself appears to view the Azov Battalion as a legitimate force in Ukraine regardless of the organization’s numerous documented human rights abuses.
At the end of the day, Strum represents far more than just a funding source for one military unit. It represents a new model of grassroots militarism which fuses companies, social media influencers, and foreign citizens into a cash cow for armed, extremist groups. Strum successfully blurs the line between consumer culture in the digital age and warfare. By doing this, it shifts responsibility away from governments and towards the individual. This raises an uncomfortable question: if the Azov Brigade is able to turn war into a participatory, monetized, and international experience, how many other groups might use similar tactics?
J.D. Hester is an independent writer born and raised in Arizona. He has previously written for Antiwar.com, Asia Times, The Libertarian Institute, and other websites. You can send him an email at josephdhester@gmail.com. Follow him on X (@JDH3ster).
