COVID-19 immunity may help protect against other bat coronaviruses

Study identifies links between virus host range and immune recognition

The Pirbright Institute

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A Rhinolophus bat. Photo courtesy of Bernard Agwanda, National Museums of Kenya.

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Credit: Bernard Agwanda, National Museums of Kenya

People who recovered from COVID-19 infection or were vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2 are more likely to have immunity to other closely related bat coronaviruses that could have the potential to threaten future human health.

In a joint study by The Pirbright Institute and King’s College London (KCL), scientists found bat coronaviruses most likely to infect a wide range of animal species are those most closely related to SARS-CoV-2 and most likely to be recognised by immunity generated through COVID-19 infection.

The research, funded by the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (UK Research and Innovation - UKRI), Wellcome, and the Medical Research Council (MRC - part of UKRI), is published today in two companion articles in PLOS Biology. 

Researchers examined how a diverse group of bat sarbecoviruses - the coronavirus sub-group that includes SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2 - interact with ACE2, the cellular receptor used by many coronaviruses to enter host cells.

They investigated the ability of these viruses to use ACE2 proteins from a broad range of bat and mammalian species, including humans, livestock, rodents and animals previously proposed as intermediate hosts.

The team discovered so-called "generalist" sarbecoviruses, which can use ACE2 receptors from many different species, were largely confined to the same evolutionary group as SARS-CoV-2.

Pirbright postdoctoral scientist and lead author, Dr Nazia Thakur, said: "Our findings suggest that the bat coronaviruses currently considered most likely to spill over into humans are also most likely to be recognised by existing COVID-19 immunity. While spillover risk can never be eliminated, widespread exposure to SARS-CoV-2 may have raised the barrier for related viruses to establish themselves in human populations."

The team analysed 15 representative bat coronavirus spike proteins using libraries of ACE2 receptors from 34 species. Broad ACE2 usage was a defining feature of viruses closely related to SARS-CoV-2, including the BANAL viruses discovered in Laos. Viruses from other evolutionary groups, including a novel UK bat coronavirus RhGB07, showed more restricted receptor usage. To aid in their analyses the Spike structure of RhGB07 was also resolved by collaborators in Switzerland.

The study also investigated how SARS-CoV-2 host range has evolved during the pandemic. Researchers found variants, particularly those within the Omicron lineage acquired mutations in the receptor binding domain which resulted in shifting patterns of ACE2 usage across animal species, highlighting the dynamic relationship between viral evolution and host susceptibility.

To understand the implications for human health, the scientists examined blood samples from people who had recovered from COVID-19. Antibodies in these samples successfully neutralised a range of closely related bat coronaviruses. Importantly, researchers also detected lower levels of neutralisation against more distant bat sarbecoviruses, suggesting some degree of broader protection.

Katie Doores, Professor of Viral Immunology at KCL, said, “These viruses showed the strongest antigenic similarity to SARS-CoV-2, meaning they were more readily recognised and neutralised by antibodies generated following COVID-19 infection. In contrast, more distantly related bat coronaviruses tended to be "specialists", capable of using ACE2 receptors from only a limited range of hosts.”

Further experiments at KCL and Pirbright identified several monoclonal antibodies capable of recognising a remarkably diverse range of sarbecoviruses. The second companion article identified where these monoclonal antibodies bind, highlighting conserved regions of the coronavirus spike protein, and offering important clues for the development of next-generation vaccines and therapeutics.

Dr Dalan Bailey, head of Pirbright’s Viral Glycoproteins group, added: "One of the encouraging findings was evidence of cross-neutralisation of even some of the more distantly related bat coronaviruses. This suggests that broadly protective, pan-sarbecovirus vaccines or therapeutics may be achievable."

The work highlights the importance of understanding virus host range, receptor usage and immune recognition together rather than in isolation. By identifying characteristics that distinguish higher-risk viruses from those less likely to spill over into humans, researchers hope to strengthen global pandemic preparedness efforts.

An RHGB07 protein spike 

Credit

Kelvin Lau

Journal

PLOS Biology

DOI

10.1371/journal.pbio.3003944

Method of Research

Experimental study

Subject of Research

Animals

Article Title

COVID-19 immunity may help protect against other bat coronaviruses

Article Publication Date

1-Oct-2026

 

Financial stress bleeds into our relationships. But partners who provide emotional support can help.

University of Florida

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When a big credit card bill hits or the rent is due, that stress can bleed into our closest relationships, adding another source of tension between partners.

But according to a new study out of the University of Florida, a partner who provides emotional support – rather than simply trying to solve the financial problems at hand – can reduce how much stress spills over from financial worries into the relationship dynamic.

“Economic issues are increasingly important nowadays, so we wanted to understand how couples handle economic stress, how this can influence their relationship stress and how couples can deal with it,” said Zhongchi Li, a graduate student in psychology at UF and lead author of the new study.

Li and UF Professor of Psychology Gregoy Webster, Ph.D., surveyed 84 unmarried couples about their levels of financial and relationship stress. Each member of the couple filled out a baseline survey. For the next seven days, the couple reported their stress once a day.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, couples who faced greater financial stress when the survey began also reported more stress in their relationships. But the researchers also asked couples about how they coped with this stress. In particular, the surveys focused on two support mechanisms: emotional support and problem solving. 

One was a clear winner, at least during the week-long survey period.

“For financial stress, we found that the most important thing is for partners to show more emotional understanding, show care and be supportive of each other, rather than simply giving them solutions to the problem,” said Li. “Partners who receive more emotional support reduced the spillover of financial stress onto the relationship.”

However, the study was limited to the seven-day diaries. Webster said future research could follow couples over months rather than days, tracking stress around paychecks, rent and other recurring financial obligations to see how relationships are affected in the long term.

For people living paycheck to paycheck, Webster said, a relationship can provide a buffer against financial stress — or compound it, depending in part on how partners communicate.

The study was published Sept. 3 in the journal Personal Relationships.

---

Journal

Personal Relationships

DOI

10.1111/pere.70090

Method of Research

Survey

Subject of Research

People

Article Title

Spillover and Crossover Effects of Financial Stress in Romantic Dyads: A Daily Diary Study

How The US-Saudi Nuclear Deal Could Ignite A Middle East Arms Race – Analysis


Saudi Arabia and the United States sign nuclear agreements. 

Credit: US Department of Energy


September 20, 2026

Observer Research Foundation

By Vivek Mishra and Surya Prakash Noutiyal

Key Takeaways:

A 123 deal, not the UAE “gold standard.” Signed 22 July 2026, the 30-year U.S.–Saudi civil nuclear pact (Atomic Energy Act §123) can move civilian fuel, tech, and kit—and, the author says, leave enrichment on Saudi soil under U.S. monitoring. Riyadh is in the NPT (1988) and has IAEA comprehensive safeguards (2009) but not the Additional Protocol. The UAE’s 2009 deal barred domestic enrichment.

Congress and a Trump aside. Energy Departent: 90 session days for Congress to object. Trump said a day after signing that it hinged on Abraham Accords/Israel; the text does not. MBS in 2023: if Iran gets a bomb, Saudi Arabia would “have to get one.” Author: enrichment up to 20% is the civilian cap named—and the proliferation worry vs Iran’s JCPOA 3.67% cap (later 60% after the U.S. left).

Rivals and spillover. A parallel bilateral safeguards deal is meant to beat China and Russia for the build. Author: Turkey, Egypt, the UAE may want the same rights; Saudi–Pakistan and Mecca (Saudi–Pakistan–Türkiye) defense pacts widen the worry. That last stretch is the writer’s brief, not the treaty text.

The United States (US) and Saudi Arabia have reached a landmark nuclear cooperation agreement (123 agreement) on civil nuclear energy that could provide the Kingdom with an enviable opportunity to enrich uranium on its soil, a prospect that has drawn criticism over the risk of regional nuclear proliferation.

The 123 agreement — a term drawn from Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 — could allow the transfer of civilian nuclear material, technology, and equipment to Saudi Arabia. The move is critical for Riyadh as it undergoes economic diversification, becoming less reliant on the fossil-fuel-based economy and developing a non-fossil-fuel energy mix that includes nuclear energy. In return, the 30-year agreement gives American companies access to Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear market, allowing them to work with local entities to build a multibillion-dollar industry.


Saudi Arabia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1988 and, since 2009, has had a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) covering all its nuclear facilities. However, the Kingdom has not signed the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA broader access to look for undeclared material and activities. Additionally, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s rupture with the Biden administration, Saudi Arabia’s tendency to act independently of the US, and its mutual defence pact with Pakistan all give Washington — and the South Asian region — reason to be cautious.

Along with the 123 agreement, Washington and Riyadh also signed a bilateral safeguards agreement that strengthens the US’s competitive edge in exporting civil nuclear technology to the Kingdom vis-à-vis other nuclear technology-trading countries such as China and Russia. This agreement offers the US significant economic and strategic advantages for long-term business opportunities in the Kingdom. The agreement lays the legal foundation for providing the Kingdom with uranium enrichment capability for its civilian nuclear programme, on the condition that the US monitors Saudi Arabia’s enrichment activities. Critics argue that the agreement lacks the “Gold Standard” that Washington has, for two decades, attached as a condition for nuclear cooperation — requiring countries to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. The UAE is a prime example of this standard being applied.


The US-Saudi nuclear agreement had remained stalled for years. In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Project for Atomic Energy to diversify its energy mix and reduce domestic oil and gas consumption, with plans to build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity generation and water desalination. The US already has a civil nuclear agreement with the UAE, in force since 2009, under which the UAE does not enrich uranium domestically and instead relies on imports of enriched uranium for its nuclear energy programme.

Riyadh’s main sticking point was believed to be its insistence on enriching uranium domestically, something Washington had long been reluctant to allow. Successive US administrations worked toward nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and the Trump administration finally signed the civil nuclear deal on 22 July 2026 — only for President Trump to declare a day later that it was contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and normalising relations with Israel, a condition not mentioned when the deal was announced.

The formal text, however, does not make the deal conditional on Saudi-Israeli normalisation, so it could take effect without it. Israel’s own domestic politics — an approaching election and its refusal to withdraw from Gaza — may have forced Trump’s hand on this point. The deal still carries a built-in buffer: according to the US Department of Energy, it now goes to Congress for review and will enter into force unless Congress votes to object within 90 session days, giving Trump time to test Riyadh’s promise.

Eight months after signing a joint declaration in November 2025, the 123 agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia arrives at a moment when Washington is at war with Iran and in urgent need of regional realignment. US allies in the region, Saudi Arabia included, have been struck by hundreds of Iranian missiles and drones, an onslaught that has threatened Saudi sovereignty, disrupted oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, and reopened the debate about the US’s utility as the Gulf’s security guarantor.


The Crown Prince has long adopted a realistic view about the threat from Iran. In September 2023, Mohammed bin Salman acknowledged that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would “have to get one, for security reasons, for balancing power.” The unpredictability of the ongoing war has since sent Riyadh scrambling for firmer security guarantees. Its early assurance that Saudi soil would not be used to strike Iran gave way as Iranian attacks intensified, eventually forcing Saudi Arabia to launch retaliatory strikes on Iran of its own. A purely defensive posture is proving unsustainable through a prolonged conflict, and with the prospect of Iranian nuclearisation now an open bet, Saudi Arabia wants a clearer path forward.
Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

The Saudi nuclear agreement would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium up to 20 percent. Such a level could be needed to power a small modular civilian reactor, but it also raises the risk of nuclear material being diverted for military purposes in the absence of stringent controls. Washington is applying a markedly different enrichment benchmark to Saudi Arabia than the one it once set for Iran. Under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s uranium enrichment was capped at 3.67 percent for 15 years, after which the restriction would lapse. Trump’s withdrawal from the deal during his first term set in motion a chain of events that saw Iran enrich uranium to as much as 60 percent — for context, 90 percent is considered weapons-grade. The biggest concern around Saudi Arabia’s entry into the nuclear fold is that it could intensify a broader nuclear arms race in the Middle East.


As the US-Iran nuclear deal remains in a quagmire and Iran still possesses its stockpile of enriched uranium, Saudi Arabia’s rush to acquire nuclear technology as a deterrent against Iran is unsurprising. Iran has already demonstrated its ability to control the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt other trade routes in the region. For reliable deterrence, the Kingdom is seeking a sovereign nuclear capability that offers lasting security in the Middle East. Another factor that may have nudged Washington toward a deal with Riyadh was the lurking possibility of Saudi Arabia turning to Russia or China instead.

Through the nuclear agreement, Washington has ensured that Riyadh stays within the ambit of a strategic partnership spanning energy, technology, and regional security. The US-Saudi civil nuclear pact is being billed as the “deal of the century” for the Kingdom: it meets Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy needs while giving Washington leverage to steer Riyadh away from Beijing and Moscow. Perhaps the most consequential spillover from the agreement will be how it shapes Washington’s approach to the nuclear ambitions of other regional powers — Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE among them — especially if Saudi Arabia succeeds in securing enrichment rights on its soil.

The issue of nuclear proliferation has never been more acute for the volatile Middle East. An uncontrolled nuclear expansion in the region could open a Pandora’s box, sharply compounding proliferation concerns. It also raises questions about regional stability at a time when the US is unable to offer its regional allies concrete security guarantees. There is a glaring contradiction at the heart of US policy in the Middle East: on the one hand, Washington is pressuring Iran to halt its nuclear programme and submit to stringent IAEA inspections; on the other, it is helping its long-standing ally, Saudi Arabia, acquire critical nuclear technology whose ultimate designs remain, at best, an open question. This contradiction is likely to heighten tensions among rival Middle Eastern states and fuel a new kind of nuclear arms race. Pakistan’s institutionalised defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia — both the bilateral Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement and the trilateral Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, which brought Turkey into the fold — only widens the avenues for nuclear proliferation rather than narrowing them. Ultimately, a civil nuclear deal between the US and Saudi Arabia, a longstanding regional rival of Iran, is set to further stoke tensions across the region.


About the authors:Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Surya Prakash Noutiyal was a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

About Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
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How Cascading Crises Are Testing Saudi Arabia’s Foundations – OpEd

Jared Kushner speaks with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud of Saudi Arabia in the Outer Oval Office, Tuesday, November 18, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

September 15, 2026

By Murray Hunter

Key Takeaways:

The author says September 2026 piled pressure on Mohammed bin Salman after Houthi seizures of Mocha, Dhubab, Perim in the Bab al-Mandeb, and most of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, plus strikes into southern Saudi provinces.

Drones hit the East–West pipeline to Yanbu while Hormuz was already tight, cutting oil export room. Reports say Riyadh sought help via CENTCOM; the Mecca pact with Turkey and Pakistan has not produced visible military aid.

Oil wealth and security forces still buffer the throne. Named risks are money, legitimacy, and border tribes. How long Yemen stays closed, the piece says, decides whether the shock stays contained.

Events in the Middle East can shift with startling speed, much as the Arab Spring demonstrated how localized triggers can rapidly erode long-standing regimes.

In September 2026, a sequence of military, economic, and diplomatic setbacks has placed significant pressure on Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). What began as a response to Houthi advances in Yemen has disrupted oil exports, exposed gaps in alliances, and raised questions about legitimacy, factors that, if prolonged, could amplify internal vulnerabilities in a system long reliant on oil revenues, coercive control, and regional standing.

The immediate catalyst lies in Yemen. Following Saudi-linked actions, including reported airstrikes, the Houthis launched a rapid offensive. They captured the port of Mocha (Mokha), Dhubab, and other coastal areas, then seized Perim (Mayun) Island in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait along with the Hanish Islands.


This consolidates Houthi control over nearly all of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline (save limited pockets near the Saudi border). Perim sits astride the narrow strait, where sea passages on either side roughly 12 miles (under 20 kilometers). This places shipping within range of short-range missiles and artillery.

The Houthis have restricted traffic, effectively complicating or blocking Saudi-linked vessels while claiming openness to others. Concurrent missile and drone strikes have hit southern Saudi provinces including Jizan, Najran, Asir (Abha and Khamis Mushait), and Sharurah, wounding dozens of civilians, damaging infrastructure (including a mosque), and forcing shelter alerts.

These are primarily aerial attacks rather than sustained ground occupations of Saudi soil, yet they underscore the spillover.

Compounding this, Saudi Arabia’s East-West (Petroline) pipeline, which is critical for moving crude from eastern fields to Red Sea terminals at Yanbu, bypassing the disrupted Strait of Hormuz was hit by drones launched from not yet determined positions. The roughly 1,200-kilometer line was shut down as a precaution amid fires and damage to pumping stations.


With Hormuz constrained by the broader Iran conflict and Red Sea routes now contested, Saudi oil export capacity faces serious constraints. Revenue shortfalls strike at the core of the kingdom’s economic model and Vision 2030 diversification efforts.

Diplomatic isolation has deepened the situation. According to reports citing regional diplomatic officials (including Israel Hayom), MBS indirectly sought intelligence and other assistance from Israel via U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) amid the Houthi advances threatening Bab al-Mandeb.

This followed U.S. President Donald Trump’s reluctance to commit direct military intervention, offering only limited intelligence and targeting support.

Saudi Arabia holds the prestigious role of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca (surrounding the Kaaba) and Al-Masjid an-Nabawi in Medina (containing the Prophet’s burial site). Seeking help from Israel, widely viewed in parts of the Islamic world as a Zionist state, risks perceptions of compromised legitimacy among religious conservatives, Islamists, and the broader Ummah (the Muslim public). Experts note that direct Israeli cooperation remains unlikely due to political sensitivities on both sides.

The recently formalized Makkah (Mecca) Joint Defense Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan, signed in August 2026 and featuring collective-defense language treating an attack on one as an attack on all has yet to yield visible support. Analyses highlight its limited institutionalization, absence of automatic military mechanisms, and credibility gaps, where neither partner has intervened despite ongoing attacks.

Reports of a delayed regional summit in Salalah, Oman (involving Iran and Gulf states on maritime arrangements), further illustrate constrained regional maneuvering, with Saudi Arabia citing the Yemen crisis.

These external shocks intersect with internal dynamics within Saudi Arabia itself. MBS has consolidated power since 2015–2017 through centralization, sidelining rivals (including former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef), co-opting or repressing the religious establishment, and neutralizing organized opposition via surveillance, arrests, and high execution rates.


Support among youth and women for social reforms has broadened the base, while oil wealth and security forces provide buffers. Residual risks exist, where royal family frictions (long-term succession ambiguity), conservative backlash against reforms, Shiite grievances in the Eastern Province, economic discontent from fiscal strain, and fragmented Islamist networks could pose potential issues for the MBS regime.

Border tribes in Najran, Jazan, and Asir add volatility. Transnational confederations (e.g., elements of Khawlan, Waylah, Yam) straddle the Yemen frontier, where Houthi mobilization of aligned factions, cross-border strikes, economic disruption from closed trade and energy attacks, and spillover insecurity create pressures. Divided loyalties and Houthi outreach could complicate local security if the conflict intensifies.

Prolonged revenue loss, military setbacks, and legitimacy questions could embolden elite maneuvering, tribal opportunism, or broader discontent, especially if external actors perceive openings, echoing how rapid crises have historically tested authoritarian systems.

Saudi Arabia retains substantial resources and coercive capacity. Yet the combination of contested chokepoints, oil disruptions, alliance shortfalls, and a high-profile outreach to Israel has created a compressed crisis. Like earlier regional upheavals, the speed of these developments underscores how external shocks can rapidly test internal resilience.

Whether the pressures remain contained or cascade further depends on the duration of the Yemen conflict, restoration of export routes, and the regime’s ability to manage perceptions and potential internal fissures.

Saudi Arabia is currently under immense political strain, where no political partners like the United States and Pakistan are willing to assist presently.

About Murray Hunter
Murray Hunter has been involved in Asia-Pacific business for the last 30 years as an entrepreneur, consultant, academic, and researcher. As an entrepreneur he was involved in numerous start-ups, developing a lot of patented technology, where one of his enterprises was listed in 1992 as the 5th fastest going company on the BRW/Price Waterhouse Fast100 list in Australia. Murray is now an associate professor at the University Malaysia Perlis, spending a lot of time consulting to Asian governments on community development and village biotechnology, both at the strategic level and “on the ground”. He is also a visiting professor at a number of universities and regular speaker at conferences and workshops in the region. Murray is the author of a number of books, numerous research and conceptual papers in referred journals, and commentator on the issues of entrepreneurship, development, and politics in a number of magazines and online news sites around the world. Murray takes a trans-disciplinary view of issues and events, trying to relate this to the enrichment and empowerment of people in the region.
View all posts by Murray Hunter →

 

Russian drones strike near Polish border as train carrying Boris Johnson, EU officials evacuated

Former UK Prime Minister Johnson and other top EU officials were evacuated from their train on the Polish border after a Russian drone attack on the railway. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By bne IntelliNews September 13, 2026

A Russian drone hit a Kyiv-Warsaw passenger train just 2km from Poland and strikes damaged vehicles and a petrol station near the Yahodyn-Dorohusk crossing, threatening a special train carrying former UK prime minister Boris Johnson and senior European officials which had to be evacuated after a drone warning.

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes close to Ukraine's border with Poland on September 13, hitting transport and fuel infrastructure along one of the country's most important connections with the EU and triggering air defence alerts on the Nato side of the frontier.

A Russian drone struck the locomotive of a Kyiv-Warsaw passenger train in Ukraine's Volyn region about 2km from the Polish border, according to Ukrainian state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia. The crew had been warned of the incoming threat and the train was evacuated before the strike. No injuries were reported.

Separately, a petrol station and trucks near the Yahodyn-Dorohusk border crossing caught fire during the attacks. The crossing, one of the principal road links between Ukraine and Poland, was temporarily disrupted. Moscow said its strikes were directed at infrastructure supporting the transport of European military cargo into Ukraine.

The attack came dangerously close to a special train carrying Johnson, Günter Sautter, foreign and security policy adviser to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and other European delegates returning from Kyiv.

Der Spiegel reported that the chartered train was caught in the danger zone and had to be partially evacuated. Passengers were alerted during the journey and prepared to leave the train as the drone warning was issued. Johnson, Sautter and the other passengers were unharmed.

Johnson and Sautter had been in Kyiv for the annual Yalta European Strategy conference, which brought together senior Ukrainian officials and Western politicians, security officials and policymakers. Other participants included Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, UK National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell, former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt and security advisers from France and Italy.

Bild reported that Poland stepped up air defence measures as the attacks approached its territory. Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz said Polish systems detected a group of 12 Russian Geran-5 drones attacking western Ukraine, with one strike about 1km from the Polish border and another about 5km away. Polish F-16 fighters, helicopters and a Saab reconnaissance aircraft were used to monitor the frontier.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha described the attacks as “Putin’s terror ‘knocking’ directly on the doors of the EU and NATO.” He called on Ukraine's partners to increase pressure on Moscow, including through tighter sanctions on Russia's military-industrial complex, restrictions on Russian citizens entering Western countries and a comprehensive trade embargo.

The incident came only days after Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that Russia was likely to target border crossings between Ukraine and European countries.

Tusk said on September 10 that Polish and Ukrainian intelligence services had already prevented a threat to one border crossing and said Warsaw had received intelligence, including a detailed briefing from CIA director John Ratcliffe, suggesting further Russian operations against the crossings could follow.

The warning followed a Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian border post with Moldova that killed two people, underscoring an apparent expansion of attacks against the logistics corridors linking Ukraine to its European neighbours.

The latest strikes form part of a sharp intensification of Russia's long-range drone campaign against western Ukraine and the country's transport network.

Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 453 drones of various types during the latest large-scale attack, including Shahed-type drones, newer jet-powered systems and decoys. Ukrainian forces said more than 400 were shot down or suppressed, although strikes or debris were recorded at multiple locations.

The railway network has come under attack for a second consecutive day. On September 12 Russian drones hit railway infrastructure in Lutsk and Fastiv, including a passenger train in Lutsk. Passengers were evacuated before that strike and no casualties were reported.

The wider September 12 barrage killed at least 10 people and injured dozens across Ukraine, according to Ukrainian officials. Two people were killed when a Russian strike hit a shop in Zviahel in Zhytomyr region, while petrol stations and other economic infrastructure were also attacked.

The growing focus on Ukraine's western regions has raised concerns that Russia is deliberately extending its campaign towards the country's economic and logistical lifelines with the EU. Unlike eastern and central Ukraine, much of the far west had until recently remained relatively insulated from sustained attack.

The strikes also bring Russian weapons increasingly close to Nato territory without crossing it, raising the risk of an accidental spillover or miscalculation at a time when the road and rail corridors through Poland remain critical both for Ukrainian trade and Western supplies.

 

When Foreign Investment Connects: Africa, Asia And The Geography Of Global Production – Analysis

 September 2, 2026

By Danilo Desiderio

Key Takeaways:

• The issue for Africa is not only how much FDI arrives but how deeply MNEs embed: local suppliers, domestic value added, and regional production chains versus export enclaves.
• ADB’s 2026 comparison shows foreign firms can bulk large in exports without matching GVA; East/Southeast Asia linked affiliates into component trade, Latin America sits in between, Africa is more uneven—Morocco autos/aerospace, Ethiopia apparel, Kenya agribusiness as pockets, extractives as the common weak-link case.
• Fragmented markets and thin intermediate-input systems limit spillover; the next frontier is turning isolated plants into continental production networks, not just more capital.

The debate on foreign investment in Africa tends often to focus on how much capital the continent attracts. Yet the volume of investment says little about its developmental impact. Firms invest abroad for different reasons and through different models, but multinational enterprises (MNEs) are particularly important because of their capacity to organise production across borders, connect suppliers to international markets and transfer technology and know-how. The critical question, therefore, is not simply whether foreign firms invest in Africa, but how deeply that investment becomes embedded in the economies where it operates. Does it generate local suppliers, domestic value added and regional production linkages, or does it remain relatively disconnected from the wider productive economy?

The Asian Development Policy Report 2026 provides a useful comparative lens because it examines the contribution of foreign MNEs to gross value added and exports. The comparison points to important differences between Africa and the economies of Asia and the Pacific, while also revealing substantial variation within the Asian region. The report suggests that Africa’s challenge is not only quantitative (in terms of the volume of foreign capital it attracts), but also qualitative: the extent to which that investment becomes embedded in domestic and regional productive networks.

This is, however, not a uniform story. The continent contains markedly different patterns of MNE integration. Morocco, for example, has become an important production base for European automotive and aerospace companies, with foreign firms increasingly connected to local suppliers and export markets. Ethiopia and Kenya have also developed pockets of integration into apparel, agribusiness and other value chains. These cases demonstrate that African economies can become platforms for internationally connected production. The broader problem is that such integration remains relatively concentrated and uneven across countries and sectors, and less extensive than the dense production networks that characterize much of East and Southeast Asia.

The regional comparison provides a useful way of putting this unevenness into perspective.  The graphic below, extracted from the Asian Development Policy Report 2026, compares the contribution of MNEs to domestic production and exports across regions. The comparison reveals an important distinction: the foreign-MNE footprint in exports does not necessarily translate into a commensurate contribution to domestic gross value added (GVA). This is particularly relevant for Africa, where foreign firms can account for a significant share of exports while their contribution to economy-wide value added remains comparatively more limited. The gap points to a deeper question about the nature of foreign investment: how far is it connected to the wider productive economy through domestic suppliers, value creation and regional production networks, rather than operating primarily through relatively self-contained export-oriented activities? The figure does not by itself answer this question, but it provides a useful starting point for examining the extent to which foreign investment becomes embedded in the economies in which it operates.

Figure 1: Share of Foreign MNEs in Gross Value Added and Exports (% GDP)

The experience of the more deeply integrated Asian economies (indicated in the graphic with the acronym AAP) helps explain why this distinction matters. In many Asian economies, foreign MNEs became central actors in export-oriented production systems. They did not merely establish factories; they connected economies through trade in components, intermediate inputs and services. Foreign affiliates became embedded in supplier networks and regional production chains, linking domestic firms to international markets. The result was a close relationship between MNE presence, exports and domestic productive transformation.

The question of embeddedness is ultimately inseparable from the broader question of how regional production systems develop. In “Emerging States and Economies”, Sugihara argues that Asian industrialization was associated with a mutually reinforcing relationship between intra-regional trade and industrialization, a dynamic that developed much less extensively in Africa and Latin America. Accordingly, the significance of the Asian experience lies not simply in its ability to attract foreign firms, but in its ability to embed those firms within dense regional production networks, where capital, technology, intermediate goods and production stages move across borders.

Latin America presents a different configuration. Foreign MNEs play a substantial role in production and exports, and several economies have developed sophisticated export industries. Yet the region has generally developed denser regional production networks than Africa, but less extensive ones than those found in East and Southeast Asia. Foreign investment has therefore been important without generating the same degree of cross-border fragmentation of production found in many Asian value chains. The relevant divide, therefore, is not between regions that attract MNEs and those that do not, but between different degrees and forms of productive integration.

Africa’s internal diversity makes this distinction particularly important. Morocco’s automotive industry, Ethiopia’s apparel sector, and Kenyan agro-processing and horticultural exports demonstrate that African economies can become effectively integrated into international value chains. Yet these successes coexist with a much larger group of economies where foreign investment remains concentrated in extractive industries or other activities with relatively limited linkages to domestic suppliers and regional production. The result is an uneven landscape, with pockets of deep integration alongside large areas of relatively weak productive embeddedness.

The distinction is crucial. An MNE that sources locally, transfers technology, develops suppliers and exports through regional production networks can generate effects that extend well beyond its own balance sheet. An investment operating largely as an enclave generates far fewer such linkages. The issue, therefore, is not whether foreign companies are present in Africa. They clearly are. The question is whether their presence helps create broader production ecosystems.

This is where Africa’s structural disadvantage becomes apparent. Many economies still lack the dense combination of domestic firms, intermediate-input markets, infrastructure, finance and regional connectivity that allows foreign investment to generate cumulative productive effects. Fragmented national markets reinforce the problem. Even where an individual African country has successfully attracted an MNE, the absence of efficient regional trade can limit the scope for developing cross-border supplier networks and production specialization.

The comparative lesson from Asia, Latin America and Africa is not that foreign investment is inherently transformative, but that its impact depends on what it connects to. Where foreign firms become embedded in dense networks of domestic suppliers, regional trade and cross-border production, investment can become a powerful engine of structural transformation. Africa already offers examples of this model. The challenge is to turn these pockets of integration into a much broader continental pattern. 

After decades of attracting foreign capital, the next frontier for Africa is therefore not simply more investment, but investment that builds lasting links between firms, suppliers, skills and production across African economies, turning individual projects into building blocks of an integrated African production system.

About Danilo Desiderio

Danilo Desiderio is a trade policy specialist focusing on customs systems, trade facilitation, and regional integration, with particular emphasis on trade and logistics dynamics in Africa. He is the Founder and CEO of Desiderio Consultants, a Nairobi-based advisory firm in Kenya. His research adopts an interdisciplinary approach, combining institutional economics, trade theory, and behavioural analysis to examine the operational and systemic dimensions of trade governance, contributing both to practitioner-oriented reforms and to emerging conceptual frameworks in trade analysis. He is also a trade policy expert and Senior Associate at the Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute (HESPI).

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