India
No, Pakistan's non-Muslim population didn't decline from 23% to 3.7% as BJP claims
During the debate on the Citizenship Amendment Bill in Parliament, the BJP repeatedly claimed that population of religious minorities in Pakistan has declined from 23% in 1947 to 3.7% in 2011. Analysis of official data however shows this argument is faulty.

Mukesh Rawat New Delhi December 12, 2019 UPDATED: December 12, 2019 23:59 IST


It is a fact that religious minorities have been persecuted and face discrimination in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but the figures quoted by the BJP are untrue. (Photo: Reuters file)

While moving the Citizenship Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha on Monday, Union Home Minister Amit Shah said at the time of Independence, non-Muslims comprised 23 per cent of Pakistan's population and that by 2011 their share was reduced to 3.7 per cent.

With regards to Bangladesh, he claimed that in 1947, non-Muslims comprised 22 per cent of its population and their share in 2011 fell to 7.8 per cent.

Amit Shah's verbatim quote in Hindi: "1947 main Pakistan ke andar alpasankhyakon ki aabadi 23 pratishat thi, aur 2011 main wog ghat kar 3.7 pratishat ho gayi. Bangladesh main 1947 main aplsankhyakon ki aabadi 22 pratishat thi aur 2011 main wo kam ho kar 7.8 pratishat ho gayi. Kahan gaye ye log? Ya toh unka dharm parivartan hua. Ya wo maar diye gaye, ya bhaga diye gaye, ya Bharat aa gaye."

(Refer to Amit Shah's speech from the video on his Twitter profile below from 9min 40sec onwards for this quote.)
Replying on Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2019 in Lok Sabha. https://t.co/L2A9ZcbCny
Amit Shah (@AmitShah) December 9, 2019

On Wednesday, while moving the Citizenship Amendment Bill in the Rajya Sabha, Amit Shah reiterated his claim, saying Pakistan and Bangladesh have seen a decline of up to 20 percentage points in their populations of religious minorities.

"Whan ke alpshankyak kahan gaye? Ya toh vo maar diye gaye, ya unhone Bharat main sharan liya (Where did the minorities disappear in Pakistan and Bangladesh? Either they were persecuted or they took shelter in India)," Amit Shah said in the Rajya Sabha.

This has been a position maintained by the Bharatiya Janata Party and its supporters. To highlight the persecution of religious minorities in Pakistan (particularly of the Hindus), the BJP and right-wing Hindu organisations in India have been citing similar figures to argue that non-Muslims were brutally persecuted in an Islamic Pakistan after the Partition of 1947.

But how true are these numbers? Has population of non-Muslims in Pakistan really shrunk to 3.7 per cent today from a high of 23 per cent? What is the basis of this claim?

IndiaToday.in's analysis of Pakistan's Census data shows that these claims are faulty.


TRACING PAKISTAN's NON-MUSLIM POPULATION

Pakistan got its identity as a separate nation on August 14, 1947. Back then, Pakistan also included present-day Bangladesh which was known as East Pakistan. These two territories were carved out as a new independent nation with Islam as its state religion.

There is no authentic and reliable official data on the religious composition of Pakistan's population in 1947. While presenting the data on religious composition of Pakistan in 1947 in his speech, Home Minister Amit Shah did not mention his source either. A similar figure was mentioned in an article published by the Hudson Institute in 2013. The artilce 'Cleansing Pakistan of Minorities' was written by Farahnaz Ispahani, former member of Pakistan's Parliament. But she too did not mention the source of her figures.

The preceding figures on Pakistan's religious composition that are available are from Census 1941. But since it was conducted in an undivided India, referring to it is futile as it doesn't reflect the ground situation created just after the bloodied Partition in 1947.

After its formation, the first census in Pakistan was carried out in 1951. This census included both East and West Pakistan.

As per this census, the share of Muslims in Pakistan's overall population in 1951 was 85.80 per cent, while the share of non-Muslims was 14.20 per cent. (Pakistan here refers to East and West Pakistan taken together).

What is important to note in Census 1951 is that Pakistan's non-Muslim population wasn't evenly distributed.

In West Pakistan, the non-Muslim population was just 3.44 per cent, while in East Pakistan (today's Bangladesh) they had a significant share comprising 23.20 per cent of the population therein.

As per Census 1951, share of Muslims in Pakistan's overall population was 85.80%, while share of non-Muslims was 14.20%.

To understand the change in population of religious minorities in present-day Pakistan, we need to separately analyse the trends in West Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

WHAT HAPPENED IN WEST PAKISTAN

In 1951, Muslims comprised 96.56 per cent of the total population in the territory that is today known as Pakistan. The table below details the religious composition of each of Pakistan's five provinces.

The next census in Pakistan was carried out in 1961 which said the non-Muslim population in West Pakistan had reduced to 2.83 per cent of West Pakistan's total population.

By 1972 when Pakistan carried out its third census, East Pakistan had been liberated and was now known as Bangladesh.

The 1972 census shows non-Muslims in Pakistan comprised 3.25 per cent of the total population. This was higher than their share in 1961. By the time the next census was carried out in 1981, Pakistan's non-Muslim population saw a miniscule rise--from 3.25 per cent in 1972 to 3.30 per cent in 1981.

Following Census 1981, Pakistan did not carry out a fresh census for more than 15 years and the next census was carried out in 1998.

As per this census, Pakistan's non-Muslim population was 3.70 per cent of the total population in 1998.

Recently, though Pakistan carried out a fresh census in 2017 but its religious data is yet to be released.

ALSO READ | Abduction, oppression and forced conversion is fate of Hindus in Pakistan

Thus in a nutshell, based on Pakistan's census data we find:

1) Population of non-Muslims was never 23 per cent of Pakistan's total population.

2) Even in undivided Pakistan, share of non-Muslim population never even touched the 15 per cent mark. (The highest was 14.2 per cent in 1951.)

3) When it comes to today's Pakistan (i.e. erstwhile West Pakistan), non-Muslims comprised 3.44 per cent of the region's population in 1951.

4) Census data show that share of non-Muslims in Pakistan has hovered around 3.5 per cent over the decades.


THE SITUATION IN EAST PAKISTAN (today's BANGLADESH)

Now, since the trend of non-Muslim population in the region that comprises Pakistan today is clear, we shall look at what happened in East Pakistan, which in 1971 became Bangladesh.

Pakistan's census data show that non-Muslims formed 23.20 per cent of East Pakistan's total population in 1951.

Over the years, this share has indeed reduced significantly, but still not as much as the BJP has claimed.

By 1961, share of non-Muslims in East Pakistan had reduced to 19.57 per cent, In 1974 it further reduced to 14.60 per cent; in 1981 to 13.40 per cent; in 1991 to 11.70 per cent and in 2001 to 10.40 per cent.

Bangladesh's latest census carried out in 2011 revealed that the share of non-Muslims has gone below 10 per cent of the country's overall population. In 2011, non-Muslims comprised 9.60 per cent of Bangladesh's population.

Thus, between 1951 and 2011, population of non-Muslims shrunk from a high of 23.20 per cent to a low 9.40 per cent.

ALSO READ | 1,792 persecutions on minorities in 11 months in Bangladesh, claims Hindu alliance

WHERE BJP'S CLAIM IS WRONG

Having separately examined the trend in population change in the regions that are today known as Pakistan and Bangladesh, let's examine the claims made by the BJP.

The BJP has claimed:

1) Population of non-Muslims in Pakistan has reduced from 23 per cent at the time of Independence to 3.7 per cent in 2011.

2) Population of non-Muslims in Bangladesh was 22 per cent at the time of Independence and has been reduced to 7.8 per cent in 2011.

3) This decline in population share of non-Muslims in these two Islamic countries was due to widespread religious persecution.

As discussed earlier, there is no official data on the religious composition of Pakistan at the time of Partition (then including today's Bangladesh). The closest official figures available are from Census 1951. What happened between 1947 and 1951 is subject to individual interpretation.

It is a fact that thousands of non-Muslims were persecuted in Pakistan at the time of Partition in 1947 (just as thousands of Muslims were persecuted in India). Besides this, thousands of Hindus and other religious minorities left Pakistan and entered India in 1947 and thousands of Muslims left India to become Pakistani citizens. This widespread migration and killings did alter the religious composition of the regions concerned in comparison to the situation before Partition. But the exact scale of these persecutions and migration remains unknown in absence of data, and hence the population share of non-Muslims in Pakistan in 1947 remains unknown.

Taking Pakistan's Census 1951 as benchmark for our analysis, we find that while raising the issue of religious persecution in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the BJP mixed-up data for the two regions.

Firstly, it said non-Muslims once comprised 23 per cent of Pakistan's population. The fact rather is that non-Muslims comprised 23 per cent of only East Pakistan's population, not the entire country. Taken together (East plus West Pakistan), share of non-Muslims was 14.20 per cent (the highest ever) in 1951.

Secondly, the BJP claimed that share of non-Muslims reduced from 23 per cent to 3.7 per cent in Pakistan. This too is incorrect because share of non-Muslims in Pakistan has hovered around 3.5 per cent from the first census onwards.

1951: 3.44 per cent

1961: 2.80 per cent

1972: 3.25 per cent

1981: 3.33 per cent

1998: 3.70 per cent

Thirdly, the BJP is correct in saying that the percentage share of non-Muslims has decreased significantly in Bangladesh. But it is wrong in saying that the decline was from 22 per cent to 7.8 per cent. As per official census data, the decline was from 23.20 per cent in 1951 to 9.40 per cent in 2011.

Fourthly, BJP has argued that religious persecution was the reason for decline of non-Muslim population in Bangladesh. There is no denying that religious minorities were brutally persecuted for decades in East Pakistan and later also in Bangladesh. It is a fact that hundreds of them were raped, murdered and forcibly converted into Islam.

But besides religious persecution, there were other strong factors that contributed in out-migration of non-Muslims from Bangladesh, which too resulted in decline of their share in population.

Persecution based on language in Bangladesh and greener economic opportunities in India have been strong push factors in Bangladesh for thousands of illegal immigrants who entered and settled in India.

These illegal immigrants are not just Hindus, but also comprise a sizable number of Bengali Muslims. Thus out-migration from Bangladesh has been a multi-factored phenomenon. Ascribing it entirely to persecution of religious minorities is erroneous.

This, however, does not reject the fact that religious minorities have been persecuted, raped and forcibly converted in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In many instances, such prosecution had explicit or tacit approval of the government in power.

This was particularly true in during decades of military rule and even after 1971 when East Pakistan was liberated and Bangladesh formed.

In summation, it appears that while championing the cause of religious minorities in Bangladesh and Pakistan, the BJP has used the 23 per cent figure of non-Muslims in Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) in 1951 and compared it with the 3.7 per cent figure of non-Muslims in Pakistan in 1998.

The result of this mix-up is a narrative that says population share of non-Muslims has been reduced from 23 per cent to 3.7 per cent in Pakistan.

(NOTE: An earlier version of this article had a line which said "Census data show that share of non-Hindus in Pakistan has hovered around 3.5 per cent over the decades". This line was part of the four bullet points just above the sub-head 'The situation in East Pakistan'. Instead of 'non-Hindus', the term should have been 'non-Muslims'. The error is regretted and has been corrected.)


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Pakistan celebrates 75th Independence Day with patriotic enthusiasm

This year also marks 75 years of bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan.

By ARSHAD MEHMOOD/THE MEDIA LINE
Published: AUGUST 15, 2022 

People are silhouetted as fireworks explode to celebrate on the eve of Pakistan's 75th Independence Day, in Peshawar, Pakistan, August 13, 2022.
(photo credit: REUTERS/FAYAZ AZIZ)

[Islamabad] Pakistan is celebrating its 75th Independence Day full of enthusiasm and national spirit.

The country came into being after gaining independence from Britain on August 14, 1947. In celebration, national green crescent flags have been hoisted on government buildings in all cities including the federal capital, Islamabad.

The Independence Day celebrations began early Sunday morning with a 31-gun salute in the federal capital and a 21-gun salute in all provincial capitals. The main feature of the celebrations was the flag-hoisting ceremony at the president’s house in Islamabad.

Pakistan’s President Arif Alvi was set to confer civil awards on Pakistani citizens and foreign nationals for showing excellence and courage in their respective fields.

Customary ceremonies for the changing of the guards also were scheduled for the shrines of the founder of the nation Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Karachi, and for national poet Allama Muhammad Iqbal in Lahore.

Pakistan's national flag flatters during a ceremony to celebrate Pakistan's 75th Independence Day, at the Mausoleum of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Karachi, Pakistan, August 14, 2022. (credit: REUTERS/AKHTAR SOOMRO)

At 8:00 a.m. sirens sounded across the country, stopping traffic, while a moment of silence was observed. Senior officials laid wreaths on the graves of those killed during the struggle for independence, while prayer ceremonies also were organized across the country.

All public and private buildings were set to be illuminated at night.

In connection with Independence Day, Pakistani embassies around the world planned to organize special events. Such special events are meant to pay homage to those people who lost their lives in the struggle for freedom.

History

Pakistan separated from India in 1947, and was named the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Before the partition of India and Pakistan, the subcontinent was called British India, and it was a British colony ruled by the British East India Company. Prior to British rule, the Mughal Empire governed the sub-continent for centuries. In the 18th century, the land became part of British India.

Under the partition plan proposed months before it took place, British India was to be split into two dominions, a Muslim majority Pakistan and a secular state of India. What followed was months of bloodshed along the borders of the two newly-formed nations. About 15 million people became refugees.

As the clock struck midnight on August 14, 1947, the British colonial government was drowned out by the screams of millions of people walking through the corpse-strewn landscape of an emerging Pakistan. The migration of tens of millions of people between India and Pakistan that came with the partition has been called the largest migration in history.

During the migration, thousands of innocent Muslims were killed by Hindu and Sikh mobs; meanwhile, tens of thousands of Muslim women were raped.

Pakistan is the seventh largest country in the world and the only Muslim-majority country to possess nuclear weapons.

Nation in crisis

“Indeed, Pakistan is currently going through the worst crisis in its history and now the nation is in desperate need of the same spirit with which it gained freedom from British slavery 75 years ago.”Riffat Ayesha, historian

Pakistan has been suffering from a severe political and economic crisis in recent months. The daily fall in the currency has significantly increased inflation, leading to increased difficulties for the average citizen.

Riffat Ayesha of Sargodha in Punjab province, a scholar who holds a master’s degree in history, told The Media Line: “Indeed, Pakistan is currently going through the worst crisis in its history and now the nation is in desperate need of the same spirit with which it gained freedom from British slavery 75 years ago.”

“In 1947, the whole nation needed a country, now the country needs the same resolute nation that gained independence from Britain with immense difficulties and without resources,” she added. “Our nation has to repeat the same determination to rebuild a strong Pakistan.”

“On this Independence Day, the nation has to take a pledge once again that without any racial, color or religious discrimination, everyone has to work together to get Pakistan out of political and economic challenges,” she said, calling on the country “to unite and initiate the teachings of peace, brotherhood and love.”

In addition to Independence Day celebrations, the country also is celebrating the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the United States.

The United States recognized Pakistan as an independent state on August 15, 1947.

Military relations between the US and Pakistan have been consistently close and, during the US-led invasion in Afghanistan, Pakistan was declared a frontline ally in the war on terror.

Ahead of Pakistan’s Independence Day, US Ambassador to Pakistan Donald Blome visited the mausoleum of Pakistan’s founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah in Karachi on Thursday and laid a wreath there.

The ambassador signed the guestbook on behalf of the US Embassy in Islamabad. “The US shares Mohammed Ali Jinnah‘s vision of a Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors, a Pakistan of religious tolerance, economic prosperity, and social inclusion. On behalf of the American people, I offer Pakistan warm congratulations on its 75th Independence Day,” Blome wrote, according to the embassy

The embassy said in a statement that: “This year marks 75 years of bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan. The United States values our long-standing cooperation with Pakistan and has always viewed a strong, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan as critical to US interests.”

“We support strengthening economic ties between our two countries by expanding private sector trade and investment, which benefits both countries,” the statement also said.

The Pakistan-US relationship has fluctuated over the years, analysts told The Media Line.

Naeem Khalid Lodhi, a retired three-star general and Pakistan’s former defense minister, told The Media Line that “America is a super power and likely to stay so for the foreseeable future. Pakistan did well by aligning itself with the US from its very inception.”

He added that “there have been ups and down in these relations mainly due to misunderstandings and at times because of divergent interests.”

Lodhi also said that “Pakistan’s inability to spell out clearly or accurately its own inalienable rights and interests has at times soured the relationship, but generally relations remained good even during difficult times, within workable limits.”

Lodhi said that the relationship currently is experiencing a “difficult phase” due to issues including internal disharmony, the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, and issues in dealing with China, including the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Despite the current difficulties, “Pakistan’s main economic, social and political interests are still firmly embedded in the West, Middle East and the US,” he said.

Lodhi said that “to reinvigorate the shaky relations, the two countries’ foreign offices and leadership must sit down and resolve the present and future cooperative model.”

Most of the US-Pakistan relationship has been focused on defense and humanitarian issues, Irina Tsukerman, a New York-based national security and south Asian analyst, told The Media Line.

The peak of the relationship has been Pakistan’s role in assisting the US efforts against the former Soviet Union in the 1980s, particularly in the transfer of arms and the training of the mujahedeen. “The same role later caused tensions with Pakistan choosing to arm hardliners, and the US more recently distancing itself over the failure to handle extremism,” she said.

The circumstances surrounding the assassination of Osama bin Laden also led to some level of diplomatic tensions, Tsukerman said.

“US humanitarian support for Pakistan was largely tied to Pakistan’s regional security role,” she added.

“The US has repeatedly expressed concern over human rights issues in Pakistan, particularly over religious freedom issues, but has also expressed support for initiatives related to women's rights, such as education,” Tsukerman said.

She noted that “the US has focused on keeping regional balance and stability, but as other countries have surpassed Pakistan as mediator and power brokers on key issues such as the peace process with the Taliban, Pakistan drifted further into China's and Russia's sphere of influence. Although after Imran Khan's departure Pakistan has tried to pivot back to its traditional relationship with the US.”

Tuskerman also told The Media Line that Pakistan's “political fictionalized and popular sectarianism makes it a complicated landscape to navigate for the US, and the level of distrust between the countries is high”.

“US officials are reluctant to return to reliance on Pakistan security services. The relationship needs to be rebuilt on other principles,” she added.

Lieutenant General (ret) Abdul Qayyum, former military secretary to the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a former senator, and the chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Defense Production, told The Media Line that, “barring few exceptional periods like President Eisenhower’s era, unfortunately, the US used Pakistan to thwart communism through Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)/Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) pacts and the Afghan war but could not stop India’s naked aggression against former East Pakistan.”

Qayyum also said that “during Afghanistan’s invasion, the US-led forces frequently utilized Pakistan’s soil, but Pakistan was never paid any compensation to ensure the repatriation of Afghan refugees.”

He told The Media Line that Pakistan was “severely punished” for becoming a frontline ally in the US-led war on terror. As a result, he said “the local supporters of the Afghan Taliban formed armed organizations and started terrorist attacks in Pakistan; as a result, more than 70,000 Pakistani citizens lost their lives while the infrastructures were severely destroyed. Moreover, the US never extended its moral and diplomatic support to stop Indian atrocities in Jammu and Kashmir.”

Qayyum said that the “US should realize the importance of Pakistan’s pivotal strategic location, which provides a safe gateway to Central Asian Republics and the Middle East.”

He also stressed that Pakistan’s “relationship with the US cannot come at the expense of our historically deep relationship with China, and if we buy cheap Russian oil or Iranian gas to meet our energy needs, the US should not have any objection."

 

Strategic Choices Of Pakistan Amid US And Chinese Investments – Analysis

 February 28, 2025  

By Shafaq Zernab and Muhammad Ahmad Khan

Pakistan is walking a tightrope in its geopolitical and geo-economic orientations compounded by regional security issues and internal rifts hindering its capacity to respond decisively. Trump’s resurgence and enduring ascent of China is shaping a decisive global order to tip the balance towards either coexistence or strategic competition. Pakistan must safeguard its national interests through pragmatic balancing without extreme alignments in this shifting landscape. Given the substantial US and Chinese investments in Pakistan___each advancing its regional interests___Pakistan’s ability to hedge strategically will determine its success in leveraging opportunities and mitigating risks. 

Since independence, the Pakistan-US relationship has mainly been transactional, driven by Washington’s strategic interests, whether countering the Soviets in 1989, security concerns after 9/11, or stabilizing Afghanistan until 2021. When the interest was served, aid often declined. In contrast, Pakistan’s relations with China have remained steady since 1951. The Karakoram Highway marked the beginning of significant Chinese investment, leading to long-term partnerships in energy, mining, and strategic infrastructure like Gwadar Port. CPEC, being a $62 billion flagship project, puts Pakistan at a pivotal position in China’s BRI strategy. 

Keeping these relations as a pre-requisite, this insight analyzes the US and China’s comparative investment strategies in Pakistan, emphasizing the need for Pakistan to recalibrate its foreign policy to safeguard its national interests by balancing its relations with these global powers.

The US investment strategies, initially in the form of aid, follow a predictable script contingent upon its regional strategic interests. Over the years, the US has invested in areas like energy, defence, economy, health, education, etc. Graph I shows that being a Western ally in the Cold War gambit, Pakistan received nearly $2 billion of substantial military aid from 1953 to 1961. The aid was suspended during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and 1971 and further deteriorated after Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions in 1979. The 1980s Afghan war reignited the Pakistan-US strategic alliance, which took another nosedive after the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. 

However, the alliance peaked after 9/11, with a surge in aid distinct from private investments, where Pakistan received approximately $7.89 billion in the “Coalition Support Fund”. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill (2009) allocated $7.5 billion for development from 2010 to 2014.  In 2017, the U.S. government, through the Pakistan Private Investment Initiative (PPII), invested over 7.5 billion PKR in Pakistan’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The initiative leverages local expertise via the Abraaj Pakistan Fund, the Pakistan Catalyst Fund, and the Baltoro Growth Fund, each receiving 2,496 million PKR from USAID, amounting to a total of 15.6 billion PKR, including their own investments. 

The US-China rivalry and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 marked a shift in Pakistan-US relations, narrowing aid from $2 billion annually to eventually complete suspension. Private investment dropped to a mere $1.5 billion. Currently, US interests in Pakistan focus on counterterrorism, governance reforms, and conditional aid, shaped by the US-China impasse and concerns over regional radicalization threatening Pakistan’s internal security. 

Despite periodic sanctions, including the latest on ballistic missile technology in December 2024, Pakistan-US relations have persisted. However, the US-India partnership, marked by $20 million in defence deals, reflects Washington’s broader strategy to counterbalance China in Asia. Spanning over 7 decades, Pak-China relations, as described by President Xi as “Iron Brothers”, have stood the test of time. In Pakistan, significant Chinese investment started in 2015, and since then, it has emerged as the largest investor in Pakistan, accounting for 30% of total FDI. In FY2024, the investment stood at $ 224.81 million. China’s approach in Pakistan can be characterized by its pilot project, CPEC, which is a US$ 62 billion venture that builds infrastructure, energy projects, industrial units, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The purpose is to connect the deep-sea ports of Pakistan with the Chinese Xinjiang province and overland routes. 

Over the past decade, USD 44,370 million have been invested in 26 schemes, and 66 more projects worth USD 36.9 billion are in the pipeline. Thus far, CPEC has created 200,000 jobs in Pakistan, built 809 km of road, added over 10,000 MW of electricity to the national grid, and installed 886km of power transmission lines. The First Metro line in Lahore was a substantial project under CPEC. (see sector-wise investment graph in million dollars)

In September 2024, 25 Chinese companies pledged investments in Pakistan’s textile, technology, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, logistics, medical equipment, automobile, and education sectors. Several MoUs were signed for a $10 billion Chinese investment in four major export-oriented sectors: agriculture, food, textile, and car spare parts manufacturing. A protocol was signed with a Chinese investor to cultivate peanuts across 10,000 acres in Cholistan for export. Telecommunication companies like Zong, Huawei, and Changan Plant are prominent examples of Chinese investments. General Yang Yundong showed interest in investing $1 billion in establishing a medical city in Pakistan. 

China’s refusal to restructure Pakistan’s energy debt, totalling $16 billion, highlights the limits of this “Iron Brothers” partnership. Furthermore, recent tensions over Gwadar Port control and Pakistan’s request for sea-based nuclear capabilities indicate strains in the relationship, compounded by China’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The graph shows the comparative net FDI by China (red) and the US (blue) over the past decade, depicting a sharp decline in Chinese investments in 2018 due to government regulations and repayment concerns. Despite notable advances, Pakistan faces hindrances on nine priority SEZs, particularly the ML-1 railway line connecting Karachi to Peshawar, which inflated the cost to 45%. The US approach remained stagnant, depicting limited strategic investments. 

A comparative analysis of US and Chinese investment strategies in Pakistan reveals diverging strategic ambitions. The US focuses on conditional aid and private sector development in non-traditional areas. Meanwhile, China’s loan-driven investments in regional connectivity and energy routes may burden Pakistan despite promising expansion.

The future prognosis vindicates that Chinese and US investments will continue to shape Pakistan’s trajectory, necessitating a foreign policy revamp from hard-core alliances to issue-based multilateralism. The US is capable of swindling Pakistan’s politics through monetary institutions. For instance, the World Bank cancelled a $500 million loan under PACE-II because Pakistan could not renegotiate its terms with power plant agreements under CPEC. Similarly, Pakistan’s lapses in security assurances of Chinese nationals have slowed down CPEC investments.China refused to reopen big deals and restructure energy debt totalling around $16 billion.

The US is a key trade partner and influential in global economic institutions. At the same time, China provides Pakistan with crucial economic infrastructure, so hedging strategically is paramount for Pakistan without disengaging with either of them.  

Pakistan must strengthen indigenous capacity building by investing in domestic industries and leveraging its mineral and cold reserves to reduce reliance on external aid. (see Graph) Pakistan must also maintain diplomatic agility to navigate the US-China rivalry without compromising its sovereignty. Utilizing the global Pakistani diaspora to enhance soft power and attract foreign direct investment is crucial to escape the vicious cycle. Pakistan needs to demonstrate tangible progress on security and economic ends to ensure viability under CPEC and continued partnership with the US. Harness soft power, leverage its diaspora, and boost indigenous capacity building to improve income and attract FDI to escape the vicious debt cycle.  

About the authors:

• Shafaq Zernab is a Research Intern at India Study Centre, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.
• Muhammad Ahmad Khan is a Research Associate at India Study Centre, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.

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Shafaq Zernab

Shafaq Zernab is a Research Intern at India Study Centre, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.

PAKISTAN
THE ROOTS OF THE RAGE AGAINST AMERICA

Zahid Hussain
Published May 1, 2022 


LOANG READ

The crowd of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) supporters at the Islamabad rally on March 27 was already charged — their party leader seemed to be on his way out, and various other politicians and stakeholders had clearly banded together to ensure his ouster.

The crowd wanted to know what their leader had in store for them. Imran Khan had promised them a revelation, and he surely delivered.

The then prime minister pulled out a paper that would further electrify this crowd. He brandished before them a ‘letter’, evidence of an ‘American-sponsored conspiracy’ to oust his government. What came next was all too familiar to anyone who has lived in, or observed, Pakistan over the decades. Chants of ‘down with America’, and a doubling down of the foreign conspiracy mantra.

Given deep-rooted anti-American sentiments in Pakistani society, the public response to the conspiracy narrative has not been surprising. The narrative of a ‘foreign conspiracy’ may have failed to prevent the unravelling of the former ruling coalition, but a populist, ultra-nationalist rhetoric has galvanised Khan’s supporters.


Weeks after former Prime Minister Imran Khan first claimed an American conspiracy to oust his government, he and his party continue to stick doggedly to the narrative — even in the absence of evidence. What do politicians hope to gain from inflaming anti-American sentiments? And why does this narrative continue to resonate in Pakistan?

Interestingly, as is now clear, the allegation has been built around a cable from the outgoing Pakistan ambassador to Washington, based on his conversations with senior-level US State Department officials. It is simply a diplomat’s analysis of the existing views in Washington regarding the Khan-led government.

A file photo shows an anti-US and anti-Israel protest in Karachi | White Star

Imran Khan’s move to weaponise this and whip up nationalist sentiments has dangerously polarised the country. It has not been uncommon in Pakistan’s power game to use the ‘anti-state’ label against political rivals. Almost every political leader in the country has, at one time or the other, been branded a traitor.

But Khan has taken this to a new level. He has declared himself the sole defender of national interests, while painting all his opponents as ‘American agents’.

It is not only the opposition. Journalists and members of the civil society have also been constantly targeted in this ongoing campaign orchestrated by the party’s top leadership. Even social interactions with foreign diplomats have been labelled as anti-state. (Khan’s own recent meeting with a US Congresswoman has been an exception, of course).

Khan is back on the proverbial container, marking the beginning of what he describes as a “freedom struggle” against a “foreign conspiracy of regime change.” He vows to bring down the so-called “imported government”.

The long history of external involvement in Pakistani politics — particularly the decades-long Pak-US relations rollercoaster ride, which has certainly had its ups and downs — has made it easier to whip up anti-American sentiments.

This is what makes the ‘imported government’ narrative such a powerful tool.

The National Security Committee has recently reiterated that there was no foreign conspiracy to topple the Khan-led government. But it hardly matters. PTI supporters and the party leadership have stuck to the narrative.

The distrust towards America strengthens this narrative. Indeed, this distrust has built up over decades. Here we journey back to see why.

DISENCHANTED ALLIES

A 2006 file photo shows US President Bush with President Pervez Musharraf

 at the Oval Office | AFP



The history of US-Pakistan relations is full of paradoxes. After gaining independence, Pakistan decided to join the US-led Western alliance against the Communist bloc. And in 1954, Pakistan and the US signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. In the same year, Pakistan also joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (Seato), a US-sponsored security alliance.

Because of its geostrategic location, Pakistan became an important cog in America’s regional security strategy to contain communism.

Although there was no assurance for Pakistan of the alliance coming to its help against any aggression from its arch-enemy India, the military aid it received from the US helped strengthen its defence. The US financial aid also provided economic stability to the country. In 1955, Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact, later known as the Central Treaty Organisation (Cento).

A new cooperation signed between the two states in 1959 was perhaps the most significant up until that time. Under the treaty, the US was required to assist Pakistan if the country was attacked by any regional power. Pakistan’s decision to join the US-led defence pacts was justified on the grounds that the country faced threats from India on its eastern borders and Afghanistan on the west. But it was mainly meant to improve the country’s defence capabilities against India.

The US supplied a wide range of military hardware, including Patton tanks, artillery, helicopters, bombers, high-level long-distance radars, frigates and submarines. Pakistan also received substantial US aid for infrastructure development. On the other hand, the defence pacts allowed the US to set up a secret intelligence base under the cover of a communication centre at Badaber, near Peshawar.

This centre also served as the base for high-level U-2 ‘spy in the sky’ surveillance aircraft for illegal flights over the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Pakistan, however, paid a heavy price for this alliance. It antagonised the Soviet Union. And it also fuelled anti-American sentiments at home.

Then the Sino-Indian War in 1962 drastically changed regional geopolitics. As the US sided with India, it heralded a new period in Pakistan’s relations with China. As Pak-China relations strengthened, there was a steep increase in US military and economic aid to India.

Finally, the 1965 war between India and Pakistan lent a serious blow to Islamabad’s relations with Washington. Instead of helping Pakistan, the US stopped all military assistance to the country. The US action was regarded as a stab in the back.

CHANGING TIDES

Then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif greets visiting US Secretary 

of State John Kerry in 2013 | White Star


The 1971 war brought further Pakistani resentment and US restrictions on Pakistan. A popular feeling of the time was that while the nearby American Sixth Fleet could have intervened in the East Pakistan fighting against India, it did not. This compelled Pakistan to review its foreign and security policy, which was heavily tilted towards the US. There was a realisation among Pakistani policymakers that they could not rely on the US for their nation’s security.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who took over power in the truncated Pakistan after the 1971 war, pulled Pakistan out of the defence pacts. He diversified Pakistan’s foreign policy by improving ties with China and the USSR.

In February 1975, following the Washington visit of then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the US administration lifted its embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan.

But the Pakistan-US relationship started to deteriorate once again in 1976, when the Ford administration exerted unprecedented pressure on Pakistan to abandon the negotiations concerning the purchase of a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. In 1979, President Carter cancelled American aid to Pakistan, having successfully pressed France to break this nuclear deal.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme, started by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1975, remained a major point of conflict between Islamabad and Washington. But two key regional developments in 1979 — the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — compelled the US to review its policy towards Pakistan. The two erstwhile allies got back together to stop the Soviet advance.

The international response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was sharp and swift. US President Jimmy Carter, reassessing the strategic situation in the region in his State of the Union Address in January 1980, identified Pakistan as a “frontline State in the global struggle against communism.” Setting aside the sanctions imposed on Islamabad for its nuclear programme, the US offered massive military and economic aid to Pakistan.

The Soviet invasion ended the decade-long estrangement between the two erstwhile allies and brought them together to help the Afghan ‘Mujahideen’ fight the occupation forces. Pakistan once again became the linchpin in the West’s battle against communism. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) collaborated in conducting the biggest covert war ever in global history.

The Afghan War placed enormous resources at the ISI’s disposal. Weapons provided by the CIA were channelled to Afghan fighters through the ISI.

By the mid-1980s, every dollar given by the CIA was matched by another from Saudi Arabia. The funds, running into several million dollars a year, were transferred by the CIA to the ISI’s special accounts in Pakistan. The backing of the CIA and the funnelling of the massive amounts of US military aid helped Pakistan expand its defence capabilities. The ISI-CIA covert operations eventually forced the Soviet forces to leave Afghanistan in 1989.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1990 also gave birth to a new world order. The US walked out of the region after the Soviet forces pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989. And Pakistan was no more as important for the US, which had emerged as the world’s sole superpower.

Relations between the two countries went into deep freeze after the US clamped multiple sanctions against Pakistan once again for developing nuclear weapons. More sanctions came after Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, in response to India’s tests. Pakistan was further punished after the 1999 military takeover of Gen Musharraf.

From being a close ally in the 1980s, Pakistan had become a pariah nation. The sanctions had hurt military to military relations the most, which had been the pivot of the relationship between the two countries.

This marked yet another period of separation between the two Cold War era partners, causing a deep sense of betrayal in Pakistan. During the 1990s, Pakistan suffered banishment from American favours.

From Pakistan’s perspective, the legacy of the country’s relations with the US during the Cold War has been generally negative. The left in Pakistan had always viewed the state’s tilt towards imperial America with hostility, since they saw US support as bolstering dictatorships such as that of Gen Ayub and Gen Zia. But now a similar hostility also began to be expressed within the establishment and by its allied conservatives. A sense of bitterness and distrust towards the US began to pervade Pakistani society. And clearly, this bitterness continues to persist.

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

The 9/11 attacks again changed the world. Within hours of the planes crashing into the Twin Towers, the Bush administration declared a war against Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda and Afghanistan. Rarely had the world witnessed such unanimous international support. Nations stood behind President Bush in what he had described as the ‘War on Terror’. A UN Security Council resolution bound all nations to support the US action.

The events of 9/11 also, once again, ended Pakistan’s international isolation.

Gen Musharraf had realised, within hours of the September 11 attacks, that the US would accept nothing short of complete compliance from his government on the US war plans. Denying support did not seem like a viable option. Musharraf was apprehensive that the Pakistani military could be completely destroyed in a confrontation with the world’s greatest superpower. His other fear was that the country’s weak economy would not be able to withstand international sanctions. His greatest concern, however, was about US forces using Indian bases in case of Pakistan’s refusal to cooperate.

And just like that, Pakistan and the US were back together after a decade of estrangement.

Pakistan’s policy volte-face after 9/11 was more of an expediency. Ironies abounded in the new relationship. After having spent the past seven years helping the Taliban, Pakistan was required to help the US dislodge the hardline Islamist government that was seen by Pakistan’s military establishment as critical to the country’s security.

Pakistan’s vast cache of intelligence information on Afghanistan was seen as crucial by the US for taking military action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. But the turnaround was not easy.

It was the most difficult moment for Gen Musharraf when, in an address to the nation on September 19, 2001, he tried to explain why he had decided to side with the US in the so-called ‘War on Terror’. He justified his decision to support the US saying it was necessary to save the country’s strategic assets, safeguard the cause of Kashmir and prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state.

Gen Musharraf was, perhaps, more concerned about the reaction within the military than the general public. He had a tough time in convincing his generals of, once again, getting into a partnership with the US. At least four commanders, including the Vice Chief of Army Staff General Muzaffar Usmani, were opposed to abandoning the Taliban. Musharraf had to walk a very difficult tightrope.

A strong argument in support of the change of policy direction was that the US could obliterate Pakistan if it did not cooperate. India had already offered logistic support and use of all their military facilities to the US. And India had even cleared its air base at Farkhor, near Dushanbe in Tajikistan close to the Afghan border, for American forces to operate from. The fear of an American-Indian alliance, that could lead to Pakistan being declared a terrorist state, finally swung the decision.

Nevertheless, antipathy towards the US ran deep in Pakistan. It was the beginning of an extremely uneasy relationship. There was deep distrust of the US.

This distrust was at the very foundation of this relationship. This new phase of the US-Pakistan partnership was seen as a good opportunity to join the international community, but there was also a vote of caution.

It was another war in Afghanistan that became the pivot around which the new US-Pakistan partnership was built. The circumstances of the two unisons were, however, very different. While there was a strong convergence of interest that had bound the two nations in a strategic relationship in the 1980s, the alliance that emerged after 9/11 was more out of expediency and compulsion. Although it was projected as a strategic partnership, in reality it was a transactional relationship from the outset.

While Pakistan’s support was critical to the US’s war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the new partnership brought an end to Pakistan’s international isolation. The removal of multiple sanctions revived the flow of US financial and military aid to Pakistan. It almost felt like the country had returned to 1979, when the Soviet invasion had ended the estrangement between the two erstwhile allies.

AN INCONVENIENT PARTNERSHIP

A 2019 file photo shows US President Donald Trump with then

 Prime Minister Imran Khan in New York | AFP

The post 9/11 US-Pakistan partnership remained full of ironies. While the cooperation between Washington and Islamabad against Al Qaeda remained extremely effective, that understanding was missing when it came to taking action against the Taliban leadership residing in Pakistan’s border regions.

Meanwhile, the sanctuaries in Pakistan and support from their allies among Pakistani Islamist groups helped the Taliban reorganise. Within a few years, the Taliban had turned into a formidable resistance force challenging the occupation forces.

Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan was one of the reasons for the Pakistani security agencies not acting against the Taliban safe havens on its soil. The Pakistani military establishment viewed the expanding Indian presence in its ‘backyard’ as a serious threat to the country’s own security. The expanding Indian presence in Afghanistan had compounded Islamabad’s fears of being encircled.

Some of Pakistan’s security concerns were legitimate, but the fears of encirclement verged on paranoia. It also resulted in Pakistan’s continuing patronage of some Afghan Taliban factions, such as the Haqqani Network, which it considered a vital tool for countering Indian influence, even at the risk of Islamabad’s relationship with Washington.

Worsening US-Pak relations had also seriously affected America’s war efforts in Afghanistan. A series of incidents in 2011 had brought an already uneasy alliance to a breaking point.

The Raymond Davis episode in January 2011 exposed the CIA’s secret network operating in Pakistan. The scandal revealed the widening trust gap between the two allies. The crisis was deescalated by both sides taking a step back, but the damage had already been done.

The unilateral raid by the US Special Forces on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, further strained the relations between Washington and Islamabad. The US action on Pakistani soil was seen as a national humiliation. But the fact that the world’s most wanted terrorist was living in a garrison town close to the Pakistan Military Academy had put Pakistan in a very embarrassing position.

Pakistan faced many questions. Was this just an intelligence failure? Or was there anything more to the presence of the Al Qaeda leader in a high security zone?

But the most serious blow to the alliance came on November 29, 2011, when US Air Force jets bombed a Pakistani border post at Salala in the Bajaur tribal region, killing several soldiers. It was an inflection point in the rocky relationship. The Obama administration’s reluctance to even offer an apology to the killing of soldiers of an allied country made things worse.

For seven months, Pakistan closed down the vital ground supply line to Nato forces in Afghanistan. The stalemate was finally broken after Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said the magic word: sorry.

But by now the cracks in the alliance had become irreparable. The Salala incident led to a resetting of the relationship. Now there was not even a pretence of a strategic alignment.

There was nothing much left in the partnership, wrecked by allegations of double games and deceit. Almost all US military aid to Pakistan had been stopped and only a trickle of civilian assistance continued.

Yet, a complete rupture was not a choice for either side. Pakistan was still critical for the US to extricate itself from its longest war. While the illusion of any strategic convergence has been absent for long, the mutual interest in ending the war in Afghanistan kept relations alive.

END OF THE WAR

With the end of America’s war in Afghanistan, the post post-9/11 US-Pakistan relations have come full circle.

There is no indication yet of any major shift in Washington’s policy towards Pakistan. The cold response from the Biden administration and some unnecessary rhetoric from Pakistani leaders has made it difficult to move forward.

Indeed, Khan’s attempts to get Biden on the phone last year yielded no results. And surely, the former prime minister’s insistence on igniting anti-US sentiments has not gone unnoticed internationally.

Nonetheless, for the past several years, Washington has seen Pakistan purely from the Afghan prism. There is no indication that the Biden administration will be deviating from that policy approach.

Meanwhile, changing regional geopolitics have created a new alignment of forces. The growing strategic alliance between the US and India on one side, and the China-Pakistan axis on the other, reflect these emerging geopolitics. Pakistan’s growing strategic relations with China and the escalating tension between Washington and Beijing too cast a shadow over future US-Pak relations.

The changing regional geopolitics and consequent realignment of forces have brought China and Pakistan closer. The cooling of Pakistan’s relations with the US, and the rising tensions with arch-rival India, have given further impetus to Pakistan to lean towards China.

BREAKING A PATTERN

Historically, the engagements between Washington and Islamabad have been narrowly framed, dictated either by short-term security interests or the imperative to deal with a common challenge. Resetting the relationship would need this pattern to be broken.

Pakistan says it seeks to have a broad-based relationship with the US. Now that the US military mission is over, there is a need to build a relationship beyond counterterrorism and Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, the US remains an important trading partner. The US is Pakistan’s largest export market and a major source of foreign remittances. Pakistan certainly needs US support to achieve economic stability. The country also has a growing technology sector that could be developed with US support.

But resetting the relationship will not be easy.

Public opinion in Pakistan about the US is not favourable. This is backed by a decades-long history — a history not only of the volatile relations between the two countries, but how these sour relations have been leveraged within Pakistan for political mileage.

Khan may be the latest politician to decry a foreign conspiracy, but he is far from the first. And in all likelihood, he will not be the last to invoke this tried-and-tested narrative.

The writer is an author and journalist.
He tweets @hidhussain

Published in Dawn, EOS, May 1st, 2022

 

Pakistan As A Consequence Of The Partition Of British India In 1947 – Analysis

 October 6, 2025

By Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

Pakistan as a country

Pakistan is a country located in the northwest of the Indian sub-continent. It borders Iran on the west, Afghanistan on the north-west, China on the north-east, and India on the east, with the direct exit to the Arabian Sea. 

Physically, from the rest of Asia, Pakistan is separated in the north by the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and the Himalaya high ring of mountain chains. Other mountain ranges are going down on the Pakistani western side to the Arabian Sea. Below them is the long and broad valley of the Indus River. The Province of the North-West Frontier contains the strategically very important Khyber Pass, which is very high. Toward the south is the Punjab plateau. It is watered by the tributaries of the Indus River, where wheat is grown. However, to the east is the Thar Desert. It is important to stress that between the Sind Desert, which covers part of the Indus delta, and Baluchistan in the western hills, there are large reserves of natural gas and, to a certain extent, oil, which is also found in Punjab.  

Pakistan has a predominantly agricultural economy. The focal export goods are raw and processed cotton, cotton fabrics, and rice. Other agricultural products include sugar cane, wheat, and maize. Livestock-raising is important too. Textiles are an important part of the Pakistani industry and are substantially contributing to Pakistani exports. Other industries include chemicals, cement production, fertilizer, and food processing. 

Population

The inhabitants of Pakistan are about 88% Pakistani Muslims, while there are about 11% Indians (Hindi). Of all the other ethnic groups, Baluchistanis are the most numerous. Baluchistan, as a province, is the least populated. With the partition of British India in 1947 into Pakistan and India, Pakistan received a predominantly Muslim population as well as a larger number of Indians, and vice versa. In the period from 1947 to 1950, population exchange between Pakistan and India, including ethnic cleansing, reached the scale of several million inhabitants in both directions. In Pakistan, the official language is Urdu (the Muslim variant of the Hindi language), which in 1972 replaced English as the official language. However, several other local/regional languages ​​are in use. In 1970, 80% of Pakistan’s inhabitants were illiterate, which caused a lack of professional and educated staff, and this was especially felt in the administration and economy. 

For the sake of more comprehensive education and the reduction of illiteracy, in September 1972, 176 private colleges were nationalized. There were three universities in Pakistan then. About 15% of the population lived in cities, while there were 10 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. The capital of Pakistan was Rawalpindi from 1959, while today it is Islamabad. Until 1959, the largest city in Pakistan was Karachi. Today, Pakistan has a population of 251 million in an area of ​​881,913 sq. km. The GDP is 373 billion dollars, while the GDP per capita is almost 1500 dollars.

State organization

With the division of the British colony of (British) India into two states, India and Pakistan, on August 15th, 1947, Pakistan received the status of dominion, and according to the constitution of February 29th, 1956, it became a republic – the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, composed of two federal units: West and East Pakistan.

By the military coup of October 1958, the constitution was abolished, and a new one was adopted in March 1962. This new constitution provided for a federal system of government, a presidential system of government (the president must be a Muslim and is elected for 5 years), a National Assembly of 156 deputies (78 deputies from each of the two federal units) and two capital cities: Islamabad in West Pakistan (seat of the central government) and Dhaka in East Pakistan (seat of the National Assembly). However, the constitution from 1962 was repealed on March 25th, 1969, and only partially reinstated on April 4th, 1969. 

A turning point in Pakistan’s history was the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in December 1971, when East Pakistan declared itself an independent state under the name Bangladesh. Thus, the new state of Pakistan included only the territory of the former West Pakistan. In January 1972, Pakistan left the British Commonwealth.

A modern history of Pakistan up to the Partition in 1947

Pakistan is a country that came under British colonial control in the first half of the 19th century, when it became part of (a Greater) British India. Interestingly, its name is derived from the word “pak” (ritually pure) in the Urdu language. In other words, it means “Land of the Pure”. However, it is as well as an acronym for its most important component peoples: Punjabis, Afghans, Kashmirs, Sindhis, and the peoples of Baluchistan.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were only a several moves towards independence. One of the reasons was that those people living in the north in Punjab and Kashmir have been great beneficiaries of the British Raj, and occupied important posts in the administration and army of British India. It was among the more disadvantaged Muslim minority in north-central India that a Muslim cultural and political identity began to form, mainly due to several reformers and organizations like the Muslim League, a party founded on December 30th, 1906, in Dacca. Originally, the party fought for separate Muslim representation at all levels of government. The party claimed to represent the grievances and demands of the entire Muslim community within British India. 

Under its leader, Jinnah, the Muslim League issued several requirements for greater rights of Indian Muslims in a vast country of British India in which Muslims at that time accounted for some ¼ of the total population. Nevertheless, this political demand became all the more urgent with the increasing momentum of the Indian National Congress (the INC) under M. Gandhi, which made self-government or even independence under a Hindu-dominated government all but inevitable during the 1930s. In the first decades of its existence, the Muslim League pursued the dual aim of winning greater rights of self-government from the British colonial power and of winning greater rights for Muslims within such a British system. In order to achieve the first aim, the Muslim League cooperated with the INC, with which it allied itself in the Lucknow Pact of December 1916. However, the League was largely ineffective in the 1920s, when it claimed to have some 1.000 members in the whole of British India. This led to a decade in the 1930s of a major revision of the political goals of the Muslim League and the organization itself for the sake of appealing to the disparate Muslim community. 

The League, in 1930, addressed its annual conference to demand, for the first time, a separate Muslim state in the western portion of British India. This demand became gradually accepted, particularly after the Muslim League’s catastrophic showing in the 1937 elections, when it gained only 104 out of 489 Muslim seats. Therefore, its leader, Jinnah, now sought to broaden its popular base. On March 23rd, 1940, the requirement for a separate Muslim state became accepted as the official party’s policy in the coming years. It was known as the Pakistan Resolution or the Lahore Resolution, which, in fact, warned that if conditions for Muslims, especially in areas with a Muslim minority, did not improve, Muslims would lay claim to separate states as their homelands. The very idea of separate Muslim states referred to the western provinces of British India and East Bengal. The Muslim League in 1944 claimed over 2.000.000 members. The League got in the 1945−1946 elections 75% of the Muslim vote. Therefore, the Muslim League got a popular mandate for the creation of a separate Muslim state in the western regions of British India. This task was finally achieved by the creation of an independent Pakistan on August 15th, 1947. However, initially dominant in Pakistani politics, after the death of its party’s leader, Jinnah, the Muslim League lacked an integrative force and soon dissolved into various groups in the coming decade.  

All the countries of South Asia have been troubled by the special position of minorities and of regional groups. The Indian government’s attempt to foster Hindi was soon faced by demands for a new structure of states on linguistic lines, and from the 1950s onward, state boundaries have been rearranged. However, the linguistic feeling remained strong, especially in South India in Madras State, which was renamed Tamil Nadu. Before 1947, Pakistan formed part of British India, but following the British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent in 1947, Pakistan was created as a separate state, comprising the territory to the north-east and north-west of ex-British India in which the population was predominantly Muslim. In Pakistan, linguistic and regional demands were initially resisted, and the separate provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated as One Unit. However, regional loyalties forced a return to the old provinces, representing linguistic regions, in 1970. In East Pakistan, the strength of Bengal culture and grievances against the dominant West Pakistan elite fostered a demand for autonomy and later for independence.  

The Partition in 1947

For the reason that no agreement could be reached on a unified form of independence, a decision was required about the partition of the Indian sub-continent. The areas in the northwest with a Muslim majority were allowed to choose separation and the formation of a new state of Pakistan. The provinces of British India, which were affected, voted either through their elected representatives or by plebiscite. The rulers of the princely states within British India chose whether to join the independent state of India or where their boundaries marched with the new partition line, Pakistan. Punjab and Bengal were separately partitioned. Independence came to India and Pakistan in August 1947, to Burma in January 1948, and to Ceylon in February 1948. 

In India, it was fraught with problems from the beginning. The major part of the Indian sub-continent wished to remain united under the leadership of Nehru and the Indian National Congress. However, the explosive situation and the impossibility of securing agreement between Congress and the Muslim League led by Jinnah forced the hand of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, and on August 14th, 1947, the sub-continent became partitioned and the new state of Pakistan (physically composed of two parts) came into existence. The princely states (500+) have been left to the individual decisions of their rulers, who could, in effect, join either India or Pakistan if their boundaries marched with the new partition lines.

For both India and Pakistan, the first question was the delimitation of frontiers between the new states. However, this question particularly affected the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, where the populations were so mixed that partition seemed the only feasible solution (like in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s). But the boundary award cut through areas which in Punjab were occupied by rich farmlands populated by Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus as neighbors.   

Nevertheless, the partition of British India soon led to the high rank of violence between Hindus and Muslims as communal riots followed, and a two-way exodus started, with Muslims moving west and Sikhs and Hindus moving east, with more than 1 million people killed. Around 7.5 million Muslim refugees fled to both parts of Pakistan from India, and around 10 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India. The partition of Bengal produced similar results. Overall, some 500.000 people lost their lives. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League, became Pakistan’s first governor-general (President). The new state was composed of the western provinces of Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, and North-West Frontier (or known as West Pakistan). Separated by Indian territory was the eastern half of Bengal, which also belonged to the newly proclaimed independent Pakistan (or known as East Pakistan).

In addition to the resettlement of the refugees, the governments had to integrate the 500+ princely states. Most princes were persuaded to accede, promptly, to either India or Pakistan. Hyderabad resisted and became absorbed only after the action by the security forces (police). The ruler of Kashmir as well as hesitated, and an invasion of tribesmen from the Pakistani North West Frontier Province followed. The Maharaja then acceded to India, subject to a plebiscite of the Kashmir people, but Pakistan supported the tribal invaders. The situation was only stabilized by the mediation of the UN in 1949. 

The new state of Pakistan was, from the very beginning, confronted by plenty of problems. The most immediate of these was extensive migration (around 17.5 million people), as a consequence of the partition of British India into a Hindu and Muslim state. In addition, Pakistan contested its borders, as it competed with India over control of Kashmir. This confrontation has led to hostile relations with India up to today and the conduct of three Indo-Pakistani Wars. Moreover, Pakistan suffered as well from the tension between the majority of the population living in East Pakistan and the important posts in government, administration, and the military being occupied by officials from the wealthier and better-educated West Pakistan. These problems have been compounded by the total lack of any tradition or history as a single, unitary state. On one hand, East Pakistan (or East Bengal) was relatively homogeneous, but on the other hand, West Pakistan was composed of regions with widely different economies and ethnicities and with different degrees of religious observance. Some tribes of the North-West Frontier had devout observance of Islam and a history of autonomy within the former British colonial system. They have been contrasted with the more secular elite of Punjab, which had been well integrated into the British colonial administration.   

A contemporary history of Pakistan since the Partition in 1947 up to 9/11

The problem of finding a compromise that would create a viable, integrated, and constitutional entity bedeviled Pakistan during its existence. Pakistan continued to be formally ruled by the 1935 Government of India Act until 1956. The country’s liberal constitution became opposed by the fundamentalist Muslims, and in 1951, the Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated by an Afghan fundamentalist. In 1954, a state of emergency was declared, and a new constitution was adopted in 1956. However, the new political settlement failed to stabilize the country sufficiently to prevent the 1958 army coup, led by Ayub Khan. It was an attempt to adopt a multiparty system, but it failed, and consequently, Ayub Khan imposed martial law in 1958. He, in fact, abolished the recently established democracy but without much resistance, and devised a second constitution in 1962. 

On the other hand, Ayub Khan’s decade of power produced economic growth, followed, however, by political resentment as the two parts of the Pakistani state have been physically separated by a thousand kilometers of the territory of the independent and hostile Republic of India. Allegations by the Bengalis in East Pakistan against West Pakistan’s disproportionate share of the state’s assets led to demands by the Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, for regional autonomy. Nonetheless, in the following civil war in 1971, the Bengali dissidents defeated the Pakistani army, with help from India. It resulted in the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh in the same year. 

In 1965, Pakistan attempted to infiltrate troops into Kashmir. In the fighting which ensued, India made some gains, but in the agreement afterward reached in Tashkent under Soviet auspices, both countries agreed to return to the status quo. His precipitation of a costly and unsuccessful war with India over Kashmir in 1965, and increasing economic difficulties in Pakistan, finally led to his resignation in 1969. Relations between Pakistan and India continued to be tense, however, and rapidly worsened in 1971 when Pakistani military President, Yahya Khan, cruelly repressed the demands for autonomy in East Pakistan (East Bengal, later Bangladesh), which led to 10 million refugees crossing over into India. 

In 1970, the first-ever general democratic election has been organized, which brought to power in Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party. However, these elections were won by the Awami League in East Pakistan. Therefore, the West Pakistani political establishment, led by Yahya Khan, refused to hand over power and sent military troops to secure control in East Pakistan. This action caused a short but extremely violent civil war, and led, after Indian military intervention in December 1971, which supported the Bangladesh guerrilla with powerful military forces, which defeated the Pakistani army within two weeks, to the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. Zulfikar Bhutto, as the new President since 1971, created a populist and socialist regime. His program of nationalization, public works, and independence from US financial help failed to overcome the negative effects of the oil price shock of 1973, leading Pakistan into an economic crisis. He introduced constitutional, social, and economic reforms, but in 1977 was deposed in an army coup led by Zia-ul-Haq and later executed.   

Zia-ul-Haq improved Pakistani relations with the USA after the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan in 1979, when Pakistan came to host up to three million Afghan refugees, followed by bases for Afghan guerrillas. US military and civilian assistance led to high economic growth in the 1980s. However, Zia-ul-Haq died in a 1988 plane crash. His successor, Ishaq Khan, supervised the transition back to democracy, with the 1988 elections won by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto. She failed to establish control over the country and was dismissed by Khan in 1990 on charges of corruption. However, she became re-elected in 1993, but once again struggled to maintain control in a country plagued by crime, the international drugs trade, and the growing assertiveness of some of the Pakistani provinces (Baluchistan and Sind) and tribes (North West Frontier Province). 

Benazir Bhutto became dismissed by President Leghari once again on formal charges of corruption and mismanagement in 1996 and was finally succeeded by Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Islamic Democratic Alliance) in 1997, who proceeded to strengthen his position by changing the constitution, which limited the power of the Prime Minister (the PM). Nevertheless, he as well as confronted the judiciary, which he sought to conciliate towards his policies. Ultimately, in 1999, he sought to introduce Islamic law in Pakistan, but this attempt led to widespread demonstrations, while at the same time, the deteriorating economic situation had already eroded Sharif’s popular support, and for the reason of his pro-Western position during the First Gulf War/Desert Storm, 1990‒1991. His order to the army to withdraw forces from Kashmir and his dismissal of Musharraf led to a successful army coup, headed by Musharraf himself, who suspended the constitution, moved to put Pakistani political and judicial institutions under military control, and tried to stabilize the economy to placate international creditors. After establishing control, Musharraf’s regime became more liberal. However, it happened only after 9/11 (in 2001) that his regime became welcomed in the Western international arena. His decisive support of the US War on Terrorism brought great foreign policy benefits and enabled him to gain very much-needed Western international loans. Nevertheless, his pro-US stance was criticized by many Islamic fundamentalists and radicals in Pakistan, so that needed to temper by a moderate stance towards radical Islamist groups in Kashmir. In 1998, Pakistan carried out a series of underground nuclear tests in response to a similar program by the focal regional enemy – India. 

The political situation in Pakistan remained turbulent, including intra-ethnic violence in Karachi, followed by national economic problems. Pakistani industrial expansion emphasized the private sector and consumer goods. Nonetheless, unemployment rose more rapidly than new production, and up to 70% of the population is still dependent on agriculture. Both governments of India and Pakistan have been putting greater emphasis on better yields from the soil. Though the rate of growth remains slow, both India and Pakistan have succeeded in attaining self-sufficiency in food. Yet some 40% of the rural population remains undernourished because their income is very low.  

Finally, from 1947 up to 1971, there were three Pakistani-Indian Wars: the First (1947‒1948); the Second (September 1st‒23rd, 1965); and the Third (December 3rd‒16th, 1971). These Pakistani-Indian wars were the result of unresolved issues, but especially border-territorial ones, between Pakistan and India that appeared after the British division of the Indian subcontinent, i.e., of British India, in August 1947 between these two states. As a consequence of the Third War, Pakistan lost its eastern territories, on which the new state of Bangladesh was formed. After the war, the general balance of power on the Indian subcontinent changed in India’s favour. India, also improved its strategic and geopolitical position. Nevertheless, the region of Kashmir has been left to be he apple of discord between Pakistan and India to our da

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.