LIBERTARIAN REVISIONIST HISTORY
Murray Rothbard in the mid-1950s. Photo Credit: The Ludwig von Mises Institute
March 6, 2026
By Joseph Solis-Mullen
Americans are taught that the Constitution completed the Revolution. The Articles of Confederation were weak, disorder reigned, Shays’s Rebellion terrified the countryside, and sober statesmen in Philadelphia heroically designed a “more perfect Union,” as the story goes. The Constitution thus appears as the Revolution’s crowning achievement.
But, as Rothbard showed, the Constitution was not the fulfillment of 1776, but rather its undoing.
After all, had the American states not just fought a war to reject centralized control by Parliament in London? Why, scarcely four years after Yorktown, were many of the same revolutionary leaders advocating a new consolidated national authority—one equipped with taxing power, a standing army, supremacy over state laws, and an independent judiciary insulated from direct democratic control?
Indeed, Murray Rothbard’s fifth volume of Conceived in Liberty invites us to reconsider the founding moment not as triumph, but as counter-revolution. And modern revisionist scholarship—from Charles Beard to Michael Klarman—suggests that this interpretation deserves more attention than it typically receives.
March 6, 2026
By Joseph Solis-Mullen
Americans are taught that the Constitution completed the Revolution. The Articles of Confederation were weak, disorder reigned, Shays’s Rebellion terrified the countryside, and sober statesmen in Philadelphia heroically designed a “more perfect Union,” as the story goes. The Constitution thus appears as the Revolution’s crowning achievement.
But, as Rothbard showed, the Constitution was not the fulfillment of 1776, but rather its undoing.
After all, had the American states not just fought a war to reject centralized control by Parliament in London? Why, scarcely four years after Yorktown, were many of the same revolutionary leaders advocating a new consolidated national authority—one equipped with taxing power, a standing army, supremacy over state laws, and an independent judiciary insulated from direct democratic control?
Indeed, Murray Rothbard’s fifth volume of Conceived in Liberty invites us to reconsider the founding moment not as triumph, but as counter-revolution. And modern revisionist scholarship—from Charles Beard to Michael Klarman—suggests that this interpretation deserves more attention than it typically receives.
The Articles: Chaos or Liberty?
The conventional narrative insists that the Articles of Confederation were a failure. Congress could not tax. It could not regulate commerce effectively. It struggled to service war debts. Shays’s Rebellion seemed to expose fatal weakness, et cetera.
But weakness to whom?
Under the Articles, political authority was radically decentralized. Congress lacked independent revenue and depended upon the states. There was no executive, no national judiciary, no standing army in peacetime. Western territories were promised eventual self-government. From the standpoint of the revolutionary suspicion of centralized power, this arrangement was not an embarrassment—it was the logical extension of 1776.
The Revolution had been fought, after all, against a distant legislature claiming plenary authority over colonial affairs. Parliament taxed without representation. It imposed navigation laws and commercial restrictions. It stationed troops in peacetime. The colonists’ grievance was not merely taxation but consolidation—power drawn away from local institutions into an unaccountable center.
The Articles embodied the opposite principle: sovereignty lodged in the states, with Congress acting as their agent. Yet, by the mid-1780s, a coalition of nationalists argued that this decentralization had gone too far.
Shays’ Rebellion and Elite Fear
Much of the urgency for constitutional reform stemmed from Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts (1786–87). The textbook version describes desperate debtor-farmers rebelling against lawful authority. But as Leonard Richards demonstrated in Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle, the uprising was less a revolt of insolvent peasants than a tax revolt against aggressive debt enforcement and heavy state taxation designed to service war bonds.
Those bonds had often been purchased at steep discounts by speculators—many of them eastern merchants and financiers—who now demanded repayment at face value. The tax burden fell disproportionately on western farmers. When courts began seizing property for unpaid taxes, rebels closed them.
To nationalists, this was not populist protest but democratic excess. For men like George Washington and James Madison, Shays’s Rebellion confirmed their fear that local majorities could threaten property rights and creditor interests.
Here Rothbard’s interpretation converges with Charles Beard’s earlier thesis in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. Beard argued that the Constitution reflected the interests of bondholders, commercial elites, and national creditors who desired a stronger central government to secure public debts and stabilize commerce. Though Beard’s determinism has been criticized, few deny that financial concerns loomed large in Philadelphia.
Michael Klarman’s The Framers’ Coup reinforces this picture. Klarman demonstrates that the Constitution was not the inevitable outcome of national consensus but the product of strategic maneuvering by political elites who capitalized on economic anxiety and fear of disorder. The Philadelphia Convention exceeded its mandate to amend the Articles and instead drafted an entirely new frame of government. Ratification rules were altered to bypass recalcitrant state legislatures in favor of specially-elected conventions.
If the Revolution was a popular uprising against consolidated imperial authority, the Constitution was most definitely an engineered response to popular unrest at home.
From Confederation to Consolidation
The shift was profound. Under the Constitution, Congress received independent taxing power. Federal law became “supreme.” A national judiciary could invalidate state legislation. The executive branch gained energy and permanence. Standing armies were constitutionally permissible. Interstate commerce fell under federal authority.
The logic of 1776 had been inverted. No longer was power presumed to rest with local institutions unless explicitly delegated; instead, the new government possessed enumerated powers whose interpretation would inevitably expand. The Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause quickly became such instruments of consolidation.
Nationalists defended these changes as essential to protect liberty. But liberty for whom?
For public creditors and commercial interests, national consolidation promised stability, uniformity, and reliable debt servicing. For slaveholding states, the Constitution protected the institution through clauses safeguarding the slave trade (for twenty years), fugitive slaves, and the three-fifths compromise. Sectional and economic interests aligned behind centralization.
The Constitution did not merely strengthen the union; it fundamentally altered the balance of sovereignty.
Betrayal or Transformation?
To call the Constitution a “betrayal” may sound excessive. After all, the Bill of Rights soon followed, and many Antifederalists ultimately acquiesced. But consider the revolutionary premise: that distant centralized power is dangerous; that standing armies threaten liberty; that taxation requires strict consent; that local self-government is the bulwark of freedom. These were not peripheral complaints, they were the Revolution.
Yet, within a decade of independence, leading revolutionaries endorsed a consolidated national government capable of exercising precisely those powers previously denounced in Parliament. The target had changed; the structure increasingly resembled what had been rejected.
The irony is striking. The same generation that resisted London’s claim of supremacy over colonial legislatures created a federal government with supremacy over the states.
The Counter-Revolution Thesis
None of this requires romanticizing the Articles or denying their weaknesses. Nor does it entail rejecting the Constitution outright. But it does require abandoning the myth of inevitability and the assumption that 1787 simply perfected 1776.
The American Revolution contained competing impulses: radical decentralization and elite consolidation. In Philadelphia, the latter prevailed.
If the Revolution was, in part, a revolt against centralized imperial power, then the Constitution represented not its fulfillment but its redirection. The question that remains is not whether the Constitution established some order (it did); the question is whether, in doing so, it compromised the very anti-centralist principles that animated the break with Britain.
For those willing to revisit the founding without piety, the answer may be uncomfortable.
But history rarely flatters the victors of counter-revolutions.
This article was also published at the Mises Institute
Joseph Solis-Mullen
A graduate of Spring Arbor University and the University of Illinois, Joseph Solis-Mullen is a political scientist and graduate student in the economics department at the University of Missouri. A writer and blogger, his work can be found at the Ludwig Von Mises Institute, Eurasia Review, Libertarian Institute, and Sage Advance. You can contact him through his website http://www.jsmwritings.com or find him on Twitter.
SEE
