Thursday, April 03, 2025

 

PACBI’s position on ‘No Other Land’ (and its response to criticisms of its position)


First published at BDSMovement.net on March 5.

The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), mandated by the Palestinian BDS National Committee that leads the global BDS movement to develop and ensure harmony with the movement’s anti-normalization guidelines, has received many requests for a position on the film, No Other Land, both before and after the film's Oscar win. There was a simmering controversy about the film that has become even wider, now that it has won an Oscar.

PACBI recognizes the importance of engaging in this debate, but there is a strong ethical duty to do so in a way that centers the struggle to end Israel’s genocide against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza and massive aggression and ethnic cleansing in the West Bank’s refugee camps and Jerusalem in particular, all enabled by the colonial West, led by the US. It is also crucial to contextualize this discussion in Israel’s 76-year-old regime of settler-colonialism and apartheid against the entire Indigenous people of Palestine.

From the moment the film, No Other Land, began to screen internationally, Israel, its massive lobby groups, and its anti-Palestinian racist partners in western cultural establishments, in the US, Germany and elsewhere, have all been attacking the film and trying to suppress it because they saw it as exposing an important, if partial, dimension of Israel’s system of colonial oppression to which Palestinians are subjected to and resist in diverse ways. They see such exposures of Israel’s crimes, such as the ethnic cleansing of Masafer Yatta, as strengthening the global Palestine solidarity movement and accelerating the already fast-growing BDS movement, which Israel has for more than a decade considered a “strategic threat” to its entire regime of oppression.

However, it is important to note that Israel’s attacks on any project that happens to violate the Palestinian anti-normalization guidelines does not play a major role in deciding whether the BDS movement will launch a boycott campaign against that particular project or not. Adhering to the principles and spirit of the movement’s guidelines, our main priority is always to defend the Palestinian people’s basic rights through dismantling Israel’s settler colonial and apartheid regime. Therefore, given the BDS movement's limited resources, it has to choose its targets very carefully, based on criteria whose effectiveness has been proven over the past two decades.

But an important factor too is that Palestinians, many Arabs, and many in the solidarity movement globally, have criticized the film as a case of normalization, with some calling for a boycott of the film accordingly.

So what’s the BDS movement’s position?

First, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) has from the start reached the conclusion that this film indeed violates the BDS movement’s anti-normalization guidelines in several ways. The BDS movement has always fought against normalization as a powerful weapon employed by oppressors to whitewash their crimes, to colonize the minds of the oppressed, and to undermine global solidarity with the struggle to end oppression.

Regardless of intentions, and according to the anti-normalization guidelines agreed upon by the vast majority of Palestinian civil society, normalization is the participation in any project, initiative or activity, local or international, that brings together (on the same “platform”) Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (individuals or institutions) and does not meet the following two conditions:

  1. The Israeli side must publicly recognize the UN-affirmed inalienable rights of the Palestinian people (at the very least an end to the occupation, end to apartheid, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees); and

  2. The joint activity must constitute a form of co-resistance against the Israeli regime of occupation, settler-colonialism, and apartheid.

No Other Land was produced with the help of Close-Up, an organization that is engaged in normalization and is therefore boycotted by many filmmakers and PACBI. Moreover, some of the team’s Israeli members are not on record supporting the comprehensive rights of the Palestinian people. They have failed to acknowledge that Israel is perpetrating a genocide, or have even made extremely harmful, immoral statements drawing a false equivalence between the colonizer and the colonized that may be used to rationalize Israel’s genocide. Accordingly, the film certainly violates the BDS movement’s anti-normalization guidelines.

We acknowledge that the film’s team recently published a statement that explicitly mentions the Nakba, ethnic cleansing, settler-colonialism, and apartheid. Calling for justice for Palestinian refugees, it goes a long way to address the above-mentioned serious flaws. Yet, the statement still fails to identify Israel as the perpetrator of all these crimes.*

Second, regardless of the above and aside from BDS guidelines, it is important to recognize that Palestinians do not need validation, legitimation or permission from Israelis to narrate our history, our present, our experiences, our dreams, and our resistance, including artistic resistance, to the colonial system of oppression that denies us our freedom and inalienable rights. It is therefore imperative for us to challenge the racist conditions, whether covert or overt, imposed by the colonial West and its hegemonic institutions, which do not platform Palestinians except with the permission or validation of Israelis.

But why is PACBI only now publicly issuing this position?

PACBI has not published its position, but has shared it with many filmmakers and festival organizers who have inquired over the last year.

While PACBI understands the debate around the film as an indicator of the growth of the popular resistance to normalization, which we appreciate, it strives to enact “strategic radicalism,” prioritizing the most complicit targets where we can achieve the most impact, guided by our principles and our overarching goal of ending international complicity in Israel’s oppression and advancing the struggle for Palestinian liberation. PACBI therefore does not, and realistically has no capacity to, publish a statement on every instance of normalization.

Over the last 17 months of the US-Israeli genocide in Gaza, the entire BDS movement, including PACBI and all its partners and networks, has been intensively leading, devising and supporting many strategic campaigns to cut the chains of international complicity with Israel’s genocide and underlying regime of settler-colonial apartheid. A crucial part of this work has always been fighting the dehumanizing colonial narratives and stereotypes propagated by Israel and its anti-Palestinian racist partners.

Given the many urgent cultural boycott projects worldwide that PACBI had to lead or support during this ongoing genocide, No Other Land was not a priority prior to the Oscars. Now, given its growing profile and in particular following its Oscar win, we find it important to explain how the film is in violation of BDS guidelines for people to enhance the collective understanding of normalization and its dangers, and to protect our struggle from the heightened risk of using normalization to whitewash genocide. The ends never justify the unethical means.

Hollywood has for decades dehumanized Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Indigenous people, as well as Black and other racialized communities. Dozens of Palestinian filmmakers recently said in an open letter that they are “outraged at the inhumanity and racism shown by some in the Western entertainment industry towards our people, even during this most difficult of times.” This dehumanization is one of the factors enabling Israel’s genocide. It is therefore not surprising that as problematic as this film is, many have overlooked its normalization problem and celebrated it for having contributed to challenging this dehumanization.

Finally, our principled, incremental struggle for liberation will depend on thousands of collective, principled and strategic efforts coming together on many fronts. In this struggle, being ethical and principled means that we should never compromise on our people’s rights. Being strategic entails prioritizing our targets to maximize the benefit to our struggle to achieve those rights.  Indigenous Palestinians have no other land than Palestine. But we surely must have another way in our struggle for liberation and self-determination that is free of the less visible chains of normalization.


PACBI’s engagement with constructive critiques of our position on No Other Land

First published at BDSMovement.net on March 10.

FAQs on PACBI’s position on No Other Land

The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) appreciates the lively debate that its statement on the documentary, No Other Land, has evoked and the constructive and very diverse critiques shared with us, whether publicly or privately. We believe that many of them will help us evolve, improve, clarify, and make our future positions even more accessible. Obviously, Palestinians have a wide diversity of political views. But on defending all our rights, ending complicity, and rejecting normalization there is a very broad consensus.

To recap, several days after No Other Land won the Oscar, PACBI issued a public statement clarifying the production’s conflict with the BDS movement’s anti-normalization guidelines. Specifically, the statement said:

No Other Land was produced with the help of Close-Up, an organization that is engaged in normalization and is therefore boycotted by many filmmakers and PACBI. Moreover, some of the team’s Israeli members are not on record supporting the comprehensive rights of the Palestinian people. They have failed to acknowledge that Israel is perpetrating a genocide, or have even made extremely harmful, immoral statements drawing a false equivalence between the colonizer and the colonized that may be used to rationalize Israel’s genocide.”

Close Up is a boycottable normalization outfit that more than 500 filmmakers, primarily from the Arab world, had publicly condemned, under the banner of Filmmakers Against Normalization. And yet, when questioned in an interview last year on this specific issue, two of No Other Land’s directors defended working with Close Up, and wrongly claimed that doing so is not a violation of the BDS movement’s anti-normalization guidelines.

Returning to the present, following PACBI’s statement the directors’ statement was modified (without indicating so) to address some of the most serious issues PACBI had raised, identifying Israel as the perpetrator of occupation and ethnic cleansing, and mentioning the genocide in Gaza–both were missing from the original film team’s statement. [See the footnote in this regard at the bottom of PACBI’s statement above]

It goes without saying that we continue to refuse to engage with Zionist attacks on our positions, for obvious reasons. The same applies to bad-faith attacks from any side that are inherently not constructive. Our movement is fast-growing, dynamic and increasingly impactful. Accordingly, we prioritize engagement with the most constructive feedback.

Below is a list of Frequently Asked Questions that summarizes the most insightful of those critiques and engages with them to move the discussion on normalization forward in a way that we hope will make our movement stronger. In this particular case, the many nuances involved, the dynamic and heightened nature of developments surrounding the film in the past year, and the context of greater popular support for rejecting normalization are all very relevant.

While we all may wish that the film’s Oscar win was an unambiguous moral and practical victory for the global solidarity movement, the urgent and ongoing debate regarding normalization, representation, gate-keeping, and privilege demonstrates otherwise.

1. Is PACBI calling for boycotting No Other Land, an Oscar-winning film about Palestinian resilience and popular resistance to Israel’s regime of occupation and ethnic cleansing at a time when we need such films to raise public awareness the most?

While PACBI has taken a clear position on normalization in how the film was produced, PACBI has not called for a boycott of the film, intentionally so.

PACBI consistently distinguishes between a held position (whether private or public) and an explicit call for boycott, precisely because in certain contexts, such as in the Western mainstream, a boycott may be counterproductive, whereas in other contexts, including but not limited to the Arab region, the harm done from screening the film would outdo any benefits (see the response to question 3 below on harms). BDS has always considered context sensitivity a key operational principle.

Millions who have watched the live-streamed US-Israeli genocide of 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza and have channeled their anger and grief into mass, strategic, principled and effective actions and campaigns do not need this film to convince them or others about Israel’s 76-year-old regime of settler-colonialism and apartheid or about the legendary Palestinian resilience and resistance to dismantle it. In the context of the Arab world, and to a lesser extent in much of the Global South, screening a film whose production includes dimensions of normalization would make it seem like the anti-occupation ends justify the normalization means, and would be far more harmful than the educational value the film would have there.

Raising awareness about Palestine, particularly in the Arab world and the Global South, should not be tainted with normalization. There are so many award-winning Palestinian, Arab, and international films out there that are not tainted in this way. There are also films by anti-Zionist Jewish-Israelis who also serve the Palestinian cause well without being tainted by any normalization (see more in the response to question 2 below).

In the colonial West, state, corporate and institutional complicity in Israel’s occupation, apartheid and genocide is still dominant  indeed it makes up most of all global complicity. Therefore challenging the racist dehumanization of Palestinians there is critical, albeit fraught with deep forms of state-sponsored censorship, repression and violence. In such a context, a boycott of the film in mainstream circles, as opposed to Palestine film festivals and solidarity circles, could be counterproductive. Raising awareness about the struggle against Israel’s military occupation and ethnic cleansing through the focus on Masafer Yatta in this film is obviously important to expose in such contexts.

Regardless, it is important to distinguish between the positions of the consensus-based BDS movement, led by the largest Palestinian coalition in Palestine and exile (the BNC) on one hand, and calls for boycott that are motivated by political “purity” with little concern about building coalitions, accumulating people power, or having any meaningful impact. The movement has therefore consistently rejected purity politics and sloganeering that ignores the ethical responsibility to be effective, strategic and goal-oriented while adhering to our principles. Our decision is always determined by our principles, first and foremost, while trying to balance these principles with strategic effectiveness and context sensitivity. This is what we call “strategic radicalism.”

2. How does PACBI deal with ethical vs political considerations? And did PACBI only consider the ethical perspective and guidelines when taking a position on No Other Land, ignoring the film’s benefits vs. harms in this critical moment?

PACBI refrained for over a year from publishing the position it had reached very early on that this production irrefutably conflicts with the BDS movement’s anti-normalization guidelines. This, like all PACBI decisions, was based on an intersection between ethical principles and strategic considerations. The latter include the movement’s priorities, capacities, and indeed the harm-benefit balance. PACBI assessed that overall, this film was a far lower priority to call out in public than many other projects that are irrefutably worse (i.e., Disney and Marvel’s revival of the racist Sabra/Ruth Bat-Seraph character in the latest Captain America movie, or Disney’s Snow White film starring Gal Gadot, a cultural ambassador of Israel who has hosted screenings of an Israeli military propaganda film justifying the genocide).

The content of an artistic project is not strictly relevant in PACBI’s decision-making process on whether the project violates BDS anti-normalization guidelines. Unless a particular cultural product is inciting war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, the content does not play a role in determining whether or not it is boycottable according to BDS guidelines. PACBI adheres to the internationally-accepted principle of freedom of expression and therefore avoids political and ideological litmus tests, including when dealing with issues of normalization.

PACBI’s overall assessment, prior to the Oscars, was that the expected harm for the Palestinian struggle from publicly criticizing the production’s normalization was significantly higher than the expected benefit. This had to do with several factors, such as the film’s potential usefulness in some Western contexts, and the fact that one of the directors has exposed aspects of Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza, including the use of artificial intelligence in mass targeting. Yet, even then, PACBI consistently shared, in private, its objective position in response to inquiries received from Palestine film festivals and many filmmakers, always explaining why it was not strategic to go public with this position at that time.

After the film’s Oscar win, and to a lesser extent after the speech by the same Israeli filmmaker parroting Zionist talking points on Gaza, the risk of the film normalizing normalization with Israel’s regime of oppression dramatically increased, regardless of intentions. This became the most important political consideration, raising the benefit from calling out the film’s normalization especially in the Arab region to a very high level, well above any harm that may result from this position in the West. This is also why the position was originally crafted and released in Arabic for an Arab** audience, which often has very different, and diverse, considerations that the movement takes into account in making its decisions (more on this in the reply to question 3 below).

3. Is fighting normalization more important than winning over allies, specifically in the West, the main partner in Israel’s regime of settler-colonialism, occupation, apartheid and genocide?

It is important to recognize that, unlike most partners operating in local or regional contexts, PACBI must take into account the global context and global audiences, and is not operating in only one part of the world. Thus, although the colonial West is indeed the main culprit in maintaining Israel’s regime of colonial oppression, addressing its context particularities is not always the movement’s top priority. Those in the West are clearly a very important constituency that the BDS movement, including PACBI, has always engaged, precisely because the complicity of western states, corporations, and institutions is the lifeline of Israeli apartheid and settler-colonialism. But it is becoming increasingly critical to fortify Arab resistance to normalization as this takes on more relative weight in the movement’s global struggle, in this exceptional moment. This point is absolutely critical and we urge allies to carefully consider it.

Israel, with unprecedented US and European support, is perpetrating the world’s first livestreamed genocide, including planned ethnic cleansing. In parallel, the Netanyahu-Trump fascist camp is feverishly trying to normalize these atrocity crimes with many tools, including by advocating for both with outrageous honesty. Their strategy to whitewash the genocide and maintain Israel’s “total impunity,” as even the UN Secretary-General calls it, includes a massive campaign of bullying, intimidation and open threats to force authoritarian, unelected Arab regimes, especially in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Libya, to join other Arab regimes in the so-called Abraham Accords of military-security alliances and normalization with Israel. This poses an existential threat to the liberation struggle of the Indigenous people of Palestine, particularly as it comes during this unspeakable genocide and the massive destruction and ethnic cleansing of refugee camps in the West Bank, the latter being aided by the so-called “security coordination” with the unelected, authoritarian Palestinian Authority leadership.

In the current Trumpian moment, with the massive push for normalizing genocidal Israel’s relations with corrupt Arab dictatorships, fighting normalization from below gains unparalleled importance as an existential need in our struggle for Palestinian rights. From a US/Western-centric viewpoint, our criticism of No Other Land’s normalization dimension may seem counterproductive. But taking the global picture into account, and particularly the specific Arab context in this moment, this harm is significantly outweighed by the benefit our struggle gains from protecting ourselves in the Arab region from extremely well-funded and aggressive normalization from below that is designed to buttress normalization from above, by despotic regimes who have no democratic mandate.

PACBI’s position came also in response to some voices in the Arab world ignoring the normalization and, in some instances, even justifying it, in a dangerous indicator of the insidious nature of normalization, almost entirely funded by western organizations and promoted by Arab dictatorships. This only reinforced PACBI’s view that going public was essential following the Oscars.

Given this overarching existential concern, fighting normalization from below in the Arab region now, at the grassroots, cultural, academic, civil society levels, gains enormous importance and weight for the BDS movement, even more than before.

4. Given assaults on advocacy for Palestinian rights and many forms of progressive speech, led by Trump, doesn’t calling out the film’s normalization weaken BDS’s ability to build intersectional coalitions to fight fascism, colonialism and oppression?

This is an important critique that PACBI appreciates. Indeed, the BDS movement has called for broad intersectional coalitions as a necessity in fighting all forms of oppression, particularly in these difficult times of rising fascism, white supremacy, and systemic racism. Controversy like the one raised around this film and PACBI’s criticism of it provides an opportunity to discuss PACBI's work globally, broaden understanding around normalization in the cultural space, and engage in constructive dialog with our partners on strategic priorities in various contexts.

Based on its over two decades of experience in building the academic, cultural and sports boycott as an indispensable and crucial part of BDS solidarity globally, PACBI assessed that through constructive and honest engagement with allies and partners in the solidarity movement in the West, we can shed light on the dimensions that they have omitted in their critiques, and even where disagreements still remain, we can maintain the broader agreement on much of the rest of the solidarity work and its priorities. Trust plays an important role in this dialog, and so does the readiness of all to intently listen, learn, and allow for evolving their respective positions. This FAQ is a part of this process, and we hope that shedding light on the complex politics of normalization and the multiple audiences that PACBI must address and consider will help to solidify this trust.

Moving forward, the BDS movement, including PACBI, will continue to build people power through broad intersectional coalitions, among others, to further isolate and eventually dismantle Israel’s genocidal regime of settler-colonial apartheid.

5. Shouldn’t we appreciate the contribution of brave Jewish-Israelis to exposing Israel’s ruthless military occupation and ethnic cleansing, as manifested in Masafer Yatta, even if they do not recognize the comprehensive, UN-stipulated Palestinian rights?

Masafer Yatta is indeed facing a cruel campaign of gradual ethnic cleansing waged by the illegal Israeli occupation and colonial settlers, and it therefore needs all the solidarity it and many similar villages like it can get. But how do we assess the participation of Jewish-Israeli activists in this or any other Palestinian-led struggle for our rights?

It is no coincidence that the BDS Call of 2005, signed by the coalition of all Palestinian political parties, as well as by trade unions and the absolute majority of grassroots and civil society entities, has explicitly invited “conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace.” Anti-Zionist Israelis who recognize the comprehensive rights of the Palestinian people, especially the right of refugees to return and receive reparations as stipulated in international law, and who wish to co-resist with us to end Israel’s system of colonial oppression are our partners in this struggle. Our Israeli BDS partner, Boycott from Within, is an inspiring example of ethical co-resistance to oppression. In contrast, Standing Together is a blatant example of insidious normalization outfits that strive to promote unethical “coexistence” under oppressionBDS, after all, targets complicity, not identity. As stated in the BDS movement’s anti-normalization guidelines:

“As in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, Israeli colonial settlers who wish to join the Indigenous-led struggle to end oppression must disassociate from Israel’s regime of settler-colonialism and apartheid and shed their colonial privileges. This begins with members of the colonial community’s public endorsement of, at a minimum, the UN-stipulated rights of the colonized people, thus recognizing that the colonized are full humans who deserve their full set of human rights (including social, political and cultural rights). Only then can members of the colonial community begin to engage with Indigenous people in real co-resistance activities rather than perpetuate a normalization of colonial violence.”

Even if the joint co-resistance project focuses on some, not all, aspects of ending the system of colonial oppression, the condition of recognizing our comprehensive rights is not negotiable.

Masafer Yatta in particular has become a focal point for anti-Zionist and international solidarity groups. However, it also became an entry point for “liberal Zionist” anti-occupation Israeli activists, given the privileges granted to Israelis in contrast to the severe movement restrictions imposed on Palestinians and internationals by the Israeli regime. Over the years, normalization projects — alongside clearer patterns of exploitation of communities in Masafer Yatta — have come to our attention. Most of the Israeli so-called “Zionist left” deal with their guilt and whitewash their ongoing investment in and support for Israel’s regime of settler-colonialism and apartheid by standing with small Palestinian communities in the occupied West Bank resisting the occupation. But the same activists would not stand with the struggle to end Israel’s genocide against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza, with many of them trying to both-sides it or even whitewash it.

And of course the absolute majority of the Israeli “Zionist left” prefer to focus on “the occupation” in the West Bank and pre-genocide Gaza, which they see as Israel’s only fault, than to touch the root causes of this colonial “conflict” — Israel’s regime of settler colonialism and apartheid since the 1948 Nakba.

This is precisely why the BDS movement, having deprived the Israeli Zionist “left” of its gatekeeping role, which they gained throughout the Oslo process that literally cemented Israel’s colonial rule, has defined normalization in very clear terms set by entities representing the absolute Palestinian majority. Israelis who refuse to recognize our comprehensive rights under international law must first shed their racism and colonialism to be true allies in this anti-colonial struggle. This was one of the many lessons we have learned from the South African liberation struggle.

We note here that even long-standing partners and allies in the West are not immune to the racial privilege of being white or in proximity to whiteness, which can prevent them from seeing other contexts or even result in them adopting a gatekeeper role, regardless of intentions. Beyond a critique of whiteness, a Western-centric attitude can also sometimes hamper a full appreciation of the issues surrounding normalization in particular. One can present a strong critique of our work, or the work of any oppressed people struggling to end oppression, while recognizing and taking into account their positionality, never to censor themselves, but to ensure that their critique is as ethical as possible, and therefore as constructive as possible.

6. Who develops the BDS guidelines, and shouldn’t they be updated and modified to reflect the evolving reality? Why should they be the reference for assessing the relative benefit of any act of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle?

The BNC is the absolute largest, most inclusive Palestinian coalition. It is representative, authoritative and reaches its decisions based on the notion of tawafuq, or accord, which means all entities represented agree to ultimately accept the decision, even if it does not fully align with their opinions. The BDS guidelines are dynamically developed over a fairly long period of time through a thoroughly participatory and expansive process that engages Palestinian communities everywhere, as much as feasible. The anti-normalization guidelines, specifically, went through many intensive discussions and deliberations in Palestine and with Palestinian communities in exile and have been subjected to much debate ever since. They have withstood the test of time, impact, and relevance.

Being consensus-based, the guidelines are ethically consistent, principled, effective, goal-oriented, and as objective as they can be. They never reflect the ideological or political views of this or that Palestinian entity, and they are applied consistently and as professionally as possible. This is why they have for many years commanded the wide respect not just of the absolute majority of Palestinians, but also of the solidarity networks globally.

The BDS guidelines evolve based on qualitative changes in reality, with some guidelines evolving much faster than others in order to better serve Palestinian popular resistance and the BDS movement’s struggle to end international complicity and advance support for Palestinian rights. To give another example, the process to develop the specific BDS guidelines that apply to Palestinian citizens of present-day Israel lasted close to three years, with inclusive and democratically-run community workshops being held in many localities in the 1948 region. Representatives of almost all political parties, grassroots networks and activist groups participated in that process that included critiques, debates, and exchanges also from partners around the world.

7. Is PACBI through this statement changing its principle of targeting institutions as opposed to individuals?

No. The BDS movement, including PACBI, has consistently targeted institutions, not individuals. It is crucial, however, to distinguish between anti-normalization work and “targeting individuals.” The BDS anti-normalization guidelines have always made that distinction clear. They say:

The BDS movement calls for boycotts of activities, events and projects which legitimize or otherwise enable Israel’s regime of apartheid, settler colonialism and occupation. It does not call for or condone boycotts of individuals because of their Israeli or Jewish origin or identity. In other words, BDS targets complicity, not identity.

With regard to anti-normalization, our work is based on the principle that this struggle is an Arab struggle and not merely a Palestinian one. In fact, the people of Palestine have for centuries been historically, culturally, linguistically, and otherwise an integral part of the Arab world – one that Western colonialism carved up into artificial states in the 20th century. Apartheid Israel has worked hard for decades, and especially through the Oslo Accords years, to reduce this struggle into a “Palestinian-Israeli conflict,” to split Arab public opinion, to detach Palestine from its Arab context, and ultimately, to even exclude Palestinians in exile from the very definition of the Palestinian people.

However, Israel has largely failed to sever Palestine from the Arab world, as far as Arab peoples’ commitments go (Israel’s recent normalization agreements with several Arab dictatorships and authoritarian regimes notwithstanding). Egypt is the best example of this. Since the Camp David “peace” accords between the Egyptian regime and apartheid Israel was signed in 1978, the almost absolute consensus among the Egyptian people and civil society has remained supportive of Palestinian liberation and strongly opposed to normalization with Israel.

In light of the above, when an Arab individual and an Israeli individual collaborate or participate in joint events or projects, they do so as “representatives” of their states rather than as private individuals. In such instances, both the Arab and the Israeli are viewed by their compatriots as well as others globally, as representing their flags, regardless of what the individuals may think or want.

Thus, ensuring that joint projects and activities between Arabs and Israelis do not undermine the principle that the struggle for the Palestinian people’s inalienable rights is an Arab struggle is certainly not the same as a boycott of Israeli individuals because of their Israeli identity. Indeed, the BNC has never called for or condoned the latter. What anti-normalization principles reject are attempts to represent Israel alongside Arab countries as if it were a normal part of the region, not a settler-colonial and apartheid state. This stance emerges from the particular context of this struggle and the centuries-old intimate relationship between Palestinians and other Arab peoples of the region.

Countering normalization is all about providing ethical and political guidance to joint activities/projects between Arabs — including Palestinians — and Israeli individuals and groups, in order to protect our struggle. It ensures that such joint activities are not used to normalize oppression but rather contribute to the Palestinian-led struggle to end it.

  • *

    Following the publication of this statement, the No Other Land directors’ statement was updated to name Israel as the perpetrator, and to mention Israel’s genocide in Gaza. A screenshot of the previous version can be viewed at https://bdsmovement.net/sites/default/files/2025-03/IMG_0345.jpg

  • **

    In our struggle for freedom, self-determination, dignity, justice and equality among human beings, regardless of color, race, gender, ethnicity or religion, the BDS movement is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and therefore rejects all injustice, racial discrimination and oppression. The BDS movement does not understand Arabism in its narrow ethnic or nationalist sense, but rather in its broader, progressive and modern sense, which rejects the exclusion of national/ethnic minorities in the Arab region and rejects all discrimination or oppression against them, but rather considers them an integral part of the composition of this region and its peoples.

 

Universities Australia’s new antisemitism definition: A novel kind of campus governance?



Published 

UWA Winthrop Hall

First published at Academics for Palestine Western Australia. Slightly edited.

Jan Lanicek and Ruth Balint have published a valuable overview of the reactions and concerns provoked by Universities Australia’s (UA) adoption of a new definition of antisemitism.1 A few points could have been framed differently, but overall we agree: universities should provide the “setting for all students to feel comfortable participating in classes without fear of prejudice” and they should be a space to “pursue genuine, evidence-based research on all aspects of current world affairs.” The authors lucidly conclude that “definitions are important, but they are one part of this vexed issue; they cannot be the sole arbiter.”

This article hopes to answer the call of that open conclusion by pointing to legitimate “arbiters” that are undermined by the new definition, and articulating why the new definition proposed by UA is more problematic and far-reaching than may at first appear.2

Lack of clarity and enforceability

Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition that inspired UA’s new position, has repeatedly voiced concern with the problematic and deleterious use of the IHRA definition, which was never intended as an on or off campus hate speech code (2017, 2019). Stern, along with many other scholars (here and here) — including the 370 scholars who signed the competing Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism — have warned about and recorded a worrying trend of politically instrumentalising the definition to silence valid critiques of the State of Israel and its allies.

Why this trend? There are many socio-political factors that cannot be covered here, yet this slippery tendency also has a logical cause baked into the definition itself, albeit not explicitly so. According to Hugh Tomlinson, the lack of clarity and comprehensiveness of the IHRA definition will likely produce a “lack of consistency in its application and a chilling effect on public bodies which, in the absence of definitional clarity, may seek to sanction or prohibit any conduct which has been labelled by third parties as antisemitic without applying any clear criterion of assessment.”3 Clearly, this chilling effect on public authorities (such as universities) would then flow onto their staff and students, themselves likely to self-censure by precaution rather than “feel comfortable participating without fear or prejudice” or “pursue genuine, evidence-based research”. Without making too many undue parallels, we already know from another continent (and from other eras) that “it [can be] remarkable how quickly the chill descends.

Concision, accuracy and enforceability are central tenets of legal drafting theory and practice. For example, the non-legally binding Jerusalem Declaration definition of antisemitism contains 16 words. In contrast, the definition proposed by UA, which seeks to be codified and enforced, is 193 words long. What might the reason be for this twelvefold gap?4 The first paragraph of the new definition defines antisemitism (69 words).5 The second paragraph opens by stating that “[C]riticism of the policies and practices of the Israeli government or state is not in and of itself antisemitic”, only to then explain that this same criticism can be antisemitic if it fills the conditions defined in the first paragraph; that is “Targeting Jews based on their Jewish identities alone” (8 words). 

If what constitutes antisemitism is contained in the first paragraph alone, are not the second and third paragraphs of the definition superfluous? And, if these two paragraphs are indeed redundant, why are they part of the definition at all? We are tempted to conclude that the function of those two paragraphs is not explained by their explicit denotative content, but rather by the connotative inflexion and the equivocation that emerges from their presence.

Judging whether a code of conduct or law has been breached has traditionally been (and should remain) the prerogative of the judging arbiter (whether a university board, a jury or a judge), not the prerogative of a definition. Such judgement should be grounded in interpreting concise and clear definitions, which provide the spirit of the rules and principles we seek to abide by, and confronting these to the empirical evidence presented by the accusation and the defence. 

What reason is there to think that public authorities such as universities cannot interpret what constitutes antisemitism accurately, on the basis of a clear and enforceable definition? Could it be that, in a move that seeks to “sanction or prohibit any conduct which has been labelled by third parties as antisemitic without applying any clear criterion of assessment”, the length and lack of clarity of this definition are not bugs but features? In that case, we can conclude that the equivocation and lack of clarity that breaks with long-standing legal drafting principles serve an implicit change in the governance paradigm, in which the chilling effect is the goal.

Lack of logical consistency

There are two types of logical incongruity in the definition proposed by UA. The first is formal (the underlying validity of the definition). The second is how the definition tracks with empirical evidence (whether the premise/s are true). Lanicek and Balint stress there are different understandings of antisemitism. This is necessarily true, or there would be no political struggle over the term. However, only one of the competing understandings is formally consistent (and the assumption is that only formal consistency can serve impartiality, truth, justice and social cohesion). 

The main point of contention between the two positions on the new definition is whether Zionism — a political project — should ever be definitionally conflated with Jewishness — an inalienable identity. Lanicek and Balint use a Soviet anti-Zionist campaign — an effectively antisemitic campaign — as an example of the conflation of antisemitism with anti-Zionism. This is somewhat surprising given that today, it is Zionists who are pushing for that conflation despite many Jews not identifying as Zionists; despite the objections made by many Jewish organisations; despite the fact that most Zionists are not Jewish; and despite the fact that at least some Zionists are antisemitic. Even if it were true that “a majority of Australian Jews identify with Zionism”, it remains the case that conflating the two terms formally is a blatantly false conclusion to reach. A single black swan is enough to falsify the statement that “all swans are white”.

Similarly, it is also true that, as the new definition states, “substituting the word ‘Zionist’ for ‘Jew’ does not eliminate the possibility of speech being antisemitic.” People can indeed purposefully misuse terms so as to effectively alter their meaning (this is how we make jokes and slurs). Yet the de facto misuse of a term should not therefore serve as grounds for a formal re-definition of the term, especially if the original meaning of the term designates something specific that proves useful to make accurate statements. 

People might misuse the word “pig” to describe a person or a group of people, but the word pig should still formally designate a four-legged animal and not a person or group of people on the grounds that some use the term as a slur. This is further complicated if a word is deemed a slur solely depending on who says it. Indeed, the fact that Zionists — Jewish or not — self-identify as Zionists should already be proof that the term designates something useful and meaningful that is not necessarily a slur.

If the formal meaning of a word is made to depend on who says it, and if this in turn determines whether or not the person should be punished for using that word, then what is policed is not the actual meaning of a word, but rather who uses it. The rationale behind hate speech laws is not to silence particular people but to silence hate. Further, it remains unclear how drawing a false logical conclusion so as to silence certain people would prove helpful in fighting actual antisemitism. 

Yet this false conclusion is made regularly, even by learned legal professionals, including Australia’s attorney-general Mark Dreyfus: “The label Zionist is used, not in any way, accurately. When critics use that word, they actually mean Jew.” Again, Dreyfus’ statement could indeed be true, yet in a liberal system the burden of proof is with the accuser; the accused remains innocent until proven guilty. Law must judge deeds, not hidden intentions, which it has no access to. The alternative is a clear shift towards arbitrary and authoritarian expediency, and away from impartiality and due diligence. From there, anyone could be accused (and potentially judged) of “actually” saying anything, despite demonstrably not saying anything of the sort.

Second, there are conspicuous silences in the new definition that mean parts of it effectively function as “performative concessions” (dead definitional weight) rather than as substantial parts of the definition. The new definition states: “[A]ll peoples, including Jews, have the right to self-determination…” Lanicek and Balint note that “the declaration leaves open the question of the future settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the subsequent political and territorial arrangement in the region.” 

Here we face another kind of logical problem: these two statements are perhaps true, but only formally so. Any confrontation with the empirical reality of Zionism as it exists today shows its direct negation of the statement “all peoples have the right to self-determination”. Indeed, this is the central criticism levelled against Zionism — that it denies Palestinian’s right to self-determination so as to assert its own, and refuses the binational, non-ethnic, equal rights, democratic alternative because, according to Zionism (not just its critics), Israel is and must be a Jewish state. The Jewish Council of Australia argues this means some of the political solutions to the conflict are not in fact “left open”; they are pre-emptively foreclosed by the new definition, which could now label them antisemitic. 

While we could plausibly try to imagine a Zionism that would acknowledge Palestinian self-determination, sound arguments require that we ground premises in empirical reality: Zionism as it exists today does not recognise Palestinian self-determination or equal rights for Palestinians. This is observably true, regardless of the quality of its justifications for doing so. The empirical facts, international reports and resolutions all point to the objectively non-existent sovereignty and self-determination of Palestinians, whether de jure or de facto (here, here, here, here, here, here). No logical explanation for this state of affairs can be provided without mentioning Israel and the Zionist project. 

These are not vague views held by everyday (potentially antisemitic) people about a conflict they know little about; these are informed views formulated on the back of thorough investigations and strict protocols from supranational institutions such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNICEF, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, Red Cross, Save the Children, etc. As with the lack of clarity of the new definition, which effectively does away with legal rigour, we could of course do away with these legal and humanitarian institutions, as well as with the diligent reports and judgements they produce. But it is unclear how this would serve truth, justice, mutual understanding, the fight against antisemitism or the social cohesion that UA claims to want.

Definitions are indeed important. They should provide clarity rather than obfuscation, especially if they are to be used for legal and paralegal purposes. But even then, they are indeed only one part of this vexed issue: they cannot — and should not — be the sole arbiter. Case by case interpretation and evidence-based reports should always be integral to the rights-based due process proper to liberal governance. The alternative undermines the principles that secure the possibility of a “setting for all students to feel comfortable participating without fear of prejudice” or of a space to “pursue genuine, evidence-based research.” History shows these paradigmatic slides in governance often start with universities, but they rarely stop there.

The author would like to thank Anna Copeland and Anne Surma for their kind feedback and suggestions on an early version of this article.

  • 1

    There are still conflicting reports about whether individual universities have already endorsed it and how they will enforce it. For example UTS has apparently stated it would not enforce the new definition, Murdoch University is currently consulting staff regarding a broader definition of ‘oppression’.

  • 2

    Before going into the details of the new definition, let us note that the definition, regardless of its form and content, would “codify antisemitism in a manner not applied to any other form of racism or discrimination”; antisemitism would be “the only form of racism and discrimination included in the Standards Framework” (NTEU). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander staff and students, as well as, in this particular context, Arab and Muslim staff and students, who also experience racism, including systemic racism, would not benefit from such a commitment and codification. Given UA’s commitment to fighting all racism and discrimination, we are led to wonder about the reason for such differential treatment.

  • 3

    In another attack on Western universities’ independence, the rebuttal to Trump’s administration’s threats of funding cuts to Columbia University also highlight the ‘unconstitutional vagueness’ of the conditions needing to be met for funding to continue.

  • 4

    I should note that much of the criticism of the IHRA definition is targeted at its accompanying examples, not at the definition itself. Tomlinson covers some of the reasons why these examples are problematic. The Jerusalem Declaration seeks to provide a non-legally binding definition that rebuts the IHRA definition politically, it therefore provides a set of ‘counter examples’. The approach taken here is different, it does not seek to provide competing and rectifying (political) content, instead it criticises the form of the definition itself: it points to the lack of concision and clarity themselves as a political weapon. Debates can of course be had about how tightly or loosely legal drafting should be in different contexts.

  • 5

    For a ‘literary reading’ of the ‘wordiness’ of the new definition that ‘conceals more the it reveals’, see Jumana Bayeh’s piece in Overland.