Why ‘Gen Z Protests’ Meant Different Things In Bangladesh And Nepal – Analysis

Protest in Nepal. Photo Credit: हिमाल सुवेदी, Wikipedia Commons

January 30, 2026
By Arijit Mazumdar



Over the past two years, protests in both Bangladesh and Nepal were widely described as “Gen Z movements.” Images of young demonstrators circulated across social media platforms, reinforcing the impression that South Asia was experiencing a generational wave of political unrest—echoing youth-led mobilizations seen elsewhere, from Hong Kong to Iran—rooted in economic insecurity, frustration with entrenched elites, and demands for accountability.

The label was convenient—but misleading. While young people were central to protests in both countries, the movements that unfolded differed fundamentally in their political logic, organizational character, and political consequences. Treating them as manifestations of the same phenomenon obscured how institutions, regime type, and political opportunity shape youth mobilization. It also encouraged misplaced expectations about what these protests could realistically accomplish.

Now that the protest cycles have ended, the contrast between Bangladesh and Nepal is clearer. Despite similar generational imagery, the two cases reveal how youth-led mobilization can produce sharply different forms of political change depending on the systems in which it operates.

Bangladesh: From Student Protest to Political Rupture

In Bangladesh, youth participation in the protests was inseparable from a political system that had steadily narrowed space for competition and dissent. Over the past decade, under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, political authority became increasingly centralized, elections lost credibility as mechanisms for change, and opposition activity faced mounting constraints. In this environment, street mobilization emerged as one of the few remaining ways to express collective grievance.

The initial spark for the protests was specific and concrete, rooted in anger over public-sector job allocation and perceptions of unfairness in access to employment. What surprised many observers was how quickly a narrowly framed student grievance escalated into a nationwide political confrontation. The protests began in June 2024, but the mobilization soon expanded beyond university campuses. High unemployment among educated youth, rising living costs, inflationary pressures, and long-standing frustration with political exclusion fed into a wider challenge to the governing order.

As protests intensified, the state responded with force. Curfews, arrests, and restrictions on communication signaled the government’s determination to reassert control. Yet repression failed to contain the unrest. Student-led mobilization widened into a broader uprising in July 2024 that ultimately forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to step down and flee to India, ending a prolonged period of political dominance.

The aftermath marked a clear rupture rather than a return to equilibrium. An interim government was installed, reshaping the political landscape and opening the path toward a new electoral cycle. A constitutional referendum on the July Charter—a comprehensive reform framework developed after the July 2024 uprising and endorsed by much of Bangladesh’s political spectrum—is planned to coincide with the February 2026 general elections. The charter proposes broad changes to governance, including stronger rights protections and new limits on executive power, subject to voter approval.

In Bangladesh, the protest wave did not simply register dissatisfaction; it produced a break in political continuity and reset the terms of political competition.

Yet the roadmap is clearer than the destination. The existence of a charter and an electoral timeline do not guarantee reform. While the July Charter outlines ambitious changes, its implementation depends on political consensus, institutional capacity, and sustained elite commitment—none of which have yet been tested in a polarized post-uprising environment. Removing a dominant leader did not automatically resolve deeper governance challenges or ensure political stability.

The transition has also exposed new fault lines. Reports of attacks on Hindu minorities following the uprising, along with the renewed visibility of Islamist parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, underscore how periods of political flux can create openings for identity-based mobilization. Managing minority protection while regulating political competition will test the capacity of post-uprising institutions and shape whether reform momentum consolidates or fragments.

Nepal: Protest as Crisis Trigger in an Open System

Nepal’s protest cycle unfolded in a very different setting. Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal is an electoral democracy with regular leadership turnover, competitive parties, and constitutionally protected political freedoms. Protest did not substitute for elections; it operated alongside them, expressing frustration with how democracy had functioned in practice.

The immediate trigger was a sweeping government decision in September 2025 to restrict access to social media platforms, widely perceived as an attempt to curb expression and shield political elites from scrutiny. The ban touched a nerve, particularly among younger citizens for whom digital platforms had become essential tools for communication, employment, organization, and political voice.

What followed was a rapid escalation. Protests that began as largely student-led demonstrations in Kathmandu quickly spread to other urban centers, drawing in young professionals, activists, and digital workers. As crowds grew, confrontations with security forces became more frequent. Efforts to enforce the restrictions and control the narrative only deepened perceptions of governmental overreach, accelerating the erosion of authority.

Facing mounting pressure, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned, and the social media restrictions were lifted. Parliament was dissolved, and general elections are expected in early March 2026 under an interim administration, even as established parties and new political actors jockey for position ahead of the vote.

Yet the meaning of this outcome differed from Bangladesh’s experience. Nepal’s political system has long been characterized by coalition instability, frequent leadership changes, and elite circulation. In this context, protest accelerated a crisis rather than creating one.

Because electoral turnover and coalition collapse are familiar features of Nepal’s political life, elite concessions and leadership change functioned as pressure-release mechanisms rather than precursors to deeper institutional transformation. Once these concessions were secured, the protests quickly lost momentum. The resignation of a prime minister and reversal of a controversial policy fit within an established pattern of political volatility rather than signaling a regime-level rupture.

When the protests subsided, Nepal’s underlying challenges remained. Corruption, weak governance, and public distrust of political parties continued to shape political life. K.P. Sharma Oli remains chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) and is expected to remain the party’s public face in the March 2026 general elections. The mobilization forced Nepal’s elites to respond, but it did not fundamentally reconfigure the system that produced popular frustration in the first place.

Same Label, Different Political Mechanisms

Seen together, the two cases show why the “Gen Z protest” label obscures more than it reveals. In Bangladesh, youth mobilization emerged from political closure. With institutional channels blocked, protest escalated into a confrontation that broke through a closed system and forced a leadership transition. Change came through rupture—and introduced significant uncertainty about what follows.

In Nepal, youth mobilization emerged from disillusionment within democracy. Protest acted as a catalyst, transforming an unpopular decision into a legitimacy crisis that toppled a government. Change came quickly, but within a system accustomed to crisis-driven adjustment rather than structural reform.

Generational language is appealing because it captures visible demographic patterns and resonates with global narratives of youth activism. But it often distracts from the institutional conditions that shape protest outcomes. Age may influence who mobilizes, but political systems ultimately determine what mobilization can achieve.

For policymakers and analysts, this distinction carries practical implications. Misreading protests as purely generational risks flawed expectations about their durability, escalation potential, and policy impact. In more closed systems, youth-led protest may push toward rupture, with destabilizing but potentially transformative effects. In more open yet stagnant systems, protest is more likely to force short-term recalibration without altering the structures that generate recurring unrest.

Bangladesh and Nepal demonstrate that similar images of young demonstrators can mask profoundly different political dynamics. Understanding those differences is essential not only for interpreting recent unrest, but for assessing how future protest movements may reshape—or fail to reshape—South Asia’s political landscape.


Arijit Mazumdar
Arijit Mazumdar is Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota. He is the author of Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia (Routledge). His research focuses on South Asian politics and Asian security and diplomacy, with particular emphasis on India’s foreign policy.