Wetlands In Brazil’s Cerrado Are Carbon-Storage Powerhouses

Campos úmidos and veredas are among Brazil's most carbon-dense ecosystems, yet they are also very vulnerable. Recognizing and protecting these peat-forming wetlands is imperative not only to strengthen national carbon accounting and meet global climate targets through nature-based solutions, but also to secure water availability, safeguard biodiversity, and ensure the resilience of Brazil’s most threatened biome. CREDIT: Paulo Bernardin


March 13, 2026 

By Eurasia Review

The Amazon rainforest is famous for storing massive amounts of carbon in its trees and soils, helping regulate the global climate. Yet a paper published in New Phytologistshows that one of South America’s largest carbon-storing ecosystems exists in an often-overlooked grassy savanna: the Cerrado in Brazil.

The study was led by Larissa Verona, a technician working with senior scientist Amy Zanne at Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies and a former graduate student at Universidade Estadual de Campinas in Brazil, where she carried out the work. The study is the first in-depth assessment of carbon stocks in the Cerrado’s groundwater-fed wetlands, known locally as campos úmidos (wet grasslands) and veredas. Measurements indicate that the peaty soils of these wetlands store about 1,200 metric tons of carbon per hectare.

“This value is about six times greater than the average carbon density of biomass in the Amazon rainforest,” said Verona.

Based on the team’s mapping of potential wetland distribution, they estimate that these areas could be storing the equivalent of about 20% of the carbon in the Amazon vegetation. However, much more work at additional sites is necessary to test this estimate.

Verona’s work was supported by a fellowship from the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) and supervised by senior author Rafael Oliveira, an ecologist at Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

A vital ecosystem

The Cerrado is the second largest biome in South America, occupying 26% of Brazil. The most biodiverse savanna in the world, it is home to parrots, toucans, pumas, tapirs, maned wolves, giant anteaters, and many other animals, as well as more than 4,000 native plant species.

“The Cerrado also has the headwaters of approximately two-thirds of Brazil’s major waterways, including the Amazon,” said Zanne. “It’s the source of a lot of water for the entire country and broader region.”

The water-logged peaty soils of these headwaters are rich in carbon from partially decomposed plants and other organic matter.

“Wet conditions create a lack of oxygen, which slows down decomposition,” Zanne explained. “As a result, organic matter accumulates over time, enabling these wetlands to store large amounts of carbon in their soils, potentially for thousands of years at a time.”

Despite their importance as carbon sinks, Cerrado wetlands and their carbon stocks remain poorly understood. The new study is the first to use deep soil profiles across multiple sites to quantify how much carbon the wetlands are storing.

Exceptionally high carbon density

To measure how much carbon is stored in the wetlands, the researchers extracted soil cores as deep as four meters. The work was physically difficult, and Verona often came back from her field work covered in mud. In the lab, each layer of the soil core was tested to determine its carbon density. Their finding of an average density of 1,200 metric tons of carbon per hectare is considered exceptionally high, although there are other peatlands, including in the Congo basin, where carbon density exceeds 2,000 metric tons per hectare.

Mapping the wetlands

Veredas and campos úmidos are spread out in relatively small patches throughout the Cerrado, making it difficult to estimate how much carbon they could be storing at a regional scale.

“Because these wetlands are naturally fragmented, Larissa had to do lots of modeling to try to predict where they might occur,” said Zanne.

Remote sensing data combined with machine learning suggested that the wetlands may cover 16.7 million hectares, occupying an area at least six times greater than previously thought. This area represents approximately 8% of the Cerrado and 2% of Brazil. The team is continuing to refine their mapping and estimates.

Very old carbon

Team members at the Max Planck Institute in Germany used radiocarbon dating to determine how long the carbon had been accumulating in the veredas and campos úmidos. The average age of the carbon was 11,185 years old, but some of it had been sitting in the wetlands for more than 20,000 years.

“This carbon accumulated over a long time period, and if it gets lost, we can’t accumulate it again for a very long time, the way we can replant a forest,” said Verona.

Zanne adds, “The Cerrado’s vast store of carbon isn’t included in our carbon budgets, because until recently, we didn’t know it was there. If these carbon stocks are disturbed — such as through agricultural expansion, wetland draining, and drying due to climate change — the stored carbon could convert into climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions. This is one of the many reasons why it’s so important to protect this ecosystem. However, current strategies to protect carbon-rich ecosystems tend to focus almost entirely on forests, and they overlook ecosystems like this.”

Dry conditions are bad for carbon storage

Verona measured greenhouse gas emissions during the Cerrado’s wet, dry, and transitional seasons. Taking these measurements involved lugging a sensitive instrument called a LI-COR Trace Gas Analyzer through the mud and hooking it up to PVC collars in the ground to measure the carbon dioxide and methane coming out of the soil — all while trying to keep the machine dry.

“This was really challenging, because it’s easy to fall when you get stuck in the mud, or you step in a hole,” said Verona. “I fall over all the time in the field, but as long as I protect the instrument, I don’t care. It’s like my baby.”

Because the majority of the vegetation is grasses, which break down more easily than woody plants, the carbon stored in the wetlands can quickly decompose and turn into carbon emissions when the soils dry out.

The LI-COR measurements showed that about 70% of the wetlands’ annual emissions occurred during the hot, dry season. As the Cerrado becomes hotter and drier under climate change, more of the soil carbon is expected to break down, increasing greenhouse gas emissions.

An ecosystem under threat

In addition to the hotter and drier conditions that boost emissions, climate change is increasing the risk of fires in the Cerrado. Fires can quickly release carbon that took millennia to build up in the soils, and clear the way for invasive plants to colonize the Cerrado wetlands. Changes in land use pose another major threat.

“We call the Cerrado a sacrifice biome, because Brazil wants to protect the Amazon,” Verona explained, “but we also want to maintain agriculture. So agribusinesses are converting the Cerrado for commodity crop production, draining its wetlands, or taking its water for irrigation. And if we are removing the water from the wetlands, we expose these soils to more air causing greater breakdown and release of carbon.”

“As we lose water in the Cerrado,” Zanne added, “we also put water supplies at risk across the country and broader region, including the Amazon. So, sacrificing the Cerrado for the Amazon actually puts the Amazon at risk, too.”

The authors think that expanded protections for wetlands and better education around the importance of groundwater-fed wetlands could help to protect these important ecosystems. Brazilian law already protects groundwater-fed wetlands, but, in some regions, as much as 50% of these wetlands have been degraded already. Improving recognition, mapping, and understanding of these ecosystems could strengthen their protection.

The authors hope that the new paper and their continuing efforts to map and understand wetlands in the Cerrado will underscore the urgency of conserving the Cerrado as a nature-based climate solution, and to safeguard water supply and biodiversity.

“When we talk about carbon in Brazil, we talk about forests,” said Verona. “But the Cerrado is also important for its large and long-term carbon stocks, and we need to fight for it, too.”

Ravens Don’t Follow Wolves To Dinner – They Remember Where The Food Is

March 13, 2026 
By Eurasia Review

New findings challenge the long-held idea that scavengers seeking food routinely follow predators to find it. Studying common raven, gray wolf, and cougar in Yellowstone National Park, researchers found that ravens rarely trail predators over long distances; instead, they rely on spatial memory to return to places where kills have occurred before.

Scavenger species that rely on the kills of predators face the challenge of finding food that is patchily distributed, unpredictable, and often ephemeral because many animals compete for it. A widely accepted hypothesis suggests that scavengers solve this problem by adjusting their movements to follow large carnivores to their kills.

Although scavengers are frequently observed near carnivores in the field, it’s unclear whether following behavior reflects the dominant foraging strategy. However, this hypothesis has been difficult to evaluate due to the challenge of simultaneously tracking predators and scavengers across large distances.

Matthias-Claudio Loretto and colleagues investigated how common raven locate carrion by studying their interactions with grey wolf and cougar in Yellowstone National Park. Ravens are often seen traveling with wolves and rapidly gathering at fresh kills. Loretto and colleagues hypothesized ravens may rely on memory and prediction to revisit areas where predators frequently make kills, rather than following them in real time.

Loretto et al. used GPS devices to track the movements of ravens, wolves, and cougars over 2.5 years, as well as records of hundreds of wolf and cougar kills. Contrary to longstanding assumptions, the authors found that long-distance predator following was rare. Instead, ravens repeatedly returned, sometimes from distances of up to 155 kilometers, to areas where wolf kills were common.

Raven-cougar interactions were rare. The findings indicate that ravens rely on spatial memory, treating areas with historically high kill density as predictable foraging sites. According to the authors, this suggests that navigation and memory, rather than real-time tracking of predators, play the dominant role in how ravens locate food sources.

Wolves kill—and ravens remember where

Legend had it that ravens followed wolves to fresh kills. A tracking study reveals a much more interesting scavenging strategy.

Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior

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image: 

Two ravens soar above a wolf pack in Yellowstone. This type of short-distance following is common, but prolonged following is extremely rare.

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Credit: Daniel Stahler / YNP

When a wolf pack runs down its prey, the first on the scene is often the raven. Even before the predators have had time to dig in, the ravens are already in line, waiting to take advantage of the odd scrap of meat that becomes available. The speed with which the scavengers arrive at wolf kills is uncanny, and people had an explanation for how: ravens must be following wolves.

But a new study that tracked ravens and wolves in Yellowstone National Park over two-and-a-half years shows that the scavengers use a far more sophisticated strategy. Ravens can remember where wolves are most likely to make kills and will return to those areas from far away. “They can fly six hours non-stop, straight to a kill site,” says Dr Matthias Loretto, the study’s first author.

Published in Science, the findings suggest that ravens use spatial memory and navigation to find food scattered over the landscape. “Ravens can cover large distances by flying, and they seem to have a good memory, so they don’t need to constantly follow wolves in order to profit from the predators,” says Loretto.

The study was led by the Research Institute of Wildlife Ecology at the University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna and the Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior (Germany), together with several other international institutions, including the Senckenberg Biodiversity and Climate Research Centre (Germany); School of Environmental and Forest Sciences at the University of Washington (USA); and Yellowstone National Park (USA).

Putting a legend to the test

The study focused on Yellowstone National Park, where wolves were reintroduced in the mid-90s after a 70-year absence. The park’s wolves are monitored by tracking collars, which are attached to a quarter of the wolf population in any given year. Dr. Dan Stahler, a biologist from Yellowstone who has tracked the park’s wolves since reintroduction, says that ravens appear to seek out the company of wolves: “You see them flying directly above traveling packs or hopping close behind wolves as they take down prey.”

For the ravens, it’s a profitable foraging strategy, as the wolves invariably produce food that the birds can scavenge. “We all assumed that the birds had a very simple rule; just stick close to the wolves,” says Stahler. But the assumption was untested. “We didn’t know what ravens were capable of because nobody had ever put them at the center; nobody had taken the scavenger’s point of view,” he says.

To gain a complete picture of raven behavior, the team attached tiny GPS tracking devices to 69 ravens, “which is just an insane number,” says Loretto, who started the research while at the Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior. “Ravens are so observant of the landscape that they don’t step into traps easily,” he says. To trap the birds for tagging, researchers meticulously matched the trap setup with the surroundings. For example, traps set near campsites had to be disguised with rubbish and fast-food bait, “or else the ravens would suspect that something was off and wouldn’t come near it,” says Loretto, now a scientist at the University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna.

In addition to tracking ravens, researchers included movement data from 20 of Yellowstone’s collared wolves. They monitored the animals during winter, when ravens most often associate with wolves, recording GPS locations at intervals of up to 30 minutes for ravens and up to one hour for wolves. They also included data on where and when wolves killed prey, primarily elk, bison, and deer.

Remembering profitable landscapes

Over two-and-a-half years of tracking, researchers found only one clear case of a raven following a wolf for more than one kilometer or more than an hour. “At first, we were puzzled,” says Loretto. “Once we realized that ravens are not following wolves over long distances, we couldn’t explain why the birds still arrive so quickly at wolf kills.”

After a detailed analysis of the movement data, the pattern became clear. Rather than tracking predators directly over long distances, ravens repeatedly revisited specific areas where wolf kills were common. Some individuals flew up to 155 kilometers in a single day, moving along highly directional paths toward places where a carcass was likely to appear—even though the exact timing of a kill is unpredictable.

When it comes to location, wolf kills cluster in particular landscape features, such as flat valley bottoms, where wolves hunt more successfully. Ravens were far more likely to visit areas with a history of frequent wolf kills than areas where kills were rare, suggesting that they learn and remember the long-term “resource landscape” created by wolves.

“We already knew that ravens can remember stable food sources, like landfills,” says Loretto. “What surprised us is that they also seem to learn in which areas wolf kills are more common. A single kill is unpredictable, but over time some parts of the landscape are more productive than others — and ravens appear to use that pattern to their advantage.”

A broader insight into animal intelligence

The authors don’t rule out that ravens still follow wolves over short distances. “To find wolf kills locally, ravens likely use short-range cues, like monitoring wolf behavior or listening to wolf howling,” says Loretto. But at a broader scale, the pattern is clear: memory first, cues second. Ravens use spatial memory and navigation to decide where to search in the first place, sometimes across tens or even hundreds of kilometers.

Senior author Prof John M. Marzluff of the University of Washington adds: “What our study clearly shows is that ravens are flexible in where they decide to feed. They don’t stay tied to a particular wolf pack. With their sharp senses and memory of past feeding locations, they can choose among many foraging opportunities far and wide. This changes how we think about how scavengers find food—and suggests we may have underestimated some species for a long time.”

Ravens and wolves in Yellowstone [VIDEO] 

The team fitted ravens with GPS backpacks, seen here with antenna protruding.

Credit

Matthias Loretto

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Journal

Science

DOI

10.1126/science.adz9467 

Method of Research

Data/statistical analysis

Subject of Research

Animals

Article Title

Ravens anticipate wolf kill sites across broad scales

Article Publication Date

12-Mar-2026

War Over Law: Europe’s Unforced Errors Over The Use Of Force In Iran – OpEd

March 13, 2026 

 ECFR
By Anthony Dworkin

In their responses to the war in Iran, many European leaders appear concerned to adjust to the unabashed international power politics unleashed by President Donald Trump. But their apparent discarding of the principle of non-aggression may only store up trouble for the future.

As America and Israel launched their war of choice, not only was Europe sidelined but its leaders’ responses have proved confused and divided. They have largely declined to make clear that the UN Charter’s rules on the use of force still provide an essential foundation for international peace and security—a fundamental question raised by the military campaign.

European differences over policy towards Israel are nothing new. But, in this case, the divergences and ambiguities in the positions of European leaders seem to reveal a more profound uncertainty. They testify to a loss of faith in a principle of international order that Europeans have traditionally seen as fundamental. And this has come at precisely the moment when the likely harms to European interests of an unnecessary war are most obvious.

There is little question that the US and Israeli war against Iran is an unlawful act of aggression. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force except when authorised by the Security Council or in cases of self-defence against an armed attack. There is overwhelming agreementamong legal scholars that neither of those applies in this case. No European leader has argued the war is lawful, and the implausibility of Trump’s statements about the risk of imminent attack by Iran suggest he launched it as a response to Iranian defiance rather than any immediate threat. But many European statements have glossed over American and Israeli responsibility for a prohibited use of force. The statement issued by high representative Kaja Kallas on behalf of the EU’s member states called for “full respect of international law, including the principles of the United Nations Charter”. It does not acknowledge the overwhelming consensus in Europe that the attack contravened the charter. In this way, and by focusing its criticism on Iran, the statement failed to uphold the principles it purported to endorse.


Even more worryingly, several European leaders have implied that a realistic view of global politics requires a move away from fully supporting the prohibition on the use of force except for genuine self-defence. Most prominently, German chancellor Friedrich Merz has backed the idea that international law should not be allowed to stand in the way of necessary and justified action against Iran. After America and Israel began their attacks in February, Merz said it was inappropriate to lecture partners and allies when “we share many of their goals without actually being able to achieve them ourselves”. In a television interview, he said it was necessary to ask “what should we do when international law clearly reaches its limits” in respect of an Iranian regime that did not respect international law itself.

In her speech to the EU ambassadors conference, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen coupled a call to “see the world as it actually is today” with the statement that there should be no tears shed for the Iranian regime and that the people of Iran deserved freedom, dignity and self-determination. In slightly coded language, such comments give weight to the idea that the erosion of the rules-based order means legal technicalities can be at odds with justified goals. Going further, Dutch foreign minister Tom Berendsen said that “international law isn’t the only framework you can apply to this situation. You also have to be realistic, given the murderous nature of the Iranian regime.” Belgian foreign secretary Maxime Prévot suggested that the extra-legal nature of the war needed to be “weighed against the principle of reality” and that the attack on Iran was justified for global security. In a more nuanced way, French president Emmanuel Macron said that Iran bore primary responsibility for the war but that the US-Israeli action took place outside international law. This framing nevertheless suggested the prohibition on the use of force was a constraint that stood in the way of an operation that was at least understandable, if not justified.


At the other end of the spectrum, Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez has forthrightly argued the attack on Iran undermines a core principle of the international system that remains important and valuable. He saidSpain rejected “the unilateral military action by the United States and Israel, which represents an escalation and contributes to a more uncertain and hostile international order.” Norway’s government has also emphasised the illegality of the war, and British prime minister Keir Starmer initially refused to allow the use of British bases for offensive action (though he has since modified his position to allow strikes in defence of regional partners). He linked his stance to the lack of a thought-through plan for the campaign and the impossibility of effecting regime change from the air. But Starmer has been fiercely attacked by the opposition Conservative Party, whose leader, Kemi Badenoch, argued that “international law will have failed” if it protected a despotic regime.

Of course, some European positioning on the war is likely to reflect a desire to avoid antagonising Trump to influence his policies on Russia’s war in Ukraine. But there is little to suggest that Europe’s courting of Trump has led to any long-term or sustainable change in his position on Ukraine, which seems to continually default back to the idea that Ukraine must make concessions that will win Russia’s approval. Moreover, Europe’s downplaying of international law in relation to Iran undermines any principled stance about the illegality of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. And the language that Europeans have used—implying that restrictions on the use of force are in tension with the realities of today’s world—goes further than merely muted criticism of US and Israeli policies.

There are legitimate questions about how far Europe’s traditional support for a rules-based international system should be modified for an age of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. But this does not mean that Europe should lose faith in the core principle of non-aggression. Indeed, the first two weeks of the war have shown how damaging this unnecessary conflict is likely to be for European interests—from the spike in energy prices, and disruption to global trade more widely, to the danger to European citizens and territory and the risk of a wave of migration if disorder spreads within Iran. The harms, escalating costs and unintended consequences that war brings are evident.

Indeed, it is notable that some of the political figures who were most outspoken in suggesting a realistic view of national or European interests should take precedence over international law, such as Merz and Badenoch, have subsequently voiced greater reservations about the conflict. Rather than projecting a loss of faith in their values that can only weaken Europe’s standing, European leaders should reaffirm the need to end the conflict as quickly as possible. In the future, rejecting wars of choice as a tool of great power politics will place them in stronger stead for protecting the full range of European interests.About the author: Anthony Dworkin is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He leads the organisation’s work in the areas of human rights, democracy, and justice.

Source: This article was published by ECFR

ECFR

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is an award-winning international think-tank that aims to conduct cutting-edge independent research on European foreign and security policy and to provide a safe meeting space for decision-makers, activists and influencers to share ideas. We build coalitions for change at the European level and promote informed debate about Europe’s role in the world.

Strikes Hit Iranian Regime Nuclear Site While Gulf States Face Massive Drone Barrage – OpEd


Airstrikes in Tehran, Iran. Credit: PMOI

March 13, 2026 
By Sadegh Pashm-Foroush


March 12, 2026, marked the thirteenth day of the conflict between the Iranian regime, the United States, and Israel. The war, which began on February 28, 2026, saw the death of the regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

Faced with mounting domestic pressure and crippling infrastructure destruction, the regime previously issued direct shoot-to-kill orders against protesters while enforcing a near-total internet blackout. Now, as the conflict enters its 13th day, the new supreme leader has voiced unprecedented fears of an explosive public uprising, even as the regime drastically intensifies its regional attacks and endures fresh waves of devastating airstrikes on its military and nuclear facilities.

Roundup of key events on day 13New regime supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued his first written statements, expressing deep concern over explosive public anger while vowing to continue the war.
A new wave of intense US and Israeli airstrikes targeted several Iranian cities, including Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, and Kashan, as well as the “Taleghan” nuclear facility in Parchin.

The Iranian regime expanded and fortified street checkpoints, anticipating domestic unrest and further Israeli drone strikes.

A massive wave of regime drones and missiles targeted multiple Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

Regime proxy forces suffered heavy casualties in Iraq, with over 260 members of the PMF killed, wounded, or missing following heavy airstrikes.

The regime escalated its maritime attacks, targeting multiple commercial ships and oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.

The Indian Prime Minister spoke with the regime’s president to urge dialogue, while the regime’s foreign ministry condemned a new UN Security Council resolution.

New supreme leader expresses fear of public uprising and vows revenge

In his first written remarks since taking power, the regime’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, expressed explicit concern about the explosive anger of the Iranian people. Pleading for internal cohesion, he stated that “unity among all individuals and strata of the nation must not be damaged.”

Framing the regime’s actions as an “effective and regret-inducing defense,” Mojtaba Khamenei insisted that the regime must continue using the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage. He also threatened that “opening other fronts will take place if the state of war continues.” Relying heavily on regional proxy groups to sustain the regime’s survival, he described the “resistance front” as the regime’s “best friends,” adding that Hezbollah and Iraqi proxy forces have come to their aid. Concluding his message, he vowed that the regime “will not give up on revenge.”

Fresh wave of airstrikes targets multiple Iranian cities and nuclear site

On the night of the 12th and into the early hours of Day 13, a widespread new wave of airstrikes hit multiple cities across Iran. Citizen reports indicated that Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, Kashan, and surrounding areas were heavily targeted. Around 4:00 AM on March 12, successive explosions were heard in Parand, Karaj, and Kashan. Residents in Kashan reported multiple blasts that shook homes, accompanied by the sounds of fighter jets overhead.

Explosions were also reported in Arak around 4:00 AM, alongside strikes on the Hasanabad Fashafuyeh and Parand industrial estates. In Ahvaz, multiple explosions and the sound of fighter jets were reported around 6:50 AM. Additionally, a drone strike hit a vehicle on Tehran’s Chamran Highway at approximately 11:30 PM the previous night, completely incinerating the car before firefighters could arrive.

Simultaneously, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) released videos announcing it had targeted the regime’s large military transport aircraft. The Israeli military also declared the start of a “massive wave of attacks” against the regime’s infrastructure in Tehran. Crucially, the Israeli army announced it had struck a nuclear facility near Tehran known as the “Taleghan Complex” in Parchin, which the regime has historically used for the advancement of its nuclear weapons capabilities.

Regime expands street checkpoints amid security fears

Fearing a popular uprising and ongoing military strikes, the Iranian regime has drastically expanded its security checkpoints in the streets. According to a Telegram channel affiliated with the IRGC’s Fars News Agency, a large number of regime loyalists have volunteered to man the checkpoints following Israeli drone strikes on several existing inspection stations. A Basij official announced a change in the street formation of these checkpoints, claiming that a “new mechanism” has been implemented to counter what the regime calls “the enemy’s design to make neighborhoods unsafe.”
Heavy casualties among regime proxy forces in Iraq

The regime’s proxy networks suffered massive losses in Iraq on Thursday. Heavy airstrikes targeted positions of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in the Akashat area in western Iraq, as well as near the city of Kirkuk. Asharq Al-Awsat reported that the strikes hit three bases belonging to the 19th Brigade of the PMF, including a military center, the second battalion, and a support unit. Initial figures indicate staggering casualties: 99 killed, 43 missing, and 123 wounded, with many suffering severe injuries.
Attacks escalate in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz

The Iranian regime has dramatically escalated its efforts to disrupt global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. According to Al Arabiya, the regime has been using explosive boats and drones to terrorize the strategic waterway. Maritime authorities confirmed that at least two attacks on oil tankers have been carried out by unmanned boats since the war began.


On Thursday, the IRGC explicitly claimed responsibility for an attack on a Marshall Islands-flagged ship named “Safe Sea,” alleging the vessel was American-owned and part of US military assets in the northern Persian Gulf. The IRGC stated the ship was attacked for “ignoring warnings.” The US military has yet to comment on this specific incident.

Additionally, an Iraqi security official told Reuters that explosive boats linked to the Iranian regime attacked two fuel tankers in Iraqi waters, causing fires on board. Security and port authorities confirmed that projectiles hit three commercial ships in the Persian Gulf on Thursday, resulting in the death of one crew member. The government of Thailand also summoned the Iranian regime’s ambassador in Bangkok after a Thai-flagged cargo ship was attacked in the Strait of Hormuz.
Gulf nations and regional targets intercept massive wave of regime missiles and drones

The Iranian regime launched a massive, coordinated barrage of missiles and drones against neighboring Arab nations.Saudi Arabia: The Saudi Defense Ministry intercepted a drone heading toward the Shaybah oil field, as well as a ballistic missile and three drones launched toward the country’s eastern region. A warning was also issued for the Al-Kharj governorate, southeast of Riyadh. Saudi forces later confirmed the interception of six additional drones over the Eastern Region.
United Arab Emirates: The UAE’s Defense Ministry announced its forces engaged with 10 ballistic missiles and 26 drones launched from Iran in a single day.
Qatar: The Qatari Defense Ministry reported intercepting two ballistic missiles, one cruise missile, and a number of drones originating from Iran.
Kuwait: The Kuwaiti army stated it battled a wave of incoming missiles and drones. The country’s civil aviation authority reported that a drone attack on Kuwait International Airport caused damage, though no injuries were reported.
Bahrain: The Interior Ministry activated air raid sirens across the country, urging citizens to remain calm and seek the nearest safe shelter.
United Arab Emirates (Dubai): A drone struck a high-rise building near Dubai Creek, leaving a large hole in the facade. The ensuing fire was contained with no injuries.

Additionally, a missile struck an Italian military base in Erbil, in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Italy’s Defense Ministry confirmed that none of its roughly 300 soldiers stationed there were harmed. Meanwhile, the regime’s state-run ISNA and IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency claimed that a US military base in Erbil was targeted and set on fire, and that the US embassy in Riyadh was also targeted.

In cyberspace, Al Arabiya reported that hacker groups linked to the Iranian regime attacked Stryker, an American medical equipment manufacturer.
International reactions and diplomatic fallout

As the regional crisis deepens, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a phone call with the Iranian regime’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Modi expressed his deep concern over the escalation of tensions and the loss of civilian lives, reiterating India’s commitment to peace and urging dialogue and diplomacy. He noted that the safety of Indian nationals and the unhindered transit of goods and energy remain his top priorities.

Meanwhile, the regime’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Esmaeil Baghaei, condemned a newly passed United Nations Security Council resolution. The resolution condemned the regime’s attacks on Gulf countries and Jordan. Baghaei falsely claimed the resolution distorts international law and defended the regime’s aggressive actions, baselessly asserting that Tehran “has no intention of violating the sovereignty or territorial integrity of its neighbors.”


Sadegh Pashm-Foroush writes for PMOI/MEK

Tensions Bubble Along Eritrea-Ethiopia Border

March 13, 2026 
By Africa Defense Forum

Locals in Ethiopia’s embattled Tigray region say Eritrean troops have entered border areas, raising concerns about a return to war. Infiltrations come amid a feud between the countries over Red Sea access and Asmara’s alleged support of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the region’s ruling party.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed also has accused Eritrean troops of committing mass killings while fighting alongside Ethiopian troops in the war that ended in 2022.

A military source anonymously told The Africa Report magazine that Eritrean forces are visible along sensitive routes in the porous border areas.

“They have entered through Tigray now,” the source said. “In Tigray, they have come as far as Mekelle, Adigrat and Zalambessa. On the Humera side, they infiltrate by posing as residents, especially through Hamdayet, a Sudanese town near Humera.”

Hamdayet has become a transit point for military movement and logistics. Residents say military vehicles move back and forth along routes linking Eritrean positions with TPLF-controlled areas in Tigray.

The Eritrean troops “disguise themselves as [Ethiopian troops] and we catch them frequently,” the military source told The Africa Report. “But those wearing their own uniforms and appearing as soldiers have entered from Mekelle to Adigrat and Zalambessa.”

The military source said Eritreans and TPLF associates in Tigray are coordinating among themselves.

“Their shared goal is to dismantle the country,” the source said. “Right now, they are leveraging internal chaos. Their main mission is to create obstacles so the government remains distracted and cannot focus on development or organizing citizens. They will not hesitate to destabilize us.”
Ethiopia Accuses, Eritrea Denies

In a February 7 letter to his Eritrean counterpart, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos accused Asmara of supporting militant groups operating in Ethiopia. Gedion demanded that Eritrea “withdraw its troops from Ethiopian territory and cease all forms of collaboration with rebel groups.” He called the alleged actions “not just provocations but acts of outright aggression.”

Two days later, Eritrea’s Ministry of Information said the claims were “patently false and fabricated,” describing them as part of a “spiral of hostile campaigns against Eritrea for more than two years.”

“The government of Eritrea has no appetite for, or desire to, engage in meaningless acrimony to add fuel and exacerbate the situation,” the statement said.

Despite Eritrea’s denial, the Ethiopian Army has moved large amounts of troops and weaponry toward Tigray’s borders. Locals told Agence France-Presse that they feared a return to civil war. The previous Tigray conflict killed at least 600,000 people between 2020 and 2022.
TPLF Tensions

Tensions between Abiy and the TPLF run high. The TPLF is embroiled in a power struggle with the Tigray Interim Administration, appointed by Abiy in 2023 as part of the Pretoria Agreement that ended the previous war.

The Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) on January 26 entered the disputed northwestern Tigray territory of Tselemt, clashing with federal troops and militias from the neighboring Amhara region. Three days later, the TDF moved into Korem and Alamata in southern Tigray’s contested Raya district without apparent federal resistance, the International Crisis Group reported. The federal government then canceled all flights to the region and on January 31 conducted two drone strikes in central Tigray.

Leftover animosity from the civil war drives this crisis. When the war broke out in 2020, Amhara militias seized western Tigray, where hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee. A few thousand people returned to their Tigray homes in 2024, but many faced intimidation and abuse from Amhara militias. Abiy also has stonewalled the TPLF’s demands to give control of disputed territories from Amhara back to Tigray.

Ethiopia’s destabilization holds significant security concerns for the Horn of Africa, which is experiencing armed conflict in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan also have argued over Addis Ababa’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a hydroelectric dam on the Nile River, since 2011.

During the previous Tigray war, conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan was renewed over the fertile border region of Al Fashaga, where governance rights have been contested since the early 1900s. The continuous dispute was exacerbated by Sudan’s support for the TPLF, according to the Global Conflict Tracker.

Why Iran Is Not Iraq: Authoritarian Institutions And Regime Survival – Analysis

March 13, 2026 
By Savas Savidis

When the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 and toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, the military campaign lasted only a few weeks. The rapid collapse of the Iraqi state governed by Saddam created an enduring image of how quickly authoritarian systems can fall once external pressure is applied.


The Iranian regime, on the other hand, which has existed in its current form since 1979, continues to exist in 2026. However, in this year, the survival of the Iranian system is at stake. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke of regime change being pursued in Iran. In the American-Israeli war since February 28, both the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and other key figures such as the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Pakpour, were killed. Other notable victims included a senior security advisor to the Ayatollah, Ali Shamkhani, and Defense Minister Asis Nassirsadeh. Even a ground invasion is reportedly being considered, according to U.S. President Trump.

Meanwhile, voices in the U.S. have drawn parallels to the Iraq war. Ted Cruz, Senator from Texas, told CNBC that it would take “a few weeks” to overthrow the Iranian regime. The Iraq war did indeed proceed quickly, but in Iran, doubts are warranted. The military analyses presented in the media over the past weeks are not the subject of this analysis. Instead, this analysis aims to show why Iran, despite numerous short-term crises – such as the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, the mass protests of 2009, or the women’s demonstrations of 2022 – has maintained remarkably high regime stability until today. It also explains why the current U.S.-Israeli war is unlikely to bring about a rapid regime collapse. The Iranian regime is unlikely to collapse within weeks as Saddam’s regime did in 2003.

Gerschewski’s Three-Pillar Model

To explain this, the article compares Iran’s regime with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

For the operationalization of regime stability in both countries, the theoretical three-pillar model of Johannes Gerschewski (2013) will be used. The political scientist argues that authoritarian regimes secure their hold on power through three pillars: legitimacy, co-optation, and repression. All three pillars complement each other and are important for maintaining existing structures. Gerschewski argues that authoritarian regimes require not only repression but also a degree of societal acceptance. He describes legitimacy, based on Max Weber’s definition, as “(…) the ‘belief in legitimacy’ in the validity of the political order by those subject to rule (…)”.

The second pillar, co-optation, refers to other relevant state actors beyond the ruling elite. These can be, as Gerschewski notes, military or economic elites of the country. These actors must be strategically integrated into political negotiation processes institutionally and economically, as they possess resources and could pose a threat to the existing regime.

Repression, the most well-known and visible form of authoritarianism, refers to the state suppression of political opponents or even the entire population. This pillar can become particularly prominent when the other two pillars falter. Gerschewski distinguishes in his model between subtle and restrictive forms of repression. The use of armed force, as in Iran during the mass demonstrations in December 2025 and January 2026, is an example of the harsher pillar of repression. According to the model, internet shutdowns in response to protests in Iran can be considered a soft form of repression.

The next step involves a brief comparison between the regimes in Iran and Iraq.

Saddam’s Iraq

Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq from 1979 until his overthrow in 2003. He came to power through a coup. The country’s dominant party, the Ba’th Party, was, alongside the military and the bureaucracy, one of the three major institutions of the country. However, since 1968, when the party came to power, it was the most important and influential. Saddam Hussein’s pillars of power shifted over the years increasingly from legitimacy toward repression and co-optation.

At the beginning of his first term as president in the 1980s, he deliberately relied on a mixture of socio-economic welfare programs and the construction of a personality cult to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime, especially during wartime with Iran. This included, as Divya Malhotra writes: “Industrial modernization, increased access to education, better infrastructure and improvement in health facilities.” Through this, he gained the support of many people in the country. At the same time, the construction of statues and the omnipresence of Saddam in public life created a fusion of personal and national identity. Ba’th nationalism, originally pan-Arab in nature, transformed into an exclusively Iraqi nationalism. The legitimacy of the regime also grew through the Iran-Iraq war, initiated by Saddam. Saddam could present himself to the population as the defender of the nation against a Persian threat. He drew historical reference to the struggle between Arab Muslims and Persian forces in the 7th century and saw his own war against the Islamic Republic as a continuation of this struggle.

This changed, however, when the war ended in 1988 with a ceasefire. The population’s belief in the strength of the regime consequently suffered, especially in the 1990s. This was also due to external stress factors such as UN sanctions, which, according to studies, cost hundreds of thousands of Iraqis their lives.


Co-optation in Saddam’s regime was based primarily on the principle of neo-tribalism. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the regime secured the loyalty of local tribal leaders (Shaykhs) to maintain its own power base and prevent uprisings. By appointing followers from his own al-Bu Nasir tribe (Tikrit) to key positions in the military and security apparatus, he strengthened the regime. Many soldiers of the Republican Guard came from Saddam’s home region Tikrit, which also served his own protection. Saddam tied members to himself and his regime through privileges such as new cars. The Ba’th Party, as the central institution of the country, was also used as an element of co-optation. The party sought to gain large segments of the population as members, with women playing an important role. Although they lacked practical decision-making power, this way participants felt part of the state and regime.

Repression in Saddam’s regime increased particularly in the 1990s. This pillar was mainly based on the feared civilian intelligence service Mukhabarat, led by his half-brother. It ensured political and violent suppression of opponents and regime adversaries. The military, especially the Republican Guard, as well as the paramilitary militia Saddam Fedajin, were also key elements of repression. These forces were deployed to crush uprisings such as the 1991 Shiite revolt in southern Iraq, as well as Kurdish insurgencies in the north.

While the Saddam regime ultimately fell to the U.S. invasion in 2003, maintaining the system would have become increasingly difficult even without that war. As mentioned at the beginning, in the 1990s, increased reliance on the pillar of repression emerged from the strengthening of legitimacy and co-optation. This was partly due to external stress factors, such as the failed invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the resulting UN sanctions. These brought the country’s economy into serious difficulties. However, internal developments in the regime – like the sectarian divisions with Shiites – also caused increasing problems. The Anfal operation in northern Iraq, in which tens of thousands of citizens – mostly Kurds – were killed, including through use of chemical weapons, revived sectarian tensions in the country. Saddam’s plan to unite the Sunni population behind him failed as he alienated other groups in the country. Iraq’s population consisted largely of a Shiite majority ruled by a Sunni-dominated political elite under Saddam. Saddam’s Arabization policy divided the country and continues to create tensions in the multi-sectarian political system.

Saddam’s governance model relied – especially toward the end – on a personality cult, which was based on the co-optation of loyal tribes and families as well as repressive state power. The weakness of the system was the declining legitimacy of the regime over years due to external and internal factors. This was linked to a personal fixation on Saddam Hussein as the leading figure of the model. As Gerschewski’s model shows, a regime loses its binding power and thus legitimacy when – like in Iraq – Saddam, as a symbol of national strength and unity, no longer enjoys credibility. The system and the party of the regime were highly dependent on one person, making them very vulnerable to internal and external weakening.

Institutionalized Stability in Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has existed since 1979. With the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the monarchy was replaced by a theocratic-presidential system. In this system, the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) makes all important decisions. In addition to political power – he commands the country’s armed forces and can dismiss the president – he is also the religious leader of all Shia believers in the country. Unlike Saddam’s Iraq, Iran does not have only one party to vote for, but formally offers the option of multiple candidates. This is evident, for example, in the election of the president every four years or the selection of parliament. The elections, however, are not fair, and candidates are vetted for loyalty to the religious-political ruling system before being allowed to run.


The legitimacy of the Iranian regime overlaps with Saddam’s rule in some respects, but only minimally.

Like Saddam, the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the 1980s -particularly due to the Iran-Iraq war – relied on nationalism. He referred to the war against Iraq as the “Holy Defense” (Defa-e Moqadas) and promoted the image of a homogeneous unity through the fusion of nation and religion. The collective identity that the young Islamic Republic consolidated also acted domestically as a bulwark against regime opponents. In this way, Khomeini was able to position the Mullah regime as the savior of Shi’ism. Unlike Saddam’s nationalism, the regime in Tehran derives its claim to power from religion. Moreover, the Iranian regime was able to portray itself, in contrast to the overthrown monarchy of the Shah and the colonial history of the Middle East, as a fighter against Western imperialism.

The personality cult is also omnipresent in Iran – photos of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Ali Khamenei hang everywhere – but the legitimacy of the Iranian system is broader, both ideologically and institutionally.

When the U.S. and Israel killed regime chief Ali Khamenei in the war at the end of February 2026, the system did not collapse, as some observers had predicted. This is because Iran’s regime stability – even despite formal concentration of power – is not dependent on a single personality. This is a key difference from Iraq, where the overthrow of Saddam triggered a de facto collapse of the regime.

While the Iranian regime initially still relied heavily on the popularity of Revolutionary Leader Ruhollah Khomeini – in a 1979 referendum, 98 percent voted for the establishment of the Islamic Republic – over the years it shifted toward repressive measures.

The co-optation pillar in Iran primarily consists of religious, economic, and security elites. While Saddam relied on neo-tribalism and tribal networks, the Iranian regime co-opts economic elites, including networks often referred to as Aghazadeh – the politically connected families of senior clerics and officials who benefit from privileged access to economic resources. Clerical elites are incorporated into the system through influential positions within the state’s religious and political institutions, such as the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts. In this way, religious elites are tied to the regime both ideologically and materially, reinforcing loyalty through economic privileges. Statistical data on the political elite of the Islamic Republic indicate that more than half of Iran’s presidents and parliamentary speakers have been clerics, highlighting the central role of religious authorities in the country’s key governing institutions.

Another central power factor, for many observers even the central one in today’s regime, is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which combines military power with vast economic influence. According to media estimates, they currently control about half of the country’s economy, including ports, agriculture, and infrastructure (oil). Originally, revolutionary leader Khomeini founded the Guard to protect himself, like Saddam in Iraq, against disloyal military forces. Today, in 2026, the elite force is considered by experts to be better armed and funded than the regular army (Artesh). Among other things, they control the ballistic missile program, a central element of the regime’s defense. While the IRGC serves as a central pillar of the regime’s power, its vast autonomy and economic influence also make it a potential rival to the civilian leadership. The Mullah regime, while dependent on the Guard – both defensively and economically – can also be seen in reverse: the Guard depends on the status quo of the theocratic system and would lose its privileges in state and economy in the event of a regime collapse.


The repression pillar, which served as the backbone of Saddam’s power, has also grown in Iran over the past decades. It can first be noted that the suppression of opponents and regime adversaries is mainly carried out by two actors: the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) and the Basij militia. Here, a key parallel to Saddam’s regime emerges. He also relied on a Republican Guard and a Special Republican Guard (SRG) founded in the 1990s for his protection. The similarity between the Pasdaran and Basij in Iran and the Guards in Iraq lies primarily in unconditional ideological loyalty and dependence on the existing regime.

The Revolutionary Guards have repeatedly been deployed to suppress large protest movements. The Basij militia, on the other hand, recruits volunteers and is organized paramilitarily. For example, it monitors whether women comply with the public hijab requirement. Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the influence of the Revolutionary Guards continued to grow. The suppression of the Green Movement in 2009, protesting election fraud, as well as the violent response to the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests across the country in 2022 (mainly led by women), led to increasing repression escalation. In the mass demonstrations of December 2025 and January 2026, again triggered by the economic crisis, thousands of people were reportedly killed violently, suppressed again by the power apparatus.

Since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, the regime has lost significant legitimacy, which can be explained using Gerschewski’s three-pillar model: the legitimacy of a regime depends on performance and “performative binding force.” Due to corruption in the state sector, where ideological loyalty rather than competence is rewarded, and international economic sanctions, the regime loses legitimacy. Increasing repression attempts to compensate for this loyalty deficit, and the co-optation pillar also appears largely intact, but it remains uncertain how long violence and suppression can maintain the existing system of rule.

From the regime’s perspective, Iran has a major advantage over Iraq: sectarian fault lines are not as pronounced, as approximately 90 percent of Iranians adhere to the Shia faith.

Unlike Saddam’s highly personalist regime, the Islamic Republic was built as a system that can absorb leadership losses without collapsing.

What distinguishes Iran from Saddam’s Iraq is not the absence of repression, but the presence of institutions that bind elites to the regime and regulate succession.

This analysis shows that the religious Mullah regime in Iran is not comparable to the personalist Saddam system in Iraq. According to research (Barbara Geddes, Beatriz Magaloni), personalist systems are more vulnerable to instability during leadership transitions. Since Saddam’s political authority was primarily legitimized through his personality cult, his regime would have faced problems even without the U.S. war upon his death. The elite cohesion that Gerschewski describes would not have existed, and an open power struggle for his position could have occurred.

In Iran, by contrast, a more institutionalized system exists. The legitimacy of the regime is not dependent on a single person. Succession mechanisms in case of need are clearer and bureaucratized, as demonstrated after the deaths of the two Ayatollahs in 1989 and 2026. Even during ongoing hostilities in February 2026 against the U.S./Israel, the regime succeeded in installing Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader. In one respect, Ted Cruz is correct: “Iran is not Iraq.”


Savas Savidis

Savas Savidis holds a Bachelor's degree in Social Sciences from the University of Augsburg and a Master's degree in Political Science from the University of Vienna. Currently, he works as a freelance journalist in Germany. His research interests include migration & integration studies, diaspora research and authoritarianism & regime stability.