Global Population Logic Undergoes A Cognitive Reversal – Analysis

April 10, 2026 
 Anbound
By Zhao Zhijiang

Over the past few decades, the understanding of global population issues has largely been based on a relatively simple framework: developed countries have lower fertility rates, while developing nations experience rapid population growth; wealthier groups tend to have fewer children, while poorer groups are more likely to have larger families. However, new data emerging over the past decade or so is gradually challenging this conventional view. Low fertility rates are no longer confined to developed economies like those in some European countries, Japan, or South Korea. Instead, they are increasingly spreading to regions such as Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Even more striking is that this shift is not only apparent between countries but is also becoming increasingly evident within countries, reflecting deep transformations in economic structures, social norms, and family values.

In a podcast discussing the economics of the baby bust, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, cited a series of surprising examples that directly challenge prevailing assumptions about who tends to have more children and who tends to have fewer.

One particularly striking comparison is between the United States and Mexico. Professor Fernández-Villaverde jokingly remarked in the podcast that if one were to randomly ask ten professors on a U.S. university campus which country has a higher fertility rate, most would likely still answer Mexico. However, the reality is the exact opposite. According to registration data from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), the country’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 2023 is approximately 1.60, while the U.S. rate for the same period is about 1.62. This marks the first time that Mexico’s fertility rate has fallen below that of the United States. It is worth noting that due to differences in statistical methods, the World Bank estimates Mexico’s TFR for the same period at 1.91, which is a significant discrepancy. Nevertheless, regardless of the data source, the sharp decline in Mexico’s fertility rate over the past decade has far exceeded most people’s expectations. From around 2.3 to 2.4 in the early 2010s, it has dropped rapidly, driven by a combination of factors such as accelerated urbanization, higher education levels, increased female labor force participation, and economic structural transformation.

Another transformative case comes from Israel. Over the past few decades, the fertility rate of the Muslim population in Israel has consistently been much higher than that of the Jewish population, a gap that has even sparked political discussions about demographic composition. However, this trend quietly reversed around 2015 to 2016, and since then, the gap has continued to widen. Data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) clearly illustrates this shift. In 2022, the TFR for Jewish women was approximately 3.03, while for the Muslim population, it had decreased to 2.91. By 2024, in January to October, the Jewish TFR further held steady at 3.07, while the Muslim rate continued to decline to 2.68. This reversal trend is now firmly established and has been strengthening in recent years.


Professor Fernández-Villaverde specifically pointed out that the underlying factors driving this change are complex. The relatively high fertility rate among the Jewish population is largely driven by the ultra-Orthodox Haredi community, whose fertility rate has long remained at a high level of around 6, although there are signs of a gradual decline in recent years. In contrast, the fertility rate among non-Haredi Jewish women, including secular and traditional groups, has remained at a much lower level, around 2.0. Meanwhile, the fertility rate within the Muslim population has seen a significant decline, from over 9 in the 1960s to around 2.75 today. This change has been driven by modernization factors, such as improved female education, increased labor force participation, delayed marriage, accelerated urbanization, and the widespread use of contraception.

This shows how the traditional assumption that “religious societies naturally maintain high fertility rates” is being gradually corrected by reality. The reversal in trends signifies there is a global spread of low fertility rates, that even groups with strong religious or cultural traditions are not immune to the penetrative forces of modernization. What makes Israel unique is that, despite the overall fertility rate of the Jewish population still being among the highest within OECD countries, this is largely due to the contributions of the Haredi community. However, downward pressure on fertility rates is increasingly evident.


Similar changes are accelerating in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt’s fertility rate, which was previously close to 4, has rapidly decreased in recent years to around 2.3. If the current trend continues, it could fall below the replacement level within just a few years. This would be much sooner than the United Nations’ earlier predictions, which anticipated this would not occur until the end of the century. Similarly, countries like Morocco and Tunisia have already seen their fertility rates drop below the replacement level.

Researchers at ANBOUND have observed that the cases provided by Professor Fernández-Villaverde represent only the tip of the iceberg. More data suggest that population transformation is spreading at an accelerating pace to regions traditionally associated with high fertility rates. For example, Chile’s TFR has recently dropped to around 1.1, putting it on par with countries like Japan, a country typically known for its low fertility rates. Thailand’s fertility rate has also fallen to around 1.0 to 1.2, approaching the range of certain European countries with low fertility. On a regional level, the average fertility rate across Latin America and the Caribbean has dropped to about 1.8, and since 2015, it has consistently remained below the replacement level. When viewed on a more global scale, over half of the world’s countries currently have fertility rates below the replacement level, and this proportion could exceed 90% by the end of this century. The global average fertility rate has dropped from around 5 in the mid-1960s to approximately 2.3 today, a near-halving in just a few decades.

These examples point to a structural shift that is taking place: population transformation is no longer progressing along the traditional linear path of “economic development—gradual fertility decline”. Instead, it is spreading globally at a faster and more concentrated pace.


Professor Fernández-Villaverde argues that the reason why low fertility rates have become a structural issue of concern is not merely because of the decline in population numbers, but because the economic growth, fiscal systems, social security frameworks, and debt repayment capabilities of modern nations are all built upon the foundation of a stable population size and a continuous supply of labor. At the same time, population changes tend to occur unevenly, often exhibiting clear spatial disparities. Core cities continue to attract population, while smaller cities and peripheral regions experience accelerated depopulation. As a result, public services such as schools, hospitals, and commercial facilities shrink, and the operational costs of local communities rise steadily. This spatial imbalance often impacts the daily lives of ordinary people more directly and more quickly than the overall population figures. When a region loses its schools, it means young families are no longer staying. When hospitals close, it forces elderly residents to relocate. The consequences of population decline are never evenly distributed.

All in all, the global population structure is entering a new phase that is fundamentally different from the past. The comparison of fertility rates between Mexico and the United States, the historic reversal of fertility patterns within Israel, and the unexpectedly rapid decline in fertility rates across the Middle East and North Africa, all of these cases point to the fact that traditional frameworks for understanding population trends can no longer fully explain reality. Low fertility rates are shifting from a localized phenomenon to a global structural trend. The pace of transformation in emerging economies may even surpass that of the developed countries of the past, and the eventual stabilization level could be even lower. This shift not only signals a contraction in population size but also points to long-term and profound pressures on labor supply, regional spatial patterns, and social security systems. To truly understand this trend, it is essential to approach it from multiple dimensions, including economic structure, social norms, and family systems, rather than relying on any single explanatory framework.

Final analysis conclusion:

Over the past decade, new data have shown that low fertility rates are no longer a phenomenon confined to developed economies such as those in certain European countries, Japan, or South Korea. Instead, they are rapidly spreading to regions like Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Even more notably, this shift is not only observable between countries but is also becoming increasingly evident within countries, reflecting deeper transformations in economic structures, social norms, and family values.

Zhijiang Zhao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.

Anbound

Anbound Consulting (Anbound) is an independent Think Tank with the headquarter based in Beijing. Established in 1993, Anbound specializes in public policy research, and enjoys a professional reputation in the areas of strategic forecasting, policy solutions and risk analysis. Anbound's research findings are widely recognized and create a deep interest within public media, academics and experts who are also providing consulting service to the State Council of China.

Latest Mediterranean migrant shipwrecks put 2026 among deadliest years on record

More than 180 people are missing or feared dead after several boats attempting to reach Europe from North Africa got into difficulty. According to the United Nations' migration agency, the most recent shipwrecks have brought the number of deaths reported in the Mediterranean Sea to nearly 1,000 this year.


Issued on: 08/04/2026 - RFI

Survivors on a boat that capsized off Libya with more than 100 people on board, in a picture shared by German rescue organisation Sea-Watch on 5 April, 2026. 

© Fabian MELBER / SEA-WATCH / AFP

At least 990 deaths have been recorded in the Mediterranean since the start of the year, according to figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

It said this represents one of the deadliest starts to a year since its records began in 2014.

In the past two weeks alone, at least 180 people have died or gone missing in five separate shipwrecks.

The latest incident on Sunday left more than 80 people missing when a boat capsized in the Central Mediterranean after departing from Tajoura in Libya with around 120 people on board.

Only 32 survivors have been found so far, while two bodies have been recovered.

World's deadliest route

The Central Mediterranean route from Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to Italy and Malta has long been the world's deadliest migration corridor, and the latest data suggests it is becoming ever more dangerous.

Around 765 people have died in the Central Mediterranean this year so far, according to the IOM – more than 460 more than during the same period in 2025.

At the same time, European countries and border enforcement officials are reporting fewer crossing attempts. However, their figures are based on the number of people who arrive and do not include those who die en route.

Experts blame a combination of severe storms, the closure of land routes into Europe, the lack of legal migration options and a crackdown on established crossing routes from Libya and Tunisia.

Spate of shipwrecks

The number of small boats attempting the dangerous crossing typically rises in spring and summer as the weather improves.

In a spate of recent shipwrecks, 19 people were found dead on 1 April aboard a boat that left Zuara in Libya and ran out of fuel, ending up drifting off the Italian island of Lampedusa. Another 58 people were rescued.

On the same day, at least 19 migrants died near Bodrum in Turkey, after a rubber boat capsized on the way to Greece.

On 28 March, at least 22 people died off Crete after departing from eastern Libya, while a 30 March shipwreck near Sfax, Tunisia, left 19 dead and around 20 missing.

The IOM warned that current search and rescue efforts were falling short and called for more legal routes for migrants trying to reach Europe.

The agency's director-general, Amy Pope, said: "Saving lives must come first. But we also need stronger, unified efforts to stop traffickers and smugglers from exploiting vulnerable people, and to expand safe and regular pathways – so no one is ever forced into these deadly journeys."

 

Tighter EU migration controls fail to curb departures from Africa, report says

By Eleonora Vasques

Published on 10/04/2026 - EURONEWS

Despite Brussels touting fewer migrant arrivals, tighter asylum rules and African deals have only temporarily diverted irregular routes, with new passages to Europe possible in 2026.

Tighter EU borders and migration deals with African countries have failed to reduce the number of departures from Africa, but merely temporarily diverted irregular routes, according to a report by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), seen by Euronews.

The ICMPD, an organisation that works for the EU and European governments to develop migration policies, analysed the major mobility trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, revealing that “recent patterns show that intensified controls do not necessarily reduce overall mobility but instead redirect movement towards alternative, often longer and riskier routes”, the report says.

In recent years, the EU has expanded its migration partnerships with African countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, and Mauritania. These agreements typically involve local authorities strengthening border controls to curb irregular departures toward Europe, while the EU provides financial support and invests in a wide range of development and cooperation projects in return.

At the same time, the EU revised its internal migration management framework through the Asylum and Migration Pact, a package of laws approved during the last mandate that harmonises border procedures and establishes common rules for handling irregular arrivals across member states.

The reforms reduced access to asylum and overall arrivals to Europe. However, the situation could evolve in different ways, including the emergence of new routes — potentially toward Europe.

"Tightening border controls across key migration routes is expected to further reshape routes in 2026, without fundamentally reducing overall mobility levels”, the document says.

New flows to Europe?

On several occasions, the EU has celebrated a reduction in the number of third-country nationals, mainly from Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, arriving in Europe via African transit routes.

However, reshaping of mobility could also lead to new irregular flows towards Europe, particularly noting the impact that instability in the Middle East may have on mobility in Africa.

"The impact of these escalations cannot be assessed at the time of writing; however, it cannot be ruled out that migrants from Africa going to the Gulf countries may wish to seek alternative destinations in 2026, including in Europe", the document says.

The irregular route from the Horn of Africa via Somalia and Djibouti to Gulf countries is still one of the most used. Data from the UN agency for migration (IOM) shows that there has been a sharp increase of departures from Sub-Saharan Africa to Gulf countries by 34% between 2024 and 2025.

Root causes and routes diversification

Increasing border controls reshape mobility but do not address migration structural drivers, such as protracted conflicts or insecurity, significant demographic growth, limited labour absorption, climate shocks, as well as drastic recent cuts in humanitarian assistance by the US and European governments, the document says.

But number of arrivals to Europe are temporarily lower. According to the latest data from the EU border agency Frontex, irregular border crossings at the EU’s external border “fell by over one-quarter (26 %) in 2025”.

The sharper decrease occurred alongside the Western African route, that "could be explained by recent partnerships between the EU and key African countries (Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania)", the document says.

But the route from Mauritania to the Canary Islands have been diverted. Departures occurs now from Gambia or Guinea, the document says, making the transit via sea longer and riskier.

Frontex also said that the Eastern Mediterranean migration route towards Europe registered a less pronounced decrease overall, as the corridor connecting Eastern Libya to the island of Crete remained active and even tripled in 2025.

THE GRIFT

EU rejects Trump's 'joint venture'
with Iran to charge ships through Strait of Hormuz

By Jorge Liboreiro

Published on 09/04/2026 - EURONEWS

Donald Trump has floated the idea of a "joint venture" to set up tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. The European Commission says this would be unlawful.

The European Commission has firmly rejected any attempt, by Iran or the United States, to charge vessels for crossing the Strait of Hormuz, while admitting the final decision on whether to pay a fee is entirely at the discretion of affected companies.

"International law provides for the freedom of navigation, which means what? It means no payment or toll whatsoever," a Commission spokesperson said on Thursday afternoon in response to an Euronews question.

"The Strait of Hormuz, like any other maritime lane, is a public good for all humanity, which means navigation must be free. Freedom of navigation must be restored."

The pushback comes a day after US President Donald Trump stirred concern across Europe by suggesting a "joint venture" with Tehran to impose a pay-to-pass system on the waterway, which is vital for the transit of oil, gas and fertiliser supplies.

"It's a way of securing it, also securing it from lots of other people," Trump told ABC News. "It's a beautiful thing."

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, later said the idea would "continue to be discussed" but stressed the "immediate priority" was reopening the shipping lane "without any limitations, whether in the form of tolls or otherwise".


Hormuz has been under Iran's tight control since the start of the US-Israeli strikes on 28 February, crippling supply chains and sending energy prices soaring worldwide.

According to Trump, the ceasefire deal announced earlier this week would lead to the "safe" reopening of Hormuz. But the narrow passage was closed again on Wednesday after Israel launched massive strikes against Lebanon, which Iran considered to be a violation of its version of the 10-point plan. (The White House has fiercely contested the plan and said Lebanon was excluded from the agreed terms.)

On Thursday, confusion continued to reign over Hormuz, with traffic data showing that only a handful of ships had managed to sail through.

An estimated 2,000 ships and 20,000 seafarers remain trapped in the Persian Gulf.

Iran is reportedly operating a new system that charges each vessel $1 per oil barrel carried on board. The payment can be made either in Chinese yuan or cryptocurrency, two options that bypass Western financial oversight.

For Brussels, neither Trump's "joint venture" nor Iran's $1-per-barrel system is acceptable because they contravene the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which strictly forbids charging for simple transit. Fees are only allowed when a specific service, such as port access or maintenance, is provided.

Even though the US and Iran are among the few countries that have not ratified UNCLOS, its rules have become customary law worldwide.

Asked whether European companies should agree to pay or remain stranded in the Persian Gulf, the Commission said the decision should be made by private operators themselves, taking into account their "various interests".

"It is up to the concerned companies and ship-owners to see whether, despite this, they would still want to pay this fee," chief spokesperson Paula Pinho told reporters.

Europeans have been mulling plans to help secure Hormuz, but nothing specific has been put on the table. Tehran considers the shipping lane its greatest leverage and is loath to make any concessions unless Washington reciprocates.

Rutte Insists NATO Allies Have Met U.S. Demands

 April 10, 2026  

By EurActiv

By Pietro Guastamacchia

(EurActiv) — NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Thursday sought to once more dispel doubts about the military alliance, saying European allies are delivering on US requests and stepping up their defence commitments.

Speaking at the Ronald Reagan Foundation a day after meeting with Donald Trump, Rutte said he told the US president that “the overwhelming majority of European allies have done what the US has asked” amid tensions over support for Washington’s campaign against Iran.

Trump has railed against European allies for a perceived lack of support after some banned US aircraft heading to the Middle East from either flying over their territory or using some jointly operated bases. The US president has accused the alliance of being a “paper tiger” and suggested he could pull his country out of the alliance altogether.

On Wednesday, after meeting Rutte at the White House, Trump wrote on social media: “NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM, AND THEY WON’T BE THERE IF WE NEED THEM AGAIN.”

Rutte acknowledged some delays. “I sensed his disappointment that he felt too many allies were not visible enough,” he said. He noted Europeans were also surprised, since “to maintain the element of surprise, President Trump opted not to inform allies about the attack” on Iran.

The NATO chief reiterated that the alliance is entering “a period of profound change,” with Europe taking “a greater and fairer share of defence responsibilities,” shifting “from unhealthy codependence to a transatlantic alliance grounded in partnership.” He pointed to concrete actions, including a UK-led effort to protect shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, as “evidence of a shift in mindset”.

Rutte also issued a blunt call to Europe’s defence industry, saying: “Produce now, produce faster, bring in those extra shifts, don’t talk about ten-year plans — the money is there, act now.”

On Ukraine, Rutte praised Trump’s push for a settlement, adding that US negotiators “all understand” that the key to breaking the current deadlock in peace talks is for “NATO membership not being off the table” for Ukraine and that the security guarantees provided are “so strong that they know that Russia will not try to attack again”.

Asked about his now infamous “Daddy” remark, he said it was a lost in translation case: “We had a sort of pre-summit meeting with the President in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel,” Rutte recounted. “This was in June last year, and I translated from Dutch something we would say: ‘sometimes Daddy has to be angry.’ I was not calling him my Daddy.”

“But of course, Daddy also has a special connotation, and I now have to live with this forever. I own it. Trump owned it,  he even made a T-shirt out of it. He is funny, and that is why we like him. What can I say… I’m not a native speaker… sorry,” he concluded.

'NATO not obliged to reopen the Strait,' Turkey's trade minister tells Euronews

By Shona Murray

Published on 10/04/2026 -EURONEWS

US President Trump has issued an ultimatum to NATO countries to find a solution to reopening the Strait of Hormuz within days. Turkey – which has the second-largest army in NATO – says the alliance is not obliged to intervene.

NATO allies are not “obliged” to assist the United States and Israel in the war with Iran, Turkey’s Trade Minister, Ömer Bolat, told Euronews’ Europe Today.

US President Donald Trump has issued an ultimatum to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington, DC, urging allies to find a solution to reopening the Strait of Hormuz within days.

Rutte is in Washington for a series of meetings, including a closed-door discussion with the US president, as well as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Only a limited number of vessels have been able to pass through the Strait, despite a tentative ceasefire agreed on Tuesday evening aimed at restoring traffic.

A coalition of around 40 countries — mainly NATO members, alongside Japan, South Korea and Australia — has been working on a strategy to secure the waterway once hostilities have ceased.

However, Trump is pushing for an immediate solution, including the deployment of military assets and naval forces.

“NATO’s presence is primarily as a deterrent force to maintain peace and security on the European continent, but also globally,” Bolat said.

Asked whether NATO countries were within their rights to remind Trump that the alliance is defensive in nature and was not involved in planning the conflict, Bolat replied: “Yes.”

NATO members have rejected initial US calls to support the military campaign in Iran, noting they were not consulted ahead of the strikes.

They also reaffirmed the alliance’s defensive mandate, rejecting claims from the White House that they had a duty to intervene alongside the US.

U.S.-Iran Ceasefire: Assessment, Reactions, And Key Issues – Analysis

April 10, 2026 
By Clayton Thomas, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Jim Zanotti
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 

On April 7, 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire, which may bring a temporary halt to 40 days of conflict. Attacks on and by Iran on April 8, as well as escalated Israeli strikes in Lebanon as of April 9, underscore the fragile and contested nature of the agreement.

During the conflict, Iran has carried out missile and drone attacks against civilian and military targets in multiple countries. The conflict has disrupted regional energy production and maritime and air transit with global economic impacts. The Pakistan-brokered ceasefire came hours after President Donald Trump wrote on social media that “A whole civilization will die tonight” and hours before his threatened deadline to destroy Iran’s bridges and power plants.

U.S. and Iranian understandings of the nature and content of the ceasefire appear to differ as of April 9, ahead of a tentative April 11 meeting between senior Iranian and U.S. negotiators, including Vice President JD Vance. Congress may consider whether and how to support, reject, or modify Administration approaches to subsequent negotiations and any proposed changes to U.S. military operations, diplomatic agreements, sanctions, or assistance to regional partners.

Assessment

As of April 9, no text reflecting mutual agreement has been publicly released. Rather, the two sides’ public statements on the ceasefire differ and may indicate possible points of tension.

President Trump, in announcing the ceasefire, wrote on social media that the United States had received “a 10 point proposal from Iran” and that it was “a workable basis on which to negotiate.” Iran has reportedly produced at least two versions of a 10-point proposal that may differ from each other, as well as from the version referenced by President Trump. The United States in March reportedly transmitted a 15-point proposal, which Iran rejected.

Issues of potential disagreement or contention include:

Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. 15-point plan reportedly restated U.S. demands that Iran dismantle its nuclear facilities, abandon its enrichment program, and give up its highly enriched uranium. By contrast, one version of Iran’s 10-point plan reportedly included, per an Iranian source, “acceptance of enrichment.” Previous U.S.-Iran diplomatic engagements during the second Trump Administration (in April-June 2025 and February 2026) stalled over such issues and were followed or interrupted by U.S. and Israeli military action against Iran. A White House spokesperson said on April 8 that “The President’s red lines, namely the end of Iranian enrichment in Iran, have not changed.”

Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s disruption of commercial shipping (via threatened and executed attacks) has reduced transit through the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial conduit for energy resources and related commodities to reach global markets. President Trump, in the week before the ceasefire, expressed ambivalence and strong interest in the status of the Strait. In announcing the ceasefire, he wrote that the cessation of U.S. military action was “subject to … Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister wrote that the ceasefire would entail two weeks of “safe passage” through the Strait “via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces.” One version of Iran’s 10-point plan, per an Iranian source, reportedly included “Continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz,” which could entail formalizing the tiered system of payments that Iran reportedlyhas charged for vessels from selected countries to transit the Strait during the conflict.

Lebanon. U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran also reignited major conflict in Lebanon. In early March, Hezbollah started firing into Israel, and Israel subsequently launched major air and ground operations that have reportedly killed more than 1,700 people and displaced up to 1.2 million, or a fifth of the country, as of April 9. In announcing the ceasefire between Iran, the United States, and “their allies,” Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif wrote on social media that it would apply “everywhere including Lebanon.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wrote, “The two-weeks ceasefire does not include Lebanon.” Israeli military operations continued as of April 9. Iran has reportedly conditioned the April 11 meeting on a ceasefire in Lebanon. Vice President Vance described the disconnect as a “legitimate misunderstanding,” echoing other U.S. officials who maintained the ceasefire does not include Lebanon.

Reactions

Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (all of which have been attacked by Iran) welcomed the ceasefire announcement; the United Arab Emirates, in an April 8 statement, said it was “seeking further clarification of the agreement’s provisions to ensure Iran’s full commitment” to a ceasefire and reopening the Strait. Officials from the European Union, Russia, and China (which reportedly encouraged Iran to agree to the ceasefire) reacted positively.

In Congress, multiple Member statements welcomed the ceasefire: one Senator applauded what he described as President Trump’s “Peace Through Strength leadership,” while another expressed relief at the ceasefire but called for “a real accounting of what President Trump’s war achieved.”

Issues for Congress

Possible issues on which Members of Congress could engage include:

War powers. Some Members in the House and Senate have indicated their intention to introduce measures under the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) to, as one Member put it, “end this conflict permanently.” Four similar measures were rejected by the House and Senate in March 2026.

Sanctions. President Trump wrote on April 8 that “We are, and will be, talking Tariff and Sanctions relief with Iran.” Members could seek to block or support sanctions relief, including via measures to condition or mandate congressional review of executive branch actions related to sanctions on Iran (H.R. 2012, H.R. 2570).

Supplemental appropriations. Per one April 7 media report, the Administration is reportedly preparing to request from Congress as much as $100 billion in additional funding related to the conflict with Iran.

Oversight. Any agreement “relating to the nuclear program of Iran” would trigger congressional review requirements under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17). More broadly, Members may engage with the Administration regarding the conduct of the conflict and its ramifications for Iran; for U.S. cooperation with Israel and other Middle East partners; for the U.S. and global economies; and for U.S. military readiness, tactics, and strategies.

About the authors:

Clayton Thomas, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

 

'No return to normal': IMF warns of lasting economic damage from Iran war

Copyright AP Photo

By Una Hajdari with AFP

Published on 10/04/2026 - EURONEWS

The IMF is cutting its global growth forecast, preparing €42.9bn in emergency aid and warning that 45 million people face food insecurity.

The International Monetary Fund will downgrade its global growth forecasts due to the Middle East war, managing director Kristalina Georgieva said Thursday, warning of lasting economic damage even in the most optimistic scenario.

"Even in a best case, there will be no neat and clean return to the status quo ante," Georgieva said, citing spiralling energy costs, infrastructure damage, supply disruptions and a collapse in market confidence as factors that would weigh on growth regardless of how the conflict unfolds.

The IMF also expects to deploy between $20bn (€17.2bn) and $50bn (€42.9bn) in emergency balance-of-payments support to war-affected countries — with the lower figure contingent on the ceasefire holding.

At least 45 million people face food insecurity as a result of the conflict.

Over €50 billion on the table

Speaking on Bloomberg TV on Thursday, World Bank President Ajay Banga said his institution could mobilise as much as $25bn (€21.4bn) "very quickly" for developing countries hit by the war, with up to $60bn (€50bn) available over the longer term.

The remarks came as the IMF and World Bank kicked off their annual Spring Meetings in Washington, gathering top economic policymakers from around the world.

The US-Israel war on Iran, launched on 28 February, has engulfed the Middle East in violence, snarled supply chains and sent oil prices surging after Tehran virtually blocked the Strait of Hormuz.

Tehran and Washington have traded accusations of ceasefire violations, with talks aimed at a more durable peace slated for Saturday.

Related

'Spare a thought for the Pacific Islands'

Georgieva highlighted the uneven toll of the crisis, warning that low-income energy importers were bearing the heaviest burden.

"Spare a thought for the Pacific Island nations at the end of a long supply chain, wondering if fuel still reaches them," she said.

The World Bank said Wednesday that the Middle East, excluding Iran, was now expected to grow just 1.8% in 2026 — a downgrade of 2.4 percentage points from pre-war projections.

Global headline inflation is also expected to be revised upward, driven by oil price shocks and supply chain disruptions.

A joint statement from the IMF, World Bank and World Food Programme warned that rising oil, gas and fertiliser prices, combined with transport bottlenecks, would "inevitably lead to rising food prices and food insecurity".

The fund's own research makes for grim reading.

Output in countries where fighting takes place drops by 3% at the outset "and continues falling for years," it found.

An earlier assessment of the Iran war was blunter still: "All roads lead to higher prices and slower growth."

Wars Bring Lasting Economic Costs As Defense Spending Forces Hard Choices – Analysis

April 10, 2026 

IMF BLOG
By Hippolyte Balima, Andresa Lagerborg and Evgenia Weaver


War is again defining the global landscape. After decades of relative calm following the Cold War, the number of active conflicts has surged in recent years to levels not seen since the end of the Second World War. Meanwhile, rising geopolitical tensions and heightened security concerns are prompting many governments to reassess their priorities and spend more on defense.

Beyond their devastating human toll, wars impose large and lasting economic costs, and pose difficult macroeconomic trade-offs, especially for those countries where the fighting is taking place. Even without active conflicts, rising defense spending can raise economic vulnerabilities in the medium term. After the war, governments face the urgent post-conflict task of securing durable peace and sustaining recovery.

In an era of proliferating conflicts, our research in two analytical chapters of the latest World Economic Outlook highlights the deep and prolonged economic harm inflicted by war, which has particularly affected sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. We also show that rising defense spending—which can boost demand in the short term—imposes difficult budgetary trade‑offs that make good policy design and lasting peace more important than ever.

Economic losses

For countries where wars occur, economic activity drops sharply. On average, output in countries where fighting takes place falls by about 3 percent at the onset and continues falling for years, reaching cumulative losses of roughly 7 percent within five years. Output losses from conflicts typically exceed those associated with financial crises or severe natural disasters. Economic scars also persist even a decade later.



Wars also tend to have significant spillover effects. Countries engaged in foreign conflicts may avoid large economic losses—partly because there is no physical destruction on their own soil. Yet, neighboring economies or key trading partners with the country where the conflict is taking place will feel the shock. In the early years of a conflict, these countries often experience modest declines in output.

Major conflicts—those involving at least 1,000 battle-related deaths—force difficult trade-offs in economies where they occur. Government budgets deteriorate as spending shifts toward defense and debt increases, while output and tax collection collapse.


These countries may also face strains on their external balances. As imports contract sharply because of lower demand, exports decrease even more substantially, resulting in a temporary widening of the trade deficit. Heightened uncertainty triggers capital outflows, with both foreign direct investment and portfolio flows declining. This forces wartime governments to rely more heavily on aid and, in some cases, remittances from citizens abroad to finance trade deficits.

Despite these measures, conflicts contribute to sustained exchange rate depreciation, reserve losses, and rising inflation, underscoring how widening external imbalances amplify macroeconomic stress during wartime. Prices tend to increase at a pace higher than most of central banks’ inflation targets, prompting monetary authorities to raise interest rates.

Taken together, our findings show that major conflicts impose substantial economic costs and difficult trade-offs on economies that experience conflicts within their borders, as well as hurting other countries. And these costs extend well beyond short-term disruption, with enduring consequences for both economic potential and human well-being.
Spending trade-offs

More frequent conflicts and rising geopolitical tensions have also prompted many countries to reassess their security priorities and increase defense spending. Others plan to do so. This situation presents policymakers with a crucial question about trade-offs involved with such a boost to spending.


Our analysis looks at episodes of large buildups in defense spending in 164 countries since the Second World War. We find that these booms typically last nearly three years and increase defense spending by 2.7 percentage points of gross domestic product. That’s broadly similar to what is required by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to reach the 5 percent of GDP defense spending target by 2035.

Ramping up defense spending primarily acts as a positive demand shock, boosting private consumption and investment, especially in defense-related sectors. This can raise both economic output and prices in the short term, requiring close coordination with monetary policy to temper inflationary pressures.

Overall, the aggregate effects on output of scaling up defense spending are likely modest. Increases in defense spending typically translate almost one for one into higher economic output, rather than having a bigger multiplier effect on activity. That said, the multiplier or ripple effects of such spending vary widely depending on how outlays are sustained, financed and allocated, and how much equipment is imported.

For instance, output gains are smaller and external balances deteriorate when the stimulus is partly spent to import foreign goods, which is especially the case for arms importers. By contrast, a buildup of defense spending that prioritizes public investment in equipment and infrastructure, together with less fragmented procurement and more common standards, would expand market size, support economies of scale, strengthen industrial capacity, limit import leakages, and support long-term productivity growth.

The choice of how to finance defense spending entails critical trade-offs. Defense spending booms are mostly deficit-financed in the near-term, while higher revenues play a larger role in later years of defense spending booms and when the defense spending buildup is expected to be permanent.

The reliance on deficit financing can stimulate the economy in the short term, but strain fiscal sustainability over the medium term, particularly in countries with limited room in government budgets. Deficits worsen by about 2.6 percentage points of GDP, and public debt increases by about 7 percentage points within three years of the start of a boom (14 percentage points in wartime). The resulting increase in public debt can crowd out private investment and offset the initial expansionary effect of defense spending.


The buildup of fiscal vulnerabilities can be mitigated by durable financing arrangements, especially when the increase in defense spending is permanent. However, raising revenues come at the cost of reducing consumption and dampening the demand boost, while re-ordering budget priorities tends to come at the expense of government spending on social protection, health, and education.
Policies for recovery

Our analysis also shows that economic recoveries from war are often slow and uneven, and crucially depend on the durability of peace. When peace is sustained, output rebounds but often remains modest relative to wartime losses. By contrast, in fragile economies where conflict flares up again, recoveries frequently stall. These modest recoveries are driven primarily by labor, as workers are reallocated from military to civilian activities and refugees gradually return, while capital stock and productivity remain subdued.

Early macroeconomic stabilization, decisive debt restructuring, and international support—including aid and capacity development—play a central role in restoring confidence and promoting recovery. Recovery efforts are most effective when complemented by domestic reforms to rebuild institutions and state capacity, promote inclusion and security, and address the lasting human costs of conflict, including lost learning, poorer health, and diminished economic opportunities.

Importantly, effective post-war recovery requires comprehensive and well-coordinated policy packages. Such an approach is far more effective than piecemeal measures. Policies that simultaneously reduce uncertainty and rebuild the capital stock can reinforce expectations, encourage capital inflows, and facilitate the return of displaced people. Ultimately, successful post-war recovery lays the foundation for stability, renewed hope and improved livelihoods for communities affected by conflict.

—This article is based on Ch. 2 of the April 2026 World Economic Outlook, “Defense Spending: Macroeconomic Consequences and Trade-Offs,” and Ch. 3, “The Macroeconomics of Conflicts and Recovery.” For more on fragile and conflict-affected states: How Fragile States Can Gain by Strengthening Institutions and Core Capacities.

About the authors:

Hippolyte Balima is an Economist in the World Economic Studies Division of the IMF’s Research Department. Previously, he worked in the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia, Monetary and Capital Markets, and African Departments, as well as at the World Bank. His research focuses on macroeconomics, international finance, sovereign debt, inflation targeting, and public economics.

Andresa Lagerborg s an economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Evgenia Weaver is an Information Management Officer at the International Monetary Fund, working in the Research Department’s World Economic Studies Division. She supports analytical and data workflows for flagship research products and has worked on numerous research and policy publications, including chapters and boxes in the World Economic Outlook, as well as working papers and journal articles.


Source: This article was published by IMF Blog

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Nuclear Myths Continue To Fuel Neocon Fantasies – OpEd

April 10, 2026 

By James W. Carden

In a recent televised rant on the Fox News Channel, the neoconservative publicist Mark Levin made the eye-opening claim that the current US-Israeli War on Iran is “every bit as important as World War Two.” Still more, according to Levin, the specter of an Iranian nuclear weapon (for which there is approximately zero evidence), requires us, as good citizens to rally around the President and the military. Not surprisingly, Levin also noted that President’s Truman decision to use atomic weapons against Japan saved “a million men” by forestalling a US invasion of the Japanese Home Islands (the inference being: Trump should do likewise). Truman’s decision to incinerate Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs remains a topic (among a number of others) with which we Americans largely deal in the counterfeit currency of myths.

Despite the conclusions of the US Bombing Survey, that “certainly prior to December 1, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated,” few myths are as entrenched in the psyche of America’a media and political elites as the claim that Truman’s decision (invariably valorized as “brave”) to incinerate a quarter of a million civilians—mainly women, children, and elderly—in Hiroshima and Nagasaki won the war in the Pacific.

The claim that Truman’s decision saved countless American lives has grown to proportions that would have surprised, if not shocked, Truman’s own military high command. President George H.W. Bush, himself a veteran of the Pacific campaign, claimed that the atomic bombs saved the lives of half-a-million US servicemen.

The record, however, rebuts the myth.

Truman’s military advisers disagreed with Truman. Five-star Navy Admiral William Leahy, who served as Roosevelt and Truman’s chief of staff, felt that the bombs were “of no material assistance in our war against Japan.” The Japanese, said Leahy, “were already defeated and ready to surrender.” Leahy believed Truman’s decision to use nuclear weapons had “adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.” Likewise, Admiral William F. Halesy, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, noted that, “the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers throughout Russia long before” Truman decided to drop the bombs. Two weeks after the nuclear attacks, General Curtis LeMay publicly criticized the decision, saying, “The war would have been over in two weeks. . . . The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.”

The myth that the bombs “saved” a million US servicemen who would have otherwise perished in the invasion of the Home Islands came from the pen and imagination of the man who would become among the most infamous strategists and apologists for the War in Vietnam, McGeorge Bundy.

Born in 1919 to an upper-class family from Boston, Bundy was a graduate of Yale who served as an Army intelligence officer during the war. His father, Harvey Hollister Bundy, was a close associate of FDR’s Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. After the war, McGeorge was hired to ghostwrite Stimson’s memoirs. It was just around that time that journalists and a number of former high-ranking military officials began asking uncomfortable questions about whether it was necessary to use the atomic bomb against the Japanese.

Stimson and Harvey Bundy viewed the growing criticism with alarm, and so, McGeorge was given a second assignment, which was to help Stimson write defense of Truman. That spirited and wholly dishonest apologia appeared on the February 1947 cover of Harper’s magazine. The article, which heavily relied on material provided by Harvey Bundy, said that the atomic bombs were “our least abhorrent choice,” despite the fact that the Japanese had been actively suing for peace. The Harper’s article also included the entirely made up claim that an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands would have come at the cost of a million US casualties.

As Robert Oppenheimer’s biographer, Kai Bird, later noted, Bundy’s essay, “Would stand for at least two decades as the definitive explanation of the decision to use the atomic bomb. Even today, it remains the orthodox view.” Six years after assuming the role of national security adviser, Bundy would depart the White House in disgrace, reviled for his role in perpetuating and defending the war in Vietnam. There is a certain symmetry to his public career, which began as it ended: In the retailing of lies.

Alarmingly, those very lies are now being repurposed by fools like Mark Levin and the his Israel First supporters within the Trump administration to justify a nuclear attack on Iran.

Reprinted with permission from the Realist Review. Subscribe and support here.

James W. Carden

James W. Carden is a former adviser to the US state department and a frequent contributor to The American Conservative and The Quincy Institute’s Responsible Statecraft, and his substack can be found here: https://substack.com/@jameswcarden