Monday, March 30, 2026

Trial begins over alleged hit squad network linked to French Masonic lodge

A complex criminal trial has opened in Paris, where 22 people are set to appear in court over allegations of murder, attempted murder and other serious offences linked to a Masonic lodge accused of operating as a covert mafia network.


Issued on: 30/03/2026 - RFI

Defendant Pierre Lebris arrives for the opening of the so-called Athanor trial, in which 22 people are facing a wide range of charges, including murder, centred on the Athanor Masonic lodge accused of running hit squads, at the Assize Court in the Tribunal Judiciaire courthouse in Paris, on 30 March 2026. 
AFP - THOMAS SAMSON

Court proceedings, which got underway on Monday, are expected to run for at least three months, with seven of the defendants – including former intelligence agents, soldiers and business figures – facing the possibility of life imprisonment if convicted.

At the heart of the case is the Athanor Masonic Lodge in the Paris suburb of Puteaux. Prosecutors allege that the lodge served as a hub for a tightly organised network that carried out violent acts ranging from assaults to contract killings.

Among those in the dock are at least four freemasons, alongside four officers from France’s DGSE external intelligence agency, three police officers, six business executives, and professionals including a doctor and an engineer. Most of the accused, aged between 30 and 73, have no prior criminal records – a detail that has added to the intrigue surrounding the case.

The alleged ringleaders – Jean-Luc Bagur, Frederic Vaglio and Daniel Beaulieu – are all linked to the Athanor lodge and are accused of orchestrating a series of crimes through a structured chain of command. They, along with Beaulieu’s associate Sébastien Leroy, face the most severe penalties.

From botched plot to major investigation


The case first came to light following a failed contract killing in July 2020. Two members of France’s parachute regiment were arrested near the home of business coach Marie-Helene Dini while in possession of weapons.

Under questioning, the pair claimed they believed they had been tasked by the state to eliminate Dini, alleging she had ties to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.

Investigators quickly uncovered links to Bagur, a business rival of Dini and the 69-year-old “venerable master” of the Athanor lodge. According to prosecutors, Bagur commissioned the hit for a fee of €70,000, allegedly passing the task through Vaglio to a network overseen by Beaulieu, a former agent with the French secret service.

Leroy, described as the operational leader of the group, later admitted in custody that he and his associates had carried out numerous violent acts on behalf of the network. These allegedly included robberies, assaults and at least one murder – that of racing driver Laurent Pasquali, whose body was discovered in a forest in 2018.

Prosecutors say the group’s activities escalated over time – evolving from acts of revenge to more organised and lethal operations. One alleged incident involved industrial espionage, in which a businesswoman was attacked and her computer stolen. In another, a car was set ablaze after its owner reportedly uncovered financial irregularities linked to Bagur.

Troubling questions

As the trial unfolds, it is expected to shine a light not only on the alleged crimes but also on the unusual composition of the group – which includes individuals from law enforcement, intelligence and professional sectors.

Leroy has told investigators he believed he was acting in the interests of the state throughout, claiming he had been misled by Beaulieu and encouraged to think he was working towards becoming an informant.

For Marie-Helene Dini, the intended target of the 2020 plot, the case is deeply unsettling. Her lawyer, Jean-William Vezinet, has described it as “terrifying”, noting that many of those implicated were figures entrusted with public responsibility.

Uncertainty remains over what testimony Beaulieu will be able to provide. His lawyer has said he suffered lasting impairments after an apparent suicide attempt while in custody, including difficulties with concentration.

Despite the gravity of the allegations, the trial is also being seen as an opportunity for the French justice system to demonstrate its thoroughness and independence – particularly given the sensitive roles held by some of the accused.

(with newswires)


Propaganda Due was a Masonic lodge, founded in 1877, within the tradition of Continental Freemasonry and under the authority of Grand Orient of Italy.

On March 17, 1981, a significant event unfolded in Italy when the nation's financial police raided the villa of Licio Gelli, a businessman with deep ties to ...

Dec 30, 2022 ... Abstract. This paper wishes to explore some characteristics of the relevant interconnections between mafias/mafiosi and masonic ...

May 25, 1981 ... A mushrooming scandal involving a secret Masonic lodge had forced the justice minister to resign and threatened the reputations of a large group of politicians.

Jun 1, 1981 ... The scandal currently dominating Italian politics revolves around allegations that a large number of key government, military, business, ...

Jun 8, 1981 ... The bizarre scandal that rocked the country last week and toppled the four-party coalition government of Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani.

Dec 16, 2015 ... Licio Gelli, the mastermind behind a notorious Italian masonic lodge with links to some of Italy's biggest scandals of the 20th century, has died at the age of...

This paper will investigate the pathological dimension of potential interplays among deviant masons and political-institutional actors in a variety of cases ...

May 24, 1981 ... Italy's Justice Minister, Adolfo Sarti, resigned today following reports linking him to a powerful, secret Masonic lodge that has been implicated in a variety&...

Jun 16, 2025 ... In June 1982, the BBC reported on the death of Italian banker Roberto Calvi, whose body was found in central London.

Captain of Russian 'shadow tanker' sentenced to one year in French prison

A French court has handed down a one-year prison sentence and issued an arrest warrant for the Chinese captain of a tanker suspected of being part of Russia’s so-called 'shadow fleet', in a case that highlights Europe’s growing efforts to enforce sanctions at sea.



Issued on: 30/03/2026 - RFI

The Chinese captain of the Boracay, a tanker from the Russian shadow fleet that was seized in September by the French navy off the coast of Brittany, was sentenced on 30 March 2026 to one year in prison by the Brest criminal court for 'failing to comply with orders.' AFP - DAMIEN MEYER

Chen Zhangjie, 39, was sentenced in absentia on Monday after failing to comply with French naval orders to stop his vessel, the Boracay, during an incident in September.

The court in the western city of Brest also imposed a fine of €150,000, underlining the seriousness with which authorities are treating alleged sanctions evasion.

The Boracay was intercepted by the French navy before being boarded and inspected. It was later released along with its crew, prompting a sharp reaction from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who described the operation as "piracy".

Despite the diplomatic tension, the ruling signals a firm stance from French authorities as scrutiny intensifies around maritime activities linked to Moscow.

Shadow fleet under scrutiny

The tanker had claimed to be sailing under a Benin flag and is believed to be part of a network of vessels used to transport Russian oil in ways that may circumvent Western sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine.

These so-called shadow fleets have become an increasing focus for European governments, who are keen to close loopholes in enforcement.

According to an informed French source and the captain’s lawyer, two employees of a Russian private security company were also on board at the time of the interception. Their reported role was to represent Russian interests and gather intelligence, adding another layer of intrigue to the case.

The European Union has already blacklisted 598 vessels suspected of participating in such operations, banning them from European ports and maritime services.

The Brest court’s decision is therefore part of a broader effort to ensure that these measures carry real consequences.

French prosecutor seeks penalty for captain in Russian shadow fleet test case

Wider security concerns

Beyond sanctions enforcement, the Boracay has also drawn attention for its alleged links to a series of unexplained drone flights over Denmark last year. These incidents formed part of a wider pattern of drone sightings and airspace violations across Europe that have often been attributed to Russian activity.

No formal connection has been established between the tanker and the drone activity, and Moscow has consistently denied any involvement. Still, the overlap of maritime and aerial security concerns has heightened unease among European officials.

While the case against Chen Zhangjie centres on non-compliance with naval orders, it reflects a much larger geopolitical picture – one in which maritime routes, energy supplies and security risks are increasingly intertwined.

(with newswires)
Amnesty warns of 'serious risks' to certain fans during 2026 World Cup

Human rights campaign group Amnesty International warned on Monday that certain fans travelling to the United States, Mexico and Canada for the World Cup face serious risks from immigration and customs officers (ICE) as well as border guards (CBP).



Issued on: 30/03/2026 - RFI

A federal agent watches as police officers respond to a protest at a warehouse purchased by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for use as a detention center, in Salt Lake City, Utah, US 18 March, 2026. REUTERS - Jim Urquhart

By: Paul Myers

In the report Humanity Must Win: defending rights, tackling repression at the 2026 Fifa World Cup, Amnesty says neither World Cup organisers Fifa nor the US authorities have provided any guarantees that supporters will be safe from ethnic profiling, indiscriminate raids, unlawful detention and deportation.

"None of the three US draft host city human rights plans so far published provide any mention of how people will be protected from such threats," the report says.

"Indeed, the acting director of Ice has told [US] Congress that the agency will be 'a key part of the overall security apparatus for the World Cup.'"

In June 2018, the US, Mexico and Canada beat off Morocco's bid to stage the 2026 World Cup.

The tournament will start on 11 June with a match between Mexico and South Africa at the Azteca Stadium in Mexico City. Two other venues in Mexico will be used along with Vancouver and Toronto in Canada and 11 in the US including the MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford which will host the final on 19 July. Some 6.5 million fans from across the globe are expected to attend the tournament.

Since Fifa awarded co-hosting rights, the administration of Donald Trump has taken power in the US and fulfilled election campaign pledges to crackdown on illegal immigration.

The Amnesty report says analysis of official government data conducted by the New York Times estimates that ICE and CBP deported more than 500,000 people in 2025 – Trump's first year as president – including 230,000 arrested inside the US and 270,000 at the border.

"As of 19 March 2026, Ice had also signed 1,544 287(g) agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, including in World Cup host cities Dallas, Houston and Miami, deputising their officers to enforce immigration law and allowing for local jails to be used for immigration detention," the Amnesty report adds.

"Amnesty International has also documented immigration detention conditions in the Krome North Service Processing Center and the Everglades Detention Facility – also known as "Alligator Alcatraz" – within 20 and 50 miles of Fifa’s Miami headquarters, respectively."

The Amnesty report also highlights the US government's attack on the rights of LGBTQI+ people, particularly in relation to transgender and gender-diverse people.
Anti-discrimination protocol

The England LGBTQI+ fans’ group and a network of European LGBTQI+ fans’ groups say they will not have a visible presence at matches in the US.

Trans youth also face persistent discrimination in Canada, says the report, while Mexico is considered to be the second most dangerous country in the world for transgender people, with 59 transfemicides recorded in 2024.

"In football, homophobic chanting has also been a persistent problem in matches involving the Mexican, US and Canadian national teams, leading to match suspensions and sanctions imposed by FIFA on the Mexican Football Federation," the report says.


Amnesty says it wants authorities to take effective measures to protect LGBTQI+ people from discrimination, harassment and abuse via anti-discrimination campaigns and proper use of Fifa’s anti-discrimination protocol during matches.

It also wants Fifa, governments and host cities to guarantee the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly inside and outside World Cup venues during the tournament.

As well as calling for an end to indiscriminate raids, ethnic profiling, arbitrary arrests, mass detention and unlawful deportations in the US, Amnesty says it wants public guarantees that World Cup events, venues and gatherings will not be targeted for immigration enforcement.

It also says organisers should make sure host city human rights plans are updated and tightened up to provide comprehensive protections for fans, players, journalists, workers and local communities.

"With just weeks to go until kick-off, Fifa's claim that "Football Unites the World" sits in stark contrast to the divisive and repressive practices of governments who host its flagship tournament," the report says,

"This World Cup is very far from the "medium risk" tournament that Fifa once judged it to be, and urgent efforts are needed to bridge the growing gap between the tournament’s original promise and today’s reality."

(with newswires)
Sunset Over Bitter Lake: Iran War And The Petrodollar – Analysis


US President Franklin D. Roosevelt with King Ibn Saud, of Saudi Arabia, on board USS Quincy (CA-71) in the Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, on 14 February 1945. The King is speaking to the interpreter, USMC Colonel William A. Eddy. 

Credit: U.S. Navy photo, Wikimedia Commons

March 30, 2026 
Geopolitical Monitor
By Zachary Fillingham

The global order has long rested on two pillars. The first is the taboo of territorial acquisition by military force, enshrined in the UN Charter following an apocalyptic World War. Second is the post-Bretton Woods petrodollar system, where oil flows from the Middle East are priced exclusively in US dollars, enabling a system of global trade that runs through US financial circuits.

The first pillar has already been toppled, as testified by recent events in Ukraine, Armenia, northern Syria, and perhaps soon Afghanistan and southern Lebanon. And now with the advent of the Iran war, the second pillar – the petrodollar – is coming under increased strain.

Weaponizing The Strait of Hormuz


The Iran war has laid bare the strategic value of the Strait of Hormuz in no uncertain terms. Tehran has leveraged its long coastline and decentralized offensive capacity to menace energy supply chains, imposing wide-ranging economic costs and boosting its own negotiating leverage. That the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group is operating somewhere in the Arabian Sea signals the enduring risk of Iranian mines, missiles, fast boats, and drones in and around Hormuz, and this is unlikely to change any time soon. Many of these factors are known quantities, having been gamed out and pored over by officials and analysts before the war broke out.

A more novel development can be found in Iran’s negotiating position, specifically Tehran’s ceasefire proposal which includes a demand for exclusive sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. It comes amid reports that the Iranians are drafting a law to permanently introduce tolls on ships transiting the Strait. The law would formalize a status quo already materializing for ships transiting in wartime, with some vessels paying transit fees in yuan and others securing safe passage via diplomatic channels, as per Lloyd’s List. The traffic represents a trickle of the normal volume, with just one pre-war day’s worth passing through the Strait since March 2.

A toll on a strategic chokepoint is not without precedent. Egypt generated approximately $10.3 billion in revenues from tolls on the Suez Canal in 2023, and Turkey charges a per-tonnage rate to transit the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Both are exceptions under international maritime law, as UNCLOS prohibits coastal states from imposing tolls, due to their falling under international conventions predating the United Nations. Strictly speaking, in a legal sense the Strait of Hormuz would fall under UNCLOS’ jurisdiction under international law. However, since we’re not exactly living in a golden age of liberal internationalism, facts on the ground tend to eclipse the letter of the law. Iran is now doing what it can to make sure these facts serve its long-term interests.

Sanctions are another consideration, since ships currently traversing the Strait are technically paying tolls to the IRGC, a sanctioned entity. Yuan-denominated tolls dovetail on other longstanding efforts to establish alternative payment methods for Iranian oil, all with a shared goal of placing these financial flows outside the purview of US surveillance and enforcement. Zoom out further and they can be situated in the broader BRICS effort to push toward the de-dollarization of global trade.

A Breakdown of Bitter Lake?

The security of Gulf states is another crucial determining variable in the future of the petrodollar. This was the core of the original pledge at Great Bitter Lake in 1945 – oil for security – a promise that was later renewed and expanded on amid the oil crisis in 1974. The resulting diplomatic infrastructure undergirds the petrodollar system that has endured to this day.

But all of this hinges on the United States’ ability to ensure the security of its Gulf partners, and the Iran war is openly calling this ability into question.

It’s clear that the wellbeing of Gulf states did not figure prominently in the design or execution of US-Israeli war planning. Gulf leaders were not notified before the February 28 strikes, and the operation ultimately produced the very wave of retaliatory strikes that had long been predicted by both Gulf and US domestic intelligence organs. Gulf economies are now the frontline in a war they did not start: Kuwait and Qatar could suffer 14% drops to annual GDP should the war last through April, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE also face 5% and 3% drops respectively. Moreover, these projections from Goldman Sachs cannot account for the more intangible and long-term economic impacts of shifting perceptions, from ultra-modern desert mirage to dangerous geopolitical flashpoint. Finally, despite having played the tragic part of Cassandra, Gulf leaders are still being sidelined in diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire, with the current (abortive) effort running through Pakistan instead.

It’s safe to say that the current configuration is not serving the needs of Gulf states in an optimal way.

Over the short-term, Gulf capitals have few appealing options to stabilize their economies and domestic political orders. But the outlook gets more clouded when one considers the long-term. Here the tyranny of proximity is inescapable: Iran is close, the United States is far. During the era of unrivaled US hegemony, it was possible to bridge this gap. But that era is now coming to an end and Gulf capitals must hedge their bets for whatever comes next.

The outcome of the Iran war will go far in determining how these hedging strategies play out. The conflict is rhyming with recent history in illustrating the limits of what military power can achieve, but advances in asymmetric warfare also set it apart. Iran’s decentralized tactics and low-cost arsenal allow the regime to maintain a deterrent capacity and impose costs despite having already been ‘overwhelmingly destroyed,’ as per the US government. This doesn’t just allow the Iranian regime to remain on the chessboard longer and increase its negotiating leverage through economic carnage. It also strikes at the heart of the qualitative US military advantages that made the Bitter Lake pact possible in the first place. The costs of deterrence are spiking, buoyed by expensive interceptors and the downing of ‘untouchable’ F-35s by far less sophisticated systems. These costs then feed back into a US domestic context that is increasingly fiscally constrained, wary of new foreign interventions, and had previously been engaged in a long-term strategic pivot away from the Middle East. The result is a security guarantee being questioned on both sides of the equation.

Looking Ahead


The US dollar maintains a singular importance in the global economy, accounting for 56% of global foreign exchange reserves and 89% of all foreign exchange market trades. In other words, de-dollarization efforts have a long way to go before the greenback is displaced in any meaningful way.

Yet the Iran war strikes at the heart of the petrodollar system that global finance runs on. It calls into question the viability of US deterrence in the age of drone warfare, and it amplifies doubts that Washington can remain engaged long-term. Over time, Gulf leaders may conclude that their security needs are better served through accommodation with the enemy just beyond the horizon rather than reliance on the ally a world away.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com
Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.
The Paradox Of Popular Mobilization: Bangladesh’s Gen Z And Electoral Reality – Analysis


Protest in Bangladesh. Photo Credit: Rayhan9d, Wikipedia Commons

March 30, 2026 
Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)
By Imran Ahmed


Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led protest movement reshaped the country’s political landscape and placed institutional reform, electoral governance and constitutional change at the centre of national political debate and public discourse. Yet despite the momentum generated by the uprising, youth-led political formations struggled to translate that energy into electoral success. The results of the February 2026 election suggest that while the protests transformed the political agenda, established political actors retained structural advantages within the electoral arena.

Established parties possess long-standing networks, disciplined party structures and well-developed grassroots mobilisation channels. The resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami illustrates this dynamic. Despite years of marginalisation, the party was able to re-enter the political arena and compete effectively once the political environment shifted. By contrast, newer formations emerging directly from protest mobilisation lacked this comparable institutional depth. The National Citizen’s Party (NCP), formed by leaders associated with the uprising, attempted to transform the legitimacy and symbolism of the protests into a political platform.

However, building durable political organisations capable of contesting elections requires time, organisational infrastructure, and local networks that protest movements often do not immediately possess. This organisational gap posed a significant obstacle for youth-led actors. When the NCP attempted to address this weakness by aligning with Jamaat-e-Islami, the move produced internal tensions, divisions and disillusionment. This weakened its ability to sustain a clear and distinct political identity in an increasingly competitive electoral field.

Secondly, the political landscape after the uprising was also highly fragmented and shaped in part by shifting alliances, the choice of some 51 different political parties and the absence of the Awami League. Moreover, youth-led groups faced competition not only from established parties and their coalitions but also from a large number of independent candidates which further dispersed political competition. This prevented the consolidation of support around any single youth-led movement and diluted the electoral impact of the protest movement’s momentum.


Thirdly, institutional features of the election itself further complicated the situation. The parliamentary election was held alongside a national referendum on constitutional reform. Voters were asked to approve or reject a package of reforms through a simple ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ vote. This design shifted attention away from individual party platforms. Instead of focusing on the minutiae of competing political programmes, the electoral debate increasingly centred on whether voters supported or opposed the broader reform agenda. In this context, the distinct political offerings of newer youth-led actors became somewhat subsumed as the election became less about competing visions from emerging actors and more about which political forces would oversee the reform process.

These dynamics do not necessarily indicate that the Gen Z protests failed. On the contrary, the decision to hold the parliamentary election alongside a national referendum on constitutional reforms reflects the extent to which these issues had moved to the centre of political debate. In this sense, the protests were so successful in redefining the political agenda that they also created opportunities for established parties to instrumentalise that agenda and use it to reinvent themselves. Jamaat-e-Islami again provides a pertinent example. The post-uprising environment allowed the party to shed its image as a controversial and, for many, sinister relic of the old political order, and present itself as a reform-minded alternative to status quo politics.

Finally, while it remains difficult to determine precisely how younger voters behaved electorally, the overall outcome of the election points to a broader pattern in voter preferences. The strong performance of an established party such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party suggests trust in actors with organisational experience and governing capacity. While support for the referendum indicates that the demand for political change is a central, defining political concern. What this reveals is that voters were not just choosing between change and continuity, but also between competing approaches to managing change.


About the author: Dr Imran Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at iahmed@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Source: This article was published by the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS),


Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)

The Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) was established in July 2004 as an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). ISAS is dedicated to research on contemporary South Asia. The Institute seeks to promote understanding of this vital region of the world, and to communicate knowledge and insights about it to policy makers, the business community, academia and civil society, in Singapore and beyond.





Sri Lanka Under Pressure Over Iranian Navy Ship Hiding From US


March 30, 2026
EurActiv
By Matthew Karnitschnig

(EurActiv) — Weeks after an Iranian vessel fleeing the US Navy sought refuge in Sri Lanka, authorities are still grappling with how to handle the uninvited guests.

The IRIS Bushehr, a logistics ship, first requested entry on 4 March following the sinking of an Iranian frigate – IRIS Dena – in the vicinity by US forces. The two Iranian ships were returning home from a naval exercise with India.

Sri Lankan authorities initially denied Bushehr’s request. The crew then issued a distress call, citing mechanical failure, though Sri Lankan naval officers found no evidence to support the claim, according to security officials who briefed Euractiv.

Despite the refusal, the ship proceeded into Sri Lankan waters carrying more than 200 Iranian crew, including armed Iranian personnel – prompting immediate concerns among local officials over sovereignty and security.

After docking near the Port of Colombo, many crew members reportedly sought asylum, according to people familiar with the situation.

Tensions between Colombo and Tehran have since escalated, security officials say. Iran’s military attaché in Sri Lanka assumed control of the vessel, limiting access for local authorities. The continued presence of armed personnel aboard has been viewed by some officials in Sri Lanka as a breach of sovereignty.

Authorities are also wary of potential pressure from Washington over the harbouring of Iranian personnel who may possess valuable intelligence, the officials added.

With the Bushehr now located at Trincomalee harbour, Sri Lanka faces mounting pressure to clarify its position – particularly regarding foreign military presence on its territory and its broader diplomatic alignment amid escalating geopolitical tensions.

Sri Lankan government officials could not immediately be reached for comment.
Responding To The US–Israel Vs Iran War: Indonesia’s Board Of Peace Dilemma Intensifies – Analysis


Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto at the inaugural meeting of the newly formed Board of Peace in Washington. Photo Credit: instagram.com/prabowo

March 30, 2026 
 360info
By Teuku Rezasyah


Indonesia faces a strategic choice as pressure mounts at home to withdraw from US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace amid the escalating US–Israel–Iran conflict. Former minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs and Vice President candidate Professor Mahfud MD recently noted that leaving the BoP would likely not cause significant losses and could be done easily if the government is “not being held hostage”.

President Prabowo Subianto may therefore need to reassess Indonesia’s decisions, especially as the country is increasingly viewed as aligning with US interests—from joining the BoP to signing one-sided trade agreements with Washington. This perception raises concerns that Indonesia is losing its independence in global affairs and drifting away from its long‑standing, free‑and‑active foreign policy.

At the same time, President Prabowo has expressed readiness to “evaluate” Indonesia’s role in the BoP. Indonesia has offered to mediate between the US and Iran, but the chances of success remain low. Instead, the current situation should prompt the government to reconsider whether the BoP framework is still relevant and effective for Indonesia’s foreign‑policy goals.


Indonesia’s options within the Board of Peace


Indonesia’s role in the BoP during the ongoing conflict in West Asia will likely follow several directions.

First, Indonesia is trying to maintain neutrality by offering to facilitate dialogue and urging all parties to prioritise diplomacy. The Iranian Embassy in Jakarta welcomed this offer, although no concrete steps have followed. Iran’s ambassador stated that both Indonesia and Iran are influential middle powers with the potential to promote peace, and that closer cooperation could strengthen regional stability.

Indonesia has also increased communication with Middle Eastern countries, shown by its intensified diplomatic engagement with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Second, Indonesia is expected to remain in the BoP despite criticism and calls to withdraw. President Prabowo has assured local Islamic clerics that if he sees no benefit for Palestine and finds that it is not in line with Indonesia’s national interests, he will withdraw. The government views the BoP as an important platform for addressing the Israel–Palestine issue, allowing Indonesia to defend Palestinian interests even though Palestine is not represented on the board.

Third, the conflict presents an opportunity for Indonesia to strengthen its image as a peace‑oriented country. If Indonesia succeeds in facilitating dialogue, it could position itself as a balancing actor contributing to global stability. Mediation efforts may also help ease economic pressures, especially with rising oil prices.

Indonesia’s membership in the BoP as a strategic tool

Although withdrawing from the BoP may appear to be an option, Indonesia would likelylose bargaining power with the United States if it left. Indonesia’s long‑standing strategy is to avoid conflict with major powers such as China and the US while gaining selective advantages, especially in trade negotiations.

This raises a key question: would Indonesia’s geopolitical position become too closely tied to the US? The answer is complex. Indonesia’s trade, investment, and import ties with the US already limit its freedom to some extent. Its BoP membership and efforts to maintain good relations with Washington reflect a cautious approach aimed at avoiding clashes with a major power.

Openly criticising US actions in Iran could also disrupt Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda, particularly within the BoP. Offering mediation allows Indonesia to maintain balance and promote de‑escalation without directly confronting Washington.

Indonesia is navigating a difficult situation during the US-Israel vs. Iran conflict while trying to assert itself as a middle power committed to peace in BoP even as it faces criticism and economic pressures. This issue is important because Indonesia—long a supporter of Palestine and without diplomatic ties to Israel—is now part of a platform where unlikely actors appear together.

As Indonesia considers reviewing its BoP membership, the decision will shape its future position in the board and its efforts to support Palestinian self‑determination.


About the author and editors:
Teuku Rezasyah teaches International Relations at Padjadjaran University in Bandung and works as a policy consultant for the Indonesian government and parliament.

Ria Ernunsari, Sr. Commissioning Editor, 360info
Samrat Choudhury, Commissioning Editor, 360info

Source: This article was published by 360.info

360info provide an independent public information service that helps better explain the world, its challenges, and suggests practical solutions. Their content is sourced entirely from the international university and research community and then edited and curated by professional editors to ensure maximum readability. Editors are responsible for ensuring authors have a current affiliation with a university and are writing in their area of expertise.
The Royal Navy In The Gulf – Analysis


The Royal Navy's presence in the Persian Gulf typically includes a Type 45 destroyer and a squadron of minehunters supported by an RFA Bay-class mothership. 
Photo Credit: LA(Phot) Gary Weatherston, Wikimedia Commons

March 30, 2026 
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Dr. Emma Salisbury


(FPRI) — The Royal Navy is set to take a leading role in a multinational “Hormuz Coalition” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and ensure safe passage for merchant vessels. Britain brings considerable expertise to the table, particularly in the mine countermeasures capabilities that the US Navy currently lacks. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has cautioned, however, that reopening the strait is “not a simple task” and that any sustained effort would require broad coalition support given the narrow geography and residual threats from mines, drones, fast boats, and missiles. Crucially, any such plan would likely not be enacted until a cessation in hostilities.

This is not the first time that Britain has operated naval forces in the Gulf—far from it. But the Royal Navy is currently very stretched with no permanent Gulf presence, and the UK government keeps delaying decisions on defense investment. In such a context, it remains to be seen how much capability is actually deployable, and for how long.
Britain in the Gulf

Britain has a long history in the Persian Gulf that predates the formation of most of the states that now border it. For much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Royal Navy policed its waters, suppressed piracy along the Trucial Coast, and enforced the treaty relationships that bound the sheikhdoms of the lower Gulf to London. When Britain withdrew from east of Suez in 1971—one of the more consequential strategic decisions of the post-war era—it did not abandon the Gulf entirely. It simply changed the nature of its commitment, from imperial presence to expeditionary partnership.

The Armilla Patrol, established in 1980 in response to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, is a very pertinent example of that commitment. As the two Gulf powers began attacking each other’s shipping in what became known as the Tanker War, Britain deployed frigates and destroyers to protect vessels sailing under the Red Ensign. The patrol was never large—typically one or two surface combatants supplemented by a Royal Fleet Auxiliary support ship—but it was continuous, professional, and symbolically significant. It signaled that Britain regarded the free passage of Gulf shipping as a vital national interest, and that it was prepared to back that judgement with steel.


The Tanker War years produced some of the most intense operational experiences the Royal Navy has accumulated in recent decades. British warships operated in an environment where the threat came not from a peer adversary’s battle fleet but from aircraft, mines, and small craft—precisely the combination that Iran has refined and extended in the years since. The minesweepers of the Royal Navy worked in some of the most hazardous waters in the world, sweeping for Iranian mines that had been laid indiscriminately across international shipping lanes. It was unglamorous, dangerous, and essential work.

Operation Granby—Britain’s contribution to the 1991 Gulf War—brought the Royal Navy into the Gulf in much greater force. A task group built around HMS Ark Royal contributed to the allied campaign to liberate Kuwait. Destroyers and frigates provided air defense and surface warfare support. Mine countermeasures vessels, working alongside allied counterparts, tackled the extensive Iraqi minefield that had been laid in the northern Gulf. The lessons of that campaign, in particular the enduring centrality of mine warfare in Gulf operations, were noted but imperfectly absorbed by the US defense establishment, which subsequently allowed the US Navy’s mine countermeasures capabilities to atrophy.


The years following the Gulf War saw presence continue in various forms, with Royal Navy frigates rotating through the Gulf on deployments that combined maritime security operations with the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq. When coalition forces returned to the Gulf in 2003, the Royal Navy again played a significant role: HMS Ark Royal led a task group that included frigates, destroyers, and submarines. Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade conducted an amphibious assault on the Al-Faw peninsula—one of the most complex opposed landings attempted by British forces—while Royal Navy helicopters provided close air support and casualty evacuation. The integration of maritime and land power in that campaign reflected a level of joint capability that, two decades later, Britain is struggling to maintain.

The most direct confrontations with Iran in recent years have come not in open warfare but in the grey zone of maritime harassment. There were incidents in 2004 and 2007 of Iranian forces seizing small groups of Royal Navy personnel, who were safely released following negotiations. The seizure of the Stena Impero in 2019 brought tensions to a new pitch. The Swedish-owned, British-flagged oil tanker was intercepted by IRGC speedboats and a helicopter in the Strait of Hormuz and escorted to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, where it was held for over two months. HMS Montrose, a Type 23 frigate on duty, was close enough to hear the radio communications during the seizure but too far away to intervene in time, illustrating with uncomfortable precision the gap between presence and protection.

HMS Montrose’s deployment during this period became something of a symbol of both what the Royal Navy could do and what it was being asked to do with insufficient resources. The frigate spent the better part of three years on near-continuous deployment in the Gulf, with crew rotations flown out to relieve exhausted personnel rather than bringing the ship home. It was a testament to the professionalism and resilience of the Royal Navy’s people, and a frank acknowledgement that there were simply not enough ships to sustain a proper rotation. When HMS Montrose finally returned home, the commitment passed to other frigates on what amounted to emergency scheduling, with the Gulf queue competing directly against NATO commitments in the North Atlantic and High North. With the withdrawal of the last Royal Navy ship from Bahrain just a couple of months ago, Britain no longer has a permanent naval presence in the Gulf.

Reviews and Resources

The allied dimension of the current crisis matters enormously. The US Navy remains the anchor of any credible response, but Washington has made clear that it expects its European partners to carry more of the burden. This is not new for Britain, but it is becoming unsustainable. Across the Middle East’s maritime theatre—from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Hormuz—there is a dangerous gap between the security guarantees Western nations implicitly underwrite and the actual military capacity they commit. A Royal Navy Type 45 destroyer can provide the layered air defense against missiles and drones that the current threat demands. A Type 23 frigate, with its sophisticated sonar suite, is formidable in the complex environment of the Gulf. Merlin helicopters provide the reach to prosecute both sub-surface and surface threats at range. Britain brings intelligence relationships and operational experience that few allies can match. But the Royal Navy currently has too few ships to sustain a meaningful Gulf commitment while honoring its obligations in the North Atlantic, the High North, and home waters simultaneously. The fleet stands at a historic low point—qualitatively capable, quantitatively stretched to breaking point.

The particular irony of this moment is that the problem has already been diagnosed—in public, in detail, and with the government’s own endorsement. Last year’s Strategic Defence Review (in which I had a small role) set out 62 specific recommendations to make the UK military more lethal, better integrated, and more operationally ready. Ministers accepted every one of them and pledged to act. Months later, the action has not materialized.

The mechanism for turning those recommendations into reality—the Defence Investment Plan, which is supposed to translate strategic ambition into funded, deliverable programs—was due last fall. It did not appear. Ministers gave assurances that it would arrive before Christmas. It did not. We are now well into 2026, and the country is still waiting. The reason for the delay is not procedural—it is financial. Reports have pointed to a gap of approximately £28 billion between what implementing the review’s recommendations would actually cost and what the Treasury has been willing to commit.

The result is a peculiar and deeply damaging situation: The government has accepted an ambitious and necessary vision for British defense, promised to deliver it at what it called a “wartime pace,” and then spent the better part of two years producing nothing of substance. There are no significant program commitments, no major modernization announcements, and no serious investment decisions. As the chair of the Commons Defence Select Committee has observed, the government appears to be “trundling along rather than realising the urgency of the moment.” The patience of the military, the defense industry, and the country’s allies is not infinite.
What Needs to Be Done

The path forward is not complicated, though it demands both funding and the political courage to spend it. The Defence Investment Plan must be published now, and it must be fully funded—another wish list without Treasury backing will not deter adversaries, will not reassure allies, and will not protect British interests at home and overseas. The Royal Navy must be treated as a priority: its surface fleet, its mine countermeasures capability, its submarine force, and its stewardship of the British continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent all require sustained investment. Emerging capabilities must be moved from promising experiments to fully funded programs, particularly those that will form the backbone of Atlantic Bastion. And the people who make all of this possible—the sailors, engineers, and other workers who represent the real foundation of military power—must be recruited in greater numbers, trained properly, and retained for the long haul.


None of this is cheap, and none of it can be done without a genuine decision by the government that defense is not a discretionary item but the first obligation of the state. The world we are navigating—with Russia to NATO’s east, a deteriorating Middle East, and an increasingly assertive China reshaping the Indo-Pacific—does not offer the luxury of a long run-up. The time for warm words with no follow-through has passed. Starmer and his government must demonstrate that they can do something harder than write an encouraging response to a defense review.


About the author: Dr. Emma Salisbury is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program, an Associate Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, and a Contributing Editor at War on the Rocks.


Source: This article was published by FPRI


Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

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