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Wednesday, April 29, 2026

The Fractures Of The World Order: Between The Civilizational Paradigm And Structural Analysis – Analysis

April 29, 2026 
IFIMES
By General (Rtd) Corneliu


At the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, the world order can no longer be described through stable balances or one-dimensional paradigms, but rather through an accumulation of structural tensions that intersect and amplify one another.

In an effort to understand the profound transformations of the contemporary international system, the specialized literature has, in recent decades, provided two major interpretative frameworks: the civilizational paradigm, established by Samuel P. Huntington[2], and the structural-anthropological analysis recently developed by Emmanuel Todd.[3]

Although different in methodology and level of analysis, both models capture real dimensions of global dynamics; however, neither is sufficient, taken in isolation, to explain the complexity of the current world order. This requires an integrative approach, capable of capturing the simultaneous interaction of multiple types of tensions and discontinuities – which, within the present material, is conceptualized in the form of “fractures of the world order.”[4] The concept of “fractures” does not describe only lines of tension, but also mechanisms of interaction between them, within a dynamic logic in which vulnerabilities and strategic advantages are generated and amplified reciprocally.

Under the conditions of the transformations of the contemporary international system, neither the civilizational paradigm nor the structural analysis are sufficient, taken separately, to explain global dynamics; these can be adequately understood only through an integrative approach, based on the interaction between multiple fractures of the world order.


The model proposed by Huntington, formulated in the post–Cold War context, is based on the premise that the main lines of conflict in the world will no longer be ideological or economic, but civilizational. In this logic, cultural and religious identity becomes the fundamental determinant of state behavior and international alliances. The fault lines between civilizations – especially between the West and the Islamic world or between the West and the Sinic space – are considered the most likely zones of conflict. This paradigm had the merit of anticipating the revaluation of identity in international relations and of highlighting the limits of Western universalism. However, it tends to oversimplify reality, treating civilizations as relatively homogeneous blocs and underestimating the internal dynamics of states, as well as the economic and technological interdependencies that cross these cultural boundaries.[5] In reality, internal fractures within civilizations often become more relevant than those between them, affecting the strategic coherence of state actors.

In contrast, Emmanuel Todd proposes a radically different interpretation, centered on the internal structures of societies. His analysis is based on variables such as demography, level of education, family structure, and the evolution of religious or post-religious values. From this perspective, the decline of the West is not the result of an external conflict, but of a progressive internal erosion, manifested through declining birth rates, social fragmentation, loss of industrial capabilities, and the weakening of cultural cohesion. In his reading, the war in Ukraine is not the cause of this weakness, but merely a revealer of it. At the same time, Todd suggests that states such as Russia or China still benefit from more coherent social structures, capable of sustaining long-term strategic efforts.[6] The apparent stability of these actors may, however, mask latent structural vulnerabilities, which become visible under conditions of major systemic stress.


Nevertheless, Todd’s approach, although profound and innovative, presents its own limitations. It tends to minimize the role of classical geopolitical factors, such as military alliances, technological capacity, or control of strategic resources, and, in certain cases, to overestimate the stability of some non-Western actors. In addition, his analysis does not sufficiently integrate the informational dimension and narrative competition, which have become essential in the current era.
The Fractures of the World Order

In this context, a conceptual synthesis becomes necessary, one that can overcome the limitations of these two paradigms and provide an analytical framework appropriate to contemporary complexity. The concept of “fractures of the world order” responds to this need, proposing a systemic vision in which global conflict is no longer reduced to a single explanatory dimension, but is understood as the result of the interaction between multiple lines of tension, constantly evolving. In analytical terms, these dynamics can be synthesized into a model of the seven fractures of the world order: geopolitical, economic, energy-related, technological, informational, socio-internal, and civilizational.

Thus, the current world order is characterized by the overlapping of multiple types of fractures. In geopolitical terms, the rivalry among major powers – especially between the United States, China, and Russia – shapes a long-term strategic competition, without, however, leading to a classical bipolarity.[7] In economic terms, an increasingly pronounced divide is emerging between economies dominated by financial capital and those oriented toward production, as well as between the Global North and the emerging South.[8] The energy dimension, in turn, introduces a critical fracture, in the context of the energy transition and competition for resources.[9]


In addition, the technological revolution generates a distinct fracture, between states capable of developing and controlling advanced technologies – artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, digital infrastructures – and those dependent on them.[10] Control over semiconductor production chains or access to strategic digital infrastructures becomes an instrument of power comparable to control over maritime routes in previous eras. In parallel, the informational dimension becomes an autonomous field of confrontation, in which states and non-state actors compete for control of narratives and the shaping of collective perceptions,[11] in many cases the perception of the outcome of a conflict becoming more important than the military outcome itself.

Finally, at the internal level, numerous states face their own fractures of cohesion, generated by political polarization, economic inequalities, and identity crises, internal fragmentation often reducing the capacity for external projection more than pressure from adversaries.[12] To these is added a fracture of a civilizational nature, reflecting persistent differences in values, identity, and models of political organization among major cultural spaces.

What fundamentally differentiates this approach from previous models is its integrative character. The fractures do not act in isolation, but generate chain amplification effects, in which vulnerabilities in one domain can produce disproportionate consequences in others. For example, an economic vulnerability may generate social instability, which in turn affects the strategic capacity of the state and makes it more vulnerable in geopolitical competition. Similarly, a technological dependency can be exploited informationally, generating effects on national security.

Within this framework, power can no longer be defined exclusively through classical indicators, such as military strength or economic size. It becomes the result of a complex combination of factors, in which internal cohesion, adaptive capacity, control of resources, and technological superiority are as important as the projection of force. In this context, power can be defined as the capacity of an actor to manage multiple systemic fractures simultaneously, maintaining internal cohesion and adaptive advantage in relation to adversaries. Moreover, strategic advantage does not necessarily belong to the most powerful actor in absolute terms, but to the most coherent and most capable of managing these multiple fractures simultaneously.

Therefore, if Huntington’s paradigm provided a map of global cultural differences, and Todd’s analysis highlighted the internal vulnerabilities of the West, the concept of “fractures of the world order” proposes a synthesis adapted to the realities of the 21st century. This allows not only a better understanding of international dynamics, but also the formulation of more nuanced strategies, capable of responding to the complexity of the current global environment.
Romania in the Logic of the Fractures of the World Order (application of the model of the seven fractures)

In the current context of transformations within the international system, Romania’s positioning can no longer be assessed exclusively through classical indicators of security or economic development, but must be analyzed through the lens of its capacity to simultaneously manage the fractures that traverse the world order. From this perspective, Romania is not merely a peripheral actor of the system, but a state situated at the intersection of multiple lines of tension, which confers upon it both significant vulnerabilities and strategic opportunities.


In geopolitical terms, Romania is positioned on the frontier of the Euro-Atlantic space, in direct contact with the conflict zone generated by the confrontation between Russia and the West. Membership in NATO and the European Union provides security guarantees and access to mechanisms of strategic coordination; however, this integration is accompanied by a limited capacity for autonomous initiative in defining foreign policy.

In practice, Romania’s external profile is characterized more by alignment with positions formulated at the level of Euro-Atlantic structures than by the articulation of autonomous strategic objectives adapted to specific national interests. This tendency reduces diplomatic flexibility and the ability to capitalize on regional opportunities, particularly in areas of direct interest such as the Black Sea or relations with the eastern neighborhood.

At the same time, proximity to the conflict in Ukraine and the role of a frontline state confer increased strategic relevance upon Romania, but also exposure to security risks and external pressures. In the absence of a more proactive and coherent foreign policy, this positioning risks transforming geostrategic advantage into a peripheral-type vulnerability, characterized by a predominantly transit and implementation role, rather than that of an actor with influence capacity.

From an economic perspective, Romania reflects the characteristics of an integrated, yet structurally dependent economy, situated between the logic of industrial production and that of consumption sustained through external capital. Although it records economic growth and attracts investment, this evolution is accompanied by persistent imbalances, particularly a high trade deficit and dependence on external financing.

The structure of the economy indicates a predominantly peripheral integration into European value chains, with specialization in relatively low value-added activities and a limited capacity to control strategic sectors. At the same time, a growth model largely based on consumption, supported through budget deficits and imports, accentuates vulnerability to external shocks and reduces the room for maneuver of economic policies.

In the context of global economic fragmentation and tendencies toward production relocation, this positioning exposes Romania to the risk of remaining trapped in an intermediate zone, without the capacity to significantly advance within value chains, but also without consolidating its economic autonomy. In the absence of a coherent industrial policy and firmer control over strategic resources, this configuration tends to transform economic integration from an advantage into a source of vulnerability.

The energy fracture, in Romania’s case, reveals a structural contradiction between potential and the effective capacity to capitalize on it.[13] Although Romania possesses significant natural gas resources, including offshore developments in the Black Sea, as well as a diversified energy mix (nuclear, hydro, renewables), these advantages are partially neutralized by increasingly evident internal vulnerabilities.

On the one hand, the natural gas sector indicates the premises for consolidating relative autonomy and even a growing regional role, in the context of future exploitation. On the other hand, in the field of electricity, a structural deficit is already taking shape, driven by the decline of available production capacities, delays in the completion of strategic projects, and pressures generated by energy transition policies.


This dysfunction is amplified by a strategic incoherence in the management of resources, under conditions in which Romania finds itself simultaneously importing electricity during critical periods while supporting exports or deliveries to sensitive external spaces, such as the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. In the absence of a clear prioritization of internal energy security, this dynamic gradually transforms the energy domain from a potential strategic advantage into a systemic vulnerability, with direct implications for economic stability and the state’s resilience capacity.

In technological terms, Romania faces a clear fracture between its capacity to adapt and the lack of real control over critical technologies. Although it has a dynamic IT sector and well-trained human resources, dependence on infrastructures, platforms, and technologies developed outside the national space limits strategic autonomy. In a world where technological control becomes a determinant of power, this dependence may generate significant vulnerabilities, especially in areas such as cybersecurity or critical infrastructures.

The informational dimension highlights a growing structural vulnerability, determined by the inability to generate, sustain, and protect coherent strategic narratives within the public space. In the current context, international competition is no longer conducted solely in the military or economic domains, but also at the level of perceptions, where control of narratives becomes an essential instrument of power.

In Romania’s case, the informational space is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and polarization, as well as by a significant dependence on external sources for the interpretation and validation of reality. In the absence of an institutional capacity consolidated around the “strategic shaping of narratives,” the state fails to coherently articulate and sustain its own positions, becoming rather a receiver and multiplier of externally generated discourses.

This situation is aggravated by exposure to disinformation and influence campaigns, but also by the emergence of an increasingly visible tension between the necessity of countering these phenomena and the risk of expanding mechanisms of control over information flows. In the absence of solid institutional safeguards, such tendencies may lead to the limitation of pluralism and the erosion of public trust, generating effects contrary to those intended.

Under these conditions, the perception of reality becomes a field of confrontation in which external actors can influence internal cohesion, strategic orientation, and even the legitimacy of political decision-making. In analytical terms, the informational fracture does not represent merely a sectoral vulnerability, but a multiplier of the other fractures, as it affects the state’s capacity to correctly interpret the strategic environment and to build internal consensus around fundamental objectives.

The socio-internal fracture represents one of the most sensitive dimensions of the vulnerability of the Romanian state, being the cumulative result of negative demographic, economic, and institutional developments. Beyond these trends, a determining factor is the degradation of the quality of the political class and the weakening of the functioning of representative institutions.

The political space is predominantly characterized by competition for access to resources and power, to the detriment of the coherent articulation of the national interest and the formulation of long-term strategies. Under these conditions, political decision-making often becomes fragmented, reactive, and dependent on electoral cycles, which reduces the state’s capacity to manage complex structural processes.


At the same time, the fundamental institutions of representative democracy show an erosion of their functional role. Parliament, although formally retaining its constitutional prerogatives, tends to be increasingly perceived as an actor with limited influence in the real decision-making process, while the transfer of power toward executive or informal areas reduces transparency and public accountability.

These developments are also reflected in international evaluations, where Romania is classified, in certain comparative analyses, as belonging to the category of hybrid regimes[14], which indicates a discontinuity between the formal institutional framework and the effective functioning of democracy.

Overall, this fracture affects not only social cohesion, but also the capacity of the state to formulate and implement coherent policies, transforming internal vulnerabilities into a multiplier factor of the other fractures – economic, energy, and geopolitical.

In civilizational terms, Romania is situated within the Western space, but with historical and cultural particularities that place it at an intersection of value systems. This positioning may generate ambivalences in relation to themes such as sovereignty, identity, or the relationship between the state and the individual. At the same time, it offers the possibility of serving as a bridge between different cultural spaces, if strategically leveraged.

Analyzed as a whole, these fractures do not act independently, but interconnect and amplify one another. Economic vulnerabilities may fuel social tensions, which in turn can be exploited informationally, affecting the strategic coherence of the state. Technological dependencies may generate security risks, while energy incoherence may have significant economic and geopolitical effects. In this sense, the main challenge for Romania is not the existence of these fractures, but the capacity to manage them in a coherent and integrated manner.

Within this framework, Romania’s position in the international system is not determined exclusively by its economic or military size, but by the level of internal coherence and its capacity for strategic adaptation. Romania is not condemned to the status of a vulnerable state, but neither can it become a relevant actor without a strategy that integrates these multiple dimensions.

Therefore, within the logic of the fractures of the world order, Romania may evolve in two distinct directions: either as a dependent state, affected by the intersection of vulnerabilities, or as a regional pivot state, capable of transforming its geographical position and available resources into a strategic advantage. The difference between these two trajectories will not be determined by the international context, but by internal decision-making capacity.

In a world in which power is defined by the management of fractures, Romania cannot afford the luxury of a reactive approach. Without a clear understanding of its own vulnerabilities and their interdependence, any strategy will remain fragmented. By contrast, an integrated approach, correlating geopolitical, economic, energy, technological, and social dimensions, can transform these fractures from sources of risk into instruments of strategic consolidation.

In this logic, Romania’s strategic vulnerability does not result from the intensity of a single fracture, but from their convergence and synchronization, within a cumulative model that reduces the capacity for autonomous decision-making and strategic projection.


The detailed analysis of these vulnerabilities, including economic, energy, demographic, and institutional dimensions, is already developed in another material dedicated to the multisectoral “assassination” of Romania, which will appear in a book currently in preparation, where these fractures are empirically highlighted. In this sense, the present analytical framework does not represent an exhaustive description, but a key for interpreting processes already manifested in concrete terms.


Conclusion

Therefore, if Huntington’s paradigm provided a map of global cultural differences, and Todd’s analysis highlighted the internal vulnerabilities of the West, the concept of “fractures of the world order” proposes a synthesis adapted to the realities of the 21st century. The current dynamics of the international system can no longer be understood through a single explanatory key, but only through the interdependent analysis of the tensions that simultaneously traverse the geopolitical, economic, energy, technological, informational, and social domains.

Within this framework, stability is no longer the result of a balance between comparable powers, but of the capacity of actors to manage complexity and to integrate these fractures into a coherent strategy. Power no longer belongs exclusively to the largest or the strongest, but to those who are the most coherent and most capable of defining and consistently pursuing their strategic objectives.

In a world defined not by equilibrium, but by the permanent intersection of fractures, international order will no longer be determined by dominance, but by the capacity to manage instability. Consequently, states that do not understand their own fractures will inevitably become the object of others’ strategies, while those that are able to integrate and control them will, in fact, define the architecture of the future world order.

Partea inferioară a formularului



About the author: 

Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse, for two decades. General Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.


The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.

[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives.” Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996. See also the original article: “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993.

[3] Emmanuel Todd, Après l’Empire. Essai sur la décomposition du système américain, Gallimard, Paris, 2002; for recent developments regarding the decline of the West and the dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine, see his public interventions and analyses from the period 2022–2024.


[4] The concept of “fractures of the world order” is used in this study to describe the set of structural lines of tension that traverse the contemporary international system and which, through their interaction, determine the dynamics of power, stability, and the evolution of conflicts. Unlike one-dimensional explanatory models, this approach proposes an integrative perspective, in which geopolitical, economic, energy, technological, informational, social, and civilizational dimensions are analyzed in an interdependent manner.

[5] Although useful for understanding identity-based conflicts, the civilizational paradigm is partially contradicted by realities such as the intense economic cooperation between states belonging to different civilizations (for example, U.S.–China trade relations or interdependencies between the EU and states in the Middle East).

[6] The conflict in Ukraine (beginning in 2022) has demonstrated both Russia’s capacity for economic adaptation under sanctions and the West’s difficulties in achieving rapid and decisive results, highlighting the limits of classical instruments of pressure.

[7] The strategic rivalry between the United States and China manifests itself in the Indo-Pacific, while the confrontation between Russia and the West is concentrated in Eastern Europe, including the Black Sea region, with direct implications for regional security.

[8] The emergence of alternative mechanisms to the Western financial system (for example, BRICS initiatives regarding payment systems independent of SWIFT) reflects this emerging economic fracture.

[9] The energy crises generated by the conflict in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East, including risks associated with the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrate the critical role of energy resources in global competition.

[10] Technological restrictions imposed on China by the United States (especially in the field of semiconductors) highlight the emergence of a global “technological curtain.”

[11] The informational warfare associated with the conflict in Ukraine and the narrative confrontations in the Middle East illustrate the importance of controlling perceptions in defining strategic outcomes.

[12] Political polarization in Western states and institutional fragilities in various regions highlight the fact that internal fractures can become decisive factors in the capacity for external projection of power.

[13] The concept of “secondary energy fracture” describes a situation in which a state’s vulnerability does not derive from the absence of energy resources, but from the mismatch between their availability, internal production capacity, and the infrastructure for their valorization, on the one hand, and the coherence of public policies and strategic prioritization, on the other.

In Romania’s case, this fracture becomes particularly visible in the electricity sector. If in 1989 the total installed capacity exceeded 22,000 MW, at present the effectively available capacity is significantly reduced, estimates indicating a decrease of at least 6,000–7,000 MW, as a result of the closure of certain energy units and delays in investments in new capacities. Consequently, Romania has become, in certain periods of high consumption, a net importer of electricity.


This evolution contrasts with the existing potential in the natural gas sector, especially through offshore projects in the Black Sea (Neptun Deep), which can consolidate Romania’s position as a regional supplier. However, the lack of correlation between the development of primary resources and the expansion of electricity production capacities generates a structural imbalance in the energy chain.

In analytical terms, this fracture reflects a discontinuity between resources, capacities, and strategic decision-making, constituting a specific form of systemic vulnerability within the model of the fractures of the world order.

[14] According to the Democracy Index 2024, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Romania is classified in the category of “hybrid regimes,” occupying positions around 70th place globally. This classification reflects the existence of a formal democratic institutional framework, but with significant dysfunctions regarding the quality of governance, the functioning of institutions, political culture, and the level of civic participation.

From Self-Defence To Deterrence: The Quiet End Of Japan’s Postwar Experiment – Analysis

April 29, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Manoj Joshi

Even as the world’s attention is on West Asia, significant developments have been unfolding in the East. On April 21, Japan endorsed scrapping a ban on the export of lethal weapons, the last major hurdle in its move away from its post-war pacifist policy. As part of this shift, the country is now seeking to build up its arms industry and deepen cooperation with its defence partners.

For now, exports will be limited to 17 countries, including India, that have signed defence equipment and technology transfer agreements with Japan. Such exports will require approval from the National Security Council and will be monitored by the government to ensure proper end-use. In principle, Japan will not export lethal weapons to countries at war. Even so, Japan’s shift has generated interest in countries such as Poland and the Philippines.

Facing serious security concerns related to China and North Korea, and influenced in part by uncertainties in US alliance commitments under Trump, Japanese strategic thinking had already begun to shift. The war in Ukraine added further urgency. Now, with the United States fully preoccupied in West Asia, the Japanese assessment is that the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific is unlikely to materialise anytime soon.

Despite isolating itself from the global arms market for decades, Japan has developed significant capabilities through its domestic industry and licensed production. At present, the United States dominates the Japanese market, accounting for 95 percent of its defence imports. Yet well-known companies such as Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fujitsu have meaningful defence divisions, and the country maintains an extensive defence-industrial base. It is capable of manufacturing submarines, fighter jets, and warships.


In terms of technology, Japan is second to none. However, it faces gaps in certain areas of military technology, which it is seeking to address through the new Defense Innovation Science and Technology Institute established in 2025 by its Ministry of Defense. Its Taigei-class submarines, equipped with lithium-ion batteries, are considered among the most advanced conventional submarines in the world. The Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP), under development since 2018, was formally deployed for the first time to the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force’s Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture. A more advanced variant is scheduled for the 2030s. In 2025, Japan conducted the first successful test firing of an electromagnetic railgun at a sea-based target and is likely to become the first country in the world to deploy such systems.

Things on the export front are already moving faster. In its biggest deal ever, Japan formalised an agreement to deliver three frigates to Australia, to be built in Japan by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, with Australia constructing the remaining eight domestically. The initial three-ship contract is valued at approximately A$10 billion (US$6.5-7 billion), part of a total programme estimated at A$15-20 billion for all eleven Mogami-class frigates, with the first vessel due for delivery by December 2029.


Japan’s post-2022 security policy moves reflect a strategic pivot: from a strictly defensive “self-defence” policy to a more assertive, deterrence-oriented posture equipped with stand-off strike capabilities, integrated air and missile defence, multi-domain operations, and deeper alliance cooperation. While still framed under the rubric of self-defence, the underlying shift seeks to adapt Japan to a rapidly deteriorating regional security environment and position it as a more resilient actor in Indo-Pacific stability.

Japan’s pacifist restrictions were rooted in Article 9 of its 1947 Constitution, which renounced war and the maintenance of “war potential.” Over time, however, Japan began to loosen its pacifist stance, beginning in 1954 with the establishment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF), on the argument that Article 9 permitted “individual self-defense.”

By 1972, this had evolved into a strict “exclusive defence” policy that banned collective self-defence, limited military spending to below 1 percent of GDP, prohibited the export of lethal arms, and barred the possession of “offensive” weapons such as long-range bombers or aircraft carriers. Arms exports were governed by the “three principles” adopted in 1967, which banned exports to communist countries, countries under UN Security Council embargoes, and those involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976, Japan clarified that, as a peace-loving country, it would refrain from promoting arms exports regardless of destination.

The long road to change began in 1987, when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone effectively removed the 1 percent GDP cap, and in 1992, the SDF was permitted to participate in overseas peacekeeping operations.

The key shift, however, began with the prime ministership of Shinzo Abe (2006-7 and 2012-2020). In 2014, his Cabinet passed a resolution permitting collective self-defence, allowing the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to be used to protect allies such as the United States in a crisis. Thereafter, the government allowed limited arms transfers for humanitarian relief and international cooperation. In 2016, the Philippines leased five used trainer aircraft for maritime patrols over the disputed South China Sea. Later, new air surveillance radars were also sold to Manila.


In 2022, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida approved new security documents — a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a companion Defense Buildup Program (2023–2027). The new National Security Strategy stated that Japan was “facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.” Tokyo stopped short of formally designating Beijing as a “threat,” but described the rise of China as “the greatest strategic challenge that Japan has ever faced.”

In a further policy shift, Japan decided to acquire counter-strike capabilities against adversaries and announced plans to raise defence spending to 2 percent of GDP within five years. In 2023, a new rule was adopted enabling the export of licence-produced weapons manufactured in Japan to the original licence holders.

Policy changes were accompanied by specific capability programmes. The first was the acquisition of US Tomahawk cruise missiles and the decision to upgrade Japan’s own Type 12 missiles, aimed at striking enemy staging areas and missile launch sites. The second was the expansion of its integrated missile defence architecture and sensor networks to counter ballistic and cruise missile attacks. This includes Aegis-equipped ships, land-based interceptors, space-based and persistent ISR capabilities, and investment in early-warning satellites. Third, Japan began investing in unmanned maritime and aerial systems. Fourth, it significantly upgraded its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities to protect critical national infrastructure.

Japan is not pursuing these steps alone. The United States remains Tokyo’s central security partner and is cooperating with Japan on areas such as integrated air and missile defence development, high-power microwave systems, and hypersonic glide-phase interceptors. Beyond the United States, Tokyo is deepening trilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and European states on capability development, intelligence sharing, and joint exercises. In 2022, Japan joined the United Kingdom and Italy in an effort to build a new sixth-generation fighter aircraft by the mid-2030s. Japan is also being considered as a partner in advanced military technology projects with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia under AUKUS, particularly in the area of autonomous maritime systems.

India and Japan share a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” manifested in a range of agreements and institutionalised dialogues. Yet efforts to deepen defence technology cooperation remain below potential — as much a result of Japanese restrictions until recently as of Indian bureaucratic lassitude.

The two countries also have an agreement to jointly develop an advanced underwater surveillance system and other maritime technologies — areas of direct relevance given their shared concerns about Chinese naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. In February, New Delhi hosted the 11th India-Japan Naval Staff Talks. According to one analyst, the talks “demonstrate that the India-Japan relationship has transitioned from a consultative phase to a phase that is deeply integrated and operational.” The naval talks followed the 18th round of the India-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, which focused on security and defence, investment, and innovation.


Japan’s transformation is neither sudden nor complete. It has been a slow, at times reluctant, evolution of its post-war identity — nudged along by an aggressive, nuclear-armed North Korea, an increasingly assertive China, and an unreliable American patron in a neighbourhood that has steadily grown more dangerous. The April 21 decision represents less a rupture than the removal of the last symbolic fig leaf.

For the Indo-Pacific, a rearmed and strategically assertive Japan is a major asset. It strengthens the web of security partnerships that the United States helped build, but may no longer be relied upon to anchor alone. For India, it opens avenues in defence technology and industrial cooperation that go well beyond what the bilateral relationship has so far achieved. Japan spent seven decades seeking to limit its military profile. That post-war experiment, born of genuine guilt and enforced by American design, is now almost certainly over.

About the author: Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

Tuesday, April 28, 2026

SPACE/COSMOS

Russia's answer to Starlink takes off

Russia's answer to Starlink takes off
Bureau 1440's Rassvet constellation marks a genuine technological milestone, but with 16 satellites against SpaceX's 10,000-plus, Russia's digital sovereignty ambitions face a daunting industrial challenge — while the military implications are already being tracked over Ukraine / bne IntelliNews
By Ben Aris in Berlin April 27, 2026

Russia launched its first operational batch of low-Earth orbit internet satellites in March, marking the beginning of what the Kremlin has boasted is the country's path to digital sovereignty — a homegrown alternative to SpaceX's (NASDAQ: SPACEX) Starlink that would free Russia from dependence on Western communications infrastructure.

Whether it can ever deliver on that ambition is a different question.

On March 23, 2026, a Soyuz-2.1b rocket lifted off from the military Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia and placed 16 satellites of the Rassvet constellation — the name means "dawn" in Russian — into low Earth orbit.

The satellites, built by the private aerospace company Bureau 1440 and developed under the Rassvet-3 programme, successfully separated from the launch vehicle and were transferred to the company's flight control centre, where they are undergoing system checks before moving into their target operational orbits.

"Launch of the first spacecraft of the target constellation marks the transition from experiments to building a communications service," Bureau 1440 said in a statement. "Dozens more launches and hundreds of satellites will be required to achieve global coverage."

The launch was originally scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2025 but was delayed by approximately three months due to satellite production difficulties. Russia has some world class technology in things like aviation and missiles, but it has a long standing problem with civil technology. While its great at software too (Tetris was a Russian invention) it struggle especially in telecoms and semiconductor tech.

The technology

The Rassvet-3 satellites, each weighing approximately 370 kilograms, are equipped with a communications system based on the 5G NTN (non-terrestrial network) standard, an upgraded power supply system, next-generation inter-satellite laser communication terminals and plasma engines. The constellation is designed to operate at an altitude of around 800 kilometres — higher than typical Starlink satellites but below the orbital range of OneWeb.

The laser inter-satellite links are among the most technically significant features. Bureau 1440 previously conducted 14 laser communication experiments over distances of 30 to 220 kilometres during prototype testing, transmitting a total of 1.5 terabytes of data, with 450 gigabytes transferred in a single session without loss.

The design specification targets 1 Gbps speeds and low latency — performance that would, if achieved at scale, represent a genuine competitive capability.

"On July 1, 2023, we conducted our first communication session with the first three satellites developed by Bureau 1440 for the Rassvet-1 mission and saw our 'space internet,'" Bureau 1440 said. "The data transfer rate to the device at that time was 10 Mbps, and the latency was 41 ms." The gap between that 2023 test figure and the 1 Gbps target illustrates the distance still to be travelled.

The scale problem

The scale of what Russia is attempting — and how far it has to go — is illustrated with brutal clarity by a single comparison. SpaceX's Starlink network has deployed more than 10,000 satellites in low Earth orbit since its first operational launches in 2019. Russia is starting with 16.

Roscosmos chief Dmitry Bakanov has previously stated that more than 900 low-orbit satellites are scheduled to go into space by 2035. Commercial operations involving over 250 satellites are expected to begin sometime in 2027.

That timetable requires approximately 15 additional Soyuz launches in the near term, each carrying 16 satellites — a demanding manifest for a launch infrastructure that is simultaneously supporting military operations and commercial commitments.

The Russian government has earmarked RUB102.8bn ($1.36bn) for the development of Rassvet as part of the national Data Economy Initiative. Bureau 1440 plans to invest an additional RUB329bn, equivalent to around $4.36bn, of its own funds through 2030.

Total committed investment of approximately $5.7bn compares with SpaceX's cumulative investment in Starlink, which analysts estimate at over $10bn and rising.

Space analyst Vitaly Egorov noted that while the project was initially conceived for civilian use — providing connectivity for airlines and rail networks — its strategic value has shifted significantly. Replacing Starlink for military purposes, he said, would require significantly more launches as well as the development and mass production of affordable ground terminals.

"The economic challenge posed by a state constellation of 900 satellites — if indeed it reaches that number — that has only begun launching in 2026, is likely out of the question" as genuine competition for Starlink, according to one industry analysis.

The military dimension

The launch has attracted close scrutiny from Ukrainian military analysts — and not because of its civilian internet ambitions. Analysis published by Militarnyi tracked three fully operational prototype satellites and observed them passing directly over Ukrainian territory two to three times per day, with each pass creating a communication window lasting approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Even with just 16 operational satellites, analysts estimated the constellation could provide communication windows totalling several hours per day.

"This underscores the need for immediate countermeasures without waiting for full deployment, as initial use cases may begin well before the system is fully operational," the analysis concluded.

The system operates in the Ka and Ku frequency bands, which are more resistant to electronic warfare interference and more difficult to detect with standard electronic intelligence systems. Experts noted that elements of the system's design may draw on technologies associated with OneWeb satellites that remained in Russia following the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

The military relevance is not hypothetical. Russian forces previously relied heavily on Starlink terminals — obtained through third-party supply chains — for battlefield communications and drone operations. Following technical restrictions implemented by SpaceX in coordination with Ukraine, which disabled a significant portion of those terminals by limiting access to registered users, the pressure on Moscow to develop a domestic alternative became acute. Ukraine's Defence Ministry adviser Serhiy Beskrestnov described the original Starlink restrictions as creating a "catastrophe" for Russian forces.

The context: digital sovereignty under pressure

The Rassvet launch is unfolding against a backdrop of deepening tensions around Russia's domestic internet infrastructure. Throughout March, mobile internet went completely dark every day in parts of central Moscow, St Petersburg and other major cities as the Kremlin pursued an intensifying crackdown on VPNs, Telegram and other communication tools ahead of September's parliamentary elections.

The internet outages have contributed to a significant fall in Putin's approval ratings, with VTsIOM data showing a seven-week consecutive decline to 65.6% — the lowest level since the invasion of Ukraine.

The irony of launching a digital sovereignty satellite constellation while simultaneously throttling domestic internet access has not been lost on Russian commentators. Roscosmos chief Bakanov stated that Rassvet was intended to equip Russia — and eventually its allies — with alternatives to Western satellite networks.

The military and geopolitical logic is clear. Whether the industrial capacity exists to execute it at the required scale, against a competitor that launched its 10,000th satellite while Russia was still preparing its first 16, is the question the coming years will answer.

Better volcano eruption predictions on Earth--and Venus--thanks to Mauna Loa study




University of Pittsburgh
Lava flow front 

image: 

(a) NERZ channelized lava flow front evolution obtained through Planet SuperDoves (PS), Landsat 8 (LS), and Sentinel 2 (S2) scenes (Table 1). The base map is a pre-eruption greyscale hillshade image from 3DEP (Table 1). (b) NERZ channelized lava flow front distance from the vent and calculated flow front areal coverage rate in km2/day.

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Credit: Courtesy of Ian Flynn/University of Pittsburgh





When Mauna Loa erupted in 2022, the largest lava flow headed on a path headed directly toward Daniel K. Inouye State Highway 200, also known as Saddle Road, a critical route that carries many residents from their homes on one side to their jobs on the other.

No one could accurately predict whether the lava would continue to flow and eventually block the highway, or stop short, sparing the road.

However, when the volcano next erupts scientists will be better able to monitor the eruption in real-time and make more accurate predictions about where the lava will flow and when the volcano might erupt. These advances are­ thanks to the availability of satellite data from public and private sources as well as machine learning algorithms developed at Pitt with help from a colleague in Italy, as highlighted in a recent publication in the Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research

During the 13-day Mauna Loa eruption, Ian Flynn, research assistant professor in the Department of Geology and Environmental Science in Pitt’s Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences, wasworking in the lab of Professor Michael Ramsey. 

At the time, more data from privately launched satellites was becoming available to researchers. Ramsey wondered if those new sources could be combined with traditional government satellites to make better predictions. “He asked if I could map the lava flow in real time and actually see the flow-front advancing toward the only road that cuts across the island,” Flynn said.

He could. He was able to watch as the lava made its way toward the Saddle Road. “The concern was that lava was making a beeline toward the road,” Flynn said. “It stopped about 1.5 miles from the road.”

The best way to keep people safe in the event of an eruption, however, is to know as soon as possible before lava begins running down hillsides.

Every volcano has its own personality

Researchers already knew that increased heat and seismic activity are indicators of an upcoming eruption, but how hot? How much activity? How early?  These questions are difficult to answer in general. 

Working with a colleague, Dr. Claudia Corradino, from the Italian National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) the team was able to use a machine learning algorithm to identify a thermal increase one month before the start of the eruption. While this signal that an eruption was coming was identified after the eruption ended, any new insights into how a volcano behaves prior to erupting adds to scientists’ ability to predict when they’ll occur for the next eruption. 

“Every volcano has its own personality,” Flynn said. “Yes, it’s cheesy, but it’s the truth. They’re all different.” His research has been focused on Mauna Loa for years, trying to decode how those changes relate to its eruptions.

Combining public and private data did just that. But Flynn thought there might be more useful information to extract. Particularly, the thickness of the lava flow. He reached out to Dr. Shashank Bhushan, a colleague working at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center.

Bhushan had done similar work with glaciers. “I reached out and asked, ‘can we use this methodology that you apply to glaciers and adapt it lava flows?’ He said, ‘I don’t know. Let’s try.’” It did work, and it gave Flynn and collaborators another tool to understand the eruption.

“Getting visible data helped us understand where it’s going,” Flynn said, but that data is two dimensional. “Now we can also generate flow thickness and understand how much material is coming out.” That information is key to understanding if an eruption has just begun or if it’s waning. It can also be analyzed in terms of the thermal trends to understand how the lava is cooling over time.

“One, if it’s still hot, it’s still a hazard. You don’t want someone walking along something that’s still degassing dangerous chemicals,” he said.  And knowing when the lava cooled can help researchers more accurately analyze the lava’s composition.

And then there’s Venus

When we search for active lava flows on other planets, knowing how long it takes for lava to cool on Earth will help us to better understand what’s happening if we see a hot flow on Venus,” he said. Depending on the environmental conditions, rates of cooling should be different. “Knowing how lava cools enables scientists to better constrain our models when we find active volcanoes on other planets.”

As more data becomes available, not only do Flynn and his colleagues continue to learn more about the Mauna Loa eruption, they learn more about the kinds of information they’ll need to know about other volcanoes. There won’t likely be a one-size-fits-all solution to predicting eruptions for all volcanoes, but there may be a way to find a unique solution for predicting eruptions at individual sites.

Mauna Loa may be the most active volcano in the world, but others can be just as—if not more—threatening to people living nearby. Each has its own personality, and each may need its own, tailor-made monitoring system.

Why stars spin down, or up, before they die



Magnetic fields in the convection zone drives the rotation evolution of massive stars



Kyoto University

Why stars spin down, or up, before they die 

image: 

Illustration of the inner regions of a massive star during its final oxygen (green) and silicon (teal) shell burning phase, before the collapse of the iron core (indigo). The strength and geometry of the magnetic field, combined with the properties of convection in the oxygen region can cause the rotation rate to speed up or slow down.

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Credit: KyotoU / Lucy McNeill




Kyoto, Japan -- From birth to death, stars generally slow by 100 to 1000 times their initial rotation rates; in other words, they spin down. The Sun's total angular momentum has declined as material is gradually blown off at the surface as solar wind. By observing this, astronomers have theorized the interaction between magnetic fields and plasma flow to be the most efficient way to spin down stars.

Why and how this happens has long interested astronomers, and recently an observational technique called astroseismology, which measures a star's natural oscillation frequencies, has made it possible to measure the internal rotation rates and magnetic fields of other stars in our galaxy. From this huge population, a picture of how stellar rotation decreases with stellar age has emerged, one that suggests that current theory is insufficient to explain the dramatic decrease in rotation.

Fascinated by astroseismology and by other researchers' 3D simulations of the solar convective zone, a team of researchers at Kyoto University was inspired to investigate how magnetic fields affect rotation inside massive stars..

"Our coauthors in Australia and the UK have already performed 3D magnetohydrodynamic simulations for massive stars before core-collapse. We suspected that the flow inside the massive star’s convective zone may evolve analogously with the solar convective zone," says team leader Ryota Shimada.

With a 3D simulation of a massive star, the researchers were able to directly investigate the complex interplay between violent convection, rotation, and magnetic fields. They confirmed that the internal rotation and magnetic field coevolve akin to the solar dynamo: the energy process that sustains our Sun's magnetic field. With these equations in hand, the team was able to mathematically predict the evolution of the star's internal rotation in time.

Their simulation reveals that the speed and direction of convective motions were influenced by rotation and magnetic fields over short timescales, which in turn changes the rotation, causing it to spin down or -- in some cases -- up. The team was able to formulate the interaction between convection, rotation, and magnetic fields as a model for radial transport of angular momentum outwards and inwards, showing that this transport in later burning phases is directly related to the geometry of the magnetic field.

"We were surprised to discover that some configurations of the magnetic fields actually spin the core up, suggesting that the final spin rate will be unique to the star's properties," says co-author Lucy McNeill. "Slow rotation might even be forbidden in some classes of massive stars."

Their discovery of magnetic angular momentum transport during advanced burning phases suggests that the theory developed to describe rotation in solar-type stars may be universal. Next, the team plans to create stellar evolution simulations depicting the whole lifetimes of various low to high mass stars to predict their rotation rates during various evolutionary stages.

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The paper "Angular momentum transport in the convection zone of a 3D MHD simulation of a rapidly rotating core-collapse progenitor" appeared on 27 April 2026 in The Astrophysical Journal, with doi: 10.3847/1538-4357/ae53da

About Kyoto University

Kyoto University is one of Japan and Asia's premier research institutions, founded in 1897 and responsible for producing numerous Nobel laureates and winners of other prestigious international prizes. A broad curriculum across the arts and sciences at undergraduate and graduate levels complements several research centers, facilities, and offices around Japan and the world. For more information, please see: http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en