Saturday, March 29, 2025

 

Marx was wrong about the declining rate of profit. Isn’t it time we put this false idea to rest?



Published 

Marx crisis

A recurrent theme in Marxian economics since the early 20th century has been “surplus capital”. It has become a shibboleth, a sticky notion more taken for granted than analysed. My recent contribution to LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal sought to dispel it and offer readers some help in navigating their way through often incoherent debates on the economics of “imperialism”. 1

A related shibboleth, so I shall argue, is the declining rate of profit. The shibboleth goes something like this: on the one hand, profits accumulate massively; on the other, declining rates of profit mean that investment opportunities fall. Pent up “surplus capital”, much like hot air in a whoopee-cushion, must find release. It blurts out offshore and into various forms of unproductive rent-seeking.

In the hope of clarifying some questions raised in today’s debates about capitalism and imperialism, the variant of the decline in the rate of profit upon which I shall focus is Karl Marx’s seminal theory. In short, this theory holds that the competitive imperative to accumulate capital causes the consequent decline in the return to it, namely its rate of profit. The work of the late Ernest Mandel exemplifies this line of thought, but it also appears in the work of David Harvey.2 The latter summarised it in the Socialist Register (2004, p. 63) in a contribution on the “new” imperialism:

The way I sought to look at this problem in the 1970s was to examine the role of “spatio-temporal fixes” to the inner contradictions of capital accumulation. This argument makes sense only in relation to a pervasive tendency of capitalism, understood theoretically by way of Marx’s theory of the falling rate of profit, to produce crises of overaccumulation. Such crises are registered as surpluses of capital and of labour power side by side without there apparently being any means to bring them profitably together…[W]ays must be found to absorb these surpluses.

Marx’s profit theory was deterministic, in the sense that capital ultimately has no choice other than to accumulate an ever-increasing mass of profits (or surplus value) in an ever-increasing stock of capital assets: machinery, plant, equipment, buildings, computing paraphernalia, inventories and so on. Each year’s investment spending by firms on assets such as these, which re-enter the production process each subsequent year until they retire, is the engine of accumulation. Even if they export capital offshore and indulge in evermore fantastic rent-seeking schemes, firms still must relentlessly accumulate at home to protect the value of the previously accumulated stock (Marx 1894 [1981], pp. 351-2, see also p. 361):

It should never be forgotten that the production of this surplus-value — and the transformation of a portion of it back into capital, or accumulation, forms an integral part of surplus-value production — is the immediate purpose and the determining motive of capitalist production... This is the law governing capitalist production, arising from the constant revolutions in methods of production themselves … and from the general competitive struggle and the need to improve production and extend its scale, merely as a means of self-preservation, and on pain of going under.3

Monopolistic tendencies might dampen competition, but the requirement to keep up with technological progress and reap the benefits of scale economies remains. Indeed, technically speaking, monopolies arise from accumulation. The productivity derived from capital-intensity and scale reduces unit costs and prices and thereby undercut actual or potential rivals. Margaret Thatcher’s TINA phrase comes to mind: there is no alternative but to accumulate, even for monopolies.4 Marx insisted that individual capitalists were subject to “external and coercive laws” that forced them to keep extending “capital, so as to preserve it…by means of progressive accumulation” (1867 [1976], p. 739; emphasis added). However, over the long run, the coercive laws were bound to deliver diminishing returns. Ups and downs notwithstanding, the rate of profit should decline as the rate of accumulation increases or, in Marx’s terminology, accelerates. Counteracting tendencies, such as capital devaluation and a decrease in the share of newly produced value received by workers, moderate the decline but do not negate its inexorable trajectory.

The theory is plausible, not to say compellingly reassuring for socialists. The rate of profit is the vital sign of capitalism’s health. Its decline is inescapable because capital must accumulate. Capitalism, therefore, fetters its own development and causes its own eventual demise. Alas, for all that, the theory that accelerated accumulation of capital must eventually cause the profit rate to decline is simply wrong. Careful attention to Marx’s exposition of the theory in Capital, the Grundrisse and elsewhere demonstrates that the theory is not coherent in its own terms. Indeed, to emphasise this point, this contribution argues its case in Marx’s terms and against his own criteria of judgement.

In case of possible misinterpretation, however, it is well to be clear at the outset that this is not an empirical exercise. Rates of profit do fall and rise, as illustrated in Appendix Chart A1. Nor will the exercise involve peering into the abyss concerning the very nature and measurability of profits and capital.5 In addition, in case there is any doubt, I am not questioning the idea that capitalism will be its own gravedigger; that is, if it has not dug humanity’s grave first. The point of the present article is simply to demonstrate the logical impossibility of Marx’s declining-profit-rate formulation. A by-product of the demonstration is to invalidate the underconsumption variant of the theory as well. 

The pathway to these conclusions runs through the groundbreaking work of the Polish economist Michał Kalecki (1899-1970). Kalecki’s rigorous causal reasoning about how the capitalist economy functions helps us to understand why. In particular, Kalecki focuses our attention on effective demand or aggregate spending. Especially important is the role of capital investment spending in the determination of profits.6 First, however, it is necessary to understand Marx. Then we can turn our attention to Kalecki’s insights.

Marx’s theory

Theorists have long looked here and there in Capital for nuance. Nuance they have found. Marx recognised that crises might involve disproportions between sectors and industries and the inability to realise produced profits. Spending might fall short in time or place. Marx also recognised that squeezes on profits might occur because labour shortages had enabled workers to obtain higher wages.7 Marx was a voracious fact hound. He could not but sniff out such nuances.

Nuance conceded, a fair reading of Marx’s work must still force one to acknowledge that “The Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit” (Capital, vol. 3, chapter 13) was dominant. He described it in the Grundrisse notebooks of 1858-9 as “in every respect the most important law of modern political economy” (1858-59 [1973], pp. 748-9). Marx’s notebooks of 1861-3, which we know now as the Theories of Surplus-Value, rehearsed formulations of the law. He formalised these in the 1864-5 drafts of the third volume, which Engels edited and published in 1894, and in the first volume, of 1867. I make these points to emphasise that there is no evidence that he ever either questioned the theory or its role in the ultimate demise of capitalism.

Rather, in a letter to Engels in 1868, he stressed that “The tendency of the rate of profit to fall as society progresses…follows from what has been said in Book I [Capital, Volume 1] on the changes in the composition of capital following the development of the social productive tendencies. This is one of the greatest triumphs over the pons asinorum of all previous economics.”8 Reflecting on the failures of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, in particular, Marx (1894 [1981], p. 319) noted that “not one of the previous writers on economics succeeded in discovering [the law/tendency]…These economists perceived the phenomenon, but tortured themselves with their contradictory attempts to explain it.” Specifically, Marx thought that Smith and Ricardo were right that the rate of profit would decline over time but were wrong about causes. Their error was to seek causes in nature rather than in social productive tendencies.

To Marx’s mind, the same cause — namely the competitive pressure to increase the social productivity of labour by accumulating capital-intensive labour-saving technology — would at once increase the social mass of value and profit and, inexorably, reduce its average rate. The mass of profit, surplus value or surplus labour, is the difference between the total value of labour expended in production and the necessary labour required to produce sustenance for workers and their families, sometimes called the wage-goods bundle. The rate of profit, on the other hand, is the ratio of surplus labour (mass of profit or surplus value) to the value of the mass of accumulated labour tied up in the means of production (the capital stock).

To permit greater logical accountability, we should represent all this symbolically with clear definitions. Let P be the annual flow of social or total surplus value or profit (surplus labour or the labour time not paid in wages) and W the annual flow of value obtained by workers (social necessary labour, the time paid for in wages and consumed to sustain working families). The total annual value added Y is the sum of W and P (necessary plus surplus labour). The average social rate of profit, on the other hand, is the ratio of the annual flow of surplus value or profits P divided by the accumulated value of labour tied up in the stock of capital C advanced for production. This stock principally comprises fixed capital, with inventories of raw materials and cash working capital representing a diminishing proportion.9 Marx’s simplified industry structure10 comprises Department I, which produces capital or investment goods I, and Department II, which produces consumption goods for workers WC and capitalists CC.

From this, two straightforward equations arise within Marx’s framework. These are all we need. The first represents the rate of profit:

equation 1

The second represents the annual value added in production Y:

Now, if workers spend all of their wages on the wage goods bundle, as Marx assumed that they should11, then it must be the case that the remaining spending (investment spending I, or the output of capital-goods industries, plus capitalists’ consumption CC) is equivalent to P. In other words, W and WC cancel, so that:

The gross capital stock C will grow each year by the value of investment or capital-goods spending I, and thus, in the first instance, we can elaborate the gross rate of profit as:

To account for the fact that a portion of the capital stock retires each year, we can indicate the proportion that remains as r. Similarly, indicates the increase to the numerator caused by capitalists’ consumption. Hence, we can elaborate the profit-rate expression more precisely as:

Marx’s argument was that the profit rate should fall despite the effects of two significant countervailing or counteracting tendencies. The first counter-tendency was an increase in the rate of exploitation, in effect the ratio of social surplus value or profits P to wages W.

The second was the constant devaluation of the stock of fixed capital C. The value of current plant and equipment declined because increasing productivity in Department I made it cheaper to replace or reproduce in terms of money and labour time.12 Marx was distinctly modern in rejecting historical-cost accounting (that is, using the unadjusted price paid for capital goods at the time of their purchasing). In addition, enhanced productivity and crises should cause faster retirement and even destruction (“forcible devaluation”13) of some existing capital, thereby facilitating periodic jumps in the profit rate.

Marx’s claim reduces to a very simple proposition. It is that the rate of growth of the denominator c.C of the elaborated equation must, over time, exceed the rate of growth of the numerator P = c.I, ups and downs and counter-tendencies notwithstanding.

Kaleckian reformulation

As Kalecki asked of the numerator (P = I + CC = c.I): “Does it mean that profits in a given period determine capitalists’ consumption and investment, or the reverse of this?” Kalecki’s answer to his own rhetorical question brooks no causal ambiguity. The determination “depends on which of these items is directly subject to the decisions of capitalists. Now, it is clear that capitalists may decide to consume and to invest … but they cannot decide to earn more. It is, therefore, their investment and consumption decisions which determine profits, and not vice versa.” (1971, pp. 78-9)14 That is, the causality runs from spending by capitalists on Department I’s output plus their own consumption of part of Department II’s output to their profits P. In a nutshell, capitalists get what they spend.15 

As the following will reinforce, the critical variables are investment I and the capital stock C, and C is principally investment spending accumulated. The rate at which the capital stock has grown to the end of period t is the rate of accumulation a′

If it is reasonable to think that both capitalists’ consumption and retirement move in reasonably constant proportion to I and C, respectively, then (with numbers added for illustration16):

It follows that, given some starting rate p′,17 the trend in the rate of profit p″ is fundamentally a function of the rate of change of investment i″ = δI/I (the numerator) and the rate of capital accumulation a′ = δC/C (the denominator). The denominator is clearly consequent upon (that is, a catch-up function of) the rate of change of investment i″.

Therefore, it is possible to simplify the terms in which we consider the direction of the profit rate and, ergo, the logical burden Marx’s theory must bear, according to:

Plainly, this is just to say that the profit rate will rise if the rate of change of investment i″ is greater than the rate of accumulation a′, and vice versa. Another way of saying this is that investment is growing proportionately by more than is the stock of capital. In the limiting case, in which capitalists do not consume and none of the capital stock retires, the rate of profit and the rate of accumulation will be equivalent.

Marx’s errors

The logical burden of the above expression shows why Marx’s theory breaks down irretrievably. Keep in mind that the burden arises from Kalecki’s insight — which, in turn, his reading of Marx and Rosa Luxemburg had influenced18 — that profits are just what capitalists themselves spend. Once we understand the imperious necessity that the denominator of the rate of profit must be understood to be a function of its numerator, and that the numerator is a function solely of capitalists’ spending decisions, then two determinations must also follow as a matter of logical (indeed arithmetic) necessity. A third is that theories of a declining profit rate due to working-class underconsumption fail because workers’ consumption does not figure in the calculation at all.

The first determination is that both major counter-tendencies that Marx proposed will not materialise. Capitalists might squeeze necessary labour and wages to the point of working class “immiseration” — to the point that workers “were able to live on air”19 — but it would not increase the rate of profit one iota, as odd as that may seem. To be sure, squeezing wages will reduce aggregate value added because wage-goods spending will fall. Hence, the size of Department II will shrink. For the same reason that underconsumption theories fail, it is apparent that a wage-squeeze or a profits-squeeze will not directly affect profits or the accumulated capital stock (the two constituents of the profit rate). Falling or rising wages will, other effects remaining equal, change the wage and profit shares of national income, but they will not directly affect the profit rate.

Moreover, because the two constituents of the profit rate are manifestations of the value of the material output of Department I, both the numerator and the denominator of the profit rate will devalue at the same rate; that is, in line with Department I’s increased productivity in a given year. Why? Just as Marx valued labour power over time in accordance with productivity changes in Department II,20 we should value profits according to productivity changes in Department I. Just as we devalue the capital stock denominator in this way at year end, including that part added by investment over the year, we must devalue that same part in the numerator. It is about revaluing what capitalists have already spent over the year according to what that spending is worth in dollars current at the end of the year. If our yardstick is spending to maintain production capacity then, in Kaleckian terms, the relative value of this year’s required investment spending, and the profits consequent upon it, should be reckoned to have fallen with the cheapening of constant capital.

Again, as odd as it may seem, if capitalists’ consumption maintains its proportionality with investment spending, the profit rate will be unaffected by devaluation.21 Accounting for the role of devaluation q, which affects numerator and denominator separately but not the rate of profit per se, we now have (with numbers illustrating a 2.5% productivity gain):

The second necessary consequence of Kalecki’s insight is far more devastating for Marx’s theory. In chapter 15 of Capital Volume III, Marx offered a nuanced account of the law, including its own internal contradictions. Nonetheless, he underscored its theoretical importance by reprising formulations made famous in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) concerning the fettering of capital by immanent barriers of its own making. He also articulated why Smith and Ricardo had strained their minds to find a natural not economic explanation of their own conclusions that the profit rate should decline over time. It is worth reading a long selection to establish how the various parts fit and, therefore, how we should judge the law (1894 [1981], p. 349-51):

A fall in the profit rate, and accelerated accumulation, are simply different expressions of the same process, in so far as both express the development of productivity. Accumulation in turn accelerates the fall in the profit rate, insofar as it involves the concentration of workers on a large scale and hence a higher composition of capital… Thus economists like Ricardo, who take the capitalist mode of production as an absolute, feel here that this mode of production creates a barrier for itself and seek the source of this barrier not in production but rather in nature (in the theory of rent). The important thing in their horror at the falling rate of profit is the feeling that the capitalist mode of production comes up against a barrier to the development of the productive forces which has nothing to do with the production of wealth as such; but this characteristic barrier in fact testifies to the restrictiveness and the solely historical and transitory character of the capitalist mode of production; it bears witness that this is not an absolute mode of production for the production of wealth but actually comes into conflict at a certain stage with the latter’s further development… It should never be forgotten that the production of this surplus-value — and the transformation of a portion of it back into capital, or accumulation, forms an integral part of surplus-value production — is the immediate purpose and the determining motive of capitalist production.22

The first point to note is that, implicit here is the antediluvian — that is Ricardian and pre-Kaleckian, pre-Keynesian — idea that causality runs from profit to capital-spending and accumulation (“transformation of a portion of it back into capital”). The idea is also implicit in the circuits-of-capital schema of capital’s self-expansion (M—C—M’ = [M+m]) that Marx introduced in the first volume of Capital. While the realisation of profit and its conversion back into capital via investment seems a plausible explanation at the level of the individual capitalist firm, the explanation does not hold at an economy-wide or macroeconomic level. The level of spending or effective demand causes production to be what is and not vice versa. It is true that Marx was aware of effective demand. He rejected “Say’s Law”23, which, in effect, maintained that production naturally engendered its own purchases. Say claimed that this precluded generalised overproduction. Marx explained, immediately after the passage quoted above, that a “second act”, of realisation of surplus value through sales, must complete the process started in the “first act”, of production. The two acts were not harmonious but were separate in theory and in time and space (1894 [1981], pp. 351-2). However, he did think that aggregate profits preceded aggregate investment causally.

Nevertheless, the true lesson of the revolution in economic thought in the 1930s was not about “overproduction” or even over-capacity. It was that production adjusts — via price changes, inventory management, market-testing and on-demand production etc — to the prior cause of effective demand or spending (and, therefore, to its prior causes). When effective demand drops, production follows, and recessions and depressions ensue. It is of utmost importance that we do not answer tangential questions in this respect. Of course, production seems primary, in the sense that it accounts for employment and the distribution of labour across the economy. Of course, realisation can seem to be primary, in the sense that unrealised profits are not really profits at all. Yet both are subordinate to effective demand, as far as we are answering the macroeconomic question. Crudely, what changes in response to what?

Detaching profits from their causal dependence on investment spending obfuscates the arithmetical imperative contained in the earlier expression for the trend in the profit rate, namely:

To illuminate the point, consider the following three stylised figures that try to capture the kinds of ebbs and flows of investment, accumulation and profits observable in real economies (see Appendix). The figures apply the key equations and illustrative numbers above. They demonstrate that sufficiently strong investment spending (and capitalists’ consumption) lifts the mass of profits and can lift the rate of profit. If investment spending is such that its rate of growth exceeds the rate of accumulation, an increase in the rate of profit must occur by necessity. These conclusions encapsulate the second necessary consequence of Kalecki’s insight.24 

Figure 1 represents the “zero case”. Capitalists “live on air”, the capital stock lives on indefatigably and productivity growth is absent. It is useful insofar as it illustrates two important things. The first is that the rate of accumulation and the rate of profit are identical in this scenario. Both are direct and uncomplicated functions of the rate of change in investment. To be precise, all are direct, uncomplicated functions of the raw numbers for investment spending in the simple table that sits behind the figure. Investment spending is causal. The second is that the figure illustrates without clutter the essential conclusion that the rate of change of investment intersects the rate of accumulation at its lowest and highest points. As it passes through the lowest points on its way up, it drags the rate of accumulation (and the rate of profit here) up with it. As it passes through the highest points on the way down, it drags the rate of accumulation down with it. In short, relatively stronger rates of investment increase the rates of accumulation and profit and vice versa.

Figure 1
Figure 1

Figure 2 is probably closest to Marx’s case, since he does not (in fact, cannot) deal with annual rates of retirement because the regrettable one-year assumption forces the whole stock to retire (depreciate, turn over) in one year. He does consider capitalists’ consumption, however, and its effect here is to separate the rate of profit from the rate of accumulation and shift it upwards by 10% of its rate in Figure 1. The rate of accumulation remains unaffected by productivity-induced devaluation of 2.5% per period, as this affects both its numerator δC = and denominator C in equal proportion; that is, a revaluation of 0.975% per period. Again, the critical conclusion is evident. As it passes through the lowest points of the rate of accumulation on its way up, the rate of change of investment drags the rate of accumulation up with it and vice versa. The rate of profit follows a corresponding path, peaking when the rate of investment intersects the rate of accumulation at its highest and vice versa. Note the obvious relationship between the rates of accumulation and profit: increasing rates of accumulation correspond to increasing rates of profit and decreasing rates of accumulation correspond to decreasing rates of profit.

Figure 2
Figure 2

Figure 3 introduces retirement. This is a necessary corollary of chapter 4 and other additions by Engels to the Volume III that tried to clarify matters, even if not to expunge the single-turnover one-year expository device.25 Because it reduces the value of the capital stock by 7.5% per period, it shifts up the rate of profit such that it sits above the rate of accumulation by about 19% of its rate. This is the number in the earlier numerical illustration. The figure exhibits the same relationships between peaks, troughs, contours and offsetting productivity effects as did Figures 1 and 2. Again, critically for the present task, increasing rates of accumulation correspond to increasing rates of profit and decreasing rates of accumulation correspond to decreasing rates of profit.

Figure 3
Figure 3

Conclusions

This brief assessment, on its own terms, of Marx’s “Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit” has reached unambiguous conclusions. The profit rate will not tend to fall in consequence of what Marx called accelerating accumulation. Rather, periods of investment growth that increase the rate of accumulation cause the rate of profit to increase. Those that dampen the rate of accumulation cause the profit rate to decline. These conclusions are contrary to the essence of Marx’s theory and the fate of capitalism that — despite all manner of qualifications and caveats we might try to make — he evidently extrapolated from it.

What other conclusions might we come to? One, surely, is that our attention should focus on the determinants — the real causes — of capitalist investment spending. It determines the trends in accumulation and is the main contributor to profitability and the rate of profit. The rate of profit, therefore, while remaining an important indicator, must lose much of the singular causal force often attributed to it. The rate of profit is a symptom and, perhaps, a secondary but not first-order cause. It is hardly a revelation then that Kalecki thought that the “theory of investment decisions” constituted “the central problem of the political economy of capitalism” and was “the central pièce de résistance of economics” (1971, pp. 148, 165). Those familiar with Kalecki might find the repetition of this conclusion somewhat tedious. Maybe, but that does not make it any less relevant.

A revised perspective might also help those of us who maintain an understandable attachment to Marx to grapple with genuinely challenging problems. For example, instead of trying to perform feats of imagination with ever-increasing masses of profit, footloose because of a declining profit rate, we should better be served by analysing the what, why and where of corporate investment spending — the “driving force” of economic activity. In grappling with such questions, the role of finance capital and credit come to the fore, because these actually permit capital to spend what it does, and — with a little help (or not) from its friends26 — to determine the level of profits, the profit rate and much more besides.


Appendix

Chart A1

Chart A1
Chart A1

Chart A2

Chart A2
Chart A2

References

Dobb, Maurice 1973, Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Doughney, James 2025, ‘Surplus Profits, Capital Exports and Imperialism: An Interrogation of Commonly Held Beliefs and Assumptions’, LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, 9 February. https://links.org.au/surplus-profits-capital-exports-and-imperialism-interrogation-commonly-held-beliefs-and-assumptions 

____ 2016, ‘Problems in Marx’s Theory of the Declining Profit Rate’, in Courvisanos, Jerry, James Doughney and Alex Millmow eds., Reclaiming Pluralism: Role of History of Economic Thought in Heterodoxy—Essays in Honour of John E. King, London, Routledge.

Eatwell, J., M. Milgate and P. Newman eds. 1987, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London, Macmillan.

EC, IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank 2009, System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA 2008), European Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations and World Bank, New York.

Glyn, Andrew 2006, Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globalization and Welfare, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

____ 1987, ‘Marxian Economics’, in The New Palgrave: Marxian Economics, pp. 274-85, from Eatwell, J., M. Milgate and P. Newman eds. 1987, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London, Macmillan.

Harcourt, Geoffrey C. 1972, Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press.

Harvey, David 2021. ‘Rate and Mass: Perspectives from the Grundrisse’, New Left Review 130, Jul-Aug 2021.

____ 2004, ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession’, Socialist Register 40, pp. 63-87.

International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 2018, Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, London, IFRS Foundation, at https://www.ifrs.org/groups/international-accounting-standards-board/.

Kalecki, Michał 1969 (1954), Theory of Economic Dynamics: An Essay on Cyclical and Long-Run Changes in Capitalist Economy, New York, Augustus M. Kelley.

____ 1971a, Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy: 1933-1970, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press.

____ 1942 (1954), ‘The Determinants of Profits’, in Kalecki 1971a.

____ 1967, ‘The Problem of Effective Demand with Tugan-Baranovski and Rosa Luxemburg’, in Kalecki 1971a.

____ 1971b, ‘Class Struggle and Distribution of National Income’, in Kalecki 1971a.

____ 1968b, ‘The Marxian Equations of Reproduction and Modern Economics’, background paper, International Social Science Council and the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies Symposium, UNESCO, 8-10 May, Social Science Information 6(7), pp. 73-9. Republished in J. Osiatyński ed. 1991, Collected Works of Michał Kalecki: Capitalism: Economic Dynamics, vol. 2, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 459-66.

Keynes, John M. 1936, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London.

King, John E. 2015, Advanced Introduction to Post Keynesian Economics, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.

Kregel, Jan A. 1976, Theory of Capital, London, Macmillan.

Lapavitsas, Costas and the EReNSEP Writing Collective 2023, The State of Capitalism: Economy, Society and Hegemony, London, Verso.

Mandel, Ernest 1975, Late Capitalism, trans. Joris De Bres, London, New Left Books.

Marx, Karl 1867 (1976), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. B. Fowkes, London, Penguin/New Left Review.

____ 1885 (1978), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 2. F. Engels ed., trans. D. Fernbach, London, Penguin/New Left Review.

____ 1894 (1981), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3. F. Engels ed., trans. B. Fowkes, London, Penguin/New Left Review.

____ 1857-8 (1973), Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. M. Nicolaus, London, Penguin/New Left Review.

____ 1859 (1970), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya, Moscow, Progress Publishers.

____ 1861-3, Theories of Surplus-Value, vols. TSV 1 (1963), TSV 2 (1968), TSV 3 (1971), Moscow, Progress Publishers.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels, 1844–95 (1975), Selected Correspondence, third edition, Marx to Engels, 11 July 1868, Moscow, Progress Publishers.

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  • 1

    Doughney, James (2025), ‘Surplus Profits, Capital Exports and Imperialism: An Interrogation of Commonly Held Beliefs and Assumptions’, LINKS, 9 February. https://links.org.au/surplus-profits-capital-exports-and-imperialism-interrogation-commonly-held-beliefs-and-assumptions Marx used the ‘surplus profits/capital’ terms infrequently and not always with the same meaning or according to subsequent usage. That is a subject for another time.

  • 2

    See Mandel (1975) Late Capitalism and Harvey, inter alia (2021), ‘Rate and Mass: Perspectives from the Grundrisse’, New Left Review 130.

  • 3

    One of the most memorable passages of the first volume of Capital (1867 [1976], p. 742) is: ‘Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! Therefore…reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus-value or surplus product into capital! Accumulation for the sake of accumulation, production for the sake of production...’ See also Capital, volume 3 (1894 [1981], pp. 351-2, p. 361).

  • 4

    Discussing with Nate Silver on a Substack video the economic effects of AI, Paul Krugman noted that “what Google is doing is spending vast sums on what are basically defensive investments. They’re spending to defend…[not to] enable them to establish a profitable monopoly position. They have a profitable monopoly position. What they’re doing is spending a lot of money to make sure that somebody — AI based — doesn’t come along and take it away from them.” (28 February 2025)

  • 5

    Controversies in such questions might have prompted Dante to create for participants their very own 10th Circle of Hell. For those brave enough to peek into this abyss, see especially Geoffrey Harcourt (1972), Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital; see also the shorter Theory of Capital by Jan Kregel (1976) and the OECD’s much longer (2009) Measuring Capital - OECD Manual 2009. For those seeking logical reasons to avert their gaze and scamper quickly away, see Keynes (1936, chapters 2 and 4).

  • 6

    See for example Kalecki (1968), “The Marxian Equations of Reproduction and Modern Economics”, UNESCO, 1968, Social Science Information 6(7), pp. 73-9 Jerzy Osiatyński has republished this short work in the Collected Works of Michał Kalecki: Capitalism: Economic Dynamics, Volume 2 (1991, pp. 459-466, esp. p. 461). For an introduction to Kalecki’s thought, see John King (2015). 

  • 7

    See for example Glyn (1987, pp. 279-83).

  • 8

    Karl Marx and Engels, Friedrich, Selected Correspondence 1844-95, Moscow 1975, p. 194, 11 July 1868; original emphasis. See also Marx, Grundrisse (1858-59 [1973], e.g. pp. 749-50, 763; Maurice Dobb Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory (1977, pp. 157-8).

  • 9

    By writing and inserting the third volume’s chapter 4, Engels, as editor, mercifully clarified flow versus stock and annual versus turnover-period complications in Marx’s exposition. In doing so, he also effectively, if silently, provided readers with the tools needed to nullify annoying problems caused by Marx’s “single-turnover one-year assumption” expository device. This device allowed that the entire stock of each of the components of capital advanced (or accumulated) would turn over or be reproduced/replaced in a single year. See James Doughney (2016), “Problems in Marx’s Theory of the Declining Profit Rate”, which offers a rather more ponderous account than the one given here. An example of the lamentable tangles the one-year assumption is still causing can be found in a recent book by Costas Lapavitsas and the EReNSEP Writing Collective (2023, pp. 53-5). Alas, almost all Marxian arguments for and against the law/tendency have treated the content of chapter 4 and other additions by Engels in Wittgensteinian (Tractatus, 7) fashion: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”. As did Marx, who knew quite well that his formulations of the profit rate required better articulation in annual-flow to stock form (e.g. Capital, vol. 3. 1894 [1981], e.g. pp. 243, 250, 478), exponents of such arguments perhaps thought/think that the single-turnover one-year “abstraction” permits conclusions having general validity. It does not. To be clear, the one-year assumption is: 1) absurdly unrealistic; and 2), like the proverbial raincoat full of holes, useless right when readers need clarity that capital is a stock not a flow. Moreover, 3) turnover periods within a year are obstacles to understanding annual productivity growth, a question of first importance. Therefore, 4) the assumption does not work, even as an expository device. Whether earlier political economists, or even those contemporary with Marx, used similar approaches is irrelevant. In order to make any sense at all of the declining-profit-rate controversy, one must abandon the single-turnover one-year assumption and any attempt to make a case using it. To take licence with both Dante (Inferno, Canto III) and Shakespeare (King Lear, Act III, Scene IV, ll. 17-22): abandon the one-year assumption all ye who enter here; shun it, for that way madness lies.

  • 10

    See especially Marx, Capital, vol. 2 (1885 [1978], p. 471 ff.).

  • 11

    Also, with Marx at this stage of his exposition, we assume no government and overseas sector. For a more realistic account, see the section Identities, causality and definitions in my “Surplus Profits, Capital Exports and Imperialism: An Interrogation of Commonly Held Beliefs and Assumptions”, LINKS, 9 February. https://links.org.au/surplus-profits-capital-exports-and-imperialism-interrogation-commonly-held-beliefs-and-assumptions

  • 12

    Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (1894 [1981], pp. 119, 205-9, 522), Theories of Surplus Value vol. 2 (1861-3 [1968], pp. 416, 473-4). NB. Revaluation is not the same as depreciation, which is the annual allocation or apportionment of the revalued purchase price of capital stock assets over their useful life. The notion of useful life accommodates the folk understanding of depreciation, namely wear and tear and technical obsolescence. Flows of annual depreciation costs reduce gross profits to net profits, while the deduction of their accumulation as stocks of depreciation provisions reduces the gross capital stock to the net stock. Gross and net profit rates correspond to these distinctions. I use the gross concept in this contribution and, therefore, must include retirement.

  • 13

    Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (1894 [1981], p. 363).

  • 14

    Michał Kalecki, ‘The Determinants of Profits’ [(1942) 1954], reproduced in Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy: 1933–1970 (1971a, pp. 78-9).

  • 15

    According to King (2015, p. 11), “this leads [Kalecki] to the famous aphorism (which accurately reflects his views, but which no one has been able to find in his published work) that ‘workers spend what they get; capitalists get what they spend’.” Joan Robinson made the same essential point in New Left Review (May-June 1965, p. 32): “The total net profit of an economy, for, say, a year, (assuming there government budget to be balanced) is equal to the net investment of that year plus the excess of sales of consumption goods over the wage and salary bill.”

  • 16

    Marx furnishes an example in which the capitalist consumes 20% of profits “for his private requirements or pleasures … as man of the world (sic)”, Capital, vol. 2 (1885 [1978], pp. 198-9; see also pp. 586-8). I shall use a different guess of 10% in the illustrations to follow. The average age of the Australian fixed capital stock is about 13 years, an age that has increased only marginally (a growth rate of 0.15% p.a. on average) since 1960. That is, about 7.5% of the stock retires on average each year, a figure I use in the following illustrations.

  • 17

    Wherein the initial p′ itself is just a function of investment I and accumulated investment C, as mediated by the approximate constant representing the combined effects of capitalists’ consumption and capital stock retirement (and, with a caveat that will presently become apparent, devaluation). The δ symbol below simply means change in.

  • 18

    Marx’s “reproduction schemes” in Capital, vol. 2, (1885 [1978], part 3; see also vol. 3, 1894 [1981], chapter 49) are the locus. See Kalecki (1968) and “The Problem of Effective Demand with Tugan-Baranovski and Rosa Luxemburg” (1967) and “Class Struggle and the Distribution of National Income” (1971b) in Selected Essays, (1971a, pp. 146-64). We should note in passing that the reproduction schemes founder inter alia on the stock-flow distinction. The output formula c+v+s makes sense if c stands only for annual fixed capital consumption (depreciation), in which case s is net surplus value and c+s is gross surplus value. If, as Marx does, “we abstract … from the fixed part of constant capital” and treat c as being “the portion of constant capital consumed in production” and, by production, replaced, then his values for v and s will be in error (e.g. vol. 3, 1894 [1981], pp. 976-7). The reason, clearly enough in terms of 20th century national income accounting, is that the value of c must decompose ultimately into contributions to aggregates of v and s. Marx’s criticism of “the absurd dogma that has pervaded all political economy since Adam Smith, to the effect that the value of all commodities can be ultimately broken down into wages, profit and rent” (Capital, vol. 3, 1894 [1981], p. 980) is obviously misplaced.

  • 19

    Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (1894 [1981], p. 355).

  • 20

    For example: “The value of labour-power remains just as independently determined as that of any means of production …  by the amount of labour needed to reproduce it; the fact that this amount of labour is determined by the value of the means of subsistence needed by the worker, and is thus the labour needed for the reproduction of these means of subsistence.” (Marx, Capital, vol. 2, (1885 [1978], p. 458) As for the capital stock, its “value depends not on the labour-time that it cost originally, but on the labour-time with which it can be reproduced, and this is continuously diminishing as the productivity of labour grows” (Theories of Surplus Value vol. 2, 1861-3 [1968], p. 416, see also pp. 473-4). “Fluctuations in the rate of profit that are independent of changes in either the capital’s organic components or its absolute magnitude are possible only if the value of the capital advanced, whatever might be the form — fixed or circulating — in which it exists, rises or falls as a result of an increase or decrease in the labour-time necessary for its reproduction, an increase or decrease that is independent of the capital already in existence. The value of any commodity — and thus also of the commodities which capital consists of — is determined not by the necessary labour-time that it itself contains, but by the socially necessary labour-time required for its reproduction. This reproduction may differ from the conditions of its original production by taking place under easier or more difficult circumstances. If the changed circumstances mean that twice as much time, or alternatively only half as much, is required for the same physical capital to be reproduced, then given an unchanged value of money, this capital, if it was previously worth £100, would now be worth £200, or alternatively £50. If this increase or decrease in value affects all components of the capital equally, the profit is also expressed accordingly in twice or only half the monetary sum.” (Capital, vol. 3, (1894 [1981], p. 237). See also, inter aliaCapital, vol. 3, (1894 [1981], pp. 205-9, 522), Doughney (2016, pp. 127-8).

  • 21

    Of course, crises can see large chunks of the capital stock laid waste by bankruptcy, asset-stripping, takeovers and so on. In this case, as long as capitalists keep spending, the profit rate will jump correspondingly. However, forcible devaluation was not what Marx had principally in mind when articulating this counter-tendency (1894 [1981], pp. 342-3). Rather, it was that the ongoing increases in labour productivity caused by capital accumulation would cheapen the elements of constant capital, the output of Department I. A credible argument concerning revaluation of capitalists’ consumption is that of opportunity cost; that it should be valued and revalued in terms of investment spending forgone. The irony of the extravagant treatment I have given “(de)(re)valuation” here should not be lost on readers. If I have erred, the only consequence should be to add weight to the logical burden Marx’s tendency must bear. That is, it must carry a counter-tendency that increases the profit rate. As I noted earlier, capital-stock measurement and its relationship to profitability are vastly more complex subjects than could be covered here, both conceptually and empirically. See the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB 2018); OECD (2009), Measuring Capital-OECD Manual 2009; SNA 2008, esp. p. 11 on the increased use of IASB standards in national accounting. See also Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (1894 [1981], pp. 357-9, 361, 364-8), Grundrisse (1857-8 [1973], pp. 749-50).

  • 22

     See also Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (1894 [1981], pp. 357-9, 361, 364-8), Grundrisse (1857-8 [1973], pp. 749-50).

  • 23

    Named for French laissez faire economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832). See Marx, Theories of Surplus Value vol. 2 (1861-3 [1968], pp. 423, 493), Grundrisse (1857-8 [1973], p. 411).

  • 24

     See also Josef Steindl (1952, pp. 240-3).

  • 25

    See e.g. Capital, vol. 3 (1894 [1981], pp. 94, 142, 167-8, 334).

  • 26

    My “Surplus Profits, Capital Exports and Imperialism: An Interrogation of Commonly Held Beliefs and Assumptions”, LINKS, 9 February, sets out a framework in which “excess spending” by other sectors — households, general government and the rest of the world — can reinforce investment spending and bolster profits and the rate of profit. https://links.org.au/surplus-profits-capital-exports-and-imperialism-interrogation-commonly-held-beliefs-and-assumptions As its task has been to assess the logic of Marx’s theory in its own terms, this contribution did not consider the obviously crucial roles other sectors play, though capitalists’ consumption has played an analogous role here. Andrew Glyn (2006, pp. 52-4) calls attention to the increasingly “active” role of the household sector, while continuing to emphasise that “Capital accumulation is the fundamental driving force of the economy. Increases in investment are usually the most dynamic element in aggregate demand expansions, particularly on a world scale” (2006, p. 86).

This work is licensed under CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0


Friday, March 28, 2025

 

The High Price of War With Iran: $10 Gas and the Collapse of the US Economy

Reprinted with permission from The Kucinich Report.

Israel is currently in turmoil, marked by widespread protests demanding Netanyahu’s resignation. Critics accuse him of prolonging war for political gain, while his dismissal of top security officials and ongoing attacks on the judiciary have further intensified the unrest.

Meanwhile, Washington DC’s drumbeat for war never stops. It’s always at the expense of a decent and secure standard of living for people in this country and abroad.

The Trump Administration, after the series of heady airstrikes against Yemen, is at this moment being beseeched by Netanyahu and his associates to prepare for a seemingly consequence-free nuclear strike against Iran, completing the trifecta of Netanyahu’s long-standing dream.

I have consistently warned against the consequences of an attack on Iran, delivering 155 speeches to the House, 63 presentations alone in the 109th Congress, between 2005 and 2007, when the Bush Administration deliberated using nuclear “bunker-busters” as a means of bringing Iran to heel.

I understood the politics then and I understand them today. I warned hundreds of times that it was not in America’s interests to go to war against Netanyahu’s hit list: Iraq, Iran, Libya…

IRAQ

In 2002, the Bush Administration caused Americans grieving over 9/11 to believe Iraq had a direct role in the attacks which took over 3,000 lives. Except, Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11.

Bush claimed Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons and other “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMDs) and was an imminent threat to the U.S. Iraq did not have WMD’s. Iraq was not a threat to the U.S. Iraq had no ability to attack America. Didn’t matter.

The war against Iraq began 22 years ago and lasted eight years. One million innocent Iraqi men, women and children perished because of lies. They were killed in relentless bombings and aggressive ground operations.

At least 4,443 U.S. servicemen and women were killed, and an estimated 32,000 wounded during “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” because of lies.

The lies cost U.S. taxpayers at least $3 trillion. Three trillion hard-earned tax dollars of the American people were spent to pay for the destruction of the people of Iraq while Americans struggled to pay bills for housing, health care, and education and the nation went further into debt.

Remember this diabolical playbook: Create a pretext. Lie to the American people about a threat. Hype the threat. Create irrational fear. Tell them military action is needed to eliminate the threat, and their fears. Bombs away.

On September 12, 2002, as a Member of Congress, I grilled then-former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a congressional hearing entitled, “An Israeli Perspective on Conflict with Iraq” (video and transcript link below). Despite evidence to the contrary, he testified that Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, were a direct threat to America due to an alleged pursuit of WMDs including a nuclear weapon. He urged the U.S. to take military action against Iraq.

I inquired of him who else he would have the United States attack.

Iran and Libya,” he said.

I spoke to Mr. Netanyahu outside the hearing room and asked him that if he was so convinced those countries were a threat, why didn’t Israel commence the attacks?

Oh no,” he responded. “We need you to do it.”

On October 10, 2002, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 296-133, authorized the use of military force against Iraq. I led the opposition. The war bill passed the Senate the next day, 77-23, and was signed into law by President Bush on October 16, 2002.

On March 20, 2003, the President describing Iraq as part of an “Axis of Evil,” commenced a “Shock and Awe” onslaught by American warships, aircraft and submarines, launching cruise missiles and “precision guided bombs” roundly murdering people in Baghdad. Iraq was destroyed. Saddam was deposed, captured and hung.

Libya

On March 19, 2011, despite lacking formal congressional authorization, President Barack Obama authorized an attack on Libya to depose Muammar Gaddafi. I led the opposition. Hillary Clinton’s State Department, the EU, NATO, the UK and France to name but a few, lobbied Congress hard to accelerate actions against Libya.

That country’s leaders were dumbfounded as to why, considering that they had done everything America had asked, such as open markets to foreign investment. I held up the bombing for some time by building a bi-partisan coalition of Members of Congress to vote no.

Alas, Obama and the Clinton State Department prevailed. Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner negotiated a redraft of the authorization bill and the Republicans fell in line.

The U.S., with NATO allies, joined forces, wreaking destruction and havoc upon Libya. Gaddafi was deposed, captured and killed, at an estimated cost of over a billion dollars. Obama admitted years later that this was the worst decision of his Presidency.

Iran

On July 25, 2024, Prime Minister Netanyahu, (while under a criminal investigation by the Israeli judiciary), addressed the U.S. Congress concerning Iran, which he characterized as not only a deadly enemy of Israel, but also of the United States.

Iran’s axis of terror confronts America, Israel and our Arab friends,” Netanyahu declared.

The interests of Israel and America were and are inseparable, he proclaimed – to 58 standing ovations. One could take that heroic reception as rubberstamping an authorization for war. As Netanyahu had told me years ago, “…we need you [the U.S.] to do it.”

Today, the Houthis of Yemen continue their attacks on Israeli shipping interests in the Red Sea, in protest to the Netanyahu government’s genocidal attack on Gaza.

President Trump, ever sensitive to and allegiant to Israel, views the Houthis as proxies of Iran. The President directed America’s air forces to rain down fire and brimstone upon Yemen, a nation of teenagers. The median age in Yemen is 18.4 years. The country spends about 1/1000 of the U.S. military budget for its own defense.

Trump threatened the Iranian government: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN (his emphasis). And IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences, and those consequences will be dire.”

The Administration followed up with Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which, according to the U.S. Treasury Department was part of a “campaign of maximum pressure” which “targets Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors and marks the fourth round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales….”

The first Trump Administration withdrew from a Joint Plan of Action agreement (JCPOA) which provided Iran relief from sanctions in exchange for accepting limitations which would preclude nuclear weaponization.

President Trump ordered the assassination by drone strike of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, considered the second most powerful person in Iran, at the Baghdad airport, underscoring his determination to strike at Iran.

Iran has consistently asserted its nuclear research is for peaceful purposes. There has been a long-standing formal prohibition in Islamic law, a fatwa, issued by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, against the development or use of nuclear weapons.

Recently, President Trump said he would love a deal to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon, “I would love to make a deal with them without bombing them.”

At the same time, U.S. B-52 bombers, capable of delivering nuclear bunker-busting bombs, were engaged in joint exercises with the Israeli Air Force, in preparation for a potential strike at Iran’s underground nuclear sites.

These joint maneuvers were reminiscent of the cooperation and interoperability exercises that took place between the UK and French forces in preparation for a real-world offensive against Libya in 2011.

Ayatollah Khamenei replied “…threats will get them (the Americans) nowhere,” and refused talks under such conditions as “deceptive.” Iranian Brigadier General Kiumars Heidari added, for emphasis, “Iran is ready to crush its enemies if it makes mistakes.”

The dialectic of conflict is escalating.

It was not in America’s interest then, nor is it now, to go to war with Iran, a nation of 90 million people, a technologically advanced society, with nearly a million-person army.

President Trump should not be misled. War with Iran would be the end of his presidency. Here is why:

Iran supplies 3% of the world’s oil. If the U.S. goes to war with Iran, crude oil prices per barrel (currently ranging from $68.86 (West Texas Intermediate) – $72.28 (Brent Crude), could rise to $200 per barrel.

The Strait of Hormuz, a major conduit for the transport of oil would be disrupted. Iran has the capability retaliate by targeting Gulf oil infrastructure, including Saudi Arabia. Market panic would ensue.

The price of a gallon of gas, currently averaging $3.13, would double, approach $7 a gallon, and in some cases, reach $10 a gallon, in states with higher fuel taxes. (This is based on historical data which calculates that every $1 increase in crude oil per barrel translates to about a 2 to 3 cent increase per gallon at the pump).

Attempts to manage supply disruptions and market distortions through the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would do little to offset panic buying and stockpiling by consumers. Nor would an increase in U.S. domestic drilling be sufficient to offset lost Middle East oil supplies, due to supply shortage, infrastructure constraints and limitations on refining capacity.

Major disruptions, including high inflation, recession risks, and market instability would hit the US economy. Consumer retail spending would sink while prices rose for food and other goods, as energy costs for manufacturing, agriculture and transportation spiraled out of control.

Slower economic growth would push the U.S. into a recession, with the Fed forced to try to maintain control over inflation by hiking interest rates well beyond the current 4.25% – 4.50 % range.

Auto sales would take a hit. Corporate profits in transportation, airlines, trucking would nosedive. The Dow Jones and S& P 500 would be in shock, with major selloffs. America would arrive at stagflation, high inflation rates and negative growth as it did during the 1973 Oil Embargo.

The multiple economic impacts of the 2008 subprime meltdown and subsequent financial crash which cost the US economy $16 to $20 trillion dollars would become the morbid benchmark for the descent of the American economy.

Now contemplate this concatenation: War with Iran, reciprocal high tariffs, massive cuts in the federal workforce and domestic federal spending and you have an economy in a tailspin, with high inflation, rising unemployment, falling consumer spending, leading to an economic contraction requiring a system of government intervention which is currently being dismantled. Then there is the permanent restructuring of the tax code to accelerate wealth upwards. These conditions create political combustibility.

In the end, Iran will never crush Donald Trump. The U.S. will crush itself trying to wipe out Iran.

The economic effects of war with Iran could spell the end, not only of the viability of the Trump Presidency, but of the Republican House and Senate, a political turnaround the likes of which has not been seen in American politics since the 1932 sweep led by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal.

In 1928 Republican Herbert Hoover took 58.2% of the popular vote and defeated Democrat Al Smith 444-87 in the Electoral College. Amidst a complete rejection of Republican economic policies and the Depression, Roosevelt took 57.4% of the popular vote in 1932 and defeated Hoover in the Electoral College 472-59.

The 270-164 advantage which House Republicans held in 1928 evaporated in 1932 as Democrats crushed Republicans with a 313-117 majority.

There has not been another turnaround like this in American political history and it was driven by the economic forces which overwhelmed a Republican Administration, followed by a program of promised reform which the new Administration delivered.

While the Administration is at the fullness of its expression of unbridled power, it faces a fateful decision regarding Iran which will determine whether the mandate received by Trump in 2024 evaporates as quickly as did Hoover’s in 1932.

Israel itself is in turmoil, with mass protests calling for Netanyahu’s resignation, charges he is prolonging the war for his political benefit, his firing of top security officials and his attacks on the judiciary.

Netanyahu is on shaky ground, pummeled by his fellow countrymen and women who worry, far from ensuring the future of Israel, his deadly policies threaten it.

One could imagine Trump, considering his own and America’s interests, could call Netanyahu and say, “Bibi, we are friends ‘til the end. This is the end.

Links: 2002 Congressional Hearing “Conflict in Iraq: An Israeli Perspective” video and transcript.

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The Signal Scandal, Carelessness, Revelations, and Hypocrisy


In an act of astonishing, and possibly illegal, carelessness, the editor in chief of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, was inexplicably invited to join an open-source encrypted conversation of a principals group of senior national security officials on Signal. The meeting included Vice-President J.D. Vance, defense secretary Pete Hegseth, national security advisor Michael Waltz, secretary of state Marco Rubio, director of national security Tulsi Gabbard, treasury secretary Scott Bessent, CIA director John Ratcliffe, Trump envoy Steve Witkoff, White House chief of staff Susie Wiles, deputy White House chief of staff Stephen Miller and Goldberg. The topic was coordinating the upcoming U.S. attack on the Houthi.

President Trump has defended his team, saying that the information discussed in the Signal chat was not classified. Hegseth has insisted that no war plans were discussed. Neither claim is true. Goldberg says the conversation included “operational details of forthcoming strikes on Yemen, including information about targets, weapons the U.S. would be deploying, and attack sequencing” as well as “information that might be interpreted as related to actual and current intelligence operations.” Goldberg did not report these parts of the conversation because, he says, if read by an American adversary, they “could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel.”

The Atlantic subsequently published Hegseth’s posts, making it clear that he revealed real-time details and sequencing of launch times of F-18’s and drones and when strikes would start at least half an hour before U.S. warplanes launched and two hours before strikes began. He also revealed that there would be “[m]ore strikes ongoing for hours tonight.”

Trump has called Goldberg’s inclusion in the conversation a “glitch” that was “not… serious” and that had “no impact at all.” But though Trump says it was a glitch and that it contained no classified information, and though several officials stated, sometimes under oath in front of committees, that no classified information was shared, does not mean that it contained no information that was embarrassing. It did. And four of those embarrassments have not yet received enough attention.

This “glitch” is not the first of its kind. General David Petraeus admitted to giving his biographer and mistress his “highly classified” “black books.” And secretary of state Hillary Clinton used a private email server while carrying out official business. Hypocritically, in hindsight, Hegseth at the time said she should “be fired on the spot for this type of conduct and criminally prosecuted for being so reckless with this kind of information.” Rubio, who holds her position now, said “nobody is above the law, not even Hillary Clinton” and that she should “be held accountable.”

The current “glitch” includes an embarrassing revelation of the U.S. evaluation of Europe’s military capabilities. Mike Waltz says that “it will have to be the United States that reopens these shipping lanes.” Agreeing with Waltz’ assessment of the inability of Europe’s navies to take care of themselves, Hegseth says, “Mike is correct, we are the only ones on the planet (on our side of the ledger) who can do this. Nobody else even close.” Revealing that the combined force of Europe cannot dislodge the Houthi from shipping lanes is an embarrassing revelation, especially at a time when Europe is offering security to Ukraine.

The leaked conversation is also interesting for its cynical frankness of the way operations have to be framed for consumption by the American public. Pointing out that only “3 percent of US trade runs through the suez,” while “40 percent of European trade does,” Vance says that “[t]here is a real risk that the public doesn’t understand this or why it’s necessary.” With American forces being committed to the operation, the risk of widening the war in the Middle East and the risk of Yemeni civilian deaths and U.S. military deaths, Hegseth agrees that Vance’s “considerations” are “important.” He says he fears that the “messaging is going to be tough no matter what” since “nobody knows who the Houthis are.” He says, perhaps shockingly, that this is “not about the Houthis.” It is about “Restoring Freedom of Navigation” and “Reestablishing deterrence, which Biden cratered.” The messaging, then, “need[s] to stay focused on: 1) Biden failed & 2) Iran funded,” meaning that the Houthi are funded by Iran.

The next two embarrassing revelations are, perhaps, the most important. Both belong to Vance. In almost every public statement by a member of the Trump administration, credit for everything is attributed back to Trump. “Every solution,” Steve Wikoff said in a recent interview, “comes as a result of President Trump. I don’t get paid to say that. I say it because it is the absolute truth.”

But in this, they thought, private conversation, Vance shares his doubts with the team about Trump’s awareness of subtleties and inconsistencies: “I think we’re making a mistake,” Vance says. In the context of a broader policy of insisting Europe pay for its own defense, including, importantly right now, in Ukraine, Vance tells the other members of the team, “I am not sure the president is aware how inconsistent this is with his message on Europe right now.” He also points out that war on the Houthi brings the “further risk that we see a moderate to severe spike in oil prices.” This may be the first public glimpse of concern over whether Trump has a comprehensive grasp of the overall, integrated foreign policy picture.

The public embarrassment that seems to have drawn the most media attention is the revelation of the administration’s disdain for Europe. “[I]f you think we should do it let’s go,” Vance tells Hegseth. “I just hate bailing Europe out again.” Hegseth then writes back, “I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It’s PATHETIC.”

Others in the conversation insist that Europe needs to pay the U.S. back. “Per the president’s request,” Waltz says, “we are working with DOD and State to determine how to compile the cost associated and levy them on the Europeans.” Miller then insists that “we soon make clear to Egypt and Europe what we expect in return. We also need to figure out how to enforce such a requirement. EG, if Europe doesn’t remunerate, then what? If the US successfully restores freedom of navigation at great cost there needs to be some further economic gain extracted in return.”

The mainstream media has covered this leaked loathing of Europe and its free-loading on America. As The New York Times proclaims in its headline, “Now Europe Knows What Trump’s Team Calls It Behind Its Back: ‘Pathetic’.” The article begins, “Trump administration officials haven’t kept their disdain for Europe quiet. But the contempt seems to be even louder behind closed doors.” Axios’ headline declares that “Vance’s anti-Europe obsession runs deep in texting debacle.” For its headline, The Guardian goes with “Stunning Signal leak reveals depths of Trump administration’s loathing of Europe” while CNN’s headline says we “learned” of the “Loathing for Europe.”

Though all of these headlines are true, none of it is new. Though loathing and disregard for Europe may becoming more transactional and consequential under the Republican administration, it was not invented by them. The mainstream media is guilty either of short memories or of hypocrisy when they treat it as a new innovation. They might remember that the Obama-Biden administration had a much more embarrassing and consequential leak that revealed American disdain for Europe when assistant secretary of state Victoria Nuland was heard on an intercepted phone call saying “fuck the EU” while plotting the 2014 coup in Ukraine.

The leaked Signal conversation suggests previously unknown doubts about Trump, cynical frankness about the need to frame events to sell them to the American public and disdain for the EU. It is incompetent and embarrassing. But it is not entirely new.

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.

Adolescence: A Gradual Awakening to the Modern World


Adolescence (2025) is a new British crime drama series written by Jack Thorne and Stephen Graham, and directed by Philip Barantini.

It is a murder story centred on a 13-year-old schoolboy Jamie Miller who is arrested and accused of knifing to death a female classmate the previous night. Jamie protests his innocence to his dad, Eddie Miller, a man who is shocked and bewildered by the sudden events he is swept up in.

Jamie is initially held for questioning at the police station but is then sent to a Secure Training Centre while awaiting trial. Police investigations at Jamie’s school, his friends and family, reveal his bitterness and pent-up anger at bullying focused on him via social media.

The series looks at the case from different perspectives: police investigations, lengthy psychologist interviews, and finally Jamie’s parents’ barely concealed, distraught reaction.

A disturbing aspect of the bullying was the use of the term ‘incel’ [involuntary celibate] for a 13-year-old schoolboy.

Jamie reveals a complex set of emotions during his interviews ranging from denial, to not caring one way or the other, to “furious outbursts, an accidental confession, displays of learned entitlement, and pent-up anger”.

The formal qualities of the series are in the use of documentary techniques and a realist style to the point of giving the impression of a camera switched on all the time recording the actions of those investigating, discussing, interviewing, and commenting on the case. This is achieved through using one continuous take for each episode, a method that gives a dynamic, active feel to a story which is largely static with long scenes of discussion, conversation, and interview.

It is a style that intensifies the realism of each episode. However, a heightened realism also implies a more unquestioning ‘truth’. The truth is taken for granted as truth and becomes familiar and more likely to be accepted.

For example, the series starts with a type of British SWAT team that rams the Miller’s front door open very early in the morning as the family is just getting up for breakfast. Such teams in the USA and the UK are generally used in dealing with hostage situations, armed criminals, and counter-terrorism operations, not in arresting a 13-year-old boy accused of a knifing. This over-the-top police operation is presented as normal and acceptable given the general kid-glove treatment Jamie is given in the police station post-arrest. For the state this is a kind of Trojan Horse that makes such operations more generally accepted and acceptable.

In Episode 3 there is a long dialogue of an interview between Jamie and Briony, a forensic psychologist whose role is “the application of scientific knowledge and methods (in relation to psychology) to assist in answering legal questions that may arise in criminal, civil, contractual, or other judicial proceedings.”

A narcissistic element to Jamie’s personality emerges, which sees him almost enjoying the attention of Briony. However, as Jamie slowly comes to understand that Briony’s role is to elicit information and not be his ‘friend’, he demands Briony to tell him if she likes him or not as he is led out after several outbursts.

Jamie gradually moves away from his entitled, aggressive behaviour as the seriousness and reality of the situation dawns on him. He initially denied he had anything to do with the victim or her murder, even directly to his dad’s face, believing he could simply lie his way out of the situation without much stress to him or his family. However, as evidence builds up there are cracks in the facade and Jamie is finally forced to accept reality and grow up. Jamie’s final dialogue over the phone with his dad is a very different, more mature Jamie, as he announces his plans to accept responsibility and change his plea.

The last scene sees Jamie’s dad in grief as he looks around his child’s bedroom and stares at Jamie’s toys, contemplating the sudden end of a short childhood.

Adolescence is a series that attempts to give some idea of the effect of social media in schools today and show the potential tragic consequences of bullying online. The audience is just as bewildered as Jamie’s dad [except for pupils who understand the hieroglyphics of emoticon symbology immediately] and we are taken for a roller-coaster ride through the modern world of digital natives who seem resigned to their digital fates in the same way that the polytheistic pagans of yore believed themselves the playthings of the callous gods.

Adolescence is creating a media stir as parents are confronted with the possible consequences of their own inertia or lack of questioning, or even power, in the face of these incredibly powerful miniature tools that they themselves have put into their children’s hands. The ensuing discussions should at least bring some sober thinking to the debates on digitisation.

Caoimhghin Ó Croidheáin is an Irish artist, lecturer and writer. His artwork consists of paintings based on contemporary geopolitical themes as well as Irish history and cityscapes of Dublin. His blog of critical writing based on cinema, art and politics along with research on a database of Realist and Social Realist art from around the world can be viewed country by country here. Caoimhghin has just published his new book – Against Romanticism: From Enlightenment to Enfrightenment and the Culture of Slavery, which looks at philosophy, politics and the history of 10 different art forms arguing that Romanticism is dominating modern culture to the detriment of Enlightenment ideals. It is available on Amazon (amazon.co.uk) and the info page is hereRead other articles by Caoimhghin.

 

A Different “Abundance Agenda”

Avoiding Delusions and Diversions

For the next few weeks, the buzzword in US debates on the liberal/left about economics and ecology will be “abundance” after the release of the book with that title by Ezra Klein (New York Times) and Derek Thompson (The Atlantic magazine).

The book poses politically relevant questions: Have policies favored by Democrats and others on the political left impeded innovation with unnecessary red tape for building projects? Can regulatory reform and revitalized public investment bring technological progress that can solve problems in housing, infrastructure, energy, and agriculture? The book says yes to both.

Those debates have short-term political implications but are largely irrelevant to the human future. The challenge is not how to do more but how to live with less.

All societies face multiple cascading ecological crises—emphasis on the plural. There are many crises, not just climate change, and no matter what a particular society’s contribution to the crises there is nowhere to hide. The cascading changes will come in ways we can prepare for but can’t predict, and it’s likely the consequences will be much more dire than we imagine.

If that seems depressing, I’m sorry. Keep reading anyway.

Rapid climate disruption is the most pressing concern but not the only existential threat. Soil erosion and degradation undermine our capacity to feed ourselves. Chemical contamination of our bodies and ecosystems undermines the possibility of a stable long-term human presence. Species extinction and loss of biodiversity will have potentially catastrophic effects on the ecosystems on which our lives depend.

I could go on, but anyone who wants to know about these crises can easily find this information in both popular media and the research literature. For starters, I recommend the work of William Rees, an ecologist who co-created the ecological footprint concept and knows how to write for ordinary people.

The foundational problem is overshoot: There are too many people consuming too much in the aggregate. The distribution of the world’s wealth is not equal or equitable, of course, but the overall program for human survival is clear: fewer and less. If there is to be a decent human future—perhaps if there is to be any human future—it will be fewer people consuming less energy and creating less stuff.

Check the policy statements of all major political players, including self-described progressives and radicals, and it’s hard to find mention of the need to impose limits on ourselves. Instead, you will find delusions and diversions.

The delusions come mainly from the right, where climate-change denialism is still common. The more sophisticated conservatives don’t directly challenge the overwhelming consensus of researchers but instead sow seeds of doubt, as if there is legitimate controversy. That makes it easier to preach the “drill, baby, drill” line of expanding fossil fuel production, no matter what the ecological costs, instead of facing limits.

The diversions come mainly from the left, where people take climate change seriously but invest their hopes in an endless array of technological solutions. These days, the most prominent tech hype is “electrify everything,” which includes a commitment to an unsustainable car culture with electric vehicles, instead of facing limits.

There is a small kernel of truth in the rhetoric of both Right and Left.

When the Right says that expanding fossil energy production would lift more people out of poverty, they have a valid point. But increased production of fossil energy is not suddenly going to benefit primarily the world’s poor, and the continued expansion of emissions eventually will doom rich and poor alike.

When the Left says renewable energy is crucial, they have a valid point. But if the promise of renewable energy is used to prop up existing levels of consumption, then the best we can expect is a slowing of the rate of ecological destruction. Unless renewables are one component of an overall down-powering, they are a part of the problem and not a solution.

Why aren’t more people advocating limits? Because limits are hard. People—including me and almost everyone reading this—find it hard to resist what my co-author Wes Jackson and I have called “the temptations of dense energy.” Yes, lots of uses of fossil fuels are wasteful, and modern marketing encourages that waste. But coal, oil, and natural gas also do a lot of work for us and provide a lot of comforts that people are reluctant to give up.

That’s why the most sensible approach combines limits on our consumption of energy and rationing to ensure greater fairness, both of which have to be collectively imposed. That’s not a popular political position today, but if we are serious about slowing, and eventually stopping, the human destruction of the ecosphere, I see no other path forward.

In the short term, those of us who endorse “fewer and less” will have to make choices between political candidates and parties that are, on the criteria of real sustainability, either really hard-to-describe awful or merely bad. I would never argue that Right and Left, Republican and Democrat, are indistinguishable. But whatever our immediate political choices, we should talk openly about ecological realities.

That can start with imagining an “abundance agenda” quite different than what Klein and Thompson, along with most conventional thinking, propose. Instead of more building that will allegedly be “climate friendly,” why not scale back our expectations? Instead of assuming a constantly mobile society, why not be satisfied with staying home? Instead of dreaming of more gadgets, why not live more fully in the world around us? People throughout history have demonstrated that productive societies can live with less.

Instead of the promise of endless material abundance, which has never been consistent with a truly sustainable future, let’s invest in what we know produces human flourishing—collective activity in community based on shared needs and reduced wants. For me, living in rural New Mexico, that means being one of the older folks who are helping younger folks get a small-scale farm off the ground. It means being an active participant in our local acequia irrigation system. It means staying home instead of vacationing. It means being satisfied with the abundant pleasures of this place and these people without buying much beyond essentials.

I’m not naïve—given the house I live in, the car I drive, and the food I buy from a grocery store, I’m still part of a hyper-extractive economy that is unsustainable. But instead of scrambling for more, I am seeking to live with less. I know that’s much harder for people struggling to feed a family and afford even a modest home. But rather than imagining ways to keep everyone on the consumption treadmill, only with more equity, we can all contribute ideas about how to step off.

Our choices are clear: We can drill more, which will simply get us to a cruel end game even sooner. We can pretend that technology will save us, which might delay that reckoning. If we can abandon the delusions and diversions, there’s no guarantee of a happy future. But there’s a chance of a future.

Robert Jensen, an Emeritus Professor in the School of Journalism and Media at the University of Texas at Austin, is the author of It’s Debatable: Talking Authentically about Tricky Topics from Olive Branch Press. His previous book, co-written with Wes Jackson, was An Inconvenient Apocalypse: Environmental Collapse, Climate Crisis, and the Fate of Humanity. To subscribe to his mailing list, go to http://www.thirdcoastactivist.org/jensenupdates-info.htmlRead other articles by Robert.