Friday, August 29, 2025

Is Lenin’s theory of imperialism still valid?


IT WAS ACTUALLY BUKHARIN'S THEORY


Featured image: “How Putin Can Use Trump for His New World Order, a Yalta Dream,” Vanity Fair, June 25, 2024. Illustration by Mark Harris. Getty Images. Courtesy of Vanity Fair.

First published in Portuguese at Esquerda Online. Translation republished from Communis.

It is never as easy to get lost as when one thinks they know the way.
Popular Chinese proverb

1. From Lenin we inherited a theory concerning the nature of imperialism. It rested upon three distinct, divergent ideas, even as they were intertwined. The first was that imperialism marked a stage in capitalism’s unfolding, its pinnacle of development, signaling, in dialectical terms, both its zenith and the onset of its decline, or an age of revolution. In other words, a criterion of historical periodisation was stratified under the supremacy of the imperialist powers at the center, surrounded by a vast periphery of dominated nations, integrated to sharply unequal degrees, many colonies, some semi-colonies and very few independent countries, meaning a rigid and hierarchical international state system, that is a global order. The third was the constituing elements of an imperialist state as it existed in the twentieth century. In essence, a standard of measurement for determining the mode of incorporation into the world market and the position occupied within the international state system.

2. These three ideas, articulated across distinct levels of abstraction, retain their full political and theoretical power. The most radical proposition maintained that modern imperialism ushered in an era in which capitalism reached its height even as it entered a phase of decay. It remains unassailable, having withstood the test of historical experience. The imperialist system led humanity into two calamitous world wars. The twentieth century was one of revolutions that uprooted capitalist domination in societies encompassing some 30% of humanity. The preservation of an imperialist order threatens humankind’s continued survival for no less than four compelling reasons: (1) the menace of new destructive economic crises like those of 1929 and 2008; (2) the looming catastrophe of global warming and the systemic incapacity of capitalism to effect an emergency energy transition; (3) the global arms race and the military intimidation by the Triad, notably the U.S., aimed to assert imperialist control over the world; (4) the rise of a neo-fascist, nationalist far-right that fights for power, overturning the democratic advances of the past three generations.

3. Of course, Lenin was not a flawless prophet. His work established solid methodological foundations, yet his legacy fundamentally offered a conceptual framework for studying tendencies and counter-tendencies, not a millenarian doctrine. A good Marxist engages in prognostic assessment, but this should not be confused with mere fortune-telling. Nor one can escape the need to revise the other two theses. The world order is far from what it once was, having undergone qualitative transformations more than once and the standards for assessing what counts as an imperialist state have not remained intact. Over a hundred years later, both the world market and the state system have shifted. The structure of the imperialist order has evolved and become increasingly intricate. Since 1975 in Vietnam, half a century has gone by without the triumph of another socialist revolution. Thirty-five years have passed since the capitalist restoration in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. The global system of states is no longer structured merely as a division between competing central imperialist powers and a vast periphery. Intermediate positions are both varied and manifold. In 1916, the year when Lenin wrote Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, neither the USSR nor the end of European colonial domination in Africa and Asia had yet come into being; nor did institutions such as Bretton Woods, the IMF, the World Bank, the dollar’s central role in global hoarding, or the mountain of fictitious capital created by the hegemony of neoliberal strategy exist, nor the United Nations with its system, including the WTO, WHO, UNCTAD, UNESCO, the Paris Agreement and the International Criminal Court. Neither Lenin’s framework çould account for the European Union, nor an imperialist Israel, nor a new Russian imperialism outside the G7, nor BRICS and much less China as the world’s second-largest power. To defend the “letter” of Lenin’s work instead of its analytical approach amounts to dogmatic inflexibility. A contemporary revision of the theory of imperialism contains far more of Lenin’s spirit than a dogmatic defense of the 1916 text.

4. From a historical perspective, at least three distinct political phases have unfolded within the imperialist epoch. The first and most turbulent stage, characterised by the predominance of great-power rivalries and the victory of the first socialist revolution, continued until the end of the Second World War. The second phase begins with the defeat of Nazifascism, distinguished by collaboration among the imperialist powers in confronting the revolutionary threat and by a policy of peaceful coexistence with Moscow: beginning with remarkable successes and ending with the demise of the USSR. The third phase commenced with the historic defeat of capitalist restoration, unfolded through the expansion of global capital culminating in the 2008 crisis, endured a decade of pandemic-exacerbated economic stagnation, and continues into the present with China’s rise and the offensive of the neo-fascist far-right.

5. Acknowledging the world’s long-standing imperialist order does not imply that a global government is in place. Capitalism has remained confined within the national boundaries of its imperialist states and hence conflicts among the bourgeoisies of the central nations endure. The notion of ultra-imperialism, flirted with in the era of the Second International, has been refuted by history: a unification of the material interests of the bourgeoisies of the central powers. Enduring disputes among the bourgeoisies of the imperialist powers, together with conflicts between fractions within each state, remain intact, evident, for instance, in the confrontation between Trump’s United States and the European Union. Even in the postwar political-historical stage, against the backdrop of the Cold War, from 1945 to 1991, capitalism was shaken by the shock of a mighty revolutionary upsurge that overturned the old colonial empires. But it would be foolish to deny that imperialist counterrevolution has drawn lessons from history. The United States, alongside the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, preserve a strategic alliance at the center of the Triad, in complementary ties with the European Union and Japan. At the heart of the world’s crisis lies the fact that this supremacy is imperiled owing to the threat of economic stagnation in the medium run. Faith placed in artificial intelligence and new technologies seems unlikely to prevent China’s ascent, which challenges the Triad on level ground. Consequently, the United States is compelled toward a national-imperialist strategy of fortifying its deterrent military hegemony.

6. For three-quarters of a century, the world has been under a clear U.S. political hegemony, though even this supremacy cannot dispense with negotiations. Clashes between the interests of the United States, Japan and Western Europe compelled Washington, for example, to partially abandon the Bretton Woods system in 1971, suspending the dollar’s fixed parity with gold and devaluing its currency to safeguard the internal market while making exports more competitive. Inter-corporate competition and rivalry between core states remain intact, albeit with oscillations in their intensity. Trump’s current global tariff offensive is an additional chapter in the broader arc of imperialist domination. Yet it would be short-sighted to deny that the ruling classes of the principal imperialist powers succeeded in establishing a core in the international state system following the almost complete destruction brought about by the Second World War. It continues to manifest institutionally decades after the USSR dissolved, via the UN and Bretton Woods institutions: specifically, the IMF, World Bank, WTO, the Bank for International Settlements in Basel and ultimately the G7. At the centre of the power is the Triad: the United States, the European Union and Japan. The EU and Japan have complementary relations with Washington, and they have accepted its superiority since the end of World War II. The international historical turning point of 1989–91 did not alter the role of the Triad, and in particular, the position of the United States. Although the United States’ dominance has been eroded, it persists. The commanding weight of its internal market, the dollar as the principal currency for global hoarding, unmatched military power and proactive geopolitical strategy have enabled it, despite tendencies toward structural weakening, to remain at the apex of the international state system.

7. The Left is divided by two dominant and erroneous understandings regarding the meaning of the current world order. The first is the one that equates China’s project with the strategy of the United States and assumes that the current “Cold War” is merely a prelude, at some future point, to a Third World War. Simplifying the twenty-first-century order using the model of a hundred years ago, when the inter-imperialist rivalry between England, France and Germany prevailed and attributing an equivalent significance to the conflict between the US and China is an error. Comparing China’s role to that of Germany or Japan in the twentieth century is an anachronism. China is not Germany marching in “slow-motion” towards world war. In China, one of the greatest peasant-based and anti-imperialist social revolutions in history triumphed, the bourgeoisie was expropriated and fled to Taiwan. A post-capitalist transition began, and despite a controlled capitalist restoration, creating a historical hybrid of market mechanisms and planned economy, neither the domestic bourgeoisie nor the Chinese bourgeoisie in the diaspora controls the state. It remains under the control of the Communist Party, which has survived despite tragic internal struggles. Unlike Russia, in China the social stratum that assumed power in 1949, a socialist bureaucracy, did not allow the strengthening of the domestic bourgeoisie to destroy the revolution’s achievements. The Chinese state is an emerging economic power and, increasingly, a military and an outer-space power as well, but it follows a defensive strategy of accumulating strength and preserving positions. The power that currently threatens the world is the United States.

8. On the other hand, reducing this complex reality to a simple struggle between the Triad and a generic Global South of semicolonial countries is absurd. China is not part of a romanticised Global South and, while it does not threaten with imperialist intervention, it exploits the advantages of unequal trade relations with Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East through commodity commerce. The existence of BRICS provides some support for peripheral countries but, for now, does not go beyond a defensive economic coordination in response to the Triad’s dominance. These two models cannot explain the current world order. Defining imperialist states solely or primarily by economic criteria seems obsolete. The Triad still dominates the system of states, but its hegemony over the global market has diminished. Russia relies on oil and gas extraction but remains the second nuclear power, a subordinate imperialism maintaining influence from Belarus to Kyrgyzstan. China is the world’s largest industrial economy and a rising global power. India possesses nuclear weapons, Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal, Iran exercises sub-imperialist influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, not to mention the roles of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, the resilience of independent Venezuela with the largest oil reserves, and even Brazil’s strategic position within Mercosur.

9. What criteria determine whether a country is imperialist? How should we measure the position each State occupies within the international system? In the context of Marxist theory, this debate has focused on responding to the transformations preceding the First World War, which made a new understanding of capitalism possible. Hobson’s Imperialism (1902) was favourably received by Kautsky, the leading theorist of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the most influential party of the Second International. Hilferding’s Finance Capital (1910) also drew major attention. Luxemburg and Bukharin contributed pioneering work, but it was Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism that had the greatest impact. Lenin identified five key factors in capital’s metabolism that marked a new phase of capitalism: (1) concentration of capital and monopoly formation; (2) the fusion of industrial and banking capital into finance capital; (3) the role of capital exports in securing and maintaining dominance; (4) the creation of multinational corporations that divide the global market; (5) and the global partitioning of the world among imperialist States. According to Lenin, the five defining features of imperialism are: (1) the concentration of production and capital to such a high degree that monopolies emerge, playing a decisive role in economic life; (2) the fusion of bank capital with industrial capital, creating “finance capital” dominated by a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital, which becomes far more significant than the mere export of goods; (4) the formation of international monopolist associations of capitalists that divide global markets among themselves; (5) the final partition of the world among the most powerful capitalist states. These five, primarily economic, criteria remain relevant today. To dismiss them would be unwise. Yet they are not enough. Many former imperialist States of the previous historical stage, perhaps most, have lost their formal imperialist status. Although still central powers within the international hierarchy, many of these states now occupy positions of partial dependence on the current imperialist center.

10. While Lenin’s criteria remain relevant, they do not fully capture contemporary imperialism for three reasons: (1) today, capital accumulation depends on globalised financialisation and the massive creation of fictitious capital, requiring highly integrated production chains and international capital circulation, a privilege few states possess; (2) the global order has shifted. For over seven decades, world peace has been maintained by nuclear deterrence, meaning imperialist power expresses itself not only in economic and financial dominance but also, crucially, in military supremacy; (3) only states with full sovereignty in strategic areas, food, energy, education, science, economy, politics, military, and space, can occupy an imperialist position.

Translated from the original in Portuguese by Noam Sala Budgen.




Sergei Lavrov’s CCCP Sweatshirt and Putin/Trump’s Nostalgic Imaginations


August 29, 2025

Photograph Source: @shanghaidaily – x.com

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wore a sweatshirt to the recent Alaska summit that vividly displayed his nostalgic imagination. Written in large Cyrillic letters was “CCCP” or USSR. Like Donald Trump’s red cap featuring the slogan “Make America Great Again,” Lavrov indicated that he, like Vladimir Putin, imagined the Russian Federation returning to its past glory as the Soviet Union. The 70-year-old leaders of the United States and Russia are in time warps. Geopolitics exists in linear time. Countries, like individuals, cannot return to their past glories in circular time. 

Nostalgia for the past can be an obsession. I’m no exception. Each season I closely follow the results of the New York Yankees and the New York Knicks to see if they can repeat their past glories. (They have not won major championships since 2009 and 1973, respectively.) Mine is not a simple optimism about the Yankees and Knicks winning games; it is an optimism about the teams returning to their former championship status. 

Now it is one thing to imagine a sports team returning to a past dominant position, it’s quite another to imagine a country returning to its past hegemonic role. Can countries or empires which were once dominant return to those previous situations? While sports seasons repeat the same number of games and similar formats to win the ultimate title, geopolitics evolves in time with no similar set of rules or formats. Baseball and basketball have regulated rules and procedures; geopolitics does not.

I know what the Yankees and Knicks need to do to win the World Series and NBA crown. I don’t know what has to happen for the Russian Federation to return to the glory of the Soviet Union. Or for the United States to be truly great again. 

Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of Great Powers present similar temporal perspectives. Both describe how empires/hegemons rose and fell. Lavrov’s sweatshirt, and Trump’s omnipresent cap represent a different temporal perspective. Lavrov/Putin and Trump imagine that their empires/hegemons rose, fell, and will rise again. 

When President Putin remarked in the post-summit that “a fair balance in the security sphere in Europe and the world as whole must be restored,” the emphasis was on restored. He implied that that is “the root causes” of the crisis with Ukraine. Putin’s nostalgic imagination is that the post 1945 Soviet Union’s regional hegemony and global power should be restored. 

Trump’s cap says much the same. The American hegemonic rise also happened after World War II. The Vietnam War – if one needs a specific starting point – saw the decline of the United States. Trump’s cap’s slogan promises that he will return the U.S. to its post 1945 dominant position. When DJT says “Make America Great Again,” the emphasis is on Again. 

Instead of linear time moving forward with new technologies and new geopolitics, Lavrov, Putin, and Trump imagine circular time going back to something that was before. Restored and Again are the keywords. So just as sports team repeat how the game is played, the nature of the schedule and the criteria for becoming champions, Lavrov, Putin, and Trump see geopolitics as circular in time as well.

But geopolitics and sports are not the same. European countries like Spain, Portugal, France, England, and the Netherlands all had their historic periods of geopolitical glory. They all had extraterritorial moments of domination. Today, none of their leaders envisions a return to that position. (The British Commonwealth of Nations is not the same as when “the Sun Never Set on the British Empire.”) 

Sports teams can return to their previous glory. Individual athletes, politicians, and movie stars may make comebacks; empires/hegemons cannot. 

And who is imagining a return to past glory? Sergei Lavrov is 75 years-old, Vladimir Putin 72 years-old, and Donald Trump is 79 years-old. All three are caught in the same nostalgic imagination. All three aging leaders project their temporal decline on a geopolitical imagination of a return to their countries’ past glories under their leadership. All three are caught in the same nostalgic time warp. 

Individually, we would all like to remain young and healthy. We would all like to de-age and increase our longevity. Botox, plastic surgery, injections, exercise and pills are all part of that effort to counter linear time. Pictures of Putin’s physical prowess are regularly presented to defy his 72 years. Trump loves to show himself energetically playing golf; he often mocked Joe Biden’s age when he himself was in his late 70s. His favorite songs, the oldies but goodies his staffers play when he is in a bad mood, are “Memory” from Cats, and the Rolling Stones’ “You Can’t Always Get What You Want.”

Lavrov/Putin and Trump have taken the personal narrative of countering aging to a nostalgic, geopolitical level. 70 year-old men’s desires to maintain their youth has become part of a larger geopolitical narrative. Science may have succeeded in the de-extinction of the dire wolf, but there is no indication it will succeed with infinitely prolonging human longevity or restoring a country’s empire. Empires/hegemons rise and fall; they do not rise again. History may repeat itself in different forms, but geopolitics does not. Nostalgia for the past has its limits. And seventy year-old men should act their ages. 

Daniel Warner is the author of An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations. (Lynne Rienner). He lives in Geneva.


Russia’s Foreign Minister Cites NATO Expansion as Cause of Ukraine War

THAT'S THE PARTY LINE


 August 29, 2025

Photograph Source: Kremlin.ru – CC BY 4.0

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told an NBC interviewer last week that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treat Organization was a “violation of Russian security interests” and one of the “root causes” of the war against Ukraine.  Russian officials have made these statements in their private meetings with American counterparts, but this is the  most explicit public statement since the start of the war three and a half years ago.  The conventional wisdom in the United States does not accept NATO expansion as a cause of the war, but I’ve been arguing since the war began that there was such linkage.

Lavrov’s comments make it clear that an end to the war with Ukraine include security guarantees for Russia as well as for Ukraine.  It’s unlikely that anyone in the Trump administration understands this linkage, which means that the war is not about to reach a negotiated solution.  The United States simplistically blames only President Vladimir Putin for the start of the war, but no Russian leader would have accepted the extensive U.S. and NATO buildup on Russia’s western border.

Lavrov has been critical of Trump’s failure to discuss specifics of a negotiated end to the war, which is typical of Trump’s lack of process in dealing with difficult geopolitical issues.  When asked about security guarantees, Trump responded that “We haven’t even discussed the specifics.”  Trump still proclaims that he doesn’t know which side to blame for the start of the war.  His most absurd statement regarding the war: “We’ll know which way I’m going, because I’m going tot go one way or the other,” he told reporters last week.

In addition to limits on Ukraine’s military buildup and the occupation in Ukraine by western forces, the Russians will push for limits on Western troops based in East Europe, an end to the deployment of a regional missile defense system as well as an end to the permanent deployment of German troops in such Baltic states as Lithuania.  Russia will press for limits on U.S. bases in Poland and Romania as well.  Even before the war began, Putin in December 2021 proclaimed that Russia demanded talks on the NATO threat to Russian national security.

Lavrov also stated that Ukraine has the “right to exist,” but only if it stops the cultural and linguistic limits on ethnic Russians and Russian speakers who the Kremlin believes “belong to Russian culture.”  The majority of the population on the Donbas is ethnic Russian. For the past 30 years, Russian leaders have claimed it is their “duty” to protect those who share the values of the Russian language and the “Russian world” (“Russkiy mir”).  Moscow uses the term “near abroad” to defend its support and protection for Russian ethnics throughout the former Soviet empire.  Kazakhstan, with its large ethnic Russian population could be a target of similar Russian expansionism. 

The Trump administration and U.S. policymakers in general do not seem cognizant of the fact that actions Washington has taken over the past 25 years in East and Central Europe are threatening to Russia.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, every U.S. administration has taken advantage of Russia’s national security weakness to expand the U.S. role in the region.  Presidents Clinton and Bush ignored warnings not to expand NATO.

Clinton was also responsible for NATO’s bombardment of Serbia 1999 without a UN mandate and without touching base with the Kremlin, which has had a special relationship with Serbia for generations.  The Bush administration was a strong supporter of the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, where Putin believed there was a strong U.S. and CIA covert role.  It was the provocative actions of the Georgian government in disputed territories that led to brief Russian military intervention in 2008.  Bush clearly overplayed his hand in threatening Russia by pursuing a special relationship with a strongly nationalistic Georgia.

Bush overlooked the warnings from German Chancellor Angela Merkel to avoid encouraging NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine.  The hardliners in the administration backed off somewhat, but only reluctantly.  Bush’s forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were  perceived as threatening to Moscow because they contributed to greater insurgency and terrorism in areas close to Russia’s borders.  The United Sates could have pursued diplomacy to coordinate actions with Russia in these areas, but no U.S. administration was willing to take Moscow seriously in view of Russia’s political, military, and economic weakness.  Putin actually offered significant assistance to the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington,

Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers and political analysts as well as the mainstream media totally dismiss the idea that NATO expansion had anything to do with Russia’s use of force.  The New York Times and the Washington Post particularly dismissed the idea that “NATO provoked Russia’s invasion.”   Again, the conventional wisdom was that Russia was engaging in an “illegitimate response to the hostile actions of a democracy.”

There is good reason for Moscow to believe that the expansion of NATO was a marker of Washington’s return to containment and a threat to its national security.  Russia was angered about the expansion from the outset, particularly since President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker had assured their Russian counterparts that the United States would not “leap frog” over Germany if the Soviets pulled their 380,000 troops out of East Germany in order to reunify the German state.  The past five administrations have pursued a policy of militarism in Europe toward Russia.  Contemporary foreign policy experts anticipate a Putin threat to NATO beyond the threat to Ukraine, which portends greater U.S. pressure on Russia.   Meanwhile, NATO expansion virtually ensures that a Cold War will exist between the West and Russia for the near future.

Melvin A. Goodman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and a professor of government at Johns Hopkins University.  A former CIA analyst, Goodman is the author of Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA and National Insecurity: The Cost of American Militarism. and A Whistleblower at the CIA. His most recent books are “American Carnage: The Wars of Donald Trump” (Opus Publishing, 2019) and “Containing the National Security State” (Opus Publishing, 2021). Goodman is the national security columnist for counterpunch.org.