Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Revisiting The Canada–United States Columbia River Treaty – Analysis


The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
By Charles V. Stern

LONG READ


The Columbia River Treaty (CRT or Treaty) is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin to provide for flood control and electric power.

The Treaty was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations between the two countries and was ratified in 1961. Implementation began in 1964.The Treaty provided for the construction and operation of three dams in Canada and one dam in the United States whose reservoir extends into Canada. Together, these dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin and provided significant flood protection benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump-sum cash payments and a portion of downstream hydropower benefits that are attributable to Canadian operations under the CRT, known as the Canadian Entitlement. Some have estimated the Canadian Entitlement to be worth as much as $335 million annually.

The CRT has no specific end date. Currently, either the United States or Canada can terminate most provisions of the CRT with a minimum of 10 years’ written notice. If the CRT is not terminated or modified, most of its provisions would continue indefinitely without actions by the United States or Canada. The only exception is the CRT’s flood control provisions, which are scheduled to transition automatically to “called-upon” operations at that time, meaning the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations as necessary.

To date, neither country has given notice of termination, but, following internal government Treaty reviews, both countries indicated interest in its modification. Perspectives on the CRT vary. Some believe the Treaty should include stronger provisions related to tribal resources and flows for fisheries that are not in the Treaty; others disagree and focus on the perceived need to adjust the Canadian Entitlement to reflect actual hydropower benefits. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Bonneville Power Administration, in their joint role as the U.S. Entity overseeing the Treaty, undertook a review of the CRT from 2009 to 2013. Based on studies and stakeholder input, they provided a Regional Recommendation to the U.S. State Department in December 2013. They recommended continuing the Treaty with certain modifications, including rebalancing the CRT’s hydropower provisions, further delineating called-upon flood control operations after 2024, and incorporating into the Treaty flows to benefit Columbia River fisheries. For its part, the Canadian Entity (the Province of British Columbia) released in March 2013 a recommendation to continue the CRT with modifications “within the Treaty framework.” It disputed several assumptions in the U.S. Entity’s review process.


Following a two-year federal interagency review of the U.S. Regional Recommendation, the U.S. State Department finalized its negotiating parameters and authorized talks with Canada in October 2016. Between 2018 and 2023, U.S. and Canadian negotiating teams held 18 rounds of negotiations. President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau announced an agreement in principle on terms of modernization of the Treaty on July 11, 2024.

Proposed Treaty amendments reportedly include a reduction of hydropower sent to Canada and terms for U.S. payments for Canadian flood control, among other things. On November 25, 2024, the State Department announced implementation of interim measures consistent with the proposed amendments.

Past Congresses have held oversight hearings and weighed in on CRT-related activities through their oversight roles. The 117th Congress enacted new authority for USACE to carry out post-2024 called-upon flood control operations, and the 118th Congress is considering funding for these activities. While the executive branch holds the power to renegotiate the Treaty, any changes to the CRT’s text would require the Senate’s advice and consent.


Introduction

The Columbia River Treaty (CRT, or Treaty), signed in 1961, is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin for the benefit of flood control and electric power.¹ Precipitated by several flooding events in the basin (including a major flood in the Northwest in 1948), the CRT was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations seeking a joint resolution to address flooding and plan for development of the basin’s water resources. The Treaty provided for 15.5 million acre-feet (MAF) of additional water storage in Canada through the construction of four dams (three in Canada, one in the United States). This storage, along with agreed-upon operating plans, provides flood control, hydropower, and other downstream benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump-sum cash payments and a portion of hydropower benefits.


Implementation of the CRT began in 1964.² The Treaty has no specific end date. Currently, either the United States or Canada can terminate most provisions of the CRT with a minimum of 10 years’ written notice. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), in their designated joint role as the U.S. Entity, undertook a review of the Treaty beginning in 2011. Based on studies and additional stakeholder input, the U.S. Entity made its recommendation to the U.S. Department of State in December 2013. If the Treaty is not terminated or modified, most of its current provisions would continue indefinitely without action by the U.S. or Canadian Entities, with the notable exception of flood control operations. These operations were scheduled to end in 2024 and transition to “called-upon” operations at this time.³

Perspectives on the CRT and its review vary. Some believe that the Treaty should continue but be altered to include, for example, guarantees related to tribal resources and fisheries flows that were not included in the original Treaty. Others believe that the Canadian Entitlement should be reduced to more equitably share actual hydropower benefits, or be eliminated entirely. For its part, Canada has stated that without the Canadian Entitlement (or with alterations that would decrease its share of these revenues), it would see no reason for the Treaty to continue. The final Regional Recommendation to the State Department, coordinated by the U.S. Entity, was to continue the Treaty post-2024, but with modifications. The Canadian recommendation, finalized in March 2013, also favored continuing the Treaty, but with modifications “within the Treaty framework,” some of which were considerably different than those recommended by the United States.


The executive branch, through the State Department, is responsible for negotiations related to the CRT. The Senate, through its constitutional role to provide advice and consent, is entrusted with the power to approve, by a two-thirds vote, treaties negotiated by the executive branch. Changes to the CRT may or may not trigger such a vote; in any case, the Senate may choose to review any changes to the CRT.⁴ In addition, both houses of Congress may enact authorizations and/or appropriations they deem necessary for federal agencies to implement Treaty responsibilities (e.g., guidance called-upon flood control operations).

This report provides an overview of the CRT. It includes background on the history of the basin and consideration of the Treaty, as well as a brief summary of studies and analyses of the Columbia River Treaty review process to date.


History and Background

The Columbia River is the predominant river in the Pacific Northwest and is one of the largest in the United States in terms of water volume flowing to the ocean. The Columbia River Basin receives water that drains from approximately 259,500 square miles in the region, including parts of British Columbia in Canada, and four U.S. states: Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. The basin is unique among large river basins in the United States because of its high annual runoff, limited amount of storage (in the U.S. portion of the basin), and extreme variation in flow levels. The basin has the second-largest runoff in the United States in terms of average flows (275,000 cubic feet per second). Approximately 60% of this runoff occurs in May, June, and July. While about 15% of the river basin’s surface area is in Canada, the Canadian portion of the basin accounts for a considerably larger share of the basin’s average annual runoff volume.⁵

The Columbia River is the largest hydropower-producing river system in the United States. Federal development of the river’s hydropower capacity dates to 1932, when the federal government initiated construction of dams of the Columbia River and its tributaries. In total, 31 federal dams within the Columbia River Basin are owned and operated by USACE and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior). Additional dams are owned by nonfederal entities. The BPA, part of the Department of Energy, markets power from federal dams on the Columbia River and its tributaries (collectively known as the Federal Columbia River Power System, FCRPS). Other than the largest of these facilities, Grand Coulee (which has some storage capacity), most of these facilities on the main stem of the river in the United States have limited reservoir storage and are managed as “run of the river” for hydropower, flood control, and navigation.⁶ 

The basin is also important habitat for a number of fish species. Economically important species in the region include steelhead trout; chinook, coho, chum, and sockeye salmon; and other species. These fish are important to commercial and sport anglers as well as Native American tribes in the region. The basin also provides habitat for several threatened and endangered species listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543); requirements under this law are an important factor in the operation of the FCRPS.

Other major uses of the basin’s waters include navigation, irrigation, recreation, and water supply. Four federal dams on the river’s mainstem have navigation locks that allow for barge traffic to transport bulk commodities that are important to regional and national economies. Due to this infrastructure, the Columbia River is navigable up to 465 miles upstream from the Pacific Ocean. Six percent of the basin’s water is diverted for irrigated agriculture, and is particularly important in eastern Washington, northeastern Oregon, and southern Idaho. Basin waters are also diverted for other water supply purposes, and the rivers and reservoirs of the basin are important for recreational users. All of these users have an interest in management of basin water supplies.


Figure 1, below, provides an overview of the basin, including dam ownership. 

Figure 1. Columbia River Basin and Dams. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review, April 2013.

The negotiation and ratification of the CRT were precipitated by several events in the basin. Most notably, a major flood event in the Northwest in 1948, the Vanport flood, caused significant damage throughout the basin and served as the impetus for negotiations between the United States and Canada, including studies by the International Joint Commission (IJC).⁷ Initially, following the flood, the United States had proposed in 1951 to build Libby Dam in Montana (which would flood 42 miles into Canada). Canada was opposed to this solution, and as a response proposed to divert as much as 15.5 MAF from the Columbia River for its own purposes. Based on a number of technical studies, the IJC recommended a compromise, which included development of upriver storage in Canada to help regulate flows on the Columbia River, including those for flood control and hydropower generation.

The CRT was signed in 1961 but was not fully ratified by both countries (and therefore did not go into effect) until 1964. Implementation of the Treaty occurs through the U.S. Entity and the Canadian Entity.⁸ The Treaty provided for the construction of 15.5 MAF of additional storage in Canada through the construction of three dams: Duncan (completed in 1968), Hugh Keenleyside, or Arrow (completed in 1969), and Mica (completed in 1973). Construction of Libby Dam in Montana, whose reservoir backs 42 miles into Canada, was completed in 1973. Together, the four dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin before construction began, providing for significant new flood protection and power generation benefits (see Figure 2). The CRT also required that the United States and Canada prepare an “Assured Operating Plan” (to meet flood control and power objectives) for the operation of Canadian storage six years in advance of each operating year. Along with “Detailed Operating Plans,” which may also be developed to produce more advantageous results for both U.S. and Canadian operating entities, these plans govern project operations under the Treaty.⁹


Under the CRT, the United States gained operational benefits in the form of flexible storage and reliable operations in Canada that provide for flood control and hydropower generation. In exchange, Canada (through the Canadian Entity) receives lump-sum payments from the United States for flood control benefits through 2024, as well as a portion of annual hydropower benefits from the operation of Canadian Treaty storage. In exchange for the assured use of 8.45 MAF annually of Canadian storage, the United States paid $64.4 million to Canada for flood control benefits as the three Canadian dams became operational. Under the CRT, Canada is also entitled to half of the estimated increase in downstream hydropower generated at U.S. dams.¹⁰ Canada initially sold this electricity (known as the Canadian Entitlement) to a consortium of U.S. utilities for $254 million over a 30-year term (1973-2003).¹¹ Currently, the United States delivers the Canadian Entitlement directly to Canada through BPA’s Northern Intertie. The U.S. Entity has estimated the value of the Canadian Entitlement at a range of $229 million to $335 million annually, depending on a number of factors.¹²

Figure 2 shows the relative storage capacity of these dams.

Figure 2. Columbia River Basin: Relative Storage of Dams. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2012. Note: Maf = million acre-feet.

Several notable changes to Columbia River operations since ratification of the CRT factor into current negotiations. Most notably, declining populations of salmon and steelhead in the Columbia and Snake Rivers led to listings under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543) beginning in 1991. These listings have resulted in steps to improve salmon and steelhead habitat in the United States, including operational changes (e.g., augmented spring and summer flows) and mitigation actions (e.g., construction of fish passage facilities).¹³

Columbia River Treaty Review


The CRT has no specific end date, and most of its provisions—except those related to flood control operations—would continue indefinitely without action by the United States or Canada. Currently, either the United States or Canada can terminate most provisions of the CRT with a minimum of 10 years’ written notice.

Assured annual flood control operations under the Treaty are scheduled to end in 2024, independent of a decision on Treaty termination. Flood control provided by the Canadian projects is expected to transition to called-upon operations at this time. Under called-upon operations, the United States would be allowed to request alterations to Canadian operations as necessary for flood control, and Canada would be responsible for making these changes. In exchange, the United States would pay for operating costs and economic losses in Canada due to the changed operation.¹⁴ USACE and the BPA, in their role as the U.S. Entity, undertook a review of the Treaty from 2009 to 2013 and delivered a final recommendation to the State Department in December 2013.

Technical Studies

As noted above, the U.S. Entity undertook a series of studies and reports to inform the parties who are reviewing the CRT (this process is also known as “Treaty review”).¹⁵ The U.S. Entity undertook its studies with significant input from a sovereign review team (SRT), a group of regional representatives with whom the U.S. Entity has worked to develop its recommendation on the future of the Treaty. In collaboration with the SRT, the U.S. Entity has also conducted stakeholder outreach so as to provide for additional input from other interests in developing a recommendation.

The U.S. Entity conducted its technical studies in three iterations. Iteration one focused on physical effects of system operations (i.e., effects on hydropower production, etc., not the effects on ecology), and modeled both current and future scenarios.¹⁶ Iterations two and three included additional analysis of various scenarios, such as modeling effects on fish and wildlife habitat and species.

Treaty Review Regional Recommendations

On June 27, 2013, the U.S. Entity shared an initial working draft of its recommendation with the State Department for comments. On September 20, 2013, the U.S. Entity released its Draft Regional Recommendation for additional review and comment through October 25, 2013. The U.S. Entity delivered the final Regional Recommendation to the State Department in December 13, 2013.¹⁷ The recommendation, which reflects U.S. Entity study results as well as stakeholder comments, is to modify the Treaty post-2024. The executive branch, through the State Department, is to make the final determination on those changes to the Treaty that are in the national interest and is to conduct any negotiations with Canada related to the future of the CRT.

In its Regional Recommendation, the U.S. Entity noted that the Treaty provides benefits to both countries, but recommended modernization so as to “[ensure] a more resilient and healthy ecosystem-based function throughout the Columbia River Basin while maintaining an acceptable level of flood risk and preserving reliable and economic hydropower benefits.”¹⁸ The recommendation included nine “general principles” for future negotiations, as well as several specific recommendations related to alterations of the existing Treaty.¹⁹

Some of the notable recommendations for modifications to the Treaty by the U.S. Entity included providing stream flows to enhance certain fish populations. This could come through the expansion of agreements to further augment flows for spring and summer (with these flows coming from reduced fall and winter drafts—also known as drawdowns—in Canadian reservoirs) and development of a joint program for fish passage.²⁰ Other recommendations included minimizing adverse effects on tribal resources; incorporating a dry-year strategy; rebalancing the power benefits between the two countries;²¹ and implementing post-2024 CRT flood risk management, including effective use and called-upon flood storage, through a coordinated operation plan and definition of “reasonable compensation” for Canada.²² Finally, the recommendation also suggests that, following negotiations with Canada over the CRT, the Administration should review membership of the U.S. Entity.²³

Perspectives on Columbia River Treaty Review

Various perspectives on the CRT and the review process have been represented in studies, meetings, and other public forums conducted since Treaty review began. These perspectives informed the Regional Recommendation to the State Department.²⁴ However, the Regional Recommendation was not binding, and the executive branch, through the State Department, has the ultimate say on the U.S. position during negotiations.

Canadian perspectives provided on Treaty review were generally coordinated by the British Columbia (BC) provincial government, and BC announced its own recommendation on Treaty review on March 13, 2014.²⁵ BC recommends continuing the Treaty but seeking modifications within the existing framework. A summary of the perspectives of the U.S. Entity, selected U.S. stakeholders, and BC is provided below.

U.S. Entity and Stakeholders


Studies by the U.S. Entity generally concluded that although the CRT has been mutually beneficial to the United States and Canada, not all benefits have been shared equitably, and the Treaty should be “modernized.” Studies by the U.S. Entity concluded that under a scenario where the Treaty continues, both governments would continue to benefit from assured operating plans that provide for predictable power and flood control benefits, among other things. These same studies generally found that without the CRT, Canada would be able to operate its dams for its own benefit (except for called-upon flood storage, which would still be an obligation regardless of termination). This could make U.S. hydropower generation more difficult to control and predict, and could also result in species impacts if advantageous flows are not agreed upon ahead of time.

Despite this unpredictability, the United States could gain some advantages from Treaty termination. Studies by the U.S. Entity have concluded that a relatively large financial benefit for the United States would likely result from terminating the Treaty—eliminating the Canadian Entitlement—while Canada would likely see reduced financial benefits from hydropower generation from the loss of the Canadian Entitlement.²⁶ However, rather than recommend termination, the U.S. Entity has recommended modification of the Treaty, including a “rebalanced” Canadian Entitlement and assurances for flows to improve ecosystems, among other things.

While most stakeholders acknowledged benefits of the CRT, several groups and individuals submitted comments criticizing the Regional Recommendation and/or its earlier drafts. Based on these comments, major areas of debate can generally be divided into three categories: (1) how to handle the Canadian Entitlement, (2) how (or whether) to incorporate flows to benefit fisheries into the current coequal Treaty goals of hydropower and flood control, and (3) specifics related to future called-upon flood management operations.

Status of the Canadian Entitlement

The status of the Canadian Entitlement to one-half of the hydropower contributed by its dam operations has been a matter of contention, especially among power interests. The final Regional Recommendation calls for “rebalancing” of the Canadian Entitlement, without specifics as to what extent it should be rebalanced. While power interests have generally stopped short of calling for termination of the CRT, they criticized the lack of specifics in earlier drafts of the recommendation, and emphasized their view that the single biggest shortcoming of the CRT is that hydropower benefits have not been shared equally.²⁷ In their public comments, many power interests noted that the Canadian Entitlement should be revised to provide a more equitable methodology for dividing hydropower generation benefits between the countries.²⁸ Some of these groups believe that because more than half of the actual generation under Treaty-related operations is being returned to British Columbia, the current Canadian Entitlement deprives U.S. power customers of low-cost power, effectively increasing electricity rates in the Northwest. Some suggest that the status of the Canadian Entitlement, rather than ecosystem flows (discussed below), should be the focus of Treaty modernization.²⁹


Flows to Improve Ecosystems as a New Treaty Purpose

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Treaty review stems from the fact that the 1964 Treaty did not include fisheries or ecosystem flows along with the Treaty’s other primary purposes of flood control and hydropower. Subsequent to the Treaty’s ratification, Canada and the United States agreed under the Treaty’s Detailed Operating Plans to maintain an additional 1 million acre-feet of storage at Canadian dams for flows to improve fisheries. As noted above, the U.S. Entity has recommended that a new Treaty take into account ecosystem flows and include a federal fisheries representative as part of the U.S. Entity.

While tribal and environmental groups have generally agreed that provisions for ecosystem-based functions should be incorporated into the agreement, some also have argued that the proposed recommendations for Treaty modifications did not go far enough in providing for these purposes. They have called for the ecosystem function to be explicitly added as a third purpose of the Treaty, to be treated coequally with hydropower production and flood risk management. Interests have argued that the Regional Recommendation’s approach (which mentions the ecosystem function but does not call for it to be treated as a coequal purpose) would effectively subordinate these changes to the other two purposes.³⁰ They acknowledge that adding the ecosystem function as a coequal purpose would likely entail operational changes on the Columbia River in both countries beyond those currently provided for under the ESA, for example. One of the primary goals of these changes would be augmented flows for fisheries in spring and summer months and during water shortages.

Conversely, some power interests (including some BPA customers) are concerned with the approach in the Regional Recommendation for the opposite reason: they think that the recommendation embodies more accommodations for ecosystem flows than should be provided. Thus, they oppose efforts to add ecosystem purposes as a stated coequal purpose of the Treaty. In the comment process, some stakeholders noted that ecosystem flows are already prioritized in both countries through major operational changes that have been required since the Treaty was ratified.³¹

In addition to recent increases in storage for fisheries flows, they point to the listings of salmon and steelhead on the Columbia and Snake Rivers under the ESA, along with related operational changes and mitigation, as having benefited fisheries.³² They also note that BPA’s power customers already make significant contributions to mitigation through power rates, which have been estimated by some to provide more than $250 million per year to improve fish and wildlife flows.³³ Finally, some have expressed concern with potentially inherent contradictions between the maintenance of existing hydropower operations under the Treaty and expanded spring and summer flows to benefit fisheries.³⁴ They believe that further operational changes of this type will be damaging to the Northwest economy and to ratepayers.


Uncertainties Related to “Called-Upon” Flood Control

A final area of concern in the Treaty review process has been the future approach to “called-upon” flood control operations. The Regional Recommendation suggests that modifications to the CRT should include a coordinated operation plan and definition of “reasonable compensation” for Canada for called-upon flood control. Both countries have acknowledged that details related to these operations, which U.S. entities would pay Canada for U.S. benefits, and under what circumstances these operations would be required, need clarification, either in modifications to the Treaty or in future operating plans.³⁵

During the Treaty review process, many regional entities (including states, electricity ratepayers, and other regional stakeholders) have focused on the recommendation’s uncertainty regarding payments for these benefits. They have argued that the federal government (rather than ratepayers or other regional beneficiaries) should be responsible for paying these costs, and in late 2022 Congress formally authorized USACE funding for called-upon flood control operations in the basin (see below section, “The Role of Congress in Treaty Review”). For its part, the U.S. Entity focused its Treaty review efforts on estimating flood risk and potential operational needs, which has been a matter of disagreement with Canada and is discussed below.

Canadian Perspectives on CRT Review


Canada, represented by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development, has the constitutional authority to negotiate international treaties. However, the Canadian Entity (BC) has been the primary entity engaged in Treaty review to date. BC initiated studies to synthesize its perspective on the Treaty beginning in 2011. These studies resulted in a decision, finalized in March 2013, to continue the Treaty while “seeking improvements within the existing Treaty framework.”³⁶ The principles outlined by BC include, among other things, specific requirements and expectations for called-upon flood control operations and a formal statement of the province’s belief that the Canadian Entitlement does not account for the full “range” of benefits accruing to the United States and the impacts on BC. The principles also acknowledge that the potential for ecosystem-based improvements “inside and outside the treaty” is an important consideration for the Treaty, but contend that management of salmon populations (including restoration of habitat) is not a Treaty issue per se.³⁷ Some of the primary differences between the two countries are explained further below.

Over the course of its review, BC documented its disagreement with several of the review findings by the U.S. Entity. It argued that, in contrast to the claims of many U.S. interests, the United States actually benefits from the CRT more than Canada.³⁸ In particular, Canada disagreed with some of the U.S. Entity findings and recommendations pertaining to flood control, hydropower, and ecosystem flows. For instance, Canada noted its disagreement with the U.S. Entity’s previous findings related to flood control benefits and expected operations. It argued that the United States has saved billions of dollars as a result of Canadian storage over the life of the Treaty, and that an agreed-upon operational plan for flood control storage similar to the current approach would be preferable to both entities in lieu of the scheduled transition to called-upon flood control operations in 2024.

In particular, Canada has disagreed with the U.S. Entity’s projections of the need and cost for called-upon flood control after 2024, including the expected runoff “trigger” for called-upon Canadian flood storage.³⁹ In essence, Canada has argued that smaller U.S. reservoirs that are not currently used for flood control are actually able to provide flood storage, and would be responsible for doing so under the Treaty’s requirement that “effective use” be made of U.S. storage before called-upon storage is required (generally the United States has not assumed this would be the case). Canada argues that these new operations would result in forgone benefits to the United States associated with hydropower generation and fisheries, among other things, and thus called-upon operations may not be as cost-effective as some in the United States have projected. The Canadian Entity estimates that, for power production alone, called-upon operations would result in $40 million to $150 million per year in lost benefits to the United States.⁴⁰ In contrast, using its own assumptions, the U.S. Entity has previously estimated costs of between $4 million and $34 million per request for called-upon flood control, but has not projected the same level of losses to U.S. generating capacity.⁴¹

Canada has also argued that the Canadian Entitlement is more equitable than previous analysis by the U.S. Entity suggested, and thus that it should remain in place. In its report on U.S. benefits, the Canadian Entity noted that it would see no reason for the Treaty to continue or be renegotiated without the Canadian Entitlement.⁴² Among other things, Canada has argued that the reliability of operations provided for under the Treaty allows for generation that is worth more to the United States than the Canadian Entitlement. The Canadian Entity also noted that if the Treaty were terminated, the lack of reliable expectations for Canadian flow would constrain U.S. hydropower benefits.⁴³ As previously noted, the U.S. Entity has projected that under a Treaty termination scenario, the United States would gain significant revenue while Canadian net revenues would be expected to decrease, largely due to the termination of the Canadian Entitlement.⁴⁴

Treaty Negotiations

On October 7, 2016, the State Department finalized U.S. negotiating parameters for the CRT and formally authorized talks with Canada through the State Department Circular 175 Procedure.⁴⁵ This was the culmination of a two-year interagency review process, which itself built on the Regional Recommendation for Treaty modification.⁴⁶ After finalizing its negotiating parameters, the United States requested engagement with the Canadian Foreign Ministry.

Negotiations between the U.S. and Canadian negotiating teams formally began on May 29-30, 2018.⁴⁷ From 2018 to 2023, the two countries held 18 rounds of negotiations, with the last round of negotiations held on August 10-11, 2023.⁴⁸ According to the State Department, the U.S. negotiating position is guided by the U.S. Entity’s Regional Recommendation and includes participation on the negotiating team by the Department of State, BPA, USACE, the Department of the Interior, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.⁴⁹ The State Department and the Province of British Columbia also have convened town halls and community meetings to discuss the status of negotiations with the public.⁵⁰

2024 Treaty Agreement in Principle and Interim Measures


On July 11, 2024, President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau announced an agreement in principle between the two countries on the terms for modernization of the Treaty.⁵¹ As of the date of this report, no formal text has been released and the precise mechanism for changes has not been articulated, but the State Department has noted that the following elements will be included in the “modernized” version of the Treaty:⁵²The United States will have access to 3.6 MAF annually of preplanned flood storage space (i.e., similar to current levels) behind Keenleyside Dam, the most important of the Canadian dams for flood risk management purposes. The United States will compensate Canada at a rate of $37.6 million per year (indexed for inflation) for this storage through 2044, beginning in spring 2025. Once the new agreement enters into force, the United States will pay an additional $16.6 million (indexed) annually to Canada, through 2044.⁵³

Beginning in August 2024 (i.e., the beginning of 2025 operating year), there will be an estimated reduction of 37% to the Canadian Entitlement, with plans for an eventual reduction of approximately 50% by 2033 (Table 1).⁵⁴ The agreement includes separate schedules for reduction to the Canadian Entitlement both in terms of capacity (i.e., energy generation capability available during a given period) and generation (i.e., average annual generation).

The revised Canadian Entitlement would be further minimized, inversely correlated with any decreases to the coordinated 15.5 MAF of water storage that come as a result of the development of Canadian hydropower, down to 11.5 MAF through 2039 and 10.5 MAF through 2044. For every MAF of reduced storage, the United States will reduce the Canadian Entitlement by an additional 6.5%. BPA and its Canadian counterpart, Powerex, also will conduct a study on expanding new transmission, as envisioned in Section 40113 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58).⁵⁵

The amended Treaty also would aim to improve coordination with Indigenous peoples by establishing a tribal and Indigenous-led body to provide recommendations on how Treaty operations can better support ecosystem needs and tribal values.

The practice of Canadian reservoirs releasing 1.0 MAF of water each year to support salmon migration would be continued; the agreement also includes a new provision to release an additional 0.5 MAF during dry years.


Source: U.S. Department of State, “Details About the Key Elements Agreed Between the United States and Canada Regarding Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime,” press release, July 26, 2024, https://www.state.gov/details-about-the-key-elements-agreed-between-the-united-states-and-canada-regarding-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/.

Although reactions to the announcement generally were positive, some have criticized specific aspects of the agreement, most prominently a perceived lack of efforts to bolster fisheries. For example, some environmental stakeholders have voiced displeasure over the lack of provisions to include additional water for salmon, and others have voiced displeasure with the lack of an “ecosystem function” in the agreement in principle.56 For their part, power stakeholders and others who support the broad elements in the announcement have noted the importance of gaining a better understanding of specific details in the agreement, and obtaining related reviews by technical experts.57

On November 25, 2024, the State Department announced the implementation of interim measures consistent with the proposed amendments in the agreement in principle.58 The State Department noted that the interim measures would remain in force until a modernized Treaty enters into force and would include the following:From 2024 through 2027, Canada is to provide 3.6 MAF per year of water storage at Arrow Lakes reservoir for flood risk management for the United States, upon election and compensation by the United States.

Beginning August 1, 2024, the Canadian Entitlement decreased by 37%.
Beginning November 1, 2024, Canada’s Powerex assumed and must pay for 1,120 MW of transmission rights previously held by BPA (i.e., to deliver the Canadian Entitlement).
The United States and Canada promised to continue working on a plan to store water in Canada to aid in salmon migration in 2025.59

The Role of Congress in Treaty Review


The President, through the National Security Council, determines the negotiating position on the CRT, and the State Department is responsible for conducting negotiations related to the Treaty. Congress is also involved in this process. The Constitution entrusts the Senate with the power to approve, by a two-thirds vote, treaties negotiated by the executive branch.60 The Senate does not ratify treaties; instead, it takes up a resolution of ratification, by which the Senate may formally provide its advice and consent on the ratification process. The Senate is not required to provide an up or down vote on a resolution of ratification, nor are treaties required to be resubmitted after each Congress.61

In the case of the CRT, the Senate would take up a new resolution of ratification if the executive branch submitted a modified Treaty to the Senate for review.62 In some cases, the United States modifies the implementation of treaties through an exchange of notes.63 If the United States and Canada continued the Treaty without modification or if either entity provided a notice of termination, there would be no apparent advice and consent role for the Senate.64 In case of a termination by either country, the Treaty does not address whether such a notice could be reversed (i.e., by a different Administration) prior to the termination date.

In the past, the House and Senate both have weighed in on Treaty review with oversight hearings.65 Some Members of Congress also have indicated their concerns to the Obama and Trump Administrations, expressing concern over the perceived slow pace of Treaty negotiations.66 On June 29, 2021, a bicameral group of Pacific Northwest lawmakers wrote to President Biden urging prompt negotiation of a modernized CRT, noting among other things the need for a strategy and funding requests for called-upon flood control operations beginning in 2024 (i.e., as early as FY2023).67

Congress also has considered resolutions and legislation related to the CRT. As previously noted, the 117th Congress authorized in Section 40113 of the IIJA several provisions related to Columbia River Basin power management, including a study and establishment of an account intended to fund new transmission facilities that facilitate two-way transfers of electrical generation between the United States and Canada.68 Separately, Congress also enacted provisions related to called-upon flood control operations in the Columbia River Basin under Division H, Section 8309, of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263). That section authorized the Secretary of the Army to expend funds for called-upon Canadian flood control operations in the Columbia River Basin, but only when such funds are appropriated by Congress for these purposes. Congress in that section also required reporting on the expenditure of these funds and authorized USACE to study options for U.S.-based flood control projects with the potential to reduce the need for Canadian calls. Another proposal in the 117th Congress, which was not ultimately enacted, would have authorized $800 million in USACE funding for cross-border flood protection in the Columbia River Basin. This funding would have been available both for payment for Canadian called-upon operations and for USACE construction of infrastructure in the United States that would further account for changing water cycles and more frequent and intense severe weather events in the basin.69 In Section 122 of the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (P.L. 118-83), enacted on September 26, 2024, Congress included FY2025 funding for USACE for Canadian flood risk management payments of the amount announced under the July 2024 Agreement in Principle (i.e., $37.6 million).

Endnotes:

The Columbia River Treaty (CRT) is different, and was considered separately, from tribal fisheries treaty rights on the Columbia River.

Implementation of the Treaty occurs through the U.S. Entity (BPA and the Northwestern Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [USACE], jointly, with the BPA Administrator as Chair and USACE as a member) and the Canadian Entity (the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, or BC Hydro).

This term is generally understood to mean that the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations. See below section, “Columbia River Treaty Review,” for more information.

See below section, “The Role of Congress in Treaty Review.”

In most years, it is estimated that the Canadian part of the basin accounts for 38%-50% of the basin’s runoff.

Notably, some headwaters projects have flood storage, including Libby, Hungry Horse, and Dworshak.

The IJC was established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which established principles and mechanisms to help resolve disputes concerning water quantity and quality along the U.S.-Canada boundary. The IJC is a joint international body. More information about the IJC is available https://www.ijc.org/en/who/mission.

Executive Order 11177, “Providing for Certain Arrangements Under the Columbia River Treaty,” 29 C.F.R. §13097. September 16, 1964.

For example, since 1995, Detailed Operating Plans under Article XIV of the Treaty have provided extra flow storage of 1 million acre-feet per year for fisheries flows.

The amount of the Canadian Entitlement is based on a formula which calculates the theoretical value of additional generation from Canadian dams.

Together with the flood control payments, these payments largely financed the construction of the Canadian facilities.

U.S. Entity, “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Recent Study Results,” June 2012. Hereinafter “U.S. Entity, Recent Study Results.”

As noted above, limited operational changes on both sides of the border have occurred pursuant to supplemental agreements under the Treaty. For more information on ESA listings and related federal actions, see CRS Report R40169, Endangered Species Act Litigation Regarding Columbia Basin Salmon and Steelhead, available upon request.
The Treaty does not describe the methodologies and procedures for how called-upon flood control would be implemented after 2024.

Separately, Canada has undertaken its own studies.

For a summary of these studies, see U.S. Entity, Recent Study Results.

U.S. Entity, “U.S. Entity Regional Recommendation for the Future of the Columbia River Treaty after 2023.” December 13, 2013. Hereinafter, “Regional Recommendation.”
Regional Recommendation, p. 2.

For a full list of the general principles, see Regional Recommendation, p. 3. Detailed recommendations are available on p. 4 of the Regional Recommendation.
The Regional Recommendation noted that these changes should not detract from existing Treaty obligations. See Regional Recommendation, p. 5.

The Regional Recommendation states that CRT power benefits are not equitably shared and that Canada is deriving substantially greater value from coordinated power operations than the United States. See Regional Recommendation, p. 4.

Under the original CRT, many of the specific details related to called-upon storage were not defined. See footnote 14.

This could potentially include a third member of the U.S. Entity representing the “ecosystem function,” depending on the extent to which this change is incorporated in Treaty modification.


The Province of British Columbia’s Treaty review documents are consolidated at https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/treaty-review/.

Studies have estimated that the Canadian Entitlement is worth approximately $229 million-$335 million annually, and that net annual revenues for the United States would increase by about $180 million to $280 million, while Canadian revenues would decrease approximately $220 million to $320 million. See U.S. Entity, Recent Study Results, pp. 6-7.
As stated previously, the Canadian Entitlement amount was a theoretical amount calculated when the CRT was originally negotiated, and did not take into account requirements to regulate and maintain fisheries in the United States that have subsequently been required and have resulted in a reduction in hydropower generation and revenues since Treaty ratification.

See, for example, Tacoma Public Utilities, Public Comment for the Columbia River Treaty Review, August 16, 2013.

See, for example, Public Power Council, Public Comment for the Columbia River Treaty Review, August 6, 2013.

Save Our Wild Salmon, Public Comment for the Columbia River Treaty Review

See for example, Northwest River Partners, Public Comment for the Columbia River Treaty Review, August 16, 2013. Hereinafter “Northwest River Partners Comment.” For background on these efforts, see previous section, “History and Background.”
See previous section, “History and Background.”

Northwest River Partners Comment.

Western Montana Electric Generating & Transmission Cooperative, Inc., Public Comment for the Columbia River Treaty Review, August 16, 2013.

To date, called-upon flood control operations have not been necessary because of the flood control operations under the 1964 treaty, and the specific details related to “called-upon” storage were not defined in the original CRT.

Province of British Columbia, Columbia River Treaty Review: B.C. Decision, March 13, 2014.
According to the BC decision document, restoration of salmon habitat is the responsibility of the government of Canada and should be handled outside of the Treaty.

Province of British Columbia, “U.S. Benefits from the Columbia River Treaty—Past, Present, and Future: A Province of British Columbia Perspective,” June 25, 2013. Hereinafter, “British Columbia U.S. Benefits Study.”

The actual trigger for called-upon flood control operations, as well as the cost for these operations, is not currently defined in the Treaty and is likely to be an important point in negotiations between the two countries. While the U.S. Entity has projected that a range of peak flows at the Dalles (a large dam near the mouth of the Columbia River) from 450,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) to 650,000 cfs would activate available Canadian storage, the Canadian Entity has assumed that it would provide called-upon storage only once flows reach 600,000 cfs (which is expected to be rare). If Canada only provides storage under these scenarios, some U.S. dams may need to be operated to account for an increased flood risk.

British Columbia U.S. Benefits Study, p. 11.
In contrast to Canada, the U.S. Entity appears to have assumed limited losses associated with hydropower generation due to altered operations for maximum power production by Canada, but has not assumed significant losses resulting from new flood control operations at U.S. dams.

British Columbia U.S. Benefits Study, p. 21.
To date, Canada has not produced estimates of the cost of this lack of reliability. British Columbia U.S. Benefits Study, p. 12.


U.S. Entity, Recent Study Results, p. 7.

For more information, see State Department, “Coordination with the Secretary of State and the Circular 175 Procedure,” November 16, 2018, https://www.state.gov/treaty-procedures/.

The process was led by the National Security Council, which designated the Department of State to coordinate and oversee an interagency policy review of the Regional Recommendation. The Interagency Policy Committee included the National Security Council; the White House Council on Environmental Quality; USACE; and the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, the Interior, and others.

U.S. Department of State, “On the Opening of Negotiations to Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime,” May 30, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-opening-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/index.html. Hereinafter “State Department May 2018 Announcement.”

U.S. Department of State, “18th Round of Negotiations to Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime and Announcement of Public Virtual Listening Session,” press release, August 14, 2023, https://www.state.gov/18th-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/.

State Department May 2018 Announcement.
For additional information on these efforts by the State Department, see https://www.state.gov/columbia-river-treaty/. For a summary of efforts by the Province of British Columbia, see https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/.

The White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on Reaching an Agreement in Principle on Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime,” press release, July 11, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-reaching-an-agreement-in-principle-on-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/.

U.S. Department of State, “Details About the Key Elements Agreed Between the United States and Canada Regarding Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime,” press release, July 26, 2024, https://www.state.gov/details-about-the-key-elements-agreed-between-the-united-states-and-canada-regarding-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/.

While the $37.6 million begins when Canada provides the flood risk management, the other payments begin when the agreement enters into force.

U.S. Department of State, “Summary of the Agreement in Principle to Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime,” press release, July 11, 2024, https://www.state.gov/summary-of-the-agreement-in-principle-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/.

For additional information, see CRS Report R47034, Energy and Minerals Provisions in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58).

Save our Wild Salmon, “Columbia River Treaty ‘Agreement in Principle’ Prioritizes Hydropower and Flood Control over the Needs of Imperiled Salmon and River Health,” press release, July 11, 2024, https://www.wildsalmon.org/news-and-media/press-releases/crt-agreement-in-principle-2024.html.

Columbia River Treaty Power Group, “Columbia River Treaty Power Group Response to the Agreement in Principle,” press release, July 18, 2024, https://www.crtpowergroup.org/columbia-river-treaty-power-group-response-to-the-agreement-in-principle/.

U.S. Department of State, “Interim Measures to Continue Columbia River Treaty Coordination,” press release, November 25, 2024, https://www.state.gov/interim-measures-to-continue-columbia-river-treaty-coordination/.
Ibid.

For more on the Senate’s role in treaty consideration, see CRS Report 98-384, Senate Consideration of Treaties, by Valerie Heitshusen, or http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm.
For example, some treaties have lain “dormant” in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for multiple Congresses.

In its November 2024 announcement regarding interim measures for the agreement in principle, the Biden Administration indicated that once the proposed amendments are finalized, it would transmit them to the Senate for advice and consent. See footnote 58.
See, for example, the U.S. approach to the 1944 Treaty with Mexico over usage of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers. For more information, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke.

For more background on the Senate’s role in treaty termination, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by Stephen P. Mulligan, at p. 23.

The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee held a hearing on CRT review on November 7, 2013. The House Natural Resources Committee held a hearing on CRT review on December 9, 2013.

Letter from Pacific Northwest Delegation to President Obama, April 14, 2015, and Letter from Reps. Dan Newhouse, Kurt Schrader, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Peter DeFazio, Greg Walden, Jaime Herrera Beutler, and Dave Reichert to President Trump, June 21, 2017.
Letter from Pacific Northwest Delegation to President Biden, June 29, 2021.
See footnote 55.
S.Amdt. 2587, 117th Congress.


About the author: Charles V. Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Research intern Andrew Spurgeon contributed to the 2024 update to this report.

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
Libya Could Fill Global Oil Gap As Iran Conflict Continues To Rage – Analysis

Map of Libya’s largest oil and natural gas fields. Credit: EIA


April 15, 2026 
By James Durso

A defining pillar of President Trump’s America First agenda has been national energy security. Paired with the diplomatic momentum of the Abraham Accords, that strategy has reshaped regional alliances, strengthened U.S. partnerships and reinforced economic stability at home.

Today, both pillars are under strain. The widening war with Iran has triggered one of the most severe energy shocks in decades. Oil prices have surged above $115 per barrel as markets react to escalating tensions and the risk of prolonged disruption.

At the center of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply flows. With shipping constrained, the effects are cascading across the global economy, raising fuel costs, fueling inflation, and increasing the risk of economic slowdown in the U.S. and among its allies.

Washington has responded with extraordinary measures. As of March, the U.S. had released approximately 172 million barrels from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as part of a coordinated 400-million-barrel drawdown with members of the International Energy Agency. Although this has helped blunt immediate price spikes, it has depressed U.S. reserves to roughly 243 million barrels — the lowest level since the early 1980s.

At the same time, policymakers have cautiously adjusted sanctions policy to stabilize supply. While maintaining core restrictions on major Russian energy firms such as Lukoil and Rosneft, the U.S. has temporarily eased certain measures. A 30-day waiver for stranded Russian and Iranianoil cargoes and a more flexible approach to shipments involving Cubareflect a pragmatic effort to ease market pressure amid the Hormuz disruption.

These steps underscore the urgency of the moment, but also their limits. Strategic reserves are finite, and sanctions flexibility carries geopolitical trade-offs. Together, they buy time, but they do not address the underlying constraint: insufficient global supply and supply chain instability.

While Trump looks for options to stabilize markets in a durable way, a more strategic opportunity is right in front of him: Libya.

Libya holds more than 48 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the largest in Africa. It also produces precisely the kind of light, sweet crude most sought after by European refiners.

Before years of instability caused by the NATO attack on the Gadhafi regime, Libya generated roughly 1.6 million barrels per day. With political stability and renewed investment, production could exceed 2 million barrels per day, providing a meaningful buffer against Gulf disruptions.

In today’s market, that incremental supply matters. Energy markets are driven as much by expectations as by actual output. The credible prospect of increased Libyan production could restore confidence, reduce volatility, and place downward pressure on global energy prices.

The challenge is governance, not geology.

Since the fall of Moammar Gadhafi in 2011, following NATO’s intervention led by the Obama administration, Libya has remained fragmented. Rival governments and militia control over infrastructure have repeatedly disrupted production and deterred investment.

That failure now presents a unique and important opportunity for Trump.

A durable political settlement in Libya would unlock suppressed production, attract investment and provide Europe with a reliable, proximate alternative to Middle Eastern supply routes. At a moment when the Strait of Hormuz remains a chokepoint, Libya offers a Mediterranean corridor largely insulated from Gulf volatility.

The benefits extend beyond energy. Libya’s instability has created space for extremist organizations to operate, including ISIS and al-Qaeda. Stabilization would strengthen counterterrorism coordination with the U.S. and Europe and enhance regional security. It would also counter growing influence from China and Russia, both of which are expanding their presence across Africa’s energy sector. Libya, given its reserves and location, is a strategic prize.

For Trump, Libya offers a rare convergence of opportunity and feasibility. Unlike Iran, it is not an entrenched adversary. Unlike Venezuela, it is not defined by ideological opposition to U.S. engagement. Instead, it is a fragmented state whose competing factions share a common incentive: restoring oil production and revenue.

That shared interest creates the foundation for a pragmatic diplomatic breakthrough. Emergency reserve releases and temporary sanctions relief are stopgap measures. A successful diplomatic initiative in Libya would expand global supply, reduce long-term price volatility, and deliver a clear geopolitical win.

At a moment of historic disruption driven by the Iran conflict, Libya is not simply another foreign policy challenge. It is a strategic solution hiding in plain sight. 

This article was published at The Hill

James Durso

James Durso (@james_durso) is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Central Asia.
US Weapons Sales To Middle East Amidst The Iran War – Analysis

File photo of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Photo Credit: The U.S. Army Ralph Scott/Missile Defense Agency/U.S. Department of Defense, Wikipedia Commons

April 15, 2026 
Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
By Dr S Samuel C Rajiv

The US State Department on 19 March 2026 approved possible foreign military sales (FMS) to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Jordan of multiple defence equipment worth over US$ 16 billion. These included a Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) long-range discrimination radar (LRDR) and related equipment for US$ 4.5 billion, Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS) and related equipment for US$ 2.1 billion, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) and related equipment for US$ 1.22 billion, F-16 fighter aircraft munitions and upgrades, including Joint Direct Munitions (JDAM) Guidance Sets, for US$ 644 million (all to the UAE);[i] Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor Radars (LTAMDS) for an estimated cost of US$ 8 billion (to Kuwait)[ii] and aircraft and munitions support to Jordan for US$ 70.5 million.[iii]

The State Department noted that the proposed sales will meet the national security objectives of the United States and help its regional partners meet current and future threats. The notifications highlight that the Secretary of State has determined that an ‘emergency exists’ which requires the ‘immediate sale’ of these weapons systems to these partner nations, waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act [AECA].

The AECA requires the US President to notify the US Congress 30 calendar days (or 15 days for weapons sales to Australia, Israel, NATO member states, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea) before concluding government-to-government FMS agreements. The AECA also gives the President the authority to waive the review periods, but must provide a justification and a description of the emergency circumstances.[iv] In April 2019, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, for the first time, waived the Congressional reporting period for arms sales to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[v] Critics point out that the use of this reporting waiver precludes effective legislative scrutiny of the proposed arms sales.[vi]

Most State Department notifications to the US Congress in recent years regarding the sale of equipment through FMS to Israel and other regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, did not invoke the Congressional review waiver. On 3 February 2026, for instance, the US State Department notified Congress of a possible US$ 3 billion F-15 sustainment sale to Saudi Arabia.[vii] On 30 January 2026, an FMS sale to Israel of AH-64E Apache helicopters and related equipment, estimated at US$ 3.8 billion, was notified to the US Congress without a waiver of Congressional review.[viii] In February 2025 and December 2023, though, Secretary Rubio waived the AECA Section 36 Congressional review requirements for the sale of munitions (including JDAM guidance kits) and 120 mm tank cartridges to Israel, as indeed for the sale of ‘non-standard ammunition’ in April 2022 and Hawk missile system sustainment-related sales in April 2024 (both to Ukraine).[ix]


The 19 March State Department notifications relating to the proposed arms sales to the UAE, Kuwait and Jordan, meanwhile, highlight the requirement for ‘immediate sale’ of the listed weapons systems. Representative Gregory Meeks, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, criticised the Trump administration for the latest arms sales proposals and pointed out that only one of the defence items (out of the ‘dozen weapons cases covered by the emergency declaration’) is available for ‘immediate export’.[x]

The US State Department on 6 March notified Congress about the sale of 12,000 ‘BLU-110A/B general purpose, 1,000-pound bomb bodies’ to Israel. That notification specifically stated that ‘part of the BLU-110A/B requirement will be transferred from stock’.[xi] As and when the G2G agreement takes place, therefore, the transfer of most of the equipment proposed to be sold to the UAE, Kuwait and Jordan may not be from current stockpiles but will have to be manufactured for eventual export. US defence corporations flagged in the 19 March 2026 notifications include Northrop Grumman, RTX Corporation, RTX Missile Defence Technologies, SRC Corporation, Lockheed Martin and S&K Aerospace.

The equipment proposed for sale meanwhile relates to air defence systems, radar equipment and munitions for fighter aircraft. Iran has attacked multiple military and commercial infrastructure in the Gulf countries through unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles in response to Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion. On 18–19 March, for instance, Iran’s attack on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure wiped out 17 per cent of the country’s export capacity and caused an estimated loss of US$ 20 billion in export revenues.[xii]


According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), Iran has launched more than 1,500 strikes across the region in response to the over 3,000 strikes on Iran by the US and Israel since 28 February. ACLED notes that the UAE has suffered the largest share of successful impacts in Iran’s retaliatory strikes, while Kuwait has recorded the highest number of casualties.[xiii] Israel’s attacks on Iran’s South Pars gas field and the Asaluyeh processing hub on 18 March triggered a wave of Iranian retaliatory strikes against energy infrastructure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar.

Reports note that many of the Gulf States were running low on their stockpile of air defence interceptors in the wake of the Iranian drone and missile barrages. Some reports estimate that the UAE used up to 75 per cent of its stockpile of Patriot interceptors since 28 February.[xiv] According to the UAE Ministry of Defence, as of 9 April 2026, UAE Air Defences engaged a total of 537 ballistic missiles, 26 cruise missiles and 2,256 UAVs.[xv] Analysts note that the US and allies used more than 900 Patriot missile interceptors (equivalent to 18 months of production stockpile).[xvi] Moreover, the US, Israel, Gulf States and other coalition forces used more than 11,000 munitions in the first 16 days of the conflict, at a cost of nearly US$ 26 billion.[xvii]

The impact of the high use of munitions and interceptors in the West Asian context is also having repercussions for other war zones, such as Ukraine. Reports note that Spain has pledged to provide five PAC-2 missile systems from its inventory to Ukraine to help it tide over the shortage caused by the heavy use of these interceptors in the Middle East.[xviii] Lockheed Martin, the company that makes the Patriot interceptors, agreed to more than triple the interceptors’ production in January 2026 (from 600 to 2,000 per year). Still, it could take multiple years to reach these production targets.[xix] Reports in mid-March also noted that the US was re-deploying a THAAD missile system from South Korea to the Gulf, to bolster regional missile defences. This was in the aftermath of THAAD radars and associated equipment being hit by Iranian drone and missile barrages in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.[xx]


The LRDR, meanwhile, is a fixed long-range active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, as opposed to the transportable AN/TPY-2 AESA radar that was reportedly damaged in Iranian strikes in Jordan. The proposed sale of the LRDR to the UAE is significant, as it will be the first country, after the US, to operate the radar. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) completed the LRDR’s operational trial period for the US Space Forces’ (USSF) Combat Forces Command (CFC) in December 2025.[xxi] This marked the operational acceptance of the radar for the CFC. It is unclear, though, when the ‘immediate’ sale of the LRDR to the UAE will take place.

Kuwait will also become only the second international customer to integrate the LTAMDS AESA radar into its air and missile defence architecture, after Poland. The US$ 1.7 billion deal to supply 12 radar units for integration into Poland’s Patriot missile batteries was signed in August 2024, following the Letter of Acceptance in October 2023. Nine of these 12 units were delivered to Poland in September 2025.[xxii] RTX Corporation, the manufacturer of the radar system, delivered the first six LTAMDS radars to the US Army in 2025. In April 2025, the company noted that it would produce 8 radars per year and ramp up production to 12 per year to meet global demand.[xxiii]

Given the high rates of use of ammunition and air defence interceptors in recent military operations, therefore, coupled with the charged regional security situation, US arms sales to the Gulf allies can only be expected to increase in the near to mid-term. At the same time, the challenge for the US defence industrial base will be to not only meet increased demands in West Asia and ongoing conflicts such as in Ukraine, but also address critical equipment requirements of US allies in East Asia, such as South Korea and Japan.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.About the author: Dr S Samuel C Rajiv is Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Prior to joining MP-IDSA in November 2006, Dr Rajiv worked at the publication India’s National Security Annual Review (from 2002-2005) and was a Visiting Scholar at the BESA Centre for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Israel (October 2005-September 2006). Dr Rajiv earned his PhD from the School of International Studies, JNU.
Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

[i] “United Arab Emirates – Long-Range Discrimination Radar with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Integration”, US Department of State, 19 March 2026; “United Arab Emirates – F-16 Munitions and Upgrades”, US Department of State, 19 March 2026; “United Arab Emirates – Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs)”, US Department of State, 19 March 2026; “United Arab Emirates – Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System”, US Department of State, 19 March 2026.

[ii] “Kuwait – Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor Radars”, US Department of State, 19 March 2026.

[iii] “Government of Jordan – Aircraft Repair, Return, and Spares”, US Department of State, 19 March 2026.

[iv] Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process”, Congressional Research Service, 27 March 2026, p. 6.


[v] Ibid., pp. 6–7.

[vi] Stavroula Pabst, “Emergency Waivers Move Arms for Israel, UAE to Speed Lane”, Responsible Statecraft, 9 April 2026.

[vii] “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – F-15 Sustainment”, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 3 February 2026.

[viii] “Israel – AH-64E Apache Helicopters”, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 30 January 2026.

[ix] Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process”, no. 4, pp. 6–9.

[x] “House Foreign Affairs Ranking Member Meeks Calls out Trump Admin for Again Abusing Emergency Authorities to Bypass Congress on Arms Sales”, United States Representative Gregory Meeks, 19 March 2026.

[xi] “Israel – Munitions and Munitions Support”, US Department of State, 6 March 2026.

[xii] Maha El Dahan, Andrew Mills and Yousef Saba, “Exclusive: Iran Attacks Wipe Out 17% of Qatar’s LNG Capacity for up to Five Years, QatarEnergy CEO Says”, Reuters, 19 March 2026.

[xiii] “Middle East Overview: April 2026”, ACLED, 8 April 2026.

[xiv] Efrat Lachter, “More Than 90% of Iranian Missiles Intercepted, but a Dangerous Imbalance Is Emerging”, JINSA, 26 March 2026.

[xv] United Arab Emirates Ministry of Defence, “Ministry of Defence confirms UAE airspace free of any air threats…”, X, 9 April 2026.

[xvi] David Crowe, “The Next Big Iran War Question: Who Will Lose from the Missile Shortage?”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 2026.

[xvii] Macdonald Amoah, Morgan D. Bazilian and Lieutenant Colonel Jahara Matisek, “Over 11,000 Munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War: ‘Command of the Reload’ Governs Endurance”, RUSI, 24 March 2026.

[xviii] Yuliia Zavadska, “Spain to Send 5 Patriot Missiles to Ukraine Amid Air Defense Shortage”, Kyiv Post, 30 March 2026.

[xix] David Crowe, “The Next Big Iran War Question: Who Will Lose from the Missile Shortage?”, no. 16.

[xx] Thomas Bordeaux and Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Radar Bases Housing Key US Missile Interceptor Hit in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, Satellite Images Show”, CNN, 6 March 2026; Alex Abraham, “THAAD Missile System Move: Why the US is Shifting Defences from Korea to the Middle East”, Gulf News, 13 March 2026.

[xxi] “Combat Forces Command Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) Operational Acceptance”, USSF Combat Forces Command, 8 December 2025.


[xxii] “RTX Awarded $1.7 Billion Contract for LTAMDS”, RTX, 23 September 2025.

[xxiii] “RTX’s Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor Positioned for Production”, RTX, 21 April 2025.

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).


LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for PERMANENT ARMS ECONOMY
Sanctions Shackles: Bangladesh Kneels To U.S. Whips – OpEd





April 15, 2026 
By Ashu Mann


The February 2026 U.S.–Bangladesh Agreement on Reciprocal Trade is being sold as a commercial bargain, but its most dangerous provisions are not about tariffs at all. They are about power. Buried inside the language of “economic and national security” is a framework that pulls Bangladesh steadily into Washington’s strategic orbit. Articles 3.1–3.3 already narrow Dhaka’s policy space on digital taxation and customs duties on electronic transmissions. But Articles 4.1–4.3 go much further: they push Bangladesh towards alignment with American sanctions, export controls, investment scrutiny, and defence preferences. This is not free trade. It is conditional sovereignty.

The bluntest example is Article 4.1. It states that if the United States adopts a border measure or other trade action it considers relevant to its own economic or national security, Bangladesh, after notification and consultations, “shall adopt or maintain a complementary restrictive measure” in support of the U.S. step. Article 4.2 then requires Bangladesh to harmonise its export-control regime with U.S. controls on sensitive technologies and goods, and to ensure Bangladeshi companies do not “backfill or undermine” those controls. It also calls on Bangladesh to help restrict transactions that would violate U.S. sanctions or export controls if they had occurred in the United States or involved a U.S. person. The footnote makes clear the reference point: Washington’s Entity List and OFAC sanctions lists.

That caveat about acting “consistent with” domestic law does not rescue the clause. In practical terms, the agreement invites Bangladesh to internalise American blacklists as a working principle of commerce. A sovereign state should decide its own foreign-policy posture according to its own interests, regional realities, and legal standards. Instead, this text pressures Dhaka to treat Washington’s sanctions architecture as the outer boundary of acceptable trade. That means the U.S. is not merely protecting itself; it is exporting its coercive regime into another country’s regulatory bloodstream. Once that logic is accepted, Bangladesh stops behaving like an independent actor and starts behaving like an enforcement adjunct of U.S. strategy.

The diplomatic cost is obvious. Any meaningful partnership with countries that fall foul of U.S. strategic preferences becomes riskier, more politically expensive, and potentially punishable. Article 3.2 allows the United States to terminate the agreement and reimpose tariffs if Bangladesh enters a new digital trade agreement with a country that “jeopardizes essential U.S. interests.” Article 4.3 repeats the same pattern for a bilateral free-trade or preferential economic agreement with a “non-market country” that Washington believes undermines the deal. This is not market openness; it is geopolitical gatekeeping. Bangladesh is told, in effect, that future relationships with China, or with any state disfavoured by Washington, may trigger economic retaliation.

The security intrusions are even starker. Article 4.3 says Bangladesh shall not purchase nuclear reactors, fuel rods, or enriched uranium from a country that “jeopardizes essential U.S. interests,” except under narrow exceptions. The same article says the United States shall work with Bangladesh to “streamline and enhance defense trade.” Then Annex III, Section 6 adds another revealing commitment: Bangladesh shall endeavour to increase purchases of U.S. military equipment and limit military equipment purchases from certain countries. When a trade agreement begins dictating the political acceptability of strategic suppliers and nudging arms purchases towards one power, it ceases to be a trade pact in the ordinary sense. It becomes an instrument of alignment.


Washington’s own public messaging confirms the direction of travel. The White House said Bangladesh committed to cooperate on export controls, share information on inbound investment, and strengthen economic and national-security alignment. It also highlighted expected commercial deals in aircraft, agriculture, and energy. The agreement was tied to anticipated purchases exceeding $18 billion, including energy, agriculture, and military products, while reducing U.S. tariffs on Bangladeshi exports to 19 percent and creating a zero-tariff mechanism for some textiles made with U.S. inputs. The structure is unmistakable: tariff relief is offered as the carrot, while sanctions alignment, sourcing pressure, and strategic dependence become the stick.

Supporters will claim Bangladesh is merely being pragmatic in a harsh trading environment. That defence misses the point. Pragmatism is negotiating flexible terms while retaining strategic autonomy. This agreement does the opposite. It binds Bangladesh’s room for manoeuvre to U.S. threat perceptions, U.S. sanctions lists, U.S. judgments about “non-market” partners, and U.S.-favoured procurement patterns. A country that cannot freely calibrate its ties with Russia, China, or any other major actor without fear of tariff snapback is not exercising full sovereignty. It is operating under managed permission.

Bangladesh deserves trade, not tutelage. It deserves access to markets without being dragooned into another state’s blacklist diplomacy. A fair agreement would expand commerce while respecting Dhaka’s right to choose its partners, suppliers, and strategic posture. The February 2026 agreement does not meet that test. It asks Bangladesh to mortgage foreign-policy independence in exchange for limited tariff relief and promised purchases. That is a poor bargain for any sovereign nation. And for Bangladesh, it is a warning that the price of doing business with Washington may now include obedience itself.


Guarding Against Excessive Economic Dependence – Analysis


April 15, 2026 
By Ashu Mann


The BNP government’s decision to review the recent trade agreement is best understood as a conscious attempt to prevent Bangladesh from sliding into structural overdependence on a single external power, particularly the United States. In doing so, it has signalled that economic policymaking in Dhaka will not be reduced to rubber-stamping deals that expand Washington’s leverage while narrowing Bangladesh’s strategic choices.

Asymmetry and strategic vulnerability

The starting point is the hard reality that the United States is already Bangladesh’s single largest export market, accounting for around 18 per cent of total export earnings and remaining the top destination for ready-made garments. In 2025 alone, Bangladesh exported goods worth about 8.69 billion dollars to the United States, running a sizeable trade surplus but also deepening exposure to fluctuations in US demand and policy. This concentration of export earnings in one market gives Washington a structural lever over Bangladesh’s growth, employment in the garment sector, and foreign exchange stability.

When any one country becomes indispensable for market access, technology, or finance, the relationship ceases to be a normal partnership and starts resembling a hierarchy. Over-reliance on a single buyer country for jobs and foreign exchange can quickly morph into a strategic vulnerability, because even limited trade disruptions or targeted sanctions can create outsized domestic political and economic shocks.

The BNP’s scepticism towards the proposed agreement reflects an awareness that codifying more such asymmetric dependence, especially in areas like critical inputs, standards, or digital rules would lock Bangladesh into a subordinate position that is difficult to reverse.

The US record of instrumentalising trade

Bangladesh’s experience with the United States on labour linked trade conditionalities is a telling warning. In 2013, Washington suspended Bangladesh’s eligibility under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), citing worker rights and safety concerns after the Rana Plaza tragedy, and tied reinstatement to a unilateral US “Action Plan”.

Yet garments, which constitute the majority of Bangladesh’s export basket, were never covered by GSP in the first place; only about 1 per cent of exports to the United States actually enjoyed those preferences. The economic impact of the suspension was modest, but the political signalling was sharp and deliberately humiliating, with Dhaka pressured to constantly demonstrate “progress” on a checklist drafted in Washington.

This episode underlines a broader pattern: the United States is willing to weaponise access to its market and trade privileges to force internal policy changes in smaller states, often with highly selective and inconsistent application of human rights rhetoric. Scholars of economic coercion have shown that such linkages can successfully reshape policy behaviour in vulnerable countries, not because the measures are economically devastating in themselves, but because leaders fear the reputational costs and the possibility of escalation to more painful sanctions.

For Bangladesh, granting Washington even deeper, treaty-backed influence over critical economic inputs would be an unforced error, given this proven track record of instrumentalising trade.

Sovereignty, conditionalities, and strategic autonomy

The BNP government’s objections on sovereignty and mandatory procurement should therefore be read as more than routine bargaining language. Clauses that effectively hard wire American suppliers into Bangladesh’s procurement chains, or require alignment with US regulatory preferences, would give Washington enduring leverage over infrastructure, energy, and emerging technologies in Bangladesh.

Once such provisions are locked into binding treaty commitments, rolling them back is politically costly and legally complex, especially for a developing country that cannot afford reputational damage in global markets.

For a state like Bangladesh, which must navigate not only US power but also the competing pulls of China, India, and other regional players, autonomy in economic decision-making is a core security interest, not a luxury.

The ability to say “no” to political conditionalities, to diversify sources of technology and finance, and to recalibrate supply chains over time is essential if Dhaka is to avoid becoming a mere arena where larger powers trade influence. The BNP’s refusal to sign a lopsided deal is thus a rare assertion of strategic agency in an environment where Washington often expects compliance as the default.

Bangladesh’s trade profile already shows that an alternative path is both possible and desirable. China and India together account for the largest share of Bangladesh’s imports, particularly in machinery, raw materials, and consumer goods, while the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom dominate as export destinations. This pattern can be leveraged to build a consciously diversified portfolio of economic partnerships, where no single country, whether the US, China, or any other, can unilaterally cripple Bangladesh’s economy by turning off the tap of trade, investment, or finance.

A diversification doctrine would mean deepening ties with regional forums and middle power coalitions, from ASEAN and the Gulf economies to African and Latin American partners, alongside a balanced approach towards both Washington and Beijing.

It would also involve pushing for more value addition at home, so that Bangladesh is not locked permanently into the lowest rungs of garment assembly, and can instead bargain for better terms in multiple markets. Such a strategy enhances resilience and bargaining power, because external partners know that Bangladesh is not trapped in a single corridor of dependence.


Ashu Mann

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.


Federal Spending Rises To Post-Covid High In Wake Of DOGE Failure – OpEd


April 15, 2026 
MISES
By Ryan McMaken


The US Treasury Department last week released its monthly report on federal spending and revenue. March spending for the US federal government was up by more than $20 billion, or by nearly four percent, from March of last year. In spite of the administration’s claims last year that Trump would implement hundreds of billions in spending cuts, the US federal government is now spending at higher levels than anything seen since 2021 when covid-related spending surged above all previous historical peacetime levels.

Meanwhile, the US is on track to spend more than a trillion dollars on interest on the debt this year, and this number will only go up as interest rates on federal Treasurys look poised to rise further. Moreover, recent numbers reflect only a small amount of the true war costs coming out of the war with Iran. The full brunt of the runaway spending that will come out of this war have yet to be felt. Indeed, the war with Iran, with no end in sight, is now estimated to be on track to cost more than a trillion dollars above and beyond the current $900 billion pentagon budget, going into 2027. If current trends continue, federal spending in 2027’s fiscal year will make 2026 spending look mild by comparison.
Federal Spending in 2026 Fiscal Year

According to the Treasury’s report, the US federal government spent $548 billion during March, an increase of $20.7 billion, or 3.9 percent over March of 2025. The total federal deficit for the month was up as well, with a total March deficit of $164.1 billion. That’s up from March 2025’s deficit of $160.5 billion.

Looking at the first six months of the current fiscal year combined—a period which began on October 1, 2025—federal spending was up by $83.9 billion, or 2.3 percent. At $3.6 trillion for the fiscal year so far, that’s the highest level of spending ever, and is now even higher than spending during the days of juiced-up covid-panic outlays. Even when adjusted for inflation, 2026’s spending for the first six months of this fiscal year is at the highest level for every year except for 2021. In other words, the only other year with higher spending was the year when Trump ratcheted up spending toward the end of the 2020 calendar year—which was an election year. Trump continued to push historically high spending levels for the first four months of the 2021 fiscal year, until he finally left office at the end of January 2021.



For the first six months of this fiscal year, the total deficit grew to the second-largest total since 2021, climbing to $1.17 trillion. Last year, the deficit for the first half of the year was $1.31 trillion. Adjusted for CPI inflation, the deficit during the first six months of this fiscal year came in behind 2021, 2023, and 2025. This year, however, as war expenses climb, and as Treasury yields rise, US federal spending is on track to top two trillion for the first time since 2021.


War Costs Mount

It is likely that the US had already spent at least $16 billion on the Iran war in just the first three to five days. Overall, estimates suggest the war costs the US taxpayer approximately $2 billion per day. Most official estimates of the war’s cost greatly underestimate the total because official estimates are usually based on the original costs for munitions and ships. Replacement costs are likely to be much higher than the cost of the initial production. Moreover, official costs in recent decades have reliably underestimated the total price tags for wars.

For example, during the Iraq war, when George W. Bush’s economic advisor, Larry Lindsey, suggested the war might cost as much as $200 billion, he was fired. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that number was “baloney.” The true cost of the war ended up being over $5 trillion. In other words, US government estimates of war costs are not to be taken seriously.

In any case, at current spending levels, the Iran war will likely cost US taxpayers at least $100 billion by early May. The war will greatly add to the total deficit by the end of the current fiscal year, and this will further add to the federal debt, which, as of the end of March, stood at $39.1 trillion. Since Trump was sworn in for his second term 14 months ago, the total federal debt has increased by $2.9 trillion Indeed, if we combine the total debt accumulated during Trump’s first term and his second term, so far, the US has added more than $10.4 trillion, or more than 26 percent of the entire national debt.


Interest Payments on the Federal Debt

With debt levels rising rapidly, and with Treasury yields no longer falling, interest payments on the national debt have become a substantial part of federal outlays. In March, for example, the US paid more than $102 billion, just for interest on the debt. For the first six months of this fiscal year, the total has been more than $622.5 billion. Nearly one dollar for every dollar spent now goes to interest on the debt. The Treasury department estimates that the total paid out in interest by the end of this year will be $1.3 trillion.

That number is likely to increase going forward, since there is good reason to believe that yields on Treasurys will go up, and this will drive up overall debt service costs as the US must refinance trillions of its debt at higher interest rates. During 2026, more than $10 trillion of US debt will mature. Naturally, the US does not have the money to pay off these Treasurys, so the US will have to refinance these costs with new bond issuance. Yet, Treasury yields are higher now than they were when most Treasurys were initially issued, so this will further increase the cost of the debt. The ten-year yield, for example, has been near a nineteen-year high for the past six months.

Rising yields are partly due to the fact that rising deficits mean the US Treasury must continue to issue hundreds of billions in new Treasurys every few months. As the market is flooded with these Treasurys, prices go down, which means yields go up. Recent Treasury auctions have indeed hinted that demand for Treasurys is weak. On March 28, Fortune reported:

President Donald Trump’s war on Iran is colliding with U.S. debt investors, who demonstrated less appetite for Treasury securities as hopes for a quick end to the conflict evaporate …The short end of the yield curve is under extra pressure as soaring oil prices boost the inflation outlook and put additional rate cuts from the Federal Reserve on hold, with odds of a rate hike also increasing.

(The odds of a rate hike are rising because price inflation remains stubbornly near three percent, well above the Fed’s two-percent target. This is all in spite of the Fed’s repeated assurances in recent years that price inflation was headed rapidly toward the target level.)

Rising war costs, coupled with growing debt levels, will further encourage volatility:

The U.S. Treasury market has entered a period of intense volatility this April, marked by a dramatic steepening of the yield curve that has caught many institutional investors off guard. For the first time in over two years, the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield has surged past the 4.30% threshold, reaching as high as 4.39% in mid-April 2026. This shift signals a fundamental “re-pricing” of long-term risk as the market grapples with a resurgent inflation narrative and a geopolitical energy shock that has dismantled hopes for a “soft landing” in the second half of the year.

Thanks to rising debts, deficits, and yields, we can expect the central bank to intervene to monetize the debt and bring down yields. In fact, the Fed has been intervening to do exactly this since December when the Fed announced that it would begin buying up $40 billion of Treasurys per month. Since December, the Fed has added $163 billion to its portfolio, meaning the Fed has essentially created 163 billion new dollars in an effort to reduce Treasury yields. This will fuel more price inflation—either in assets or in consumer goods. This all comes in spite of years of Fed promises to eliminate the Fed’s stockpile of Treasurys which peaked at $5.7 trillion in 2022. The persistence of this easy-money financed purchasing of Treasurys has been a major factor in the 40-year highs in price inflation reached in 2022, and has reduced American’s purchasing power by nearly 25 percent since 2020.

We’ve come a long way from early 2025 when the Trump administration was claiming that it would slash federal spending with cuts through the so-called “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE). That was clearly an immense failure, with no more than $33 billion in confirmed cuts to federal spending. That’s far less than a single month’s payment on the federal debt, and less than a single month’s cost of carrying on the Iran War.

At the same time it was pretending to cut federal spending, the Trump administration was claiming that it would cut spending so much that it could eliminate the federal income tax and rely on import taxes instead. Anyone who knew anything about US fiscal policy knew that was absurd, of course. Taxes on imports, even with recent growth in revenue, amount to a small percentage of the federal government’s immense receipts total. But many Trump supporters bought the idea. In the real world, however, there will be no spending cuts and the income tax is certainly not in danger. Instead of that, the Trump administration has subjected to the American taxpayers to even more federal spending and higher interest rates fueled by larger debts. 



About the author: Ryan McMaken (@ryanmcmaken) is editor in chief at the Mises Institute, a former economist for the State of Colorado, and the author of two books: Breaking Away: The Case of Secession, Radical Decentralization, and Smaller Polities and Commie Cowboys: The Bourgeoisie and the Nation-State in the Western Genre. He is also the editor of The Struggle for Liberty: A Libertarian History of Political Thought. Ryan has a bachelor’s degree in economics and a master’s degree in public policy, finance, and international relations from the University of Colorado. Send in your article submissions for the Mises Wire and Power and Market, but read article guidelines first.
 
Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute

The Mises Institute, founded in 1982, teaches the scholarship of Austrian economics, freedom, and peace. The liberal intellectual tradition of Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) and Murray N. Rothbard (1926-1995) guides us. Accordingly, the Mises Institute seeks a profound and radical shift in the intellectual climate: away from statism and toward a private property order. The Mises Institute encourages critical historical research, and stands against political correctness.
Hydropower Generation Expected To Recover Despite Snow Drought In US West – Analysis

The Dalles Dam on the Columbia River between Oregon and Washington. Photo Credit: USGS, Wikipedia Commons


April 15, 2026 
By EIA


In our April Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), we expect U.S. hydropower generation will increase by 5% in 2026 but remain 1.8% below the 10-year average following snow drought conditions in some states. Hydropower generation in 2025 increased to 245 billion kilowatthours (BkWh), about 4 BkWh more than the record-low generation year 2024. In 2026, we expect generation will be 259 BkWh, which would represent 6% of U.S. electricity generation.

Seasonal precipitation in the form of rain and snowpack accumulation are the two main factors that help predict water supply and hydropower generation. Seasonal precipitation influences soil moisture, and moister soil helps to preserve the snowpack, which in turn acts as a natural reservoir.

According to data from the Western Regional Climate Center, precipitation levels across the western United States have been mostly normal. However, many states in this region have experienced record warm winter temperatures leading to snow drought conditions. A heat wave in March affecting much of the western United States also led to early snowmelt especially around California, the Southwest, and portions of the Northwest. These conditions will likely affect hydropower generation, as less water supply is expected in the spring and summer months.
Northwest

The Columbia River Basin in the Northwest region contains more than one-third of U.S. hydropower capacity and generates enough electricity to power over 4 million homes. Changes in water supply in the Northwest can affect the use of other electricity-generating fuels in the region, such as natural gas, and can affect electricity trade with neighboring areas.

We expect hydropower generation in the Northwest and Rockies region to be 125 BkWh, which is a 17% increase compared with 2025 and 4% less than the 10-year average. Hydropower generation in December 2025 and January 2026 was unusually high due to a series of atmospheric rivers that led to devastating flooding in the region. Our hydropower forecast is informed by the water supply outlook from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Northwest River Forecast Center.

Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), April 2026


California

We forecast hydropower generation in California to be 28.5 BkWh in our April STEO, which is 6% less than last year’s generation but 15% more than the 10-year average.

As of April 1, reservoir levels in most major reservoirs in California were above the 30-year historical average for this time of year. The two largest reservoirs in the state, Shasta and Oroville, were at 114% and 124% of the historical average, respectively. The state of California also experienced three consecutive weeks of no drought or drier than normal conditions. However, according to the California Department of Water Resources, snowpack conditions as of April 1 were well below normal with Northern Sierra Nevada at 7%, Central Sierra at 25%, and Southern Sierra at 39%. Additionally, warmer-than-normal temperatures in March led to some early snowmelt across the state.

Principal contributor: Lindsay Aramayo

Source: This article was published by EIA

EIA

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects, analyzes, and disseminates independent and impartial energy information to promote sound policymaking, efficient markets, and public understanding of energy and its interaction with the economy and the environment.


 

After 9,000 Years Of Cultivation, Rice Has Reached Its Thermal Limit


By 

Rice has historically been a heat-loving plant. In fact, the wild ancestor of cultivated rice once grew primarily on the sweltering, rain-swept Malay and Indochina peninsulas as well as the islands of Southeast Asia. It wasn’t until Earth’s climate warmed after the last ice age that wild rice substantially spread into central China and South Asia, where it was independently domesticated by humans in two events that arguably rank among the most important in the history of our species.

Rice fueled many of the earliest civilizations and remains a virtually indispensable source of food in the modern world. Today, half of all humans get 20% of their calories from rice, and more than a billion people are reliant on the production and distribution of rice for their livelihoods.

That might be about to change. Scientists warn that over the next 50 years, global warming caused by the emission of greenhouse gases will accelerate to a pace that is 5,000 times faster than rice, and many other crop species, have ever had to contend with at any time during their evolutionary history.

Left to its own devices, even rice — with its proclivity for heat — would almost certainly be unable to keep up. With the help of humans, who carefully breed and genetically engineer new varieties, it’s possible rice will be able to cope. But, said Nicolas Gauthier, curator of artificial intelligence at the Florida Museum of Natural History, the best-case scenario is not something anyone’s looking forward to.

“These changes are going to be disruptive, and the process of adaptation doesn’t come for free. It has to be done with intention and might not be pleasant,” he said.

Gauthier is the lead author of a new study that combines data from multiple scientific disciplines to predict the possible future for rice — or lack thereof — in a rapidly warming world. The prognosis is grim.

“Regions in the south, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, are the ones that are going to be most heavily impacted, and the process of adapting is going to leave a lot of people out of the loop. Those who depend on rice for their subsistence today aren’t necessarily the ones who are going to be able to access the new genetic varieties that are developed.”

The threat to food security posed by global warming is multifaceted, and in the case of rice, it involves a long history of adaptation in the opposite thermal direction toward cooler climates.

Rice was initially domesticated in the Yangtze River basin in central China between 7,000 and 9,000 years ago, when balmy temperatures and frequent rain made it possible for humans to develop agricultural societies around the world. Trade networks connected these societies like hyphae, and early rice cultivars were among the many goods that streamed along them.  

Based on archaeological evidence, rice farms in China expanded to the north and east along the course of the Huang He River and westward into interior China beginning roughly 5,000 years ago and continuing for a millennium. Then, about 4,200 years ago, a period of abrupt cooling and drought struck much of Eurasia, causing several civilizations — including the Akkadian Empire and the Egyptian Old Kingdom — to wane.

Rice farmers in China adapted by cultivating new varieties of rice that could tolerate colder temperatures. The existence of these new cold-tolerant varieties eventually allowed rice production to spread to regions with more temperate climates, such as Korea and Japan.

In contrast, transitioning from cold to hot climates can involve more than just a plant expediting its developmental timeline.

“You don’t see that kind of flexibility on the hot end because at some point, the plant will physically stop working,” Gauthier said.

By way of analogy, if you were to move into a house north of the Arctic Circle, you might compensate for the longer winters by staying inside for a greater portion of the year and staying outdoors as long as possible during the 20-hour halcyon days of summer. But if you move to a place where summers get too hot, you might suffer from heat stroke. Spending the summer indoors might be an option for you, but rice gets all its nutrition from being out in the sun and doesn’t have that luxury.

Gauthier wanted to know the upper temperature threshold beyond which modern rice varieties are unable to extend. Working with colleagues from New York University and the University of Washington, Gauthier combined archaeological and botanical records, including satellite imagery, agricultural records and herbarium data, to figure out where rice was grown historically and where it grows now.

This resulted in a map to which they could add current, historical and future climate projections. Using this, they determined that rice today is grown almost entirely in areas with a mean annual temperature of less than 82° degrees Fahrenheit and an average monthly maximum of less than 104 F. This aligns well with data from other studies that demonstrate rice begins showing signs of heat stress at anything above 91 F

With this baseline in hand, the authors used artifacts from 803 archaeological sites to trace the historical movement of rice and determine how that coincided with past temperatures. The results indicate that at no point during its 9,000 years of cultivation has rice ever been grown in a region with a mean annual temperature of more than 82 F. There were a few archaeological sites in northern India and Pakistan in which the average monthly maximum temperature exceeded 104 F, but given the arid climate of these regions, the authors note that long-distance trade may be a more plausible explanation for how rice ended up at those locations rather than it having been grown there.

Thus, 104 F seems to be the cutoff, and anything with an annual average above 82 F is pushing it.

Finally, the authors projected future global temperatures using climate models to see where rice might have a chance of growing over the next century. By 2070, the results suggest that almost the entire southern distribution of rice, from India through Malaysia, will have mean annual temperatures of more than 82 F. A maximum monthly average temperature of more than 104 F during the hottest months of the year is expected for most of India, as well as parts of China and the Middle East.

India became the world’s top rice-producing country, a title previously held by China, after growing nearly 150 million metric tons of rice grain. Were anything to suddenly and negatively affect India’s ability to grow rice, ensuing mass starvation is a very real possibility. 

Under business-as-usual models of climate change, in which countries are collectively unable to significantly reduce the emission of fossil fuels, rice growers and consumers have about 50 years to prepare for the worst. Much of that preparation and adaptation will probably involve growing tropical varieties of rice in what are today more temperate regions and growing temperate varieties at higher latitudes than they are currently able to grow. But even if this averts famine, Gauthier warned, the process will still be unutterably difficult and its effects distributed unequally.

“On an aggregate scale, it could be that, pound for pound, all the rice that won’t be able to grow in Southeast Asia could be grown in China instead, but that doesn’t change the impact on the people in Southeast Asia who can’t just start growing a new crop from scratch.”