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Monday, March 23, 2026

Interests And Armageddon: The Third Gulf War Shakes Middle East – Analysis




March 23, 2026 
 Geopolitical Monitor
By Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco


War has broken out in the Middle East once again, but this time the writing on the wall brings an unusually ominous message. Although the Third Gulf War is unlikely to be the last showdown between Iranian and Israeli-US forces, this ongoing conflict is heading in a dangerous direction. What both sides are fighting over is the strategic prerogative to redraw the very balance of power in West Asia, so the aftermath could produce a prolonged local ‘Cold War,’ a new hegemonic cycle, or widespread anarchy. The ripple effects are not just encouraging the proliferation of regional seismicity in multiple overlapping layers. This front is a facet of a broader chessboard in which the multipolar great game of high politics plays out. But perhaps the most troubling aspect of the war is that its politico-strategic logic of statecraft is interwoven with the incendiary grammar of religious millenarianism.

Geopolitical Outlook

The current US-Israeli Iran war is the culmination of a long-range trajectory. As the late Shabtai Shavit, former Mossad chief, noted, Israel and Iran have been locked in a low-intensity war for decades. In the multidimensional operational theatres of this dispute, both sides have relied on grey-zone tactics and mosaic warfare, but no checkmate has occurred. Unlike the Soviet-sponsored Arab armies that intended to destroy Israel through clumsily planned invasions, Iran has mobilized nonstate proxy militias, attritional tools, and sectarian violence. Even high-ranking members of the Israeli defense apparatus and intelligence community regard the Islamic Republic as a sophisticated adversary. Considering the profile of Iran as a Persian and Shiite nation, Iran’s hostility towards Israel validates its pretensions as an aspiring overlord of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Israel, in order to address Teheran’s aggressive bid for regional hegemony and the latent threat of hypothetical Iranian nukes, has counterattacked with covert operations, cyber warfare, and targeted assassinations. Based on a zero-sum logic, the Israelis have also supported Sunni militias opposed to the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’ to dismantle Teheran’s regional sphere of influence. As a state with little strategic depth and limited manpower, Israel has invested several assets in the development of a strong security partnership with the US against Iran.

Long gone are the days in which Israel and Iran joined forces, both openly and clandestinely, against the military and (geo)political challenge of Arab nationalism. Once the threshold of direct kinetic was crossed in the Twelve-Day War, the spectre of a wider regional war is nowadays haunting much of West Asia. The ongoing 2026 rematch is dangerous because the belligerents have incentives to double down rather than de-escalate. The Americans want to permanently degrade Iranian military capabilities and annihilate the material and infrastructure of the Iranian nuclear program, but it is unclear if this can deliver long-term satisfactory results without unpleasant blowback. Israel’s endgame goes further. Considering both the patterns of Israeli strategic thinking and recent statements made by Israeli commentators, Jerusalem wants regime change in Tehran, a de facto Balkanisation and the ignition of a civil war. The point is that Iran is never again able to threaten the survival of the Jewish state in any meaningful way. This discernible Carthaginian strategy, reflected in the implementation of the so-called Dahiya doctrine in the Iranian capital and a strong support for Kurdish separatist militias, may backfire.

When confronted with external sources of danger, nations like Iran are inclined to rally around the flag, regardless of who is in charge, rather than capitulate. This political reality means that, even if the Ayatollahs’ theocratic regime is overthrown, what comes after may be even less tractable. The fallout of a humiliating defeat (e.g. imposed with tactical nukes) would give the IRGC, the core of the Iranian deep state, an opportunity to take over as a military junta more closely aligned with China, Russia, and North Korea. The materialization of this secular military government would sideline moderates willing to negotiate some sort of détente. In a post-war revanchist Iran, there would be no place for the likes of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or Mir Hossein Mousavi, let alone an organized opposition. Under these conditions, a renewed Iranian military buildup and yet another rematch would be guaranteed. On the other side of the spectrum, the fall of the Iranian state and the breakout of a Syria-like internal conflict would invite, sooner or later, the intervention of neighboring powers. States like Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey could fill the resulting power voids, carve up buffers and advance their preferred versions of regional order. This would place them in a collision course with an Israel driven by a siege mentality. Senior Israeli politicians have already identified Turkey as “the next Iran.” In the best-case scenario, backchannel diplomacy can forge a negotiated ceasefire (which seems doubtful because the existing shadow of duplicity cannot be easily dissipated), but a long-term solution remains elusive. One way or another, the idea of Reza Pahlavi as an enlightened pro-Western king who will bring peace, reconciliation, and liberal democracy is unrealistic.


Thanks to both their nuclear arsenal and air superiority, the Americans and the Israelis have an upper hand in the battlefield, as well as escalation dominance. The targeted assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the destruction of both Iranian military materiel and strategic nerve centers confirm this assessment. Despite this comparative weakness, the Iranians are not powerless. Their response includes, aside from reprisals aimed at both the US forces and Israeli targets, the mobilization of proxy militias, attacks against critical infrastructure nodes in the Gulf petro-monarchies, and the sabotage of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital chokepoint for the flow of Middle Eastern oil to faraway consumer markets. Considering that advanced economies are still powered by hydrocarbons, these measures have the critical mass to dislocate energy markets, industrial cycles, interconnectedness networks, financial stability, and economic normalcy in order to increase the costs and the risks for Iran’s enemies. Tehran has also adapted to this theatre of engagement through additional measures like the de-centralization of military chains of command and drone swarms. The upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup provides plenty of attractive targets for Iranian-led terrorist masterminds.

Neither side seems eager to peacefully settle this matter. Instead, there are structural incentives to raise the stakes. Iran is, metaphorically, a very hard nut to crack. The country’s heartland, in the Iranian plateau, is a natural fortressshielded by the Zagros and Elburz mountains. Iran’s territorial and demographic proportions are superior to those of many Middle Eastern states. Thus, expeditionary warfare with boots on the ground is hardly a palatable choice for potential invaders. In short, intensive airpower alone is unlikely to vanquish the Iranians. Another crucial factor is that Iran, unlike artificial Middle Eastern states that are byproducts of either Sykes-Picot or the injection of petrodollars, belongs to another category of political lifeforms.


Iran is a Persian civilization-state, with roots that go back to the Achaemenids and the Sassanids, whose unbroken organic evolution confers a heightened degree of resilience. The Persians have outlived extinct powerful foes like the Mongols, the Romans, and the Byzantines. Modern-day Iran is, as heir of these ancient imperial traditions, a multiethnic polity that integrates Indo-European Persians, Azeris, Arabs, Armenians, Balochis, Jews, and Kurds, amongst others. Despite some internal animosities, Iran is more cohesive than fragmentary states like Lebanon, Iraq, or Syria. As such, Iran has withstood the impact of coercive economic sanctions, regional wars, civil unrest, airstrikes, the mysterious death of President Ebrahim Raisiand the loss of proxy satrapies across the region. The Iranian system of architectural institutionalized governance is a solid and impersonal machinery. Finally, the IRGC is a dangerous force to be reckoned with, due to their irregular warfare tradecraft, foreign intelligence capabilities, and grip over the Iranian system of political economy.

Israel is, in turn, an impressive textbook example that states can come back to life. Therefore, Israeli leaders are aware of the tragic fact that, in a violent neighborhood shaped by bitter rivalries and abundant enemies, defeat in war by a powerful foe usually means annihilation and carnage. This explains Israel’s efforts to secure strategic partnerships with great powers like the United States and India, especially in a multipolar environment. Such reality explains Israel’s relentless pursuit of regional military and intelligence superiority. Whereas Israel fought various existential wars in the heyday of the Cold War against Baathist armies, the vectors of Iran’s geopolitical revisionism cross the red lines of Israeli national security in various ways. Likewise, Iranian suzerainty over much of West Asia would represent an obstacle for an eventual Israeli territorial expansion as the population of this Levantine state soars. Israel has conventionally and unconventionally engaged Iranian-sponsored militias like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Although no conclusive victory has been achieved, Israel has managed to turn the tables and now the enemy’s ultimate center of gravity is in the crosshairs of the IDF.


Finally, neither lacks the esprit de corps (Asabiyyah, in Ibn Khaldun’s teachings) which undergirds the strength of nationalism. Moreover, reciprocal attacks against civilian infrastructure —unlawful acts of collective punishment— encourage Iranians and Israelis to keep on fighting. As Thucydides warned, honor, along with fear and greed, can push men into the darkness of the abyss. Despite self-evident differentials in military power projection capabilities, the balance of resolve shows parity. Hence, more blood will stain the shifting Middle Eastern sands before Teheran or Jerusalem can decisively emerge as the last man standing.

Great Power Politics

This conflict is heavily embedded into the dynamics of high politics. Aside from its close ties to Israel and an intermittent mutual animosity, the US has its own reasons to attack Iran. Although the US is self-reliant in oil supplies, Washington cannot tolerate Iranian hegemony in a region whose fossil fuels are critical for global energy security, especially considering the energy-intensive needs of AI platforms and data centers. Plus, the second Trump administration is trying to undermine Chinese and Russian alliance networks. This new rollback strategy includes regime change, the beheading of adversarial governments and coercion without control, rather than military campaigns followed by nation building. The point is to alter the strategic alignment of these states without engaging in costly and unwinnable “forever wars.” Iran was also blacklisted by Washington because of its antagonism towards dollar-denominated financial circuits. Although US forces have decimated Iranian military readiness and killed the Iranian head of state, it is unclear what a strategic victory looks like.

This intervention, contrary to the logic of self-restraint is a dangerous gamble because the long-term risks and costs may be superior to the short-term benefits. As a result of US airstrikes, Iran is now weaker, but the IRGC is now getting stronger. Then again, the calculated demolition of Iran would be leveraged as an engine of chaos that would engulf Washington’s Eurasian rivals. The task of scrambling over the leftovers of Iran (natural resources, indigenous technologies, arms caches, regional enclaves, cultural treasures) would keep them busy. For US generalship, this would not be a bad outcome, as long as it is managed in a manner that does not lead to a protracted quagmire with no way out or imperial overstretch. Will Trump follow the footsteps of Alexander the Great or Crassus?

China is concerned because strategic instability in the Persian Gulf threatens its energy security, especially considering the large-scale needs of its advanced industrial sectors. The propagation of spillovers across the Greater Middle East is also problematic for the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ as some investment projects and logistical corridors related to the Belt and Road Initiative transit through this turbulent region. On the flip side, the relocation of US military assets from East Asia to frontline service in West Asia temporarily alters the balance of power in China’s geopolitical perimeter. The perspective of Russia is nuanced too. In partial compliance with an emerging bilateral defense partnership, the Russians have apparently assisted the Iranians with intelligence on US targets, but Moscow does not support bellicosity toward Israel or the GCC states. The former, due to the presence of Russian émigrés, is partially regarded as an informal member of the so-called “Russian world.” The latter are economic partners that share a common interest in overcoming the system of petrodollar hegemony. Furthermore, the Kremlin certainly does not mind both higher oil prices and a messy Middle Eastern conflict from which Washington cannot easily disengage. Despite their transactional ties to Tehran, the Russians are not interested in a strong Iran that may later challenge their geopolitical interests in corners of the post-Soviet space such as the Caucasus or Central Asia.

A Clash of Fundamentalisms


Hardcore political realism considers states to be akin to billiard balls whose behavior responds to the Newtonian laws of power politics. Nevertheless, this lens does not account for the full-spectrum complexity of this war. Complementary angles are needed to make sense of it. According to Carl Schmitt, modern political life is —despite its outward secular façade— heavily shaped by the theoretical echoes of theological concepts. Aside from its worldly dimension, this conflict shows that, far from being an archaic anachronism, the connection between statecraft and religion is alive in the 21st century, and not just based on the utilitarian logic of psychological warfare. As Machiavelli argued, whereas unarmed prophets usually perish, their armed counterparts conquer and triumph. In this case, religious providentialism is —for both sides— a source of legitimacy, driver of mutual hostility, theoretical basis to claim a moral high ground and ideological morale booster. A common denominator shared by Iran and Israel is an illiberal theocratic inclination. Accordingly, the warrior ethos of these societies is rational, but radical.

The Iranians, once on the verge of building a Shiite Crescent as a linchpin of regional hegemony, have, under the pressure of Israeli-US carpet bombing, been cornered into a reactive, but bellicose position. This asymmetric approach does not respond just to the pragmatic necessities of military statecraft and the existing correlation of forces. Said course of action is also aligned with the tenets of Shia Islam that revere the virtues of martial resistance and popular defiance. One could even argue that Tehran’s underground pursuit of nuclear weapons has been carried out under the covert umbrella of Taqiyya (public dissimulation and concealment intended to hide one’s private intentions). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the Iranian state is not only framing the war as a Clausewitzian confrontation over relative gains and self-interests. For both domestic and international audiences, this conflict is being portrayed as a pious cosmic struggle against the earthly representatives of “demonic cabals.”

This apocalyptic worldview also reflects esoteric expectations about the redemptive arrival of Mahdi as a figure whose revelation will lead to the defeat of tyranny and evil. Such perceptions evoke an understanding of the concept of the political, the existential distinction between friends and enemies, through the lens of a religious creed. Yet, the mobilization of these Manichean archetypical representations goes beyond self-righteous propaganda and cognitive operations. The purpose of this seemingly unhinged sectarian fervor is to encourage Iranians to fight and endure hardship for the sake of a victory whose heavenly transcendence is supposedly greater than themselves as individual citizens, combatants and/or believers.

Aside from national security concerns, Israel’s moves against Iran and its regional pseudopods is, to a certain extent, also driven by religious zeal. Zionism originally arose as a secular movement which borrowed elements from Western philosophies, including liberalism, nationalism, and socialism. The establishment of Israel as a national state was officially justified based on the principles of international law, national liberation, self-determination, and sovereignty, not the fulfilment of Biblical prophecies. However, the Israeli political system and the ongoing war effort are in the hands of hardline religious Zionists like Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Modern Israel is ideologically closer to the teachings of Rabbi Meir Kahane than to the secular ideals of Theodor Herzl and David Ben Gurion. The Israeli way of warfare is underpinned by the contents of the Pentateuch which chronicle the ruthless military prowess of the ancient Israelites, a proud warrior people, against their enemies in the Holy Land.


Unlike Western doctrines about the acceptable parameters of a just war, the Old Testament does not prescribe an operational distinction between enemy combatants and civilians, both of which are regarded as legitimate targets. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has framed the conflict as a continuation of the timeless mandate to eradicate the seed of Amalek and Haman. Netanyahu’s increasingly hawkish attitude has been fueled not just by an opportunistic intent to profit from regional chaos, but also by the growing politico-ideological influence of both the national religious movement (Dati Leumi) and Orthodox sects like Chabad Lubavitch. Unlike less politically militant Haredi groups such as Satmar (distrustful of Zionism), these factions champion the expansionist project of a Greater Israel. Notably, more than three decades ago, the late Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson, asked a young Netanyahu to intervene as a herald who will hasten the promised arrival of the Messianic era. Originally created as an outreach Hassidic movement, Chabad has become an influential cultish organization whose clerics rub shoulders with world leaders in Western and non-Western societies. Even the name of operation ‘Roaring Lion’ references the royal crest of the Davidic monarchy.

The US is not immune from this phenomenon. The intent to attack Iran cannot be entirely attributed to either to politico-strategic national interests or the influence of AIPAC and similar lobbies. This war is also enthusiastically endorsed by Evangelical Christians close to both GOP senior leaders and grassroots activists. For these Christian Zionists, military intervention against Israel’s enemies is a desirable shortcut, even if it triggers Armageddon, to bring the second coming of Jesus. Ironically, this mindset contrasts with the spiritual detachment from Israel amongst younger generations of Jewish American progressives.


The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.


Geopolitical Monitor

Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.

Sunday, March 22, 2026

COP28 To COP30: Nuclear Energy In The Climate Equation – OpEd


COP30 in Brazil. Photo Credit: RICARDO STUCKERT, ABr

March 22, 2026 

By Hafsa Azam


Nuclear energy is becoming a central pillar in global plans to address climate change and also gaining importance as countries seek low-carbon climate solutions. The Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was held in Belem, Brazil, in November 2025. The COP30 has been widely described as a “COP of Implementation” due to its emphasis on bringing existing initiatives into action than on new climate pledges. While the summit produced important agreement on adoption of mechanism for adaptation finance to track climate actions, one of its consequential developments was the reinforcement of role of nuclear energy in the global climate strategy.

In December 2023, during the COP28 held in Dubai, 25 countries including Armenia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ghana, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy by 2050. The initiative gained further momentum at subsequent climate summits, with six additional countries including Kazakhstan, Kenya, El Salvador, Kosovo, Nigeria and Turkiye joining at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, and two more countries including Rwanda and Senegal at COP30, bringing the total to 33 countries.

The COP28 Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy underscores the essential role of nuclear energy in achieving global net-zero Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 2050, a prerequisite for keeping the 1.5 °C temperature-limit target within reach. It also highlights nuclear power’s contribution to energy security through supply of clean, reliable, and affordable source of electricity.

Beyond government commitments, strong support has also emerged from industry and finance for tripling nuclear energy. According to the World Nuclear Outlook Report presented at COP28, 130 nuclear-sector companies signed a pledge backing the tripling objectives. This was followed by New York Climate Week 2024, where 14 financial institutions publicly expressed support and explored ways in which the financial sector could facilitate nuclear expansion. Further endorsement came at Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) Week observed in Houston, Texas in March 2025, where 14 major energy-consuming companies voiced their backing for tripling global nuclear capacity by mid-century.

According to the World Nuclear Outlook Report 2025 presented at COP30, global energy demand is increasing in order to meet the needs of populations with insufficient access to energy and electricity. Approximately 750 million people currently lack access to electricity, and emerging economies require significantly more power to support development. This rising demand is driven by a growing global population, which stands at approximately 8 billion today and is projected to increase to 9.8 billion by 2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100. At the same time, global GHG emissions continue to rise due to increasing energy demand.


International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that 2025 reached a record of 38.1 billion tonnes of CO2. This rise is largely driven by continued growth in coal, oil, and gas consumption, particularly in emerging economies and high-demand regions. The upward trend poses a serious challenge to efforts to limit global warming to below 1.5 °C under the Paris Agreement.

According to the World Nuclear Association, the capacity target outlined in the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy is anchored to 2020 levels, when global operable nuclear capacity stood at 393 GWe produced by 441 nuclear reactors. Tripling this figure would require nearly 1,200 GWe of operational capacity by 2050.

According to the World Nuclear Outlook Report 2025, 177 reactors have an operating lifetime of 60 years, while 203 reactors are expected to receive lifetime extensions to 80 years. In addition, 75 reactors are currently under construction, 103 reactors are planned, 295 reactors have been proposed, and 24 reactors are considered potential projects. To meet the national targets, 538 additional nuclear capacity units would be required. If these targets are achieved, global nuclear capacity could reach 1,428 GWe by 2050.

According to the World Nuclear Association Reactor Data 2025, the global nuclear power sector is largely shaped by large-scale reactors. As of October 2025, a total of 438 nuclear reactors were in operation worldwide, providing combined capacity of 397 GWe. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) dominate the operating fleet, representing over 70% of all reactors. Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) account for 14%, while Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) make up 11%. Light-Water Graphite-Moderated Reactors (LWGRs) and Gas-Cooled Reactors (GCRs) represent about 2% of the total, respectively. Only two Fast Neutron Reactors (FNRs) and one High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR) are currently operational.


During COP30, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) hosted its Atoms4Climate and Atoms4Net Zero Pavilions and underscored the role of nuclear energy and technologies in addressing climate mitigation, adaptation, and decarbonization. IAEA’s key priorities include innovative financing mechanisms, the deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), and the use of nuclear applications in agriculture, food security, and environmental monitoring.

During its participation in COP30, Pakistan underscored the extreme climate vulnerability of the country, despite its contribution of less than one percent to global GHG emissions. The devastating floods of 2022 and 2025 highlighted the country’s acute exposure to climate extremes, displacing millions and worsening poverty. In this context, at COP30, Pakistan called for survival, climate justice, and fair global support for developing countries.

Nuclear energy could play a key role in mitigating climate change in Pakistan, who’s energy deficit has been a longstanding problem. With a population of over 250 million, Pakistan struggles to meet growing energy demand. Nuclear power offers a reliable and independent energy source. In contrast to fossil fuels, nuclear power does not rely on imports and offers Pakistan a level of energy independence that is vital for national security. While speaking at the 69th IAEA General Conference in Vienna on 15 September 2025, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Mr Ali Raza Anwar, reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear technology for sustainable development and international cooperation. He highlighted that Pakistan’s six nuclear power plants contribute 18.3% to the national energy mix and also help avoid nearly 15 million tonnes of Carbon Dioxide (CO2)emissions each year.


Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, during his official visit to Vienna on 17 February 2026, reaffirmed Pakistan’s support for the IAEA in the promotion of safe and responsible use of nuclear technology in areas such as agriculture, industrial applications, nuclear power generation, and cancer diagnosis and treatment.

Investing in nuclear power could bring multiple economic benefits. Construction of NPPs in line with Pakistan Vision 2050 to produce 42,000 MWe nuclear power would create jobs, vitalize technological development, and produce a skilled workforce. Additionally, nuclear power would also offer long-term price stability, which is especially important in the light of the unpredictable fluctuations in international oil and gas prices for geopolitical reasons.




Hafsa Azam

Hafsa Azam is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Environmental Sciences from Bahria University, Karachi. Her areas of interest include climate change, climate mitigation and adaptation, environmental impact assessment, environmental policies and laws, environmental hazards and management, occupational health and safety, Sustainable Development Goals, energy and artificial intelligence.

Saturday, March 21, 2026

  Istanbul Blog

ISTANBUL BLOG: Bedtime reading for Trump. Condemnation and denunciation from Arab and Islamic countries affirmed

ISTANBUL BLOG: Bedtime reading for Trump. Condemnation and denunciation from Arab and Islamic countries affirmed
The top diplomats of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the UAE met in Riyadh. Turkey's Hakan Fidan is third from right. / @KSAmofaEN
By Akin Nazli in Belgrade March 19, 2026

While Donald Trump in the White House was adding coherence to his explanation of why it is the US and Israel have unleashed a massive military assault on Iran (this just in from the wires, Trump’s explanation of Israel attacking Iran’s biggest gas field: “Yeah I did, I told him [Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu] don’t do that [attack the gas field] … And he won’t do that [though he did do that] … We’re independent. We get along great. It’s coordinated. But on occasion, he’ll do something, and if I don’t like it … So, we’re not doing that any more.”), in Riyadh, there was a big gathering of top diplomats.

The foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the UAE held a consultative ministerial meeting on Wednesday, 29 Ramadan 1447, in the Saudi capital on the Iranian attacks, Turkey’s foreign ministry announced on March 19, particulary referring to Iran’s response to the Israeli attack on the gas field, South Pars, with strikes on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

The ministers affirmed their condemnation and denunciation of the deliberate Iranian attacks conducted with ballistic missiles and drones on residential areas, civilian infrastructure, including oil facilities, desalination plants, airports, residential buildings and diplomatic premises, the parties said in a joint statement following the meeting.

Whatever I

“The ministers further affirmed that such attacks could not be justified under any pretext or in any manner whatsoever,” the statement also read.

And the ministers stressed the right of states to defend themselves in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations charter.

They called on Iran to immediately halt its attacks. They affirmed the necessity of respecting international law, international humanitarian law and the principles of good neighbourliness as a first step toward ending the escalation, achieving security and stability in the region and promoting diplomacy as a means to resolve the crisis.

Whatever II

The ministers emphasised that the future of relations with Iran would depend on respecting the sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs as well as refraining from violating their sovereignty or their territories in any manner whatsoever and not using or developing Iranian military capabilities to threaten countries of the region.

The ministers stressed the need for Iran to abide with implementing Security Council Resolution 2817 (2026), which calls for an immediate halt to all attacks, the unconditional cessation of any provocative acts or threats against neighbouring states along with the cessation of support, financing and arming of affiliated militias in Arab countries, which Iran is carrying out to serve its goals, against the interests of these countries.

Editorial problems

“Furthermore,” Iran was urged “to refrain from any measures or threatening aimed at closing or obstructing international navigation in the Strait of Hormuz or threatening maritime security in Bab al-Mandab,” the statement also said (this section appeared to have escaped the proofreader).

Reaffirmation of condemnation of Israel’s attack on Lebanon

The ministers reaffirmed support for the security, stability and territorial integrity of Lebanon and for the activating of the sovereignty of the Lebanese state over all its territories and supporting the Lebanese government's decision to limit weapons to the state. They also condemned Israel's aggression against Lebanon and its expansionist policy in the region.

Proofreader asleep again

“The ministers reaffirm their commitment to continuing intensive consultation and coordination in this regard, to monitor developments and assess emerging issues in a way that ensures the formulation of common positions and the adoption of necessary legitimate measures and procedures to protect their security, stability, and sovereignty, and to halt the Iranian heinous attacks on their territories,” the statement added.

Hakan Fidan in Riyadh

Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan represented Turkey at the gathering.

On March 18, Waleed Abdulkarim El Khereiji (@W_Elkhereiji, seen right, above) received Fidan upon his arrival at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh.

Later, Fidan met with Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan (@FaisalbinFarhan, middle) and Jordan’s foreign minister Ayman Fasadi (@AymanHsafadi, right) on the sidelines of the consultative meeting of the foreign ministers of a number of Arab and Islamic countries.

Fidan further participated in a consultative ministerial meeting leg with counterparts.

After posing with all of the meeting participants following the gathering, Fidan held a coordination meeting (of the type that Trump so enjoys) with the foreign ministers of Pakistan (right), Saudi Arabia (second right) and Egypt (left). This was a sidelines meeting. It was on the sidelines of the consultative meeting.

 

Azerbaijan Moves to Defuse Tensions With Iran After Drone Strikes

  • Azerbaijan has shifted from threats of retaliation to active diplomatic engagement with Iran.

  • Baku fears wider instability, especially in Nakhchivan and among Iran’s large Azeri population.

  • Higher energy prices may boost Azerbaijani revenues, even as security and inflation risks grow.

Diplomatic engagement has replaced aggressive rhetoric, as Azerbaijan strives to keep tensions with neighboring Iran from boiling over again.

In the immediate aftermath of Iranian drone strikes in the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan on March 5, officials in Baku adopted a bellicose stance, warning that further acts of aggression against Azerbaijan would result in “Iron Fist” retaliation. They also demanded that those responsible for the drone strikes be held accountable.

Over the last 10 days or so, however, Baku’s tone has softened considerably, and officials have kept open diplomatic channels of communication. On March 17, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov checked in with his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi.

According to an Azerbaijani government statement, their phone conversation “emphasized that civilian objects should not be targeted during the ongoing war.” Bayramov also reiterated Azerbaijan’s support for a quick, negotiated end to the conflict, and reminded Araghchi about an Iranian pledge to carry out a full investigation into the March 5 drone attacks.

Several factors are encouraging Azerbaijan to pursue a de-escalation strategy. One, according to Zaur Shiriyev, a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, is Nakhchivan’s relatively isolated position vis-à-vis the Azerbaijani mainland. Writing in a Carnegie-published analysis on the impact of the war so far on the South Caucasus, Shiriyev noted that “air and land links [between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan] depend heavily on transit through Iran.” Any sustained disruption of those Iranian connections, then, could have serious economic ramifications for the exclave.

Baku’s desire for a quick end to the war is connected in part to concern about Iran’s potential fragmentation in the event of the total collapse of the Islamic Republic’s governing system. Ethnic Azeris number approximately 20 million in Iran, roughly a quarter of the overall population, and are primarily concentrated in northwestern areas of the country. The Islamic Republic’s demise would stand to destabilize Azeri-dominated areas, perhaps prompting a wave of refugees seeking relative safety in Azerbaijan. Or Baku could face pressure to intervene on behalf of Iranian Azeris, if they became embroiled in conflict with other ethnic groups in Iran, Shiriyev suggested.

“Regime survival could represent the least destabilizing outcome for Iranian Azerbaijanis,” Shiriyev wrote.

The energy crisis precipitated by the prolonged US-Israeli bombing campaign stands to benefit Azerbaijan. A prolonged spike in oil and gas prices could generate upwards of $7.5 billion in additional annual energy export revenue for Baku, Shiriyev estimated. At the same time, the disruption is expected to cause inflation in Azerbaijan and across Eurasia to skyrocket. 

While Azerbaijani officials seem to be succeeding for now in keeping bilateral tensions in check, there is evidence that elements within the Iranian leadership are intent on destabilizing Azerbaijan.

The tech giant Meta, operator of Facebook and Instagram, recently announced that since the start of 2026, it had deleted over 700 accounts and three pages on the two social media platforms after determining they were operated by malicious actors “associated with Iran and targeting Azerbaijan,” according to a March 17 report published by the Azerbaijani government-connected news outlet Minval.

By Eurasianet

Iran issues global threat as Israel's regime kill list grows with help from the inside

Iranian Revolutionary Guard members march during an annual military parade outside Tehran, 21 September, 2024
Copyright AP Photo

By Peter Barabas & Babak Kamiar
Published on 

Israel eliminated three top Iranian commanders on Friday as it continues its relentless strikes on Tehran's repression forces, with help from ordinary Iranians who are rising up against the regime.

Israel continued its intense strike campaign against the Iranian regime's security forces on Friday by killing the spokesman of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ali Mohammad Naini, the intelligence chief and deputy commander of the Basij forces, Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam as well as the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, Mehdi Ghorishi, the Iranian media and Israel’s Defence Forces (IDF) announced on Friday.

Ali Mohammad Naini was known to be the IRGC's main propagandist, while Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam was described as a main pillar of the Basij force, "with a central role in suppressing protests," Israel said.

Additionally, as Israel keeps pounding the regime forces across Iran, the IRGC in Iran's East Azerbaijan Province announced that 12 Basij members were killed in a strike in Tabriz on Thursday.

Shortly after these announcements, Iran's top military spokesman, General Abolfazl Shekarchi warned that "parks, recreational areas and tourist destinations" worldwide won't be safe for Tehran's enemies, renewing concerns that Iran could stage attacks beyond the Middle East.

"From now on, based on the information we have about you, even parks, recreational areas and tourist destinations anywhere in the world will no longer be safe for you," Shekarchi said in a statement quoted by Iranian state television on Friday, which is set to trigger renewed alarms across European security agencies. Qatar and the UAE announced that their security agencies dismantled Iranian operatives cells after the start of the war.

Since the war began, monitors estimate that up to a third of strikes have eliminated scores of IRGC and Basij personnel in a relentless campaign of precision strikes to break the regime's complex security establishment responsible for the brutal crackdown on protests, and apparently to support regime opponents to return to the streets.

The Basij units, also known as the regime's moral police, are a paramilitary force of volunteers tasked with enforcing loyalty to Iran's theocratic rulers across the country. They are linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) which is the backbone of the Iranian regime's security force, responsible for killing and injuring hundreds of opposition protesters before the war.

Member of the Basij paramilitary force attend a rally in Tehran, 28 March, 2025 AP Photo

Basij checkpoints have proliferated across Tehran since the war started. One resident told the Associated Press that there were five or six new checkpoints in his neighbourhood alone and that the Basij forces search vehicles for weapons, examine documents and sometimes demand to look at people’s phones. By manning checkpoints, the Basij helps security agencies to focus on information gathering and arrests.

The strikes on checkpoints began on 11 March, with at least 15 incidents on a single day documented by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, a US-based monitoring group, quoted by AP.

Social media accounts observed by Euronews since the war started show that ordinary Iranian citizens have been sharing films or photographs of the Basij checkpoints or military hideouts, posting locators, photos or videos on social media in a form of opposition following the regime's violent crackdown on the widespread protests preceding the war.

Members of the Iranian Basij paramilitary force march in Tehran, 10 January, 2025 AP Photo


Despite the nationwide internet blackout imposed by the regime, Israel is reportedly gathering some of the targeting intelligence from the videos and photos by ordinary Iranians who often tag the Farsi account of the Israeli military, sometimes in the name of protesters who were killed in the area.

According to insiders in Iran Euronews spoke to at the time, as many as 32,000 people were reportedly killed by mid-January after Tehran responded with violence to growing country-wide unrest originally sparked in December by hyperinflation and the cost of living, but then grew into major anti-regime demonstrations.

Euronews' Persian service observed that a phrase has been trending on Iranian social media saying that every drone that hits a Basij checkpoint "gladdens the souls of dozens of Javid-nam" in reference to the victims of January repression. It also suggests that these strikes provide new momentum and renewed hope for the protest movement.

In a recent move, Israeli intelligence has started appealing to Iranians to keep posting the locators of the regime forces. One of the Israeli messages says: "Don't underestimate your power. One more location, one less Basij dog. Start sending."

Residents say security forces still have an intimidating presence in Tehran. War monitors say an intensified crackdown that began with the crushing of January’s nationwide protests continues, often targeting those who take videos of strikes or try to get around a weekslong internet blackout to contact the outside world.

The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, a U.S.-based group, said people have been rounded up for taking pictures identifying the location of checkpoints, bases and military installations, AP reported. Authorities are also still detaining people linked to the January protests, former political prisoners or members of minorities.

The rights group said it had reports of security forces opening fire at checkpoints. In one incident, two teenage brothers were shot and killed after honking their car horn in celebration of the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the war's opening salvo.

Nevertheless, over the last days, new videos from Tehran surfaced on social media showing the Basij and IRGC units hiding under bridges, in tunnels and even in empty schools and kindergartens to evade Israeli strikes.

In a recent video, a group of Basij fighters appear to hide under a bridge in Tehran waving a white flag.

Another video from Tehran appears to show security forces changing uniforms to avoid being identified from the air.

The Israeli Defence Force keeps releasing cockpit videos of its airstrikes on the Basij and IRGC forces to show its rate of action, while ordinary citizens continue posting videos showing the aftermath of the Israeli airstrikes.

On Friday, Iranians posted the aftermath of an Israeli airstrike on a Basij compound in Semnan.

As Israel's strikes are dismantling the Iranian regime's security system and in growing signs of defiance, social media videos out of Tehran over the last days showed scores of Iranians celebrating the yearly Chaharshanbe Suri, an ancient Persian festival, which is consistently opposed by the regime as young Iranians often use the occasion to protest..

In videos released from the Chitgar neighborhood in western Tehran, security forces can be seen entering an apartment complex with a large convoy of vehicles while residents chant slogans and gunshots can also be heard.

According to the Associated Press, the Basij, Farsi for "mobilization," has tens of thousands of volunteers under the command of the Revolutionary Guard, being engaged in ideological and political activities, with branches in schools, universities, government institutions and other organizations.

Volunteers, both men and women, work to ensure loyalty to the Islamic Republic which include holding religious lectures or harassing those who flout social restrictions, but they can also be mobilized for state-organized events, including counterprotests.

District-level paramilitary units deploy in times of domestic unrest — like the January protests — armed with everything from batons and electroshock devices to live ammunition.

Iranians describe mass text messages warning against protests while aggressive Basij patrols operate in Tehran, AP reports. On Thursday, Iran announced the execution of three men detained in the January protests, the first such sentences known to have been carried out.

Members of the Iranian Basij paramilitary force march during the force parade in Tehran, 10 January, 2025 AP Photo

In the last week, semiofficial news outlets have reported the arrest of more than 100 people across Iran, most accused of conspiring with enemy states or sharing media reports with foreign entities. At least 14 were accused of possessing Starlink internet dishes or virtual private network cards. Starlink has been one of the only ways to access the global internet since the unprecedented blackout began on January 8.

The government has also reportedly shut down parts of Iran’s internal internet and revoked some VPN cards given to people with specialized jobs.