It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Whenever one country annexes part of another as Russia did with Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, many observers immediately ask whether such moves presage the opening of a new era in which annexations will become more common. Now although Moscow hasn’t yet annexed South Ossetia, some are already asking about the future of Abkhazia.
In most cases, it becomes obvious that any annexation does not lead immediately to more but rather delays any further moves in that direction not only because conditions in other potential candidates for absorption are different but also because the international community makes it clear that it opposes any such actions.
Now, it appears that Moscow is close to annexing South Ossetia, a territory Russian forces carved out of Georgia in 2008, with both the Russian and South Ossetian sides apparently on track to take this step, long rumored because South Ossetia has so few attributes of an independent state, sometime in the near future (jamestown.org/south-ossetia-and-russia-make-further-steps-toward-annexation/).
Georgia would certainly be infuriated if Moscow and Tskhinvali take that step. Indeed, it could put on hold any hopes Moscow may have making more progress to returning Georgia to its fold. But given the size of South Ossetia and the fact that many in the West have assumed Moscow would eventually take this step, it is not clear how Western governments would react.
But even before Moscow makes such a move, some are speculating that the Kremlin will follow this step by annexing Abkhazia, which also achieved the status of a partially recognized state in 2008 as a result of the Russian invasion of Georgia, although even those who do are saying Moscow would face more problems with the Abkhaz case than the South Ossetian one
One observer in the region, Ruslan Magomedov, says that no one should forget that Abkhazia represents a much different situation than does South Ossetia, something many are inclined to do because for them the two attracted attention as Russian-sponsored breakaway states at the same time (akcent.site/novosti/45307).
According to that commentator, “Abkhazia’s political circles are actively discussing the scenario of the republic joining Russia. This discussion has become inevitable against the backdrop of developments in South Ossetia, which could culminate in that republic’s integration into Russia.
But he stresses, Abkhazia is very different. It has a border on the Black Sea. Its own people worked far more actively to achieve independence even before the Russian invasion. And “it is a region with a far more complex elite structure” and with a far more ramified legal system allowing elites to control the situation.
Many in the Abkhazian elite “are not as heavily dependent on direct subsidies from Moscow as their South Ossetian counterparts and are prepared to aggressively defend their autonomy. They have their own economic interests which do not always align with Russia’s” and have shown themselves capable of blocking Moscow moves they oppose.
As a result, what is most likely to happen in the near term, regardless of any moves in South Ossetia will be “a faster harmonization of the tax and legal systems of Russia and Abkhazia” and ones that will involve not “a landing party’ of Russian officials … but rather “the cultivation of a loyal pro-Russian pool of administrators.”
That will serve Russia’s interests without the problems that an attempt at annexation would cause and over the longer term could help make Abkhazia a stronger candidate for emerging from its partially recognized status to a more normal position in the international order, a development some in Moscow may see as the most useful.
About Paul Goble
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com . View all posts
Sunday, June 28, 2026
GPS Jamming Can Be Solved With Existing Satcom Signals
GPS is easily corrupted, but all sorts of other radio signals can be used for accurate positioning
Starlink's vast satellite constellation transmits signals that can be used for positioning, without any approval or involvement from the operator (SpaceX file image)
Few people want to get lost when traveling. But if there are places where being lost feels especially unsettling, they tend to be the sea, desert and sky. These environments share a defining feature: the absence of distinctive visual cues. Where horizons blur, landmarks disappear and every direction can look deceptively similar. Knowing where you are depends on information that you cannot see for yourself.
For most of human history, finding your way in such environments required skill, judgment and constant attention. Satellite navigation marked a fundamental shift. The advent of GPS has made navigation almost effortless: Press a button and voilà, location and heading appear instantly.
GPS’s great strength is that under benign conditions, it works remarkably well in precisely the environments where being lost would be most dangerous. Civilian systems routinely achieve meter?level accuracy. This accuracy, however, masks a growing vulnerability.
Over the past few years, deliberate GPS interference has surged worldwide, disrupting maritime and aviation operations at an unprecedented scale. I’m an electrical engineer who studies alternative methods of electronic navigation. My lab and others around the world are developing these alternatives as backup for when GPS is unavailable or unreliable.
When GPS is silent – or lies
Jamming overwhelms weak satellite signals with noise or radio frequency signals, blocking GPS position and time altogether.
Spoofing is more insidious: Counterfeit signals surreptitiously replace authentic ones, misleading GPS receivers about location and timing while appearing to crews and automated systems to operate normally.
Interference arises from three sources: military activity, criminal exploitation and accidental misuse. In conflict zones, GPS disruption has become a routine tool of warfare, used to protect assets, degrade surveillance and counter drones. This activity is well documented across Ukraine, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. It routinely spills over to affect civilian ships and aircraft, and civilian life.
Accidental GPS jamming has caused serious disruption at international airports by making it difficult for aircraft and air traffic controllers to track traffic in and out of the airports. Intentional GPS spoofing was even used in a highway heist to steal US$1 million worth of restaurateur Guy Fieri’s tequila.
Making matters worse, spoofed GPS data does not remain confined to a single system. Ships use the Automatic Identification System to broadcast their locations and to see what other ships are nearby to avoid collisions. The system broadcasts a ship’s GPS position information along with the ship’s name, course and speed, classification and call sign.
GPS spoofing effectively corrupts Automatic Identification System signals, sending false position information to nearby vessels, shore authorities, insurers and commercial tracking services. This activity can create fleets of “ghost ships” that appear real to others navigating nearby.
Criminals use GPS interference to block or alter Automatic Identification System information to evade oversight. Illegal fishing fleets, oil smugglers, sanctions evaders and maritime sand thieves have been repeatedly linked to falsified or disrupted Automatic Identification System and GPS signals.
Deadly consequences
GPS intereference is not new, and the U.S. government warned about it decades ago, but the scale of its impact has significantly accelerated over the past few years. GPS spoofing and jamming incidents affecting civil aviation increased by about 500% from January to August 2024.
Maritime authorities reported hundreds of ships affected daily, with groundings and collisions in 2024–25 publicly linked to interference of GPS and other satellite navigation systems, including in the Baltic Sea and the Strait of Hormuz.
The consequences have claimed lives. In December 2024, Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 was struck by a Russian air-defense system, killing 38 people after the flight was diverted due to GPS interference. At sea, GPS interference in the Strait of Hormuz has caused oil tanker collisions.
GPS jamming caused the container ship MSC Antonia to run aground in the Red Sea near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on May 10, 2025.
Disruption has also forced runway closures, mass flight diversions and emergency procedures at Newark Liberty, Dallas-Fort Worth and Denver international airports.
Even senior officials are not immune: In 2025, GPS jamming forced an aircraft carrying the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to make an emergency landing.
Strait of Hormuz: Navigation danger zone
Recent incidents in the Strait of Hormuz during the U.S.-Iran war mark a decisive escalation in the risk posed by GPS interference. The strait sits at the intersection of intense geopolitical conflict and one of the world’s most critical maritime choke points. Around 20% of global petroleum trade transits these narrow waters each day, alongside dense commercial traffic. There’s little margin for navigational error. Here, even modest mistakes in position or timing can rapidly escalate into collisions, groundings or environmental disasters.
The Iran war has led to sustained spoofing across the Persian Gulf. Ships have reported positions via Automatic Identification System that place them on land or otherwise miles from their true locations without triggering alarms.
In the confined waters of the Strait of Hormuz, where ships pass one another in close proximity, GPS interference erodes situational awareness precisely where it matters most.
Crucially, interference in Hormuz is persistent rather than episodic. Reports show jamming and spoofing used systematically over extended periods, not merely as short-term responses to specific incidents. This pattern suggests that GPS disruption has become routine practice rather than a niche capability in electronic warfare.
Once normalized in one of the world’s busiest sea-lanes, such practices are difficult to contain geographically. The result is a navigation environment in which people can no longer fully trust position, timing and identity at sea. The consequences extend far beyond the confines of the Persian Gulf.
Beyond GPS
The normalization of GPS disruption exposes a deeper issue: Modern navigation resilience has been built around the assumption that GPS signals are usually available and trustworthy. As that assumption erodes, attention has shifted from hardening GPS toward security through diversification. This means drawing navigation information from fundamentally different signals.
For a backup to satellite navigation, several countries, including the U.K., France, Saudi Arabia, Russia, South Korea and China, are deploying or modernizing long-range radio navigation, or LORAN, a system that dates back to World War II.
Another alternative that has gained increased interest over the past decade or so is using signals never intended for navigation, referred to as signals of opportunity. In contrast to dedicated navigation systems, such as long-range radio navigation, this approach uses existing infrastructure and preserves scarce radio spectrum. A particularly fruitful type of signal to exploit is terrestrial cellular.
The author’s team tracked the path of its car using signals from cell towers during live GPS jamming at Edwards Air Force Base. Zak Kassas
My lab has demonstrated this type of navigation with ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, high?altitude balloons and aircraft, including in GPS?jammed environments. We developed specialized receivers that exploit signals from existing LTE and 5G cellular networks.
We have demonstrated sub?meter accuracy on UAVs, near-lane?level accuracy on ground vehicles, and meter-level accuracy on aircraft and high-altitude balloons, without cooperation from cellular network providers.
The author’s team tracked the flight of a U.S. Air Force plane it was aboard using signals from cell towers, demonstrating that its method aligned closely with GPS. Zak Kassas
Another approach leverages the rapid proliferation of constellations of low Earth orbit communication satellites. Compared with GPS signals from medium Earth orbit, low Earth orbit satellites offer stronger signals, are numerous, transmit in a much wider swath of the spectrum, and their signals are more resilient to wide-area disruption.
We demonstrated meter-level positioning accuracy exploiting signals transmitted by Starlink satellites. We then developed receivers that can passively listen to signals emitted from multiple low Earth orbit satellite constellations.
The author’s lab demonstrated using satellite signals not meant for navigation to approximate the position-tracking ability of GPS. The blue line represents the vehicle’s GPS position and the green the vehicle’s position estimated by the researchers’ system.
Since then, my lab has demonstrated navigation with low Earth orbit satellites across the U.S. In our latest experiment, we successfully navigated a vessel in the Arctic seas, off the coast of Greenland.
The author’s team tracked the course of a ship it was aboard in the Arctic using nonnavigation signals from low Earth orbit satellites. Zak Kassas
These results point to a pragmatic solution: Navigation resilience will come from a diversity of techniques. We and others are already demonstrating the technologies to do so. Whether they are put into practical use is now a matter of policy, regulation and timing.
Saturday, June 27, 2026
Ukraine’s Deep-Strike Campaign Imposing Rising Costs On Russia Far Beyond The Battlefield – Analysis
Next-generation autonomous interceptors have successfully passed combat testing in the Kharkiv region. Credit: mod.gov.ua
Battlefield assessment. Russian forces retained the offensive initiative in land warfare, waging at least 200 combat engagements a day. Huliaipole, Pokrovsk, and Kostiantynivka remained the conflict’s primary pressure points, while Ukraine expanded its interceptor drone operations.
Ukraine stress-tests Russia’s occupation of Crimea. Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign began to stress Russia’s rear areas and the systems that sustain the Kremlin’s control over the Crimean Peninsula. Strikes on Kapotnya, near Moscow, and on Crimea’s fuel, rail, power, and air-defense targets presage a likely increase in strategic pressure.
What to look for. TrophyLab, a new Ukrainian effort to share intelligence gathered from captured Russian weapons, could provide Kyiv’s allies with increased access to information about Russian systems, components, vulnerabilities, and test data.
1. Battlefield Assessment
Military activity remained heightened across the Ukrainian battlespace, with Kyiv and Moscow conducting at least 200 combat engagements a day. Huliaipole, Pokrovsk, and Kostiantynivka again bore the brunt of Russia’s offensive push, while Orikhiv, Oleksandrivka, Lyman, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk also saw combat.
The Russian military continued to maintain its offensive footing in land warfare, and sustained increased drone warfare activity. In return, Ukrainian forces ramped up their interceptor drone operations.
Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign imposed rising costs on Russia far beyond the battlefield. Recent Ukrainian attacks have reached targets in Moscow, including energy infrastructure, factories linked to Russia’s defense industry, logistics nodes, and other industrial sites.
Ukrainian strikes on the Kapotnya Refinery illustrate this development. Drones struck the facility in southeast Moscow on June 18 for the second time in three days, causing large explosions, a major fire, and heavy black smoke over the city. Ukraine’s General Staff later released satellite imageryshowing damage at the site. The refinery lies inside the capital’s ring road, roughly 10 miles from the Kremlin, making the Ukrainian strikes both operationally and politically significant.
2. Ukraine’s Military Stress-Tests the Russian Invasion in Occupied Crimea
Ukraine’s medium-range strike program, initiated under the country’s defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, is increasingly turning occupied Crimea into a logistics nightmare for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kyiv’s campaign in the peninsula has moved beyond episodic strikes on high-value assets and now targets Crimea’s fuel supply, rail access, power grid, air-defense network, and rear-area military movements.
Ukrainian officials describe the concept guiding their Crimea campaign as a “logistics lockdown” involving strikes against Russia’s operational depth, including storage sites, command nodes, equipment, and supply routes. Kyiv has also allocated additional funding for middle-strike assets, a class of unmanned, artificial intelligence–assisted aerial drones optimized to strike targets at operational depth. This concept reflects Ukraine’s effort to institutionalize its attacks rather than treat them as one-off raids.
The campaign’s most visible effect is Crimea’s fuel crisis. On May 22, Russia began fuel rationing in Sevastopol, the peninsula’s largest city, limiting fuel sales to roughly five gallons per vehicle. By June 21, the government had reportedly suspended gasoline sales to civilians.
Ukraine’s strikes have destroyed the routes and the storage architecture that supply Crimea. Ukrainian drones have struck vehicles, including fuel tankers, along the land corridor in occupied southern Ukraine, and have also damaged fuel infrastructure inside Crimea, including the Feodosiia Maritime Oil Terminal, the Semykolodezianska oil depot, and the ATAN fuel depot near Simferopol.
Bridges have become another pressure point. Ukrainian forces previously destroyed the Chonhar Bridge, a road bridge to the peninsula, forcing freight traffic onto longer, more vulnerable routes. On June 22–23, Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces also attacked the railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal near Rozdolne in a two-phase operation. The first strike damaged the rail line, collapsing one span of the bridge. The second strike destroyed repair equipment and the bridge’s remaining spans. Ukrainian forces later asserted that the bridge no longer exists, though independent authorities have not confirmed the claim.
Ukraine’s latest wave of strikes also hit Crimea’s energy system. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Command reportedly used attack drones to strike fuel reservoirs at the Kerch Thermal Power Plant, the Simferopol gas distribution station, and the West Crimea 330/110 kilovolt electrical substation. Russian occupation authorities later stated that approximately half of Crimea was without electricity and introduced preventive load-shedding measures to manage pressure on the area’s electrical grid.
Local operators also reported blackouts in Yevpatoriia, Saky, Dzhankoi, and Krasnoperekopsk, while monitoring channels reported a major fire at the Kerch plant, where a smoke plume stretched about 29 miles. Some areas of the peninsula reportedly now receive electricity only a few hours each day under scheduled supply arrangements.
Ukraine’s strikes have both highlighted and exacerbated Crimea’s structural energy vulnerabilities. Before Russia’s 2014 occupation, the peninsula relied on mainland Ukraine for more than 80 percent of its electricity. Moscow later reduced this dependency by constructing and modernizing the area’s plants—which are now targets for Ukrainian drones.
The peninsula also faces fuel vulnerabilities. Crimea’s civilian population alone consumes roughly 2,500 tons of fuel a day, while total demand on the peninsula typically reaches about 4,000 tons. Meeting that demand requires 120,000 tons of fuel each month, which is roughly the equivalent of 2,200 railway tank cars. Observers find these volumes difficult to conceal, especially as Ukraine expands medium-range drone coverage across the peninsula’s supply routes.
Ukraine is also increasing the pressure on Russia’s military presence in Crimea. In their June 23 strike package, Ukrainian forces stated they had hit more than 60 Russian military targets across the country’s occupied territories. Reported targets on Crimea included three Orion reconnaissance-strike drone launchers, a Nebo-U radar, a Pantsir-S1 air-defense system, an S-300 launcher, and a ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun. This pattern suggests that Ukraine is coupling interdiction with the suppression of Russia’s local air-defense and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture.
3. What to Look for in the Coming Weeks
Ukraine recently launched its TrophyLab initiative, a controlled-access platform that turns captured Russian weapons into a structured intelligence resource for its allies and partners. The platform provides vetted governments, defense firms, research institutions, and Ukrainian defense manufacturers and military units access to technical data on Russian systems. Resources include documentation, laboratory studies, component analyses, schematics, and vulnerability assessments.
Kyiv says the platform already covers more than 115 captured Russian systems across 79 categories, including assets such as the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile and the T-90 main battle tank. Verified users of the platform can also request physical access to captured hardware for inspection, disassembly, or destructive testing. This innovation will almost certainly accelerate the development of new countermeasures against Russian weapons.
It will be worth monitoring how the TrophyLab project is received by Ukraine’s partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ahead of the alliance’s July 2026 summit.
About the author: Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions. He specializes in open-source defense intelligence, geopolitical assessments, international weapons market trends, as well as emerging defense technologies and related concepts of operations.
About Hudson Institute Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom. View all posts by Hudson Institute →
Why are Ukrainian drones targeting annexed Crimea's infrastructures?
Issued on: 26/06/2026 - FRANCE24
11:50
Kyiv is seeking retribution and one of its targets is Crimea. The peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014 now threatens to become Moscow's Achilles' heel, as Ukraine steps up its attacks targeting bridges, ferries and oil storage facilities. The strategy appears to be working: fuel and power shortages are becoming increasingly difficult and have forced Russian-installed leaders to introduce temporary measures and Crimeans now find themselves living under bombardment.
Ukraine’s successful drone attacks on Russian refineries and ports have significantly reduced Moscow’s ability to meet domestic needs and sell oil abroad. They highlight serious bottlenecks in Russia’s critically important oil sector.
These chokepoints reflect the fragility of Russia’s oil pipeline network. As a result, damage at a relatively few places has an outsize impact, and their concentration near Russia’s few ports makes them tempting targets for attack.
Beyond these attacks are ever-more pressing causes. Global warming is damaging pipelines, easily accessible oil reserves are being exhausted, and developing more difficult-to-exploit alternative fields entails enormous costs and extreme challenges.
Analysis
Ukraine’s drone attacks on Russian refineries and ports have significantly degraded Moscow’s ability to meet domestic needs and sell oil abroad to fill Russian government coffers. They highlight serious bottlenecks in Russia’s critically important petroleum sector (Svobodnaya Pressa, June 21). These chokepoints reflect the lack of redundancy in Russia’s oil pipeline network in many parts of the country, especially in the north, where natural resources such as oil are most plentiful, yet highways, rail lines, and pipelines are scarce. That situation means that any damage to a relatively small number of the latter has an outsized impact, especially as their high concentration near Russia’s few ports makes them particularly tempting targets for attack (Nakanune.ru, March 30).
Beyond those problems, however, are now two even more serious ones. Pipelines are increasingly damaged by global warming, which undermines political will for such pipes. Existing fields are being exhausted, and finding new fields is difficult. Additionally, using new technologies that were not available earlier to extract oil is challenging (The Moscow Times, April 12, 2024; Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, December 4, 2025; Versia, February 10; Window on Eurasia, May 10; Sibirskiy Ekonomist, June 17). Consequently, these bottlenecks are not the marginal or short-term problems some imagine, but rather ones that will remain critical for Moscow not only as long as its war against Ukraine goes on, but even once that conflict is settled, unless it directs new resources into this sector.
The successful Ukrainian drone attacks on the two largest Russian oil ports on the Baltic Sea, Ust-Luga and Primorsk, and on other ports and refineries elsewhere, highlight the sophistication of Ukrainian military planners and the skills of Ukrainian forces. They also highlight the logistical bottlenecks Moscow has taken remarkably few steps to overcome, leaving itself at risk of such attacks. Despite Russia’s enormous size, the two ports on the Baltic alone had been handling almost half of Russia’s oil exports. This is a reflection not just of the absence of other ports that might do so but of rail, road, and pipeline connections from the point of extraction to these points of export (Nakanune.ru, March 30).
Few other industrialized countries, and none anywhere near as large as the Russian Federation, have so many bottlenecks of this kind and thus, in time of war, are at such enormous risk of serious losses from attacks on a relatively small number of sites. So far, however, instead of working to improve its logistics network, the Kremlin has adopted a short-term approach, focusing on improving its anti-drone systems and waiting for better times to do anything else. Until it makes a denser and more complete logistical network a priority, something that by its very nature will take enormous time and money, however, Russia will remain far more vulnerable to analogous attacks by foreign countries or domestic opponents with consequences far greater than they’d be in the case of other countries.
These bottlenecks and the lack of a concerted effort to overcome them are, in the first instance, inheritances from Soviet times. Central planners sought to address this or that problem with little thought given to redundancy or even survivability. It has also affected and continues to affect Moscow’s thinking not only in the petroleum sector but in many others as well (Kommersant, June 19, 2023). While the Russian economy, especially in extractive industries such as oil, has expanded dramatically since 1991, this approach has remained remarkably unchanged. Moscow has sought to boost production with little thought given to the risks of having so much of its oil flow through such a limited network. These risks have increased exponentially since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine.
Unfortunately for Moscow, the effects of this failure to build redundancy in the oil sector have been dramatically exacerbated in recent years by two other developments unrelated to any attack. Global warming has led to the damage or even collapse of some pipelines (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, September 22, 2023). The exhaustion of easily exploited fields has meant that Russia has had to invest far more in exploring for others or in extracting oil using technologies that are far more difficult and expensive (Sibirskiy Ekonomist, June 17). According to official Russian government estimates, more than 60 percent of Russia’s oil reserves are now in the difficult-to-exploit category. Most of these new fields are in the Russian north, where there are few people and even fewer roads, rail lines, and pipelines than in the rest of the country, and where attracting and retaining residents and developing such infrastructure are especially difficult (see EDM, February 18, March 5).
The challenges and costs of increasing redundancy in the oil sector are so great that Russian officials have instead come up with more imaginative proposals rather than focusing directly on these problems. They reflect Moscow’s proclivity for extensive rather than intensive solutions, however problematic some of these ideas are. Among the most problematic of these ideas are calls for developing and using dirigibles to export coal, developing oil fields in the Antarctic, and relying on riverine shipping to move oil and other raw materials even though Russia has a severe shortage of ships equipped to do so (EastRussia, July 9, 2024; seeEDM, August 13, 2024; Sibirskiy Ekonomist, December 11, 2025). Such attitudes and proclivities also help explain proposals for new gigantic infrastructure, such as the Bering Strait tunnel, which would certainly require enormous sums but, because of the absence of rail links on either side, would not have the positive impact its advocates claim (see EDM, June 11).
Bottlenecks are now a characteristic of the Russian economy, not just in the oil sector. (For a useful discussion of such bottlenecks in other parts of Russian economic life, see The Insider, August 13, 2025.) The Putin regime has not taken the steps needed to overcome this general problem or even to convince industry managers that they must do so It is certainly worried, however, about it not only because of the immediate consequences of bottlenecks on the Russian economy and how such chokepoints are limiting Russian growth but also because of the widespread belief that bottlenecks played a key role in the demise of the Soviet state, something the Kremlin is committed to avoiding any repetition of (Profile, December 22, 2022). The results of Ukraine’s drone attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure will only heighten those concerns, and that should lend more attention to bottlenecks in Russia that were routinely given to bottlenecks in the years leading up to the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com . View all posts by Paul Goble →
Moscow-appointed authorities declare state of emergency in Crimea
26.06.2026, 15:01 Uhr
Photo: Ulf Mauder/dpa
The authorities appointed by Moscow on the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, have declared a regional state of emergency.
The move was announced on Friday by the appointed head of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, and the appointed governor of Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhayev.
The decision was taken primarily to resolve economic issues, Aksyonov wrote on Telegram. The state of emergency would make it possible to swiftly address issues essential to the stable functioning of all sectors on which the population's livelihoods depend.
Kiev has significantly expanded its counteroffensives recently, primarily targeting the Russian oil and gas industry and military installations.
Ukraine aims to disrupt the Russian army's fuel supplies and reduce revenue from the energy sector, which is vital for Moscow in financing its war.
People in Crimea are feeling the consequences acutely. Private individuals can no longer obtain petrol, and power cuts have been introduced.
Kiev has announced its intention to cut off supplies to the peninsula.
Wednesday, June 24, 2026
India looks to increase its unmanned warfare capabilities
The Indian military is on a long and arduous journey to modernise its capabilities and force structure. Under its new direction, the Indian Ministry of Defence, in all three services is pivoting away from traditional methods of human surveillance and toward autonomous systems across all domains.
However autonomous and semi-autonomous platforms are not the only driving factor, as localised production and sourcing under India’s flagship “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” initiative as well as wider insights gained from contemporary international conflicts are also driving the agenda.
While New Delhi frames it as a framework and calculus to establish native supply chains, it isn’t about autarkic backsliding into a pre globalisation paradigm of limited capability. In a pragmatic world of complex value and supply chains, the shift represents a transition from exclusively importing to structured, multi-tiered domestic production. Furthermore, India’s own operational lessons from past conflicts and skirmishes including Operation Sindoor and the hostilities with Pakistan in May 2025 which have been absorbed into the guiding principles.
Largely beginning with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite existing for decades before, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)s signalled a special strategic and tactical importance in modern warfare. Similarly, due to the effective employment of sem-autonomous unmanned naval surface craft by Ukraine against the Russian Navy, this has elevated what was once seen mainly as a surveillance and Search And Rescue (SAR) tool to a strike role against capital warships.
According to a report by DW, the cornerstone of this structural change is going to be a large procurement order to the tune of $2bn. While the amount is noteworthy, the suppliers being exclusively India’s own private defence firms including Adani Group (NSE:ADANIENT), Tata Advanced Systems, and Larsen & Toubro (NSE:LT), the timelines are also reportedly relatively short, spanning around 18 to 24 months.
While India’s state owned defence structure including Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (NSE:HAL) have their own armed UAV designs, and some have even passed trial, none have received large procurement orders with any plans for induction into the inventories and arsenals of any of India’s defence forces as of June 2026.
The three main categories of unmanned vehicles that are likely to be part of the $2bn order are likely to be, High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE), Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP), Electronic Warfare (EW) suite platforms especially in a companion configuration aimed at operating in conjunction with a manned multirole fighter aircraft and its pilot, and loitering munitions especially those intended for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD).
India has also pursued procurement of foreign origin platforms such as Israel’s IAI industries's series of Heron UAVs procured between 2000-2016, and the US General Atomic’s MQ9 between 2020-2026.
The US supplied MQ9 platforms have been a capability boost with their high endurance and combat radius, as well as the ability to be fitted out for modular mission profiles ranging from surveillance over vast swathes of ocean, to strike any surface cruising maritime or land based threats.
These contracts for foreign origin platforms have cost over $10bn in the past 26 years. However, as things shift into a decisively indigenous direction for procurement, India is looking for greater utility for a fraction of the price. This would include leveraging the economies of scale and not having to pay a premium for foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) profit margins, currency exchange rate related costs, as well as much more scalable and available after sales support, as well as overhauls and retirement costs over the system and platform’s life cycle.
However, these expectations and specifications are not easily fulfilled as the consistent pattern of underinvestment in Research and Development (R&D) by both state owned entities and the private sector has been the proverbial achilles heel of India’s defence industrial complex.
Even when a programme which has produced a solid product for a replacement or upgrade of a capability away from a foreign vendor, India’s procurement agencies have repeatedly changed the specifications and demanded constant iterative changes without paying for the now inflated costs owing to these value additions.
This approach of shifting goalposts and in some cases even using defence procurement as a tool to court favour with geopolitical partners such as the US and Russia, has inevitably downgraded capability as a second priority over relationship building.
While this approach has its own merits, the negatives when weighed against the fundamental goal of developing its own defence industrial base, leaves New Delhi few options but to continue dependence on historical suppliers and partners as a strategic necessity.
Nevertheless, the awareness that future military conflicts will involve highly sophisticated, yet fast produced and equally fast depleted stockpiles of cheap, disposable unmanned platforms with an attrition rate in the hundreds of thousands in a given month is resonating with New Delhi and its strategic planners just as soundly as those in any other consequential state with a military.
However, the delicate dance of balancing, ambition, autonomy, and technology and diplomacy with budgetary concerns may be what makes or breaks India’s push for unmanned systems in all domains.
Thursday, June 18, 2026
Who Lost Out And Who Made Big Money From The Iran War? – Analysis
Since Israeli-American airstrikes against Iran began, speculators and oil companies have been making huge profits. Airlines and consumers, on the other hand, are the ones losing out. In the face of inflation, only the strength of currencies such as the Swiss franc, and of commodities such as gold, silver, copper and oil, is providing a counterbalance.
Generally speaking, there are more losers than winners in a war. The stock market indices reflect this: since the start of the war on 28 February, the S&P 500 fell by around 8% in the initial weeks, but has since surged to new highs and is now trading substantially above pre-war levels, in line with the tech-focused Nasdaq. While companies are generally in a difficult position due to soaring energy prices, institutions based in the Middle East, including banks, have been targeted by the Iranian regime. Speculative gains on commodities
Oil and gas price volatility has not been this high since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Following the strikes against Iran, the price of a barrel of Brent crude, which was around $70 in February, neared $150 in the first few days before falling back below $100. Since the peace deal was announced between Iran and the United States on 14 June, the Brent price has fallen to $83, offering opportunities for high returns to speculators. Some hedge funds specialize in betting on volatility and are profiting from instability in the commodities market.
For example, between 1 and 6 March, the commodities fund managed by Doug King, a London-based trader at RCMA Capital, surged by 9.5%. Year-to-date, it has gained 20%, thanks to bets on oil, European gas, base metals, coal and agriculture:
The fund managed by Ron Ozer, a trader at Statar Capital in Florida, gained 6.25% in the first week of the conflict thanks to its natural gas investments. Meanwhile, the energy-focused Saber Capital fund from Barclays Bank also gained 6.7% in the first week, with results reaching 13.5% by the end of April. Others profited from bullish bets on gold, silver, copper and tin. Market commentators anticipate that the gains will continue as commodity volatility shows no signs of abating.
Super profits for oil companies
‘A barrel at $100 is the jackpot,’ said a commentator in Le Monde, referring to the expected profits for TotalEnergies this year. As during the war in Ukraine, oil companies such as the French giant and Britain’s BP have benefited greatly from high oil prices.
As the price per barrel increases, so do these companies’ profit margins. So do their refining margins, which are linked to the prices of diesel and kerosene. TotalEnergies and BP are also major players in the gas market, and gas prices have also skyrocketed. TotalEnergies’ stock price has risen by 28% on the stock market this year, and BP’s by 22%. The stock prices of Exxon, Chevron and Shell are also rising, enriching the portfolios of investors who bought these stocks from the outset.
Gains in the arms industry
As with every war, it is a grim reality that arms stocks are among the big winners. Elbit Systems, an Israeli arms company, has seen its stock rise by 20% since the start of the strikes against Iran, having already gained twice as much during the 2.5 years of war in Gaza as it had over the previous five years.
In the United States, Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the F-35, has risen 30% since January. The surge began before the conflict in Iran started, but has continued since then. Northrop Grumman, known for its missile defense systems, was up 26% in March.
In Europe, Leonardo, an Italian group, has seen its value increase by 27%, while Dassault, a French company, has seen its value soar by 25%. In contrast, Germany’s Rheinmetall, the big winner of the war in Ukraine whose market value rose from $4.5 billion to $104 billion between October 2021 and October 2022, is not benefiting from the current conflict outside Europe this time.
Cryptos seen as a safe haven
Bitcoin is one of the winners of the war in Ukraine: after a long downtrend in which it lost 50% of its value over the past year, the leading cryptocurrency has managed to reverse this trend since the start of the Israeli-American strikes, gaining 18%. Ethereum, the other major cryptocurrency, has also benefited from the war, rebounding by 22% since the start of the strikes after declining since January.
The crypto community has always promoted the idea that cryptocurrencies play the role of safe haven during turbulent times. However, the Iranian crisis has not vindicated the idea that Bitcoin is a safe haven, but it has offered the clearest real-world test of this theory in the current cycle.
Furthermore, Reuters reports that significant volumes of cryptocurrency funds were transferred from Iranian platforms such as Nobitex to other parts of the world from the outset of the conflict on Saturday, 28 February. The Iranian government cannot control crypto assets in the same way that it controls traditional money. This allows for secure capital flight, even if the volumes — amounting to a few million dollars — have remained modest.
The consumer is the big loser
American and European consumers were the big losers from the return of inflation following the war against Iran. As a result of the global oil shortage, gas prices in the US have risen sharply, increasing by around 40% since the US and Israel began the war. According to data from motor club AAA, gas prices have risen to an average of over $4 per gallon, putting a strain on household budgets nationwide. Higher fuel costs have led to increased transportation costs, which in turn have driven up food prices and the cost of everyday goods. Electricity and heating bills have also increased, as have grocery prices. Companies weighed down by energy costs
Many companies sensitive to rising energy prices have been penalized. In Europe in particular, companies are more dependent on energy imports than in the US.
Among the biggest losers are airlines. For groups such as Lufthansa (which also owns Swiss) and Air France-KLM, fuel alone often accounts for 20–35% of costs. Fuel prices are also crucial for shipping companies such as the Geneva-based giant MSC and the Danish container shipping firm Maersk, as well as the French company CMA CGM, which has a strong presence in emerging markets.
The booming data center sector is highly energy-intensive and is currently undergoing a historic AI-driven infrastructure boom. It is therefore highly exposed to rising energy costs.
Finally, not all currency and stock market traders have come out of the armed conflict ahead, with some losing out on inflation. Some were on the wrong side of their bets, particularly those who were betting on an expected decline in inflation this year.
About Richard Rousseau Richard Rousseau, Ph.D., is an international relations expert. He was formerly a professor and head of political science departments at universities in Canada, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates. His research interests include the former Soviet Union, international security, international political economy, and globalization. Dr. Rousseau's approximately 800 books, book chapters, academic journal and scholarly articles, conference papers, and newspaper analyses on a variety of international affairs issues have been published in numerous publications, including The Jamestown Foundation (Washington, D.C.), Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century (Canada), Foreign Policy In Focus (Washington, D.C.), Open Democracy (UK), Harvard International Review, Diplomatic Courier (Washington, C.D.), Foreign Policy Journal (U.S.), Europe's World (Brussels), Political Reflection Magazine (London), Center for Security Studies (CSS, Zurich), Eurasia Review, Global Asia (South Korea), The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, Journal of Turkish Weekly (Ankara), The Georgian Times (Tbilisi), among others. View all posts by Richard Rousseau →
Wednesday, June 17, 2026
Growing Water Shortages In Central Asia Threaten Region And Its Neighbors – Analysis
The water shortage in the five Central Asian countries continues to worsen. It has now reached the point where the “water surplus” upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan no longer have sufficient water to send more downstream to the three other “water short” countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Window on Eurasia, March 3, 2024). That problem and its purported solution—one that drove policies in Soviet times, when Moscow controlled the distribution of water, and still dominates the thinking of many in the region and elsewhere—no longer apply (see EDM, April 9). Climate change, burgeoning population growth, and poor irrigation policies mean that there are no longer any “water surplus” countries in the region (Window on Eurasia, March 3, 2024). This new reality is something the international community is only slowly coming to recognize.
Even as the water crisis undermines the growth and stability of each Central Asian country, it is also increasing tensions among them. Each country is forced to look individually and collectively beyond the region as a whole, sounding ever more warnings that unless they get help and soon, there will be instability in Central Asia and massive refugee flows into these neighboring states (Window on Eurasia, December 6, 2025;RITM Eurasia, June 12).
Unless more comprehensive approaches are adopted, the ever-growing need for water in Central Asian countries and the impossibility of solving this problem on their own will be a major and growing cause of instability and conflict within and among them. Tensions will mount between them again individually and collectively, on the one hand, and Afghanistan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Russian Federation, on the other. Each of these countries has its own domestic water problems and agendas for using the water crisis in Central Asia to promote its national interests (see EDM, July 11, 2024;Fond Strategicheskoy Kul’tury; Vecherniy Bishkek; Spik.kz, June 8;Stoletie, June 10).
Drought conditions over the last several years have pushed the water crisis in Central Asia to unprecedented dimensions. Even those countries long identified as “water surplus” no longer have enough water to ensure that their major lakes will not disappear as the Aral Sea already has, that critical food crops will supply the growing cities, and that the latter will not begin to empty with their residents fleeing abroad to find water (Window on Eurasia, September 8, 2024, December 6, 2025; see EDM, April 9). This perfect storm is the result of the convergence of three factors, any one of which would be a challenge, but together pose a threat to the region. First, global warming has reduced the flow of water from the mountains where glaciers are melting at unprecedented rates (Window on Eurasia, June 11). Second, still-burgeoning population growth is occurring beyond the capacity of the governments there to cope with (Window on Eurasia, April 18). Third, water distribution systems both in cities and especially in agricultural areas remain both inadequate and wasteful (Window on Eurasia, December 21, 2025).
The countries of Central Asia are increasingly being forced to seek to obtain water from their neighbors. Most importantly, they are being forced to obtain water from the Russian Federation with talk about revisiting earlier plans to divert Siberian river water to Central Asia (seeEDM, April 1, 2025). They are also being forced to seek water from the PRC, some of whose river flows might be diverted to Central Asia (Window on Eurasia, July 31, 2025). Additionally, water is being sought from Afghanistan, where Central Asians are alarmed by a major Kabul water project that will further reduce the flow of water into Central Asia’s riverine system (see EDM, July 11, 2024). To date, progress on these fronts has been limited by two factors.
On the one hand, all three of these countries face mounting domestic water problems and oppose spending massive amounts of money to help others when they themselves need water (Window on Eurasia, June 27, 2025; see EDM, July 3, 2025). On the other hand, the Central Asian countries, instead of adopting a common approach, have adopted contrasting national programs. This is a choice that Moscow, Beijing, and Kabul have been quick to exploit, offering water to those who cooperate on other issues but not doing so for others who refuse (Window on Eurasia, December 6, 2025; RITM Eurasia, June 12).
The resulting impasse in turn has sparked increasingly apocalyptic talk about what will happen if the neighboring countries do not help Central Asia. Not only are there now increasing references to the possibility of economic and social collapse and the rise of extremism, but some in the region and elsewhere are now suggesting that as the countries of Central Asia run out of water, that by itself will force millions of the people there to flee to other countries, including Russia. One Uzbek scholar, Ravshan Nazarov, for example, has gone as far as to suggest that unless Central Asia gets more water from its neighbors and soon, as many as 100 million Central Asians will decamp from their homeland and create what would be the world’s largest refugee problem in the Russian Federation (Vostochniy Ekspress, December 8, 2023).
Especially ominous for many Russians now focusing on this issue is that international bodies such as the World Bank have echoed this apocalyptic vision and warned that steps must be taken now to avert it (Window on Eurasia, April 2, 2023; The World Bank, December 12, 2024). There have been three responses to such suggestions. First, some in Russia, for example, are now warning that Moscow has no choice but to give the Central Asians water lest more Muslims move into the Russian Federation. Second, others are saying that the Kremlin should beef up its military along the borders with Central Asia to prevent such an influx. Third, still others are saying that the water crisis is affecting more than just Central Asia and that Moscow should demand that the international community get involved to solve that rather than bear all the burdens of doing so by acting on its own in Central Asia (Window on Eurasia, December 13, 2023; see EDM, July 3, 2025; Stolitie, June 10). The PRC has a freer hand to act because it has less water at stake and thus has proved more willing to be cooperative (Window on Eurasia, July 31, 2025;Vecherniy Bishkek, June 8). Afghanistan has been willing to talk but has not scaled back its own water projects the way Central Asians would like, to their increasing annoyance and the two other countries as well (seeEDM, July 11, 2024; Fond Strategicheskoy Kul’tury, June 8).
There are few signs that Central Asia’s water problems will be resolved anytime soon (RITM Eurasia, June 12). As a result, the water problem in Central Asia is likely to explode, possibly as early as this fall, when harvests there fail. If that happens, this will affect not only the five Central Asian states and their three neighbors but the international community as a whole.
About Paul Goble Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
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