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Tuesday, September 22, 2026


The SCO Comes Out Of The Shadows – OpEd



Group photo of the heads of delegations participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Heads of State Council Meeting in Bishkek. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru

September 10, 2026

By Michael Harrison

Key Takeaways:

The author says the Sept. 1 SCO summit in Bishkek did not create an anti-Western alliance, but the enlarged group (now 10 members, including India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus) looked more intent on turning talk into tools—AI and port centers, 100 tech projects, charter changes, new security and anti-drug bodies.

War in Ukraine, Iran’s sanctions and conflict with the U.S. and Israel, and doubts about U.S. staying power have made those tools more useful. The Bishkek Declaration condemned strikes on Iran and criticized sanctions, while India’s Quad ties keep the SCO from being a simple anti-U.S. bloc.

Weaknesses remain: consensus vetoes, India–Pakistan and India–China rivalry, no SCO development bank, and most real economics still running through China’s Belt and Road. The group’s value is hedging—cheaper ways to say no to Washington—not replacing NATO or the dollar.



For most of its 25-year history, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was easy to underestimate. Founded by China, Russia, and four Central Asian states, it gave Beijing and Moscow a forum for managing security concerns and expanding ties across Eurasia. But on economics and institution-building, the SCO often lived in the shadow of the overlapping BRICS group—of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—which produced a development bank and a more visible platform for emerging powers.

That is what made the SCO summit in Bishkek on September 1 different. The SCO did not suddenly become a cohesive anti-Western alliance this month. But it looked less like a diplomatic holding pen and more like an organization trying to turn political convergence into practical cooperation.

The change comes from two directions at once. The SCO itself has expanded and begun building new mechanisms. Meanwhile, the geopolitical environment around it has made those mechanisms more valuable.

From Forum to Infrastructure

The organization that met in Kyrgyzstan is much larger than the one created in 2001. It now has 10 members, including India and Pakistan, which joined in 2017, Iran, which became a full member in 2023, and Belarus, which joined in 2024. Last year’s Tianjin summit also approved a 2026–2035 development strategy and new cooperation platforms in energy, green industry, the digital economy, science and technology, education, and vocational training.

Bishkek added another layer. Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed an international center for artificial-intelligence applications, a China-SCO port-economy cooperation center in Tianjin, and 100 joint technology projects over the next three years. The summit also approved 28 documents, including amendments to the SCO Charter and regulations for new security and anti-drug bodies.

These measures are modest compared with the European Union or even the New Development Bank of the BRICS. Still, they matter because they suggest movement from declarations toward an infrastructure of cooperation.

Geopolitics Gives the SCO New Weight

The external environment has changed even faster. Russia’s rupture with the West as a result of the war in Ukraine pushed Moscow toward Asian markets and institutions. Iran entered the SCO after years of U.S. sanctions and now participates while fighting a direct conflict with the United States and Israel. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reinforced doubts in many capitals about the durability of U.S.-led economic and security arrangements.

That context gave the Bishkek Declaration more significance than a routine summit communiqué. SCO members condemned military strikes on Iran and criticized sanctions on member states. The statement did not transform the group into a military alliance, but it showed that governments with very different relationships with Washington could still agree on limits to U.S. coercive power.

India is the most important caveat—and the clearest reason not to label the SCO an anti-American bloc. New Delhi works with Washington in the Quad, competes strategically with China, and has resisted efforts to turn non-Western institutions into explicitly anti-Western coalitions. Its participation instead reflects a broader pattern of multialignment. Major powers want room to work with the United States where interests overlap while preserving alternatives when they do not.

The Limits Are Real

Those alternatives should not be exaggerated. The SCO’s biggest weakness is institutional. Its charter requires decisions to be made by consensus, which gives every member a potential veto. India and Pakistan remain rivals; India and China have unresolved strategic disputes; and Russia and China do not always support the same economic architecture in Central Asia. The long-running failure to establish an SCO development bank is a reminder that slogans about integration are easier than pooled money and shared rules.


Even the economic case for the SCO requires nuance. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral trade corridors, and national payment systems do much of the practical work often attributed to the organization. A recent Carnegie assessment of the Bishkek summit argues that strategic rivalries and weak cross-border institutions still obstruct meaningful regional integration.

In other words, the SCO may be becoming more useful without becoming strong.


A More Plural Order, Not a Replacement Hegemon

That distinction is precisely why Washington should pay attention. The SCO does not need to replace NATO, the World Bank, or the dollar to alter the balance of power. It only needs to make it easier for member states to hedge—to find diplomatic backing, trade routes, technology partnerships, security forums, and payment channels that reduce the cost of saying no to the United States.

For U.S. policymakers, the lesson from Bishkek is not that American power has vanished. The United States still possesses unmatched military reach, deep alliances, and enormous financial influence. The lesson is that coercion now operates in a more crowded institutional landscape. Sanctions, tariffs, asset freezes, and military pressure can still impose costs, but they can also increase the value of organizations designed to provide political and economic alternatives.

For two decades, the SCO could be dismissed as a talking shop whose ambitions exceeded its capacity. Bishkek did not erase those weaknesses. It did, however, show an organization trying to convert its enlarged membership and a favorable geopolitical moment into practical relevance.

The SCO has not emerged as the new center of world order. It has simply come out of the shadows. In a more fragmented international system, that may be consequential
enough.

This article was also published at FPIF

About Michael Harrison
Michael Harrison is an independent writer focusing on politics, history, and global affairs. His work offers a critical perspective that goes beyond headlines, exploring the deeper forces shaping international events and public discourse. He can be reached on X at @M_Harrison93
View all posts by Michael Harrison →

Monday, September 21, 2026

An acute crisis in Iran

Saturday 19 September 2026, by Babak Kia



Unable to win the war, US president Donald Trump is bogged down. The Islamic Republic of Iran is responding blow for blow to the US bombings. With the elections in the US and Israel approaching, Trump and Netanyahu cannot back down. This raises fears of a headlong rush and an escalation of the war.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime blockade and sanctions imposed by the United States, galloping inflation, poverty and the worsening economic crisis have brought Iranian society to the brink of social explosion. The deterioration of living conditions is accompanied by the militarization of the regime, an increase in executions and the intensification of repression.

Government strengthens security apparatus

This is evidenced by the bill presented to the Iranian parliament on 16 August, relating to “the infiltration of foreign intelligence services and agencies”. Three days later, nine senior officials from the judiciary, the Prison Organization, the General Inspectorate of the country, the security organs, the Guardians of the Revolution and the Basij were dismissed and replaced. This so-called “reform” is above all intended to strengthen the regime’s repressive capacity in the face of future upheavals.

The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, replaced the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) with Mohsen Rezaï, a former senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq war. This sudden change places the latter at the heart of the national security decision-making process. The appointment of Hossein Taeb as head of the Basij is another example. Taeb, the former intelligence chief of the Revolutionary Guards, is a major figure in Iran’s security apparatus, associated in particular with the repression of popular uprisings and opponents.

An economy in tatters

Washington is further tightening the maritime blockade and sanctions. On 20 August, the United States announced new measures threatening any country that helped Iran circumvent them or maintained trade relations with it. If they were effectively implemented, the economic and social situation would become even more critical for the vast majority of the population.

Immediate consequences: a new collapse of the national currency and a new surge in prices. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is severely affecting imports. For example, India’s exports of medicines to Iran have declined. In August 2026, an Iranian pharmaceutical company announced an average price increase of 117% of 82 medicines, with some molecules increasing by several hundred %. Thus, between September 2025 and September 2026, the price of amoxicillin increased by 284%, that of ibuprofen by 110%.

In addition, there is a significant shortage of gasoline, which is pushing the regime to reduce subsidies and limit consumption. This situation illustrates the growing difficulties in the production, import and distribution of fuels.

The concern of the Iranian leaders

The Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, declared on 21 August: “We can have all the military power we want, but without financial circulation, economic growth and national production, we will not be able to stand up to a starving people.”

President Masud Pezeshkian also speaks of a real economic, military and security war. He acknowledges the fall in imports and exports as well as the financial restrictions on aid to the population, the payment of salaries and social benefits. He also declared that "it would be better to end the war today”, implicitly questioning the leadership of the Guardians of the Revolution, who play a central role in defining the regime’s strategic orientations. In response, currents close to the Revolutionary Guards and their media accuse critics of the current policy of being "lackeys of Trump and Netanyahu”.

A few days before the fourth anniversary of the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, the government particularly fears a new mobilization of workers, women, youth and national minorities. Caught between the violence of US imperialism and that of the reactionary dictatorship, the peoples of Iran are fighting for their survival, dignity and freedom. They need our anti-imperialist solidarity.

9 September 2026

Translated by International Viewpoint from l’Anticapitaliste.

Sunday, September 20, 2026

BROWN AND RED FASCISM

Germany’s AfD asks Kremlin to turn Russian gas back on, Hungary prepares to turn it off

Germany’s AfD asks Kremlin to turn Russian gas back on, Hungary prepares to turn it off
Germany's far-right AfD party has proposed to start talks with the Kremlin to turn Russian gas imports back on next year, while Hungary says it will turn them off. / bne IntelliNews
By Ben Aris in Berlin September 18, 2026

Berlin and Budapest are moving in opposite directions. Germany’s AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) riding high on a recent election victory is in talks with the Kremlin on turning Russian gas supplies back on, while Budapest, previously one of Russia’s few allies in Europe, says it will cut off supplies completely next year.

The AfD has opened talks with Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s go-top man on international business on restoring Russian gas supplies to Europe’s largest economy next year and potentially reopening the Nord Stream pipelines, Reuters sources report.

The proposed meeting between Dmitriev, who has also been acting as the Kremlin’s special envoy in Ukraine ceasefire negotiations, and AfD co-leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla could take place as early as March 2027, according to Reuters. Israel, the United Arab Emirates and India are being considered as venues. The organisers say a meeting would only take place after a peace framework had been agreed between Russia and Ukraine.

Organisers have also discussed bringing the other US special envoys into the talks, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. However, a senior US official told Reuters that neither had been informed or invited to the proposed meeting yet.

The proposal is likely to cause a storm in Brussels, which has been revving up to ban imports of Russian gas completely by January and more recently has also suggested a ban on Russian LNG too, on which the EU has been heavily dependent this year as it races to fill gas storage tanks which are at record low levels ahead of the start of the heating season, now only two months away. However, with gas prices double what they were pre-war, a permanent change, the Germany economic model has been broken, and the country is slowly deindustrialising.

Russia accounted for 52% of Germany’s gas imports in 2021, according to Germany’s Federal Network Agency. Nord Stream 1 deliveries progressively collapsed during 2022, reaching zero by the beginning of September that year after an explosion destroyed three of the four strands of the twin pipelines Nord Stream 1 & 2. The surviving strand was sealed by Danish authorities last year and can be turned on within a day, Putin reminded partners in recent remarks. That strand could carry around 25bcm of gas and is already full of the technical gas that would allow it to be immediately restarted.

The AfD has increasingly made restoring access to Russian energy part of its economic platform, which contributed to its landslide victory in the recent Saxon-Anhalt regional elections in eastern Germany. Weidel told Reuters in June that Germany should end its boycott of Russian oil and gas, and has described “cheap energy from Russia” as “the secret of the success of ‘Made in Germany’.”

For his part, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has vowed “not to give one inch” in his support for Ukraine and resistance to Russian pressure. However, with his popularity having fallen to 14% in the last poll and facing another crushing defeat in two more regional elections in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin this weekend, it is possible that Merz’s CDU will not manage to clear the 5% of the vote threshold that could trigger the collapse of his coalition, or see the Chancellor ousted.

The Nord Stream pipeline issue is especially poignant as it makes landfall in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Recent polling cited by Reuters puts the AfD well in the lead in those elections with 37%, compared with 35% for the governing Social Democrats, but the CDU is polling in single digits in the region.

Most of the German establishment is opposed to restarting Russian gas imports and even if the AfD wins control of another region, they have no voice in the Bundesrat and no power to actually close a deal with Gazprom that operates the pipeline. The announcement of the talks remains little more than an electoral strategy not a business deal.

“Germany cannot become dependent on Russia again,” said Michael Kellner, a Green MP who was responsible for German energy policy during the crisis following the interruption of Russian gas supplies.

“We cannot repeat the mistakes of the energy crisis,” he said. “It cost us €50bn. We cannot want to go back to that. It would be treason. Putin is using the AfD to his own ends.”

However, Roderich Kiesewetter, an MP from Merz’s Christian Democrats, told Reuters that the talks could strengthen voices within his own party that favour a return to Russian gas.

“The AfD is on Russia’s side, willing to betray both Ukraine and Germany. Russia uses energy, especially Nord Stream, as a hybrid weapon for military purposes. Reopening Nord Stream would be a disaster for European security and isolate Germany.”

The politics of restarting Russian gas imports stink. The economics of turning the pipelines back on make perfect sense. EU gas storage was only 68.84% full on September 17, according to Gas Infrastructure Europe, while Germany’s stocks were considerably lower at 56.02% - about 20pp lower than they were a year ago at this point in the year. Under EU rules, the tanks are supposed to be 90% full on November 1, and the chances of that happening are now zero. Germany tanks will be only 67% full by the deadline, according to IntelliNews Lambda calculations and the price of gas has already tripled since the start of the restocking season in May to €80/MWh and is likely to go higher say market participants.

The European Commission (EC) remains committed to cutting off gas imports completely, despite the gas shortage and soaring prices. New regulations were adopted in January banning new short-term contracts that went into effect in April. Imports under long-term Russian LNG contracts are due to stop from January 2027 and long-term pipeline imports from September 30, 2027, although the pipeline deadline can be postponed until November 1 if storage targets are not met.

Hungary bails on Russian gas supplies

In a remarkable parallel development, Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar announced on the same day that Hungary will end its imports of Russian gas completely, backtracking from earlier comments after his election that Hungary would continue to buy Russian methane for now and reversing the policies of his predecessor Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Orban rebelled against European sentiment and maintained good relations with the Kremlin throughout his career and was amongst the most resistant to severing energy links with Moscow. Now Magyar is allying with Brussels and says he wants to shut down the pipelines arriving in Hungary as soon as the same autumn 2027 deadline.

Economy and Energy Minister István Kapitány told Telex that Hungary was working on “alternative supplies” and believed the country could obtain sufficient non-Russian gas by next October if current plans proceeded as expected. He said Budapest was in discussions over additional LNG supplies and potential imports from Romania.

The change would be substantial. According to the European Commission’s 2026 country report, Russia supplied 74% of Hungary’s imported gas in 2025 and more than 90% of its imported oil. Russian fossil-fuel imports were equivalent to 2.1% of Hungarian GDP.

One important potential source is Romania’s Neptun Deep Black Sea development, being developed by OMV Petrom (BVB:SNP) and Romgaz (BVB:SNG), which each hold 50%. The €4bn project remains on schedule to produce first gas in 2027 and is expected eventually to add about 8bn cubic metres a year to Romanian gas production.

Hungarian companies are also signing longer-term LNG contracts and will need to reserve sufficient import and transport capacity through neighbouring countries, Kapitány said.

The apparent reversal therefore has an important qualification: Hungary’s timetable largely reflects a legally binding EU phase-out rather than a unilateral decision by Budapest to abandon Russian energy. But like the AfD’s mooted talks with the Kremlin, Magyar’s announcement probably has more to do with politics and energy security policy.

One of Moscow’s traditionally closest energy partners inside the EU is now building the infrastructure and contracts needed to live without Russian gas. At the same time, a German party whose support has risen sharply is putting the resumption of that trade back onto the political agenda.'

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was a sentence out ofthe "Red Flag." Every argument a





How The US-Saudi Nuclear Deal Could Ignite A Middle East Arms Race – Analysis


Saudi Arabia and the United States sign nuclear agreements. 
Credit: US Department of Energy


September 20, 2026

Observer Research Foundation

By Vivek Mishra and Surya Prakash Noutiyal



Key Takeaways:

A 123 deal, not the UAE “gold standard.” Signed 22 July 2026, the 30-year U.S.–Saudi civil nuclear pact (Atomic Energy Act §123) can move civilian fuel, tech, and kit—and, the author says, leave enrichment on Saudi soil under U.S. monitoring. Riyadh is in the NPT (1988) and has IAEA comprehensive safeguards (2009) but not the Additional Protocol. The UAE’s 2009 deal barred domestic enrichment.

Congress and a Trump aside. Energy Depart
ent: 90 session days for Congress to object. Trump said a day after signing that it hinged on Abraham Accords/Israel; the text does not. MBS in 2023: if Iran gets a bomb, Saudi Arabia would “have to get one.” Author: enrichment up to 20% is the civilian cap named—and the proliferation worry vs Iran’s JCPOA 3.67% cap (later 60% after the U.S. left).

Rivals and spillover. A parallel bilateral safeguards deal is meant to beat China and Russia for the build. Author: Turkey, Egypt, the UAE may want the same rights; Saudi–Pakistan and Mecca (Saudi–Pakistan–Türkiye) defense pacts widen the worry. That last stretch is the writer’s brief, not the treaty text.



The United States (US) and Saudi Arabia have reached a landmark nuclear cooperation agreement (123 agreement) on civil nuclear energy that could provide the Kingdom with an enviable opportunity to enrich uranium on its soil, a prospect that has drawn criticism over the risk of regional nuclear proliferation.

The 123 agreement — a term drawn from Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 — could allow the transfer of civilian nuclear material, technology, and equipment to Saudi Arabia. The move is critical for Riyadh as it undergoes economic diversification, becoming less reliant on the fossil-fuel-based economy and developing a non-fossil-fuel energy mix that includes nuclear energy. In return, the 30-year agreement gives American companies access to Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear market, allowing them to work with local entities to build a multibillion-dollar industry.


Saudi Arabia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1988 and, since 2009, has had a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) covering all its nuclear facilities. However, the Kingdom has not signed the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA broader access to look for undeclared material and activities. Additionally, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s rupture with the Biden administration, Saudi Arabia’s tendency to act independently of the US, and its mutual defence pact with Pakistan all give Washington — and the South Asian region — reason to be cautious.

Along with the 123 agreement, Washington and Riyadh also signed a bilateral safeguards agreement that strengthens the US’s competitive edge in exporting civil nuclear technology to the Kingdom vis-à-vis other nuclear technology-trading countries such as China and Russia. This agreement offers the US significant economic and strategic advantages for long-term business opportunities in the Kingdom. The agreement lays the legal foundation for providing the Kingdom with uranium enrichment capability for its civilian nuclear programme, on the condition that the US monitors Saudi Arabia’s enrichment activities. Critics argue that the agreement lacks the “Gold Standard” that Washington has, for two decades, attached as a condition for nuclear cooperation — requiring countries to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. The UAE is a prime example of this standard being applied.


The US-Saudi nuclear agreement had remained stalled for years. In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Project for Atomic Energy to diversify its energy mix and reduce domestic oil and gas consumption, with plans to build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity generation and water desalination. The US already has a civil nuclear agreement with the UAE, in force since 2009, under which the UAE does not enrich uranium domestically and instead relies on imports of enriched uranium for its nuclear energy programme.

Riyadh’s main sticking point was believed to be its insistence on enriching uranium domestically, something Washington had long been reluctant to allow. Successive US administrations worked toward nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and the Trump administration finally signed the civil nuclear deal on 22 July 2026 — only for President Trump to declare a day later that it was contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and normalising relations with Israel, a condition not mentioned when the deal was announced.

The formal text, however, does not make the deal conditional on Saudi-Israeli normalisation, so it could take effect without it. Israel’s own domestic politics — an approaching election and its refusal to withdraw from Gaza — may have forced Trump’s hand on this point. The deal still carries a built-in buffer: according to the US Department of Energy, it now goes to Congress for review and will enter into force unless Congress votes to object within 90 session days, giving Trump time to test Riyadh’s promise.

Eight months after signing a joint declaration in November 2025, the 123 agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia arrives at a moment when Washington is at war with Iran and in urgent need of regional realignment. US allies in the region, Saudi Arabia included, have been struck by hundreds of Iranian missiles and drones, an onslaught that has threatened Saudi sovereignty, disrupted oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, and reopened the debate about the US’s utility as the Gulf’s security guarantor.


The Crown Prince has long adopted a realistic view about the threat from Iran. In September 2023, Mohammed bin Salman acknowledged that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would “have to get one, for security reasons, for balancing power.” The unpredictability of the ongoing war has since sent Riyadh scrambling for firmer security guarantees. Its early assurance that Saudi soil would not be used to strike Iran gave way as Iranian attacks intensified, eventually forcing Saudi Arabia to launch retaliatory strikes on Iran of its own. A purely defensive posture is proving unsustainable through a prolonged conflict, and with the prospect of Iranian nuclearisation now an open bet, Saudi Arabia wants a clearer path forward.
Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East

The Saudi nuclear agreement would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium up to 20 percent. Such a level could be needed to power a small modular civilian reactor, but it also raises the risk of nuclear material being diverted for military purposes in the absence of stringent controls. Washington is applying a markedly different enrichment benchmark to Saudi Arabia than the one it once set for Iran. Under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s uranium enrichment was capped at 3.67 percent for 15 years, after which the restriction would lapse. Trump’s withdrawal from the deal during his first term set in motion a chain of events that saw Iran enrich uranium to as much as 60 percent — for context, 90 percent is considered weapons-grade. The biggest concern around Saudi Arabia’s entry into the nuclear fold is that it could intensify a broader nuclear arms race in the Middle East.


As the US-Iran nuclear deal remains in a quagmire and Iran still possesses its stockpile of enriched uranium, Saudi Arabia’s rush to acquire nuclear technology as a deterrent against Iran is unsurprising. Iran has already demonstrated its ability to control the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt other trade routes in the region. For reliable deterrence, the Kingdom is seeking a sovereign nuclear capability that offers lasting security in the Middle East. Another factor that may have nudged Washington toward a deal with Riyadh was the lurking possibility of Saudi Arabia turning to Russia or China instead.

Through the nuclear agreement, Washington has ensured that Riyadh stays within the ambit of a strategic partnership spanning energy, technology, and regional security. The US-Saudi civil nuclear pact is being billed as the “deal of the century” for the Kingdom: it meets Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy needs while giving Washington leverage to steer Riyadh away from Beijing and Moscow. Perhaps the most consequential spillover from the agreement will be how it shapes Washington’s approach to the nuclear ambitions of other regional powers — Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE among them — especially if Saudi Arabia succeeds in securing enrichment rights on its soil.

The issue of nuclear proliferation has never been more acute for the volatile Middle East. An uncontrolled nuclear expansion in the region could open a Pandora’s box, sharply compounding proliferation concerns. It also raises questions about regional stability at a time when the US is unable to offer its regional allies concrete security guarantees. There is a glaring contradiction at the heart of US policy in the Middle East: on the one hand, Washington is pressuring Iran to halt its nuclear programme and submit to stringent IAEA inspections; on the other, it is helping its long-standing ally, Saudi Arabia, acquire critical nuclear technology whose ultimate designs remain, at best, an open question. This contradiction is likely to heighten tensions among rival Middle Eastern states and fuel a new kind of nuclear arms race. Pakistan’s institutionalised defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia — both the bilateral Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement and the trilateral Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, which brought Turkey into the fold — only widens the avenues for nuclear proliferation rather than narrowing them. Ultimately, a civil nuclear deal between the US and Saudi Arabia, a longstanding regional rival of Iran, is set to further stoke tensions across the region.


About the authors:Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Surya Prakash Noutiyal was a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

About Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
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Wednesday, September 16, 2026

BRICS Summit Takes Aim at U.S. Influence Over the Global Economy



  • BRICS demanded greater developing-country influence at the IMF, World Bank and WTO but avoided directly naming the United States in its criticism.

  • The declaration urged “maximum restraint” in the Middle East and made no mention of Ukraine, illustrating the compromises required to maintain consensus.

  • Kazakhstan used the summit to balance BRICS ties with Washington, while Uzbekistan’s president traveled to South Korea and sent a deputy prime minister to represent the country in New Delhi.

Like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the global grouping of emerging markets and developing countries, is intent on diminishing Western influence over the world economy. And just like the SCO summit earlier in September, the latest conclave of BRICS leaders fell short of presenting a united front against the West, the United States in particular.

Both the SCO and BRICS include China, India, Iran and Russia as permanent members. Among the four, India, the host nation for this edition of the BRICS annual summit, has acted as a brake on efforts to de-dollarize the global economy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are both BRICS partner countries.

BRICS members adopted a 140-point joint statement September 12 that featured calls for major reforms of Western-dominated financial institutions, including the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to give developing countries a greater say in policymaking and practices. 

Some joint statement provisions took oblique swipes at the Trump administration. For example, in comments on the WTO, the statement noted a “proliferation of trade-restrictive actions that are inconsistent with WTO rules, whether in the form of indiscriminate raising of tariffs and non-tariff measures, or protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives.”

But the statement does not mention the United States or Trump by name, and it soft-pedals the group’s stance on the Gulf war currently embroiling the US, Israel and Iran, calling for “maximum restraint” of all sides, instead of adopting a clear position more favorable to Tehran. 

Iran came away with a symbolic victory of sorts, however, underscored by a one-on-one between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed, a meeting designed to counter the image that the United States is succeeding in economically isolating Tehran. 

A statement issued by Abu Dhabi officials was non-committal about future bilateral ties, however. The two “discussed a number of regional and international issues of mutual interest,” while emphasizing a need to promote “de-escalation and strengthen regional stability.”

Beyond the Gulf war, the BRICS statement makes no mention of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a clear win for the Kremlin.

Underscoring a lack of unity within the broader BRICS framework, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev passed over the summit in New Delhi, instead making a state visit to South Korea, where he promoted stronger economic ties with the East Asian Tiger.

South Korea will host a gathering of leaders from all five Central Asian states in Seoul under a C5+1 format on September 16.

Meanwhile, in an expanded session of the BRICS gathering, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev adopted a middle-of-the-road stance that, consistent with the country’s multi-vector foreign policy, sought to balance the interests of China, Russia, the United States and the European Union.

“The erosion of the international security architecture and protracted conflicts are increasing the risk of a new arms race and strategic miscalculations and practical wrongdoings,” Tokayev said. “Therefore, high-level dialogue among nuclear powers is needed to reduce nuclear risks, including those linked to new technologies.”

The comments could be seen as referring to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. But they can also be interpreted as a call for the US and China to de-escalate their deepening rivalry for dominance in the development of artificial intelligence. Central Asia is emerging as a central battleground in the brewing race for AI leadership.

Tokayev went on to characterize BRICS as “an open platform for practical cooperation that complements the UN-centered multilateral system and connects peoples, regions and markets.”

On the sidelines of the BRICS gathering, Tokayev met with Sergio Gor, the US ambassador to India, who is also the Trump administration’s special representative to Central Asian states. Tokayev told Gor that he is looking forward to participating in the G20 meeting to be held in Miami in December. But he also delivered an unusually blunt message, indicating that he expects faster progress on deal-making between the United States and Kazakhstan and the repeal of the Central Asian nation’s Jackson-Vanik trade status.

The Miami gathering will provide “a good opportunity to discuss bilateral issues,” a Kazakh readout of the conversation quoted Tokayev as saying. “We prefer concrete actions and practical steps to advance our mutual cooperation, rather than just words.”

By Eurasianet