It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Many years ago, I was persuaded to teach a political science course to students at the Moscow Aviation Institute.1 Needless to say, future aviation engineers and aircraft designers did not particularly need it, and my expectations during seminars were fairly modest. Still, when we reached the topic “Lenin as a Political Thinker,” the result left me stunned.
The student assigned to give the presentation first pleaded unpreparedness, but when I insisted that the task was not actually that difficult, and certainly easier than dealing with Aristotle or Max Weber, he began:
Lenin lived in the nineteenth century.
At that point I became slightly uneasy.
And he fought against Tsarism.
A pause followed.
And eventually he overthrew Tsarism, although at the time he was abroad. So he had to govern Russia from overseas at first. Then he returned to Russia in an armoured railway carriage, became friends with Stalin, and died.2
That’s all?
That’s all.
I went to the administration office and submitted my resignation.
Yet as time passes, I find myself understanding that student better and better. Ignorance certainly deserves no excuse, but it does require an explanation.
Once quotations from Lenin ceased to be hammered into students’ heads in Soviet courses on Marxism-Leninism, a lamentable vacuum emerged in many minds, filled largely with informational noise. Even the revival of academic interest in Marxism, influenced in part by Western university programs, has not improved matters all that much.
Unfortunately, Lenin did not leave us a body of conventional academic texts that can easily be placed on reading lists. Instead, we encounter a multitude of ideas and conclusions scattered across an enormous number of articles, speeches and short books sometimes more akin to pamphlets.
Hardly anyone is going to read the complete Collected Works from cover to cover. The problem is not simply that we view many things differently today. After all, one can appreciate Aristotle’s political thought without sharing his views on slavery and understand Thomas Hobbes’ significance without accepting his arguments on the benefits of authoritarian rule.
Lenin’s political thought first requires reconstruction, and only afterward evaluation in light of contemporary realities and experience accumulated during the 20th century.
Some people, it is said, no matter what they think about, eventually come around to money. Some men think about women every fifteen minutes. Lenin, whatever he happened to be writing about, ultimately thought about revolution.
The strategy and tactics of revolutionary transformation was central in his thought: the role of power, how to seize and retain it, what a revolutionary party should be, how a revolutionary situation emerges and develops, how it differs from the normal life of society, and how it can be used.
What matters is that Lenin posed these questions for himself in a genuinely theoretical way, not merely a pragmatic one. Before doing anything, one must understand the essence of the problem by generalising it.
Revolution is not simply the sum of political actions. It is movement along a path, not always clearly visible in advance, that requires investigation and generalisation carried out alongside action and shaped by it. This is not academic theory. It is an instrument of practice, one that is not always successful.
Such an approach makes Lenin a difficult author for academia. It is useless to study his texts without context, but that does not mean the texts themselves lack value. Even today we must reflect on the possibilities of political action under conditions of systemic crisis, on Lenin’s famous observation that “the upper classes cannot rule in the old way and the lower classes do not want to live in the old way”; on the dialectic of spontaneous protest and class consciousness.
His book What Is to Be Done? provoked fierce debate and criticism, yet it raised questions that remain with us today. We must think about the tendency of the left toward opportunism and revolutionary sectarianism, discussed in Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, and about the social base of revolution. What, for example, is to be done with the peasantry in a petty-bourgeois country shaken by political storms?
Of course, as events unfolded, the Bolshevik leader constantly reconsidered his positions. His views evolved, a process brilliantly described by Teodor Shanin in Revolution as a Moment of Truth. Lenin was continually rethinking and rewriting his ideas.
This is perhaps what contemporary leftists most need to learn from him. Not memorizing ready-made answers, but engaging seriously with questions that we will inevitably have to answer again, and in new ways.
When Soviet ideologues, beginning with Nikolai Bukharin and Joseph Stalin, attempted to construct a closed and coherent system called Leninism by summarising the ideas of the deceased leader,3 they missed the essence of his theoretical approach: a permanent, non-dogmatic openness in which theory is inseparable from ever-changing practice.
Unfortunately, such an approach is of little use to those seeking to build ideological constructions that justify and sustain themselves, which is precisely what the disciplines of Soviet Marxism-Leninism became.
We no longer memorise quotations from Lenin’s works, although those who studied in the Soviet Union can never quite rid themselves of them. They seem to reside somewhere in our subconscious.
Yet having freed ourselves from compulsive quotation, it might not be a bad idea occasionally to open the blue volumes of the Collected Works and rediscover Lenin.4 Incidentally, that is also the title of a book by Michael Brie, which is highly useful for anyone wishing to understand the subject.
Ultimately, all of the Bolshevik leader’s theoretical explorations lead back to the phrase with which he concludes the unfinished work State and Revolution: “Making a revolution is far more interesting than writing about it.” It is entirely possible that this formulation has not yet lost its relevance.
The reference to Lenin returning to Russia in an "armoured railway carriage" reflects a common confusion of the historical episode known as the "sealed train," in which Lenin travelled from Switzerland through Germany to Petrograd in April 1917.
The reference to Bukharin and Stalin concerns early Soviet attempts to systematize Lenin's ideas into a coherent doctrine known as "Leninism," most famously codified in Stalin's The Foundations of Leninism (1924).
India’s efforts to balance relations with the United States have evolved into a clear tilt toward Washington — yet this shift is still viewed as insufficient by the U.S. At the same time, Washington has begun adjusting its policy toward Pakistan.
US President Donald Trump with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo Credit: POTUS, X
In a move that signals a blunt recalibration of South Asian geopolitics, the United States has quietly shifted its strategic focus. It has reverted its “Indo-Pacific Command” back to its traditional designation of US Pacific Command (USPACOM)..
The structural reversal effectively undoes a 2018 policy that symbolically merged the maritime interests of the US across both the Pacific and Indian oceans. Under the newly restructured USPACOM, the Indian Ocean is being treated largely as a strategic back up plan.
While the policy shift sends a clear signal that Washington views its ties with New Delhi as subsidiary to its broader relationships with China and Pakistan, India remains surprisingly undeterred.
Despite the apparent administrative and symbolic downgrade, New Delhi seems determined to demonstrate its strategic tilt toward the US, preparing to collaborate closely under a command structure that now positions the Indian Ocean as a secondary theater.
With a single strategic sweep, Washington has decisively reprioritized the Pacific. This is a major shift in American geopolitical strategy and not merely a semantic tweak.
The Pacific has re-emerged as the ultimate strategic theater. Its shores are lined with critical global flashpoints and major players, including China — explicitly designated as America’s only “near-peer” competitor — and Russia in the northeast, a vital gateway to the resource-rich Arctic routes of the future.
The region also anchors Washington’s most critical allies, including Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, while containing vital maritime choke points like the Straits of Malacca and the heavily contested passages of the North and South China Seas. Ultimately, this major restructuring serves as a direct response to the rapidly evolving and increasingly tense dynamics of US-China relations.
Under the new “constructive strategic stability” put in place by the President Trump and Xi Jinping Beijing Summit in May 2026 , the two agreed to respect each other’s red lines and ‘manage’ their relationship. For now, the China threat may have receded but it remains a useful tool for the US to retain the co-dependency of their Asian allies who suffer from China phobia.
The US wants partnership with Asian allies for providing security to manage their relationship with China, Japan, South Korea and Philippines.
India has shown ambiguity but is part of the US’s co-dependency thesis.
The US expects far more service from India and has been exacting in its demands, which India has consistently met. Washington ordered India to reduce purchases of discounted Russian oil, India complied, sacrificing its own energy security.
India stopped buying oil from Iran in 2019 under US pressure. It then downplayed the International Strategic Economic Transport Corridor (INSTEC), where Iran’s Chabahar port was to be a key link for India’s sea-rail transport route to Russia via Central Asia. India’s multimillion dollar investments in Chabahar stagnated once the US intervened.
Meanwhile, Washington’s closest Middle East allies proposed the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), linking India to Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Greece — bypassing Iran and ignoring Russia.
India nearly abandoned INSTEC, years in the making, for IMEC, which remains a paper dream. After the Iran-US/Israel war, the UAE suffered economic and logistics setbacks, while Saudi Arabia moved toward rapprochement with Iran. China, welcomed across the Middle East, especially by Iran, is poised to secure reconstruction contracts and a role in a renewed regional security architecture where both China and the US may participate.
President Trump has publicly thanked Russia, China and Pakistan for their respective constructive roles in the Middle East. India had hoped to curry favor with Washington by aligning with the Jewish lobby and becoming indispensable to Israel. It diluted its traditional support for Palestine, supplying weapons to Israel despite the latter violating humanitarian and international law through ethnic cleansing. India, once a staunch defender of international law, compromised its position by arming a state committing humanitarian crimes.
India’s misreading of these shifts, while calling Israel “Fatherland” (for the Jewish people who migrated from India), has not gone unnoticed by the Global South, Arab nations, and others whose goodwill India seeks.
India’s attempt to balance ties with the US has turned into a tilt, still deemed insufficient by Washington. The US has shifted its policy toward Pakistan. This was evident after India’s May 2025 Operation Sindoor, in which Trump claimed to have mediated peace.
Washington views Pakistan as a major ally for its Middle East and Central Asia ambitions. It endorsed the Pakistan-Saudi Defense Partnership, potentially with a nuclear component, and cultivated close ties with Pakistan’s Army and General Asim Munir. India’s long-standing effort to isolate Pakistan as a “terror supporting state” has failed.
For a decade, India’s strategic establishment has claimed four guiding principles: strategic autonomy, multi vector engagements, Global South leadership, and multipolarity. Recent Indian foreign policy misadventures have undercut each.
About the author and editors:
Anuradha Chenoy is Adjunct Professor at Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India
360info provides an independent public information service that helps better explain the world, its challenges, and suggests practical solutions. Their content is sourced entirely from the international university and research community and then edited and curated by professional editors to ensure maximum readability. Editors are responsible for ensuring authors have a current affiliation with a university and are writing in their area of expertise.
The Indian military is on a long and arduous journey to modernise its capabilities and force structure. Under its new direction, the Indian Ministry of Defence, in all three services is pivoting away from traditional methods of human surveillance and toward autonomous systems across all domains.
However autonomous and semi-autonomous platforms are not the only driving factor, as localised production and sourcing under India’s flagship “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” initiative as well as wider insights gained from contemporary international conflicts are also driving the agenda.
While New Delhi frames it as a framework and calculus to establish native supply chains, it isn’t about autarkic backsliding into a pre globalisation paradigm of limited capability. In a pragmatic world of complex value and supply chains, the shift represents a transition from exclusively importing to structured, multi-tiered domestic production. Furthermore, India’s own operational lessons from past conflicts and skirmishes including Operation Sindoor and the hostilities with Pakistan in May 2025 which have been absorbed into the guiding principles.
Largely beginning with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite existing for decades before, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)s signalled a special strategic and tactical importance in modern warfare. Similarly, due to the effective employment of sem-autonomous unmanned naval surface craft by Ukraine against the Russian Navy, this has elevated what was once seen mainly as a surveillance and Search And Rescue (SAR) tool to a strike role against capital warships.
According to a report by DW, the cornerstone of this structural change is going to be a large procurement order to the tune of $2bn. While the amount is noteworthy, the suppliers being exclusively India’s own private defence firms including Adani Group (NSE:ADANIENT), Tata Advanced Systems, and Larsen & Toubro (NSE:LT), the timelines are also reportedly relatively short, spanning around 18 to 24 months.
While India’s state owned defence structure including Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (NSE:HAL) have their own armed UAV designs, and some have even passed trial, none have received large procurement orders with any plans for induction into the inventories and arsenals of any of India’s defence forces as of June 2026.
The three main categories of unmanned vehicles that are likely to be part of the $2bn order are likely to be, High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE), Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP), Electronic Warfare (EW) suite platforms especially in a companion configuration aimed at operating in conjunction with a manned multirole fighter aircraft and its pilot, and loitering munitions especially those intended for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD).
India has also pursued procurement of foreign origin platforms such as Israel’s IAI industries's series of Heron UAVs procured between 2000-2016, and the US General Atomic’s MQ9 between 2020-2026.
The US supplied MQ9 platforms have been a capability boost with their high endurance and combat radius, as well as the ability to be fitted out for modular mission profiles ranging from surveillance over vast swathes of ocean, to strike any surface cruising maritime or land based threats.
These contracts for foreign origin platforms have cost over $10bn in the past 26 years. However, as things shift into a decisively indigenous direction for procurement, India is looking for greater utility for a fraction of the price. This would include leveraging the economies of scale and not having to pay a premium for foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) profit margins, currency exchange rate related costs, as well as much more scalable and available after sales support, as well as overhauls and retirement costs over the system and platform’s life cycle.
However, these expectations and specifications are not easily fulfilled as the consistent pattern of underinvestment in Research and Development (R&D) by both state owned entities and the private sector has been the proverbial achilles heel of India’s defence industrial complex.
Even when a programme which has produced a solid product for a replacement or upgrade of a capability away from a foreign vendor, India’s procurement agencies have repeatedly changed the specifications and demanded constant iterative changes without paying for the now inflated costs owing to these value additions.
This approach of shifting goalposts and in some cases even using defence procurement as a tool to court favour with geopolitical partners such as the US and Russia, has inevitably downgraded capability as a second priority over relationship building.
While this approach has its own merits, the negatives when weighed against the fundamental goal of developing its own defence industrial base, leaves New Delhi few options but to continue dependence on historical suppliers and partners as a strategic necessity.
Nevertheless, the awareness that future military conflicts will involve highly sophisticated, yet fast produced and equally fast depleted stockpiles of cheap, disposable unmanned platforms with an attrition rate in the hundreds of thousands in a given month is resonating with New Delhi and its strategic planners just as soundly as those in any other consequential state with a military.
However, the delicate dance of balancing, ambition, autonomy, and technology and diplomacy with budgetary concerns may be what makes or breaks India’s push for unmanned systems in all domains.
Tuesday, June 23, 2026
Tanker Owners Are Having the Best Week of the Hormuz Crisis
The Strait of Hormuz may be reopening, but don't tell tanker owners the crisis is over.
They're making too much money.
As Middle Eastern producers scramble to move crude that has spent months stranded in the Persian Gulf, tanker rates have exploded higher, turning a slow return to normal into a windfall for shipping companies.
According to Reuters, the cost of hiring a tanker in the Gulf has nearly doubled in just a week, jumping from around $106,000 per day to more than $190,000 per day. For some very large crude carriers (VLCCs) hauling cargoes through Hormuz, daily earnings have surged to nearly $470,000—a level that would have seemed absurd before the war began.
Oil prices have spent much of the past week falling as traders price in the return of Middle Eastern supply, with Brent futures trading at $77 on Tuesday afternoon. Meanwhile, the people actually moving that oil are charging some of the highest rates seen during the entire crisis.
There still aren't enough ships.
Even after Iran lifted its effective blockade last week as part of the 60-day ceasefire agreement with the United States, traffic through Hormuz remains well below normal levels. Before the war began in late February, roughly 125 ships passed through the chokepoint each day. Current traffic remains a fraction of that.
At the same time, roughly 100 tankers are still trapped inside the Gulf carrying cargoes loaded during the conflict.
Now producers want their barrels moving again.
Abu Dhabi's ADNOC has been aggressively marketing crude cargoes, while refiners in major importing nations such as India are seeking additional Middle Eastern supplies after months of disruption. The result is a sudden surge in demand for ships just as vessel availability remains unusually tight.
The futures market has largely moved on from the crisis, but the shipping market clearly hasn't.
Until more vessels begin moving through the world's most important oil chokepoint, tanker owners may remain among the biggest winners of a conflict that cost almost everyone else dearly.
By Julianne Geiger for Oilprice.com
Tankers Emerge from Dark Mode amid Tentative Hormuz Reopening
A growing number of oil tankers have been broadcasting their position and intention to pass through the Strait of Hormuz in recent hours, in a sign that a tentative recovery of traffic through the chokepoint is underway.
Before the U.S. and Iran signed the memorandum of understanding to negotiate a peace deal, most tankers were moving through and around the Strait of Hormuz in the so-called dark mode, with transponders and AIS positioning switched off.
Once the hallmark of Iran’s sanction-evading tactics, dark mode has become mainstream in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and most of all – in the Strait of Hormuz, as tanker owners and shippers sought to protect their cargoes from attacks.
The dark crossings of vessels compounded the already difficult task of market analysts and observers to estimate how much supply was lost in the Middle East and how much could still reach some buyers with stealthy moves out of the region.
Since the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding was signed, more vessels have started to openly broadcast their position, according to conventional visible tracking signals monitored by Bloomberg.
As many as seven tankers were broadcasting they were in the Strait of Hormuz on Tuesday morning local time—two outbound non-Iranian supertankers, three outbound tankers carrying fuels, and two Iran-flagged medium-sized Suezmax tankers inbound moving into the Gulf, according to the data.
While the increase in visibility in tanker positioning suggests a tentative recovery of confidence, shipowners remain wary of abrupt changes to navigability conditions, including conflicting signals from the U.S. and Iran on whether the Strait is open or not, and where mines need to be cleared.
A total of 25 AIS-visible transits through Hormuz were recorded on June 22, including French- and Qatari-linked LNG carriers, maritime intelligence firm Windward said.
But in a sign that shippers are still waiting for full go-ahead, Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) has reportedly failed to charter three tankers to pick up crude and gas from the Persian Gulf and ship the volumes through the Strait of Hormuz, as many shipowners and operators remain very cautious about sending vessels to the area.
By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com
Op-Ed: In the Strait of Hormuz, Free Transit Is No More
While Tehran has pledged to allow free passage for the next 60 days, the long-term future of the strait is under Iranian control
An empty conference room awaits American and Iranian negotiators, June 21 (Courtesy IRNA)
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the leaders of Iran and the United States last week sets the agenda for further negotiations, which, after some delays, have now commenced between the two parties, with Pakistan and Qatar present as intermediaries. The talks are taking place in the Qatari-owned mountainside resort of Bürgenstock in Switzerland.
Political commentators have gone into overdrive, seeking to paint the MoU as a victory or defeat for one side or another. Much remains to be resolved, with plenty of evidence that there is very little meeting of minds on a number of extremely contentious issues. The Iranian delegation is absolutely in no mood for compromise, and is buoyed up by what it sees as its political success so far.
There is a strong likelihood that the talks will break down, and that the negotiations are in effect only an elongation of the pre-existing ceasefire. President Trump clearly wants to walk away from the issue and leave his Vice President to clear up the mess, an impression strengthened by his description of the MoU negotiations in terms of their effect on domestic gasoline prices and inflation rather than on the future of the Middle East. But if President Trump is not engaged in the follow-through, both Israel and the Gulf States most certainly are. Neither is likely to want to allow Iranian hardline positions to prevail, and both have plenty of capacity to sabotage the negotiations in Switzerland if the talks look like threatening their future national security.
While there is a risk of a resumption of fighting, there are already conclusions to be drawn about the outcome of the war — practical realities that leaders and CEOs within the maritime community need to absorb as they shape their business plans.
Free transit through the Strait of Hormuz is no more. Just possibly, a deal will be done in the negotiations whereby fees described as navigation dues will be charged at acceptable levels. Shipowners may not mind, because these are costs that can be passed on; but ministers of business, economy and finance are likely to be very wary of any charges that have the overall effect of increasing prices and reducing the Gulf's competitive advantages.
Much more concerning, though, is the reality that, if current circumstances prevail, Iran will in the future be able to close the Strait again whenever it wants to, on a political whim, as it has demonstrated it can do. It is already trying to ensure that traffic through the Strait uses its own "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" route rather than the internationally recognized Traffic Separation Scheme, so that it may hereafter be able to exert political control over shipping transits. This will force all the GCC states to radically redesign their logistics and communications infrastructure, although some of the alternative routes out of the Gulf carry risks of their own. Also badly affected will be the confidence of foreign direct investors, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, which have no alternative routes out of the Gulf.
The Houthis have not succumbed to pressure from the IRGC to disrupt traffic in the Red Sea, having their eye at present on the hope of a life-saving financial deal with the Saudis to help rescue the economy of northern Yemen. But the recent war has demonstrated that it would be easy to close the Bab el-Mandeb, and the Houthis have shown themselves to be a resilient enemy; hence the risk of closure, not so far realized, is very real, and would probably have consequences on a similar scale to the disruption caused in the Strait of Hormuz.
The question of the IRGC curbing its regional expansionist program is not even on the agenda at Bürgenstock. Moreover, in the discussions surrounding the negotiation of the MoU, the IRGC made it clear that it would press on with this program. This is immediately evident in Lebanon, where the IRGC has not given up on Hezbollah. But it is also evident in Iraq, where the IRGC appears to be reorganizing to avoid coming under pressure from the new Iraqi government – which is itself under regional and American pressure to curb the obviously Iranian-controlled PMF militias. The IRGC's subversive model, bringing disruption to political stability across the Middle East, has been battered by Israel in particular over the last 12 months. But although damaged, it is still intact; the IRGC's intent remains, and with an influx of money released by the lifting of sanctions, it will flourish again and take on new targets.
Another permanent threat to peace and stability is the survival of a critical mass of the IRGC Aerospace Force's drone and missile capability. A comparison of known drone and missile storage and launch sites against the facilities known to have been attacked in 2025-26 suggests that very few of these sites were left untouched; it is not as if the Iranians had successfully kept their sites hidden. But they were built in expectation of attack, well dispersed, with multiple exits. The speed with which some sites have been repaired suggests that recovery plans and resources had been pre-positioned for just such an eventuality. Moreover, if any funds are released to the Iranians by way of sanctions relief, further repair and enhancement of the more than 40 sites spread across the country will be accorded high priority.
To a degree, the survival of the IRGC Aerospace Force's operational capability can be countered by increased spending by GCC states on air defenses; but the brutal fact is that the capability remains intact and is a continuing threat that the IRGC has demonstrated it will have no compunction about using, either directly or through its proxies. It is now understood, moreover, that the Iranians have access to timely and accurate information for targeting both US military and GCC infrastructure, supplied courtesy of the joint Russian/Iranian Khayyam/Kanopus-V satellite constellation. This makes the residual drone and missile threat even more potent.
Finally, the mood of the GCC states must be considered. All, to a greater or lesser degree, attempted to conciliate with Iran before the war. All, even Oman, have been attacked by Iran nonetheless. There is now a stark recognition that Iran is determined to achieve regional dominance, which threatens the future of all the Gulf monarchies. The GCC countries may still smile at the Iranians, but they all know they have an implacable enemy, and will be looking for ways to get the better of Tehran.
In summary, if war does not resume and the negotiations in Bürgenstock continue in the same vein as they have so far, then the Middle East can look forward to greater Iranian dominance, driven by the prevailing IRGC-Paydari hardliners. Logistics in the Gulf will remain difficult and threatened, alleviated only when major capital investment projects to broaden contingency options come to fruition.
Even if these problems can be overcome, the Gulf region will for many years be far less stable than it was when it enjoyed the benefits of Pax Americana — a product seemingly now being withdrawn.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
Strait of Hormuz Traffic is Beginning to Return, But it is Hard to Spot
Iran's Kharg Island loading terminals (public domain file image)
Despite some new conflicting guidance from U.S. and Iranian forces on the safest route through the Strait of Hormuz, commercial shipping is resuming slowly - though it is tough to spot.
"50-60 percent of the traffic is completely dark," said Windward co-founder Ami Daniel, speaking to CNBC. The blackout is more than just transiting with AIS off - these ships are moving without radar, satellite or VHF comms for fear of being targeted. "This is like full-on navy operational mode for ordinary tankers," he added, and it makes it tough to count the number of transits accurately. As might be expected from these extreme precautions, "[shipowner confidence] is absolutely, without a doubt not there yet," he said.
Iran's shadow fleet tonnage continues to operate with a diversity of deceptive practices, including fraudulent flagging; hidden ownership; and coastwise shipments of oil from Iran towards Iraq, where covert STS transfers to disguise the origin of oil have historically been common. Outbound, sanctioned, Iran-linked tankers made up a large share of the day's traffic, Windward said.
Iran has a motive to export quickly: the U.S. Treasury has given Iran a 60-day waiver to sell crude at any price it can, to any willing buyer. China has historically been Iran's top customer for petroleum, but cut its imports by half during the peak of the Hormuz crisis; its return to the market is expected to come soon, and to absorb much of the pent-up surge of Iranian exports.
Iran's tankers tend to use Iranian-controlled northern half of the strait, but foreign-flag vessels have a choice of routing. The FT reports that shipowners are receiving competing instructions from Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority (which manages the northern, Iranian route) and U.S. Central Command (which has its own corridor on the south side, in Omani waters). The so-called PGSA advises using its lane for safety, while CENTCOM and certain Western insurers advise that the Omani lane is better. If followed, that choice could put them in Iran's crosshairs.
"If they follow the guidance of underwriters and U.S. authorities by navigating closer to Oman, they risk interference, detention or potential hostile action from Iranian authorities," said Dr SV Anchan, chair of Safesea Shipping, speaking to the FT.
Alternatively, if owners choose to follow Iranian guidance, they can submit all transit details to the "PGSA" at least 48 hours ahead of the planned crossing, wait for a transit permit valid for a one-way voyage, and have the crew stand by for further instructions on VHF.
U.S. Treasury Suspends Restrictions on Iranian Oil and Tankers for 60 Days
U.S. has suspended the restrictions on Iranian oil exports and tankers (Tasnim - CC BY 4.0)
Indicating that there was positive movement in the negotiations between the United States and Iran, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced on Monday a sweeping 60-day suspension of nearly all restrictions on Iran’s oil industry. It followed Iran’s quick resumption of oil exports after the U.S. last week ended its blockade for ships heading to Iranian ports and on tankers carrying Iranian oil.
Bessent said as part of the framework signed between Iran and the United States, “Treasury has issued a temporary 60-day general license authorizing the production, delivery, and sale of Iranian oil.” It is in effect until 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on August 21.
The General License is extremely broad and represents a total reversal of the Trump administration’s campaign of maximum pressure that has been in effect. It covers the production, sale, delivery, and offloading of crude oil and petrochemical products. It also covers vessels currently listed as blocked by the United States and permits servicing of the vessels.
Included in the terms is authorization of transactions that import Iranian oil and products into the United States. Further, it states that payments can be made in U.S. dollar-denominated funds to Iran, its government, or individuals previously blocked.
Bessent said the moves were “in line with” productive talks in Switzerland. He said Iran has committed to free and open transit in the Strait of Hormuz. It is also reportedly agreeing to again permit International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors into Iran.
The official permission follows a rush by Iran to export oil after the end of the blockade. Analysts at the well-known tracking service TankerTrackers.com reported in the first five days, “Iran has exported nearly 18 million barrels (or $1.44 billion) of crude oil.” Today, it wrote in a social media posting that the exports have risen to 36 million barrels of crude oil. TankerTrackers.com estimates that “roughly an equal amount is still afloat in Iran.”
Critics point out the large amounts of money the United States is quickly releasing for Iran by permitting these transactions. It comes as Donald Trump is writing online that the Iranian economy was “broken” while inflation was at 250 percent.
Despite Iran’s assertion over the weekend that it had again suspended transits of the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. Central Command asserted the southern lane near the coast of Oman is moving. On Saturday, it wrote, “Safe passage through the international waterway remained intact today as 55 merchant ships transited, moving large amounts of cargo and more than 17 million barrels of oil to global markets.” Volume, however, was reported to have slowed on Sunday.
As of June 14, CENTCOM said U.S. forces had redirected 142 commercial ships that complied with its orders and disabled nine vessels that did not comply. U.S. forces are reported to be closely monitoring vessel movements since the end of the blockade.
With U.S.-Iran Deal Signed, Jones Act's Defenders Call for an End to Waiver
Now that the U.S. has signed a ceasefire deal with Iran and tanker flows in the Strait of Hormuz appear to be back on the rise, American domestic shipping interests are renewing their call for the Trump administration to end its broad Jones Act waiver policy for energy cargoes. The 30-plus-90-day waiver is one of the most significant executive orders of its kind since the WWII era.
"With President Trump's signing of the Iran ceasefire agreement, the statutory basis for the Jones Act waiver is concluded. It's time to end the waiver, put Americans back to work, and resume the task of Restoring America's Maritime Dominance. Let's do this, Mr. President!" said the American Waterways Operators' President and CEO, Jennifer Carpenter, in a statement last week.
Since its entry into force on March 18, the administration's Jones Act waiver has been used for about 110 voyages to move about 25 million barrels, equivalent to 1.4 percent of American consumption, according to the American Maritime Partnership. The biggest beneficiaries so far have been motorists and commercial aircraft operators in the state of California, where refinery closures and a dearth of pipeline interconnections make the energy market unusually dependent upon seaborne supplies. Shipments from the Gulf Coast to the Golden State since March total about eight million barrels of gasoline, jet fuel and other products; in May, Reuters estimated that Texas was supplying about six percent of California's fuel and blendstock needs using waivered tankers.
In normal times, California fuel markets are usually topped up with imported products from Asia; the long Texas-to-California route through the Panama Canal rarely happens at scale on Jones Act tonnage, according to the American Petroleum Institute. Shipment volumes from the Gulf to the mid-Atlantic states have also been notable, API says. The waiver activity did not appear to have an appreciable impact on U.S. fuel prices, which rose throughout most of the period in all regions.
While fuel prices may not have come down, there are other foreseeable outcomes. Act's defenders have long warned that without its legal protections, foreign operators would enter U.S. coastwise commerce - with potential implications for U.S. national security. AMP tallied up the waivered voyages and determined that about one quarter were performed by Chinese-owned or Chinese-subsidized ships, including one tanker operated by state-owned giant China COSCO.
"AMP members continue to report canceled contracts and lost business opportunities as foreign vessels take domestic cargoes from Americans," the group said in a statement. In addition, the Federal Reserve has warned that investments in America's maritime industry are being put on hold because of the waiver and the uncertainty it injects into business decisions.
If the waiver were made permanent by an act of Congress, U.S.-built ships would lose the protected legal status that underpins their valuation. Domestic shipowners would be exposed to competition from lower-cost ships manned with lower-cost labor, Jones Act advocates warn, with effects on asset value, revenue, employment, newbuild ordering and fleet size.
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