[By Henry Yep]
Thucydides famously observed that nations go to war for reasons of fear, honor, and interest. In today’s Indo-Pacific, rational interests often dominate strategic analysis.
A US Marine Corps War College war game – distinct from a scenario recently featured in The Interpreter – suggests that fear, national honor, and miscalculation could be more decisive triggers for conflict than calculated interest. Studies likewise caution that it is reckless to assume wars only erupt by deliberate design. The War College simulation – which portrayed a fast-escalating crisis with China – revealed how easily each side’s fears and pride might spiral into an unintended war. It also underscored critical lessons about managing escalation, alliance coordination, and the fragility of national will.
In the simulation, initial moves and counter-moves were driven by mutual fear and the impulse to seize any perceived advantage. Both the United States and China felt compelled to respond forcefully to each other’s military posturing and ambiguous signals. Lacking clear diplomatic off-ramps, each side feared that any restraint would invite aggression. This cycle of insecurity led to rapid escalation – even early talk of nuclear options – illustrating how quickly a US–China clash could cross red lines and see dangerous signals misread.
The lesson is stark: without pre-planned de-escalation channels and credible crisis communication, fear can push rivals into a corner where they see escalation as the only recourse.
US allies in the region also hesitated out of fear of Chinese retaliation. Aside from a few close partners, most limited their roles to logistical support or other low-risk tasks to avoid becoming targets. This disunity sent mixed signals about allied resolve and forced Washington to shoulder an outsized burden – a dynamic that could embolden Beijing to test the coalition’s commitments. If an ally in peril sensed US hesitation, American credibility (honour) would likewise suffer. In short, when partners have inconsistent risk appetites, it creates fertile ground for misjudgment by all sides.
Status and reputation emerged as volatile factors. In the war game, certain Chinese responses were driven less by immediate military advantage and more by their symbolic value. For example, after suffering a high-profile naval loss, China retaliated in dramatic but strategically questionable fashion – a move aimed at avoiding humiliation domestically and internationally. Such symbolic escalations can be dangerously misinterpreted. What one side views as an act of honour or a necessary show of resolve, the other may see as aggressive provocation, prompting an outsized counter-response. Planners must account for the possibility that actors like China will prioritise saving face and showing resolve, even at high cost. Understanding these emotional and domestic drivers is as important as analyzing capabilities; it requires looking beyond cold calculations to the narratives and historical grievances that motivate state behavior.
Perhaps the most sobering lesson is how quickly miscalculation can take over when emotion eclipses strategy. In the war game, critical signals were consistently misread. The US team assumed that certain bold moves including a covert and deadly strike on a Chinese naval asset off South Africa’s coast – more than 10,000 kilometers from Taiwan – would deter Beijing. The China team interpreted those actions, and others, as unambiguous escalation. Caught off guard, China retaliated in ways Washington did not anticipate. Even other seemingly minor US and allied activities at sea or in the air were perceived by the China team as deliberate provocations, with each side assuming the worst of the other’s intentions. At one stage, a fragile ceasefire briefly held, only to unravel when one side attempted to exploit the pause for tactical advantage.
Efforts by outside parties to de-escalate were largely ineffective, as mutual suspicion and the fear of losing face overshadowed diplomatic appeals. This paranoia fuelled a cascade of tit-for-tat moves that neither side initially sought, yet each felt compelled to answer in kind – propelling them deeper into violence.
The simulation also showed how fragile national will can be in a high-intensity war. Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and high casualties from initial clashes had outsized effects on morale. Leaders quickly faced pressure to either escalate further or seek a quick peace to avoid domestic backlash. On the Chinese side, the leadership felt compelled to show strength to maintain legitimacy. Misjudging one’s own or the adversary’s resolve under such stress could lead to fatal errors beyond what any war plan anticipated.
A real-world replay of these war game missteps remains a credible danger unless governments act now. Washington, Beijing, and key regional players should establish clearer crisis hotlines and pre-agreed “off-ramps” to defuse incidents before fear turns into shooting. Likewise, the United States and its allies must better align their strategies and risk thresholds through combined exercises and frank dialogue – presenting a unified front that leaves no room for Beijing to doubt their collective resolve. Red team simulations must also move beyond rehearsing military options. They must stress-test how China’s leadership might react to crises shaped not only by strategic calculations, but by nationalism, historical grievances, and fears of humiliation. Without that discipline, the Indo-Pacific risks stumbling into a conflict that no side truly intends – one driven less by strategy than by misperception, pride, and mounting pressure.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense or the US Government.
Henry Yep is a China specialist with 19 years of experience at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In June 2025, he began serving as a branch chief in DIA’s China Mission Group (CMG), where he leads a team of civilian analysts, military officers, and contractors. Prior to this role, he was a deputy defense intelligence officer for China, responsible for orchestrating DIA support to the Secretary of Defense on China-related initiatives, engaging foreign partners and academia, contributing to wargames, and serving as a key node across the intelligence community.
This article appears courtesy of The Lowy Interpreter and may be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
