IRAN

Commentary

The binding inequality of the protests

The gap between the population’s demands regarding living conditions and the government’s real priorities remains one of the material factors that lies at the core of the protests’ continuity.

Maysoon Majidi•January 16, 2026
IL MANIFESTO

ITALY

The protests that began in Iran last December 28 represent neither a sudden social explosion nor a reaction to economic shock. They are the product of a deep structural crisis that has been going on for years. The current popular mobilization must be understood in continuity with the protests of January 2018, November 2019 and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022. These are mobilizations that have come up each time with different intensity and in different forms, but which were all built on a common ground consisting of an unresolved crisis of legitimacy, structural inequalities and political unresponsiveness.

In the first seven days, strikes and demonstrations spread from Tehran to 50 cities in various provinces. Data from civic and human rights networks indicate that at least 148 citizens have been arrested, including 77 Kurds, five women and six minors. At least seven people have lost their lives. However, the extensive internet blackout in many Iranian cities – part of an already well-established model of crisis management by the authorities – severely limits access to accurate and independent data, reinforcing the possibility that these numbers are actually higher.

The unprecedented collapse of the value of the rial, the increase in inflation, market stagnation and the drastic reduction in purchasing power have brought economic pressure to such a level that even traditionally conservative sectors, including the bazaaris, are no longer able to continue their activities. An exchange rate that reached 140,000 tomans per dollar on the free market in the days preceding the protests was not only an economic indicator but the signal of a profound loss of confidence in the country’s future.

The gap between the population’s demands regarding living conditions and the government’s real priorities remains one of the material factors that lies at the core of the protests’ continuity. According to estimates by international institutes, Iran’s official military spending represents about 3 or 4 percent of Gross Domestic Product and absorbs a significant share of the state budget.

The strike of the Tehran Bazaar holds both symbolic and political importance. It is not a simple corporatist action, but the announcement of the collapse of an unwritten historical pact between the state and a part of the urban middle class: an implicit agreement in which political participation was given up in exchange for a minimum of economic stability. The rapid extension of the strike to other cities showed that the crisis has surpassed the level of mere economic discontent and transformed into a crisis of legitimacy. The government’s response re-enacted the usual repressive logic: increased presence of anti-riot forces and plainclothes agents, mass arrests and lack of information on the places of detention for those arrested. In cities like Lordegan, Kermanshah, Kuhdasht, Nahavand and Azna, reports spoke of the use of tear gas, birdshot ammunition and violent clashes.

Amidst these developments, Donald Trump’s recent declarations on the willingness of the United States to “help” Iranian protesters have brought the theme of external intervention back to the center. Trump stated that if the Islamic Republic were to shoot at demonstrators, the United States would be “ready to act.” At the same time the Mossad, whose activity is by nature based on secrecy, has undertaken an unprecedented campaign of sending public and direct messages addressed to the Iranian population.

On the international level, recent developments have complicated the picture. The capture of Nicolás Maduro, an ally of Iran, following a U.S. military operation has fueled speculations on Trump’s endgame toward Tehran. Trump recently recalled: “if you think about it, there have been other good [displays of American military might], like the attack on Soleimani, the attack on Al Baghdadi, and the obliteration and decimation of the Iran nuclear sites just recently in the operation known as Midnight Hammer.” From the point of view of political sociology, when foreign powers or intelligence services present themselves as “supporters of the protests,” this marks the start of a delicate and risky phase. This support is not a sign of solidarity but often serves to show power and influence. History demonstrates that the consequences of such interference fall above all on those who are already most vulnerable, such as women, oppressed ethnic groups, the popular classes and those from peripheral areas.

Recalling the specter of external intervention, particularly if coming from a figure like Trump, offers the Iranian government the opportunity to cast the protests as a project “guided by the enemy.” This narrative not only intensifies repression but also deepens the fracture between the part of society that is mobilizing and the public opinion that is still uncertain.

Ultimately, the key point is that the protests in Iran are the product of internal tensions and unresolved conflicts, not the result of an external provocation. The attempt to pigeonhole them into the dynamics of geopolitical competition – whether by Washington or by the opposition in exile – carries the risk of emptying them of their true social and class content.

Originally published at https://ilmanifesto.it/la-diseguaglianza-collante-delle-proteste on 2026-01-08