Why Iranian drones are hard to stop
By AFP
March 16, 2026
An Iranian-designed drone seen over the Ukrainian capital in December 2025
- Copyright AFP/File Sergei SUPINSKY
Ali BEKHTAOUI
Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.
– Offline navigation –
Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position — known as an “inertial navigation system”.
“GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target,” Withington told AFP.
“If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there’s a lot of jamming… By not using the GPS, you avoid that.”
The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.
“It’s not always necessarily very accurate, but it’s as accurate as it needs to be,” said Withington.
– Anti-jamming mechanisms –
Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.
The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used “state-of-art antenna interference suppression” to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.
Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.
“They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has… many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has,” Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.
Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.
“The Shaheds have been upgraded,” said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.
– Stealth materials –
The Shahed is built from “lightweight radar-absorbing materials”, such as plastic and fibreglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.
Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defence systems.
– Other positioning systems? –
Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.
Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defence ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.
And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.
Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.
LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.
But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.
– Counter-strategies –
Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.
But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can “spoofing”, which involves hacking into the drone’s navigation system to change its destination.
Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralise 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 — not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.
Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defences are often used in tandem against the drones.
Ali BEKHTAOUI
Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.
– Offline navigation –
Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position — known as an “inertial navigation system”.
“GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target,” Withington told AFP.
“If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there’s a lot of jamming… By not using the GPS, you avoid that.”
The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.
“It’s not always necessarily very accurate, but it’s as accurate as it needs to be,” said Withington.
– Anti-jamming mechanisms –
Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.
The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used “state-of-art antenna interference suppression” to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.
Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.
“They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has… many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has,” Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.
Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.
“The Shaheds have been upgraded,” said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.
– Stealth materials –
The Shahed is built from “lightweight radar-absorbing materials”, such as plastic and fibreglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.
Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defence systems.
– Other positioning systems? –
Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.
Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defence ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.
And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.
Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.
LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.
But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.
– Counter-strategies –
Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.
But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can “spoofing”, which involves hacking into the drone’s navigation system to change its destination.
Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralise 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 — not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.
Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defences are often used in tandem against the drones.
Rise of drone warfare sharpens focus on laser defense
By AFP
March 16, 2026
A laser-based system from Israeli defense group Rafael at a London arms fair in September 2025 - Copyright AFP Adrian DENNIS
Thomas URBAIN
The surge of drone use in conflicts worldwide, seen most vividly in the Ukraine and Middle East wars, will accelerate the race to develop high-power laser systems that could down the devices far more cheaply than traditional defensive weapons.
It is a critical issue for governments threatened by low-cost, easily obtainable drones that can wreak outsize destruction, and are usually shot down only by the most advanced — and expensive — missile technologies.
Currently, so-called directed energy weapons (DEWs) mounted to ships or armored vehicles can fire a concentrated electromagnetic beam at targets up to 20 kilometers (12 miles) away.
“Those systems have made a lot of progress in the last 10 to 15 years,” said Iain Boyd, director of the Center for National Security Initiatives at the University of Colorado.
Russia is using several versions against drones from Ukraine, which is testing its own system, while Israel has deployed the Iron Beam technology from Rafael against drones fired by Lebanon’s Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah.
However, the Israeli Army confirmed to The Jerusalem Post last week that Iron Beam was not being deployed in its current war with Iran, saying it was not ready for regular use.
China presented its LY-1 system last September, Britain and France are developing their own versions, and the United States has started equipping warships in particular, with Helios from Lockheed-Martin or the LWSD from Northrop Grumman.
“We have shown this technology has broad applicability including military operations and for homeland defense,” Northrop told AFP in a statement.
– Pennies per shot? –
US President Donald Trump said recently that “the laser technology that we have now is incredible,” and would soon replace the Patriot interceptor missile for taking out drones.
That would be music to the ears of military planners who are using the pricey Patriot and similar systems, where a single missile can cost millions of dollars, to down drones worth just several thousand dollars.
A top official in Britain’s DragonFire program has estimated its per-fire cost at around 10 pounds ($13).
“The cost of firing one laser or microwave is really the cost of electricity,” an expert in DEW systems design told AFP on condition of anonymity.
After the initial investment is made, “it’s going to be pennies per shot,” the designer said.
At that price, not even Iran’s notorious Shahed drones, estimated to cost as low as $20,000 each, or drone interceptors developed by Ukraine, whose costs start at around $700, can compete.
Other advantages include no launching device, the ability to modulate the beam’s intensity, and unlimited “ammunition.”
Billions of dollars have been invested in the technology, and in 2018 the US Navy ordered two DEW prototypes for around $75 million each.
– Limitations –
But the challenges for making lasers more widespread in the fight against drones are daunting.
“One is just the pointing, the ability to point — you really need to maintain the laser spot on the same area to create an effect,” said Boyd of the University of Colorado.
“If it’s sort of moving all over a drone or something, it’s not going to do anything.”
Laser systems are also less effective in cloudy weather, and can also be a risk for other aircraft in the area.
In February, the FAA aviation authority shut down airspace near El Paso, Texas after the US military mistakenly shot down a government drone with a laser near the Mexican border.
According to The New York Times, the FAA had not approved the use of the laser.
By AFP
March 16, 2026
A laser-based system from Israeli defense group Rafael at a London arms fair in September 2025 - Copyright AFP Adrian DENNIS
Thomas URBAIN
The surge of drone use in conflicts worldwide, seen most vividly in the Ukraine and Middle East wars, will accelerate the race to develop high-power laser systems that could down the devices far more cheaply than traditional defensive weapons.
It is a critical issue for governments threatened by low-cost, easily obtainable drones that can wreak outsize destruction, and are usually shot down only by the most advanced — and expensive — missile technologies.
Currently, so-called directed energy weapons (DEWs) mounted to ships or armored vehicles can fire a concentrated electromagnetic beam at targets up to 20 kilometers (12 miles) away.
“Those systems have made a lot of progress in the last 10 to 15 years,” said Iain Boyd, director of the Center for National Security Initiatives at the University of Colorado.
Russia is using several versions against drones from Ukraine, which is testing its own system, while Israel has deployed the Iron Beam technology from Rafael against drones fired by Lebanon’s Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah.
However, the Israeli Army confirmed to The Jerusalem Post last week that Iron Beam was not being deployed in its current war with Iran, saying it was not ready for regular use.
China presented its LY-1 system last September, Britain and France are developing their own versions, and the United States has started equipping warships in particular, with Helios from Lockheed-Martin or the LWSD from Northrop Grumman.
“We have shown this technology has broad applicability including military operations and for homeland defense,” Northrop told AFP in a statement.
– Pennies per shot? –
US President Donald Trump said recently that “the laser technology that we have now is incredible,” and would soon replace the Patriot interceptor missile for taking out drones.
That would be music to the ears of military planners who are using the pricey Patriot and similar systems, where a single missile can cost millions of dollars, to down drones worth just several thousand dollars.
A top official in Britain’s DragonFire program has estimated its per-fire cost at around 10 pounds ($13).
“The cost of firing one laser or microwave is really the cost of electricity,” an expert in DEW systems design told AFP on condition of anonymity.
After the initial investment is made, “it’s going to be pennies per shot,” the designer said.
At that price, not even Iran’s notorious Shahed drones, estimated to cost as low as $20,000 each, or drone interceptors developed by Ukraine, whose costs start at around $700, can compete.
Other advantages include no launching device, the ability to modulate the beam’s intensity, and unlimited “ammunition.”
Billions of dollars have been invested in the technology, and in 2018 the US Navy ordered two DEW prototypes for around $75 million each.
– Limitations –
But the challenges for making lasers more widespread in the fight against drones are daunting.
“One is just the pointing, the ability to point — you really need to maintain the laser spot on the same area to create an effect,” said Boyd of the University of Colorado.
“If it’s sort of moving all over a drone or something, it’s not going to do anything.”
Laser systems are also less effective in cloudy weather, and can also be a risk for other aircraft in the area.
In February, the FAA aviation authority shut down airspace near El Paso, Texas after the US military mistakenly shot down a government drone with a laser near the Mexican border.
According to The New York Times, the FAA had not approved the use of the laser.
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